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On the Career and the Cognition of *Yogins*¹

In the present paper, I shall first attempt to reconstruct Dharmakīrti's notion of a yogin's career on the basis of the statements one can find scattered throughout his very influential *Pramāṇavārttika*. I shall try to draw a coherent picture of both yoga and yogins, from the first insights (*prajñā*) that take place when still in the stage of an "ordinary person" (*prthagjana*), who is beset by a false view of self (*satkāyadr̥ṣṭi*), to the culmination of the yogic endeavour at emancipation (*mukti*) and/or enli-

¹ The present paper is the fifth in a series of studies of Dharmakīrti's religious philosophy, see Eltschinger 2005a and b, 2007 and forthcoming. Most sincere thanks are due to Prof. Ernst Steinkellner, Prof. John Taber and Dr. Helmut Krasser, who carefully read through the present paper, and to Mrs Cynthia Peck-Kubacek, who very kindly improved my English. Though I could not do justice to all his suggestions and remarks, I am much indebted to Prof. Eli Franco's very insightful comments on this paper. Since the present study was written in 2005, it did not take into consideration John Dunne's 2006 essay on the *yogins*' cognition. Dunne's exegetical hypothesis is, however, diametrically opposed to mine. To put it in a nutshell, Dunne argues that "Dharmakīrti does not choose to present yogic perception as a mystical gnosis that encounters or uncovers real things in the world" (Dunne 2006: 500), or, to put it in other words, that "Dharmakīrti deliberately chooses to downplay the notion that, through spiritual exercises, an adept gains extraordinary sensory abilities" (Dunne 2006: 504). As I shall try to argue in the second part of this paper, I think that Dharmakīrti actually *did* hold the opinion that, at the completion of the path, the *yogin* has a direct perceptual encounter with reality itself. In my opinion, Dharmakīrti inherits from ideas that can be found, e.g., in the *Śrāvaka-bhūmi*, and which have been summarized recently by Lambert Schmithausen. According to the latter (Schmithausen 2007: 232/79), "the contemplation process culminates in a non-conceptualizing (*nirvikalpa*) perceptual cognition or insight (*pratyakṣaṃ jñānadarśanam*) that transcends the mental image and directly apprehends the respective object *itself*." To be more precise, the path described in the *Śrāvaka-bhūmi* "culminates in a non-conceptualizing (*nirvikalpa*) perceptual cognition (*pratyakṣajñāna*) of the four Noble Truths" (Schmithausen 2007: 232/79). Research for this article was supported by the Austrian Science Fund in the context of the FWF-Project P19862 ("Philosophische und religiöse Literatur des Buddhismus").

ghtenment (*bodhi*). The description aims at presenting the religious conceptions that form the background of Dharmakīrti's epistemological account of a yogin's perception (*yogipratyakṣa*). In the second part of this paper, I shall adduce a new and somewhat provocative hypothesis concerning the still rather unclear subject of the nature of the yogin's cognition. I shall try to show that the properties Dharmakīrti ascribes to a mystic's perception (*pratyakṣa*), viz., vividness (*spaṣṭābhatā*), non-conceptuality (*nirvikalpatā*) and reliability (*avisamvāditā*), should be taken at face value. To put it in other words, I shall attempt to demonstrate why, though of an admittedly much higher type, the yogins' perception of the (Buddhist) truths does not differ from ordinary perception.

THE CAREER OF A YOGIN

1. On Ordinary Persons (*prthagjana*) and Nescience (*avidyā*)

1.1. *Prthagjanatva*. The intrinsically painful and unsatisfactory condition from which a *yogin* wishes to free himself is traditionally described as the state of an ordinary/worldly person (*prthagjanatva*). Buddhist definitions of this state are of a mainly negative character: the ordinary person is one in whose psychic stream the path of seeing (*darśanamārga*), the four noble truths (*āryasatya*) or, to be more precise, the supramundane (*lokottara*) noble factors (*āryadharmā*), have not yet arisen (see below §3.2). According to the Sautrāntikas, the state of an ordinary person – which is denied any reality as a separate entity² – is to

² The Vaibhāṣikas, some of whom at least classify *prthagjanatva* as a factor dissociated from the mind (*cittaviprayuktadharmā*), define *prthagjanatva* as follows (AKBh 66,9–12 together with AK 2.40bc₁): *mārgasyāprāptir iṣyate | prthagjanatvam | prthagjanatvaṃ katamat | āryadharmānām alābha iti śāstrapāṭhaḥ | alābhas ca nāma aprāptiḥ* | “[T]he non-possession of the noble path is held to be the nature of an ordinary person (*prthagjanatva*). As the *śāstra* states: ‘What is the nature of an ordinary person? It is the non-acquisition of the noble factors.’ Non-acquisition is a synonym for non-possession.” Translation (of Saṅghabhadra's *Nyāyānusāra* 399a) in Cox 1995: 202. According to Cox (1995: 223n. 102), *śāstra* here refers to *Jñānaprasthāna* 2, 298c5ff, and *Mahāvibhāṣā* 45, 232b9ff: “What is the nature of an ordinary person? The nature of an ordinary person is the present, past, and future non-possession of noble factors, noble heat, noble views, noble patience, noble inclination, and noble insight.” Translation in Cox 1995: 223n. 102.

be defined as follows³: “The state of an ordinary person is the stream in which the noble factors have not arisen.” Not surprisingly, Vasubandhu’s Sautrāntika definition coincides with the one put forth by Yogācāras, who hold the state (*gnas skabs = avasthā?*) of an ordinary person to be one in which the supramundane (*lokottara*) noble *dharma*s have not arisen (*ma bskyed pa = anutpanna?*).⁴ Idealist sources moreover regard the state of an ordinary person, which they also consider being besieged with erroneous clinging to (the notion of) person(s) and *dharma*s (*pudgaladharmābhīniveśasaṃmoha*), as the obstacle (*āvaraṇa*) that prevents one from entering the first Bodhisattva stage (*bhūmi*).⁵ Provided the *yogin* has not, still as an ordinary person, gone through (parts of) the so-called mundane path of cultivation (*laukika-bhāvanāmārga*), his condition is characterized by entanglement in ne-science (*avidyā*, or ignorance, *ajñāna*, delusion, *moha*) and the depravities, moral faults and defilements (*āsrava*, *doṣa*, [*upa*]kleśa, etc.) ne-science is responsible for, all of which make one subject to rebirth

See also *Siddhi* I.57–58. Note that, at least for the epistemologists, the category of *arvāgdarśin* (“jemand, dessen Erkenntnis von unserer Art ist,” Steinkellner 1979: 79n. 258) is wider than the category of *prthagjana*: whereas the second refers to those who have not yet entered the path of vision/first Bodhisattva stage, the first is often though not systematically used as an equivalent of *asarvadarśin* (“non-omniscient”), i.e., seems to refer to all persons who are not Buddhas.

³ AKBh 66,20: *anutpannāryadharmasantatiḥ prthagjanatvam* |. The *Mahāvibhāṣā* (45, 231b26–29) ascribes to the Dārṣṭāntikas the conception according to which *prthagjanatva* is no real entity (Cox 1995: 224n. 109). See also AKVy 154,28–31 on AKBh 66,20: *anutpannāryadharmā santatir iti. anutpannā āryadharmā asyām ity anutpannāryadharmā santatiḥ prthagjanatvam. anutpannāryamārgā skandhasantatir ity arthaḥ. arthād utpannāryadharmā santatir āryatvam ity uktaṃ bhavaty āsraya-parāvṛtteḥ.*

⁴ VinSg P77a8, as quoted by Kritzer (2005: 63): *so so’i sbye bo gnas skabs gañ la gdags | rnam pa du yod ce na | smras pa | ‘jig rten las ‘das pa ‘phags pa’i chos ma bskyed pa’i gnas skabs la’o ||.*

⁵ According to SNS 9.5.1 (see Lamotte 1935: 240), each stage or *bhūmi* opposes a specific type of error (*saṃmoha*), the first opposing *pudgaladharmābhīniveśasaṃmoha* (SNS 127,12–13: *sa dañ po la ni gañ zag dañ chos la mñon par žen pa kun tu rmoñs pa*). According to Vasubandhu’s commentary on MS 5.1 (see Lamotte 1973: II.196 as well as II.39*, which contains numerous bibliographical references to *prthagjanas*), *prthagjanatva* opposes the first stage. *Siddhi* II.642 explicitly identifies the SNS’s *saṃmoha* to Vasubandhu’s *prthagjanatā*, the latter being defined as the (*bījas* of the) *kleśa*° and *jñeyāvaraṇa* of the speculative type (see *Siddhi* II.639–640 as well as II.590).

(*punarjanman*) and re-existence (*punarbhava*), i.e., to the intrinsically painful (*duḥkha*) cycle of transmigration (*samsāra*).⁶

1.2. *Satkāyadrṣṭi*. Dharmakīrti identifies the traditional Buddhist concept of nescience with the equally traditional concept of false view of self (*satkāyadrṣṭi*, or °*darśana*),⁷ the latter being in turn equivalent to the belief in a self (*ātmagraha*) or in a (personal) being (*sattvagraha*).⁸ What does the false view of self consist of? According to Śākyabuddhi and Kaṇṇakagomin, *satkāyadrṣṭi* is to be explained as clinging or adherence to the self and one's own (*ātmātmīyābhīniveśa*),⁹ which is close to the definitions of *prthagjanatva* provided earlier by the Sautrāntikas as well as the Yogācāras. According to (the Sautrāntika) Vasubandhu, *satkāyadrṣṭi* consists in the false view of the self and one's own (*ātmātmīyadrṣṭi*),¹⁰ and is to be explained as an “aberration relative to the things which constitute the pseudoperson.”¹¹ According to the Yogācāra VinSg, which Vasubandhu most likely relied upon,¹² *satkāyadrṣṭi* it to

⁶ On *prthagjanas* in epistemological literature, see PVP D195a2–3/P227b6, PVT *Ñe* D205b2/P253b2–3 (*ad* PV 3.217b; for the context, see Eltschinger 2005b: 168–171); PVP D58a6/P66b1–2 (*ad* PV 2.140–141a; for the context, see Eltschinger 2005a: 415–416).

⁷ See Vetter 1990: 22–26 and Schmithausen 1987: II.517–519 (= n. 1421). On *satkāyadrṣṭi* in general, see Rahder 1932, *Kośa* 5.15–17 + nn. 2–3 (AKBh 281,17–282,3 on AK 5.7), TṛBh 23,12 and 29,21, *Traité* II.737n. 3. On the reasons for such an identification (rejected by Vasubandhu, see AK 3.29c), see Eltschinger (2007a, Appendix D, §1).

⁸ According to PV 2.211 and PV 2.196. For a more complete list of conceptual equivalents, see Vetter 1990: 22–23.

⁹ PVT *Je* D252a6/P299b8–300a1 = PVSVT 401,23: *satkāyadarśanād ātmātmīyābhīniveśāt* |.

¹⁰ AKBh 281,20: *ātmadrṣṭir ātmīyadrṣṭir vā satkāyadrṣṭiḥ* |, and AKBh 281,24: *ātmātmīyadrṣṭir eva satkāyadrṣṭiḥ* |.

¹¹ See AKBh 290,19–21: *apī cānāyor drṣṭyoḥ svadravyasaṃmūḍhatvād aparapīḍāpravṛttatvāc ca | svargaṭṛṣṇāsmimānāyor apy evaṃ prasaṅgaḥ | sahaḥ satkāyadrṣṭir avyākṛtā | yā mṛgapakṣiṇām apī vartate | vikalpitā tv akuśaleti pūrvācāryāḥ* |. English translation of *Kośa* 5.41 in Pruden 1991: III.798. See also AKVy 463,8–10: *svadravyasaṃmūḍhatvād iti. svasantatipatitānām upādānaskandhānām ātmātmīyātvena grahaṇāt svadravyasaṃmūḍhā satkāyadrṣṭiḥ* |.

¹² See Kritzer 2005: 292–293 (“Samghabhadra identifies this as the opinion of the sūtra-master [T. 1562: 618a17–19] and refutes it”). The first of the two passages quoted by Kritzer (2005: 293) runs as follows (VinSg P112b6–113a1): *de la 'jig tshogs la lta ba gañ ze na | ñe bar len pa'i phuñ po lta po dag la bdag gam bdag gir*

be defined as “the false view of self and one’s own (*ātmātmīyadr̥ṣṭi*), clinging (*abhiniveśa*) and ‘mentalization’ (*sems la ‘jog pa*) with regard to the five constituents-of-personality being clung to (*upādāna-skandha*).” According to all the schools mentioned – the Yogācāras, the Sautrāntikas, and epistemologists such as Dharmakīrti – this false view of self is twofold, viz. speculative (*parikalpita* VinSg, ASBh, LAV, PVP, PVT, *vikalpita* AKBh) and innate/spontaneous (*sahaja*).¹³ The speculative false view of self characterizes heretics (*anyatīrthya*, VinSg), i.e., substantialist philosophers such as Sāṅkhyas and Vaiśeṣikas (AKVy),¹⁴ and arises out of the meditation on (heterodox) treatises (*śāstracint[an]ādi*, PVT).¹⁵ The innate view of self is common to puerile worldly people (*bālaprthagjana*, VinSg) as well as to animals like antelopes and birds (*mṛgapakṣin*, VinSg, AKBh)¹⁶ and arises out of beginningless latent tendencies (*anādivāsanā*, PVT).¹⁷ According to Dharmakīrti, both the speculative and the innate false views of self characterize the type of living beings traditional Buddhist scholasticism classifies as ordinary persons.

1.3. *Pratītyasamutpāda*. Nescience traditionally forms the first link in the Buddhist twelve-membered chain of dependent origination (*pratītyasamutpāda*) and as such at least indirectly conditions thirst or craving (*tr̥ṣṇā*, or love, *sneha*, or desire, *rāga*). This craving is in turn regarded as the cause of suffering (*duḥkhaḥetu*), i.e., the factor that prompts deluded people to act in order to quench their thirst, hence to

ba lta ba dañ | mñon par žen pa dañ sems la ‘jog pa gañ yin pa de ni ‘jig tshogs la lta ba zes bya’o || de’an rnam pa gñis su rig par bya ste | lhan cig skyes pa dañ kun brtags pa’o || de la lhan cig skyes pa ni byis pa so ‘i skye bo thams cad dañ tha na ri dags dañ bya rnam kyī yañ yin no || kun brtags pa ni gzan mu stegs can rnam kyī yin par blta bar bya’o ||.

¹³ LAV 117,17–118,13, AKBh 290,19–21 (see n. 11 above), VinSg (see n. 12 above), PV 2.199 (see n. 47 below). Note that Prajñākaragupta and Manorathanandin call the first of these two kinds of *satkāyadr̥ṣṭi* “*ābhisaṃskārikā*,” Manorathanandin defines it as *skandhavyatiriktātmādhyavasāyinī* (see PVA 139,27–28 and PVP 79,20–23).

¹⁴ AKVy 463,17–18: *yā ātmavādibhiḥ kapilolūkādibhir vikalpitā |*

¹⁵ PVT *Ñe* D131b6–7/P162a7–8: *kun tu brtags pa ni bstan bcos sems pa la sogs pa’i sgo nas byuñ ba’o || lhan cig skyes pa ni thog ma med pa’i bag chags las byuñ ba’o ||.*

¹⁶ See nn. 11 and 12 above.

¹⁷ See n. 15 above.

be bound to *saṃsāric* existence.¹⁸ Dharmakīrti devotes many *pratītya-samutpāda*-like passages to account for the rise of craving and the other defilements out of the belief in the person. One of the clearest runs as follows¹⁹: “The one who sees a self has a constant love for this [self, thinking of it as] ‘I’. Because of [this] love [for the self] he craves for the delights [for that self, and this] thirst conceals [from him] the drawbacks [of the things he deems conducive to these delights]. Seeing [but] qualities [to these things], he craves [for them thinking of them as having to become] ‘mine’, and appropriates (*upā√dā*) the means [that are conducive] to them. Therefore he [remains] in *saṃsāra* as long as he clings to [that] self.” These texts exhibit the traditional chain that links nescience, craving, appropriation (*upādāna*) and (re-)existence (*bhava*[/*jāti*]), but fail to inform us further about the rise of passions or defilements other than craving. The PVSV provides us with the most exhaustive picture of Dharmakīrti’s account of the genealogy of defilements²⁰: “The birth of all kinds of [moral] faults is due to the [false] view of self [i.e., to the clinging to self and one’s own, and] this [false

¹⁸ See PV 2.146a (*duḥkhaṃ saṃsāriṇaḥ skandhāḥ*) and PV 2.185d (*tasmāt tṛṣṇā bhavāśrayaḥ*) in Vetter 1990: 53 and 88.

¹⁹ PV 2.217–218: *yah paśyaty ātmānaṃ tatrāśyāham iti śāsvataḥ snehaḥ | snehāt sukheṣu tṛṣyati tṛṣṇā doṣāṃs tiraskurute || guṇadarśī paritrṣyan mameti tatsādhanāny upādatte | tenātmābhīniveśo yāvat tāvat sa saṃsāre ||*

²⁰ “Genealogy” as a free rendering of Kaṛṇakagomin’s *krama* (lit. sequence, succession; PVSV 401,25–26: *kena punaḥ krameṇa doṣānāṃ satkāyadarśanād utpattiḥ*). *Satkāyadarśana* is the *prabhava* (PVSV 111,11, gl. *utpattikāraṇa* PVSV 401,20), the *mūla* (PV 2.196), the *ekayoni* (PV 2.211) of the defilements. PVSV 111,13–20 (together with PV 1.222): *sarvāsāṃ doṣajātīnāṃ jātiḥ satkāyadarśanāt | sāvidyā tatra tatsnehaḥ tasmād dveṣādisambhavaḥ || na hi nāhaṃ na mameti paśyataḥ parigrahaṃ antareṇa kvacit snehaḥ | na cānanurāgiṇaḥ kvacid dveṣaḥ | ātmātmīyānuparodhiny uparodhapratighātini ca tadabhāvāt | tasmāt samānajātīyābhyāsajam ātmadarśanam ātmīyagrahaṃ prasūte | tau ca tatsnehaṃ sa ca dveṣādīn iti satkāyadarśanajāḥ sarvadoṣāḥ | tad eva cājñānam ity ucyate |* See also PV 2.196ac: *mohaś ca mūlaṃ doṣānāṃ sa ca sattvagraho vinā | tenāghahetau na dveṣaḥ ...* “Delusion is the root[-cause] of [moral] faults, and this [delusion] consists in the belief in a [personal] being. In the absence (*vinā*) of this [belief, there can be] no aversion for a cause of evil (*agha*) [since the error of an injury to the self does not occur for one who does not see any self].” PV 2.211: *ātmagrahaikayonitvāt ... rāgapratighayoḥ ...* “Because both desire and hostility have the belief in a self as their only source.” PV 2.212cd: *tanmūlās ca malāḥ sarve sa ca satkāyadarśanam ||* “All the defilements have this [delusion] as [their] root[-cause], and this [delusion] is the [false] view of the self.” On this point, see Franco 2001: 295–296.

view of self] is nescience [itself]; with regard to the [object which is clung to as being self and one's own arises] love for those [i.e., for self and one's own, and] from this [love] are born such [evil defilements] as aversion. Indeed, the one who, without grasping (*parigraha*), sees that there is neither I nor mine, does not love anything and, [being so] unattached, does not hate anything [either], for there is no [aversion] for that which does not hinder the self or one's own, nor of that which opposes the [said] hindrance.²¹ Therefore the [false] view of self, which is born from the repeated habit (*abhyāsa*) of the [previous very] same [false view of self], generates the [false] view of one's own. Both of them then [produce] love for those [two things, self and one's own], and this [love in turn generates] such [evil passions] as aversion. Therefore all [moral] faults are born from the [false] view of self, and it is this [false view of self] that is called 'ignorance' (*ajñāna*) [in our doctrinal system]." Provided, once again, that he has not yet gotten rid of those defilements that an ordinary person can eliminate by means of the mundane path of cultivation, the *prthagjana* is first and foremost typified by his erroneous superimposition of ego-related aspects onto the selfless constituents of reality, and by the correlative defilements that make him slave to *saṃsāra* and suffering.

2. The Idea of a Way Out

2.1. Gotra, kalyāṇamitra and the śrutamayī prajñā. There are some reasons to believe that at least some of Dharmakīrti's commentators and epigones assented to the (mainly) Mahāyānist doctrinal complex that entails such key notions as *gotra* ("family"), *kalyāṇamitra* ("spiritual friend"), *bodhicitta* ("thought of enlightenment") and *prañidhāna* ("vow").²² Asked to account for the cause(s) of a Bodhisattva's first im-

²¹ See PV 2.219: *ātmani sati parasamjñā svaparavibhāgāt parigrahadveṣau | anayoḥ sampratibaddhāḥ sarve doṣāḥ prajāyante* || "When there is [a notion of] a self, [there is] a notion of the other; from [this very] distinction between a self and another, both grasping (*parigraha*) and aversion [are generated and], bound to these two, all the [moral] faults arise."

²² On *gotra*, see PVP D16a5/P18a3–4, PVṬ *Ñe* D88b5/P108a3–4, TSP K872,1–7/Ś1055,14–20 and PVV 20,12–17 (on this passage, see Franco 1997: 24); on *bodhicitta* and *prañidhāna*, see PVP D85a5/P98a1 (*byañ chub kyi sems sñon du soñ ba can gyi brtse ba*) and PVV 79,9 (*prañidhāna*). See Eltschinger (2008, §§3.2–3 and 5.4).

pulse toward the practice of compassion (*karuṇā*), Devendrabuddhi, Śākyabuddhi and Kamalaśīla mention a particular type of living being (*sattvaviśeṣa*, PVP), i.e., a (specific) family (*gotra* PVT, *gotraviśeṣa* TSP) that we must understand as consisting of the *bodhisattvagotra* (“family of Bodhisattvas,” in contrast to the families of the Hearers [*śrāvakagotra*] or Buddhas-for-themselves [*pratyekabuddhagotra*]). Indeed, the *bodhisattvagotra* is intrinsically linked to compassion.²³ His belonging to this family causes the Bodhisattva, *still as an ordinary person*, to generate the (conventional) thought of enlightenment and to make the vow of striving for awakening in order to alleviate the suffering of living beings.²⁴ Elsewhere I have argued that Dharmakīrti’s PV 2.131cd–132ab can be interpreted as providing us with a functional equivalent to the arising of the thought of enlightenment²⁵: “[Wishing to calm other people’s suffering,] the compassionate [Bodhisattva] engages in [the cultivation of] means to [calm suffering] in order to eradicate [his own] suffering: for whom the goal (*upeya*) and [its] cause remain imperceptible (*parokṣa*), it is indeed a difficult task to [correctly] teach [others about them].” True to a well-documented Yogācāra tradition, Devendrabuddhi, Śākyabuddhi and Ravigupta also consider companionship with and service (*sevā*) to a “spiritual friend” to be instrumental (< *pratyaaya*) in the the rising of the first impulse of a (novice) Bodhisattva toward the practice of compassion.²⁶ In addition to his exhortation to engage in compassion, this *kalyāṇamitra*’s main function is to teach Dharma or the path toward awakening (*bodhimārga*). From such a Buddha or skilled Bodhisattva, the *yogin* hears or learns ($\sqrt{\text{śru}}$) the Good Law (*saddharma*) or Word (*pravacana*) of the Buddha²⁷: this is the so-called wisdom born of listening (*śrutamayī prajñā*), which, just

²³ See MSA 3.5 together with MSABh 11,18, Maithrimurthi 1999: 268 and nn. 153–154.

²⁴ See BoBh D10,12–13/W15,11–12 and MSABh 15,2.

²⁵ PV 2.131cd–132ab: *dayāvān duḥkhaḥānārtham upāyeṣv abhiyujyate || parokṣopeya-taddhetos tadākhyānaṃ hi duṣkaram* |. See Eltschinger (2008, §§5.3–5).

²⁶ See Eltschinger (2008, §3.4).

²⁷ See Eltschinger (2008, n. 75). Interestingly, the Buddha’s Word seems to be nine-membered (*navāṅga*) rather than twelve-membered (*dvādaśāṅga*) in the few places it is mentioned by the epistemologists. See PVP D120b4–5/P139b3 (together with PVT *Ñe* D150b3–4/P186a2–3) and TSP K877,4–6/Ś1062,7–9. On this distinction, see Lamotte 1976: 157–159.

like the following “wisdom born of (rational) reflection,” the (novice) Bodhisattva obtains still as an ordinary person.²⁸

2.2. *Cintāmayī prajñā*.²⁹ The wisdom born of (rational) reflection mirrors the concerns of a human “type” who is ideally possessed of two properties: first, his desire to engage (*pravṛttikāma*) in a religious path and second, his practical rationality (*prekṣāvattva*, *prekṣāpūrvakāritva*). At this stage, the (novice) Bodhisattva submits the scriptural contents he has previously heard/learned to a rational inquiry (*yukti*) or examination (*parīkṣā*, *vicāra*, etc.) that mainly proceeds by means of inference (*anumāna*, *sādhana*). Wisdom born of (rational) reflection consists in an ascertainment (*niścaya*, *nirṇaya*) of scriptural contents through the so-called means of valid cognition (*pramāṇa*), and results in (a) cognition(s) that is/are termed “agreeing with the means of valid cognition” (*pramāṇasaṃvādin*), i.e., whose objects (*artha*) have proved to stand critical analysis by means of *pramāṇas* (*pramāṇa[pari]śuddhārtha*, *pramāṇa[pari]dṛṣṭārtha*) and hence are deemed to be worthy of (religious) exertion/endeavour (*abhiyogārha*). Typical of this kind of object are the four Noble Truths, which form the core or principal point (*pradhānārtha*) of the Buddhist teaching and which a rational person subjects to inferential investigation in order to assess the reliability (*avisaṃvāditva*) of scriptures (*āgama*). In a philosophical narrative,³⁰

²⁸ See MSAVBh D142b5–6 on MSA 9.76a₁ (*dhāraṇāt*): *daṅ po so so'i skye bo'i dus na dge ba'i bśes gñen la brten nas | dam pa'i chos mñan pa daṅ | mñan nas tshig daṅ don gzuñ ba daṅ gzuñ ba rnamś bśam žiñ ...* “First when [still] an ordinary person (*prthagjanakāle*), [the Bodhisattva] learns (*√śru*) the Good Law (*saddharma*) relying on a spiritual friend (*kalyāṇamitra* *āśritya*), grasps (*√grah*) the word (*vyañjana*?) and the meaning (*artha*) after he has learnt (*śrutvā*) [them] and reflects (*√cint*) upon the [things thus] grasped (*grhīta*) ...”

²⁹ On the *cintāmayī prajñā*, see Eltschinger (forthcoming 1). The present section is but a summary of (parts of) the second part of this study.

³⁰ PV 2.132cd–135: *yuktyāgamābhyāṃ vimṛśan duḥkhaheṭuṃ parīkṣate || tasyānityādīrūpaṃ ca duḥkhasyaiva viśeṣaṇaiḥ | yatas tathā sthite hetau nirvṛttir neti paśyati || phalasya hetor hānārthaṃ tadvipakṣaṃ parīkṣate | sādhyate tadvipakṣo 'pi heto rūpābodbhataḥ || ātmātmīyagrahaktāḥ snehaḥ saṃskāragocaraḥ | hetur virodhi nairātmyadarśanaṃ tasya bādhakam ||* “Reflecting on [the means and the goal] through reasoning (*yukti*) and the Scriptures (*āgama*), [the compassionate Bodhisattva] inquires into the cause of the suffering [that is to be eradicated] and, through the particularities of suffering itself, [he inquires also] into the impermanent nature, etc., of the [cause in question]. Since in this way [he who wishes to eradicate suffer-

Dharmakīrti relates how the compassionate Buddha-to-be, rationally and scripturally (*yuktyāgamābhyām*), reflects upon the cause of suffering and the antidote (*vipakṣa*, *pratipakṣa*) to that cause. The Bodhisattva first determines love (*sneha*, i.e., craving), itself generated by the belief in self and one's own (*ātmātmīyagrahakṛta*), to be the (destructible) cause of suffering. He then identifies the means (*upāya*) or factor (*dharma*) that is able to oppose, contradict (*vi√rudh*, *√bādh*) and destroy the cause of suffering: this antidote or antagonistic factor consists in the view or perception of unsubstantiality or emptiness (*nairātmya-darśana* or °*drṣṭi*, *śūnyatādrṣṭi*). In the stage of rational reflection, *pramāṇas* (i.e., inference) ascertain or determine the real aspects (*bhū-tākāra*, impermanence, painfulness, emptiness in the sense of the lack of one's own [AKBh 400,2–3], selflessness, etc.) of entities and hence provide the reflecting *yogin*'s cognition with aspects (*ākāra*) and objects (*ālambana*) that contradict, oppose or counteract the superimpositions (*samāropa*, etc., namely, permanence, delight, one's own, self, etc.) that ignorance, as a generalized erroneous perception (*mithyopalaḍhi*), is responsible for. What the *yogin* is intent upon here is nothing other than following a path that will enable him to counteract (*pratipakṣamārga*) the adventitious (*āgantuka*) filth of passions and

ing] sees that there is no end to the effect so long as the cause remains, he inquires into the antidote of the [cause of suffering] in order to eliminate it. [As for the *dharma* forming] the antidote of that [cause, it] is also ascertained by the [Bodhisattva's] knowledge of the nature of the cause [itself]. [That] cause [is] attachment bearing on dispositions, [an attachment which] is due to the belief in self and one's own; [as for] the antidote to that [cause, it is] the perception of selflessness which opposes it." On this important passage, see *inter alia* Franco 1989: 84–90, Vetter 1990: 11–12, Eltschinger 2005: 397–408, Eltschinger (forthcoming 1, §2.4) and Dunne 2006: 505–507. It is easy to show that this passage narrates the Bodhisattva's rational determination of the Noble Truths. PV 2.131cd–132ab present us with a mahāyānist account of the Bodhisattva's being struck by his own as well as the other living beings' suffering (*duḥkhasatya*). This of course needs not be further investigated since *duḥkha* is but an empirical fact. PV 2.132c–133ab and 135ac₁ account for the Bodhisattva's inquiry into the origin of suffering (*samudayasatya*), whereas PV 2.134bd and 135c₂d describe his determination of the path leading to the destruction of suffering (*mārgasatya*). As to the destruction of suffering (*nirodhasatya*) itself, it cannot be made the object of an analysis, but merely be hinted at, which we can observe in PV 2.133cd–134a, with its characteristic allusion to *nivṛtti*. On that passage, see in general Eltschinger 2005a: 397–408 and Eltschinger (forthcoming 1, §2.4).

hence establish his mind (*citta* = *vijñāna*) in its naturally radiant (*prabhāsvara*) and flawless (*nirāsrava*) condition.

3. The Path to Salvation

3.1. *Pratipakṣamārga*.³¹ According to Dharmakīrti, nescience consists in an erroneous perception (PV 2.213) that he identifies with the innate false view of self. This false view gives rise to thirst or craving, which is regarded as the cause of suffering. The *yogin* who is eager to rid himself of suffering will thus have to eliminate craving and other defilements by eradicating their cause. In other words, he will have to develop and cultivate the perception of unsubstantiality or emptiness, which acts as an antidote or antagonistic factor to the false view of self, in order to free himself from craving and suffering. This antagonism between *avidyā* = *satkāyadr̥ṣṭi* and *nairātmyadarśana* is based on the fact that these mutually opposing factors display contrary aspects of the object (*viparītālabhanākāra*).³² Two stanzas of PV 2 account well for this mutual incompatibility and for Dharmakīrti's general conception of the yogic path³³: "Having[, due to nescience,] superimposed sixteen unreal aspects, viz. 'lasting', 'pleasant', 'mine', 'I',³⁴ etc., on the four [Noble] Truths, one experiences craving [for such a superimposed object as delight, etc.].³⁵ The correct view, well cultivated,³⁶ destroys the thirst together with its suite [of defilements such as selfishness, envy, etc.,³⁷ insofar as this correct view], with regard to these [four Noble

³¹ *Pratipakṣamārga* in PVT *Je* D252a1–2/P299a8–b1 = PVSVT 401,12–13.

³² PVP D115b3/P134a4: 'gal ba de yañ* dmigs pa'i rnam pa phyin ci log pa'i sgo nas yin no ||. * = ma rig pa dan bdag med pa ñid mthoñ ba 'gal ba according to PVT Ñe D147a3/P181b5–6.

³³ PV 2.270–271: *sthiraṃ sukhaṃ mamāhaṃ cetyādi satyacatuṣṭaye | abhūtān ṣoḍaśākārān āropya paritr̥ṣyati || tatraiva tadviruddhārthatattvākārānurodhinī | hanti sānucarāṃ tr̥ṣṇāṃ samyagdr̥ṣṭiḥ subhāvitā ||*. On *anurodhin*, see Vetter 1990: 27n. 14.

³⁴ See PVP D115b4–6/P134a5–8 and PVT Ñe D147b1–3/P182a5–8.

³⁵ According to PVP D116a2–3/P134b4–5, Dharmakīrti shows now that the path is the counteracting factor because it is possessed with aspects that are contrary to the ones superimposed by nescience.

³⁶ According to PVP D116a6/P135a1, once the perception of unsubstantiality has become coessential (*sātmūbhūta*) with the mind through cultivation; on PVV 103,8 (*subhāvitā sādaranirantaradīrghakālābhyāsaprāptavaiśadyā*), see below §3.5.

³⁷ *Mātsarya* and *ir̥ṣyā* according to PVP D116a6/P135a1–2 and PVV 103,8–9.

Truths], conforms to (*anurodhin*) the real aspects of the thing³⁸ which are contradictory to the [ones falsely ascribed by ignorance].”³⁹ Nescience has one superimpose or grasp such unreal aspects as permanence.⁴⁰ Once craving and all kinds of defilements arise, they bear upon objects whose aspects have been superimposed.⁴¹ Now the perception of unsubstantiality entails or goes along with the sixteen real aspects of the Noble Truths,⁴² i.e., is provided with aspects that are contradictory to those superimposed by nescience. Cultivating this perception to its maximum degree of intensity, i.e., up to the point where it becomes essential to the mind or the psychic stream, will annul not only the innate false view of self, but also all the defilements that it gives rise to by providing them with (pseudo-)objects. Such is the basic structure and goal of Dharmakīrti’s path (*mārga*). Though this structure remains basically the same for all types of Buddhist *yogins* (Śrāvakas, Pratyekabuddhas and Bodhisattvas), differences are mainly concerned with the initial motivation (*nimitta, prayojana*) guiding the *yogin*, and hence with

³⁸ Literally: “aspects which constitute the true reality of the thing.” See Devendrabuddhi’s and Manorathanandin’s explanations in PVP D116a3/P134b5 and PVV 103,6–8 respectively.

³⁹ PVP D116a1–2/P134b3–4: *lam ma rig pa dañ ‘gal bar gyur pa na sred pa dañ yañ don gyis ‘gal ba yin no zes bstan to* ||. “[Dharmakīrti] teaches [here] that if the path is contradictory to nescience, it is [then] indirectly (*arthāt*) contradictory to craving too.”

⁴⁰ PVP D115b6–7/P134a8–b2 presents us with the following unreal aspects with regard to *trṣṇālakṣaṇo duḥkhaheṭuḥ*: erroneous superimposition of *asamudaya*°, *ahetu*°, *apratyaya*° and *aprabhavākāra*. PVT *Ñe* D147b3–5/P182a8–b2 supplies for Dharmakīrti’s and Devendrabuddhi’s °*ādis* in the following way: superimposition of *anirodha*°, *aśānta*°, *aprañīta*° and *aniḥsaraṇākāra* with regard to *nirodhasatya*; superimposition of *amārga*°, *anyāya*°, *apratipatti*° and *anairyaṇīkākāra* with regard to *mārgasatya*.

⁴¹ Note PVT *Ñe* D147b5–7/P182b2–4: *sgro btags nas ni yoñs su sred ces bya ba’i tshig gis log par sgro ‘dogs pa sñon du soñ ba can gyi sred pa ñid gsal bar bstan pa yin no* || *sgro ‘dogs pa’i yul la ‘jug pa’i sred pa de yañ sgro ‘dogs pa’i rnam pa ñid yin la* | *sgro ‘dogs pa’i rnam pa can gyi yul can gyi ñon moñs pa dañ ñe ba’i ñon moñs pa thams cad ñid ma rig pa ñid yin pa de ltar na de’i rañ bžin can ñid kyañ bstan pa ñid yin no* ||.

⁴² See AKBh 343,16–19 together with *Kośa* 6.163 (Pruden 1991: III.930) and, for definitions, AKBh 400,1–401,17 together with *Kośa* 7.30–39 (Pruden 1991: IV.1110–1116).

the length of the cultivation as well as with the quality or scope of the salvational result.⁴³

3.2. *Darśanamārga*. When he practiced rational reflection on scriptural contents, the *yogin* was still an ordinary person, and the compassion he was endowed with still bore upon a hypostasised notion of living beings (*sattvāmbana*).⁴⁴ To put it in a more traditional way, we could say that at this stage, the *yogin* was a Bodhisattva who has formed the initial resolution (*prathamacittotpādika*), abiding in the so-called *adhimuktī-caryābhūmi* (“stage of zealous conduct”). The supramundane noble factors that an ordinary person is *per definitionem* bereft of are those that arise on the so-called path of vision/seeing (*darśanamārga*), which (normally) opens up the Buddhist religious path properly speaking and coincides, in a Mahāyānist perspective, with the Bodhisattva’s entrance into the first stage (most commonly known as the “joyful stage,” *pramuditā bhūmiḥ*).⁴⁵ The state of an ordinary person ceases as soon as the *yogin* has entered the path of vision⁴⁶: at this time, the *yogin* becomes a noble person (*ārya*[*pudgala*]) and enters the path of those who are undergoing religious training (*śaikṣamārga*). Like all the path structures that have been inherited from the Vaibhāṣika *abhisamayavāda*, Dharmakīrti’s path is basically twofold, divided into a path of vision and a path of cultivation (*bhāvanāmārga*, though both are here included in the broader category of *bhāvanā*). Dharmakīrti spells it out as follows⁴⁷: “[Objection:] Inexistence (*abhava*) [i.e., liberation from *saṃsāra*,]

⁴³ For differences between the *darśanamārgas* of the Śrāvakas and the Bodhisattvas, see MS 3.15.

⁴⁴ PVṬ *Je* D24b6/P29b2–3 = PVSVT 53,9: *sattvāmbanā prthagjanānām* | “*sattvāmbanā*” refers itself to *karuṇā* and more generally, to the four “immeasurables” (*apramāṇa*).

⁴⁵ See e.g. BoBh D223,22–25/W326,22–327,1.

⁴⁶ There are at least two interpretations with regard to the nature of the noble factors referred to in the Vaibhāṣika definition of the state of an ordinary being: “To the non-acquisition of which factors does the nature of an ordinary person refer? [According to two interpretations, it is maintained that the nature of an ordinary person] is either the general non-acquisition of all (*sarva*) noble factors or the [specific] non-acquisition only of the presentiment of the knowledge of the doctrine with regard to suffering (*duḥkhe dharmajñānaksānti*).” *Nyāyānusāra* 399b as translated in Cox 1995: 203. See also *Kośa* 6.182–183n. 1 (Pruden 1991: III.1056–1057n. 165).

⁴⁷ PV 2.199ac: *satkāyadr̥ṣṭer viḡamād ādya evābhavo bhavet | mārge cet sahaḡjāhāner na ...*

should occur [already] on the initial path [i.e., during the path of vision],⁴⁸ for the [false] view of self[, which is the cause of the connection to a new birth,] ceases [at that time].⁴⁹ [Answer:] No, because [at that time] one does not rid oneself of the innate [false view of self].” We see thus that Dharmakīrti also accepted the two above-mentioned *satkāyadr̥ṣṭis*: whereas the speculative one is to be eliminated by the path of vision, the innate one, which arises from beginningless latent tendencies, can only be eliminated by the path of cultivation (*bhāvanā-mārgaheya*, PVT, PVV). Since one does not rid oneself of the innate *satkāyadr̥ṣṭi*, i.e., the cause of rebirth (*punarbhavahetu*, PVP), by the path of vision,⁵⁰ love for the self (*ātmasneha* PVP, *tr̥ṣṇā* PVV) continues beyond the path of vision and results in re-existence (*punarbhava* PVP, *janmaprabandha* PVV).⁵¹ This amounts to saying that such Bud-

⁴⁸ PVP D85a7/P98a4: *lam dan po ste | mthoñ ba'i lam*; PVV 79,19: *ādyā eva mārge darśanamārge*. According to Śākyabuddhi (PVT *Ñe* D131b5/P162a6), Dharmakīrti calls the *darśanamārga* the “initial path” because *darśanamārga* occurs before the path of cultivation, the path of those who are undergoing religious training (*śaikṣa-mārga*) and the path of those who no longer need religious training (*aśaikṣamārga*). On *śaikṣas* and *aśaikṣa* = *arhat*, see AKBh 365,16–366,7 and *Kośa* 6.230–233. The category of Śaikṣa covers seven types of saints or noble persons (*āryapudgala*) according to AKBh 365,18–19 (*sapta pūrvoktāḥ pudgalāḥ śaikṣā iti*), viz., four “candidates” (*pratipannakāḥ*) and three “abiders” (*phale sthītāḥ*, AKBh 366,1–2): the ones who are in the progress of realizing the four states of Srotaāpanna, Sakṛd-āgāmin, Anāgāmin and Arhat, and those who in fact are Srotaāpanna, Sakṛdāgāmin and Anāgāmin (AKBh 366,2–3). On the Srotaāpanna, see AK 6.29cd together with AKBh 353,20–22 (*Kośa* 6.194, Pruden 1991: III.953); on the Sakṛdāgāmin (*devān gatvā sakṛn manuṣyalokāgamanāt sakṛdāgāmī*, AKBh 358,1–2), see AK 6.35 together with AKBh 358,1–3 (*Kośa* 6.208–209, Pruden 1991: III.964–965); on the Anāgāmin (*kāmadhātvanāgamanāt*, AKBh 358,16–17), see AK 6.36d together with AKBh 358,16–17 (*Kośa* 6.209–210, Pruden 1991: III.965–966).

⁴⁹ Conclusion, PVP D85a7/P98a4–5: *de yañ mi 'gyur ba de'i phyir bdag tu chags pa skye ba'i mtshams sbyor ba'i rgyu ma yin no že na* |. “But it does not occur [at that time]; therefore, love for the self (*ātmasneha*) is not the cause of the connection to a [new] birth.”

⁵⁰ Note also PVP D121a1/P139b7–8 (about *abāhyaśaikṣas*, i.e., Buddhist *śaikṣas*): *lhan cig skyes pa'i 'jig tshogs su lta ba ma spañs pa'i phyir ro* ||.

⁵¹ See PVP D85b1–2/P98a5–7: *bdag tu lta ba'i rnam pa gñis te | kun brtags pa dan lhan cig skyes pa'o || kun tu brtags pa de ni de dag gis śin tu kun tu spyod pa'i chos ma yin pas na spañs pas de ni skye ba'i kun nas 'chiñ ba'i rgyur mi 'gyur ro || 'jig tshogs su lta ba lhan cig skyes pa yañ srid pa'i rgyu gañ yin pa de ni de dag ñid kyis spañs pa ma yin no || de ma spañs pa'i rgyu'i phyir bdag tu chags pa ma log pa ñid yin pa de ltar na yañ srid pa yod pa yin no* ||. PVV 79,20–23: *dvidhā hi satkāyadr̥ṣṭir*

dhist saints as the stream-enterer (*śrotaāpanna*), the once-returner (*sakṛdāgāmin*) and the non-returner (*anāgāmin*) are still possessed of an innate erroneous nescience (**sahajāvidyā viparītā*?) that they will have to eradicate by the path of cultivation.⁵²

3.3. Bhāvanāmārga. At the end of the path of vision, the *śaikṣas* of the *śrāvaka* type obtain the religious fruit or result (*phala*) they were a candidate for (*pratipannaka*) before entering the path. Depending on the extent to which they have, still as ordinary persons, eliminated the *bhāvanāheya* defilements by means of a mundane path of cultivation,⁵³ they obtain the results of stream-enterer, once-returner and non-returner.⁵⁴ As such they are reborn, respectively, seven times in the realm of desire (*kāmadhātu*), or only once, or no more, before they reach emancipation from *saṃsāra*, i.e., *nirvāṇa*. The supramundane path of cultivation they

ābhis[a]mskārīkī yā skandhavyatiriktāmādhyavasāyīnī sahajā ca | tatra prathamā darśanamārgaḥ hīyate | na dvitīyā bhāvanāmārgaheya | sā ca mohas tṛṣṇāyās ca hetur iti bhavati janmaprabandhaḥ | PVT Ṇe D131b7/P162a8–b1: *de dag ñid kyis spaṅs pa ma yin no zēs bya ba ni thog ma med pa'i bag chags las byuñ ba de ni bsgom pa'i lam ñid kyis spañ bar bya ba ñid yin pa'i phyir ro ||* For a similar distinction between speculative-*darśanaheya* and innate-*bhāvanāheya* *āvaraṇas*, see *Siddhi* II.572 and *Siddhi* II.639–640.

⁵² PVT Ṇe D131b7/P162b1–2: *bdag tu chags pa khas len pa ñid kyi phyir | rgyun du žugs pa la lhan cig skyes pa'i mi šes pa phyin ci log yod pa yin no zēs bstan pa'i phyir |* See also ASBh 62,3–4, as quoted by Schmithausen (1987: II.440n. 931): *sahajā satkāyadr̥ṣṭir bhāvanāprahātavyā: yām adhiṣṭhāya utpannadarśanamārgasyāpy āryaśrāvakasyāsmimānaḥ samudācarati |* “Innate [false] view of self is to be eliminated through cultivation: based on this (*yām adhiṣṭhāya*) [innate false view of self], egotism (*asmimāna*) occurs even in a Noble Hearer (*āryaśrāvaka*) in whom the path of vision has arisen.” ASBh 62,9–11, as (partly) quoted by Schmithausen (1987: II.440–441n. 932): *darśanamārgaṇa prahīnaparikalpitasatkāyadr̥ṣṭimalasyāpy āryaśrāvakasya pūrvābhīniveśābhyāsakṛtam ... āmadarśanam anuvartate yat tat punar mārgabhāvanayā prahātavyam bhavati |* “Even in a Noble Hearer in whom the impurity consisting in the speculative [false] view of self has been eliminated by the path of vision, the [false] view of self, caused by the repeated habit of former clinging, goes on existing, which is still to be eliminated by the cultivation of the path.”

⁵³ *Laukikabhāvanāmārga* at PVV 107,5–6; see also TS 3496–3497, and *Kośa* 6.iv–xi (Pruden 1991: III.xiv–xxii).

⁵⁴ PVP D85a7/P98a4: *rgyun du žugs pa la sogs pa*; PVV 79,19: *śrotaāpannasya*. PVT Ṇe D131b5–6/P162a6–7: *rgyun du žugs pa la sogs pa zēs bya ba la sogs pa'i sgras ni lan cig phyir 'oñ ba dañ phyir mi 'oñ ba gzuñ no || sduḡ bñial gyi bden pa mthoñ ba ñid kyis de dag gis 'jig tshogs su lta ba spaṅs pa yin no ||*

still need in order to get rid of the remaining defilements is then extremely short. Highly different is the situation of the *śaikṣa* who is destined for Buddhahood and not for Arhatship, and who, still as an ordinary person, had made the vow to reach enlightenment in order to alleviate living beings' suffering by teaching them the path to liberation. As far as I can see, this Buddha-to-be still must rid himself of three major elements as he exits the path of vision. (1) Like Hearers and Buddhas-for-themselves, he will have to uproot the innate false view of self together with its attendant defilements, but (2) unlike Hearers and Buddhas-for-themselves, he will have to eliminate these defilements together with their traces or after-effects (*vāsanā*), which regularly manifest themselves in Arhats through corporeal, vocal or mental deficiencies (*kāyavākcittavaiguṇya*). (3) The Buddha-to-be still must uproot the so-called undefiled nescience or ignorance (*akliṣṭāvidyā*, or °*ajñāna*, or °*saṃmoha*). To put it technically, the Bodhisattva must eradicate two kinds of obstacles (*āvaraṇa*) in addition to the innate false view of self: the obstacle that consists in the defilements together with their after-effect (*savāsanakleśāvaraṇa*), and the obstacle that conceals the knowable (*jñeyāvaraṇa*).⁵⁵ Needless to say, this threefold uprooting demands an incomparably longer path of cultivation than that taken by Hearers and Buddhas-for-themselves.⁵⁶ Whoever the *yogin* may be, the cultivation or repeated practice (*abhyāsa*) consists in the *yogin*'s practicing (*prayoga*) or generating (*utpādana*, *utpatti*) repeatedly, "again and again" (*punaḥ punaḥ*, *paunaḥpunyena*),⁵⁷ the salvational means, viz., the perception of unsubstantiality, in order to finally reach a direct perceptual realization⁵⁸ (*sākṣātkaṛaṇa*) of it.

3.4. *Anābhogatā* and *svarasavāhitva*. Dharmakīrti's conception of a Bodhisattva's cultivation is based on a Mahāyānist path structure that

⁵⁵ On all this, see Eltschinger 2005a: 408–436, and below §3.5.

⁵⁶ On the duration of the various religious careers (and especially the one of Bodhisattvas), see *Traité* IV.1842, and n. 5 (pp. 1842–1843), and *Siddhi* II.731–733.

⁵⁷ *Abhyāsa* is defined as *punaḥ punar nairantaryeṇotpādanam* (PVSVT 398,9), as *paunaḥpunyenānādikālam utpattiḥ* (PVT *Je* D252b7–253a1/P300b6 = PVSVT 402,19), or else as *punaḥ punaḥ prayogaḥ* (AKVy 649,26), or as *punaḥ punaś cetasi viniveśanam* (NBṬ S11,18–19/M67,5).

⁵⁸ See PVP D54b7/P62a8, PVA 108,20 and 26, PVV 57,4, TS 3339–3340ab, TSP K16,1–3/Ś20,12–13, K876,17–19/Ś1061,14–16, *passim*.

entails various stages (*bhūmi*) as well as the parallel development of insight (*prajñā*, *vipaśyanā*) and compassion (*karuṇā*, *kṛpā*, *dayā*).⁵⁹ In the most authoritative traditional accounts of a Bodhisattva's career (*caryā*), the entrance into the eighth (or seventh) stage (*acalā* DBhS, *niyatā* BoBh, or the tenth abode, *vihāra* BoBh) stands out as a decisive turning point. The Bodhisattva is now possessed of the "presentiment that *dharma*s (ultimately) have no arising" (*anutpattikadharmakṣānti*); from now on his progression is irreversible (*avaivartika*). Especially noteworthy is the fact that all the factors and operations characterizing him have now become spontaneous (< *svarasena eva*) on account of the intensity of the cultivation (*bhāvanābhūyāt*),⁶⁰ and develop without any intentional effort (*anābhogena*).⁶¹ This pertains to the Bodhisattva's wisdom as well as to his compassion, which from now on can properly be termed "great compassion" (*mahākaruṇā*), and which no longer bears upon anything (*anālambanā*, because the Bodhisattva no longer sees *sattvas* or *dharma*s).⁶² Note should also be made that the entrance into the eighth (or seventh) stage coincides with the acquisition of "unfixed" *nirvāna* (*apratīṣṭhitanirvāna*).⁶³

The epistemologists' assent to this complex of ideas can be easily documented. Dharmakīrti himself accepts the notion of an objectless compassion (*anālambanā karuṇā*),⁶⁴ which Śākyabuddhi and Karṇakagomin declare to be proper to Buddhas and Bodhisattvas who, in contradistinction to ordinary persons and noble beings (*ārya*), have rid themselves of the clinging to the object-subject dichotomy.⁶⁵ Moreover,

⁵⁹ Note Devendrabuddhi's explanation of *hetusampad* in PVP D57b2/P65b2: *bcom ldan 'das kyi thugs rje dan thabs goms pa rgyu yin no zes rgyu phun sum tshogs pa gsuñs pa yin no* ||. *Upāyābhyāsa* = *nairātmadarśanābhyāsa* = *prajñābhyāsa*. Devendrabuddhi's *prayoga* at PVP D57a1–3/P64b7–65a2 (see Eltschinger 2005a: 405n. 45) makes it perfectly clear that *nairātmadarśana* is *prajñā*.

⁶⁰ See BoBh D219,17–220,2/W320,24–321,2 and Eltschinger (2008, §4.3 and n. 103).

⁶¹ See DBhS (VII F) 58,6–9, (VIII C) 64,15–16 and 25–26, (VIII K) 67,10–19, and (VIII C) 64,26–27. This is also termed the *anābhogacaryā* at LAV 43,9 (see Suzuki 1999: 221–230).

⁶² See Eltschinger (2008, §4).

⁶³ On the *apratīṣṭhitanirvāna*, see the bibliographical references in Lamotte 1973: II.47*–48*; see also *Siddhi* II.671–672 and Nagao 2000: 2–4.

⁶⁴ See PVSV 9,14–15.

⁶⁵ PVT *Je* D24b6–7/P29b3–4 = PVSVT 53,9–10: *anālambanā grāhyagrāhakābhini-veśavigatānām buddhabodhisattvānām* |.

Dharmakīrti associates “great compassion” (*mahatī kṛpā*) with Bodhisattvas who are possessed of a durable substratum (*sthīrāśraya*) and remain in *saṃsāra* (in contradistinction to Śrāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas).⁶⁶ Last but not least, Dharmakīrti argues at length that compassion proceeds spontaneously (*svarasena*) as it becomes the very nature (*svabhāva*) of the psychic stream and no longer requires any effort (*yatna*) in order to increase.⁶⁷ The same doctrinal pattern also seems to obtain in the case of discernment (*vipaśyanā*), which, defined as “wisdom bearing upon unsubstantiality” (*nairātmyālabhanā prajñā*),⁶⁸ is equivalent to the already mentioned perception of unsubstantiality and the counteracting path it defines. The *yogin*’s nearly endless cultivation of *nairātyadarśana* gradually results in the latter’s becoming “co-essential” or “conatural” to the mind (*citta*), a process (or rather its result) the epistemologists usually describe in terms of *sātmya* or *sātmībhāva*: after a certain point, the mind or the psychic stream (*santāna*) acquires discernment as its own nature,⁶⁹ which amounts to saying that it is coessential with the perception or cultivation of unsubstantiality, also referred to as the path or the antidote of the defilements (*doṣapratipakṣa*/^o*vipakṣa*).⁷⁰ Devendrabuddhi uses the expression **anābho-*

⁶⁶ See PV 2.197–198, below n. 73.

⁶⁷ See PV 2.120–131ab, and Eltschinger (2008, §2) for an English translation and explanations.

⁶⁸ PVT *Ñe* D134b3/P166a1: *lhag mthoñ yin la zes bya ba bdag med pa la dmigs pa'i šes rab bo* ||. Note also BhK 1.219,23–220,4, where *vipaśyanā* bears upon the unsubstantiality of all *dharma*s (*sarvadharmāṅsvabhāvatālabhana*), and Kamalaśīla’s definition of *vipaśyanā* at BhK 3.5,17–20: *bhūtapratyavekṣaṇā ca vipaśyanocyate | bhūtaṃ punaḥ pudgaladharmanairātmyam | tatra pudgalanairātmyaṃ yā skandhānām ātmātmīyarahitatā | dharmanairātmyaṃ yā teṣāṃ eva māyopamatā* |. “La *vipaśyanā* est une analyse correcte. Elle est correcte parce [qu’elle porte] sur l’inexistence de l’individu et sur l’inexistence des *dharma*. L’inexistence de la personne consiste en ce que les agrégats sont privés de Moi; l’inexistence des *dharma* est le fait qu’ils sont pareils à une magie.” Translation in Lamotte 1987b: 340.

⁶⁹ PVSVT 400,13: *vipaśyanāsvabhāvāsyā*; PVP D90a1/P103b8: *rañ bžin yan lhag mthoñ ba yin*; PVSVT 401,14: *vipaśyanāsātmani sthitasya* (= PVT *Je* D252a2, as against P299b1).

⁷⁰ PVSV 110,18 (*sātmībhāvāt* – see PVT *Je* D249a6/P295b1 = PVSVT 398,11, where the *santāna* is said to be *sātmībhūtaḥ doṣapratipakṣa*, to be treated as a *bahuvrīhi* compound), PVSV 110,24 (*doṣavipakṣasātmatve*, where the *doṣavipakṣa* is *nairātyadarśana* according to PVT *Je* D250b1/P297a5–6 = PVSVT 399,17), PVSV 111,3 (*vipakṣasātmanah puruṣasya*), PVSV 111,8 (*pratipakṣasātmya*^o); PVV

ganairātmyadarśanaḥ puruṣaḥ to refer to this state,⁷¹ while Śākyabuddhi regards *nairātmyadarśana* as proceeding spontaneously (*svarasavāhitva*, or **svarasappravartakatva*).⁷² As for “unfixed” *nirvāṇa*, an allusion (at least according to Śākyabuddhi) is found in a passage in which Dharmakīrti contrasts Śrāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas on the one hand, and Bodhisattvas on the other⁷³: “It is not true (*na*) that there [can be] no liberation [from *saṃsāra*], because once the previous *saṃskāra* [= *karman*] has been exhausted, there is no connection to another [painful birth. However,] those whose *saṃskāra* is of unexhausted force do remain [in *saṃsāra* out of compassion, after having meditated upon the benefit of the other living beings,⁷⁴ and are] immaculate. And because compassion is weak [since it has not been cultivated intensively before], the effort in order to remain [in *saṃsāra*] is not great [and hence the abode in *saṃsāra* does not last]; on the contrary (*tu*), [those] whose commiseration (*krpā*) is great do remain [in *saṃsāra*, being entirely] devoted to the other [living beings].” It is commonplace in Mahāyāna literature for Śrāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas⁷⁵ to hasten to reach *nirvāṇa* because they are terrified of *saṃsāra*, whereas Bodhisattvas⁷⁶ remain in

59,24: *nairātmyabhāvanāsātmye*; PVT *Je* D251a1–2/P298a2 ≈ PVSVT 399,25: *sātmibhūtaṃ mārgam*; PVP D89b1/P103a5: *lam de'i bdag ñid can gyi sems*; PVV 83,14–15: *sātmibhūtanāрге*. Note Devendrabuddhi's definition of *mārga* at PVP D89b3/P103a8: *bdag med pa ñid mthoñ ba'i mtshan ñid can gyi lam* (cf. PVV 83,11: *nairātmyadarśanasya mārgas[ya]*). Note also PVT *Ñe* D133a6–7/P164a7–8: *dños po ji ltar gnas pa bžin du 'dzin pas žugs pa'i bdag med pa'i lam ni sems kyi rañ bžin ñid yin pa'i phyir ro* ||.

⁷¹ PVP D58a7–b2/P66b3–6 and D58a2–4/P66a4–6: *bdag med pa ñid mthoñ ba lhun gyis grub pa'i skyes bu*.

⁷² PVT *Ñe* D118b1–2/P144b8: *rañ gi nañ gis 'jug pa ñid kyis rañ bžin ñid yin pa'i phyir ro* ||. Note also TSP K895,8–9/Ś1082,22–23: ... *iti svabhāvatvena prajñādīnām sakṛdāhitānām svarasata eva pravṛttir bhavatīti siddham* |.

⁷³ PV 2.197–198: *nāmuktīḥ pūrvasaṃskāraḥ saṃskāro yeṣāṃ tiṣṭhanti te 'naghāḥ* || *mandatvāt karuṇāyās ca na yatnaḥ sthāpane mahān* | *tiṣṭhanti eva parādhiṇā yeṣāṃ tu mahatī krpā* ||.

⁷⁴ According to PVP D85a1/P97b3–4: *gal te chags pa med pa dag sñiñ rjes gnas pa de'i tshes sñiñ rje[s] gnas nas sems can gyi don yid la byas nas de dag yun riñ por ci'i phyir mi gnas* |. See also the *prayoga* that follows (PVP D85a1–3/P97b4–6).

⁷⁵ PVP D85a3/P97b7: *dper na ñan thos dañ rañ sañs rgyas dag lta bu'o* ||. PVV 79,11: *śrāvakāṇāṃ tu karmaṇo niyatakālasthītikadehākṣepakatvāt*.

⁷⁶ PVP D84b7/P97b3: *dper na byañ chub sems dpa' rñams kyi lta bu'o* ||. Note, however, Manorathanandin's (PVV 79,10) explanation of *anaghāḥ* as *samyaksambuddhāḥ*.

samsāra in order to honour their commitment to alleviate living beings' suffering.⁷⁷ Though these Bodhisattvas are dispassionate (*vītarāga?*) and “endowed” with an undefiled (*nirdoṣa?*) series of aggregates (*skandhasantati?*),⁷⁸ the force of their karmic impulses is unexhausted,⁷⁹ “because all [their] provisions [of merit and knowledge] result in un-fixed *nirvāṇa* (**sarvasambhārasya apratiṣṭhitanirvāṇaphalatvāt*).” Because of his great compassion, a Bodhisattva does not remain in *nirvāṇa* (unlike Śrāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas), and because of his insight or wisdom, he does not remain in *samsāra* either (unlike ordinary people).⁸⁰ As Devendrabuddhi puts it,⁸¹ “the reason why these great beings (*mahāsattva*) who are extremely affectionate without any [selfish] motive (*akāraṇaparamavatsala*) remain uninterruptedly [in *samsāra*] is [their] great compassion (*mahatī kṛpā*), which proceeds spontaneously (*svarasavāhin*), because its practice (*kṛpābhyāsa*) is preceded by the thought of enlightenment (*bodhicittapūrvaka*).”

3.5. Āśrayaparivṛtti and Buddhahood. The practice of the path ends with the so-called transmutation of the basis [of personal existence]⁸² (*āśrayaparivṛtti*), which, like Vasubandhu (the Kośakāra), Dharmakīrti interprets (only in PV 2!) from a Sautrāntika perspective as the final and irreversible elimination (*niranvayavināśa*) of defilements together

⁷⁷ See BoBh D27,9–28,6/W40,3–41,12, TSP K872,1–7/Ś1055,14–10, and Eltschinger (forthcoming 1, §2.6).

⁷⁸ See PVT *Ñe* D131b2/P162a1–2: *gañ 'du byed nus zad med can źes bya ba ni phuñ po'i rgyun skyon med pa skyed pa la | 'dod chags dañ bral ba gañ dag la las kyi nus pa zad pa med pa yod pa źes bya ba'i don to ||*.

⁷⁹ According to PVT *Ñe* D131b2–3/P162a2–3: [*dper na byañ chub sems dpa' rnam kyi lta bu'o źes bya ba ni byañ chub sems dpa' rnam ni las kyi nus pa zad pa can ma yin te | tshogs thams cad mi gnas pa'i mya ñan las 'das pa'i 'bras bu can ñid yin pa'i phyir ro ||*].

⁸⁰ See MSAVBh D63b5–64a4, and Eltschinger (2008, n. 51).

⁸¹ According to PVP D85a4–6/P98a1–2: *gañ dag sems can chen po rgyu med par mchog tu mñes gśin pa byañ chub kyi sems sñon du soñ ba can gyi brtse ba goms pa'i stobs kyiś rañ gi ñañ gis 'jug pa'i brtse ba chen po rgyun mi 'chad par gnas pa'i rgyu mña' ba [de dag gźan gyi ñor ni bźugs pa yin | sems can gyi don gyi phyir | dus thams cad du bźugs pa ...]* Note PVV 79,15: *yeśāṃ akāraṇavatsalānāṃ mahatī kṛpā*, as well as PVV 79,9: *yeśāṃ punar mahākṛpāṇāṃ prañidhānaparipuṣṭasya ...*

⁸² PV 2.205ab: *ukto mārgas tadabhyāsād āśrayaḥ parivartate |*.

with their (productive) latent tendencies or germs (*bīja*).⁸³ Whereas this (minimal) definition seems to be true of all the Buddhist liberated minds whatsoever, it must be considerably enlarged when regarding the transmuted basis of the Bodhisattva who has just (i.e., *ipso facto*) become a Buddha/Sugata. Dharmakīrti first spells this out in PV 2.135–136ab⁸⁴: “The qualities and drawbacks of the [perception of unsubstantiality and its opposite] become [perfectly] clear to the [Bodhisattva] who practices the means [i.e., insight/discernment] repeatedly, in various ways and for a very long time. And because of the intensity the cognition [of unsubstantiality has reached] due to this [extremely long repetition of practice], the after-effect of the cause [of suffering] is abandoned.” Because he sees in all clarity the qualities of the salvific means and the drawbacks of its opposite, the Buddha is able to instruct living beings in the path or the four noble truths,⁸⁵ i.e., is possessed with *śāstrīvasampad* and conversion through the teaching (*anūsāsanīprātihārya*).⁸⁶ But no less important here is the fact that, due to this nearly endless cultivation, the Bodhisattva has rid himself of the (non-productive) trace or after-effect of defilements. This after-effect of defilements consists in a corporeal (*kāya*°), verbal (*vāc*°) and mental (*buddhi*°) defectiveness (*vaiguṇya*) or unwieldiness (*akarmaṇyatā*).⁸⁷ This still affects liberated saints like the Arhat Maudgalyāyana, who kept hopping around because he had been born as a monkey 500 lifetimes earlier, or the Arhat Pilindavatsa who, because he had been a *brāhmaṇa* before, continued to say harsh and belittling words to his

⁸³ On the *āśrayaparivṛtti* in Dharmakīrti’s works, see Eltschinger 2005b. *Niranvayavināśadharman* in PVSV 110,22, TSP K875,20/Ś1060,13, is explained by Śākyabuddhi and Karṇakagomin (PVT *Je* D250a3–4/P296b5–7 = PVSVT 399,7–9) as follows: *anvayaḥ kleśabījam | anvety utpadyate ’smād doṣa iti kṛtvā | nirgato ’nvayo yasmīn vināśe sa niranvayavināśaḥ | sa dharmo yeṣāṃ doṣānāṃ te niranvayavināśadharmāṇaḥ | vāsanayā saha vināśadharmāṇa ity arthaḥ |*. On Vasubandhu’s views as regards *āśrayaparivṛtti*, see Eltschinger 2005b: 181–182.

⁸⁴ PV 2.135–136ab: *bahuśo bahudhopāyaṃ kālena bahunāśya ca | gacchanty abhīkṣyatas tatra guṇadoṣāḥ prakāśatām || buddheś ca pāṭavād dhetor vāsanātaḥ prahīyate |*.

⁸⁵ As a *tāyin* or “protector” of the living beings (see PV 2.145–146ab).

⁸⁶ PVP D61a2–3/P69b5–7 (Eltschinger 2005a: 424). See *Kośa* 7.110–112 (Pruden 1991: IV.1166–1167).

⁸⁷ See PV 2.141c.

fellow monks.⁸⁸ In other words, the (Bodhisattva/)Buddha has eliminated the obstacle consisting of defilements together with their after-effects (*savāsanakleśāvaraṇa*). But yet another type of abandonment distinguishes him from Śrāvakas and Pratyekabuddhas: contrary to them (or to Arhats), a Buddha has rid himself of unskilfulness in teaching the path (*mārgoktyapaṭutā*),⁸⁹ which I interpret as Dharmakīrti's allusion to undefiled ignorance (*akliṣṭāvidyā*, °*ajñāna*, °*saṃmoha*).⁹⁰ If this hypothesis holds good, we can safely consider our Bodhisattva's transmutation of the basis also to entail the elimination of the obstacle that conceals the knowable (*jñeyāvaraṇa*, and hence an omniscience of the *sarvasarvajñatā*-type), for the equation *akliṣṭāvidyā* = *jñeyāvaraṇa* is easy to document in Buddhist Mahāyāna literature.⁹¹ Moreover, most of the definitions of *āśrayaparivṛtti* include the elimination of both obstacles, the epistemologists being no exception.⁹²

THE COGNITION OF A YOGIN

4. Yogijñāna as an Epistemological Topic

Let us now turn to the epistemological dimension of yoga proper.⁹³ Dharmakīrti devotes two main passages to the so-called perception of

⁸⁸ On the *vāsanāsamudghāta*, see Lamotte 1974, *Traité* IV.1755–1758, and Eltschinger 2005a: 419–422. On the story of Maudgalyāyana, see PVT *Ñe* D118b4–5/P145a4–5, Lamotte 1973: II.300, *Traité* I.117n. 4 and Lamotte 1974: 92. On the story of Pilindavatsa, see PVT *Ñe* D118b5–6/P145a5–7.

⁸⁹ See PV 2.141d.

⁹⁰ See AKBh 1,13–15 (*Kośa* 1.2, Pruden 1991: I.1–2), Jaini 2001: 167–179, Eltschinger 2005a: 423–424.

⁹¹ See Eltschinger 2005a: 429–434.

⁹² See PVT *Je* D115a1/P135b6 ≈ PVSVT 211,8–9.

⁹³ Among Buddhist philosophers, Dignāga (480–540?) is likely to have been the first one to discuss the perception of mystics within the general framework of perception (*pratyakṣa*) as a means of valid cognition. However, the following statement seems to exhaust Dignāga's opinion on the subject: “[T]he *yogin*'s intuition of a thing in itself unassociated (*avyatibhinna*) with the teacher's instruction [is also a type of perception]. The *yogin*'s perception which is not associated (*avyavakīrṇa*) with any conceptual construction of *āgama* (the authoritative words of the teachers) and which apprehends only a thing in itself is also perception.” Hattori's (1968: 27) translation of PS 1.6cd and PSV thereon. Sanskrit texts (< Vibh. 191n. 3 and 203n. 1) in Hattori 1968: 94 nn. 1.48 (*yoginām gurunirdeśavyatibhinnārthamātradṛk*) and

yogins (*yogipratyakṣa*),⁹⁴ both of which refer their reader back to the religious ideas we have considered so far, i.e., to the religious philosophy as expounded in PV 2. What do yoga and *yogins* consist of? Dharmottara (740–800) is one of the few authors to supply any substantial definitions of these two terms. According to ordinary understanding (*loka*), yoga consists of (psychic) concentration (*samādhi*), but according to (Buddhist) authoritative treatises (*śāstra*), it consists of tranquillity (of mind, *śamatha*) and discernment (*vipaśyanā*), which have (psychic) concentration and insight (*prajñā*) for their nature (°*ātman*), respectively. A *yogin* is one who is possessed of tranquillity of mind and discernment into the nature of things, one who strives for constant concentration (< *nityasamāhita*) and discrimination of true reality (*tattva-pravicaya*?).⁹⁵

1.49 (*yoginām apy āgamavikalpāvyavakīrṇam arthamātradarśanam pratyakṣam*). Steinkellner's reconstruction of PS(V) 1.6ab reads as follows: *yoginām gurunirdeśāvyavakīrṇārthamātraḍṛk* |. Note that PSV is also quoted in PVP D210b3/P246b56. Interestingly enough, Dignāga's presentation is based on two notions the subsequent tradition will seemingly disregard. First, the perception of *yogins* grasps a "thing in itself" (*arthamātra*); this expression I do not dare interpret further than Jinen-drabuddhi's comment to the effect that °*mātra* ("only," "in itself" in Hattori's translation) aims at excluding superimposed objects (PST 56,15–57,1: *mātraśabdo 'dhyāropitārthavyavacchedārthaḥ* |). Second, this perception is totally free from, or unmixed with scriptural concepts (*āgamavikalpa*), which on the one side matches the definitory non-conceptuality of perception well, but on the other side *seems* to conflict with the subsequent tradition's insistence upon the four Noble Truths (on this point, see Franco in present volume).

⁹⁴ PV 3.281–286, PVin 1.27,7–28,8; see also NB 1.11. On *yogipratyakṣa*, see Vetter 1964: 41, Steinkellner 1978, McDermott 1991, Pemwieser 1991: 21–50, Dreyfus 1997: 413–414.

⁹⁵ According to the following passages: PVinṬ D117b2–3/P135b1–2: 'jig rten na ni mñam par gžag pa la rnal 'byor (em. 'byor: DP 'byor ba) yin la | bstan bcos las ni tiñ ne 'dzin dan śes rab kyi bdag ñid ži gnas dan lhag mthoñ la yin te | rnal 'byor ba de dag la yod pa de dag ni rnal 'byor bas te | rtag tu mñam par gžag pa dan | de kho na rnam par 'byed pa la brtson pa'o ||. NBṬ S12,8–9/M70,2: *yogaḥ samādhiḥ | sa yasyāsti sa yogī* | (≈ PST 56,12: *yogaḥ samādhiḥ | sa yeṣām asti, te yoginaḥ* |), and DhPr 70,19–22 thereon: *yogaśabdasya vyutpattim āha | yoga iti | samādhiś cittaikāgratā | iha dharmottareṇa lokaprasiddhir āśritā | viniścayaṭīkāyaṃ tu śāstrasthitis tenāvirodhaḥ | yad vā samādhi-grahaṇasyopalakṣaṇatvāt prajñā ca vivekakarāṇaśaktir draṣṭavyā | sa yasyāsti sa nityasamāhito vivekakarāṇatatparaś ca yogī* |. PVA 327,17–18: *tathā ca śamathavipaśyanāyuganaddhavāhī mārgo yoga iti vacanam* |.

Let us start with Dharmakīrti's definition of perception in his PVin and NB, and disregard the possible evolution of his ideas on this topic (cf. Franco, forthcoming). In PVin 1.4ab₁, Dharmakīrti defines perception as cognition that is free from conceptual thought (*kalpanā-podha*) and is non-erroneous (*abhrānta*),⁹⁶ conceptual thought being in turn characterized as a cognition whose appearance or image *may* be expressed verbally.⁹⁷ We may thus offer two defining conditions that the cognition of a *yogin* must meet in order to be termed a "perception": first, it must be non-conceptual (and hence its content cannot be adequately expressed by words); second, it must be non-erroneous and reliable/non-belying (*avisamvādin*). The criterion of a given cognition's non-conceptual character lies in its presenting a clear or vivid (*spaṣṭa*, *sphuṭa*) appearance or image. The vividness and hence the non-conceptuality of a *yogin*'s cognition comes from the fact that this cognition is born of cultivation (*bhāvanāmaya*, etc.) and arises out of this virtually endless process characterized as *punaḥ punar utpādanam*, as we have seen above.⁹⁸ Dharmakīrti spells this out as follows⁹⁹: "[We have already] presented the cognition of the *yogins* above [in the second chapter]. This [cognition] of the [*yogins*] is born of cultivation [and therefore is] free from the [deceptive] net of conceptual thought (*kalpanā*); because it is of a non-conceptual character, this cognition] presents a vivid image." This depiction is indeed the forerunner of Dharmakīrti's opening statement on the subject in PVin 1, where the second definitory criterion has been duly integrated¹⁰⁰: "That cognition which, as in the case of fear, etc., vividly appears by force of cultivation, [and which is]

⁹⁶ PVin 1.4ab₁ = NB 1.4: *pratyakṣam kalpanāpoḍham abhrāntam*. Note also Dharmotara's (PVinṬ D117a4/P135a2–3) definition of *pratyakṣa* in this context: *gsal bar snañ ba don byed par bzod pa'i dños po'i rañ bzin la ma 'khrul pa dan | rtogs pa med pa'i śes pa ni mñon sum yin no* ||.

⁹⁷ PVin 1.7.7 ≈ NB 1.5: *abhilāpasamśargayogyapratibhāsā pratītiḥ kalpanā* |.

⁹⁸ See n. 57 above.

⁹⁹ PV 3.281: *prāg uktaṃ yoginām jñānaṃ teṣāṃ tad bhāvanāmayaṃ | vidhūtakalpanājālaṃ spaṣṭam evāvabhāsate* ||. To be connected with PV 3.285 = PVin 1.31: *tasmād bhūtam abhūtaṃ vā yad yad evātibhāvyate | bhāvanāpariṇiṣpattau tat sphuṭākālpadhīphalam* ||. "Therefore, [be it] real or unreal, whatever is intensively meditated upon (*atibhāvyate*) results in a clear and non-conceptual cognition when the cultivation is perfected."

¹⁰⁰ PVin 1.28: *bhāvanābalataḥ spaṣṭam bhayādāv iva bhāsate | yaj jñānam avisamvādi tat pratyakṣam akalpakam* ||.

reliable [as well as] non-conceptual (*akalpa*), this is a [direct] perception [too].” As Dharmottara has it,¹⁰¹ “due to cultivation, [this cognition] appears vividly; because it appears vividly, [this cognition] is established (*siddha*) as non-conceptual; since it bears upon an entity that has been ‘purified’ by the means of valid cognition (*pramāṇa-pariśuddhavastuviṣaya*), [this cognition] is non-erroneous; therefore, why should it not be a perception, [if all] the other perceptions also appear vividly, are non-conceptual and non-erroneous?”

A cognition’s being the outcome of the intense cultivation of an object by no means implies that the said cognition bears upon a real (*bhūta*) object (*artha*, *viṣaya*). Dharmakīrti adduces several examples in order to show that the cultivation of unreal (*abhūta*) objects may also result in a vivid and hence non-conceptual cognition. He says¹⁰²: “[People who are] deluded by confusion due to love, sorrow or fear, and by dreams about thieves, etc.,¹⁰³ see [the respective objects] as if [these would] stand before [them,] though [these objects are] unreal.” But, one may ask, how do we know that these deluded persons see, because of their cultivation of it, the object as if it would stand before them?¹⁰⁴ This is to be inferred on the basis of these persons’ outward behaviour, as Dharmakīrti says¹⁰⁵: “Since we see that, in accord with the delusion

¹⁰¹ PVinT D117a7–b1/P135a7–b1: *bsgoms pas gsal bar snañ žiñ | gsal bar snañ ba’i phyir nram par rtog pa med par grub pa yin la | tshad mas yoñs su dag pa’i dños po’i yul can yin pa’i phyir ma ’khrul pa yin pas ci’i phyir mñon sum ñid du mi ’gyur | mñon sum gžan yañ gsal bar snañ ba dañ rtog pa dañ bral žiñ ma ’khrul pa yin no ||.*

¹⁰² PV 3.282 = PVin 1.29: *kāmaśokabhayonmādacaurasvapnādyupaplutāḥ | abhūtān api paśyanti purato ’vasthitān iva ||.* According to PVP D210b5/P247a1, this stanza answers the following question: *gañ dañ gañ śin tu bsgoms pa de dañ de las gsal bar snañ bar ’gyur ro žes bya ba de ñid gañ las yin že na |.*

¹⁰³ PVP D210b7/P247a4 explains “etc.” as: *myur du bskor ba dañ ’chi ltas la sogs pa gzuñ ño ||.* See also PVT Ñe D215b6–7/P266b1–2 thereon: *sogs pa smos pas ni myur du bskor ba dañ ’chi ltas la sogs pa gzuñ ño žes bya ba la | ’di ltar ’khor lo bžin du lus myur du bskor ba las dños po g.yo ba med pa yañ g.yo ba bžin du gsal bar dmigs par ’gyur ba ’añ ’chi ba’i dus na lus dañ sems kyi gnas skabs ’ga’ žig ’chi ltas kyi miñ can dños po yañ dag pa ma yin pa mthoñ bar ’gyur ro ||.*

¹⁰⁴ PVinT D119a1/P137a4: *yañ de dag gis de mdun na gnas pa bžin du mthoñ ba žes bya ba ’di gañ las še na |.*

¹⁰⁵ PVin 1.30ab: *yathāviplavam āvegapatipattipradarśanāt |.* “To be inferred” according to Vibh. 203n. 3 (*anumeya*). Eli Franco kindly suggests to me that one can interpret this statement in a slightly different manner: ... since they show (their delusional) cognition by their agitation.

[they are the victims of], they act with agitation.” Some explanations may not be out of place. By “agitation” (*āvega*), we should understand physical states such as trembling with joy, or being thrilled (*romaharṣa*). By “behaviour” is meant a physical action (*anuṣṭhāna*) that conforms to the specific vision of a deluded person: the first will stretch his arms out in order to embrace his beloved, the second mourns or sighs, and the third boastfully seizes a sword.¹⁰⁶ But one may also wonder why the cognition at stake should be of an immediate (*pratyakṣa*) rather than of a mediate (*parokṣa*) character.¹⁰⁷ This Dharmakīrti answers as follows¹⁰⁸: “Because we do not see any behaviour of that kind when [someone] is conscious that his/her cognition is a mediate one (*parokṣa*).”

However, cultivating unreal objects is by no means limited to deluded or passionate people. The Buddhist meditation exercises that build up, among other things, the (remote) preparatory path (*prayoga-mārga*) are also endowed with utterly unreal objects, as Dharmakīrti tells us in both his PV and PVi¹⁰⁹: “We hold that, though [they are] unreal, the loathsome, the totality of earth, etc., which are created by force of cultivation, are vivid and [hence] non-conceptual.” This includes meditation such as cognizing a corpse turning blue (*vinīlaka*) or rotting (*vipūyaka*), or of a corpse that has become a skeleton (*asthi-*

¹⁰⁶ See PViT D119a1–3/P137a4–6: *gus pas ni grims pa ste | spro ba'i dbaṅ gis 'dar ba'i mtshan ñid can nam ba spu laṅs mtshan ñid kyi lus kyi gnas skabs so || bsgrub pa ni mthoṅ ba daṅ rjes su mthun par nan tan du byed pa ste | sdug pa la sogs 'dren pa daṅ | 'di na su su žes smra ba daṅ | ña rgyal daṅ bcas pa ral gri la sogs pa la 'ju ba ste |* PVP D210b7–211a1/P247a5–6: *de ltar na de ltar mthoṅ bas don mñon du gyur pa bžin du | de daṅ rjes su mthun par bsgrubs pa la dmigs par 'gyur na | gaṅ gis na de dag 'dir lkog tu gyur pa'i miñ can du yaṅ 'gyur ba ma yin no žes bya ba de ñes par gzuñ bar mi 'gyur |* PVV 203,9: *yasmāt tadanurūpāṃ pravṛttiṃ ceṣṭante |*

¹⁰⁷ According to PViT D119a3/P137a6–7: *'di sñam du gus pas bsgrub pa mthoṅ du zin kyaṅ | mñon sum bžin du de dag gsal bar snaṅ ba yin par ji ltar ñes še na |*

¹⁰⁸ PVi 1.30cd: *parokṣagatisamjñāyām tathāvṛtter adarśanāt ||*

¹⁰⁹ PV 3.284: *aśubhāpṛthivīkṛtsnādy abhūtam api varṇyate | spaṣṭābhaṃ nīrvikalpaṃ ca bhāvanābalanīrmitam ||* PVi 1.28,7–8: *tathā hy aśubhāpṛthivīkṛtsnādīkam abhūta- viṣayam api spaṣṭapratibhāsaṃ nīrvikalpakaṃ ca bhāvanābalanīṣpannam iṣyate ||* “It is indeed accepted [by us Buddhists] that [meditative exercises] like [the contemplation of] the loathsome and the totality of earth, which arise by force of cultivation, present a vivid image and are non-conceptual despite [their] having an unreal object.”

saṅkalā),¹¹⁰ or meditation that has all entities (*vastu*) appearing as the earth, or as water, as they have unreal objects despite the fact that the image they display is perfectly clear once the cultivation process has been completed.¹¹¹ The reason why these meditations have unreal objects is, according to Vaibhāṣikas and to Dharmottara, that they consist in acts of attention that are directed towards imaginary or, better, volitional objects (*adhimuktimanas[i]kāra*).¹¹²

Since they arise from intensive cultivation of their objects, the aforementioned direct or immediate cognitions display a vivid image and hence are non-conceptual. In this respect, they all meet the first defining condition of a perception. But since they bear upon imaginary or volitional objects such as a beloved, an enemy or a putrefying corpse, they fail to meet the second. As belying/unreliable (*visaṃvādin*, *asaṃvādin*) cognitions, they do not lay claim to the “validity” that is inherent in a true perception. As Dharmakīrti himself says,¹¹³ “among these [vivid and non-conceptual cognitions that result from cultivation,¹¹⁴ we] accept as a means of valid cognition [only] that perception which, born of cultivation, is reliable,¹¹⁵ just like [the one that is related

¹¹⁰ See PVinṬ D119b2/P137b7: *mi sduḡ pa źes bya ba ni rus pa 'brel pa'i nram pa can gyi tiñ ñe 'dzin to* ||, PVV 203,22: *aśubhā viñīlakavipūyakāsthisaṅkalādikā*. On *aśubhā*, see *Kośa* 6.148–153 (Pruden 1991: III.916–921).

¹¹¹ PVinṬ D119b2–3/P137b7–8: *zad par sa ni dños po mtha' dag sar snañ ba'i tiñ ñe 'dzin to* || *sogs pa smos pas ni zad par chu la sogs pa'o* ||, PVV 203,22: *prthivī-kṛtsnādi bhūmayatvādi*. On *kṛtsnāyatana*s, see *Kośa* 8.213–215 (Pruden 1991: IV.1277–1278).

¹¹² PVinṬ D119b4/P138a1–2: *mos pas byas pa rnal 'byor ba'i spyod yul du 'gyur ba rus pa la sogs pa rnam* ... On *adhimuktimanas[i]kāra* in the case of *aśubhā*, see *Kośa* 6.150 and 152 (Pruden 1991: III.918–919 and 920); on *adhimuktimanas[i]kāra* in the case of the *kṛtsnāyatana*, see *Kośa* 8.214n. 1 (Pruden 1991: IV.1306n. 203). About this meaning of *adhimukti*, see Bhsd 14b–15a s.v. *adhimucyate* (2). Note also Devendrabuddhi's (PVP D211b2–3/P248a1) explanation: *rañ gi nram par rtog pa tsam gyis kun nas bslañ ba yin no* || (*svavikalpamātreṇa samutthitāḥ), as well as Prajñākaragupta's (PVA 327,14): *atattvamanaskāratvād aśubhādīnām*.

¹¹³ PV 3.286: *tatra pramāṇam saṃvādi yat prāñnirñītavastuvat | tad bhāvanājam pratyakṣam iṣṭam śeṣā upaplavāḥ* ||.

¹¹⁴ According to PVV 204,9: *tatra bhāvanābalabhāviṣu spaṣṭ[a]nirvikaḷpeṣu*; PVP D211b4/P248a4: *de sgom pa'i 'bras bu'i śes pa de dag la*.

¹¹⁵ See PVV 204,9: *saṃvādy upadarśītārthaprāpakam*.

to] the matter (*vastu*) [we] determined above [in chapter two]. All the remaining [cognitions] are [mere] delusions.¹¹⁶

The condition of a yogic cognition's reliability lies in its bearing on an object that has proved to stand critical analysis by means of *pramāṇas*. In other words, this object must have been submitted to rational inquiry (*yukti*), "purified" (*[pari]śuddha*) or ascertained as agreeing (*saṃvādin*) with the means of valid cognition. This is tantamount to saying that the object of a *yogin*'s cognition is one that has been reflected upon (< *√cint*), examined (< *vi√car*) or ascertained (< *nīś√ci*, *vyava√sthā*_{caus}, *nir√nī*) by means of the above-mentioned *cintāmayī prajñā*. It is obvious that, as Dharmakīrti himself makes clear, this object only consists of the four Noble Truths¹¹⁷ that he submitted to inferential evaluation in the second chapter of his PV.¹¹⁸ When commenting on Dharmakīrti's statement to the effect that yogic cognition has already been treated, all commentators add that it has been explained "as bearing upon the (four Noble) Truths" (*[caturārya]satyaṣaya*), and this in the *satyavicāracintā* of the *Pramāṇasiddhi* chapter.¹¹⁹ In other

¹¹⁶ PVP D211b5/P248a5: *dper na zad par sa la sogs pa lta bu'o* ||; PVV 204,13–14: *śeṣā ayathārthā upaplavā bhramā yathā aśubhāprthivīkṛtsnādipratyayāḥ* |.

¹¹⁷ See PVinT D118a2–3/P136a2–4 for a short summary on the four Truths: '*bras bur gyur pa ñe bar len pa'i phuñ po lña ni sdug bñal lo* || *de dag ñid sred pa dan lhan cig pas rgyur gyur pa ni kun 'byuñ ño* || *ñes par legs pa'i rañ bñin du gyur pa'i sems ni 'gog pa'o* || *rañ bñin de ñid thob pa'i rgyur gyur pa bdag med pa la sogs pa'i rnam pa can gyi sems kyi khyad par ni lam mo* ||. "Suffering (*duḥkha*) consists of the resultant (*phalabhūta*) five constituents[-of-a-person] which one clings to (*pañca upādānaskandhāḥ*). The origin (*samudaya*) [of suffering] consists of the same [five constituents] with the status of a cause (*hetubhūta*) because [they are] accompanied by craving (*trṣṇāsaḥita*?). The destruction (*nirodha*) [of suffering, i.e., *nirvāṇa*.] consists of the mind (*citta*) having turned into a blissful condition (*nīḥśreyasasvabhāvabhūta*?). The path (*mārga*) [that leads to the destruction of suffering] consists of a particular mind (*cittaviśeṣa*?) which, endowed with such [real] aspects as unsubstantiality (*nairātmīyādyākāra*[*vat*]?), is the cause of obtaining this very condition (*tasya eva svabhāvasya prāptihetubhūtaḥ*?) [that defines *nirvāṇa*]."

¹¹⁸ PV 3.286b: *prāñnirñūtavastuvar*; PVin 1.27,11–12: *āryasatyadarśanavad yathā nirñūtam asmābhiḥ pramāṇavārttike*; note also PV 3.281a: *prāg uktam yoginām jñānam*.

¹¹⁹ On PV 3.281a: PVV 203,1: *prāk prathamaparicchede* (= *Pramāṇasiddhi*) *yoginām jñānam satyaṣayaṃ uktam*; PVA 326,23: *caturāryasatyaviśayaṃ yoginām jñānam prāg uktam*; PVP D210b3–4/P246b6–7: *sñar bśad rnal 'byor śes pa ni sñar 'phaḡs pa'i bden pa bñi'i yul can du bśad pa na | bden pa dpyod pa gañ yin pa de źes bya ba'i don to* ||. On PV 3.286b: PVV 204,12–13: *prāk prathamaparicchede nirñūtam*

words, as Devendrabuddhi has it,¹²⁰ “not all cognitions of *yogins* are perception (*pratyakṣa*), but (*kiṃ tarhi*) [only] the one that has been stated before, i.e., the one that has been stated before as bearing upon the four Noble Truths.” According to Dharmottara,¹²¹ “the cognition that perceives (*darśana*) these [four Noble Truths], i.e., is aware of them in immediate manner (*sākṣāt*^o/*pratyakṣīkarana*), is perception (*pratyakṣa*).” And according to the same author,¹²² Dharmakīrti in his PV has explained “how the four Noble Truths are ‘purified’ by *pramānas*, and how they are to be cultivated (*bhāvanīya*) under such aspects as impermanence (*anityādi*).” Now provided a *yogin*’s cultivational and hence non-conceptual cognition has the four Noble Truths for its object, it meets the second defining condition of a perception.

vastu satyacatuṣṭayam tasminn eva; PVA 327,32–33: *prānirñītavastu paralokacaturāryasatyādikaṃ tadviṣayam eva pratyakṣam | na tu kāmādiviṣayam |*; PVP D211b5/P248a5: *sñar bden pa dpyad pa’i skabs su tshad ma’i dños po yañ dag par bstan pa bzin no*. Note also NBT S11,18/M67,3–4: *bhūtaḥ sadbhūto ’rthaḥ | pramāṇena dr̥ṣṭas ca sadbhūtaḥ | yathā catvāry āryasatyāni |*, and PVV 203,2 (*satyasvarūpaviṣaya*) or 204,3 (*āryasatyādi* as a gloss on *bhūtam*). Prajñākaragupta’s *paraloka* is the only exception I am aware of in this particular context. The presence of an “etc.” (^o*adi*) is no argument since most if not all ^o*adis* are explicable or even explained as *nairātmya* or *anitya*[*tā*], which of course amounts to the four Noble Truths (note also that Dharmakīrti does not introduce an ^o*adi* in this particular context).

¹²⁰ PVP D210b3–4/P246b6–7: *rnal ’byor ba’i śes pa thams cad mñon sum ma yin no || ’o na ci yin ze na | sñar bśad rnal ’byor śes pa ni [= PV 3.281a] | sñar ’phags pa’i bden pa bzi’i yul can du bśad pa na |*.

¹²¹ PVinT D118a3–4/P136a4–5: *’di [= bden pa] dag mthoñ bar mñon sum du byed pa’i śes pa gañ yin pa de mñon sum yin pa |*.

¹²² PVinT D118a4/P136a5: *’phags pa’i bden pa bzi po rnams ji ltar tshad mas rnam par dag pa dañ | mi rtag pa la sogs pa de dag rnam pa ji lta bu bsgom par bya ba*. Note the whole of Dharmottara’s account of Dharmakīrti’s PV 2 (PVinT D118a4–6/P136a5–8): *’phags pa’i bden pa bzi po rnams ji ltar tshad mas rnam par dag pa dañ | mi (D:P bi) rtag pa la sogs pa de dag rnam pa ji lta bu žig (D:P om. žig) bsgom par bya ba dañ | skye ba brgyud pa du mas dus ji srid kyi mthar thug par goms par bya ba dañ | rgyu gañ la goms par byed pa byañ chub sems dpa’ rnams kyi ni sñiñ rje las yin la | de las gžan rnams ni ’khor ba las yid byuñ ba žes bya ba gañ yin pa de thams cad ni | ji ltar Tshad ma rnam ’grel du gtan (D:P bstan) la phab pa’i rnam pa de ñid kyis ’phags pa’i bden pa mthoñ ba thabs dañ bcas | yul dañ bcas | rnam pa dañ bcas par khoñ du chud par byas te | ’dir ni yañ dag pa’i yul can gyi rnam par rtag pa goms pa las de’i don la dmigs pa’i mñon sum skye ba ñid do žes bya ba de tsam žig bsrub (P:D bsrubs) par ’dod pa ’ba’ žig tu zad do ||*.

In a most interesting statement of the PVin, Dharmakīrti relates the topic of *yogijñāna* back to the basic path-structure of Buddhism. The traditional threefold sequence or gradual progression (*bhāvanā-krama*) of insights is deemed to be the cause of a yogic cognition's vividness and reliability¹²³: “Having first grasped objects through a cognition born of listening [to treatises that are favourable to cultivation¹²⁴], and [then] ascertained [them] through a [cognition] born of reflecting [upon them] by means of rational inquiry (*yukti*) [i.e., by means of *pramāṇas*],¹²⁵ *yogins* cultivate [those objects]. The [cognition] which, at the completion of this [cultivation], appears as vividly as in such cases as fear [or sorrow, and hence is] non-conceptual [but which also] has a true object [because it bears upon an object that has been formerly ascertained by *pramāṇas*], this is [also] the *pramāṇa* perception.”

Note should be made in this connection that the cognition at stake is said to be “born of cultivation” (*bhāvanāmaya*), which the commentators explain as “caused by cultivation” (*bhāvanāhetu[niṣpatti]ka*),¹²⁶ an expression that matches Dharmakīrti's own formulations well (*bhāvanāja*, *bhāvanābalanirmita*, *bhāvanābalaniṣpanna*, *bhāvanā-balataḥ*¹²⁷). In other words, this cognition does not *consist* in cultivation, but arises at the very *end* of cultivation, once the cultivation proc-

¹²³ PVin 1.27,7–8: *yoginām api śrutamayena jñānenārthān gṛhītvā yukticitāmayena vyavasthāpya bhāvayatām tanniṣpattau yat spaṣṭāvabhāsi bhayādāv iva, tad avikalpakam avitathaviṣayaṃ pramāṇaṃ pratyakṣam*. Dharmottara's introduction (PVinṬ D117b1–2/P135b1) runs as follows: 'di nīd nram par 'grel pa na gsal bar snañ ba nīd kyi rgyu bsgom pa'i go rim ston par byed do ||.

¹²⁴ See PVinṬ D117b3–4/P135b3–4: *thos pa las byuñ bas bsgoms pa dañ rjes su mthun pa'i bstan bcos mñan pa'i rgyu can gyis bzuñ ba ñes pa'i don bsgom par bya ba |*.

¹²⁵ See PVinṬ D117b4/P135b4: *rīgs pas te tshad mas sems śiñ ñes par rtog pa ni rīgs pas (em. pas: DP pa) sems pa'o ||*.

¹²⁶ PVA 326,23–24: *bhāvanāhetukam*; PVV 203,1–2: *bhāvanāhetuniṣpattikam*.

¹²⁷ Respectively, PV 3.286c (*bhāvanāja* also PVV 203,10, PVV 204,10); PV 3.284d; PVin 1.28,8; PVin 1.28a (see also PVinṬ D117a5/P135a4 and D119b3/P138a1, where *stobs* is explained as *mthu*; PVP D211b4/P248a3; *bhāvanābalāt* PVV 327,8 and PVA 328,1). The commentators provide us with plenty of expressions: *bsgoms pa'i stobs las skyes pa* (PVP D211b1/P247b7–8), *bhāvanābalaja* (PVV 203,18 and 204,13), *bhāvanābalabhāvin* (PVA 327,32), *bsgoms pa'i 'bras bu'i śes pa* (PVP D211b4/P248a4, PVinṬ D119a7/P137b4 and D119b1/P137b6), *bsgoms pa'i mthu las* (PVinṬ D119b5/P138a3).

ess has been completed (*bhāvanāpariniṣpattau*, *tanniṣpattau*¹²⁸). This is indeed the way Dharmakīrti accounts for *yogijñāna* in the definition he supplies in his NB¹²⁹: “Arisen from the ultimate degree [reached by] the cultivation of a real object, the cognition of *yogins*, too[, is a direct perception].”

5. *Yogijñāna in a Soteriological Perspective*

5.1. Dharmakīrti repeatedly reminds his readers of the fact that he has already accounted for *yogināṃ jñānam* in the second chapter of his PV. This remark is a little puzzling insofar as this chapter does not provide any explicit treatment of the topic. Nevertheless, I think it supplies enough materials for us to proceed further in our interpretation of the *yogin*'s cognition.

It is my contention that Dharmakīrti's account of the *yogin*'s cognition as vivid, non-conceptual and non-belying refers to the mind's gnoseological condition at the end of the “cleansing” path, i.e., at the moment when all superimpositions and their concomitant defilements, even those of an extremely subtle nature, have been thoroughly and absolutely eliminated. In other words, Dharmakīrti's presentation concerns the mind or cognition of the mystic whose basis-of-existence has just been transmuted. The coincidence between Dharmakīrti's *bhāvanāpariniṣpattau* in the context of *yogijñāna* and his remark to the effect that the basis-of-existence is transmuted due to the repeated practice of the path (*tadabhyāsāt*), is striking. It is brought out with particular clar-

¹²⁸ PV 3.285c = PVin 1.31c (note PVV 204,4–5: *bhāvanāyāḥ sādaranirantaradīrghakālapravartitāyāḥ pariniṣpattau*); PVin 1.27,10 (*sgom pa rdzogs śin* PVinṬ D117b5/P135b5). Note also Devendrabuddhi's explanation of *bhāvanāmaya* as *bden pa sgom pa rdzogs pa las* (PVP D210b4/P246b7–8), as well as Dharmottara's *bsgoms pa mthar phyin pa* (PVinṬ D119a6/P137b3). The process traditionally ends up with or culminates in the so-called “absorption similar to a diamond” (*vajropamasamādhi*, see AKBh 364,13–365,10 [*Kośa* 6.227–229, Pruden 1991: III.981–983]). This final moment in the path of cultivation marks the end of the “cleansing” process. I hold it to coincide with Dharmakīrti's *bhāvanāprakaraṣaparyanta* (NB 1.11), or with his *bhāvanāpariniṣpatti* (PV 3.285c).

¹²⁹ NB 1.11: *bhūtārthabhāvanāprakaraṣaparyantajaṃ yogijñānaṃ ceti* ||. Dharmottara interprets °*paryanta*° as ablative case (NBṬ S11,23/M68,2: *tasmāt paryantāt yaj jātam*), contrary to Jñānaśrīmitra's locative (*bhāvanāprakaraṣaparyante*, in Steinkellner 1978: 130n. 42).

ity in Devendrabuddhi's commentary¹³⁰: “Due to the [repeated] practice (*abhyāsa*) of the [aforementioned] path (*mārga*), i.e., once the cultivation (*bhāvanā*) of the path defined as the perception of unsubstantiality (*nairātmyadarśanalakṣaṇa*) has been completed (*niṣpatti*), the basis[-of-existence] is transmuted (*āśrayaḥ parivartate*, = PV 2.205b): the defiled (*doṣavat?*) mind (*citta*) [now] has the property (*dharma*) absolutely [never] to [re]arise (*atyantānutpatti?*). The meaning (*artha*) [intended] by Dharmakīrti is the following: the mind is [now] coessential with the path (*mārgasātmani sthitam*).” Highly interesting in this connection is an allegedly Vaibhāṣika objection occurring in Prajñākaragupta's PVA. Just before he turns to his criticism, the Vaibhāṣika opponent concedes the following point:¹³¹ “It is true that [the cognition in question] presents, due to [intense] cultivation, a vivid image of an object (*vastu*) that has been [previously] established by the means of valid cognition, because [in it] the object (*artha*) appears in its own [particular] form (*svena rūpeṇa*) when the opacity of nescience (*avidyākāluṣya*) has been [entirely] wiped away through cultivation.” *I conjecture that the doctrine that provokes the Vaibhāṣika's assent encapsulates Dharmakīrti's position with regard to the cognition of yogins.* As we shall see, this hypothesis accounts both for the vividness and for the truth that are deemed inherent in a *yogin's* cognition.

5.2. In the second chapter of his PV, Dharmakīrti presents us with the following “realist” account of the nature (*prakṛti*) of cognition (*vi-jñāna*)¹³²: “[Provided one accepts, unlike the idealist,¹³³ that] the property of [all] cognition is to grasp an object, [one must also admit that]

¹³⁰ PVP D87a4–5/P100a7–b1: *lam de goms pa las bdag med pa mthoñ ba'i mtshan ñid can gyi lam de'i sgom pa rdzogs pa na rten ni yoñs su gyur par 'gyur | ñes pa dañ bcas pa'i sems śin tu sbye ba med pa'i chos can yod na lam de'i bdag ñid la sems gnas par 'gyur ro zēs bya ba'i don to ||.*

¹³¹ PVA 327,8–9: (*vaibhāṣikā āhuḥ | nanu*) *vastuni pramāṇaprasiddhe bhāvanābalāt spaṣṭābhateti yuktam | bhāvanayāvidyākāluṣyāpagame svena rūpeṇārthasya prati-bhāsanāt |.*

¹³² PV 2.206–207a₁: *viṣayagrahaṇam dharmo vijñānasya yathāsti saḥ | gr̥hyate so 'sya janako vidyamānātmaneti ca || eṣā prakṛtiḥ ...*

¹³³ On the epistemological presuppositions of that passage, see PVP D87b5–88a4/P101a3–b3 (Eltschinger 2005b: 185–186), and TSP K872,27–873,7/Ś1056,21–25 (McClintock 2002: 213–214).

this [object] is grasped as it [really] is [i.e., as impermanent, etc.¹³⁴]. This [object] generates this [cognition of itself] by [its] existing nature (*vidyamānātmanā*). And this is [the object's and the cognition's original] nature [i.e., that the object generates a cognition that grasps it as it really is, and that the cognition grasps a real aspect of the object].” Dharmakīrti's presentation relies on a Sautrāntika doctrine, according to which direct perception is explained by the fact that the object casts or “projects” (*arpaṇa*) its own aspect (*ākāra*) and hence generates the cognition itself. Dharmakīrti spells this out in the third chapter of the same work¹³⁵: “Experts on rational inquiry consider that to be an object/be perceptible consists in being a cause [which is] capable of projecting a [true] aspect [of itself] onto the cognition.” I believe we are left with no other possibility than to accept the alleged *reality* of the aspects the entity casts onto consciousness. As Devendrabuddhi makes clear,¹³⁶ these real aspects are those we already met in Dharmakīrti's description of the sixteen aspects of the four Noble Truths, impermanence, painfulness, emptiness, selflessness, etc. The conclusion is then easily drawn, as Kamalaśīla has it¹³⁷: “It has been settled that the original nature of the [mind/cognition] is to grasp the real aspects of the object. It has also been explained that the real nature of the object consists in momentariness, selflessness, etc. Therefore, [the mind] has but the grasping of unsubstantiality for its nature.” In order to present us with the nature of cognition, the epistemologists resort to, and reinterpret accordingly, two highly valued traditional *topoi*, i.e., the alleged natural “luminosity” (*prakṛtiprabhāsvaratā*) of the mind or cognition,¹³⁸ and the perception of true reality (*tattvadarśana*). Dharmakīrti describes the first in PV 2.208ab¹³⁹: “[Therefore,] the mind is radiant by [its very] nature [i.e., grasps an object as it really is,¹⁴⁰ whereas] impurities (*mala*)

¹³⁴ *Anityādyākāra* in PVP D87b6/P101a4, D88b3–4/P102a4–5.

¹³⁵ PV 3.247b,d: *grāhyatām viduḥ | hetuvam eva yuktijñā jñānākārārpaṇakṣamam ||*.

¹³⁶ See PVP D88a4–5/P101b3–4.

¹³⁷ TSP K873,5–7/Ś1057,2–4: *bhūtavaiṣayākāragrāhitā asya svabhāvo nija iti sthītam | bhūtaś ca svabhāvo viṣayasya kṣaṇikānātmādirūpa iti pratipāditam etat | tena nair-ātmyagrahaṇasvabhāvam eva.*

¹³⁸ See Eltschinger 2005b: 180 and 190–192. On the mind's natural luminosity, see Seyfort Ruegg 1969: 410–454 and Lamotte 1987a: 51–60.

¹³⁹ PV 2.208ab: *prabhāsvaram idaṃ cittam prakṛtyāgantavo malāḥ |*.

¹⁴⁰ According to PVP D89a5/P103a1: ‘*di'i rañ b'zin 'od gsal te | yan dag pa ji lta ba b'zin du 'dzin pa 'i rañ b'zin no ||*.

[such as the view of self or craving] are [purely] adventitious [i.e., are not its nature,¹⁴¹ and hence are removable].” According to the second *topos*, which, as far as I can see, Dharmakīrti does not explicitly allude to in this particular context, to see the real aspects of things amounts to perceiving true reality. Thus, Devendrabuddhi¹⁴²: “By its [very] nature, the mind thus consists of the perception of true reality, [whereas] impurities are [merely] adventitious.” Or, as Śāntarākṣita has it,¹⁴³ “the mind, which consists of the perception of true reality, is radiant [by its very nature].”

Now how are we to account for the indisputable fact that we actually do *not* perceive true reality, i.e., do not perceive real entities as impermanent, painful, empty or selfless? In other words, how is it that we ordinary persons can at best *infer* these real aspects of things, and hence have but conceptual and nonvivid notions of them? Dharmakīrti’s answer is as follows¹⁴⁴: “On account of a certain cause (*nimitta*) [i.e., on account of an adventitious cause of error], the [mind] shifts (*skhalat*) from this [inherently veracious nature, superimposing such erroneous aspects as permanence on the object,¹⁴⁵] and becomes uncertain (*adr̥ḍha*), requiring a condition¹⁴⁶ (*pratyaya*) for the removal [of this state], like the cognition of a piece of rope [as a snake].” In order to understand the first part of Dharmakīrti’s explanation, we should remember what the state of an ordinary person consists of. The innate false view

¹⁴¹ According to PVP D89a6/P103a2: *glo bur ba yin gyi de’i rañ bžin ni ma yin no* ||.

¹⁴² PVP D89b1/P103a5–6: *’di ltar sems ni no bo ñid kyis de kho na ñid mthoñ ba’i bdag ñid can yin la | dri ma rnams ni glo bur ba yin pa*. See also PVP D89b2/P103a7: *sems kyī de kho na ñid mthoñ ba de’i bdag ñid can*; PVP D87b4/P101a1: *sems kyī rañ bžin ñid kyī de kho na ñid mthoñ ba de’i bdag ñid can*; TSP K895,10/Ś1083,11: *tattvadarśanātmakam eva vijñānasya* (sic); TSP K895,7/Ś1082,21: *prakṛtyā tattvadarśanātmakatayā cittasya*; TSP K895,19/Ś1083,15–16: *tattvadarśanātmakam eva cittam siddham iti bhāvah*; TSP K896,4 (with no equivalent in Ś!): *tattvadarśin*; PVV 107,6: *tattvadarśivāt* (said of the Blessed One); PVV 107,5–6: *atattvadarśinah* (said of the *vūtarāgā bāhyāh*).

¹⁴³ TS 3435_k/3434_s: *prabhāsvaram idaṃ cittam tattvadarśanasātmakam* |.

¹⁴⁴ PV 2.207a_d: *asyās tan nimittāntarataḥ skhalat | vyāvṛtau pratyayāpekṣam adr̥ḍham sarpabuddhivat* ||.

¹⁴⁵ According to PVP D89a2/P102b4–5: *rtag pa la sogs pa’i mnam par sgro ’dogs pas ’jug pa ni gžan du gyur pa’o* || (where *gžan du gyur pa* is the Tibetan rendering of Sanskrit *skhalat*/[*skhalana*]).

¹⁴⁶ PVP D89a2–3/P102b5–6: *rkyen la ltos pa yin te | de ltar skyes bu’i ’khrul pa gnod pa can gyi tshad ma la ltos pa dan bcas pa yin no* ||.

of self, i.e., nescience, causes *prthagjanas* to superimpose sixteen unreal aspects onto the four Noble Truths, e.g., permanence, pleasantness, mine and I. Because they are attached to I and mine, or to self and one's own, ordinary beings crave for objects that delight the (pseudo-)self, and act accordingly in order to grasp them; they also develop aversion of whatever is deemed a threat to the self or its alleged property. Thus defilements and depravities arise out of the false view of self.¹⁴⁷ This is the situation that Dharmakīrti alludes to when he says that the mind or the cognition shifts from its own true nature.¹⁴⁸ But, as Dharmakīrti has it, this superimposing cognition is as uncertain or unsteady as the mistaken cognition of a piece of rope as snake at night in a place where one may suspect the presence of snakes.¹⁴⁹ In the same way, nescience and the superimpositions it is responsible for, no matter how deeply rooted in the mind, are removable because they are adventitious or unnatural to the mind. Now what is needed to get rid of this shift? The epistemologists' answer is unambiguous: an ordinary person who is deluded by the false view of self must resort to the means of valid cognition and especially to inference. Here again we should remember that, still as an ordinary person, one may, on account of belonging to a specific "family" and/or having met a "spiritual friend" like a Buddha or an advanced Bodhisattva, listen to the Buddhist scriptures and hence develop faith or conviction (*adhimukti*), but one may also set about rationally reflecting upon scriptural contents by means of *pramāṇas*. This rational inquiry, mainly consisting of the ascertainment of the true aspects of the Noble

¹⁴⁷ See §§1.1–3 above.

¹⁴⁸ We should, however, be cautious not to ascribe to him the mythological notion of a "fall" or decay of the mind that would in turn imply the path to consist in the gradual recovery of a lost condition. Nescience is a beginningless (*anādi*) erroneous perception (*mithyopalabdhi*) that arises out of its own seeds (*bīja*) or latent tendencies (*vāsanā*) and that has been nourished by, and nourishes in turn, the so-called incorrect judgement (*ayoniśomanaskāra*). On this last doctrinal point, see PVSV 8,20–21 (*āmātmīyābhiniveśapūrvakā hi rāgādayo 'yoniśomanaskārapūrvakatvāt sarvadoṣotpatteḥ*), PVT *Je* D249b6–7/P296a6–7 ≈ PVSVT 398,25–26, PVT *Je* D253a4–5/P301a4 = PVSVT 403,8–9, PVV 101,10 and 367,10–11. On *ayoniśomanaskāra* as the root of *satkāyadr̥ṣṭi*, see MS 2.20.9 in Lamotte 1973: II.115, *Paramārthagāthā* 20 in Wayman 1961: 170, BhK 1.215,8–15.

¹⁴⁹ See PVP D87b7/P101a6: *dper na sbrul du 'dris pa'i phyogs mi gsal bar thag pa la sbrul gyi śes pa lta bu'o* ||. Cf. Vibh. 82n. 4: (*mandamandaparakāśe*) *sarpopacite pradeśe*. See also Lamotte 1973: II.109–110, and MS 3.8.2 in Lamotte 1973: II.163.

Truths, aims at shaping the salvational means (*upāya*), i.e., the perception of unsubstantiality as an antagonistic or opposing factor of *satkāyadr̥ṣṭi*. There can be no doubt that Dharmakīrti's *vyāvṛttau pratyayāpekṣam* (PV 2.207c) refers in the first place to the inferential analysis that is typical for the *cintāmayī prajñā*.¹⁵⁰

As we have seen above, the cultivation of the salvational means that the *yogin* carries out is simultaneously of a cognitive and cleansing character. The more our *yogin* sharpens his realization of the Truths and their corresponding aspects, the more he succeeds in uprooting the opposite false views as well as the superimpositions and defilements they are responsible for. But eradicating the adventitious impurities amounts to gradually freeing the mind of those malignant obstacles that prevented it from grasping the object as it really is, i.e., with its real aspects of impermanence, emptiness, etc. During the path of vision, the *yogin* gets rid of gross superimpositions such as those the speculative false view of self gives rise to. Much more difficult to eliminate however, is the innate false view of self, along with the remaining defilements (i.e., the *bhāvanāheyakleśas*) and their productive and non-productive *vāsanās*, the uprooting of which, in many Mahāyānist accounts, necessitates no less than eight complete stages or *bhūmis* (*bhūmis* 2-9). During the first six of these *bhūmis* (2-7), the *yogin* must devote constant effort and "intentionality" (*vikalpa*) to his cultivation of the cleansing means; during the last two *bhūmis* (8-9), insight becomes spontaneous, effortless, and unintentional. The removal of the most subtle categories of bad dispositions now proceeds as "automatically" or "naturally" as the perception of unsubstantiality itself. At the end of the path of cultivation, the entire filth of impurities has been irreversibly destroyed, a psychological and existential situation described as a transmutation of the basis-of-existence. Now the mind only consists of the path; it has the perception of unsubstantiality or discernment for its unique and indestructible nature. Dharmakīrti describes this as follows¹⁵¹: "Of [these impurities] that were incapable [of annulling the mind] before [the perceptual realization of unsubstantiality¹⁵²], what (*kva*) [could] therefore be the capacity afterwards, with regard to a [mind] that [once the practice of *nairātmyadarśana* has been completed,

¹⁵⁰ See §§2.1-2 above.

¹⁵¹ PV 2.208cd: *tat prāg apy asamarthhānām paścāc chaktiḥ kva tanmaye* ||.

¹⁵² According to PVP D89a6/P103a3: *bdaḡ med pa mthoñ ba'i mñon sum du byas pa*.

entirely] consists (*maya*) of the [path]¹⁵³?” The following excerpt of Devendrabuddhi will provide a useful summary as well as transition to the concluding part of my hypothesis¹⁵⁴: “[Moral] faults [i.e., defilements,] lack the capacity to re-occur in the mind of the one who is of one essence with the path (*mārgasātmye sthitasya*), for the nature (*svabhāva*) of the mind (*citta*) consists in the perception of true reality (*tattvadarśanātmaka*);¹⁵⁵ it does not have for its essence the [moral] faults that are bound to [i.e., derive from] aspects that are contrary (*viparītākāra*) [to the ones which are ascertained by the means of valid cognition]. Now its (= the mind’s) depravities (*upakleśa*) [arise] by force of a [purely] adventitious condition (*āgantuka*)*pratyayavaśāt?*).¹⁵⁶ If something opposes (*√bādh*) them,¹⁵⁷ the mind that rests in its own [original] nature (*svasvabhāva*) provides the [moral] faults with no support/resting-place (*āśraya*) anymore (*na punar*), because its nature exists by force of [real] entities (*vastubalapravṛtta*).”¹⁵⁸ As Devendrabuddhi has it, the mind or cognition now abides in its own proper and undefiled nature, which is nothing other than the grasping of the real aspects of the object projected onto it. The practice of the path, i.e.,

¹⁵³ According to PVP D89a7–b1/P103a5: *bdag med pa mthoñ ba goms pa grub pa na de’i rañ bžin lam de’i bdag ñid can gyi sems la* (**nairātmadarśanābhyāsanīṣpattau tanmaye mārgasātmani citta*).

¹⁵⁴ PVP D87a7–87b2/P100b2–5: *lam goms pa la gnas pa’i sems la ñes pa rnam yañ ’byuñ ba’i nus pa yod pa ma yin no* * || *de ltar na sems kyi rañ bžin ni de kho na ñid mthoñ ba’i bdag ñid can yin gyi | phyin ci log gi rnam pa dañ rjes su ’brel pa’i ñes pa de’i bdag ñid can ni ma yin no* || *’di’i ñe ba’i ñon moñs pa gañ yin pa de yañ glo bur ba’i rkyen gyi dbañ gis yin no* || *de la gnod pa yod na rañ gi rañ bžin la gnas pa’i sems ni yañ ñes pa’i rten byed pa ma yin te | dños po’i stobs kyiś žugs pa’i rañ bžin ñid yin pa’i phyir ro* ||. *Cf. PVV 82,1–2: *mārgasātmye ’pi sthitasya cetasi na doṣānām utpattum sāmāthyam asti* |.

¹⁵⁵ PVT Ñe D133a3–4/P164a2–3 explains *tattvadarśanātmaka* as follows: *dños po ji lta ba bžin du gnas pa’i ’džin pa’i bdag ñid can* (**yathāvasthītavastugrahaṇātmaka* < PVV 82,14–15).

¹⁵⁶ PVT Ñe D133a5/P164a4–5 explains *āgantuka*)*pratyaya* as follows: *rgyu mtshan ’ga’ žig las bdag la sogs par sgro btags pas ’jug pa’i ’khrul pa’i śes pa*.

¹⁵⁷ PVT Ñe D133a5–6/P164a5–6: *de la gnod pa yod na žes bya ba glo bur ba’i rnam pas | de’i rgyu can gyi ñe ba’i ñon moñs pa bdag med pa’i lam gyis bsal ba yod na žes bya ba’i don to* ||.

¹⁵⁸ PVT Ñe D133a6–7/P164a7–8: *dños po stobs kyiś žugs pa’i rañ bžin ñid yin pa’i phyir ro žes bya ba ni dños po ji ltar gnas pa bžin du ’džin pas žugs pa’i bdag med pa’i lam ni sems kyi rañ bžin ñid yin pa’i phyir ro* || (**yathāvasthītavastugrahaṇa-pravṛttasya nairātmayamārgasya cittasvabhāvatvāt*).

cultivation, has freed the cognition of the obstacles that *avidyā* was ultimately responsible for; in other words the mind is now free from the obstacle that concealed the knowable. Of the real and *pramāṇa*-ascertained aspects the object imposes upon it, which are the real aspects of the four Noble Truths, the mind can have but a vivid and hence non-conceptual image. In other words: whereas the *cintāmayī prajñā*, i.e., the (initially purely conceptual) ascertainment of true reality by means of *pramāṇas*, is responsible for the reliability of the *yogin*'s cognition, the *bhāvanāmayī prajñā* gradually frees the mind of the defilements in such a way that the aspects objects cast upon it appear vividly. Irrespective of all subsequent interpretations of the *yoginām jñānam*, this in my opinion is what Dharmakīrti has in mind when he rather cryptically describes the cognition of *yogins*.

I would like to add a final remark. As far as I know, Dharmakīrti does not describe the nature of discernment *during* the path itself, i.e., before the *āśrayaparivṛtti* takes place. Now it is clear that, before entering the path of vision, the *yogin* has but an inferential and hence *conceptual* notion of such real aspects as impermanence, emptiness and the like. I would incline towards considering that his cognition of them remains a conceptual one, albeit extremely refined and hence vivid, throughout the path. But we ought not to forget that the mind is a purely momentary entity: the cognition that the path or the cultivation generates again and again may well be nothing like the cognition of the liberated one. This is exactly what the following stanzas of the *Paramārthagāthās* account for¹⁵⁹: “39. Defiled mind, of course (*hi*), is [something] that arises and ceases each time together with the Defilements. For it, liberation from the Defilements has [therefore] neither [already] happened nor will it [ever] happen. 40. [For it is] not that this [very same defiled mind] arises afterwards as a pure one, but [rather what] arises [afterwards is] *another* [mind which is pure]. And [it is]

¹⁵⁹ *Paramārthagāthā* 39–41: *sahotpannaniruddhaṃ hi kleśaiḥ kliṣṭaṃ manaḥ sadā | kleśebhyas tasya nirmokṣo na bhūto na bhaviṣyati || na tad utpadyate paścāc chuddham anyat tu jāyate | tac ca pūrvam asaṃkliṣṭaṃ kleśebhyo muktam ucyate || yat kliṣṭaṃ tad ihātyantāc chuddhaṃ prakṛtibhāsvaram | na ceha śudhyate kaścīd kutaścīd vāpi śudhyate ||*. Text and translation in Schmithausen 1987: I.232–233 (see also the commentary on the stanzas in Schmithausen 1987: I.161–162). See also the Vaibhāṣika's account of liberation (*vimukti*) in AKBh 388,19–389,4, and Eltschinger 2005b: 190–192.

this [other mind that, although it had] not [been] defiled before, is called ‘liberated’ from Defilements. 42. That which is defiled is, in this [system], *absolutely* [defiled]; [what is] pure is radiant *by nature*. And [thus (?) there is], in this [system], no [person or even *dharma* which] is purified, nor is [he/it, *a fortiori*,] purified from anything.”

ABBREVIATIONS AND BIBLIOGRAPHY

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- AKVy Unrai Wogihara: *Sphuṭārthā Abhidharmakośavyākhyā, the Work of Yaśomitra*. Tokyo, 1989 (1936¹): Sankibo Buddhist Book Store (The Publishing Association of Abhidharmakośavyākhyā).
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