

**INDIAN INTELLECTUAL TRADITIONS:
THEIR SELF-PERCEPTION AND INTERACTION**

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Manu and Gautama A Study in Śāstric Intertextuality

Early explorations of the issue of intertextuality in the *Mānava Dharmasāstra* (*Manu*, *M*) centered on the hypothesis first articulated by Max Müller in a letter to one Mr. Morley on July 29, 1849 that the extant *śāstra* was a versified version of a lost *Mānava Dharmasūtra*.¹ This hypothesis was given strong support by George Bühler (1886: xviii f.) in the introduction to his renowned translation of *Manu*, although it has been abandoned by and large in recent scholarship and vigorously refuted by Kane (1962-1975: I, 143-149).² The focus on this issue, however, has obscured the very real textual connection between *Manu* and one of the extant Dharmasūtras, the *Gautama Dharmasūtra* (*Gautama*, *G*). It is this śāstric intertextuality that is the subject of this paper. It studies the textual and thematic dependence of the *Mānava Dharmasāstra* on the *Gautama Dharmasūtra* amounting in several instances to the versification of the *sūtras* of *Gautama*. This analysis also throws some light on the process of composition undertaken by the author of *Manu*.

The textual parallels between *Gautama* and *Manu* are so close and so numerous that it is safe to conclude that the author of *Manu* used *Gautama* as one of his primary sources; the frequency of these parallels makes it unlikely that the authors of both texts were drawing from a common source. What is given below is not an exhaustive list of all the parallels between the two texts.³ These examples, however, permit us to draw some significant conclusions concerning both the sources of and the process entailed in the composition of *Manu*.

Manu 2.6ab ← *Gautama* 1.1-2

vedo 'khilo dharmamūlaṃ smṛtiśīle ca tadvidāṃ | | *vedo dharmamūlaṃ tadvidāṃ ca smṛtiśīle |.*

The root of dharma is the entire Veda, and the tradition and practice of those who know the Veda.⁴

The root of dharma is the Veda, and the tradition and practice of those who know the Veda.

The dependence of *Manu* on *Gautama* here is evident; the addition of (*a*)*khilo* in *pāda*-a and the change in word order in *pāda*-b convert the prose into a *śloka*. What is less clear, however, is whether the *sūtra* of *Gautama* itself is a prose rendering of a verse original. No other dharma text has a formulation quite like this.

¹ This letter is cited in full by Bühler (1879: ix-xi) and referred to in his translation of *Manu* (Bühler 1886: xviii).

² The abandonment of the *Mānava Dharmasūtra* hypothesis does not mean that the extant *Manu* is independent of the vedic *śākhā* tradition. Stephanie Jamison (2000) has recently shown some interesting textual connections between *Manu* and the Maitrāyaṇīya *śākhā* of the *Yajurveda*.

³ For further examples, see *M* 2.14 and *G* 1.4; *M* 2.15 and *G* 1.3; *M* 2.73 and *G* 1.46; *M* 2.101 and *G* 2.8; *M* 4.112 and *G* 16.17; *M* 5.66 and *G* 14.15; *M* 8.112 and *G* 23.29; *M* 9.112 and *G* 28.5; *M* 9.123-24 and *G* 28.14-15. Note the term *pakṣiṇī* that occurs only in *M* 5.81 and 4.97 and in *G* 14.19.

⁴ Although I have translated *smṛti* as “tradition,” it has become abundantly clear to me as I have worked through the Dharmasāstric material that the term is much more ambivalent and complex. For its early semantic history, see Klaus 1992.

The ceremonies involving the teacher and the vedic student at the beginning and end of vedic instruction are recorded only in *Gautama* and *Manu*, and the dependence of *Manu* on *Gautama* is clear.

Manu 2.73 ← *Gautama* 2.46

<p><i>adhyeṣyamānas tu gurum nityakālam atandritaḥ adhīṣva bho iti brūyād virāmo 'stv iti cāramet </i>⁵</p> <p>When he is ready for vedic recitation, he should say to the teacher, “Teach, Sir (<i>bho</i>)!,” without being lazy at any time; and when commanded “Stop!,” he should terminate.</p>	<p><i>pāṇinā savyam upasaṃgrhyānaṅguṣṭham adhihi bho ity āmantrayeta gurum .</i></p> <p>Clasping (the teacher’s) left (hand) – excluding the thumb – with his right, he should address the teacher “Teach, Sir!”</p>
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Gautama is the only *sūtra* that specifies the length of time for the evening *saṃdhyā* and that notes the time when stars become visible. *Yājñavalkya* (1.24-25) has a similar statement, but it is derivative of *Manu*.

Manu 2.101 ← *Gautama* 2.11

<p><i>pūrvām saṃdhyām japaṃs tiṣṭhet sāvitṛm ārka- darśanāt paścimām tu samāsiṇaḥ samyag ṛkṣavibhāvanāt </i></p> <p>At the morning twilight, he should stand reciting softly the Sāvitrī verse until the sun comes into view; but at the evening (twilight), he should remain seated until the Big Dipper becomes clearly visible.</p>	<p><i>tiṣṭhet pūrvām āsītottarām saḥyotiṣyā jyotiṣo darśa- nād vāgyataḥ .</i></p> <p>He should stand at the morning (twilight) from the time the stars are still visible until the sun comes into view, and he should sit at the evening (twilight) from the time the sun is still visible until the stars come into view.</p>
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In their respective lists of persons unfit to attend a *śrāddha*, *Manu* (3.150-166) and *Gautama* (15.16-19) show close similarities. Even though these similarities may result from the wide circulation of such lists, the near identity of some expressions makes it likely that *Manu*, although its list is much longer than that of *Gautama*, is dependent on the latter, especially because such an extensive list is lacking in any other Dharmasūtra. The beginnings of the two lists are nearly identical:

Manu 3.150ab ← *Gautama* 15.16

<p><i>ye stenāḥ patitāḥ klībā ye ca nāstikavṛttayaḥ ...</i></p> <p>Those who are thieves, outcastes, and impotent men, and those who follow the livelihood of infidels ...</p>	<p><i>na bhojayet stenaklībapatitanāstikatadvṛtti-</i></p> <p>He should not feed a thief, an impotent man, an outcaste, an infidel, a man who follows the livelihood of infidels ...</p>
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⁵ The original reading of this verse, as also its exact meaning, are unclear. *Gautama* helps us to determine the original reading. Most mss. read *adhyeṣyamānaṃ tu gurum*, making the teacher the subject of *brūyāt*. In my critical edition (Olivelle 2005), however, I have adopted the reading *adhyeṣyamānas tu gurum*, supported by the commentator Nārāyaṇa. Nandana also comments: *brūyād brahmcāri*; thus the subject is not the teacher but the pupil, thereby supporting the adopted reading. Several reasons prompt me to adopt this reading. The parallel in *G* (1.46), furthermore, reads *adhīhi bho ity āmantrayeta gurum*. Here the subject is clearly the pupil and the words are addressed to the teacher. *Gautama*’s reading is supported by *Śāṅkhāyanaḥśrīyasūtra* (4.8.12), which contains the identical words *adhīhi bho*. In the *Taittirīya Upaniṣad* (3.1-6) also these words are put in the mouth of the pupil. The request *adhīhi* (changed to the middle voice *adhīṣva* in *Manu*) is made by the pupil to the teacher in all these sources.

Manu 3.158ab ← *Gautama* 15.18

<i>agāradāhī garadaḥ kuṇḍāśī somavikrayī</i> ...	<i>kuṇḍāśīsomavikrayyagāradāhigarada-</i>
an arsonist, a poisoner, someone who eats from the son of an adulteress, a seller of Soma ...	someone who eats from the son of an adulteress, a seller of Soma, an arsonist, a poisoner ...

In the above list, only the order of the items is changed by *Manu*, possibly due to exigencies of meter. The expression of *Gautama*: *upapatir yasya ca saḥ* (“a wife’s paramour and her husband,” 15.17), moreover, has its parallel in *Manu*: *yasya copapatir gr̥he* (“a man in whose house lives his wife’s paramour,” 3.155). This expression is unique to these two *śāstras*. Likewise, the somewhat ambiguous compound *gaṇābhyantara* (“someone linked to a guild”) of *Manu* 3.154 parallels *gaṇapreṣya* (“someone who is in the service of a guild”) of *Gautama* 15.18, expressions that are again unique to these two *śāstras* and probably refer to a Brahmin who does contractual work (most likely of a ritual nature) for a guild.

One of the most significant parallels occurs in the section on impurity caused by the birth of a child. The vulgate version of *Manu* 5.61-62 contains two verses, and they are supported by most manuscripts of *Manu*:

yathedaṃ śāvam āśaucam sapiṇḍeṣu vidhīyate |
janane ’py evam eva syān nipuṇām śuddhim icchatām || 61 ||
sarveṣāṃ śāvam āśaucam mātāpitros tu sūtakam |
sūtakam mātur eva syād upaspr̥śya pitā śuciḥ || 62 ||.

As this period of death-impurity is prescribed for those who belong to the same ancestry, so the same holds true at a birth for those who desire perfect purity. Death-impurity affects all, but birth-impurity affects only the mother and the father. The mother alone is subject to the period of birth-impurity; the father becomes pure by bathing.

In the critical edition of *Manu* that I have just completed, the *pādas* given in bold are retained and the rest is omitted, resulting in a single verse:

janane ’py evam eva syān mātāpitros tu sūtakam |
sūtakam mātur eva syād upaspr̥śya pitā śuciḥ ||.

The same holds true at a birth, but the birth-impurity affects only the mother and the father. The mother alone is subject to the period of birth-impurity; the father becomes pure by bathing.

I believe that the first half-verse of 61 was introduced by a later editor into the text of *Manu*. The reason for its introduction was probably the intervention of verse 60, which defines *sapiṇḍa*, between verses 59 and 61, thus breaking the natural continuity between the latter two. The significant *pādas* a-b of verse 59 define the period of impurity at the death of a relative: *daśāhaṃ śāvam āśaucam sapiṇḍeṣu vidhīyate* – “a ten-day period of death-impurity is prescribed for those who belong to the same ancestry.” If this verse came immediately before, then *evam* in the phrase *janane ’py evam* of verse 61 becomes clear; the period of impurity after a birth is the *same* as that after a death. The intervention of verse 60 prompted a later editor to insert *pādas* a-b of verse 61, making the connection between 61 and 59 explicit. A similar commentarial intrusion occurs in the parallel passage of the *Vasiṣṭha Dharmasūtra* (4.16-22) between *sūtra* 16 (which is identical to *Manu* 5.59 *pādas* a-b) and *sūtra* 20 (which is identical to *Manu* 61 *pādas* c-d). But in *Vasiṣṭha*, because the commentarial portion is in prose, the connection between the verses 16 and 20 remains transparent.

However, both *Manu* and *Vasiṣṭha* are dependent, I think, on *Gautama* 14.14-16. This section of *Gautama* on impurity begins with the determination of the time of impurity following a death (4.1-12). The section begins: *śāvam āśaucam daśarātram anṛtvigdikṣitabrahma-*

cāriṇām sapinḍānām – “there is a ten-night period of death-impurity for those belonging to the same ancestry, except an officiating priest, one consecrated for a sacrifice, and a vedic student” – a provision that parallels *Manu* 5.59 and *Vasiṣṭha* 4.16. This section in *Gautama* concludes (4.13) with a brief definition of *sapinḍa*. Then *Gautama* (14.14-16) deals with impurity resulting from the birth of a child, two causes of impurity generally treated together in the *śāstras*:

<i>janane 'py evam </i>	The same holds true at a birth.
<i>mātāpitros tat </i>	It affects the father and the mother.
<i>mātur vā .</i>	Or just the mother.

It is evident that *Gautama* is giving here three opinions regarding impurity resulting from childbirth. The first treats it exactly the same as impurity resulting from a death. The second restricts it to the parents of the newborn child. The third restricts it even further to only the mother. That these were opposing views is made clear in the parallel version of *Vasiṣṭha* (4.20-22), which adds reasons for the three opinions (given below in Roman type and italics, respectively):

janane 'py evam eva syān nipuṇām śuddhim icchatām |
mātāpitror vā bijanimittatvāt |
mātur ity eke – [after which a verse is cited in support of this view].

The same holds true at a birth *for those who desire perfect purity*.
 Or it affects the father and the mother, *because [the birth] is caused by the seed*.
 Or just the mother, according to some.

The same three opinions are found in *Manu* 5.61-62, but they are difficult to discern because of the expansion of an original single verse into two. When we look at the single verse of the critical edition, we see the same three opinions clearly stated:

janane 'py evam eva syān
mātāpitros tu sūtakam |
sūtakam mātur eva syād upaspr̥śya pitā śuciḥ ||.

The textual dependence of both *Manu* and *Vasiṣṭha* on *Gautama* becomes clear when we strip the former of their commentarial accretions. The expansion of the first opinion into a full half-*śloka* with the addition of the reason *nipuṇām śuddhim icchatām* occurs both in *Manu* and in *Vasiṣṭha*. Given the textual problems inherent in *Vasiṣṭha* (see Olivelle 2000: 631-632), it is possible that the extant version may have been influenced by the revised version of *Manu*, which contains this expansion. It is also possible that the expansion took place independently and was absorbed into both *Manu* and *Vasiṣṭha*.

There is a similar proximity between *Manu* and *Gautama* in the rule of purification after a person has touched an impure substance while holding something in his hand. Both *Baudhāyana* 1.8.27-29 and *Vasiṣṭha* 3.43 have similar provisions;⁶ but their formulations are not similar to that of *Manu* and they instruct the person to place the article he is carrying on the

⁶ The provision of the *Baudhāyana Dharmasūtra* is long and complex and could not have been the source of *Manu*, whereas the wording of the *Vasiṣṭha Dharmasūtra* is very different from that of *Manu*: *taija-saṃ ced ādāyocchiṣṭi syāt tad udasyācamyādāsyann adbhiḥ prokṣet | atha ced annenocchiṣṭi syāt tad udasyācamyādāsyann adbhiḥ prokṣet | atha ced adbhir ucchiṣṭi syāt tad udasyācamyādāsyann adbhiḥ prokṣet | Baudhāyana 1.8.27-29; pracarann abhyavahāreṣūcchiṣṭam yadi saṃspr̥śet | bhūmau nidhāya tad dravyam ācamya pracaret punaḥ || (Vasiṣṭha 3.43).*

ground, purify himself, and pick the article up again. The provision of *Manu* is quite the opposite; the person should purify himself without placing the article on the ground.

Manu 5.143 ← *Gautama* 1.28

<i>ucchiṣṭena tu saṃspr̥ṣṭo dravyahastah kathamcāna anidhāyaiva tad dravyam ācāntah śucitām iyāt .</i>	<i>dravyahasta ucchiṣṭo 'nidhāyācāmet .</i>
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But a man who, while carrying something in his hand, is touched by a sullied person/thing, becomes pure by sipping some water *without* laying that thing down.

Someone who becomes sullied while holding something in his hand should sip water *without* [after] laying it down.

I have deliberately left no space between *ucchiṣṭo* and *nidhāyācāmet* in the text of *G*. The complication created by Sanskrit *sandhi* makes the reading ambiguous: we can read the text as either *ucchiṣṭo 'nidhāya* (where the negative “a” is elided and in manuscripts often left unmarked without an *avagraha*) or *ucchiṣṭo nidhāya* (without the negative). Thus the latter term may be read as *nidhāya* or *anidhāya*. The commentator Maskarin reads it as a positive statement and interprets it to mean that one should place what is in the hand on the ground and then sip water, in accordance with the provisions of *Baudhāyana* and *Vasiṣṭha*. Likewise, Medhātithi, commenting on *Manu* 5.143, reads it without the negative, and takes this *sūtra* to be in conflict with the provision of *Manu*. Haradatta, on the other hand, reads it with the negative, but says that one should place any food on the ground but not other articles, such as clothes. Whatever the interpretation, it is clear that the *śloka* of *Manu* is an expansion of the brief *sūtra* of *G*. It is also quite likely that the author of *Manu* read the text of *Gautama* with an *avagraha* and understood it to recommend that the article carried in the hand be not placed on the ground before purification.

The provisions of *Manu* and *Gautama* regarding the fate of lost property also show remarkable similarities that cannot be accidental:

Manu 8.30 ← *Gautama* 10.36-37

<i>praṇaṣṭasvāmikaṃ rikthaṃ rājā tryabdam nidhāpa- yet arvāk tryabdād dharet svāmi pareṇa nrpatir haret .</i>	<i>praṇaṣṭam asvāmikaṃ adhigamya rājñe prabrū- yuh vikhyāpya saṃvatsaram rājñā rakṣyam ūrdhvam adhigantuś caturthaṃ rājñah śeṣah .</i>
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A property whose owner is lost should be kept in deposit by the king for three years. Before the lapse of three years, the owner can claim it; after that the king may take it.

If someone finds lost property without an owner, he should disclose it to the king. The king should have it publicized and keep it safely for a year, after which time a quarter goes to the finder and the rest to the king.

There is some textual confusion here between *praṇaṣṭasvāmikaṃ* of *Manu* and *praṇaṣṭam asvāmikaṃ* of *Gautama*. At least one manuscript of *Manu* reads *praṇaṣṭāsvāmikaṃ* (“lost and without an owner”), which would agree with the provision of *Gautama*. Lakṣmīdhara’s (*Kṛtyakalpataru* 12, p. 554) citation of *Gautama*, on the other hand, has the reading *praṇaṣṭasvāmikaṃ*, agreeing with the reading of *Manu*. The dependence of *Manu* on *Gautama*, however, is unmistakable.

Another provision relates to the establishment of legal ownership as a result of the continuous use of a property. Both texts have very similar rules regarding the right of a person to claim ownership by his unobstructed use of a property for a given period of time:

Manu 8.147-148 ← *Gautama* 12.37

<p>yat kimcid daśavarṣāṇi saṃnidhau prekṣate dhanī bhujyamānaṃ parais tūṣṇīm na sa tal labdhum arhati </p> <p>ajadaś ced apogaṇḍo viṣaye cāsya bhujyate bhagnaṃ tad vyavahāreṇa bhoktā tad dravyam arhati .</p>	<p>ajadāpogaṇḍadhanaṃ daśavarṣabhuktaṃ paraiḥ saṃnidhau bhoktuḥ .</p>
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When an owner looks on as something is being enjoyed by others in his presence for ten years, he is not entitled to recover it. If something is enjoyed within his own locality and he is neither mentally incapacitated nor a minor, he loses any legal right to it; the user is entitled to that property.

When others make use of the property of a person who is neither mentally incapacitated nor a minor in his presence for ten years, it belongs to the user.

Here we have the expansion of a single brief *sūtra* of *Gautama* into two *ślokas* by *Manu*; but the identity of the provision and the terminology makes the dependence of *Manu* on *Gautama* unmistakable.

Several rules of *Manu* relating to interest charged on loans parallel those of *Gautama*. The basic rules regarding the rate of interest, the length of time during which interest accrues, and the classification of loans are similar in both and show clear dependence of *Manu* on *Gautama*:⁷

Manu 8.153 ← *Gautama* 12.30, 34-35

<p>nātisāmvatsarīm vṛddhiṃ na cādṛṣṭām punar haret cakravṛddhiḥ kālavṛddhiḥ kārītā kāyikā ca yā .</p> <p>He must not charge interest beyond one year or what is unauthorized. Cyclical interest, periodic interest, contractual interest, and manual labor [are the kinds of interest].</p>	<p>nātisāmvatsarīm ity eke cakrakālavṛddhiḥ kāri- tākāyikāsikhādhibhogās ca .</p> <p>According to some, [interest does not accrue] beyond one year. Cyclical interest, periodic interest, contractual interest, manual labor, daily interest, and use of the collateral [are the kinds of interest].</p>
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The laconic nature of *Manu*'s *śloka* has misled the commentators, who take the verse as a syntactic unit with the negative *na* governing also the second half of the verse. According to this interpretation, the four types of interest given in the second half are also prohibited. All the translators follow this interpretation, e.g. Bühler: "Let him not take interest beyond the year, nor such as is unapproved, nor compound interest, periodical interest, stipulated interest, and corporal interest." When we look at the source of this *śloka* in *Gautama*, we can see clearly that the second half verse merely enumerates the kinds of permitted loans carrying different rates of interest.

Another rule relates to a loan taken after a pledge has been given to the creditor. Both *Manu* and *Gautama* forbid any interest on such a loan if the creditor makes use of the pledge:

Manu 8.143 ← *Gautama* 12.32

<p>na tv evādhau sopakāre kausīdīm vṛddhim āpnu- yāt .</p> <p>If a pledge together with its use has been furnished, however, he shall not receive any interest</p>	<p>bhuktādhir na vardhate .</p> <p>No interest accrues [on a loan] whose pledge has been used.</p>
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⁷ See also the parallel rules regarding interest not exceeding five times the loan on certain items in *M* 8.151 and *G* 12.36.

I give below further parallel passages that show clear dependence of *Manu* on *Gautama*. These require little comment.

Manu 4.50 ← *Gautama* 9.41-43

<i>mūtroccārasamutsargaṃ divā kuryād udayānmukhaḥ dakṣiṇābhimukho rātrau samdhyayoś ca yathā divā .</i>	<i>ubhe mūtrapuriṣe divā kuryād udayānmukhaḥ samdhyayoś ca rātrau tu dakṣiṇānmukhaḥ .</i> ⁸
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During the day, he should void urine and excrement facing the north, at night facing the south, and at the two twilights in the same way as during the day.	He should void both urine and excrement facing the north during the day and at the two twilights, but facing the south at night.
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Manu 4.34cd ← *Gautama* 9.3

<i>na jīrṇamalavadvāsā bhavec ca vibhave sati .</i>	<i>sati vibhave na jīrṇamalavadvāsāḥ syāt .</i>
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He should not wear old or dirty clothes, if he has the means.	If he has the means, he should not wear old or dirty clothes.
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Manu 4.57d ← *Gautama* 9.54

<i>yajñam gacchen na cāvṛtaḥ .</i>	<i>na yajñam avṛto gacchet .</i>
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He should not go to a sacrifice uninvited.	He should not go uninvited to a sacrifice.
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Manu 4.63c ← *Gautama* 9.56

<i>notsaṅge bhakṣayed bhakṣān .</i>	<i>na bhakṣān utsaṅge bhakṣayet .</i>
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He should not eat food placed on his lap.	Food placed on his lap, he should not eat.
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Manu 5.81a ← *Gautama* 14.22

<i>śrotriye tūpasampanne .</i>	<i>śrotriye copasampanne .</i>
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But at [the death of] a vedic scholar living near by [the impurity lasts for three days].	And at [the death of] a vedic scholar living near by [the impurity lasts for one day].
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Here *Manu* follows *Gautama* verbatim, but the rule is different; *Manu* has a three-day period of impurity, whereas *Gautama* requires only a single day. The author of *Manu* does not follow *Gautama* slavishly; he shows independent thinking here as in other areas, such as meat eating and the rules on *niyoga*.

Manu 8.337-338 ← *Gautama* 12.15-17

<i>aṣṭāpādyam tu śūdrasya steye bhavati kilbiṣam ṣoḍaśaiva vaiśyasya dvātriṃśat kṣatriyasya tu brāhmaṇasya catuṣṣaṣṭiḥ pūrṇam vāpi śatam bhavet dviguṇā vā catuṣṣaṣṭis taddoṣaguṇavid dhi saḥ .</i>	<i>aṣṭāpādyam steyakilbiṣam śūdrasya dviguṇottarā- nītareṣāṃ prativarṇam viduṣo 'tikrame daṇḍabhū- yastvam .</i>
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With respect to theft, the liability for a Śūdra is eight times; for a Vaiśya, 16 times; for a Kṣatriya, 32 times; and for a Brahmin 64 times, or fully 100	With respect to theft, the liability for a Śūdra is eight times. It is progressively doubled for those belonging to each of the prior classes. The punish-
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⁸ The text of *G* here is probably based on a verse original. *Vasiṣṭha* 6.10 is probably also based on the text of *G*.

times, or twice 64 times, for he knows what is good and bad.

ment is more severe when a learned man commits the crime.

Here the author of *Manu* has expanded on the brief *sūtras* of *Gautama*, not only specifying the fines for each *varṇa* but also explicitly indicating that it is the Brahmin who deserves to be punished more severely because he is expected to know what is good and bad and not just any learned man.

A similar expansion is found in the following parallel dealing with the time and manner of partitioning the paternal estate. *Manu* also adds the provision that both the father and the mother must be deceased for partition to take place, stating explicitly that the sons are incompetent when either the father or the mother is alive.

Manu 9.104-105, 111 ← *Gautama* 28.1-3

*ūrdhvaṃ pituś ca mātus ca sametya bhrātarah
samam |
bhajeraṃ paitṛkaṃ riktham anīsās te hi jīvatoḥ ||
jyeṣṭha eva tu grhṇīyāt pitryaṃ dhanam aśeṣataḥ |
śeṣās tam upajīveyur yathaiva pitaraṃ tathā ||
pṛthag vardhate dharmas tasmād dharmyā pṛthak-
kriyā |.*

After the father and mother have passed on, the brothers should gather together and partition the paternal estate evenly; for they are incompetent while those two are alive. The eldest alone, on the contrary, ought to take the entire paternal estate, and the others should live as his dependents just as they did under their father.

Living separately increases *dharmā*; therefore, the act of separation is dharmic.

*ūrdhvaṃ pituḥ putrā riktham bhajeraṃ | nivṛtte
rajasi mātur jīvati vecchati | sarvaṃ vā pūrva-
jasyetarān bibhryāt pitrvat |*

vibhāge tu dharmavṛddhiḥ |.

After their father has passed on, the sons should partition the estate; or, if the father so wishes, even during his lifetime but after their mother has reached menopause. Alternatively, the entire estate goes to the eldest, and he should maintain the others just as the father.

When the estate is partitioned, however, *dharmā* increases.

Manu 11.122 ← *Gautama* 25.1-2

*marutaḥ puruhūtaṃ ca guruṃ pāvakaṃ eva ca |
caturō vratino 'bhyeti brāhmaṇ tejo 'vakīrṇinaḥ ||.*

When a votary breaks his vow of chastity, the vedic energy within him enters these four: Maruts, Indra, Teacher, and Fire.

*tad āhuḥ katidhāvakīrṇī praviśatīti | marutaḥ
prāṇenendraṃ balena bṛhaspatiṃ brahmavar-
casenāgnim evetareṇa sarveneti |.*

So, they ask: “Into how many does someone who has broken his vow of chastity enter?” – “Into the Maruts with his breath; into Indra with his strength; into Bṛhaspati with the splendor of his vedic learning; and into just the Fire with everything else.”

Manu 11.134cd ← *Gautama* 22.23

palālabhāraḥ saṅḍhe saisakaṃ caiva māśakam |.

For (killing) a eunuch, a load of straw and a Māśa of lead.

saṅḍhe palālabhāraḥ sisamāśas ca |.

For (killing) a eunuch, a load of straw and a Māśa of lead.

There is, furthermore, a structural parallel between *Manu* and *Gautama* at the beginning of their sections on penance. In both, the authors state that they have completed their discourse

on the *dharma* of *varṇas* (*Manu* 10.131; *Gautama* 19.1), before they embark on the discourse on penance. The clear distinction between the sections on the *varṇāśramadharmā* and on penance is a feature common to both and a structural innovation continued in later Dharmaśāstras.

In the section on penance, moreover, both use the technical term *anirdeśya* to describe a sin for which there is no penance (*Manu* 11.147; *Gautama* 21.7), a term that is unique to these two *śāstras* and does not occur anywhere else. Indeed, *Gautama* ascribes the rule *trīṇi prathamāny anirdeśyāni* to *Manu*, hinting at a tantalizing possibility of a connection between *Gautama* and the *dharma* tradition of the Mānavas.

What insights can we draw from these parallels with reference to the textual history and composition of the *Mānava Dharmaśāstra*? First, for reasons that have been fully spelled out in the introduction to my critical edition, I believe that *Manu* was composed by a single author, although some accretions appear to have occurred after its initial composition.⁹ Once we put an author and authorial agency behind the text, as opposed to conceiving the creation of the text as a gradual and almost unconscious accumulation parallel to the formation of an iceberg, then we can ask significant and pertinent questions about authorial intent and his use of sources.¹⁰ It is evident that the author of *Manu* conceived of his *śāstra* as a charter applicable to all and transcending the narrow boundaries of vedic *śākhās*. That *Manu* is not limited to any *śākhā* is clearly articulated by Kumāṛila (on *Pūrvamīmāṃsāsūtra* 1.3.15). The author of *Manu* also introduced a significant and drastic innovation: unlike the Dharmasūtras – which were located within the give and take of an expert tradition, offer glimpses into the divergent views within that tradition, and do not pretend to be anything other than humanly authored works – the *Mānava Dharmaśāstra* is presented as a treatise composed and handed down by none other than the creator god Vivasvat. He taught it to his son Manu, who transmitted it to his disciples, including Bhṛgu, who is made the spokesman and promulgator within the treatise. All this raises interesting questions about the social and political circumstances and motivations behind the composition of *Manu*, questions that are beyond the compass of this paper.

I have argued elsewhere (Olivelle 2000: 8) that, contrary to the opinion of Kane and others, *Gautama* is not the oldest Dharmasūtra:

The fact that *Gautama* is composed entirely in prose *sūtras* that are frequently very brief, thus conforming to the aphoristic ideal, has been considered by some as arguing for its antiquity. I would argue that, on the contrary, the omission of all cited verses, a practice common in all other Dharma texts, argues for the author's deliberate attempt to produce an ideal *sūtra* work

along the lines of Pāṇini's grammar. That the prose of *Gautama* is probably dependent on verse originals is also indicated by many *sūtras* that scan as *pādas* from *ślokas*, especially when some inserted words are removed (e.g., 1.38, 40; 4.2, 8; 8.1; 9.41; 14.22; 22.27). Unattached as it was to a larger Kalpasūtra, *Gautama* may have been conceived as a true *śāstra* in the manner of Pāṇini's grammar, a *śāstra* that was not confined to a particular *śākhā*. If this is true, then we can see how *Manu*, another such *śāstra* with a universal application, may have drawn on the text of his predecessor.

⁹ I have pointed out above one such accretion at *Manu* 5.61-62.

¹⁰ We see an attempt to put authorial intent back into even the large epic, *Mahābhārata*, in several recent studies by Alf Hiltebeitel (in Hiltebeitel 2001), and James Fitzgerald in several forthcoming articles (cited by Hiltebeitel) as well as the translation of the Rājadharmakāṇḍa in the *Mahābhārata*, Vol. 12.

There is also evidence that *Gautama* had risen to prominence as the first and perhaps the paradigmatic Dharmasāstra. Kumārila, writing in the seventh century, takes *Gautama* as the first and foremost of the Dharmasūtras, using the expression *gautamasūtrādi* and again listing *Gautama* first in the list *gautama-vasiṣṭha-śaṅkhalikhita-hārīta-āpastamba-baudhāyanādi*. As Kane (1962-1975: I, 25) observes:

The Gautama Dharmasūtra appears to have been held in high esteem by Kumārila, as in his Tantravārtika he quotes or clearly refers to Gautama Dh. S. at least a dozen times, but quotes Āp. Dh. S. and Baudhāyana Dh. S. only a few times.

The fame of *Gautama* in the seventh century is also confirmed by a Buddhist source. Dharmakīrti in his *Nyāyabindu* also places *Gautama* as the first among the writers of Dharmasāstras: *gautamādayo dharmasāstrāṇāṃ praṇetārah* (“The composers of Dharmasāstras, beginning with *Gautama*”).¹¹ It is difficult to assess when *Gautama* rose to prominence as the premier Dharmasūtra, and even more difficult to know whether it had reached that prominence during the time when the *Mānava Dharmasāstra* was composed, at least four or five centuries before Dharmakīrti and Kumārila.

Given the numerous parallels between *Manu* and *Gautama* that I have discussed above, however, and the evidence several centuries later about the prominence of *Gautama*, I want to present the hypothesis that *Gautama* had assumed prominence as the chief Dharmasūtra by the time *Manu* was composed. If this is true, then we can understand how *Gautama* exerted the kind of influence on the author of *Manu* that we see reflected in the text. Even though *Manu* purports to be a divine revelation, we must assume that the author operated within the expert tradition of *dharma* in a way similar to his predecessors. This becomes evident in many instances when the author somehow forgets the divine angle and resorts to common pandit discourse of citing opinions and arguing against opponents.¹²

The author of *Manu* was influenced by two expert traditions. We have looked at the *dharma* tradition represented principally by *Gautama*. He was also influenced by the *artha* tradition especially in the long chapters 7-9 on Rājadharmā. The dependence of *Manu* on the extant *Arthasāstra* is also evident when we analyse the two texts (see Olivelle 2004).

The *Mānava Dharmasāstra*, however, is not simply a patchwork of material borrowed from different sources. The author integrated what he borrowed into an overall scheme that is very much his own. His intent was clearly to produce a *śāstra* that would be superior in structure, style, and content to all that preceded him. In this he was clearly successful, a success evidenced by the extraordinary reception the text has received in the *dharma* tradition spanning nearly two millennia.

¹¹ *Nyāyabindu* p. 99.

¹² There are, of course, the numerous verses that ascribe a rule to *Manu*, even though the entire text is ascribed to *Manu* (e.g., 8.139, 279; 9.239; 10.63, 78). Now, it is certainly true that such ascriptions to the reputed author are found in other *śāstras* as well, including the *Arthasāstra*. But these texts, unlike *Manu*, do not pretend to be anything other than humanly authored compositions. The author of *Manu* also falls into the habit of using the pandit idiom of *iti cet* occasionally: 9.122; 10.82. Reference is also made to the views of others: 9.31, 158.

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George Cardona

On the Position of *Vyākaraṇa* and Pāṇini*

The elevated status of grammar (*vyākaraṇa*) in Indian thought – especially, but not exclusively, in connection with knowledge of the Veda – is generally accepted and was emphasized in early works. While taking up the five major reasons for studying grammar,¹ Patañjali notes that there is a traditional injunction that a Brāhmaṇa has to study and know the Veda with its six ancillaries (*ṣaḍaṅgo vedah*) and says that the principal ancillary among the six is grammar.² Harking back to Patañjali, moreover, Bhartṛhari later characterizes grammar as the gateway to Mokṣa (*dvāram apavargasya*), the first rung on the ladder to Mokṣa, the direct kingshighway for those who seek Mokṣa.³ In the same context, Bhartṛhari speaks of grammar as the curative for the stains that affect speech – that is, incorrect speech forms that are causes of demerit and which one who knows grammar does not use – just as Āyurveda is the curative for physical faults.⁴ In addition, Bhartṛhari here says of grammar that it is the purifier of all areas of knowledge (*pavitram sarvavidyānām*) and that it appears, shines forth in each of them (*adhividyam prakāśate*).⁵ In his *Vṛtti*, he explains the first of these statements noting that grammar is the cause of the “perfection” (*saṃskāra* “adorning, perfecting”) of speech and remarks that the content (*artha* “meaning”) in all Vidyās is supported by speech (*śabdopagrhitā*).⁶ That is, what is conveyed in an accepted field of knowledge is conveyed in correctly formed speech that harmonizes with the grammatical description of the language according to constituent bases and affixes.⁷ Bhartṛhari goes on to note that it is because of this that grammar appears in each science; for anyone who conveys such knowledge regularly follows grammar in his science and necessarily fears the use of incorrect speech therein.⁸

* The place of the Veda in the history of Indian thinking was a subject of enduring interest to Wilhelm Halbfass, as can be seen readily from the first four chapters of Halbfass 1991. In this light, I offer in his memory a brief essay on the status of an important Vedāṅga. I am grateful to David Pingree for his comments on a draft of this paper.

¹ See recently Cardona 1997: 544-545.

² *Bh.* I p. 1,18-20: *āgamaḥ khalv api: brāhmaṇena niṣkāraṇo dharmah ṣaḍaṅgo vedo 'dhyeyo jñeya iti | pradhānam ca ṣaṭsv aṅgeṣu vyākaraṇam*. In the introduction to his commentary on Yāska's *Nirukta*, on the other hand, Durga not unexpectedly grants *Nirukta* first status among the six Vedāṅgas, since it deals primarily with meaning, to which expression (*śabda* “speech form”) is subsidiary, and the chief intent one has in the study any *śāstra* is to learn what is conveyed therein: *NirVṛ.* p. 27,5-7: *pradhānam cedam itarebhyo 'ṅgebhyaḥ sarvasāstrebyaś cārthaparijñānābhiniveśāt | artho hi pradhānam tadguṇaḥ śabdaḥ*.

³ *VP* 1.14a: *tad dvāram apavargasya*, 1.16:

*idam ādyaṃ padasthānam siddhisopānāparvaṇām |
iyaṃ sāmokṣamānānām ajihmā rājapaddhatih ||*

Ṛṣabhadeva (*VPPad.* p. 49,26-27: *siddhiḥ mokṣaḥ*) glosses *siddhi* with *mokṣa*, and in his introductory section to his commentary on the *Kāśikā*, Haradatta (*PM* I p. 14,21) cites *VP* 1.16 with the reading *muktisopānāparvaṇām* in the second Pāda.

⁴ *VP* 1.14b: *vāṅmalānām cikitsitam*, *VPVṛ.* 1.14 (p. 48,3-4): *āyurveda iva sārīrānām doṣānām | vyākaraṇajño hi pratyavāyāhetubhūtān apabhraṃsān na prayuṅkte*.

⁵ *VP* 1.14cd: *pavitram sarvavidyānām adhvīdyam prakāśate*.

⁶ *VPVṛ.* p. 48,6-7: *pavitram sarvavidyānām | tannimitatvāt saṃskārasya | śabdopagrhitō hi vidyāsv arthaḥ*.

⁷ On *saṃskāra*, see Cardona 1997: 557-564.

⁸ *VPVṛ.* p. 49,4-5: *ataś ca adhvīdyam prakāśate | sarvo hi prāyeṇa svasyām vidyāyām vyākaraṇam anugacchaty apabhraṃśaprayogeṇa ca niyatam apatrapate*. Just before this, Bhartṛhari cites two verses, one of

It is understandable that grammar be considered to have such a status with respect to all fields of knowledge in ancient India, given that treatises in these fields were traditionally composed in Sanskrit. This was to be kept separate from vernaculars, so that authors were supposed to be aware of how Sanskrit differed from the vernaculars by being amenable to description in terms of grammatical procedures known from Pāṇini's grammar, whose work had achieved the status of representing the Vedāṅga Vyākaraṇa. It is equally understandable that logical examination (*ānvīkṣikī*)⁹ also should be viewed as having the status of a science comparable to a lamp with respect to all traditional sciences (*pradīpaḥ sarvavidyānām*)¹⁰ in that it serves to examine the ways of acquiring knowledge on the basis of which matters are accepted or rejected within each science, so that these depend on *Ānvīkṣikī*.¹¹

On the other hand, such a universal claim is not usually made for *Mīmāṃsā*, traditionally included among the fourteen sciences which are basic in that they are means of acquiring knowledge which serves to achieve the goals men seek.¹² Although the exegetical principles

which (*VPVr.* p. 48,8-9: *yad adhūtam avijñātam nigadenaiva śabdyate | anagnāv iva śuṣkaidho na taj jvalati karhi cit ||*) is a variant (with *adhūtam* instead of *grhūtam*) of a verse from Yāska (*Nir.* 1.18), cited in the same form by Patañjali (*Bh.* 1 p. 2,15-16). Commenting on the phrase *anagnāv iva śuṣkaidhaḥ* ("like dry firewood where there is no fire") from the latter in his *Mahābhāṣyadīpikā* Bhartṛhari (*Dīpikā* a: p. 11,2-3, b: p. 9,22-23: *yathā jvalanasamartham api sat kāṣṭham agninānupagrūtam na jvalanasamartham niṣprajojanam evam adhūtam api śāstraṃ vyākaraṇenānupagrūtam asamartham phalanisṣpattim prati*) explains that, as a piece of wood is not capable of burning – purposeless – if it is not supported by fire, though of itself it is capable of burning, in the very same manner, a Śāstra that is not supported by grammar is not capable of bringing its result to fruition, although it is acquired as traditional learning.

⁹ It is not necessary for the present discussion to consider details concerning just what *Ānvīkṣikī* was originally (for a recent discussion in a general philosophical context, see Halbfass 1988: 263-286 along with the posthumously published Italian version, Halbfass 2002). Suffice it to accept, along with commentators and lexicographers, that *ānvīkṣikī* is equivalent to *nyāyavidyā* (e.g., *NBh.* 1.1.1 [p. 3,13], *NV* 1.1.1 [p. 20,4]) or *tarkavidyā* (e.g., *AK* 1.5.5ab: *ānvīkṣikī daṇḍanītis tarkavidyārthasāstrayoh*), and that the term is traditionally derived from *anvīkṣā* "examining," with the *taddhita* affix *ika* (← *thañ*) – in the sense of "reason, purpose" (*prayojanam*: *Aṣṭādhyāyī* 5.1.109: *prayojanam*) – and the feminine suffix *ī* (*ñip*: *Aṣṭādhyāyī* 4.1.15: *tiḍdhāṇādvayasajdaghnajmātractayapṭhakṭhañkañkvarapaḥ*), designating that field of knowledge (*vidyā*) whose purpose is the examination of what is known and knowable by direct perception or through verbal communication (*Kṣīrasvāmin* on *AK* 1.5.5ab: *pratyakṣāgamābhyām ikṣitasya paścād ikṣaṇam anvīkṣā | sā prayojanam yasyāḥ sāvīkṣikī tarkavidyā*).

¹⁰ *NBh.* 1.1.1 (p. 5,18-20): *seyam ānvīkṣikī pramāṇādibhir vibhajyamānā pradīpaḥ sarvavidyānām upāyaḥ sarvakarmaṇām | āśrayaḥ sarvadharmāṇām vidyoddeṣe prakīrtitā ||*

As is well known, the enumeration of sciences (*vidyoddeśa*) to which Pakṣilasvāmin refers is the second *adhyāya* of the first *adhikaraṇa* in Kauṭalya's *Arthaśāstra*, which ends with a comparable verse:

pradīpaḥ sarvavidyānām upāyaḥ sarvakarmaṇām | āśrayaḥ sarvadharmāṇām śāśvad ānvīkṣikī matā || (*AŚ* 1.2.12).

The verse also speaks of *Ānvīkṣikī* being the means of approaching all activities (*upāyaḥ sarvakarmaṇām*) and the support of all meritorious acts (*āśrayaḥ sarvadharmāṇām*).

¹¹ *NVTṬ* 1.1.1 (p. 57,18-19): *yady apītarā vidyāḥ pramāṇīkam evārtham abhiniviśante tathāpy etadvidyāpratīpādyam eva pramāṇādy upajīvyā sve sve vyutpādye 'rthatattve pravarttante na tu pramāṇādy api vyutpādayanti.*

¹² *YSm.* 1.3:

purāṇatarkamīmāṃsādharmaśāstrāṅgamiśritāḥ | vedāḥ sthānāni vidyānām dharmasya ca caturdaśa ||

Jayanta cites this (*NM* p. 8,5-6) right after explaining how the fourteen śāstras earlier enumerated have the property of being bases of knowing (*vidyāsthānatva*): *NM* p. 7,16-8,4: *vidyāsthānatvaṃ nāma caturdaśānām śāstrāṇām puruṣārthasādhanajñānopāyatvam evocyate | vedanaṃ vidyā | tac ca na ghaṭādivedanam api tu puruṣārthasādhanavedanam | vidyāyāḥ sthānam āśraya upāya ity arthāḥ ... yathoktam*

Mīmāṃsā explains and uses do indeed have general application¹³ and Mīmāṃsā does concern itself with means of acquiring knowledge as well as with showing that Vedic utterances have the property of being such valid means of knowledge, it nevertheless concerns itself more importantly with the exegesis of Vedic utterances – Mantras and Brāhmaṇas – in connection with ritual. Now, Nyāya too is conceived of as essential to the Vedas in that one of its purposes is to maintain the Vedas' status as means of acquiring knowledge not obtainable through direct experience or inference.¹⁴ Moreover, Jayanta downplays the role Mīmāṃsā plays with respect to Pramāṇas, asserting that this is only a secondary role, since the main purpose of Mīmāṃsā is the discussion and explanation of what utterances mean, so that Nyāya is not rendered redundant thereby.¹⁵ Of course, this exegetical role is indeed the main topic with which the great majority of Jaimini's *Mīmāṃsāsūtras* are concerned, and in this respect Mīmāṃsā as the *vākyaśāstra* is traditionally contrasted with grammar, which is characterized as a *śabdaśāstra*, Pāṇini's work being the major *śabdānuśāsana*. Further, as is well known, among the compelling reasons which Patañjali enumerates for why this grammar should be studied is preserving the Vedas (*rakṣārthaṃ vedānām*) from distortion.¹⁶

Thus, grammar, Nyāya and Mīmāṃsā all three are said to play roles in the preservation of the Vedas and their authoritative status, the first as a Vedāṅga, the last two as Upāṅgas.¹⁷

It is a widespread phenomenon that commentators justify their work in part by saying that the comparable work of predecessors is deficient, and commentators on Vyākaraṇa, Mīmāṃsā and Nyāya works are no different in this regard. Thus, at the end of the introductory verses to his *Ślokavārttika*, Kumārila says that he has exerted the effort to produce this work in order to put Mīmāṃsā on the *āstika* path, since earlier this had been in great part reduced to a *lokāyata* system.¹⁸ Kumārila's predecessors wrought their damage by establishing views that

¹³ E.g., *ŚVNR* 1.15 (p. 6,11-12): *mīmāṃsā tu sarvavākyaगतान्यायानिरुपात्तमिकā | tenāsyāṃ yo nyāya-mārgas tasmīn ajñāte durjñāte vā vivekābhāvān na kiñcij jñāyeta*. Earlier, alluding to the view noted in *PGS* 2.6.5 (*vidhir vidheyas tarkas ca vedah*), where the referent of *veda* is said to include not only Brāhmaṇa and Mantra but also Tarka, which Kumārila understands to be *mīmāṃsā*, Kumārila remarks that *mīmāṃsā* encompasses all reasonings concerning the Veda: *TV* 1.3.6.13 (p. 168,23-24): *yathaiva vidhir vidheyas tarkas ca veda ity etasmin darśane sati samastavaidikatarkopasamhārātmikā mīmāṃsāpi vedasābdavācyā ...*

¹⁴ *NM* p. 7,7-8: *nyāyavistaras tu mūlastambabhūtaḥ sarvavidyānām vedaprāmānyarakṣāhetutvāt*. Jayanta again refers to this purpose of Nyāya later, both in making it useful to the attainment of the *puruṣārthas* (*NM* p. 22,3-4: *... vedaprāmāṇyasiddhyarthaṃ cedaṃ śāstram iti tāvanmātram eva vyutpadyatām ...*, p. 23,2-3: *nyāyaś ca vedaprāmāṇyapratishāpanapūrvakatvena puruṣārthopayogitvam upayātīti darśitam*) and in arguing against the inclusion of non-Vedic systems because they do not serve such a purpose (*NM* 8,15-9,1: *... kiyad eva tattarkaṇa vedaprāmāṇyaṃ rakṣyata iti nāsāv iha gaṇanārhaḥ | bauddhās tu yady apy anumānamārgāvagāhananaiḥpunyoddharām kandhāram udvahanti tathāpi vedaviruddhatvāt tattarkasya kathaṃ vedādividyāsthāpanamādhye pāṭhaḥ*).

¹⁵ *NM* p. 10,2-4: *nanu vedaprāmāṇyanirṇayaprayojanāś cen nyāyavistarāḥ kṛtam anena mīmāṃsāta eva tatsiddheḥ | tatra hy arthavicāravat prāmāṇyavicāro 'pi kṛta eva | satyam | sa tv ānuṣaṅgikaḥ | tatra mukhyas tv arthavicāra eva*.

¹⁶ See recently Cardona 1998: 544-545.

¹⁷ *PBh* 1: *śikṣā kalpo vyākaraṇam niruktaṃ chando jyotiṣam iti vedāṅgāni ṣaṭ | purāṇanyāyamīmāṃsā dharmasāstrāṇi ceti catvāry upāṅgāni*. In his commentary on *Rām*. 1.1.14, Govindarāja (*RāmG* I, p. 25,16-18) notes that Nyāya and Mīmāṃsā have to do with all Vedas in general:

*dharmasāstram purāṇam ca mīmāṃsānvikṣikī tathā |
catvāry etāny upāṅgāni śāstrajñāḥ sampracakṣate ||*

tatra ... nyāyamīmāṃse sarvavedasādhāraṇyau.

¹⁸ *ŚV* 1.10:

prāyeṇa hi mīmāṃsā loke lokāyatiktṛtā |

were contrary to what traditional Mīmāṃsakas would maintain (*apasiddhānta*, see note 18). In a comparable vein, Jayantabhaṭṭa not only asserts the primacy of Nyāya because its purpose is to maintain the integrity of the Vedas' authoritative status (see note 14) but immediately thereafter goes on to say why this protection of the Vedas is necessary, inveighing against predecessors who constructed false reasonings (*kutarka* “bad reasoning”): the Vedas had their authoritative status reduced to a semblance of this through the false reasoning of Tārkikas, so that noble persons who would otherwise perform the acts conveyed therein might not have respect for such performance – which required great expense and effort to be carried out – because they had lost faith in the Vedas reduced to such a state. Nor with the authoritative Veda (*svāmin* “master”) thus weakened, can one see what is to be done by one who follows it and adheres to the basic sources of knowledge, Mīmāṃsā and so on. Therefore, Jayanta goes on, this Śāstra called *nyāyavistara* taught by Akṣapāda is the foremost base of knowledge, since it is the basis for establishing Śāstras in that it is capable of imparting logical reasoning that restores a firm faith in the authoritativeness of the Vedas by destroying all such followers of false reasoning.¹⁹

Deprecation of such false reasoning also appears in the context of Vyākaraṇa. Moreover, Jayanta's wording – in particular *tārkikaracitakutarkaviplāvitaprāmāṇyeṣu* – recalls a famous verse from the end of the *Vākyakāṇḍa* of the *Vākyapadīya*, where Bhartṛhari speaks of Patañjali's *Mahābhāṣya* as a work of a Ṛṣi that was reduced to a semblance of such a work (*ārṣe viplāvite granthe*) by Vaijī, Saubhava and Haryakṣa, who followed “dry reasoning” (*śuṣkatarkānusāribhiḥ*).²⁰ Such Śuṣkatarka amounts to inferential reasoning used by persons without regard to textual tradition, in particular the tradition of the Veda. Bhartṛhari brings this out clearly in several Kārikās of the *Brahmakāṇḍa*.

The section in question begins with a statement concerning doctrinal traditions such as Sāṅkhya. No one understands the text of such a tradition to lack a human author.²¹ The utterances of the Veda, on the other hand, are not human products. Further, all human traditions

tām āstikapathe kartum ayaṃ yatno mayā kṛtaḥ ||.

The principal earlier commentator identified in this connection is Bhartṛmitra, who accepted as final views such positions as that there is no ultimate desirable result associated with ritual acts that should be performed obligatorily or undesirable result from performing prohibited acts: *ŚVT* 1.10 (p. 3,18-19): *namu vedārthagrahaṇāvismaraṇārtham api tattadbhartṛmitrādiviracitatattvaśuddhyādi prakaraṇam asty eveti gatārtham idaṃ vākyam ity ata āha prāveṇeti*, *ŚVNR* 1.10 (p. 5,9-11): *mīmāṃsā hi bhartṛmitrādibhir alokāyataiva satī lokāyatīkṛtā nityaniśiddhāyor iṣṭāniṣṭaṃ phalaṃ nāstītyādi bahvapāsiddhāntaparigraheṇeti tām āstikapathe kartum vārttikārambhayatnaḥ kṛto mayeti*.

¹⁹ *NM* p. 7,8-14: *vedeṣu hi (dus)tārkikaracitakutarkaviplāvitaprāmāṇyeṣu śīthilāsthāḥ katham iva bahu-vittavyayāyāsādisādhyam vedārthānuṣṭhānam ādriyeran sādavaḥ kiṃ vā svāmini parimlāne tadanuyāyinā mīmāṃsādividyāsthānaparijanena kṛtyam iti | tasmād aśeṣaduṣṭatārkikopamardanadvārakadṛḍhataravedaprāmāṇyapratyayādhāyinyāyopadeśakṣamam akṣapādopadiṣṭam idaṃ nyāyavistarākhyam śāstram śāstrapratiṣṭhānanibandhanam iti dhuryaṃ vidyāsthānam*. Edition (b) has *dustārkikaracita-* and *dhuryaṃ vidyāsthānam*; the others (a p. 3, c p. 8) have *tārkikaracita-* and *paraṃ vidyāsthānam*. These points are not crucial to the present discussion. Nor does it make a crucial difference to our discussion whether *drḍhatarā* “very firm” qualifies *vedaprāmāṇya* or *pratyaya*, though I consider the latter more felicitous in the general context.

²⁰ *VP* 2.484:

*vaijisaubhavaharyakṣibhiḥ śuṣkatarkānusāribhiḥ |
ārṣe viplāvite granthe saṅgrahapratikañcuke ||.*

Puṇyarāja (ad *VP* c 2.479 [p. 190,2]) glosses *viplāvita* as *ābhāsīkṛta*, which interpretation I follow.

²¹ *VP* 1.148ab: *na jātv akartṛkaṃ kaścid āgamam pratipadyate*. *VPVr.* 1.148/124 (p. 203,7): *sarvapravādeṣv āgamavākyānām pranetṛparigraheṇa pauruṣeyatvam abhyupagamyate*.

perish, and when they do, what remains fixed as a seedlike source to reestablish them through texts of new authors is the utterances of the tripartite Veda.²² Moreover, it is accepted that the doctrines propounded by human authors disappear just as their authors perish; yet, in the interval between the time that the texts propounding the doctrines of tradition with human authors and the time when later authors arise to propound such tradition anew, the world of exemplary persons does not transgress the correct behaviour provided for in Śruti works as well as in Smṛti works.²³ In addition, there must be a source from which the authors of new treatises draw their knowledge. If the knowledge were simply natural to them, then one could argue that such knowledge could be natural to others also, so that the texts propounding that certain acts are beneficial and others, which have ill results, are not and therefore forbidden, would serve no purpose. Nor can one argue that the source of this knowledge in those who possess it is some special quality inherent in them without instruction, while other, common, persons require instruction to gain the same knowledge. For such a quality itself must have a definite source, and the other sources of the knowledge in question – the prior expositions of the doctrines – perish. Consequently the source of this special knowledge is considered to be the tradition of the Veda.²⁴

Now, there were, according to various traditions, early sages who were capable of perceiving Dharma and the meaning of Vedic utterances directly, without assistance, and later people, who required teaching.²⁵ For such students, who lacked the capacity to perceive the meanings of Vedic utterances simply from hearing the texts,²⁶ Tarka that does not conflict with tradi-

²² *VP* 1.148cd: *bijaṃ sarvāgamāpāye trayy eva vyavasthitā. VPVr.* 1.148/124 (p. 203,8-9): *vedavākyaṇi tu caitanyavad apauruṣeyāni | tāny āgamāntarāṇāṃ praṇetr̥ṣu vicchinneṣv āgamāntarānusandhāne bijavad anuṣiṣṭhante (VPVr. d 1.132 [p. 230,5]: ... bijavad avatiṣṭhante).*

²³ *VP* 1.149:

*astam yāteṣu vādeṣu karṭṛṣv anyeṣv asatsv api |
śrutismṛtyuditaṃ dharmam loko na vyativartate ||.*

VPVr. 1.149/125 (p. 204,3-5): *iha praṇetr̥vad āgamānām api pravādeṣu vicchedo 'bhyupagamyate | teṣu pratyastamiteṣu yāvad anye praṇetāro notpadyanta āgamāntarāṇi ca na pratāyante tatrāntarāle śrutivihitāni karmāṇi smṛtinibandhanāṃś ca bhakṣyābhakṣyādīn niyamān nātikrāmanti śiṣṭāḥ. VP* (b) 1.125 has *karma* instead of *dharmam* in *pāda* c. This could be supported by the *Vṛtti*'s use of *karmāṇi* in speaking of the ritual acts enjoined in Vedic texts as opposed to restrictions concerning such things as what one may or may not eat and which women one may approach or not, which have their textual sources in Smṛtis. This textual issue, however, is not important for the present discussion.

²⁴ *VP* 1.150:

*jñāne svābhāvike nārthaḥ śāstraiḥ kaścana vidyate |
dharmo jñānasya hetuś cet tasyāmnāyo nibandhanam ||.*

VPVr. 1.150/126 (p. 204,9-205,3): *anupadeśam hi kasyacij jñānam abhyupagacchatām ahitapraṭiṣedhārthānām hitapratipādanārthānām copadeśaśāstrāṇāṃ vaiyarthyaṃ prasajyate | yadi hi dharmaviśeṣāt kasyacid eva puruṣasyopadeśam antareṇa jñānam utpadyate kecit puruṣāḥ śāstreṇa pratipādayitavyās tadā tasya puruṣaviśeṣahetor dharmasya vyavasthitena nibandhanena bhavitavyam | vicchidyante cānyāni nibandhanāni | tasmād āmnāyanibandhanam dharmam āsevamānāḥ pṛthakpravādānām praṇetāras tāṃ tāṃ bahuvikalpām siddhiṃ labhante.*

²⁵ Yāska speaks of such sages (*Nir.* 1.20 [p. 143,4]: *sākṣātḥṛtadharmāṇa ṛṣayo babhūvuḥ | te 'varebhyo 'sākṣātḥṛtadharmabhya upadeśena mantrān samprāduḥ*) as ones who transmitted Mantras through teaching to later persons who did not perceive Dharma directly. In a different context, Patañjali (*Bh.* I p. 11,11-12: *evam hi śrūyate: yarvānastarvāṇo nāmarṣayo babhūvuḥ pratyakṣadharmāṇaḥ parāparajñā viditaveditavyā adhiḡatayā-thātāthyāḥ*) also speaks of certain sages who had direct perception of Dharma. The terms they use are *sākṣātḥṛtadharmāṇa ṛṣayaḥ* and *pratyakṣadharmāṇa ṛṣayaḥ*.

²⁶ *VP* 1.151b: ... *apaśyatām* ("of those who do not see"), *VPPad.* 1.151/127 (p. 205,19): *śrutimātrād asamarthā vedārthān draṣṭum*. I have left the term *tarka* untranslated here for a reason; see below (*VP* 1.153).

tional teaching of the Veda in accepted works (*vedaśāstrāvirodhī ... tarkaḥ*) is the eye that allows them to see these meanings,²⁷ since for these later students the meaning of a Vedic utterance is not definitely established merely from its external form.²⁸ That is, such Tarka serves as a means whereby the distinct meanings of traditional Vedic utterances are determined.²⁹ As prior scholars had contrasted sages with direct insight into Dharma with students who required instruction (see note 25), so does Bhartṛhari here characterize the Tarka in question as one which teachers in sciences of reasoning who preceded him adopted seeing that it served those of inferior insight. Vṛṣabhadeva identifies the teachers and sciences in question as Jaimini and others as well as Mīmāṃsā and such.³⁰ Moreover, even if one considers only the traditional text itself as the sole means of obtaining the knowledge sought, without having to resort to any additional reasoning, this Tarka has a purpose in that it serves to establish the understood meaning more firmly. For, Bhartṛhari then says, there are cases where, despite utterances having identical external forms, their significations (*śaktiḥ* “signification capacity”) differ due to other causes. Under such circumstances, if one who lacks the direct access of earlier sages understands the meaning of an utterance from nothing but its form alone and does not also take into consideration such factors as context and the capacity of an element to signify something other than the immediate primary meaning, he is subject to confusion with respect to what is intended and what is not intended.³¹ Bhartṛhari goes

²⁷ VP 1.151ab: *vedaśāstrāvirodhī ca tarkaś cakṣur apaśyatām*. Vṛṣabhadeva (VPPad. 1.151/127 [p. 205,17-18]: *tīrthāntaraprakalpitatarakaṃ vyudasya vedārthavyavasthāpakasya mīmāṃsāsthāpitasya śruti-liṅgādeḥ prāmāṇyam udbhāvayati*) remarks that Bhartṛhari here excludes *tarka* as conceived by other traditions and brings up the authoritative status of direct expression (*śruti*), capacity to signify indirectly (*liṅga*) and so on, established in Mīmāṃsā as determining meanings of Vedic utterances. See below. *śāstra* of *vedaśāstra* in *vedaśāstrāvirodhī* can refer to what is taught in the Vedas or to the texts by means of which these are taught (cf. Cardona 1997: 572-573). A similar expression *vedaśāstrāvirodhinā tarkeṇa* occurs in a verse from the *Manu-smṛti* (*Manu*) (12.106):

*ārṣaṃ dharmopadeśaṃ ca vedaśāstrāvirodhinā |
yas tarkeṇānusandhatte sa dharmam veda netaraḥ ||.*

Manu also uses the term *vedaśāstrārthatattvajñaḥ* (*Manu* 12.102):

*vedaśāstrārthatattvajño yatra tatrāśrame vasan |
ihaiva loke tiṣṭhan sa brahmabhūtāya kalpate ||,*

which distinguishes between Vedaśāstra and its meaning, so that *vedaśāstra* here signifies the Vedic text (cf. Kullūka: *yas tattvato vedaṃ tadārthaṃ ca karmabrahmātmakaṃ jānāti ...*).

²⁸ VP 1.151cd: *rūpamātrād dhi vākyārthaḥ kevalān nātitiṣṭhati*. Given the context, *atitiṣṭhati* should mean “stands out, is perspicuous.” Rau’s subgroup F has the reading *nāvatiṣṭhate*, with *avatiṣṭhate* “remains, is fixed”; this reading is common to earlier editions and is the one adopted also in Aklujkar’s text, which I have only in electronic form. The same reading is supported also by the *Vṛtti*’s phrase *śabdārthaprabhāgavyavasthā tarkeṇa kriyate* (see next note).

²⁹ VPVr. 1.151/127 (p. 205,6): *āgamavākyānām eva hi śabdārthaprabhāgavyavasthā tarkeṇa kriyate*.

³⁰ VPVr. 1.151/127 (p. 205,6-7): *sa cāyam arvāgdarśanānām anugrahe vartata iti pūrvair nyāyavidyāsv itthambhūtas tarka āśritaḥ*. VPPad. p. 205,23-24: *pūrvair iti jaiminyādibhiḥ | nyāyavidyāsv iti mīmāṃsādiḥ*. Vṛṣabhadeva also explains that by *arvāgdarśanānām* is meant those who are incapable of discriminating a particular meaning although it is conveyed by the utterances in question (VPPad. p. 205,23: *ye pratipāditam apy artham asamarthā vivektum*).

³¹ VPVr. 1.151/127 (p. 206,1-5): *atha tarkānanugamena yaḥ kevalam āgamam pramāṇam karoti tasya kiṃ prayojanam | āgamavākyānām samyakpratipattiḥ prayojanam | vākyānām hi tulyarūpatve 'pi sati nimitāntarāc chaktir bhidyate | tatra yo rūpād eva kevalād vākyārtham pratipadyate prakaraṇasāmarthyādī nāpekṣate sa vivakṣitāvivakṣitayoḥ sammoham āpadyate*. Vṛṣabhadeva (VPPad. p. 206,16-17: *samyag iti suṣṭhutam*) appropriately glosses *samyak* of *samyakpratipattiḥ* “correct understanding” with *suṣṭhutam* “quite right.”

on³² to say that what one understands finally with the help of such Tarka varies in several ways,³³ and specifies three: (1) what is explicitly signified is not intended (*sato 'vivakṣā* “not wishing to express what is there”), (2) a different entity from the one apparently signified is intended (*pārārthyam*), (3) the meaning actually intended is brought out through what is said in a related utterance, which serves as a means of inferring what is intended. Of the eight examples given as illustrations in the *Vṛtti* (*VPVṛ.* 1.152/127 [p. 206,8-12]), it will suffice to consider the following.

(1) (a) *Aṣṭādhyāyī* 1.4.49: *kartur īpsitatamaṃ karma*: although *īpsitatamaṃ* “most wished to be reached” is singular and neuter, the gender and number are not intended, so that the class name *karman* applies not only to one but also two or more entities which an agent may wish to reach, as also to such entities associated with genders other than neuter; similarly, though *kartuḥ* (“agent”) is formally genitive singular, it is not meant to refer only to a single agent. In addition, although the participle *īpsita-* in *īpsitatamaṃ* has tense value,³⁴ that to which the name *karman* is assigned may be something one wished, wishes, or will wish to reach. (b) *Aṣṭādhyāyī* 4.1.92: *tasyāpatyam*: although *apatyam* (“offspring, descendent”) is formally neuter singular, the taddhita affixes introduced by *sūtras* under this heading are introduced to signify also one or more descendants associated with different genders. (c) *grahaṃ sammārṣ-ṭi* “... wipes clean the Soma cup:”³⁵ although *graham* is singular, this number is not intended, so that the wiping applies also to more cups. In such instances the gender, number and times which appear explicitly in the expressions are not intended; determining where these are thus not intended and where they are intended depends on reasoning.³⁶

(2) (a) *Maitrāyaṇīsamhitā* 3.6.9: *nakṣatram drṣṭvā vācam visṛjet* “(The sacrificer) should resume speech upon seeing the constellation.”³⁷ Although this expressly speaks of seeing (*drṣṭvā* “after seeing”) a constellation, the same act is enjoined also for a time when this may not be visible due to cloudy conditions, so that speaking of seeing the constellation is meant to refer to the time at which this may be seen under appropriate conditions. For, the principal act enjoined here is that of freeing one’s voice from the restraint of silence, qualified as taking place at a certain time, namely when one sees the stars, if these are indeed visible. Seeing the stars is thus intended to specify the time of the main act, and this time can be determined

³² *VP* 1.152:

sato 'vivakṣā pārārthyam vyaktir arthasya laiṅgikī |
iti nyāyo bahuvīdhas tarkeṇa pravibhajyate ||.

³³ *nyāya-* used in *VP* 1.152 can be an action or object noun, designating the act of determining, deciding, as well as a conclusion that is determined, decided upon. This is divided (*pravibhajyate*) into several types (*bahuvīdhaḥ* “of many kinds”) through *tarka*. In terms of its grammatical structure, *nyāya-* is derived from *i* (*iṅ*) with the *upasarga ni*, used in a sense of fitness, propriety (*Aṣṭādhyāyī* 3.3.37: *parinyor niṅor dyūtābhreṣayoḥ*). In addition, there is a term *nyāya* signifying a means whereby one reaches such an acceptable final conclusion (*Aṣṭādhyāyī* 3.3.122: *adhyāyanyāyodyāvasamhārās ca* (*karaṇādihikaraṇayoś ca* [117], *pumṣi sañjñāyām ghaḥ* [118]).

³⁴ It is most immediately to be interpreted as having present value in accordance with *Aṣṭādhyāyī* 3.2.188: *matibuddhipūjārthebhyas ca*. This accounts most easily for the use of the agentive genitive *kartuḥ* (*Aṣṭādhyāyī* 2.3.67: *ktasya ca vartamāne*). Vṛṣabhadeva (*VPPad.* 1.152/128 [p. 207,7-11]) considers this alternative first, then goes on to note that *īpsita* could be a past participle.

³⁵ Example discussed in commentaries on *JS* 3.1.7.13.

³⁶ *VPVṛ.* 1.152/128 (p. 207,1-2): ... *iti liṅgasamkhyākālānām avivakṣā kvacic ca vivakṣeti lakṣaṇavyavasthāpanaṃ tarkādhiṅam*.

³⁷ I cite the Vedic text here and below without accentual marking, as cited in the *Vṛtti*.

otherwise also.³⁸ (b) *kākebhyo dadhi rakṣyatām* “Curds should be protected from crows:”³⁹ what one wishes to do is to prevent harm coming to the curds, so that these are protected from dogs and such, even if there are no crows.⁴⁰

(3) (a) *aktāḥ śarkarā upadadhāti* “... puts down smeared pebbles” (b) *tejo vai ghr̥tam* “Truly, ghee is brilliance” (see note 41). Since (a) merely enjoins that the ritual officiant is to put down pebbles that are smeared, there is the possibility of these being smeared with any substance that can serve to smear, such as ghee or oil. (b) is an Arthavāda that contextually goes with (a), and it serves as an indication (*liṅga* “mark”) from which one infers that the substance to be used for smearing the pebbles is ghee.⁴¹

In *VP* 1.151a (note 27), Bhartṛhari used *tarka*. Since the term generally signifies some kind of reasoning, it is understandable that this *tarka* is considered to reside in humans (*puruṣāśrayaḥ*). Nevertheless, Bhartṛhari says that *tarka* that is so viewed as residing in humans is actually a capacity (*śaktiḥ*) of speech units alone (*śabdānām eva*).⁴² The *Vṛtti* explains as follows,⁴³ taking into consideration both speaker and hearer-interpreter. It is the speech unit that signifies. Speakers enter into speech acts with a wish to express something, and if this desire is to be met, it must depend on the use of appropriate speech units, which will properly serve to convey the intended meaning, so that when they do speak, speakers act in accordance with the capacity (*sāmarthyam*) that speech forms have. An interpreter understands a particular meaning from a given utterance by acting in accordance with the specific (*niyatām* “restricted, fixed”) signifying capacity of a speech unit as he determines this to be from context (*prakaraṇa*), a word’s implicational capacity (*liṅga*), collocation with other words in an utterance (*vākya*) and so on.⁴⁴ In doing so, he only follows what is intended by the utterance in question,⁴⁵ so that he follows the capacity of the speech element used. However, since he does indeed interpret, one considers that the *Tarka* in question resides in that person.

³⁸ *VPVr.* 1.152/128 (p. 207,2-5): *tathā ca nakṣatraṃ dr̥ṣtvā vācam visrjed iti kālopalakṣaṇārthaṃ nakṣatradarśanam tat | pradhānasyānyathāsiddhau parārthatvād dr̥ṣyamāneṣu jyotiḥṣu kālaparicchede sati tat kriyate.*

³⁹ This is a well known example of the type of secondary word-meaning relation (*lakṣaṇā*) such that the primary meaning is partly kept and partly given up (*jahadajahallakṣaṇā*).

⁴⁰ *VPVr.* 1.152/128 (p. 207,5-208,1): *kākebhyo dadhi rakṣyatām ity upaghātapratiśedhasya cikīrṣitatvāt kākeṣv asatsv api śvādībhyo rakṣyate.*

⁴¹ *VPVr.* 1.152/128 (p. 208,3-7): *laiṅgikī khalv api vyaktiḥ | aktāḥ śarkarā upadadhātīti sarvāñjana-dravyaprasaṅge tejo vai ghr̥tam iti liṅgād viśeṣapratipattiḥ.* The actual Vedic text in question (*Taittirīyabrāhmaṇa* 3.12.5.12: *yadī hiraṇyāṃ na vīndēt śarkarā aktā upā dadhyāt | satējasam evāgniṃ cīnute* “If ... should not find gold, let him put down smeared pebbles. Ghee is brilliance. He thus heaps up a fire altar that is brilliant.”) provides that, if one cannot obtain gold to make gold bricks, one should put down smeared pebbles.

⁴² *VP* 1.153ab: *śabdānām eva sā śaktis tarko yaḥ puruṣāśrayaḥ.*

⁴³ *VPVr.* 153/129 (p. 209,1-3): *śabda evopadeṣṭā | tatsāmarthyam evānugacchanto vaktāro yogyaśabdanibandhanāyaiva vivakṣayā pravartante | niyatām tu śabdaśaktim arthaprakaraṇaliṅgavākyaḍibhir anugacchati puruṣe śabdāśritam eva sāmarthyam puruṣāśrayo ’yam tarka iti manyante.*

⁴⁴ Bhartṛhari here is surely alluding to the factors which Jaimini gives (*JS* 3.3.7.14: *śrutiliṅgavākya prakaraṇasthānasamākhyanām samavāye pāradaurbalyam arthaviprakarṣāt*) for determining the relation between a major and a subsidiary element in cases where interpretation is required.

⁴⁵ In this context, Vṛṣabhadeva remarks (*VPPad.* 1.153/129 [p. 209,15-16]: ... *prayoktāro viśeṣeṣu pranyūñjate nānapekṣya śabdaśaktim svavivakṣāmātrena*) that users themselves act in conformity with the capacity of words to signify particular meanings, not by dint of their own wish to say something (*vivakṣā*), without taking the capacity of the speech forms into consideration. In connection with this, it is worth recalling the distinction Patañjali makes between two types of *vivakṣā*: one that is particular to the individual speaker (*prāyoktrī vivakṣā*), who may choose to speak in a particular manner, using words that are soft, gentle, smooth – *apa-*

Bhartṛhari next⁴⁶ contrasts such valid Tarka with a type of reasoning (*nyāyaḥ*) that is found in persons who do not take tradition into consideration.⁴⁷ This lacks a source (*anibandhanaḥ*), a domain in which it could apply appropriately, since it is not used with respect to a traditionally accepted textual tradition in which the textual expressions themselves have the capacity spoken of earlier.⁴⁸ The *Vṛtti*⁴⁹ remarks that such reasoning is called *śuṣkas tarkaḥ* (“dry Tarka”) in that it simply follows common properties and differences, without being determined by the Tarka that is the capacity of terms in textual traditions, so that it lacks a proper textual domain, and because it serves to destroy all traditions. The commentary ends with two examples of such dry reasoning, one of which is taken from the *Mahābhāṣya*.⁵⁰ After citing and discussing a verse extolling one who knows the correct formation of speech forms in support of why grammar should be studied, the *Bhāṣya* remarks that if this verse serves as an authoritative means of knowing, then another verse also should serve in this manner. The verse in question is meant to denigrate Vedic practice, in particular the practice of having liquor drunk in the Sautrāmaṇī rite: if a great array of copper colored jugs of liquor does not cause one to reach heaven when drunk, how could the liquor drunk at the rite lead one to heaven? The assumption is that if some X is a cause of a result Y, then a greater amount of X should cause a greater result Y; conversely, if Y does not result from a large amount of X, then it should also not result from a smaller amount of X. Accordingly, one reasons that the liquor drunk at the Sautrāmaṇī cannot serve any purpose, and this is contrary to tradition. Patañjali counters that the verse cited is one recited erroneously by one who is confused and contrary, so that it is not authoritative. On the contrary, the earlier verse is authoritative since it is recited in full control of one’s senses and knowledge of tradition.

Such inferential reasoning is considered perverse in that it is applied with respect to a claim made in a particular context, ritual and the results expected therefrom. For it is traditionally accepted that the Veda is an instrument whereby one gains knowledge of certain means, which cannot be learned through direct perception or inference, of attaining extramundane results.⁵¹ Inferences may also be discounted on the grounds that they are merely clever and

bhramśa terms according to Kaiyaṭa – and another *vivakṣā*, which pertains to the general community of speakers who generally agree on understanding meanings from particular expressions (*Bh.* III p. 342,26-343,3 [on *Aṣṭādhyāyī* 5.1.16]: *vivakṣā ca dvayī | asty eva prāyoktrī vivakṣāsti laukikī | prāyoktrī vivakṣā: prayoktā hi mṛdvyā snigdhayā ślakṣṇayā jihvayā mṛdūn snigdhan ślakṣṇān śabdān prayunkte | laukikī vivakṣā yatra prāyasya sampratyaḥ | prāya iti loko vyapadiśyate*).

⁴⁶ *VP* 1.153cd: *sa śabdānugato nyāyo ’nāgameṣv anibandhanaḥ*.

⁴⁷ *anāgameṣu, VPPad.* 1.153/129 (p. 209,11): *āgamanirapekṣeṣu puruṣeṣu*.

⁴⁸ *VPPad.* 1.153/129 (p. 209,12-13): *anibandhana itī nirviṣayaḥ | śabdāvasthitā śaktis tasya viṣayaḥ*.

⁴⁹ *VPVṛ.* 1.153/129 (p. 209,3-5): *śabdaśaktirūpāparighṛitas tu sādarmyavaidharmyamātrānusārī sarvā-gamopaghātahetuvād anibandhanaḥ śuṣkas tarka ity ucyate*.

⁵⁰ *VPVṛ.* 1.153/129 (p. 209,6-7): *tadyathā:*

*yad udumbaravarṇānām ghaṭinām maṇḍalaṃ mahat |
pītaṃ na gamayet svargaṃ kiṃ tat kratugataṃ nayet ||*

Bh. I p. 3,1-5: *yadi pramāṇam ayam api ślokaḥ pramāṇam bhavitum arhati:*

*yad udumbaravarṇānām ghaṭinām maṇḍalaṃ mahat |
pītaṃ na gamayet svargaṃ kiṃ tat kratugataṃ nayet ||*

pramattagīta eṣa tatrabhavato yas tv apramattagītas tat pramāṇam.

⁵¹ Cf. the verse

*pratyakṣeṇānumityā vā yas tūpāyo na budhyate |
etaṃ [enaṃ] vidanti vedena tasmād vedasya vedatā ||*

which Sāyaṇa quotes in the introductions to his commentaries on the *Taittirīyasaṃhitā* (*SāyBh.* p. 2,22-23), the *Rgveda* (*SāyBh.* p. 45,7-8), and the *Kāṇvasaṃhitā* (*YV* p. 8,23-24).

subject to being overturned by even cleverer persons,⁵² whereas objects with respect to which they are applied are not subject to logical refutation. It is not the case that inferential reasoning is outrightly rejected. On the contrary, it is accepted even that there are instances where an inference is more valid than what one apparently perceives directly.⁵³

According to authoritative authors in these traditions, Vyākaraṇa, Mīmāṃsā and Nyāya all are thus used in support of Vedic traditions, and adherents of these systems condemn the application of modes of reasoning they use in manners that could be detrimental to these traditions. It is well known that Vyākaraṇa and Mīmāṃsā are closely related. As far as grammar is concerned, moreover, although it is indeed a Vedāṅga and is conceived of as a pursuit one of whose aims is to maintain the Veda intact, it is also obviously concerned with everyday usage. Thus, Patañjali begins the *Mahābhāṣya* with a discussion of the term *śabdānuśāsana*, asking what words are dealt with, to which the answer is: those of the Vedas and those of everyday usage.⁵⁴ Patañjali also asserts twice, “We have the word as our authoritative means of knowing: our authority is what the word says” (*śabdapramāṇakā vāyam | yac chabda āha tad asmākaṃ pramāṇam*). In one context (*Bh.* I p. 11,1-2) the “word” in question is Vedic passages, in the other (*Bh.* I p. 366,12-13) it is utterances from everyday usage. Now in Mīmāṃsā there are explicitly stated principles for interpreting Vedic utterances and the relative status of given decision procedures is also made explicit (see note 44). As I have noted earlier, Bhartṛhari takes up the reasoning involved. It is also noteworthy that the examples given in the *Vṛtti* on *VP* 1.152/128 (see above p. 6f. with notes 34-36 and 38-41) to illustrate Tarka that is used to interpret utterances are not only from Vedic texts but also from Pāṇini’s *Aṣṭādhyāyī* and from everyday usage. Similarly, when he gives examples illustrating interpretive principles that are used by Mīmāṃsakas, as enumerated in *VP* 2.77-87, Puṅyarāja illustrates each one with examples from the Vedas, from everyday life, and from Pāṇinian grammar. That is, although both Vyākaraṇa and Mīmāṃsā without any doubt whatever had their first sources and impulses in the Veda, its interpretation and maintenance, they also both observed principles that were not restricted to Vedic.

In Vyākaraṇa too there are decision procedures comparable to those of Mīmāṃsā, and the relative status of these is also explicitly stated in commentatorial literature. The canonical statement by Nāgeśa⁵⁵ is late, but it reflects the manner in which these principles applied for Kātyāyana, Patañjali, and, with one major exception, for Pāṇini.⁵⁶ There can be little doubt,

⁵² Cf. *VP* 1.34:

yatnenānumito ’py arthaḥ kuśalair anumātr̥bhiḥ |
abhiyuktatarair anyair anyathaivopapādyate ||.

This *kārikā* is cited by Puṅyarāja in his commentary on *VP* 2.484/479 (see note 20).

⁵³ A famous example, invoked by Patañjali (*Bh.* III p. 125,17-18 [on *Aṣṭādhyāyī* 3.2.124]: *bhavati vai pratyakṣād apy anumānabaliyastvam | tadyathā alātacakram pratyakṣam dr̥śyate ’numānāc ca gamyate naitad astīti*) is the error whereby one perceives a torch being moved rapidly in a circle as though it were a fire wheel, which is refuted inferentially, since a true wheel is simultaneously in contact with different directions and the torch is not. In the context of arguing that Mīmāṃsā defenses of the authoritative status of the Vedas do not make Nyāya redundant (see above p. 3 with n. 15), Jayanta also remarks that means of getting correct knowledge such as direct perception do not have their authoritative status as such means without being confirmed by agreement with other means (*NM* p. 10,8-10: *na hi pramāṇāntarasamvādādār̥dhyam antareṇa pratyakṣādīny api pramāṇabhāvaṃ bhajante kim uta tadadhīnavṛttir eṣa śabdah*).

⁵⁴ *Bh.* I p. 1,3: *keṣāṃ śabdānām | laukikānām vaidikānām ca.*

⁵⁵ *Pbh.* 38: *pūrvaparanyāntaraṅgāpavādānām uttarottarabaliyastvam.*

⁵⁶ For a general discussion, with examples, of these principles, see Cardona 1997: 401-427.

moreover, that the most important principle governing grammar – namely that an exception (*apavāda*) blocks a related general rule or application (*utsarga*) – was recognized in pre-Pāṇinian times. Thus, the *Ṛgvedaprātisākhya* has a metarule (*paribhāṣā*) which states that one should understand exceptions together with (*miśrān* “combined”) general rules.⁵⁷ This reflects something well known from later Pāṇinian practice, namely considering that a general rule and its exceptions are considered together, forming a single context (*vākyaikavākyatā*).

Pāṇini nowhere formally states in his *Aṣṭādhyāyī* that one should proceed in this manner. But for that matter neither does Pāṇini explicitly state that exceptions block the application of related general rules. This is simply accepted as a known principle. Patañjali brings this point out vividly in the *Mahābhāṣya* on *Aṣṭādhyāyī* 1.1.47: *mid aco 'ntyāt paraḥ*. The discussion concerns the derivation of nominative–accusative plural forms such as *kuṇḍāni* “bowls, temple tanks,” *vanāni* “forests” on the one hand and *payāmsi* “portions of water, milk,” *yaśāmsi* “fames” on the other. The derivation of these forms in the Pāṇinian system involves a stage at which the bases *kuṇḍa-* and so on are followed by the ending *śi* (*i* with the marker *ś*): *kuṇḍa-i*, *vana-i*, *payas-i*, *yaśas-i*. The ending *śi* belongs to the class of items called *sarvanāmasthāna*, and *Aṣṭādhyāyī* 7.1.72: *napuṃsakasya jhalacaḥ* (*num* [58], *aṅgasya* [6.4.1]) provides for introducing *num* which bears the marker *m*, and according to *Aṣṭādhyāyī* 1.1.47, an item so marked immediately follows the last vowel of the element to which it is introduced. As Kātyāyana says explicitly (1.1.47 vt. 1: *mid aco 'ntyāt para iti sthānapratyayāpavādaḥ*), *Aṣṭādhyāyī* 1.1.47 is an exception to two rules, only one of which is pertinent to the present discussion. This sūtra (*Aṣṭādhyāyī* 1.1.49: *śaṣṭhī sthāneyogā*) provides that a relational genitive which is not subject to another interpretation according to its context, is to be understood as concerning the relation “in place of”: it is to be interpreted as signifying an item subject to replacement. In addition, a replacement that consists of a single sound generally substitutes for the last sound of the item in question (*Aṣṭādhyāyī* 1.1.52: *alo 'ntyasya*). Now, given *kuṇḍa-i*, *vana-i*, *num* cannot be introduced both after the final vowel of the base⁵⁸ and as a replacement for this vowel. If the latter were to be allowed, the required forms would not be derived. The desirable derivation is assured, since the exception blocks the general rule. On the other hand, given *payas-i*, *yaśas-i* one operation is not made impossible by the other; it is indeed possible to introduce *num* after the last vowel of the stem⁵⁹ and as a substitute for the final *-s*. Only if the latter is disallowed, however, can the required forms be accounted for. And this is possible if a general rule is blocked by its exception not only where both the operations in question are not possible but also where they are possible. Patañjali emphasizes

⁵⁷ *RPr.* 1.53: *nyāyair miśrān apavādān pratiyāt*. Uvāta explains that the term *nyāya* refers to rules with broad domains, otherwise called *utsarga*. He goes on to say that exceptions, rules with lesser domains, should be understood as combined and that what this rule means is that general rules apply after leaving aside the domain of exceptions related to them: *RPrBh.* 1.53: *nyāyā utsargā mahāviṣayā vidhayaḥ | apavādā alpaviṣayā vidhayaḥ | tān utsargair miśrān ekikṛtān jānīyāt | apavādaviṣayaṃ muktvoṣṭargāḥ pravartanta ity arthaḥ*. Whether Uvāta is fully justified in saying that the Sūtra provides for a general rule to be blocked by its exception(s), so that it applies only in the domain left over is not important to the present discussion, although the intent of the Sūtra doubtless was just this. It is important to accept, however, that the Sūtra is a metarule concerning general rules and their exceptions, although the terminology is in part different from that of regular Pāṇiniya usage. Note, nevertheless, that Patañjali (*Bh.* I p. 439,7–8 [on *Aṣṭādhyāyī* 2.3.1]) uses *nyāyā* with reference to an affix provided for by a general rule. According to Kaiyaṭa (*Pr.* II p. 752,8: *utsargaḥ pūrvācāryaprasiddhyā nyāyā ucyate*), *nyāyā* thus used is a term of early teachers.

⁵⁸ *kuṇḍa-i* → *kuṇḍan-i* → *kuṇḍāni*; see Cardona 1997: 320 (A 7.1.72).

⁵⁹ *payas-i* → *payans-i* → *payāns-i* → *payāmsi*.

that this is known from everyday life. He says: neither does the lord command nor do authors of Dharmasūtras recite that general rules should be blocked by exceptions. On the contrary, this is a conclusion in the everyday world. In the everyday world, blocking occurs even if there is this possibility. He then gives a well known example involving Brāhmaṇas in general and a particular Brāhmaṇa named Kauṇḍinya. If one says, “Curds should be given to Brāhmaṇas, buttermilk to Kauṇḍinya,” although there is the possibility of giving curds to Kauṇḍinya, giving him buttermilk sets aside the giving of curds. Similarly in the case of *payas-i*, *yaśas-i*: although it is possible for *num* to occur in place of the final sound, the occurrence of this element after the final vowel of the stem will block the substitution.⁶⁰

Similarly, Patañjali remarks that another major decision principle, which involves operations conditioned by elements that are relatively closer and more distant (*antaraṅgaṃ* [*kāryam*], *bahiraṅgaṃ* [*kāryam*]), also is known from the everyday world. Thus, he notes, it is observed that in everyday life one proceeds to do things with respect to individual things and people in such an order: when someone gets up in the morning, he first performs the things that have to be done for his own body, then he does things that are to be done for friends, then others associated with him. Similarly, a nominal base such as *kartr* “one who does or makes, an agent” first signifies something general common to all possible referents, then an individual, that is associated with a gender and a number; the individual accompanied by its gender and number bears a relation with an external entity like an action. The speech units connected with these meanings have the very same sequence as the meanings, and the operations associated with these should apply similarly.⁶¹ Thus, one has a complex (((*kartr*)-*i*)-*ā*), bracketed as shown to mark the relative status of the base, the feminine suffix *ñip* and the instrumental singular ending *tā*, which signifies a single agent with respect to an action. In accordance with this bracketing, first *r* is replaced by *r* and then *i* is replaced by *y* (*Aṣṭādhyāyī* 6.1.77: *iko yaṅ aci*): *kartr*-*i*-*ā* → *kartr*-*i*-*ā* → *kartryā*, with a high-pitched ending *-ā* replacing low-pitched *ā* after a semi-vowel which has replaced a high-pitched vowel and is preceded by a consonant (*Aṣṭādhyāyī* 6.1.174).

This appeal to the Laukika status of the most basic principles governing how Pāṇini’s Sūtras are to apply, principles which Pāṇini obvious observes but does not need to formulate explicitly, brings up a general issue regarding grammar, other Vedāṅgas, and their status in Indian

⁶⁰ *Bh.* I p. 114,24-115,4: *naiveśvara ājñāpayati nāpi dharmasūtrakārāḥ paṭhanty apavādair utsargā bādhyantām iti | kiṃtarhi laukiko ’yaṃ dṛṣṭāntaḥ | loke hi saty api sambhave bādhanam bhavati | tadyathā dadhī brāhmaṇebhyo dīyatām takraṃ kauṇḍinyāyeti | saty api sambhave dadhidānasya takradānam nivartakam bhavati | evam ihāpi saty api sambhave ’cāmantyātparatvaṃ ṣaṣṭhiṣṭhāneyogatvaṃ bādhiṣyate.*

⁶¹ *Bh.* I p. 145,22-28 (on *Aṣṭādhyāyī* 1.1.57): *nanu ceyam api kartavyā: asiddham bahiraṅgalakṣaṇam antaraṅgalakṣaṇa iti | bahuprayojanaiśā paribhāṣā | avasyam eṣā kartavyā | sā cāpy eṣā lokataḥ siddhā | katham | pratyaṅgavartī loko dṛśyate | tadyathā: puruṣo ’yaṃ prātar utthāya yāny asya prati śarīraṃ kāryāṇi tāni tāvat karoti tataḥ suhrdām tataḥ sambandhinām | prātipadikam cāpy upadiṣṭam sāmānye ’rthe vartate | sāmānye vartamānasya vyaktir upajāyate | vyaktasya sato liṅgasaṅkhyābhyām anvītasya bāhyenārthena yogo bhavati | yayaiva cānupūrvyārthānām prādurbhāvas tathaiva śabdānām api tadvat kāryair api bhavitavyam. In the context of Pāṇinian grammar, the internal : external relation usually involves actual speech units subject to operations determined by internal and external conditions, but Pāṇinīyas also consider meanings in the same light, as does Patañjali in the passage cited. Note in passing that according to *YS* 3.7: *trayam antaraṅgaṃ pūrvebhyah*, the same relation is said to hold between *dhāraṇā*, *dhyāna* and *samādhi* on the one hand and *yama*, *niyama*, *āsana*, *prāṇāyāma* and *pratyāhāra* on the other: the first three are internal relative to the others, which Vācaspati characterizes as *bahiraṅga* (*YSTV* 3.7 [p. 123,13]: ... *tasmāt te bahiraṅga ity arthaḥ*).*

thought. In a justly famous early study, Ingalls made the following important observation (Ingalls 1952: 4):

In philosophyzing the Greeks made as much use as possible of mathematics. The Indians, curiously, failed to do this, curiously because they were good mathematicians. Instead, they made as much use as possible of grammatical theory and arguments.

The very background of early Indian learning explains the preoccupation with issues concerning language. These endeavors were intimately connected with Vedic matters. This left a lasting imprint, to the point that centuries later Gaṅgeśa, who shows extreme sophistication in dealing with issues of reasoning, includes in his *Tattvacintāmaṇi* not only exquisite discussions concerning grammatical issues but also has to include a section dealing with the status of Vedic authorship. The position of Pāṇini's grammar as the representative of Vyākaraṇa among the Vedāṅgas, moreover, assured that the *Aṣṭādhyāyī* was later the fundamental basis for taking up issues concerning language and its structure – certainly within orthodox schools of thought that accepted the authority of the Vedas, but also among heterodox thinkers – so that Mīmāṃsakas and Naiyāyikas engaged in considerable exegesis of Pāṇinian Sūtras in order to interpret them in conformity with their own presuppositions and aims. In addition, I think anyone who considers seriously Pāṇini in relation to his predecessors would have to conclude that he did much more than merely reorganize and make systematic the work which he inherited from these predecessors, that he rethought much of what had been done and in several major aspects departed from this earlier work in a manner which is little short of revolutionary.⁶²

At the same time, one should be careful not to exaggerate. It is difficult to deny that the *Ṛgvedaprātiśākhya*, which does not show influence of Pāṇini's system and on this and other grounds is reasonably considered a pre-Pāṇinian work, observes a distinction between operational rules and metarules. Certainly, *RPr.* 1.53 (see note 57) is a metarule (*paribhāṣā*)⁶³ concerning how general rules and their exceptions are to be considered. In addition, the *Ṛgvedaprātiśākhya* has a Sūtra providing for the interpretation of rules where nominative and accusative forms respectively are used to signify sounds that are subject to changes and those to which they change, and the same Sūtra further states that where more than one result is possible, one is to understand that the one closest to the original sound is selected.⁶⁴ This is comparable, *mutatis mutandis*, to Pāṇini's Sūtras providing that a genitive not otherwise interpretable in context is interpreted as referring to that which is subject to replacement and that, if more than one replacement is possible that one is selected which is closest to the element subject to substitution.⁶⁵

Similarly, both the *Ṛgvedaprātiśākhya* and the *Taittirīyaprātiśākhya*, which also is without doubt a pre-Pāṇinian work, operate with series of class names (*sañjñā*) introduced by rules which provide that given elements bear these names, a procedure replicated in the *Aṣṭādhyā-*

⁶² I presented arguments for my views in the Rabindranath Tagore lecture "Pāṇini in the history of Indian thought," delivered under the auspices of the Centre for Philosophy and Foundations of Sciences in Delhi on December 13, 2000. The lecture will be published in the near future.

⁶³ At the end of the group of Sūtras from *RPr.* 1.53-56, Uvaṭa appropriately notes (*RPrBh.* 1.56 [p. 45]: *nyāyair miśrān apavādān ity ata ārabhya paribhāṣāsūtrāṇy etāni*) that these are *paribhāṣāsūtras*.

⁶⁴ *RPr.* 1.56: *asāv amum iti tadbhāvam uktaṃ yathāntaram (pratīyāt 53)*. The *Taittirīyaprātiśākhya* has rules comparable to this (*TPr.* 1.23: *aḥkāra āgamavikāriḥopinām*, 1.25: *āsannaṃ sandeḥa*, 1.28: *avṃ vikārasya*), although they differ in details that do not concern the present discussion.

⁶⁵ *Aṣṭādhyāyī* 1.1.49-50: *ṣaṣṭhī sthāneyogā, sthāne 'ntaratamaḥ*.

yī, so that it is also beyond reasonable doubt that the distinction between a metalanguage and an object language was observed before Pāṇini. Further, the Padapāṭha to the *Ṛgveda*, which Pāṇini certainly knew, uses the quotation particle *iti* following vocative singular forms in *-o*, thus showing that, as in Śākalya's dialect, the *-o* is not subject to phonological operations. Thus, where the Saṃhitāpāṭha *Ṛgveda* 1.2.1a has *vāyav ā yāhi* – with *-av* before a vowel – the Padapāṭha has *vāyo iti*. Pāṇini shows his awareness of this procedure when he provides that *-o* of a vocative singular form followed by *iti* that does not belong to the original Vedic Saṃhitā is assigned to the Pragṛhya class according to Śākalya.⁶⁶ Now, in Padapāṭhas for other Vedic texts such as the *Taittirīyasamhitā*, a compound regularly is first given in its Saṃhitā form followed by *iti*, then repeated with a pause between its two major constituents. Śākalya does not follow this practice regularly,⁶⁷ but he does in certain instances. One of these is where a compound like *vibhāvaso* (voc. sg.) is involved, with a Pragṛhya vowel: *vibhāvaso iti vibhā-vaso* in the Padapāṭha to *Ṛgveda* 1.44.10. Given that *iti* is the standard citation particle, it is plausible to assume that the Padapāṭha authors were aware that they were first citing a form, using *X-iti* to refer to *X* as it occurs in the Saṃhitā text. There is also particular terminology associated with this procedure; according to the *Ṛgvedaprātiśākhya*,⁶⁸ *upasthitam*, *sthitam*, and *sthitopasthitam* respectively denote a Pada joined with *iti*, a Pada by itself, and the two uttered together. Moreover, Pāṇini uses *upasthita* in a Sūtra that deals with the status of Pluta elements followed by *iti*.⁶⁹ Although according to Pāṇinīyas *upasthita* refers to the citation particle *iti* and not to the cited item (see note 69), it would be stretching things to claim that Pāṇini is not using a technical term inherited from predecessors. In the same vein, the use of markers (*it*, *anubandha*) attached to linguistic elements definitely was a pre-Pāṇinian practice. There is no reasonable way to explain Pāṇini's uses of equivalent terms such as *auṭ* and *auñ*, both referring to the nominative-accusative dual ending *au*, other than to accept, as Pāṇinīyas do, that the latter reflects pre-Pāṇinian usage.

In view of these facts, it is an exaggeration, I think, to claim that Pāṇini's system somehow produced such distinctions as that between an operational rule and a metarule governing how such rules are to be considered and applied.⁷⁰ It is more reasonable and in accord with what we know about Pāṇini's antecedents to say that the Indian concentration on issues of language and grammar as formal systems is based on the Vedic background in which such

⁶⁶ *Aṣṭādhyāyī* 1.1.16: *sambuddhau śākalyasyetāv anārṣe (pragṛhyam 11)*.

⁶⁷ This is, however, the normal practice for compounds when one recites the *kramapāṭha* for the *Ṛgveda* (*RPr.* 10.7: *avagrhyāny atikramya sahetikaraṇāni ca ... etāni parigrhṇīyāt*).

⁶⁸ *RPr.* 10.12-14: *upasthitam setikaraṇam, kevalam tu padaṃ sthitam, tat sthitopasthitam nāma yatrobhe āha samhite*.

⁶⁹ *Aṣṭādhyāyī* 6.1.129: *aplutavad upasthite*. According to Pāṇinīyas (e.g., *Bh.* III p. 90,18: *upasthita ity ucyate | kim idam upasthitam nāma | anārṣa itikaraṇaḥ*), *upasthita* refers to *iti* that does not occur in the original Saṃhitā text of a Veda. The Sūtra provides, then, that a Pluta element is treated as though it were not Pluta when such an *iti* follows. The standard example cited by Patañjali (*Bh.* III p. 90,18-19: *suślokā3 iti suśloketi*) and others is the vocative singular *suślokā3* “of good fame,” which occurs in *Taittirīyasamhitā* 1.8.162 (*suślokām3 sumāṅgalām satyārājā3n*), *Kāṭhakaśamhitā* 38.4 (*suślokā3 sumāṅgalā3 sātayarājān*). According to Pāṇini's rule, a *padapāṭha* treats *-ā3* as though it were not Pluta, so that it is subject to replacement: *suślokā iti* → *suśloketi*. Although this is illustrated in the *Mahābhāṣya*, however, the Padapāṭha to the *Taittirīyasamhitā* does not follow the same procedure (*suślokām3 iti suślokām3*). Pāṇinian commentators discuss this issue, but I cannot enter into additional details here.

⁷⁰ “Pāṇini's system produced at an early date such logical distinctions as those between language and metalanguage, theorem and metatheorem, use and mention, which were discovered much later in Europe” (Staal 1965/1988: 158).

thinking originated and developed. Once established, this attitude towards philosophy, to use again Ingalls's term, had a profound and lasting effect for later Indian thinking. Pāṇini does indeed represent the pinnacle of such thinking. At the same time, however, he reflects this background and Pāṇinīyas are certainly justified in pointing out that some of the very basic principles on which his grammar is based have their sources in Indian ways of doing and viewing things. In sum, we are in the presence of an Indian background, cultural, religious and philosophical, of which Pāṇini is a preeminent representative.

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Ṛgveda 1.164.23-24 and Bhartṛhari's Philosophy of Language *

1.1 In a rich and insightful paragraph on Bhartṛhari and the Veda, Wilhelm Halbfass remarked that “Bhartṛhari does not draw a strict border between the uncreated Veda and the traditions of human thought and exegesis” (Halbfass 1991: 37). Nevertheless, we find that there is a significant contrast between the way the grammarian and philosopher Bhartṛhari deals with these two types of texts. He frequently supports his discussion with precise references to the traditions of human thought and exegesis – first of all the Pāṇinian grammatical tradition, but also various philosophical schools in his time (Mīmāṃsā, Vaiśeṣika, Buddhist schools). However, it is only to exemplify grammatical points and not on account of the thoughts expressed that he gives quotations from Vedic texts.¹ Bhartṛhari's own work, as is well known, has a direct exegetical relationship with the Pāṇinian tradition: his *Mahābhāṣya-Dīpikā* (*MBhD*), to the extent it is available, is a running commentary on Patañjali's *Vyākaraṇa-Mahābhāṣya*, while his *magnum opus*, the *Vākyapadīya* (*VP*), is a topical commentary on major philosophical issues in the same text of Patañjali. Apart from the occasions where the Veda is a transcendent “entity” nearly identical with Brahman,² and apart from Vedic expressions cited only by way of grammatical example or illustration, are there any direct links with Vedic texts, and especially with the oldest and in several respects most important Vedic text, the *Ṛgveda*?

1.2 While direct references to the *Ṛgveda*, only to exemplify grammatical points, are rare in Bhartṛhari's *MBhD* and *VP*,³ commentaries including the ancient *vṛtti* do find reason to occasionally cite from the *Ṛgveda* in order to support an idea. It is not surprising that one of the verses cited is from the Ṛgvedic “Riddle Hymn” (*ṚV* 1.164.45)⁴: “Speech” is a major theme in this hymn (cf. Brown 1968; Houben 2000) as it is in Bhartṛhari's philosophy of language. On closer study it turns out that a few other enigmatic verses in this hymn express thoughts

* The research on which this paper is based was supported by the KNAW (Royal Dutch Academy of Sciences) when the author was KNAW-research fellow at Leiden University. I profited much from Frits Staal's studies on the practice of Sāmavedic chanting, his collection of material in the form of films and recordings, and from a few email-exchanges with him on various problems.

¹ That is, Vedic texts in the strict sense: the Saṃhitās and Brāhmaṇas of the various Śākhās (cf. the dictum *mantrabrāhmaṇayor vedanāmadheyam*, *ĀpŚS* 24.1.31, and *mantrās ca brāhmaṇam ca vedah*, Śabara on *Mīmāṃsā-Sūtra* 2.1.33). Such quotations are predominantly from Yajurvedic texts, and among these especially from the *Maitrāyaṇīya-Saṃhitā*: cf. Rau 1980 and Bronkhorst 1981, 1987.

² *VP* 1.5ab: *prāptiṣṭupāyo 'nukāras ca tasya* (viz., *brahmaṇah*) *vedah* ... “Of this (Brahman) the Veda is the means of attainment and the image”; *VP* 1.172ab: *anādim anavacchinnām śrutim āhur akartykām* “It is said that the authorless Śruti (revealed text, i.e., the Veda) is beginningless and uninterrupted”; cf. also *VP* 1.173: *avibhāgād vivṛtānām abhikhyā svapnavac chrutau* “Those evolved from the undivided (i.e., the primeval *ṛṣis* evolved from *brahman*), (had) a perception with regard to the Śruti as in a dream.” See further Houben 1997: 331-336 and Aklujkar 1991.

³ Cf. *ṚV* 10.85.33c cited in *MBhD* 1: p. 4,18 (*MBhD* [*AL*] p. 5,8); *ṚV* 9.12.3c in *MBhD* 5: p. 18,17 (*MBhD* [*AL*] p. 176,21), p. 19,28 (*MBhD* [*AL*] p. 178,16); *ṚV* 1.108.10ab in 6a: p. 27,3 (*MBhD* [*AL*] p. 214,20), *ṚV* 8.75.9a in 6b: p. 19,6 (*MBhD* [*AL*] p. 240,14).

⁴ This famous verse on the four *padās* of speech, and on the availability of only one part of speech to normal men, is cited in the *vṛtti* on *VP* 1.159 (*VP* I: p. 221,1-2) which mentions three forms of speech, *vaikharī* (the elaborate, explicit one; cf. Mayrhofer 1996: 587 for its possible etymology via Prakrit), *madhyamā* (the intermediate one), and *paśyantī* (the “seeing” or visionary one).

which are remarkably relevant to crucial ideas in Bhartṛhari's philosophy of language. One of these ideas⁵ was of special importance to Bhartṛhari and later grammarians, but it seems largely absent in the preceding Sanskrit tradition as far as available, especially in Patañjali's *Mahābhāṣya* and Kātyāyana's *vārtikas*.

2.1 Among the verses in the "Riddle Hymn" connected with the theme of "speech" are verses 23-24. In the subdivision of the hymn based on ritual correspondences, these verses belong to the first of three parallel, alternative liturgies (cf. Houben 2000). Within this first liturgy they come towards the end of the section which accompanies the fanning of the pot, and just as the verse at the end of this section in the middle liturgy (1.164.39) and two verses in the third liturgy (1.164.45-46) it refers to the knowledge and application of (metrical) speech employed in the ritual. In the case of verses 23-24 (as well as the subsequent 25) the subject is apparently metrical speech employed in ritual songs or Sāmans.

Verse 23 is as follows:

*yād gāyatrē ādhi gāyatrām āhitam
traīṣṭubhād vā traīṣṭubham nirātaksata |
yād vā jāgaj jāgaty āhitam padām
yā it tād vidūs té amṛtatvām ānaśuḥ ||.*

An approximate translation does not seem very difficult.⁶ The statement must be in some way paradoxical or enigmatic but it is not precisely clear how. Interpreters have remained relatively silent about it, and so far did not present a convincing interpretation.⁷ Geldner (1951: 231f. note) observes:

Hier steigt zunächst der Dichter von den Höhen der bisherigen Spekulation in die Niederungen der dichterischen Technik und der rituellen Praxis hinab. Er geht von den metrischen Elementen aus. Das Paradoxon liegt wohl darin, daß das metrische Element (das *padām* oder die Reihe) auf dem Lied beruhen soll statt umgekehrt. Doch bleibt der tiefere Sinn verborgen.

2.2 In the group of verses 23-25, several terms clearly point in the direction of Sāmavedic chanting: *jāgat*, *rathantarā* and *gāyatrā*.⁸ If we concentrate on verse 23, here too the terms *gāyatrā* and *jāgat* can be very well connected with Sāmavedic chanting. The same applies to

⁵ An important idea expressed in *RV* 1.164 and of pervading relevance for Bhartṛhari's philosophy which I do not discuss here is "unity in diversity." *RV* 1.164.46c (*ekaṃ sād viprā bahudhā vadanti* "One reality that is – the inspired ones speak of it as many") may be compared with *VP* 3.3.87cd: *eko 'rthaḥ śabdavācyaṭve bahurūpaḥ prakāśate* "The one Thing-meant (i.e., the ultimate object of linguistic expressions) manifests itself as manifold when it is expressed by words."

⁶ We may take Geldner's translation as starting point: "Nur die haben die Unsterblichkeit erlangt, die wissen, daß der Gāyatrī(-fuß) auf dem Gāyatrī(-lied) beruht, oder daß der Triṣṭubh(-fuß) aus dem Triṣṭubh(-lied) herausgebildet wurde, oder daß der Jagatfuß auf dem Jagat(-lied) beruht."

⁷ Renou 1967, in his notes on *RV* 1.164, has nothing to remark on verses 23-24 (no translation is given in his *Études Védiques et Pāṇinéennes*); Oldenberg 1909: 158f. discusses some matters of *sandhi* in 23 and 24 and remains doubtful on a proposed emendation in verse 24 because of the "Unbestimmtheit des Sinnes."

⁸ For an example of the application of Gāyatra and Rathantara Sāmans cf. Parpola 1969: 13-14 and Staal 1983: Vol. 1, p. 538. Gāyatra as the name of a Sāman is well known (cf. Howard 1977: 514f.). Also Rathantara is well known (Howard 1977: 534). In the classical system Jagat as the name of a Sāman seems to refer to any Sāman based on a verse in Jagatī metre: cf. *jagatsāman* "having the Jagat as Sāman" in *ĀpŚS* 12.14.1 next to *rathantarāsāman* and *brhatsāman*. As such it is equivalent to Jāgata Sāman. R. Simon's index to the *PS* lists the Jāgata-Varuṇa Sāman; *LŚS* 7.3.11 and 7.10.12 know in addition of a Jāgata-Soma Sāman. Cf. further *ṢaḍvBr* 1.4.12, and *ŚB* 4.2.5.20 with Eggeling's notes on the employment of metrical verses in the three Soma-pressings (morning, noon and third).

the term *traiṣṭubha*, even though it is not equally well known as name of a Sāman.⁹ But all three terms may just as well refer to a line or verse in the *gāyatrī*, resp. the *trīṣṭubh* or *jāgatī* metre (which may provide the *yōni* or underlying text of a Sāman), and the use of the term *padā* in connection with *jāgat* in verse 23c suggests indeed that this metrical aspect is intended rather than the melodious song.¹⁰ Unfortunately, we do not have any precise knowledge of the practice of chanting at the time of the *Rgveda*, nor do we know what the precise relation was between a Sāman and its underlying verse, usually from the *Rgveda*.¹¹ In the classical system, in any case,

[T]he connection between a verse and its melody is a loose and mechanical one, e.g. the caesura divides in the prosody the *trīṣṭubh* into two parts of 5 and 6, or 4 and 7 syllables, but the *sāman*-techniques never care about this essential metrical construction and generally divide the *trīṣṭubh* into three *parvans*. (van der Hoogt 1929: 51)¹²

We thus seem justified in distinguishing, also in the time of the *Rgveda*, the metrical aspect of the line as it appears in a recitation (with a pattern of heavy and light syllables) and the line as employed in chanting.

2.3 Against this background we can interpret verse 23 on the assumption that the terms refer to the metrical aspect of text-parts underlying Sāmans. The verse says that something is based on something, and something is created from something. More precisely, *pāda* a of verse 23 informs us that “something of Gāyatra character” is based on “something of Gāyatra character,” and *pāda* b that “something of Traiṣṭubha character” is created from “something

⁹ The index of Simon’s edition of the *PS* does list Traiṣṭubha (occurring only in some of the commentaries on the *PS*), Traiṣṭubha-Vātsapra (variant name in some mss. for Vātsapra) and Traiṣṭubha-Śyāvāśva. It was demonstrated long ago by Oldenberg (1884) that the Triṣṭubh (as well as its extended version, the Jagatī) is the preferred metre in hymns intended for recitation (by the Hotṛ and his group), whereas Gāyatrī and Pragātha are the main metres for chant (by the Udgātṛ and his group).

¹⁰ The relation between *gāyatrā*, etc., as a metrical term (as in the frequent Yajurvedic expression *gāyatrēṇa chandasā* ... etc.) and *gāyatrā* as the name of a Sāman is complex. The famous Gāyatra Sāman (melody, way of singing) is indeed based on a verse in *gāyatrī* metre (*RV* 3.62.10) (cf. Howard 1983, 1987), but the same melody may be applied to other verses or parts of other verses as well (cf. *LŚS* 1.8.9 where the Gāyatra way of singing is applied to a verse in the Pañkti metre). In the case of *traiṣṭubha* a linguistic derivation from *trīṣṭubh* seems likely; in the case of *gāyatrā* the historical derivation is rather “song” directly from $\sqrt{gā}$ “to sing,” with *gāyatrī* as the feminine indicating the metre. If *gāyatrā*, *traiṣṭubha* and *jāgat* appear together, however, a reference to the three major Rgvedic metres *gāyatrī*, *trīṣṭubh* and *jāgatī* seems natural, even if there is a Sāmavedic context. Cf. *SV* 2.9.2.7.2-3 sung at the beginning of the Soma-pressing (cf. Caland and Henry 1906-1907: 134):

3 1 2r 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2r 3 1 2
yuñje vācam śatapadīm gāye sahasravartani | gāyatraṃ traiṣṭubhaṃ jagat ||2||
 3 1 2r 3 2 3 1 2 3 2 3 1 2 3 1 2r 3 2
gāyatraṃ traiṣṭubhaṃ jagat | viśvā rūpāni sambhṛtā | devā okāṃsi cakrire ||3||

¹¹ On the other hand, it is known and accepted that the authors of the *Rgveda* were familiar with the practice of Sāman-chanting, and that there was also an intimate relation between the texts of the *Rgveda* and this practice. Apart from the mentioned names of specific Sāmans, the hymns contain numerous references to the *sāman* “song,” and the priest specialized in singing, the Udgātṛ, has been mentioned (*RV* 2.43.2) and was referred to (*RV* 10.71.11). A considerable number of hymns in the *Rgveda* was apparently from the outset intended to be sung. Cf. Oldenberg 1884: 441 (Oldenberg 1967: Vol. 1, p. 515): “Wäre eine Ausdrucksweise erlaubt, bei welcher der Unterschied von Sāman, d.h. Sangweisen, und Sāman-Texten ignorirt wird, könnte man geradezu sagen: der Rīgveda ist zugleich der älteste Sāmaveda.”

¹² While the Triṣṭubh would have been preferred for recitation rather than for singing according to the argument of Oldenberg (1884, 1915), van der Hoogt (1929: 51, n. 2) points out that this threefold structure in Sāmavedic application suits the name Triṣṭubh better than the twofold structure in metrical recitation.

of Traiṣṭubha character.” Initially, however, it is not clear exactly what is based on what, and what is created from what. From the statement in *pāda* c, which is just a bit more explicit, we understand that it is the *padá*, “foot” or “metrical line” (namely a *padá* “foot” or “metrical line” of Jagat character) that is based on something (namely, on something else having a Jagat character). The term *padá* “line” is already in the *Ṛgveda* used with reference to the metrical lines which make up versified speech (cf., e.g., 1.164.45: *catvāri vāk párimitā padāni*). Taking into account the structural parallelism in *pādas* a, b and c, we may fill in this notion of *padá* “line” at the corresponding open places in *pāda* a and b. In *pāda* b, we then arrive at the statement that a metrical line (*padá*), namely one of Traiṣṭubha character, is created from something else, still undefined, but in any case having a Traiṣṭubha character. In *pāda* a we arrive at the statement that a metrical line (*padá*), namely one of Gāyatra character, is based on something else, still undefined, but in any case having a Gāyatra character. In line with our preceding considerations, we may assume that “to have a Gāyatra character” amounts to “to be in the Gāyatrī metre.”¹³ It is to be noted that the metrical line is the smallest unit that can still have a Gāyatra character. Hence, we may infer that the other thing of Gāyatra character is another, larger unit, e.g., a verse, hymn or song. Because neither this verse nor verses 24-25 refer to the unit of the verse (*ṛc*), but references are made to larger units (*arká* “song of praise,” *vāká* “recitation”), it is preferable to take “song” or “hymn” as the unexpressed unit in the remaining places in verse 23a, b and c. With this we have solved the “riddle” of verse 23 in the sense that we have inferred which units remained unexpressed. But the resulting statement may still be regarded as enigmatic. The verse now says that in the case of Gāyatrī lines and hymns, Triṣṭubh lines and hymns, and Jagatī lines and hymns, it is the smaller unit, the line, which is based on, or fashioned out of, the larger unit – contrary to what one would expect from a common sense point of view.

The underlying idea has no doubt to do with an experience at the basis of the inspired creation of a hymn or chant. Poets reflecting on this process (cf. in general Gonda 1963) occasionally speak of a “milking” which suggests a complete object, the hymn or Sāman, given in advance, albeit in an indiscriminate, vague form.¹⁴ *TĀ* 5.10 lets *mantras* and songs be “milked” from Prajāpati or the sun. The subsequent differentiation into smaller units is expressed by the verb *vi-√kr* (*TĀ* 5.10.1: *tād agnir vy àkarot*), elsewhere with *vy-ā-√kr* (*TS* 6.4.7.3; cf. Thieme 1983 on *vyākaraṇa*). The *Ṛgvedic* poet’s creation of hymns has also been referred to as a process of “seeing,”¹⁵ which likewise suggests a complete object given in advance.

2.4 Those familiar with Indian linguistic philosophy and grammar will recognise in the above formulation the position for which the fifth-century philosopher–grammarians Bhartṛhari became famous: sentences or larger units rather than words or smaller units are primary.¹⁶ To state it with more precision – since a sentence may consist of a single word, a word of a sin-

¹³ That is, minimally it will refer to the eight-syllabic Gāyatrī sequence, which normally forms part of a verse of three lines.

¹⁴ According to *ṚV* 5.44.13 (*sutambharó yájamānasya sátpatir viśvāsām údhaḥ sá dhiyām udāñcanaḥ*), Sutambhara (name of a seer in Sāyaṇa’s explanation which is accepted by Geldner) milks the udder of all *dhi*, which is both abstract “vision” and its concrete expression in a verse or hymn.

¹⁵ Cf. *ṛṣibhir mantradrgbhiḥ* in the opening verse of the *Ṛgvidhāna*.

¹⁶ Since linguistics includes semantics I refrain from using an expression such as “linguistic–semantic unit.” It is to be noted, however, that in Bhartṛhari’s arguments the semantics of the units under discussion is always of crucial importance, even where the focus is on the linguistic form rather than the meaning it is supposed to have.

gle phoneme – the units of a higher organizational order are primary, those of a lower organizational order are secondary. Bhartṛhari did not claim originality for this view, but both for him and for the author of the *vṛtti* it has been very difficult to find convincing authoritative antecedents in the work of those claimed as predecessors, especially Patañjali and Pāṇini. Pāṇini gives no explicit definition of the sentence at all, but we find two definitions in Patañjali's *Mahābhāṣya*, viz., *ekatiṅ vākyam* (deriving from Kātyāyana) and *ākhyātaṃ sāvya-kāravaiśeṣaṇaṃ vākyam* (*MBh* Vol. 1: p. 367,10-17). Both definitions point to words as the basic units which together form a sentence. Bhartṛhari can further refer to a theoretic statement implying the primacy of the word, and this statement occurs a few times in the *Mahābhāṣya* (*yad atrādhikyam vākyārthaḥ saḥ*, *MBh* Vol. 1: pp. 462,4 and 464,10-12). But neither Bhartṛhari nor the author of the *vṛtti* can cite an equivalent authoritative statement from the *Mahābhāṣya* which would indicate the primary status of the sentence. Bhartṛhari refers to the *Mahābhāṣya* statement on the primacy of the continuous version (*saṃhitāpāṭha*) of Vedic texts over the word-by-word version (*padapāṭha*) (*VP* 2.58-59), and he refers to a rather obscure thinker mentioned in the *Nirukta*, viz., Audumbarāyaṇa (*VP* 2.344; cf. *Nir* 1.1-2). If the author of the *vṛtti* comes to referring to traditional support for the sentence as basic unit (*vṛtti* on *VP* 1.24-26) he cites only from a now lost pre-Patañjali work, the *Samgraha*.¹⁷ The citation is a verse that appropriately emphasizes the dependence of the word on the sentence in its semantic aspect, in other words, the sentence meaning:

*na hi kiṅ cid padaṃ nāma rūpeṇa niyataṃ kvacit |
padānāṃ rūpam artho vā vākyārthād eva jāyate ||.*

Nowhere, indeed, is any word fixed as to its form; form and meaning of words arise from the meaning of the sentence only.

2.5 Taking into account the conspicuous absence of references to the view that the sentence is primary in older Pāṇinian works, the view which we find expressed in *ṚV* 1.164.23 resonates remarkably well with Bhartṛhari's theoretical preference. This Ṛgvedic verse is hence a perfect candidate for having been a direct source of inspiration for Bhartṛhari's position. Otherwise, the verse may very well have had its influence on works of grammarians and other language-oriented thinkers now lost to us, such as the author of the *Samgraha*, and hence have indirectly supported or confirmed Bhartṛhari in accepting the sentence as the main linguistic unit. While we should not exclude the possibility that contemporaneous philosophical discussion may have stimulated Bhartṛhari to search theoretical solutions to language-philosophical problems in a certain direction,¹⁸ Bhartṛhari's own self-presentation as someone continuing the tradition of Vedic and Brahmanical grammarians is to be taken seriously. The verse *ṚV* 1.164.23 may in any case be translated as follows (the crucial word that solves the "riddle" in capitals):

That the Gāyatrī(-line) is based on the Gāyatrī(-hymn) (the smaller on the larger unit, rather than the other way round), and that the Triṣṭubh(-line) is fashioned out of the Triṣṭubh(-hymn), and that the Jagatī-LINE is based on the Jagatī(-hymn): only those who know this have attained immortality.

Our translation is finally not that much different from Geldner's; but the latter's solution of the "riddle" remained a good guess, no arguments were adduced, and he admitted not to have

¹⁷ Bhartṛhari's preferred theory of the sentence as linguistic unit has received considerable attention (cf. Cardona 1976: 300-302), but the contours of its originality were for the first time systematically explored in Houben 1993, 1995 and 1998 [1999].

¹⁸ Cf. Bronkhorst 1998 arguing that developments in Buddhist thought were crucial for Bhartṛhari's view of the sentence as primary linguistic unit.

any idea about the intention behind the enigmatic statement. His “Lied” could refer to several aspects of a ritual utterance. Here we assume that the other unit which remains unexpressed is first of all a unit of metric linguistic utterance – its melodious character is not in focus.

3.1 In *RV* 1.164.24 we find an explicit reference to a *sāma* or chant (in *pāda* b). The verse may be taken as a discussion of, again, sacred metrical speech in the first place. The word *sāma* in *pāda* b may refer to the song as a whole, i.e., to the text of the song to which the specific melody is applied. In verse 24 it is said that several things are “made according to” several other things (*prāti mimīte*, *mimate*, plus a word in the instrumental case). As in verse 23, it is not immediately clear which things have a specific relation to which other things. In verse 23 a solution was found by applying the one explicit reference to a unit of speech (the *padā* or LINE) towards the end of the statement, to structurally parallel previous parts of the statement. In verse 24 we find explicit mention of *two* units of speech towards the end of the statement: seven *vāñī* or “voices” are made in accordance with the syllable (*akṣāra*). In contrast with the syllable, the *vāñī* or “voice” is likely to be a larger unit, and I propose to take it as the complete recitation (set of recitations) by one priest.¹⁹ The verse then states the dependence of the larger unit upon the smaller one, and presents a viewpoint opposite or complementary to the view expressed in verse 23. This view, too, can be linked to the way poets have seen the process of their poetic creation: the metaphors employed include the construction of a chariot by the poets,²⁰ which would imply the piecing together of parts given in advance.

RV 1.164.24 and its translation are as follows (crucial words that solve the “riddle” in capitals):

gāyatrēṇa prāti mimīte arkām
arkēṇa sāma trīṣṭubhena vākām |
vākēṇa vākām dvipādā cātuspadā-
-akṣāreṇa mimate saptā vāñīḥ ||24||.

With the Gāyatrī(-line) one makes the song of praise (*arkā*); with the song of praise a chant (*sāma*), with the the Trīṣṭubh(-line) the recitation. With the two- and four-lined recitation (one makes again a larger) recitation; according to the SYLLABLE they make the seven VOICES.

The “seven voices” (*vāñī*; cf. Mayrhofer 1996 s.v. *vāñā*: “nicht geklärt”) are not infrequently referred to in the *Rgveda*.²¹ Still, a precise identification of these “voices” is difficult: interpretations vary from “rivers” (Sāyaṇa on *RV* 3.1.6 and 3.7.1) to “metres” (Sāyaṇa on *RV* 1.164.24).²² In the context of the present hymn, as in the context of *RV* 9.103.3 and the similar expression in 9.104.4 (*abhī vāñīr anūṣata*), the voices can be taken as the seven complete sets of utterances, including recitations and chants, one set for each of the seven main priests

¹⁹ Cf. Monier-Williams 1899 s.v. *vāñī*: speech, language, words; literary composition. The “seven voices” or complete sets of utterances will belong to the seven main priests of the *Rgvedic* ritual, referred to elsewhere in the present hymn, viz. in verses 2 and 3. One may also compare the seven *hotrāḥ* or *vaṣatkartārah* of the Śrauta ritual; cf. Caland and Henry 1906-1907: 3. “Seven voices” are also referred to in *RV* 3.1.6, 3.7.1, 8.59.3 (Vāḷakhilya) and 9.103.3 (cf. below, n. 21).

²⁰ Cf. Gonda 1963: 110-111, and, in addition to the places discussed there, *RV* 5.73.10: *imā brāhmāṇi ... yā tākṣāma rāthāṃ iva*.

²¹ Cf. *RV* 3.1.6d: *ékaṃ gārbhaṃ dadhire saptā vāñīḥ*; 3.7.1b: *ā mātārā vivīṣuḥ saptā vāñīḥ*; 8.59.3b: *mādhva ūrmīm duhate saptā vāñīḥ*; 9.103.3c: *abhī vāñīḥ ṛṣīṇām saptā nūṣata*.

²² Cf. Grassmann 1875 on *saptā vāñīḥ* s.v. *vāñīḥ*: “die sieben Stimmen des Soma, die sieben rauschenden Somagüsse, persönlich gefasst auch mit sieben Stimmen der Sänger verglichen ... die sieben Tonweisen oder Liedformen.”

or the seven primeval priest-seers of a Ṛgvedic ritual. The seven main priests are referred to elsewhere in *RV* 1.164,²³ whereas 9.103.3 speaks of the seven voices of the seers (*vāñih ṛṣiṇām saptā*).

3.2 We thus see that *RV* 1.164.23-24, two enigmatic statements in the “Riddle Hymn,” express two complementary viewpoints on the relationship between smaller and larger units of metrical speech employed in ritual chanting. As such, they provide antecedents for two complementary views which play a major role in Bhartṛhari's *Vākyapadiya*, one according to which the units of a lower organizational level (especially the word and its meaning) are primary, and another according to which units of a higher organizational level (especially the sentence and its meaning) are primary. Especially the latter view so far seemed to have had hardly any predecessors in the Sanskrit tradition, although Bhartṛhari did not claim originality for it.

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²³ Cf. *RV* 1.164.2ab: *saptā yuñjanti rātham ekacakram éko ásvo vahati saptánāmā* “Seven (priest-seers) yoke (employ in their sacrifice) the one-wheeled chariot (the year); one horse (the sun) with seven names draws it.” In *pādas* cd of the next verse “the seven sisters” may very well refer to the same seven voices *vāñih* (fem. plur.) of the priests which we have in verse 24: *saptā svásāro abhí sám navante yātra gāvām níhitā saptā náma* “Seven sisters (the seven voices of the seven priests?), in whom the seven names of the cows are deposited, collectively sing songs of praise.”

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Logic, Love and the Complementary Concepts of *Anvaya* and *Vyatireka**

One of the more exciting developments in the cognitive sciences in recent years proposes a link between human emotions and reasoning. In *The Feeling of What Happens* Antonio Damasio provides a lucid synopsis of clinical work supporting the hypothesis that emotions provide a sort of touchstone for making decisions, including rational choices.¹ This provides a context for considering two Indian intellectual traditions, the *Alaṃkāra-* and *Nyāyaśāstras*, as they relate to a brief passage from Jagannātha Paṇḍitarāja's *Rasagaṅgādhara*.² At issue is how best to understand a distinction in the classification of love found in Indian texts on poetics. Since Jagannātha wrote after the peak period of intellectual activity in *Nyāya*, both his remarks and those of his many commentators are informed by much of this literature. The *Rasagaṅgādhara*'s imposing reputation as a classic of its genre is well known. Edwin Gerow considers Jagannātha as the last of the great *ālaṃkārikas* and echoes many others in asserting that this text crowns the remarkable achievements of Indian literary criticism.³

The purpose of this paper is to present Jagannātha's analysis of the well-known and long-standing subdivision of *śṛṅgārarasa* into "love-in-separation" (*vipralambhaśṛṅgāra*) and "love-in-union" (*sambhogaśṛṅgāra*). It is clear that Jagannātha intends to abandon relative physical presence as a means of distinguishing these subdivisions in favor of a psychological distinction (*antaḥkaraṇavṛtti*). More complex is the task of showing how his commentators have pursued an additional inference and attributed its very detrimental result to Jagannātha. The word *doṣa* is the key to understanding his position; the word triggers a discussion of established, formulaic conceptions that fall under the rubric of "deviation" (*vyabhicāra*). Using tables which specify the assumptions being made by Jagannātha and his commentators, I show how they differ in understanding "deviation," and how the concepts *anvaya* and *vyatireka* are employed by commentators in their attempts to elucidate Jagannātha's cryptic remark. We find precedent for these commentarial usages in Śaṅkara's commentaries on the *Māṇḍūkya* and *Praśna Upaniṣads*.⁴ Wilhelm Halbfass points this out:

It should be noted that in these passages Śaṅkara does not use *vyabhicāra* in the logical or epistemological perspective, i.e. in the sense of the logical "deviation" of an inferential reason (*hetu*) being present without its inferendum (*sādhya*). In Śaṅkara's usage, *vyabhicāra* and the corresponding verb forms do not indicate an unaccompanied presence, but a failure to be present in a relationship of concomitance, and an ontological defect rather than a logical one.⁵

* It is with both sadness and remembered affection that I acknowledge the help which Wilhelm Halbfass provided after reading a draft of this paper. I presented a version of this paper at the 203rd Meeting of the American Oriental Society held in Chapel Hill, NC, March 24-27, 1993.

¹ Damasio 1999: ch. 2 passim.

² *Rasagaṅgādhara* (hereafter *RG*) of Jagannātha. Ed. Mathura Nath Shastri. Delhi 1983 (all references to this edition unless otherwise noted).

³ Gerow 1977: 287. Despite this praise, Gerow seems less impressed with his actual achievements: "Jagannātha's arsenal of arguments is far from trivial. Combining the grace of a poet with the relentlessness of a *naīyāyika*, the result always seems less important than how it was arrived at." At issue in this paper is the presumption that the results have been understood uniformly.

⁴ *ŚBh* pp. 187 and 133, respectively.

⁵ Halbfass 1991: 168.

Like Śāṅkara, these commentators were well versed in scholastic concepts and terminology, including those of Advaitavedānta, Vyākaraṇa and Nyāya.

The Alamkāraśāstra has recognized eight *rasas* (later nine) since the compilation of the *Nāṭyaśāstra*.⁶ Corresponding to eight basic *sthāyibhāvas* or fundamental emotions, the *rasas* arise from a sensitive critic's imaginative experience of a *kāvya*, i.e., that verbal structure which conveys a delightful meaning.⁷ While a creative composition need not give rise to *rasa* to be called *kāvya*, for Jagannātha the best of the best (*uttamottama*) of aural artistry goes by the name *rasadhvani*.

The *rasa* par excellence is unquestionably *śṛṅgāra*. Its real world correspondent is love, one of the fundamental emotions; translators use “romance” or the “romantic *rasa*” for *śṛṅgāra-rasa*. Often forgotten is the important distinction between love and *śṛṅgāra*: the first is what we know from our own lives; the second, what connoisseurs experience during their imaginative interaction or communion with an art object, the experience being coextensive with the duration of that interaction.

The literary category *śṛṅgārarasa* has two subtypes: *vipralambha* and *saṃbhoga*. In Jagannātha's *Rasagaṅgādhara*⁸ the description runs as follows:

Among these (*rasas*), *śṛṅgāra* is twofold: love-in-union and love-in-separation. The first arises when love is delimited by the time of togetherness. The second arises when (love) is delimited by the time of separateness.⁹

Examples of both these types abound in the literature. Jagannātha himself supplies his own original *kāvya*s with great success. We quote here, however, two verses from the *Amaruśataka* (*AŚ*)¹⁰ in *śārdūlavikṛīḍitā* meter, to exemplify love-in-separation (example 1):

*prasthānaṃ valayaṅḥ kṛtaṃ priyasakhair asrair ajasraṃ gataṃ
dhṛtyā na kṣaṇam āsitaṃ vyavasitaṃ cittena gantuṃ puraḥ |
yātuṃ niścītaḥ priyatame sarve samaṃ prasthitā
gantavye sati jīvita priyasuhr̥tsārthaḥ kim u tyajyate ||. (AŚ 31)*

My bracelets have made their departure, tears, my close friends, have one by one gone off,
courage didn't linger for a moment and my heart resolved to lead them.
They all began their departures together when my dearest decided he had to go.
O life, since you too must go, why forsake the company of your close friends?

The verse's first line alludes to the conventional idea that a woman pining for a lover becomes so emaciated that her ornaments can no longer stay on. The mere idea that she will die of grief in her husband's absence is subsumed in a reader's experience of the depths of their love, even while separated. In order to understand the point which Jagannātha makes in this context, we must consider a second example of *vipralambhaśṛṅgāra* (example 2):

⁶ For details on the enumeration of the *rasas* see Raghavan 1967.

⁷ *RG* p. 4: *ramaṇīyārthapratipāḍakaḥ śabdaḥ kāvyam*.

⁸ This is not to imply that Jagannātha is the first to recognize such a distinction; cf. *Kāvyaaprakāśa* vv. 29-36 with *vṛtti*.

⁹ *RG* p. 41: *tatra śṛṅgāro dvidvidhaḥ saṃyogo vipralambhaś ca. rateḥ saṃyogakālāvachchinnatve prathamāḥ. viyogakālāvachchinnatve dvitīyāḥ*.

¹⁰ The three examples drawn from the *AŚ* are cited according to the sequence of Arjunavarmadeva, the oldest known commentator, whose text makes up the western recension. For a complete conspectus of the verse sequences in the *AŚ* see Appendix B of *AŚ*.

*sā patyuh prathamāparādhasamaye sakhyopadeśam vinā
no jñāti savibhramāṅgavalanāvakroktisaṃsūcanam |
svacchair acchakapolamūlagalitaiḥ paryastanetrotpalā
bālā kevalam eva roditi luṭhallolālakair aśrubhiḥ ||. (AŚ 27)*

When her husband makes his first faux pas she doesn't know – without her friends to tell her –
how to let him know she's angry – subtle statements, cool gestures ...
Lotus eyes brimming with glistening tears tumbling down clear cheeks
the young one merely cries, with locks of hair quivering to and fro.

Another verse, also from the *Amaruśataka*, exemplifies *sambhogasṅgāra* (example 3):

*sūnyam vāsaḥṣam vilokya śayanād utthāya kiñcic chanair
nidrāvyājam upāgatasya suciraṃ nirvarṇya patyur mukham |
visrabdham paricumbya jātapulakām ālokya gaṇḍasthalīm
lajjānamramukhī priyeṇa hasatā bālā ciraṃ cumbitā ||. (AŚ 82)*

Seeing their bedchamber empty, slowly inching up from the bed so slightly,
then, gazing long at her husband's face feigning sleep,
She freely kissed him – and then seeing his cheek bristling with glee
the young woman, her bashful face bent down, was kissed for a long time by her laughing lover.

With verses like these in mind, Jagannātha proceeds to make a distinction in how we are to differentiate “love-in-union” and “love-in-separation”:

Note that “being together” (*saṃyoga*) is not the fact that the couple is in the same place since [poets] describe valid cases of love-in-separation (*vipralambha*) even when [the couple] are on the same bed, when jealousy, etc., are present. In the same way, being apart, too, is not the property of being in different places, because of the problem (*doṣa*) just mentioned.¹¹

With reference to the second example, Jagannātha sees a problem, a double-edged sword that cuts both ways: the verse does not evoke love-in-union, though the couple are physically united; it rather evokes love-in-separation, though the couple are not physically separated. Commentators, starting with Nāgeśa, inevitably explore the phrase “because of the problem (*doṣa*) just mentioned.” The word *doṣa*, glossed or interpreted as *vyabhicāra*, implies a “deviation” from various models which employ the terms *anvaya* and *vyatireka*. These complementary concepts include a formula which serves as a relation of proof (foundational to Nyāya), as well as one which references a range of relationships via common presence and common absence. Deviations falsify relations (whether involving logical proof or, by contrast, “commonsensical” formulations) by demonstrating either a) the absence of the effect when the cause is present, or b) the presence of the effect without its cause. Nāgeśa's comment belies his assumption that Jagannātha's terse remark works with a formula predicated upon common presence and common absence. We can state the relationship underlying his reading of the problem as “when x occurs, y occurs; when x is absent, y is also absent.” So the couple's togetherness (x) violates the formula's first clause since love-in-union (y) should be present – but it is not. Conversely, if the verse's sense of love-in-separation (y) is palpable, they should be apart (x), but they are not.

In this regard, Halbfass makes an apt observation:

Anvayavyatireka as a combination of concomitant presences and concomitant absences may be used to support claims of identity and mutual reducibility, if it applies “concomitance” in the strict sense of a fully reversible, “homogeneous” relationship. In a less stringent manner, i.e., in the

¹¹ RG p. 41: *saṃyogaś ca na daṃpatyoḥ sāmānādhikaraṇyam, ekatalpaśayane 'pīrṣyādisadbhāve vipralambhasyaiva varṇanāt. evaṃ viyogo 'pi na vaiyādhikaraṇyam, doṣasyoktatvāt.* The key term is the penultimate: *doṣasya* (gen.).

sense of a statement and its contraposition, it is widely used in inferential reasoning, which does not normally require a reversible or homogeneous concomitance between the inferential reason (*hetu*) and the inferendum (*sādhyā*). In an essential, though often problematic and ambiguous sense, *anvayavyatireka* is related to the empirical ascertainment of causality (*kāryakāraṇabhāva*) or the relationship between means and ends (*sādhyasādhanabhāva*), and in general to the idea of order, regular succession and predictability in the universe.¹²

To establish the psychological nature of the terms “love-in-union” and “love-in separation” Jagannātha alludes to this method of reasoning. He expects readers to understand that the coordination of positive and negative concomitance entails cause–effect relationships vis à vis technical terms such as “love-in-union” and “love-in-separation.” These are effects – the results of a long tradition of literary criticism – insofar as they invariably reflect relations depicted in an inherited corpus of poems. We will return to examine Jagannātha’s perspective shortly. For now it will be useful to consider some assumptions made by his commentators.

The deviation which Nāgeśa envisions regarding a spatial understanding of the terms *viyoga* and *saṃyoga* can be summarized in terms of the following inference table (table 1):

1. Where there is (physical) togetherness literary critics use the term *saṃyoga*.
2. A jealous wife is in bed with her husband.
3. In that context the term *saṃyoga* does not apply.

Here we have a deviation known (in the commonsensical formulation) as *anvayavyabhicāra* (i.e., the cause is present, but no effect). In example 1 the lovers are physically separate and the term *viyoga* properly applies. It is the second example which causes a problem.

Nāgeśa explicitly pursues a parallel line of reasoning which leads to a deviation of another sort (table 2):

1. Where there is (physical) separation literary critics use the term *viyoga*.
2. A jealous wife is in bed with her husband.
3. In that context the term *viyoga* does not apply.

In Indian logic this deviation is known as *vyatirekavyabhicāra*; the cause (physical separation) is absent even though its effect (the application of the term *viyoga*) is present. Non-Naiyāyikas often refer to this same deviation as *anvayavyabhicāra* when it deviates from a model presuming the common presence of cause and effect (i.e., when x is absent, y is absent). In commenting on the text *evaṃ viyogo ‘pi na vaiyadhikarāṇyam, doṣasyoktatvāt*, Nāgeśa presumes that Jagannātha is working with this latter formulation. A review of the poems will help clarify: in example 1 the lovers are physically separate and the term *viyoga* properly applies. In example 3 the lovers are united and the term *saṃyoga* properly applies. Once again example 2 causes the problem. It is important to note that this formulation is *not* the corollary to inferential table 1. That is to say, Jagannātha has made no mention of literary examples which require critics to make an inference proceeding from cause (viz. separation) to effect (viz., love, of either subtype).

As a grammarian Nāgeśa is perhaps more familiar with *anvayavyatireka* as employed to indicate a concomitance of presence and absence.¹³ He understands that the word *doṣa*, taken with the first word of the sentence, *evaṃ*, refers to a situation which implies yet another inferential table (table 3):

¹² Halbfass 1991: 170. See Halbfass’ note 173 for specific references. The expression *anvayavyatireka* does not occur in the *RG*.

¹³ He supplies a characteristically terse comment in his (*Guru*)*marmaprakāśa*: *īrṣyādyabhāve vaiyadhikarāṇye ‘pi saṃbhogasyaiva varṇanād ity arthaḥ*.

1. Where there is (physical) separation literary critics use the term *viyoga*.
2. A wife, not at all jealous, is physically separated from her husband.
3. In that context the term *viyoga* does not apply.

Nāgeśa takes the word *evam* to mean “in the same manner” and the phrase *doṣasyoktatvāt* to mean “due to the flaw just mentioned.” His interpretation identifies the flaw or problem (*doṣa*) as the technical deviation *anvayavyabhicāra*. The third inferential scheme, then, is the corollary to the first. Mathura Nath Shastri, editor of the *RG*, adds a note of his own as to Jagannātha’s intent:

Even while staying in separate places, when love is present in the heart [of a man and woman] and when jealousy and the like are absent, it is not called “being separate” (*viyoga*), but rather, none other than enjoyment (*sambhogah*).¹⁴

Both Nāgeśa and Shastri argue that it makes no sense for physical separation to serve as the defining characteristic of “love-in-separation” (*vipralambhaśṅgāra*). With respect to the commonsensical formulation of common presence and absence, their reasoning is sound, but the result is very nearly absurd. The situation, which Nāgeśa has formulated as logically possible and which Shastri describes, is, in human terms, unlikely in the extreme: two lovers are physically separated and are so completely content in their separation that they consider themselves “united.” If questioned as to whether they would like to be reunited with one another, their mutually agreeable answer would have to be “What on earth for? – We enjoy perfect union!” It is doubtful if any poet has ever attempted to describe such a situation, in India or elsewhere.¹⁵ Such an emotional ambivalence can hardly be called love, for it calls for erasing the distinction between romantic love (heterosexual by convention) and platonic love. Further, should we come across an attempt to render such a scene, we would next have to find the sensitive critic who could imaginatively participate in experiencing *sambhogaśṅgāra* during its presentation!

In his commentary *Madhusūdani*, Madhusudana Shastri (*RG [M]*) also pursues Nāgeśa’s peculiar corollary shown in inference table 3. He not only accepts this formulation (perhaps understandable for a dutiful commentator) but he goes on to suggest the context for an example. He surmises that in the presence of a father-in-law, a couple (not impeded by jealousy) does feel as if physically united. It is significant, though, that no actual example follows. In the Chowkhamba edition (*RG [B]*) Badrinath Jha does not take up Nāgeśa’s remark. In a carefully worded comment, however, he avoids discussing the corollary which the wording of Jagannātha’s text prompts others to pursue.¹⁶

As mentioned above, Indian writers employ *anvayavyatireka* within two general spheres: (1) reasoning from common presence and absence, and (2) the logical realm which adopts a formula which serves as a relation of proof. Since Jagannātha uses the language and concepts of Nyāya we might expect his usage to correspond to the latter method. His statement identifies a cause just as Naiyāyikas present their stock example of inferring fire from smoke. Poets’ descriptions of lovers-in-union serve as the sign from which one infers their shared emotion,

¹⁴ *RG* p. 41, n. 2. His full note is: *prthaksthānasthitāv api manasi rateḥ sattve, irśyādinām cāsattve, viyogo nākhyāyate, api tu sambhoga eveti, vaiyadhikarānyasya viprayogalakṣaṇatve doṣa evety āśayah.*

¹⁵ Although material for the poet with such contrary ambitions may be found, for example, in Khalil Gibran’s letters to May Ziadah (Bushri and Kuzbari 1983).

¹⁶ *RG [B]* pp. 150-151. Jha merely avers that all critics agree that such verses evoke love-in-separation and all reject that love-in-union could apply. Ojha’s rather cryptic remark on this passage (*RG [K]* p. 105) recasts the issues in terms of overapplication (*ativyāpti*, with regard to *saṃyoga*) and underapplication (*avyāpti*, with regard to *viyoga*). This merely restates the dilemma in different terms.

the love (*rati*) which is the foundational emotion for *śṛṅgāra*. Moreover, just as certain factors may impede fire from causing smoke, so obstacles (such as jealousy) can prevent love. The *anvaya* of this formula is: Wherever an effect (y) is present, the cause (x) is also present. The *vyatireka* is: Wherever physical separation is absent (x) there is no application of the term *viyoga* (y). We can, accordingly, reformulate our data to account for deviations in these proof relations.

The deviation from the *anvaya* relation is (table 4):

1. Wherever the term *saṃyoga* is used, there is physical togetherness.
2. A jealous wife is in bed with her husband.
3. In that context physical togetherness is not the cause.

This inference fails quite obviously since jealousy blocks love. Such obstacles are traditionally considered to trigger love-in-separation, so love-in-union is ruled out *tout de suite*. Five are enumerated in the *Kāvyaprakāśa* (*vṛtti* on *kārikā* 29); the first of these, a separation or “frustration that takes the form of yearning” (*abhilāṣa*) satisfactorily covers the scenario adduced here.¹⁷ More importantly, this table is a non-starter since critics have never labelled such scenes as evoking love-in-union.

The deviation from the *vyatireka* relation is (table 5):

1. Whenever there is no physical separation, the term *viyoga* does not apply.
2. A jealous wife is in bed with her husband.
3. In that context physical separation is not the cause.

Taken together, tables 4 and 5 represent how example 2 mucks things up: deviations in both *anvaya* and *vyatireka* formulations are evident. It would be a happy resolution to conclude that commentators mistakenly use a more stringent formulation (involving common presence and absence) while Jagannātha instead employs the concepts as establishing a proof for the technical terms he has inherited. Unfortunately, the phrase *doṣasyoktatvāt* implies a single, common defect, whereas this resolution implies that both types of *vyabhicāra* (*anvaya* and *vyatireka*) are at work. Yet we need not argue that the text as we have it assumes the situation formalized by table 3 as several factors mitigate against this. Jagannātha’s reputation as a critic, his ability as a poet, and his sensitivity to the subtleties of human emotions (as demonstrated in his definitions of nine fundamental emotions and thirty-three secondary moods) precludes such an interpretation. At most, we can perhaps point out that his usage of the word *doṣa* in this context is idiosyncratic. What he really has in mind are the problems posed by example 2 for both the terms *saṃyoga* and *vipralambha*.

Since the focus of this paper has been on how the second example has been logically interpreted (or over-interpreted!) it might be appropriate to use Jagannātha’s own example of this subtype of *śṛṅgārarasa*:

śayitā savidhe 'py anīśvarā saphalikartum aho manorathān |
dayitā dayitānanāmbujaṃ daramīlannayanā nirīkṣate ||. (RG p. 12)

Though lying tight by – alas! so unable to fulfill her desires
The beloved gazes at the lotus-like face of her beloved with her half-closed eyes.

It is left to sensitive critics to decide whether this verse precisely matches the aesthetic result achieved in the second example from the *AŚ*. The fact that Jagannātha’s intent, as poet, is

¹⁷ For *abhilāṣa* see also *Dhvanyāloka* (*DhĀ*), pp. 216-217. The quoted phrase is used in the translation (Ingalls et al. 1990: 264).

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