Shōryū Katsura

The Mode of Argumentation
in the Fangbian xin lun / *Upāyahṛdaya

The Fangbian xin lun (方便心論 Taisho 1632), attributed to Nāgārjuna (2nd cent.) and translated by Jijiaye (吉迦夜) around 472,[1] and the Rushi lun (如實論 Taisho 1633) attributed to Vasubandhu (4th-5th cent.) and translated by Paramārtha (眞諦 499-569), have been the only two texts of Buddhist logic in East Asia before Xuanzang (玄奘) introduced Dignāga's New Buddhist Logic by translating the Nyāyamukha (因明正理門論 Taisho 1628) of Dignāga and the Nyāya-praveśa (因明入正理論 Taisho 1630) of Śaṅkarasvāmin that had a strong impact upon Chinese studies of Buddhist logic (Hetuvidyā 因明). In the following I would like to present the general features of the Fangbian xin lun and to discuss the characteristics of the modes of argumentation utilized by its author in order to locate the text in the history of Indian logic.[2]

Before going into the main discussion I would like to touch on the problem of the author and original title of the text. Regarding the author of the text, the Song version of the Chinese Tripiṭaka mentions Nāgārjuna as the author, but its Koryo version regards the text as anonymous. Hakuju Ui, who thoroughly studied the text, came to the conclusion that it is a work of some Hīnayāna author and cannot be attributed to Nāgārjuna.[3] Yuichi Kajiyama, on the other hand, criticized Ui's conclusion, saying that the text could have been written by Nāgārjuna because the fourth chapter lists 20 types of arguments based on *reductio ad absurdum* (*prasaṅga*), some of which are quite close to the *prasaṅga* arguments found in the works attributed to Nāgārjuna such as the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā, the Vaidalyaprakaraṇa, and the Vigrahavyāvartanī.[4] Michiko Ishitobi, who pub-

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[1] According to Toru Funayama, from the late third century until the beginning of the sixth century there was a long period of stagnation of translation activities in the Northern Dynasties; Jijiaye is the only translator known to us during that period, which may explain some of the apparent confusions in his translation of the *Upāyahṛdaya, as, e.g., the order of the detailed descriptions of the eight principles of debate which is different from the order of their initial presentation.

[2] I have been working with Prof. Brendan Gillon (McGill University) to produce the first English translation of the Fangbian xin lun for some time now and we have already published an English translation of the first chapter; see English Translation of the *Upāyahṛdaya (Pt. 1). *Journal of Indian and Tibetan Studies* 20 (2016) 195-232.

[3] Hakuju Ui, Hōbenshinron no Chūshakuteki Kenkyū ("An Annotated Study of the Fangbian xin lun"). *Indotetsugaku Kenkyū* 2 (1925) 425-472.

[4] Yuichi Kajiyama, *Bukkyō Chishikiron no Keisei* ("Formation of Buddhist Epistemology"). [*Kōza Daijō Bukkyō* 9]. Tokyo 1984, p. 2-52; cf. id., On the Authorship of the *Upāyahṛdaya*. In:

lished a comprehensive study of the Fangbian xin lun,[5] agrees with Kajiyama. I also follow the lead of Kajiyama and regard the text as written, if not by Nāgārjuna, author of the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā, himself, then by someone in the circle of Buddhist scholars who produced other texts such as the Vaidalyaprakaraṇa and the Vigrahavyāvartanī that are traditionally attributed to Nāgārjuna.

Regarding the original Sanskrit title of the text, G. Tucci proposed *Upāyahṛdaya,[6] while E. Frauwallner is said to have suggested *Prayogasāra. The Chinese term *fangbian (*方便) can translate both Sanskrit words *upāya* and *prayoga*. As a matter of fact, there are two occurrences of *fangbian* in the entire text, (1) p. 23b12:

> Therefore, all spiritually noble people use unlimited means (方便: *upāya*) to cut debaters off,

and (2) p. 23c18:

> You previously mentioned the example. Now, what use/formulation (方便: *prayoga*) does putting forth an example have?

Thus, in the first occurrence the term corresponds to *upāya* and in the second it corresponds to *prayoga*. Therefore, it is impossible to decide which proposal is better. For the time being, I adopt the title *Upāyahṛdaya (= UH) simply because it is more commonly used by modern scholars.

Now, the UH consists of the following four chapters:

> Chapter 1: Explaining how to engage in debate (明造論品第一) [Taisho p. 23b06-26a28],
> Chapter 2: Explaining situations of defeat (明負處品第二) [Taisho p. 26a29-27a4],
> Chapter 3: Explaining proper debate (辯正論品第三) [Taisho p. 27a5-c7],
> Chapter 4: Responses/Rebuttals (相應品第四) [Taisho p. 27c08-28c17].

It starts with this verse:[7]

> If one is able to understand this treatise, then one will grasp all the principles of debate (論法). Thus, I shall now expound at length this deep and far reaching subject matter.

Studies in the Buddhist Epistemological Tradition. Ed. by Ernst Steinkellner. [*Beiträge zur Kultur- und Geistesgeschichte Asiens* 8]. Wien 1991, p. 107-117.

  [5] Michiko Ishitobi, *Ryūjyu-zō Hōbenshinron no Kenkyū* ("A Study of Fangbian xin lun composed by Nāgārjuna"). Tōkyō 2006.

  [6] Giuseppe Tucci, *Pre-Diṅnāga Buddhist Texts on Logic from Chinese Sources*. Translated with an Introduction, Notes and Indices. [*Gaekwad's Oriental Series* 49]. Baroda 1929.

  [7] Taisho p. 23b07-08. It is to be noted that in this text the same Chinese character *lun* (論) seems to be used with two different meanings, namely, "treatise" (*śāstra*) and "debate" (*vāda*). When it is combined with *ci* (此) meaning "this", however, *ci-lun* (此論) always means "this treatise", i.e., the *Upāyahṛdaya.

From this it is clear that the main subject matter of the UH are "the principles of debate". There are eight principles of debate presented in this text that are explained both in brief and in detail in the first chapter that occupies more than half of the whole text.

The first chapter of the UH begins with the following exchange of question and answer:[8]

> Question: One should not engage in debate. Why? All those who engage in debate by and large promote hatred, arrogance and pride. Since their thoughts are confused, their minds are rarely gentle or peaceful. They point out what is bad in others and proclaim what is good in themselves. The wise denounce all such faults. Therefore, all spiritually noble people use unlimited means to cut debaters off. The wise are usually happy to keep them at a distance, just as they are happy to avoid vessels of poison.
> Furthermore, those who engage in debate, even if they are, in fact, harmonious and gentle on the inside, evince many faults on the outside. Therefore, if one wishes to benefit oneself and others, one should avoid the principles of debate.

This question reflects the traditional Buddhist as well as Brahmanical view that takes reasoning and argumentation as a hindrance to the search for a higher goal. Here is the answer to the above objection given by the author:[9]

> Answer: This is not so. Now, I have not composed this treatise for the sake of victory or to increase profit or fame. I only wish to reveal all features, good and bad[, of debate]. Therefore I compose this treatise.
> If the world had no treatise [of debate], the confused would be many. Then, due to people's perverse ideas and wily rhetoric, the confusion shared by them would give rise to bad deeds, evil incarnations and loss of real/true benefits. If, then, one who understands debate oneself distinguishes [its] good, bad and useless features, then the many devilish non-Buddhists and adherents of perverse views will not be able to vex and harm him, thereby putting up obstacles [to his *nirvāṇa*]. Therefore, to benefit people, I compose this corrective treatise.
> Furthermore, I wish to spread the true teaching [of the Buddha] all over the world. Just as, in order to cultivate the fruits of mango trees, one plants widely round them thickets of brambles so as to protect their fruits,[10] now in composing [this] treatise, I too act in the same way, for I wish to protect the true teaching [of the Buddha] and I do not seek fame. Those whom you mentioned earlier as

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[8] Taisho p. 23b09-14.

[9] Taisho p. 23b15-24.

[10] In this connection it is most interesting to note that a similar simile is found in the Nyāyasūtra 4.2.50: *tattvādhyavasāyasaṃrakṣaṇārthaṃ jalpavitaṇḍe, bījaprarohasaṃrakṣaṇārthaṃ kaṇṭakaśākhāvaraṇavat* "Disputation (*jalpa*) and destructive criticism (*vitaṇḍā*) are employed in order to protect the realization of truth, just as thorny branches [are placed to] enclose [the plants] in order to protect seeds and sprouts." This fact indicates that both Buddhist and non-Buddhist logicians attributed the same role to debate/reasoning, namely, to protect the realization of truth.

good at debate are not like this. In order to protect the teaching [of the Buddha],
I must compose [this] treatise.

The author of the UH tries to justify his act of composing this treatise that
expounds the principles of debate, by arguing that he does so not for the sake
of his own benefit but for the sake of others because, by learning the proper
principles of debate, people will not be misled by the wrong views of non-Bud-
dhists. Furthermore, he argues that he composes the treatise of debate in order
to protect the true teaching of the Buddha, so that it will be spread all over the
world.

Now UH Chapter 1 discusses the following eight principles of debate:

1. example (譬喻/喻: *dṛṣṭānta/udāharaṇa),
2. tenet (lit. that which accords with what one holds 隨所執: cf. siddhānta),
3. excellence of statement (語善: *vākya-praśaṃsā),
4. deficiency of statement (言失: *vākya-doṣa),
5. reason for knowledge (知因: *jñāna-hetu; cf. pramāṇa),
6. timely statement (應時語/語應時: *prāpta-kāla-vākya),
7. non-reason [called] specious reason (似因非因: *hetvābhāsa-ahetu),
8. objection based on the wording (隨語難/隨言難: cf. vāk-chala).

The number "eight" immediately reminds us of the list of eight means of proof
(sādhana) found in the Hetuvidyā section of the Yogācārabhūmi:[11]

sādhanam aṣṭavidham. katamat. pratijñā hetur udāharaṇaṃ sārūpyaṃ vairūpyaṃ
pratyakṣam anumānam āptāgamaś ca.

This list consists of (1) three members of a proof formulation (prayoga), (2)
two relations of similarity and dissimilarity[12] and (3) three kinds of pramāṇas.
As we shall see later, the UH knows the five membered proof formulation, and
it admits the four kinds of pramāṇas, viz. perception (現見), inference
(比知), analogy (以喻知) and scriptural authority (隨經書/聞見).[13] With re-
spect to the number of members of a proof formulation and that of pramāṇas,
the Yogācārabhūmi represents an advanced stage of Buddhist logic in compar-
ison with the UH. Regarding inference, the UH admits three kinds, viz. *pūr-

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[11] Hideomi Yaita, Yugaron no Inmyō, Bonbun Tekisuto to Wayaku ("Hetuvidyā in the Yogā-
cārabhūmi, Sanskrit Text and Japanese Translation"). *Journal of Naritasan Institute for Buddhist
Studies* 15 (1992) 1*-27*. The Abhidharmasamuccaya has a slightly different list of the eight
sādhanas: sādhanāny aṣṭau | pratijñā hetur dṛṣṭānta upanayo nigamanaṃ pratyakṣam anumānam
āptāgamaś ca; cf. Hideomi Yaita, Yugaron Inmyō niokeru sārūpya to vairūpya nitsuite ("On
sārūpya and vairūpya in Hetuvidyā of the Yogācārabhūmi"). *Journal of Indian and Buddhist
Studies* 51,2 (2003) 134-138.

[12] The relations of similarity and dissimilarity seem to correspond with those of anvaya and
vyatireka in Vyākāraṇa and the theory of trairūpya.

[13] Taisho p. 24a01 and 25a27-b25.

vavat (前比), **śeṣavat* (後比) and **sāmānyato-dṛṣṭa* (同比).[14] Those facts point out that the principles of debate presented by the author of the UH are more closely related to the classical Indian principles of debate of the Carakasaṃhitā (= CS) and the Nyāyasūtra (= NS)[15] than those of the later Buddhist logical tradition.

Here is the list of 44 principles of debate in CS 3.8.27:[16]

1. *vāda* (*jalpa* & *vitaṇḍā*),
2.-7. *dravya*, *guṇa*, *karman*, *sāmānya*, *viśeṣa*, *samavāya*,
8. *pratijñā*,
9.-10. *sthāpanā*, *pratiṣṭhāpanā*,
11.-14. *hetu*, DRṢṬĀNTA, *upanaya*, *nigamana*,
15. *uttara*,
16. SIDDHĀNTA,
17.-21. *śabda*, *pratyakṣa*, *anumāna*, *aitihya*, *aupamya*,
22.-27. *saṃśaya*, *prayojana*, *savyabhicāra*, *jijñāsā*, *vyavasāya*, *arthaprāpti*,
28. *sambhava*,
29.-32. *anuyojya*, *ananuyojya*, *anuyoga*, *pratyanuyoga*,
33.-34. VĀKYADOṢA, VĀKYAPRAŚAṂSĀ,
35. CHALA,
36.-37. AHETU, *atītakāla*,
38.-39. *upālambha*, *parihāra*,
40.-44. *pratijñāhāni*, *abhyanujñā*, *hetvantara*, *arthāntara*, *nigrahasthāna*.

NS 1.1.1 has the following 16 principles that later come to be called *padārtha*:

1. PRAMĀṆA,	9. *nirṇaya*,
2. *prameya*,	10. *vāda*,
3. *saṃśaya*,	11. *jalpa*,
4. *prayojana*,	12. *vitaṇḍā*,
5. DRṢṬĀNTA,	13. HETVĀBHĀSA,
6. SIDDHĀNTA,	14. CHALA,
7. *avayava*,	15. *jāti*,
8. *tarka*,	16. *nigrahasthāna*.

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[14] Taisho p. 25b10-11.

[15] For the Carakasaṃhitā I use the edition with the Āyurveda-Dīpikā by Yādava Sharma (Bombay: Nirṇaya Sāgar Press, 1941), and for the Nyāyasūtra the edition with the Nyāyabhāṣya by Taranatha Nyaya-Tarkatirtha (Calcutta 1936-1944).

[16] For a recent detailed analysis of the 44 principles, see Karin Preisendanz, Logic, Debate and Epistemology in Ancient Indian Medical Science: An Investigation into the History and Historiography of Indian Philosophy Part I. In: Dominik Wujastyk – Anthony Cerulli – Karin Preisendanz (ed.), *Medical Texts and Manuscripts in Indian Cultural History.* New Delhi 2013, p. 63-139. It would be worthwhile noting that the manual of debate in the Spitzer manuscript also recognizes four *pramāṇas*. It is also interesting that it uses *aupamya* like the CS, and instead of *śabda*, *aitihya*. See Eli Franco, *The Spitzer Manuscript.* The Oldest Philosophical Manuscript in Sanskrit. [*Beiträge zur Kultur- und Geistesgeschichte Asiens* 43]. Wien 2004, vol. II, p. 486ff.

It is clear that there is a close affinity among the lists of the UH, the CS and the NS. To begin with, *vāda* (debate), which is important both in the CS and the NS, is the main subject matter of the whole of the UH. Second, of the eight principles of debate listed in the UH, six (viz., *dṛṣṭānta*, *siddhānta*, *vākya-praśaṃsā*, *vākyadoṣa*, *ahetu* and *chala*) are listed in the CS and five (viz., *pramāṇa*, *dṛṣṭānta*, *siddhānta*, *hetvābhāsa* and *chala*) in the NS. In addition, not only do the CS and the NS themselves share the ten principles of *vāda*, *jalpa*, *vitaṇḍā*, *dṛṣṭānta*, *siddhānta*, *saṃśaya*, *prayojana*, *chala*, *ahetu/he-tvābhāsa* and *nigrahasthāna* but they also recognize the proof formulation to comprise the same five members (*avayava*). Third, the four kinds of *pramāṇa* mentioned in the UH and the NS are all mentioned in the CS. Finally, *nigra-hasthāna* (situation of defeat), discussed in the CS and in the NS, is treated in detail in UH Chapter 2.

There is one important difference among the three texts: the CS has no catego-ry corresponding to NS's *jāti* (erroneous objections), while the UH deals with *jāti*-like arguments as proper responses/rebuttals (相應) in the fourth chapter.[17] As Yuichi Kajiyama pointed out, some of the NS's *jāti*s such as *prāptisama* and *aprāptisama* are found in the works attributed to Nāgārjuna and they are essen-tially *reductio ad absurdum* (*prasaṅga*) arguments,[18] which indicates that the compiler of the relevant parts of the NS regarded Nāgārjuna and some of his early followers as dangerous critics of his system and named Nāgārjuna's *prasaṅga* arguments "erroneous objections". The fact that the UH treats them as proper responses/rebuttals confirms Kajiyama's thesis that the UH was writ-ten, if not by Nāgārjuna himself, by someone who closely followed his philos-ophy and way of argument.[19] In any case, the chronological order of the UH and the relevant parts of CS and NS is clear: the CS, which is ignorant of Nāgārjuna's *prasaṅga* arguments, must come first, then comes the UH, which positively presents such arguments, and finally the NS, which gives them a negative assessment as "erroneous objections". As a matter of fact, the author of the UH does not seem to recognize the Naiyāyikas as an independent school

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[17]   Some scholars regard the concept of *uttara* in the CS as related to or as the origin of NS's *jāti*, but there is a sharp distinction between the two concepts, namely, *uttara* is a valid objection, while *jāti* is an erroneous objection / false rejoinder; the later Buddhist logicians regard *jāti* as a pseudo-*uttara*. For a discussion of the term *jāti*, see Sung Yong Kang, Die Carakasaṃhitā in der Geschichte der indischen Philosophie I. Nyāya und Carakasaṃhitā. *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Südasiens* 50 (2006) 143-176; also see, by the same author, What Does -*sama* Mean? On the Uniform Ending of the Names of the *jāti*-s in the *Nyāyasūtra*. *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 37 (2009) 75-96, and The Typology of *Jāti*-s Indicated by Diṅnāga and Development of Diṅnāga's Thought. *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 40 (2012) 615-633.

[18]   Kajiyama, op. cit. (n. 4)*,* p. 32-42.

[19]   Kajiyama, op. cit.*,* p. 12-32.

of his time, for he does not refer to them when he lists the ten schools under the heading of "tenet" (*siddhānta).[20]

As I mentioned above, the second chapter of the UH discusses the situations of defeat (nigrahasthāna 負處) in the same way as the CS and the NS. They are seventeen in number. For the sake of comparison, in the following list I indicate the numbers of the nigrahasthānas mentioned in CS 3.8.66 and NS 5.2.1 that have the same name or content as the nigrahasthānas of the UH, in parentheses:[21]

1. False arguments (語顛倒 lit. "inverted statements"),[22]
2. arguments which state the wrong reason (立因不正; CS 13 & NS 3),
3. arguments which adduce an inapposite example (引喩不同),[23]
4. not to question when one should question (應問不問; CS 3 & NS 19),
5. not to answer when one should answer (應答不答; NS 16),[24]
6. to fail to make the other understand something after having stated it three times (三説法要不令他解; NS 8),
7. after being told something three times, one does not clearly understand (自三説法而不別知; CS 1 & NS 15),
8. when someone is debating someone else, while the second person's argument is deficient, the first person does not realize it (共他論彼義短闕而不覺知),
9. while what the second person means is correct, the first person makes a mistake [i.e., misunderstands the second person] (他正義而爲生過; CS 2 & NS 20),
10. someone says something and, while everyone [else] understands, only [the second] does not (衆人悉解而獨不悟; NS 14),[25]
11. if one speaks softly and quickly [so that] the listeners do not understand (言輕疾聽),
12. statements being deficient (語少; CS 8 & NS 11),
13. statements being excessive (語多; CS 9 & NS 12),
14. statements being meaningless (無義語; CS 11 & NS 7),[26]
15. statements being ill-timed (非時語; CS 6 & NS 10),
16. [statements with] repetition (義重; CS 12 & NS 13),
17. abandoning one's own thesis (捨本宗; CS 4 & NS 1, 4).[27]

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[20]   Taisho p. 24a13-b04: [1] Buddhists (佛正義); [2] Fire-worshippers (事火外道); [3] Grammarians (音聲外道); [4] Physicians (醫法); [5] Vaiśeṣika (衞世師); [6] Sāṅkhya (僧伽); [7] Yoga (踰伽外道); [8] Jains (尼乾陀法); [9] Radical Monists (計一外道); [10] Radical Pluralists (計異外道).

[21]   Kajiyama (op. cit. [n. 4], p. 7-8) and Tucci (op. cit. [n. 6], p. xxii) present comparative lists of the nigrahasthānas in the NS, CS and UH.

[22]   Kajiyama seems to consider it to correspond to CS 6 and NS 10.

[23]   Kajiyama takes this, together with 非時語, 言輕疾聽 and 雖有義理而無次第 ("though what is said is reasonable, it is disorderly" [Taisho p. 25a21]), to correspond to CS 7 and NS 22 (four kinds of hetvābhāsa).

[24]   Kajiyama shows some reservation about this correspondence, while Tucci is silent about it.

[25]   Tucci is silent about this correspondence.

[26]   Tucci takes this to correspond to CS 11 and NS 9.

[27]   Both Kajiyama and Tucci add NS 2 as a further corresponding item.

Here are the lists of *nigrahasthāna*s in CS 3.8.66 and NS 5.2.1, with the corresponding items in the UH mentioned in parentheses:[28]

CS 1.	APARIJÑĀNA (UH 7)	NS 1.	PRATIJÑĀHĀNI (UH 17)
CS 2.	ANANUYOJYASYĀNUYOGA (UH 9)	NS 2.	pratijñāntara
CS 3.	ANUYOJYASYĀNANUYOGA (UH 4)	NS 3.	PRATIJÑĀVIRODHA (UH 2)
CS 4.	PRATIJÑĀHĀNI (UH 17)	NS 4.	pratijñāsaṃnyāsa (UH 17)
CS 5.	ABHYANUJÑĀ	NS 5.	HETVANTARA
CS 6.	KĀLĀTĪTAVACANA (UH 15)	NS 6.	ARTHĀNTARA
CS 7.	AHETU	NS 7.	NIRARTHAKA (UH14)
CS 8.	NYŪNA (UH 12)	NS 8.	avijñātārtha (UH 6)
CS 9.	ADHIKA (UH 13)	NS 9.	apārthaka
CS 10.	vyartha	NS 10.	APRĀPTAKĀLA (UH 15)
CS 11.	ANARTHAKA (UH 14)	NS 11.	NYŪNA (UH 12)
CS 12.	PUNARUKTA (UH 16)	NS 12.	ADHIKA (UH 13)
CS 13.	VIRUDDHA (UH 2)	NS 13.	PUNARUKTA (UH 16)
CS 14.	HETVANTARA	NS 14.	ananubhāṣaṇa (UH 10)
CS 15.	ARTHĀNTARA	NS 15.	AJÑĀNA (UH 7)
		NS 16.	apratibhā (UH 5)
		NS 17.	vikṣepa
		NS 18.	MATĀNUJÑĀ
		NS 19.	PARYANUYOJYOPEKṢAṆA (UH 4)
		NS 20.	NIRANUYOJYĀNUYOGA (UH 9)
		NS 21.	apasiddhānta
		NS 22.	[5 kinds of] HETVĀBHĀSA

Those *nigrahasthāna*s that are commonly found in both lists are in capital letters. It is clear that the NS shares almost all the *nigrahasthāna*s with the CS; having added more cases, at least a couple of which may go back to the UH, the NS puts the *nigrahasthāna*s in a more systematic order. This again proves the chronological order of the UH and the relevant parts of the CS and the NS, namely, the CS is the earliest source, followed by the UH and then the NS.

The third chapter of the UH explains what the author thinks to be proper debates, which I will analyze in detail below. Its fourth and last chapter discusses the following twenty types of responses/rebuttals (相應):[29]

1. addition (增多相應 *utkarṣa-sama*),
2. subtraction (損減相應 *apakarṣa-sama*),
3. similarity and difference (同異相應),
4. prolixity of question and paucity of answer (問多答少相應),

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[28] For a detailed analysis of *nigrahasthāna*s in the NS, see Alberto Todeschini, Twenty-Two Ways to Lose a Debate: A Gricean Look at the *Nyāyasūtra*'s Points of Defeat. *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 38 (2010) 49-74.

[29] Kajiyama (op. cit. [n. 4], p. 42) and Tucci (op. cit. [n. 6], p. xxi) present comparative lists of the *jāti*s in the NS, CS and UH.

5. paucity of question and prolixity of answer (問少答多相應),
6. similarity of reason (因同相應),
7. similarity of effect (果同相應 *kārya-sama[30]),
8. similarity of pervasion (遍同相應 *sādharmya-sama[31]),
9. similarity of non-pervasion (不遍同相應 *vaidharmya-sama[32]),
10. similarity of time (時同相應),[33]
11. non-contact (不到相應 *aprāpti-sama),
12. contact (到相應 *prāpti-sama),
13. contradiction (相違相應),
14. non-contradiction (不相違相應),[34]
15. doubt (疑相應 *saṃśaya-sama),
16. non-doubt (不疑相應),
17. refutation of the example (喻破相應),[35]
18. similarity of tradition (聞同相應),
19. difference of tradition (聞異相應),
20. non-arising (不生相應 *anutpatti-sama[36]).

As mentioned above, these responses are essentially *prasaṅga*-type arguments, and some of the responses of the UH (Nos. 3, 6, 7, 10, 11, 12 and 14) have parallels in works attributed to Nāgārjuna such as the Vigrahavyāvartanī and Vaidalyaprakaraṇa. The author of the UH regards them as proper responses to the opponents' wrong arguments. NS Chapter 5, on the other hand, has a similar list of responses that the Naiyāyikas regard as "erroneous objections" (*jāti*), namely:

1. *sādharmya-sama*,
2. *vaidharmya-sama*,
3. *utkarṣa-sama*,
4. *apakarṣa-sama*,
5. *varṇya-sama*,
6. *avarṇya-sama*,
7. *vikalpa-sama*,
8. *sādhya-sama*,
9. *prāpti-sama*,
10. *aprāpti-sama*,
11. *prasaṅga-sama*,
12. *pratidṛṣṭānta-sama*,
13. *anutpatti-sama*,
14. *saṃśaya-sama*,
15. *prakaraṇa-sama*,
16. *ahetu-sama*,
17. *arthāpatti-sama*,
18. *aviśeṣa-sama*,
19. *upapatti-sama*,
20. *upalabdhi-sama*,
21. *anupalabdhi-sama*,
22. *nitya-sama*,
23. *anitya-sama*,
24. *kāryasama.*

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[30] Kajiyama does not suggest this correspondence, but Tucci does.

[31] Tucci does not support this correspondence which is also assumed by Kajiyama.

[32] Tucci does not support this correspondence which is also assumed by Kajiyama.

[33] This clearly corresponds to *ahetusama* in the NS. There is the variant reading 時因 for 時同.

[34] Kajiyama takes this to correspond to *aviśeṣasama* in the NS list of *jāti*s.

[35] Tucci takes this to correspond to *pratidṛṣṭāntasama* in the NS list of *jāti*s, while Kajiyama assumes, with some reservation, that it corresponds to *anupalabdhisama*.

[36] Kajiyama does not suggest this correspondence, but Tucci does.

It is interesting to note in passing that ten out of twenty "responses" of the UH seem to have left some traces in the NS treatment of "erroneous objections".

At this point I would like to compare the general structures of the NS and the UH. The NS consists of five chapters: the first chapter gives the definitions and brief elucidations of the sixteen principles (*padārtha*) of the Nyāya school, the second to the fourth chapter record various debates with other schools some of which seem to stem from their debates with Nāgārjuna-like Buddhists, and the fifth chapter deals with 24 kinds of "erroneous objections" (*jāti*) and 22 kinds of "situations of defeat" (*nigrahasthāna*). Now, the first chapter of the UH corresponds to the first chapter of the NS because both of them define the principles of their own systems, the second and the fourth chapters correspond to the fifth chapter of the NS, and the third chapter of the UH, which presents debates between Buddhists and non-Buddhists, resembles the remaining three chapters of the NS. From this we may be able to infer that the UH and the NS belong to similar traditions and the same period.

In the following, I will examine what the author of the UH regards as the proper way of debating in the third chapter of the UH. At the outset he presents two sets of proof formulations (*prayoga*) that seem to consist of the five members (*pañcāvayava*), viz., assertion (*pratijñā*), reasoning (*hetu*), exemplification (*dṛṣṭānta/udāharaṇa*), application (*upanaya*) and conclusion (*nigamana*). In the first chapter of the UH the author discusses in one way or another the first three members, viz., assertion or thesis (*siddhānta*), reasoning and exemplification, but he never refers to the last two members. However, he apparently knows that his contemporaries use the five-membered formulation of a proof. I rephrase the initial two sets of arguments in the form of five-membered proofs.

Argument 1 (= A1):[37]

> [Assertion] There exist sentient beings (*sattva*), life forces (*āyus*) or souls (*jīva*).
> [Reasoning] Because they are perceptible by the senses (*aindriya*).
> [Exemplification] Unlike residueless *nirvāṇa* (*nirupadhiśeṣa-nirvāṇa*) that does not exist because it is not perceptible by the senses.
> [Application] Sentient beings and others are not like that.
> [Conclusion] Therefore, it is known that they exist.

As Ui mentioned,[38] this kind of proof is called "formulation based on a dissimilar example" (*vaidharmya-prayoga*) by later Indian logicians. Now, the proponent of A1 must be a non-Buddhist, and he seems to have two aims. First,

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[37] Cf. Taisho p. 27a06-08.
[38] Ui, op. cit. (n. 3), p. 456,12f.

by proving the existence of sentient beings and others, he denies the Buddhist
doctrine of "non-soul" according to which sentient beings and others are regard-
ed as having mere "conceptual existence" (*prajñaptisat*). His second aim is to
deny the Buddhist doctrine of residueless *nirvāṇa*, i.e., the final emancipation
from *saṃsāra*.

A1 has the following underlying arguments:

> (A1a) Whatever is not perceptible by the senses does not exist; residueless *nir-
> vāṇa* is not perceptible by the senses; therefore, it does not exist. Hence,
> (A1b) whatever is perceptible by the senses does exist; sentient beings and oth-
> ers are perceptible by the senses; therefore, they do exist.

A1a presents what later Indian logicians called "negative concomitance" (*vya-
tireka*), in the form of "not perceptible → not existent", and A1b presents the
"positive concomitance" (*anvaya*), in the form of "perceptible → existent".
As Dignāga later made clear, *anvaya* and *vyatireka* can imply each other only
when they are in the relation of contraposition. In other words, "not percep-
tible → not existent" implies "existent → perceptible", not "perceptible →
existent". Therefore, logically speaking, A1 is wrong. Furthermore, the neg-
ative concomitance of A1a "whatever is not perceptible by the senses does not
exist" is problematic and will be questioned in the UH. In passing, it is to be
noted that the UH is similar to the Nyāyabhāṣya here, but can be contrasted
with the Rushilun in terms of the unawareness of the principle of contraposi-
tion.

Argument 2 (= A2):[39]

> [Assertion] The soul (神 *ātman*) is eternal.
> [Reasoning cum Exemplification] Because it is not like the state of being an
> *arhat* (阿羅漢果 *arhattva*) that exists only at one time and does not exist before
> or after, as a second head or a third hand does not exist. If something did not
> originally exist yet does now, one knows that it previously did not exist; if
> something already existed yet is destroyed, one knows that it will subsequently
> not exist.
> [Application] The soul is not like that.
> [Conclusion] Therefore, it is eternal.

The formulation of A2 is not a standard five-membered proof because it puts
reasoning and exemplification together. The proponent of A2 must be the same
non-Buddhist who presented A1. He now wants to prove the eternity of the soul
by introducing another dissimilar example, i.e., the Buddhist notion of *arhattva*,
which may be equated with *sopadhiśeṣa-nirvāṇa* (*nirvāṇa* with residue [of mind
and body]) in contrast with *nirupadhiśeṣa-nirvāṇa* in A1.

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[39] Cf. Taisho p. 27a08-11.

According to him, *arhattva* exists only at one time, not forever, because it neither existed before nor will exist afterwards, as a second head or a third hand never exists. In this connection, it is to be noted that the additional examples of a second head and a third hand are not so appropriate because they do not exist at any time but *arhattva* is admitted to exist at least at one time. The two examples will be criticized in UH.

From a Buddhist point of view, it is true that *arhattva* does not exist for a practitioner until he attains it, but it does not seem proper to say that it will not exist afterwards because one who becomes an *arhat* will never go back to a lower stage of the path of Buddhist practice as long as he is alive. However, if we take into consideration the Buddhist doctrine of "non-eternity", even *arhattva* should be regarded as non-eternal from the ultimate point of view. In that sense, the opponent's argument has a point. Furthermore, he asserts that the *ātman* is not like *arhattva* and concludes that the *ātman* is eternal.

A2 has the following underlying arguments:

> (A2a) Whatever does not exist, like a second head or a third hand, before and after, exists only at one time; *arhattva* does not exist before and after; hence, it exists at one time.
> (A2b) Whatever exists before and after, exists all the time; the *ātman* exists before and after; hence, it exists all the time.

Now a certain Buddhist, probably the author of the UH himself, gives the following four objections.

Objection 1 (= O1):[40]

> This is like saying that water under the roots of a tree does not exist because one does not see it. *arhattva* too is like this. It is not something non-existent. [So] it is you who have not proven [your point].

The point of the objection is that non-cognition of X does not prove non-existence of X. This is the objection to the negative concomitance "whatever is not perceptible by the senses does not exist" presupposed by A1. The objector gives a counter-example, i.e., water under the roots of a tree that is not seen but not non-existent. Here we would expect him to say that residueless *nirvāṇa* is not non-existent even if it is not perceived; instead, he brings in *arhattva* of A2 and argues that *arhattva* is not non-existent even when it is not cognized, which seems to imply that *arhattva* is not non-existent, if not before, after the moment of attaining it. In any case, his point is clear: non-cognition of X does not prove non-existence of X.

To this objection the non-Buddhist proponent gives the following counter-argument.

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[40] Taisho p. 27a12-13.

Counter-argument 1 (= CA1):[41]

> This is not so. The water is not seen because the earth hides it. Now what is it that hides *arhattva* so that it is not seen? [Nothing.] Therefore it is known that it does not exist.

The non-Buddhist argues that water under the roots of a tree is not seen because the earth hides it. Then he asks what prevents the cognition of *arhattva*. This is a quite reasonable counter-argument to which the Buddhist objector must give an answer.

Curiously enough, he does not answer it immediately but will give an answer towards the end of the whole exchange of arguments. Instead he gives the following objection to the examples given in A2, namely, "a second head and a third hand".

Objection 2 (= O2):[42]

> It is wrong for you [to think] that because a second head or a third hand cannot be seen, you show that *arhattva* does not exist. Though there is no second head, it is not the case that there is no first. Still [when] you say that there is no *arhattva*, [you mean that] there is absolutely nothing [that can be called 'arhattva']. How does [a second head or a third hand] manage to be an example?

The Buddhist objector points out the discrepancy between the examples of a second head and a third hand and the subject under consideration, i.e., *arhattva*, for the very ideas of a second head and a third hand presuppose the existence of the first head and two hands, but *arhattva* does not exist at all from the non-Buddhist point of view. Therefore, those examples cannot be used when the non-Buddhist proponent wishes to deny the existence of *arhattva*. To this criticism the non-Buddhist does not give any counter-argument, though he will refer to the example of a second head once more.

The Buddhist objector gives another counter-example that discredits the fundamental principle of A1, namely, non-cognition of X proves non-existence of X.

Objection 3 (= O3):[43]

> Furthermore, you said that you know there is no *nirvāṇa* because you do not perceive it. This too is not so. For example, can one say that there is no ocean [given that] one does not know how many drops of water [it has]? [Even] if one does not know the number of drops, still it (i.e., the ocean) exists. *nirvāṇa* too is this way. Though one cannot perceive it, in fact it exists on its own (i.e., independently of the senses). And [if] you say that it does not exist, you have to state the reasons. If you cannot, then your thesis perishes on its own.

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[41] Taisho p. 27a13-15.
[42] Taisho p. 27a15-17.
[43] Taisho p. 27a17-21.

It is true that one cannot deny the existence of the ocean simply because one cannot know the number of water drops that make it up. This counter-example, however, is not so convincing because *nirvāṇa* is certainly not like the ocean that is a whole consisting of parts. As a matter of fact, being a whole, the ocean is regarded as merely "conventionally existent" by Buddhists. The non-Buddhist proponent again does not give an answer immediately; he will criticize the example of the ocean later.

Next the Buddhist objector points out that the reason of A1, i.e., "non-perception", is a cause of doubt (*saṃśayahetu*) which is the third kind of *hetvābhāsa* in the UH.

Objection 4 (= O4):[44]

> Next, if [you think that] non-perception of *nirvāṇa* shows that it does not exist, then for [your] opponent a doubt will arise: for example, if one sees a tree at night, a doubt [might] at once arise in one's mind: is it a trunk or is it a man? One should realize that the tree is neither a reason for determining that something is a man nor a reason for determining that it is a trunk. If one takes non-perception to be a reason for determining that *nirvāṇa* is non-existent, then a doubt should not arise.

The Buddhist objector has already given two counter-examples where non-cognition of X does not prove non-existence of X, namely, the cases of water under a tree and the ocean. Consequently, non-cognition of *nirvāṇa* asserted by the non-Buddhist proponent may lead to either of two contradictory conclusions, viz., non-existence of *nirvāṇa* and existence of *nirvāṇa*; hence, it is a cause of doubt. Later Indian logicians called such a reason that is a cause of doubt an "indeterminate" (*aniścita*/*anaikāntika*) or "deviant" (*vyabhicārin*) reason. To this criticism the non-Buddhist does not give any counter-argument, which seems to indicate that the author takes the non-Buddhist to have lost the debate at this point.

Now the Buddhist objector tries to prove his own position that *nirvāṇa* exists, by resorting to *prasaṅga*-style arguments.

Buddhist Argument 1 (= BA1):[45]

> Furthermore, *nirvāṇa* exists because [otherwise] the fruits of karma could not be destroyed [completely]. What is the reason? For example, because a fire burns down a mountain forest, the fire is the reason for [its] destruction. Now, what do these fruits of karma have as a reason for their destruction, so that they can be destroyed? If one attains *nirvāṇa*, then they (i.e., the fruits of karma) at once dissipate.

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[44] Taisho p. 27a23-26.
[45] Taisho p. 27a26-29.

The point may be like this: If there were no *nirvāṇa*, there would be no complete destruction of the fruits of karma; there indeed is the complete destruction of karma; consequently, there must be *nirvāṇa*. In this context, the Buddhist seems to hold that *nirvāṇa* destroys all the results of karma just as a fire burns down a whole forest. To this critique the non-Buddhist proponent gives a counter-argument that is essentially the same as CA1 mentioned above.

Counter-argument 2 (= CA2):[46]

> There is in fact a reason for their destruction [different from *nirvāṇa*]. [But] because there is an obstruction, one does not see it.

The Buddhist objector does not deny CA2; he rather accepts the principle behind CA1 and CA2, namely, something existent may not be seen because of some obstruction, and uses it in order to prove his own thesis that *nirvāṇa* exists. It is to be noted that the Buddhist's accepting the non-Buddhist argument involves a situation of defeat (*nigrahasthāna*) called *abhyanujñā*, "approval", in the CS or *matānujñā*, "approval of [the opponent's] opinion", in the NS. However, such a strategy is often found in *prasaṅga*-style arguments of Nāgārjuna. From his point of view, the principle behind the non-Buddhist counter-arguments will lead to the consequence that *nirvāṇa* exists, which cannot be admitted by the non-Buddhist.

Buddhist Argument 2 (= BA2):[47]

> Still *nirvāṇa* exists. Only it is not seen because of the obstruction by ignorance. Moreover, if you do not explain [how] all karma has a reason for its destruction, your thesis perishes on its own. If there is no reason [to believe] that there is a reason for its destruction and you do not state one, [there is every reason to believe that] there is no obstruction either. What can you [then] say? For these reasons, we know that karma does not come to an end.

By using the non-Buddhist proponent's logic that something existent may not be seen because of some obstruction, the Buddhist argues that, though *nirvāṇa* is not seen due to ignorance, it certainly exists. The same line of argument can be made about *arhattva*, namely, though *arhattva* is not seen due to ignorance, it certainly exists. In this way the Buddhist finally answered to the question in CA1: "What is the cause of non-cognition of *arhattva*?"

At this point the non-Buddhist proponent goes back to and criticizes the counter-example of the ocean given by the Buddhist in O3.

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[46] Taisho p. 27a29.
[47] Taisho p. 27a29-b04.

Counter-argument 3 (= CA3):[48]

> If you use the existence of the ocean to establish the existence of *nirvāṇa*, then
> how can you further suppose the [non-]existence of a second head[49] [on a body]?
> If you suppose that a second head cannot come into existence, why does *nirvāṇa*
> alone come into existence? Your example of the ocean still does not establish
> that *nirvāṇa* exists. How can it establish the [non-]existence of a second head?

The point of O3 is that as non-cognition of the number of water drops does not
prove non-existence of the ocean, non-cognition of *nirvāṇa* does not prove
non-existence of *nirvāṇa*. As a response to this, the non-Buddhist proponent
argues that if the example of the ocean proves existence of *nirvāṇa*, then it must
prove existence of a second head as well, which cannot be accepted by the
Buddhist. It is true that non-cognition of X does not prove non-existence of X;
however, the lack of a proof of non-existence of X does not imply existence of
X. Therefore, the non-Buddhist proponent has a good point. As mentioned
above,[50] the example of the ocean itself has a problem even from the Buddhist
point of view.

To this criticism the Buddhist objector does not give a direct answer. Instead he
deals with the general problem of existence and non-existence regarding *nirvā-
ṇa* and concludes that *nirvāṇa* exists:

Buddhist Argument 3 (= BA3):[51]

> If your intention is to say that *nirvāṇa* does not exist, [then you mean] either (1)
> that existent [*nirvāṇa*] does not exist or (2) that non-existent [*nirvāṇa*] does not
> exist.
> (2) If [you mean that] non-existent [*nirvāṇa*] does not exist, [then] how do you
> know [that] non-existent *nirvāṇa* [in the first place]?
> (1) If [you mean that] existent [*nirvāṇa*] does not exist, [then] why do you say
> that it is completely not apprehended?
> [And] if you say that, though there is something called non-existent *nirvāṇa*, yet
> it does not exist on its own, [then] it should be that the existent is non-existent
> [which is self-contradictory].
> Why can there not be *nirvāṇa*? You must state a reason. If you cannot state one,
> then you must acknowledge that *nirvāṇa* definitely exists.

The above is a typical Nāgārjunian-style argument by means of a destructive
dilemma. Simplified, the dilemma it addresses can be brought into the follow-
ing form: the object of the non-Buddhist criticism is *nirvāṇa*, which must be
either (1) existent or (2) non-existent; (1) if the non-Buddhist denies "existent"

[48] Taisho p. 27b04-07.
[49] Read 二頭無 instead of 二頭有 (Taisho p. 27b5 and 7).
[50] See p. 32.
[51] Taisho p. 27b07-12.

nirvāṇa, then he cannot say that *nirvāṇa* does not exist at all; and (2) if he denies "non-existent" *nirvāṇa*, he must apprehend *nirvāṇa* in the first place. In either case, he must admit the existence of *nirvāṇa* in one way or another.

The complicated exchange of arguments that I have so far presented can be summarized in the following way:

> A1 (Sentient beings, etc., exist because they are not like *nirupadhiśeṣa-nirvāṇa* which is not perceived. Non-cognition of X proves non-existence of X)
> A2 (The *ātman* is eternal because it is not like *arhattva* which does not exist, like a second head or a third hand, before and after)
>> O1 (*arhattva* exists because non-cognition of X does not prove non-existence of X, like the water under a tree)
>>> ← CA1 (The water under a tree is not seen because it is hidden by the earth)
>> O2 (Critique of the examples of a second head and a third hand in A2)
>>> ← No counter-argument.
>> O3 (*nirvāṇa* exists because non-cognition of X does not prove non-existence of X as the ocean exists, even though the number of water drops that make it up cannot be known)
>>> ← No counter-argument.
>> O4 (The reason of A1 "non-perception" is a cause of doubt)
>>> ← No counter-argument.
> BA1 (*nirvāṇa* exists because it destroys the fruits of karma as a fire burns down a forest)
>> ← CA2 (There is another reason for the destruction of karma but it is not seen because of an obstruction. Cf. CA1)
> BA2 (Similarly, *nirvāṇa* and *arhattva* are not seen because of the obstruction by ignorance)
>> ← CA3 (The example of the ocean in O3 is not good)
> BA3 A destructive dilemma is given in order to establish that *nirvāṇa* exists.

The rest of UH Chapter 3 presents an exchange of arguments in six steps regarding the eternity or non-eternity of the *ātman*, which I intend to discuss on a future occasion together with another six-step argument that occurs at the end of UH Chapter 4 and similar six-step arguments found in the Vigrahavyāvartanī and NS Chapter 5.

In conclusion, I would like to state that the author of the UH does not use any fixed formulation of proof or disproof such as the five-membered formulation of proof; instead he uses *prasaṅga*-style arguments that are characteristic of works attributed to Nāgārjuna.

The author of the UH ends the text by repeating the importance of mastering the principles of debate:[52]

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[52] Taisho p. 28c09-17.

I have already explained the essence of the principles of debate. The essence of this treatise is the basis for all debate. Because of this treatise, one can widely engage in (lit. give rise to) questions and answers and increase wisdom. Just as when one plants seeds in good earth, their roots and stalks flourish, and when one plants them in bad fields, there is no fruit, so it is with these principles [of debate]. If one has wisdom and is good at reflection, then one can widely engage in (lit. give rise to) all [kinds of] debates. But stupid people lacking in wisdom, even if they study this treatise, [nonetheless] cannot understand [the principles expounded herein]. They, then, are not said to be ones of truly excellent insight. Therefore, all those who wish to give rise to real wisdom and to distinguish right from wrong, should practice assiduously debate [in accordance] with these proper principles.