

The Habsburg-Ottoman Rivalry in Hungary and the Mediterranean in the Age of Sultan Süleyman the Magnificent

Géza Pálffy

A Turning Point in the History of the Mediterranean and Hungary: The Reign of Sultan Süleyman the Magnificent

Focusing on the Habsburg-Ottoman rivalry between Emperor Charles V (1519–56) and Sultan Süleyman the Magnificent (1520–66), this chapter examines the dynamism of military border zones and interactions in the sixteenth-century Habsburg Mediterranean. The first part of this chapter charts a more traditional perspective on Habsburg-Ottoman military conflicts in sixteenth-century Hungary, illustrating the main military campaigns, activities and events. A heuristic focus on the Habsburg Mediterranean, however, broadens our understanding of the entanglement of Hungarian and Mediterranean Habsburg frontiers. Therefore, this chapter then continues examining the presence of Spanish and Italian soldiers at the Habsburg-Ottoman border zone in Hungary. Such an analysis, and the case study of Sforza Pallavicini (1510s–85) in particular, sheds new light on the interconnectedness of the military and biographical realms of the Habsburg Mediterranean. The sixteenth-century notion of a Habsburg political domain covering wide expanses of the Mediterranean Sea and its hinterlands furthermore granted legitimacy to the Habsburg intrusion into Hungarian lands; an expansionary rhetoric that helped juxtapose imperial claims of rivalling Ottomans at that time.

The reign of Sultan Süleyman the Magnificent was not only a significant period in the history of the Ottoman Empire.¹ It marked a turning point in the history of the Habsburg dynasty as well as that of the Mediterranean and Hungary. From the middle of the 1520s, the House of Habsburg clearly became the most significant European rival of Süleyman, first and foremost through Charles V, Holy Roman Emperor and Spanish King (1516–56), and his brother Ferdinand I, King of Hungary and Bohemia (1526–64) (fig. VII.1). Thus, besides the Reformation, the Ottoman expansion was one of the biggest challenges for the Habsburgs in

¹ Metin Kunt and Christine Woodhead, eds., *Süleyman the Magnificent and His Age: The Ottoman Empire in the Early Modern World* (London: Longman, 1995).

the sixteenth century. The emperor's Spanish lands were mainly challenged in the Mediterranean and in North Africa; in central Europe Hungary became the main theatre of war for the military rivalry between the Habsburgs and the Ottomans.²



Fig. VII.1: Barthel Beham, *Portrait of Ferdinand I*, 1531. Copper engraving. Hungarian National Museum, Budapest.

² For a historical point of view on art and culture see Gülru Necipoğlu, “Süleyman the Magnificent and the Representation of Power in the Context of Ottoman-Habsburg-Papal Rivalry”, in *Süleyman the Second and His Time*, eds. Halil İnalçık and Cemal Kafadar (Istanbul: Isis Press, 1993), 163–94; and generally Gábor Ágoston, “Information, Ideology, and Limits of Imperial Policy: Ottoman Grand Strategy in the Context of Ottoman-Habsburg Rivalry”, *The Early Modern Ottomans: Remapping the Empire*, eds. Virginia H. Aksan and Daniel Goffman (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 75–103.

Before the death of Süleyman I in 1566, the Ottoman armies had had significant successes in both theatres of war. In Spring 1565 they besieged Malta and even though that turned out to be a failure, the eastern part of the Mediterranean—except for Cyprus and Crete—came under their authority. One year later, during the late summer of 1566, the sultan laid siege to the fortress of Szigetvár,³ after having conquered the capital of the medieval Hungary, Buda, in 1541. Although Süleyman had died a couple of hours before Szigetvár was conquered, by the end of the year two fifths of the medieval Hungarian kingdom was actually under Ottoman occupation, and another fifth, the Principality of Transylvania, became a tributary or vassal state of the Ottoman Empire.⁴

Because of the Ottoman expansion and the close relations of the two Habsburg brothers, events in the Habsburg Mediterranean and in Habsburg central Europe were often intertwined. However, subsequent research has not paid enough attention to this topic so far.⁵ Examining the Habsburg-Ottoman military encounter in Hungary in the light of Mediterranean history broadens our understanding of this central European rivalry. The focus on the Habsburg Mediterranean as a methodological approach helps to reframe traditional narratives of Habsburg-Ottoman conflicts beyond their national focus. This study aims to fill in this lacuna from two points of view. First of all, it examines how the events of the two Habsburg theatres of war were directly and indirectly related. Or how the anti-Ottoman strategy and campaigns of Emperor Charles and those of Sultan Süleyman in the Mediterranean and against the Safavids in Persia influenced the defence of central Europe as the fate of the Danube Basin depended on a border defence system to be established on Hungarian and Croatian territory. Of course, the question is also valid the other way around: did the Ottoman and Habsburg campaigns and military activities in Hungary shape the history of the Mediterranean Sea? Second, the case study of the career of general Sforza Pallavicini aims to draw attention to the fact that between the two theatres of war

³ Recently Roger Crowley, *Empires of the Sea: The Siege of Malta, the Battle of Lepanto, and the Contest for the Center of the World* (New York: Random House, 2008); Szabolcs Varga, *Europe's Leonidas: Miklós Zrínyi, Defender of Szigetvár (1508–1566)* (Budapest: Research Centre for the Humanities, Hungarian Academy of Sciences, 2016), 212–55; Pál Fodor, ed., *The Battle for Central Europe: The Siege of Szigetvár and the Death of Süleyman the Magnificent and Nicholas Zrínyi (1566)* (Leiden, Boston, Budapest: Brill–Research Centre for the Humanities, Hungarian Academy of Sciences, 2019).

⁴ Géza Pálffy, *The Kingdom of Hungary and the Habsburg Monarchy in the Sixteenth Century* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009), 35–52.

⁵ See Zoltán Korpás and his Spanish and Hungarian studies cited hereinafter. Zoltán Korpás, *V. Károly és Magyarország (1526–1538)* (Budapest: Századvég Kiadó, 2008).

in the years from 1530 and 1570, there were actual opportunities for personal advancement and military service for Spanish and Italian officers.

A very important point needs to be emphasized: until the abdication of Charles V in 1556 the Habsburg dynasty had not been divided into the Spanish and Austrian branches. The head of both branches was Charles V, who ruled over one quarter of European lands. Though his younger brother, Ferdinand I, was a sovereign ruler in Hungary and Bohemia, he depended hugely on his brother in terms of dynastic, diplomatic, financial and military issues. The diplomatic settlements and peace treaties were also always concluded between the emperor and the sultan.⁶ Thus, before 1556 it is more conducive to talk about Charles V's Habsburg empire (or Habsburg Universal empire) and after that to differentiate between the Spanish monarchy (or Catholic monarchy) and the central European Habsburg monarchy separately.⁷ However, unlike the world power of Charles V or the Spanish monarchy, until the beginning of the eighteenth century the Vienna-centred composite state only counted as a local or middling European power, partly because of the significant Ottoman conquests in Hungary after the battle of Mohács in 1526. The sultan had conquered an area of almost 120,000 km² of the medieval Hungary and Croatia's loss of area was also considerable. It is therefore crucial to reflect on the Ottoman expansion into Habsburg territory in Hungary in the light of the broader Mediterranean ambience of the Habsburg world.

Campaigns and Strategy of Sultan Süleyman I

Although during most of Süleyman's reign Emperor Charles V was the head of the House of Habsburg, the Ottomans mainly challenged Habsburg authority on the mainland, namely in the Danube Basin. This is also shown by the fact that of the thirteen campaigns led by the sultan personally, seven targeted Hungary, three Persia, only two the Mediterranean and one the Principality of Moldavia,

⁶ Anton von Gévay, ed., *Urkunden und Actenstücke zur Geschichte der Verhältnisse zwischen Österreich, Ungern und der Pforte im XVI. und XVII. Jahrhunderte: Aus Archiven und Bibliotheken. Gesandtschaften König Ferdinands I. an Sultan Suleiman I., 1526–1541*, 3 vols. (Vienna: Schaumberg und Comp., 1840–42); Karl Nehring et al., eds., *Austro-Turcica 1541–1552: Diplomatische Akten des habsburgischen Gesandtschaftsverkehrs mit der Hohen Pforte im Zeitalter Süleymans des Prächtigen* (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1995).

⁷ Robert J. W. Evans, *The Making of the Habsburg Monarchy 1550–1700: An Interpretation* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979); Paula Sutter Fichtner, *The Habsburg Monarchy 1490–1848: Attributes of Empire* (Houndmills: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2003), 14–30; Winkelbauer, *Ständefreiheit und Fürstenmacht*, vol. 1.

as shown on Table 1 (the Hungarian campaigns are *in italics*) and fig. VII.2.⁸ In addition, out of the seven campaigns in Hungary, the latter ones clearly aimed to conquer or at least to threaten Ferdinand's new residence city, Vienna.

Table 1: The campaigns of Sultan Süleyman the Magnificent (1521–66)

	Year	Campaign
1.	<i>1521</i>	<i>Belgrade</i>
2.	1522–23	Rhodes
3.	<i>1526</i>	<i>Mohács</i>
4.	<i>1529</i>	<i>Vienna</i>
5.	<i>1532</i>	<i>Vienna (Güns)</i>
6.	1534–35	Iraq
7.	1537	Albania
8.	1538	Moldavia
9.	<i>1541</i>	<i>Buda</i>
10.	<i>1543</i>	<i>Esztergom</i>
11.	1548–49	Iran
12.	1553–55	Iran
13.	<i>1566</i>	<i>Szigetvár</i>

⁸ Pál Fodor, *The Unbearable Weight of Empire: The Ottomans in Central Europe – A Failed Attempt at Universal Monarchy (1390–1566)* (Budapest: Research Centre for the Humanities, Hungarian Academy of Sciences, 2015), 48–133, especially 88–89.




Fig. VII.2: The campaigns of Süleyman I, 1521–66. Pál Fodor, *The Unbearable Weight of Empire: The Ottomans in Central Europe – A Failed Attempt at Universal Monarchy (1390–1566)* (Budapest: Research Centre for the Humanities, Hungarian Academy of Sciences, 2015), 8.

According to Ottoman studies, different factors played their part in prioritising strengthening the front lines with Hungary. On one hand, the military-bureaucratic elite of the Ottoman empire clearly supported the conquests on the mainland as most of them had Balkan origins: between the middle of the fifteenth and the beginning of the seventeenth centuries all the grand viziers originated from that area. On the other hand, the ideology of a religious war, the *jihad*, also played an important part. In fact, Süleyman considered himself the successor to Alexander the Great and the Roman Emperor Constantine the Great. As the custodian of Istanbul, formerly Constantinople he strove to revive the East Roman Empire. He thus became not only the main rival of the Holy Roman Emperor Charles V in military terms, but also in terms of ideology and representation of power.⁹

However, the situation was different for the half decade after Süleyman came to the throne in 1521. Although Charles V had already been Spanish and Holy Roman ruler for years, the sultan's main enemy in Europe until 1526 was Hungary governed by Louis II Jagiello, King of Hungary and Bohemia (1516–26), a relative of the Habsburgs. Even though the area of the medieval Hungarian Kingdom was just slightly smaller than today's Germany, thus playing an important role in central Europe, the dominant position of the Ottoman empire was clear, as is shown in Table 2. Hungary had only limited resources for a lengthy resistance against the Ottomans: the empire of the sultan covered five times as much area, counted four times as many inhabitants and was economically and militarily hugely superior to Hungary.¹⁰ Being aware of these facts, the fall of Belgrade (the key to the Hungarian defence system for more than half a century) during Sultan Süleyman's first campaign in Hungary in the summer of 1521, and later the step-by-step collapse of the southern border fortifications, had almost been a matter-of-course development.¹¹

⁹ Idem, *In Quest of the Golden Apple: Imperial Ideology, Politics, and Military Administration in the Ottoman Empire* (Istanbul: Isis Press, 2000), 106–69; Gülru Necipoğlu, "Süleyman the Magnificent and the Representation of Power in the Context of Ottoman-Hapsburg-Papal Rivalry", *The Art Bulletin* 71, no. 3 (1989): 401–27.

¹⁰ Gábor Ágoston, "Habsburgs and Ottomans: Defence, Military Change and Shifts in Power", *The Turkish Studies Association Bulletin* 22, no. 2 (1998): 126–41; idem, "The Most Powerful Empire: Ottoman Flexibility and Military Might", in *Empires and Superpowers: Their Rise and Fall*, eds. George Zimmer and David Hicks (Washington: Society for the Preservation of the Greek Heritage, 2005), 127–71.

¹¹ Ferenc Szakály, "Nándorfehérvár, 1521: The Beginning of the End of the Medieval Hungarian Kingdom", in *Hungarian-Ottoman Military and Diplomatic Relations in the Age of Süleyman the Magnificent*, eds. Géza Dávid and Pál Fodor (Budapest: Loránd Eötvös University, Department of Turkish Studies, 1994), 44–76.

Table 2: A statistical survey of the Ottoman Empire and the Kingdom of Hungary c. 1520

	Ottoman Empire	Kingdom of Hungary
area (km ²)	1,500,000	325,000
population	12–13,000,000	3,300,000
annual revenue (florins)	4–5,000,000	400–500,000
armed forces	100–120,000	30–40,000

From the point of view of Christian Europe, the situation in the Danube basin had fundamentally changed by the end of 1526. During his first campaign in the Mediterranean in 1522–23 Süleyman took over Rhodes from the Knights of St. John, and ensured the empire's authority over most of the eastern Mediterranean basin, except for Crete and Cyprus. After leaving Rhodes, the knights established their headquarters in Crete for a short time, and then moved to Malta thanks to a donation from Charles V as Spanish King in 1530. In the meantime, on 29 August 1526, the sultan won the battle of Mohács against the forces of his rival, the King of Hungary, Louis II Jagiello (fig. VII.3).¹² The Hungarians replaced Louis II with two kings, John Szapolyai (1526–40) and Archduke Ferdinand I of Habsburg in 1526–27, which resulted in decisive consequences for the House of Habsburg, the Ottomans and, of course, for Hungary as well.¹³

The area of Hungary was split into three parts for a long time, while King John Szapolyai became the vassal of the sultan after about a year, thus isolating himself almost totally in terms of European foreign policy.¹⁴ On the other hand, the Hungarian-Ottoman military conflict turned into a Habsburg-Ottoman rivalry as the remaining Kingdom of Hungary became part of Ferdinand's new composite state in central Europe.¹⁵ This created an entirely new situation for

¹² János B. Szabó and Ferenc Tóth, eds., *Mohács (1526): Soliman le Magnifique prend pied en Europe centrale* (Paris: Economica, 2009).

¹³ Pálffy, *Kingdom of Hungary*, 37–41.

¹⁴ Gábor Barta, *La route qui mène à Istanbul 1526–1528* (Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó, 1994); Sándor Papp, *Die Verleihungs-, Bekräftigungs- und Vertragsurkunden der Osmanen für Ungarn und Siebenbürgen: Eine quellenkritische Untersuchung* (Vienna: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 2003), 27–51.

¹⁵ Géza Pálffy, "The Origins and Development of the Border Defence System Against the Ottoman Empire in Hungary (Up to the Early Eighteenth Century)", in *Ottomans, Hungarians, and Habsburgs in Central Europe: The Military Confines in the Era of the Ottoman Conquest*, eds. Géza Dávid and Pál Fodor (Leiden: Brill, 2000), 16–18.




Fig. VII.3: Ottoman campaigns in Hungary, 1521–66. Géza Pálffy, *The Kingdom of Hungary and the Habsburg Monarchy in the Sixteenth Century* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009), 378–79.

Emperor Charles as well,¹⁶ as his brother's military and financial opportunities were limited, even though Ferdinand got control over all the Austrian provinces in the Treaty of Brussels in February 1522. Sultan Süleyman's army outnumbered the archduke's army four to five times.

During the rule of Ferdinand I, Hungary was not entirely subjected to Ottoman occupation, despite the sultan attempting to conquer the country in five campaigns (1529, 1532, 1541, 1543 and 1566). There were several reasons for this. First, the cooperation between Ferdinand and the Hungarians did not blossom until the 1540–50s; secondly, the mistakes and eastern obligations of the sultan's military between 1530 and 1550 took its toll; and last but not least the direct and indirect help by Charles V played a significant role at the time of the birth of the central European Habsburg Monarchy after 1526. In this chapter I keep track of the main phases, phenomena and relations of these processes, mainly from the point of view of the two Habsburg brothers, and the Habsburg Mediterranean and Hungary.

Contacts Between the Two Habsburg-Ottoman Border Zones

Based on the latest research it has become clear that Emperor Charles V and German merchant bankers played a significant role in assisting Archduke Ferdinand to ascend to the Hungarian throne with the help of the military in 1527–28. Several different documents give evidence of this account. In November 1526 the Spanish Council of State unprecedentedly discussed the situation of Hungary and allocated 100,000 ducats in help—a sum about one fifth of the annual income of the Hungarian state.¹⁷ The bill of exchange was given to Ferdinand by Don Antonio de Mendoza y Pacheco (1490–1552) in March 1527,¹⁸ who sat next to the ruler at the coronation banquet in Székesfehérvár in November 1527.¹⁹ At the

¹⁶ Cf. Zoltán Korpás, “The History of Charles V in Hungary: The Unavailable Subject of Hope”, in *The Histories of Emperor Charles V: Nationale Perspektiven von Persönlichkeit und Herrschaft*, eds. Scott C. Dixon and Martina Fuchs (Münster: Aschendorff, 2005), 203–36; Korpás, *V. Károly*, 43–51.

¹⁷ Zoltán Korpás, “La frontera oriental de la Universitas Christiana entre 1526–1532: La política húngara y antiturca de Carlos V”, in *Carlos V: Europeísmo y universalidad. El congreso internacional, Granada, 1–5 de mayo*, vol. 3: *Los escenarios del imperio*, eds. Juan L. Castellano et al. (Madrid: Universidad de Granada, 2001), 324–25.

¹⁸ De Mendoza was shortly afterwards the founder and first Viceroy of New Spain (Mexico, 1535–50), then died as Viceroy of Peru in 1552. Zoltán Korpás, “A spanyol Államtanács a mohácsi csatavesztésről”, *Lymbus* 2 (2004): 8.

¹⁹ Géza Pálffy, “Krönungsmähler in Ungarn im Spätmittelalter und in der Frühen Neuzeit: Weiterleben des Tafelzeremoniells des selbständigen ungarischen Königshofes und Macht-

same time reports about the Habsburg campaign in Hungary arrived in the south German trading centres of Augsburg and Nuremberg, mainly from master of the household (*königlicher Obersthofmeister*), Wilhelm Truchseß von Waldburg, one of Ferdinand's principal appointees.²⁰ The initial mistrust between the Hungarians and Ferdinand—between 1528 and 1542 the Habsburg ruler didn't travel to his country as it had turned into a theatre of war²¹—was assuaged after Spanish and German financial aid poured in.

The fourth and fifth campaigns of Sultan Süleyman almost brought an end to the expansion of the Habsburg state in east central Europe (fig. VII.3). Had the Ottomans been victorious in Vienna in 1529 or 1532, Süleyman would have rebuilt the walls of Vienna as he had the walls of Jerusalem, in the 1530s. In this sense the history of not only central Europe and Hungary, but also of the Habsburg dynasty, would have turned out decidedly different. It was due to Charles V that such a scenario did not take place. In the autumn of 1529 a considerable number of the defenders of Vienna were German and Spanish soldiers of the emperor, contributing significantly to the defence of the residence city of Ferdinand I. The emperor took up an even greater burden in the summer of 1532: he mobilized huge military and financial resources to stop the sultan marching against Vienna again. Though Süleyman's army still slightly outnumbered that of the emperor, the latter counted 90,000 men, he did not risk an open battle but settled for symbolically occupying Kőszeg/Güns in western Hungary. The Ottomans were only able to put their flag on the wall of the city, but they did not actually occupy it.²²

It is important to stress that this was probably the only time in sixteenth-century Europe when a Christian ruler assembled an army of almost 100,000 men. Even though the army was only maintained for a short period of time, the costs totalled several million florins, an incredible burden for the treasury of Charles V. In addition, in the summer of 1532 the Genoese Andrea Doria (1466–1560), former French mercenary, who had switched sides and was now serving the emperor, occupied Koroni and Patras in Greece. Whilst this diverting action could not stop the main army of the sultan, his two campaigns against

repräsentation der ungarischen politischen Elite. Teil 1", *Mitteilungen des Instituts für Österreichische Geschichtsforschung* 115, no. 1. (2007): 92.

²⁰ Lajos Gecsényi, "Briefe des Hofmeisters König Ferdinands I. an die Stadt Augsburg über die Ereignisse des ungarländischen Feldzuges im Jahre 1527", *Archivalische Zeitschrift* 88 (2006): 201–15.

²¹ Anton von Gévay, *Itinerar Kaiser Ferdinand's I. 1521–1564* (Vienna: Strauß's Witwe, 1843), sine pagina.

²² István Bariska, *A Contribution to the History of the Turkish Campaign of 1532* (Szombathely, Kőszeg: Institute for Social and European Studies, 2007).

Vienna determined the actions of the emperor and Spanish king, not only on the mainland but also in the Mediterranean.

The events in 1532 marked a turning point in central European politics both for Süleyman and Charles. They both changed strategy or rather they were forced to do so. Even though the sultan did not give up besieging Vienna as his main goal, the failure of his two great campaigns made him change his strategy of conquest.²³ He had to realize that even though his army outnumbered that of the Habsburgs, he couldn't bring them to the knees with just one blow, as it was much stronger than the east European enemies on the Balkan had been in earlier campaigns. The Truce of Constantinople signed in 1533 is proof of this: during the negotiations a scenario was discussed to give back Koroni and Patras on the Peloponnese in exchange for Hungary, which in itself indicates the close relationship between the Habsburg Mediterranean and Hungary.

The new strategy of the Ottomans was to gain access to Vienna step by step, which also meant the gradual occupation and conquest of Hungary. Besides this, the sultan was faced with events in the Mediterranean and Persia. After the conquests of Sultan Selim I (Mesopotamia in 1515; Syria in 1516; Egypt in 1517) the Safavid dynasty in the east had become at least as serious an enemy of the Sublime Port as the Habsburgs in the west, even though Süleyman's moves were more orientated towards the west. The sultan took part in the Long Persian Campaign in 1534–35, which resulted in the occupation of Baghdad, and his fleet was near the western coasts of India in 1538. On the whole, though, he missed a particular chance in Hungary, which gave the Habsburgs time to recover, consolidate the country and build up a new defence system.

Charles' change of strategy played an important part in the new strategy of the Ottomans in Hungary. The emperor had also learned from the events of 1532.²⁴ He realized that he could not afford—neither for financial nor for military reasons—regularly to recruit armies of tens of thousands to protect the central European countries of his brother. It looked more practical to help directly and indirectly in defending Hungary, particularly as the leaders of the Hungarian political elite regularly informed members of the dynasty about the necessity of their help. Alexius Thurzó, Chief Justice of Hungary (1527–43), wrote to Ferdinand I in December 1531, “both the future of Your Majesty and the

²³ Fodor, *Unbearable Weight*, 81–87.

²⁴ Zoltán Korpás, “Las luchas antiturcas en Hungría y la política oriental de los Austrias 1532–1541”, in *Fernando I, 1503–1564: Socialización, vida privada y actividad pública de un emperador del Renacimiento*, eds. Alfredo Alvar and Friedrich Edelmayer (Madrid: Sociedad Estatal de Conmemoraciones Culturales, 2004), 335–70.

whole of the German territories are entirely dependent on Hungary”.²⁵ Hence, in the 1530s the emperor regularly stationed a few thousand Spanish and Italian mercenaries in Hungary, in defence of the Austrian and German territories.²⁶ Until 1556 they played a very active part in occupying and securing the area ruled over by King John Szapolyai and later his son, where it had become possible to organize a new defence system against the Ottomans.

The events of the Ottoman Empire had effects on the campaign for Koroni in 1532 as well as the campaigns against Tunis in 1535 and Algiers in 1541.²⁷ When the sultan became less active in Hungary, the Habsburg fleet became more active on the seas, under the leadership of general Andrea Doria. Moreover, in 1537–38, the diplomats of Charles V were working on putting together a Holy League of the Habsburg brothers, Venice and the pope, who were to start a joint assault on the Ottoman Empire on both land and sea. They wished to involve the Hungarian King John Szapolyai in this alliance by the secret Treaty of Várad in 1538, and that is why the emperor himself ratified it in Toledo.²⁸ Even though finally the result was only an unsuccessful naval campaign—the Battle of Preveza in September 1538—and the temporary occupation of Castelnuovo (Herceg Novi, Montenegro) in 1538–39,²⁹ it still clearly showed the connection between the Habsburg Mediterranean and Hungary. Moreover, the plan of the alliance later became the blueprint for the Holy League in 1571.³⁰

²⁵ Gabriella Erdélyi, ed., *Bethlenfalvi Thurzó Elek levelezése (Források a Habsburg-magyar kapcsolatok történetéhez)*, vol. 1: 1526–1532 (Budapest: Magyar Országos Levéltár, 2005), 318, no. 88: *a qua [a Hungaria] dependet omnis salus aliorum regnorum et Maiestatis Vestrae et totius Germaniae* (translation by Géza Pálffy).

²⁶ The list of Spanish soldiers, courtiers and nobles serving in Austrian and Hungarian territories under the reign of Ferdinand I: Christopher F. Laferl, *Die Kultur der Spanier in Österreich unter Ferdinand I. 1522–1564* (Vienna: Böhlau, 1997), 209–80, and Korpás, *V. Károly*, 264–95.

²⁷ Sabine Haag and Katja Schmitz-von Ledebur, eds., *Kaiser Karl V. erobert Tunis: Dokumentation eines Kriegszuges in Kartons und Tapisserien* (Vienna: Kunsthistorisches Museum, 2013); Rubén González Cuerva and Miguel Á. de Bunes Ibarra, eds., *Túnez 1535: voces de una campaña europea* (Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, 2017); Daniel Nordman, *Tempête sur Alger: l'expédition de Charles Quint en 1541* (Saint-Denis: Bouchène, 2011).

²⁸ Korpás, “Las luchas antiturcas”, 358–62.

²⁹ John F. Guilmartin Jr., *Galleons and Galleys* (London: Cassell & Co, 2002), 130–32; Emmanuelle Pujeau, “Preveza in 1538: The Background of a Very Complex Situation”, in *Preveza B: Proceedings of the Second International Symposium for the History and Culture of Preveza (16–20 September 2009)*, eds. Marina Vrelli-Zachou et al. (Preveza: University of Ioannina, 2010), 121–38.

³⁰ Zoltán Korpás, “Buda–Algír–Buda: A magyarországi és a mediterrán oszmánellenes küzdelmek kölcsönhatásai 1538–1542”, *Tanulmányok Budapest Múltjából* 42 (2017): 88.

Thus, the fleet of the Habsburgs and the soldiers of the Safavids managed to divide the military power of the sultan. Therefore, after the Baghdad expedition, Süleyman led his seventh campaign against Albania and Corfu in 1537, while his troops also landed on the coasts of Apulia in Southern Italy in alliance with the French, and later his Kapudan Hayreddin Barbarossa conquered more and more Greek islands from Venice. Süleyman started a war again during the autumn of 1538; this time he settled things in the vassal state of Moldavia which had proved itself unreliable. Again, this was indirectly in connection with the Hungarian theatre of war. All in all, the division of the sultan's military power played an important part in the fact that Ferdinand I could consolidate his authority in Hungary in the 1530s. He possessed more and more land (in 1537 he owned seventeen counties, in 1539 28, in 1546/49 35) and could start the modernization of his finances and army in cooperation with the Hungarians. Moreover, from the end of the decade, the establishment of a new defence system began in Croatia near Bihać, as those lands had become directly affected by the Ottoman occupation of Jajce in Bosnia at the beginning of 1528 (fig. VII.4). A similar defence system was developed near the course of the river Danube outside Vienna.³¹

Finally it is also an important, though often forgotten, fact that after the death of John Szapolyai in July 1540, Habsburg troops led by two great generals of Ferdinand I, Leonard von Vels (1497–1545) and later Wilhelm von Roggendorf (1481–1541) persuaded by the Hungarian estates, attempted to take back Buda, which had been held by followers of John Szapolyai with the help of the Ottomans after 1529. Even though the Austrian-Hungarian armies could not take over the Hungarian capital then, they could occupy Visegrád, Székesfehérvár, Tata, Vác and Pest, creating a pincer movement around the Hungarian vassals of the Ottomans.³²

The sultan could not tolerate this development which challenged his Hungarian conquests. As a consequence, the following three years were marked by great military campaigns again, which brought important changes to the Habsburg defence system. The two rulers of world empires responded to each other's actions on Hungarian territory. In response to Ferdinand's campaigns against Buda in 1540 and 1541, Süleyman took over Buda during his fifth Hungarian campaign in August 1541, which had thus become the westernmost *vilayet* or province of the Ottoman Empire. Charles, then, responded by his action in Algiers in

³¹ Pálffy, "Origins", 20–22.

³² See recent studies in *Tanulmányok Budapest Múltjából* 42 (2017).




Fig. VII.4: The border defence system in Hungary against the Ottomans. Géza Pálffy, *The Kingdom of Hungary and the Habsburg Monarchy in the Sixteenth Century* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2009), 383.

the autumn of 1541 and even more so by the large expedition launched to take back Buda in the summer of 1542.³³ An army of about 50,000 men was led by Joachim II, Elector of Brandenburg (1535–71), although at first the emperor had also seemed a possible choice to lead the campaign, but the attack in Italy by the French King Francis I scuppered this possibility.

Though both actions by the Habsburgs, in Buda and Algiers, were spectacularly unsuccessful, the sultan personally turned again to Hungary to marshal events in the Hungarian theatre of war in the summer of 1543. During his sixth Hungarian (in total tenth) campaign he took over Székesfehérvár, with its necropolis of the Hungarian kings, and Esztergom, the centre of Hungarian Catholicism, making a stable ring of defence around Buda. In 1544–45 the local Ottoman military increased the conquered territories.³⁴ This status quo was determined in the Peace of Edirne in 1547, the first peace treaty between the Habsburgs and the Ottomans in which the rulers recognized that they were unable to accomplish their goals in Hungary and divided the area between them.³⁵ Thus, in 1548–49 and in 1553–55 Süleyman could go against the Safavids again, though he did not achieve total success in the east either, despite conquering some new lands.

Spanish and German Soldiers Fighting at the Habsburg-Ottoman Frontier in Hungary

1541 was a turning point in the history of Hungary as well as central Europe. As Ottoman Buda was only 270 and Esztergom around 200 kilometres east of Ferdinand's residence city Vienna, there was no more time to waste. Based on the experiences (Ottoman and Habsburg failures of 1532 and 1542) Charles and Ferdinand had to give up the large campaigns against the Ottomans and had to mobilize everything for the sake of permanent defence. Because of this from the 1540s the Turkish Tax (*Türkenhilfe*), voted for by the German estates, was

³³ Korpás, "Buda–Algír–Buda", 95–97; Árpád Károlyi, *A német birodalom nagy hadi vállalata 1542-ben* (Budapest: Athenaeum R. Társulat, 1880); Paula Sutter Fichtner, "Dynasticism and Its Limitations: The Habsburgs and Hungary (1542)", *East European Quarterly* 4 (1971): 389–407; Antonio Liepold, *Wider den Erbfeind christlichen Glaubens: Die Rolle des niederen Adels in den Türkenkriegen des 16. Jahrhunderts*. (Frankfurt a. M.: Peter Lang, 1998), 237–52.

³⁴ Klára Hegyi, *The Ottoman Military Organization in Hungary: Fortresses, Fortress Garrisons and Finances* (Berlin: Klaus Schwarz, 2018), 82–84.

³⁵ Ernst D. Petritsch, "Der habsburgisch-osmanische Friedensvertrag des Jahres 1547", *Mitteilungen des Instituts für Österreichische Geschichtsforschung* 38 (1985): 49–80.

increasingly used for the maintenance of the border defence.³⁶ In the next one and a half decades the emperor himself sent new Spanish regiments (some thousand soldiers per year) that played a determinative role in expanding the lands ruled by Ferdinand in northern Hungary, to the detriment of the son of King John, John Sigismund Szapolyai (1540–71). This was precisely the area where the Habsburgs could start to build the new defence system.³⁷

Famous Spanish officers served in Hungary at this time. Álvaro de Sande (1489–1573) in 1545 in Upper Hungary, had already fought in the campaign of Tunis in 1535, then in the battle of Mühlberg (1547) in the War of Schmalkalden, later in Italy against France in the 1550s, and finally in defence of Djerba in Tunisia in 1560. He also excelled in the liberation of Malta in 1565. Miguel de Cervantes Saavedra (1547–1616), later the author of *Don Quijote*, served with him.³⁸ The famous artillery officer, Bernardo de Aldana, who after serving in the War of Schmalkalden was active in the Hungarian theatre of war between 1548 and 1554 and played an important role in the modernization of the Castle of Szolnok near the river Tisza and in the Habsburg expedition in Transylvania. The latter ended unsuccessfully because of the latest two Ottoman campaigns against Hungary (1551, 1552), that were not led by the sultan, but by the second vizier Kara Ahmed Pasha (died 1555). Later Aldana became the artillery captain of the Viceroyalty of Naples, while as military engineer he also took part in building the fortress of Djerba. He died in 1560 during the expedition against Djerba.³⁹

Meanwhile Ferdinand I also brought changes to his Hungarian politics. From the end of 1542 he regularly took part in the Diets of Hungary and he made compromises with the most prominent secular and ecclesiastical leaders.⁴⁰ At the same time he succeeded in mobilizing the estates of the Austrian and Bohemian

³⁶ Peter Rauscher, “Kaiser und Reich: Die Reichstürkenhilfen von Ferdinand I. bis zum Beginn des ‘Langen Türkenkriegs’ (1548–1593)”, in *Finanzen und Herrschaft: Materielle Grundlagen fürstlicher Politik in den habsburgischen Ländern und im Heiligen Römischen Reich im 16. Jahrhundert*, eds. Friedrich Edelmayer, Maximilian Lanzinner and Peter Rauscher (Munich and Vienna: Oldenbourg, 2003), 45–83.

³⁷ Pálffy, “Origins”, 39–54.

³⁸ Zoltán Korpás, “La expedición de Álvaro de Sande a Hungría Superior, 1545”, in *Palabras enlazadas: Estudios en homenaje al profesor László Scholz*, eds. Zsuzsanna Bárkányi and Margit Santosné Blastik (Szeged: JATE Press, 2018), 217–29; Korpás, *V. Károly*, 290–91.

³⁹ Lafertl, *Die Kultur der Spanier in Österreich*, 134–39, 211–12; Zoltán Korpás, “La correspondencia de un soldado español de las guerras en Hungría a mediados del siglo XVI: Comentarios al diario de Bernardo de Aldana (1548–1552)”, *Hispania* 60, no. 3 (2000): 881–910; idem, “Ami a magyarországi hadjárat után történt: Bernardo de Aldana és a spanyol zsoldosok sorsa 1552 után”, *Fons* 12, no. 3 (2005): 379–98.

⁴⁰ Gévay, *Itinerar*; Pálffy, *Kingdom of Hungary*, passim.

provinces in order to finance and protect the Hungarian borderlands. In the vicinity of Vienna, the most important region for Süleyman's conquest, the estates of Lower Austria, contributed yearly allowances for one and a half centuries from 1546 onwards to help with financing the new captaincy general of Győr.⁴¹

On the whole Ferdinand I was gradually able to mobilize the resources and German soldiers of his central European provinces in order to support the defence of the borderlands against the Ottomans. Hungary and Croatia clearly needed the financial and military support of Vienna and central Europe, while Vienna equally needed Hungary and Croatia as advanced bastions of defence.⁴² Thus Hungary and central Europe joined together under the guidance of Vienna. Emperor Charles V also significantly supported this action in this period with financial aid and some thousand Spanish mercenaries. Sultan Süleyman had probably not reckoned with this fact sufficiently, which played an important part in the fruitless strategy of his European military advance. He missed another huge opportunity after 1543, one he couldn't make up for later, partly because of the new defence system of the Habsburgs in Hungary.

From the 1550s onwards the hitherto ad hoc measures of the Habsburgs were replaced by more and more systematic planning. An increasing number of factors opened up opportunities for doing so. First, Süleyman still had not marched against Hungary in person, giving the Habsburgs and Hungarians another reprieve. Second, the Hungarian estates and Viennese military leaders began to co-operate even more closely, and held military conferences in both Vienna and Pozsony (Bratislava), in the new Hungarian capital. During these conferences based on border zone inspections, they primarily debated which fortresses should be fortified and taken under treasury control, which ones should be demolished, where should new ones be built, and how their garrison could be provided for.⁴³ Finally, in November 1556, another decisive change was put in place with the formation of the Aulic War Council (*Hofkriegsrat*) in Vienna,⁴⁴ whereby the

⁴¹ Idem, *A császárváros védelmében: A győri főkapitányság története 1526–1598* (Győr: Győr-Moson-Sopron Megye Győri Levéltára, 1999), 65–72, 185–92.

⁴² Idem, "The Habsburg Defence System in Hungary against the Ottomans in Sixteenth Century: A Catalyst of Military Development in Central Europe", in *Warfare in Eastern Europe, 1500–1800*, ed. Brian J. Davies (Leiden: Brill, 2012), 35–61.

⁴³ Pálffy, *A császárváros*, 109–33.

⁴⁴ Oskar Regele, *Der österreichische Hofkriegsrat 1556–1848* (Vienna: Österreichisches Staatsarchiv, 1949); Géza Pálffy, "Die Akten und Protokolle des Wiener Hofkriegsrats im 16. und 17. Jahrhundert", in *Quellenkunde der Habsburgermonarchie (16–18. Jahrhundert): Ein exemplarisches Handbuch*, eds. Josef Pauser, Martin Scheutz and Thomas Winkelbauer (Vienna and Munich: Oldenbourg, 2004), 182–95.

military administration of the Habsburg Monarchy and the Hungarian border defence received a central governing office. This brought about a quality change, which can't be compared to the situation of the late middle ages, when there was no institution for military affairs. The war council became one of the first regular bodies of military government in Europe. Its main task was to organise the new defence system and to design defensive strategies in co-operation with the Hungarian magnates. Thereby the military affairs of Hungary and the monarchy came under a central and common control. The main result in the next decades was the organisation of the new border defence system against the Ottomans (fig. VII.4) as emphasized by the Speyer Imperial Diet in 1570, "[T]he Kingdom of Hungary is the bastion of protection of the German territories and their forward shield".⁴⁵

Between the Mediterranean and Hungary: The Military Career of Sforza Pallavicini

In the 1540s and 1550s, along with Spanish officers, several Italian mercenaries served in the armies of Emperor Charles in Hungary. Besides the well-known general Gianbattista Castaldo (1493–1563), Marchese di Cassano, Commander-in-Chief in Hungary in 1551–53, and later general of the Holy See, the most important is Sforza Pallavicini (1510s–85), Marchese di Cortemaggiore. He played an important role regarding both the relationship of the Habsburg brothers and the connections between the Mediterranean and Hungary (fig. VII.5).⁴⁶ On the one hand, he served as a mercenary for both Emperor Charles and Ferdinand I. On the other hand, he survived Ottoman imprisonment and led a successful military action against the Ottomans in Hungary, a rare feat in the decades after 1526. Unlike most of the Spanish and Italian mercenaries he did not only take part in campaigns, but also in organizing the defence of the border zones. In the end, after serving in the Hungarian theatre of war, he spent the last one and a half

⁴⁵ Staatsarchiv Nürnberg (StAN), Ansbacher Reichstagsakten (Rep. 136) Bd. 43, No. 19 (1570): *Cron Ungern – ein Propugnakel und Vormauer Deutscher Landen* (translation by Géza Pálffy).

⁴⁶ For the career of Pallavicini generally, see the late sixteenth-century German short-biography Jakob Schrenck von Notzing, *Die Heldenrüstkammer (Armamentarium Heroicum) Erzherzog Ferdinands II. auf Schloss Ambras bei Innsbruck: Facsimile of 1601/03*, ed. Bruno Thomas (Osnabrück: Biblio-Verlag, 1981), "Sfortia Pallauicinus"; an Italian manuscript biography in Österreichisches Staatsarchiv (ÖSt), Kriegsarchiv, Memoiren 28/1334/11, 195–227; and the recent publication based on archival research in Vienna and Hungary, Pálffy, *A császárváros*, 254–55.

decades of his active career in the pay of Venice in the Mediterranean. He also played a part in preserving the Crown of Hungary, even though the Hungarian national historiography remembers him as a troublemaker because of killing Friar George Martinuzzi (1482–1551), governor of Transylvania, with the tacit permission of Ferdinand I in late 1551.⁴⁷

Pallavicini was born to an Italian aristocratic family in the 1510s and, after a short time in the service of Emperor Charles, he was to be found in the troops commanded by Hans Katzianer (1491–1539), Commander-in-Chief of Ferdinand I in Hungary in the autumn of 1534.⁴⁸ After this he appeared either in service of the emperor or the pope on different frontlines all over Europe. In 1536 in the campaign of Charles V in the Provence he served side by side with the famous Spanish general Antonio de Leyva (1480–1536); in 1539 he was on the side of the emperor against the rebelling city Ghent in Belgium. He served as captain of the pope's cavalry of six hundred horsemen under the commando of general Alessandro Vitelli (1500–54) during the above-mentioned campaign in 1542 to take back Buda. In 1544 he led two thousand foot soldiers in the emperor's army against the French in Piedmont, and he also took part on the side of Charles V in the Schmalkaldic War in 1546–47.

In the following years Pallavicini served again in Italy as soldier and diplomat and for half a decade in Hungary. In 1551–52 he served as a colonel of German and later Italian foot soldiers commanding around 3,000 people in Hungary and Transylvania, first in 1551 in the unsuccessful attempt of the Habsburgs to unite Transylvania and Hungary, then in 1552 against the Ottomans. With general Erasmus Teufel (d. 1552) he was already commander of the army of King Ferdinand, but he didn't succeed there either as he was taken prisoner by the Ottomans on 9 August 1552 in the battle of Palást north of Buda (Plášťovce, Slovakia). He was lucky though as, unlike general Teufel, he wasn't taken to Istanbul but was ransomed more than two months later for a huge sum of 18,000 gulden.⁴⁹

⁴⁷ Teréz Oborni, *Az ördögös Barát: Fráter György (1482–1551)* (Pécs and Budapest: Kronosz Kiadó, 2017), 239–46; Adriano Papo and Gizella Nemeth Papo, *Frate Giorgio Martinuzzi: Cardinale, soldato e statista dalmata agli albori del Principato di Transilvania* (Canterano: Aracne Editrice, 2017), 266–92.

⁴⁸ Österreichisches Staatsarchiv, Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv (HHStA Vienna), Ungarische Akten (Hungarica), Allgemeine Akten Fasc. 25, Konv. A, fol. 76r–77v.

⁴⁹ Nicolaus Isthvanfi, *Historiarum de rebus Ungaricis libri XXXIV* (Cologne: Antonius Hieratus, 1622), 335.



Fig. VII.5: Anon., *Portrait of Sforza Pallavicini*, Venice, end of sixteenth century. Oil painting. Hungarian National Museum, Budapest.

As much as he was unsuccessful in the campaigns of 1551–52, Pallavicini worked quite efficiently between 1552 and 1556 on the organization of the defence of the new border zones in Hungary against the Ottomans. In the middle of November 1552, Ferdinand appointed him High Field Marshal in Hungary,⁵⁰ stationed in Győr. In this role he played an important part in the captaincy general of Győr, the most important frontier zone of the Habsburgs for defending the monarchy.⁵¹ The fact that he had gained local experience, having served in Hungary for almost twenty years supported his work as a military organizer. He was versed in European, Hungarian and Ottoman warfare, he understood strategies of infantry and cavalry and was competent in fortification. Turning Győr into a fortress city began under his guidance and involved Italian military architects, still remembered by the Sforza Bastion named after him until today.⁵² All in all, he worked so effectively that after organising of new border zone and leaving Győr in 1556, Ferdinand appointed the first general of the Győr border fortress captaincy (1556–60), Adam Gall from Lower Austria.⁵³

Though in the 1550s both the current governor of Milan, Fernando Álvarez de Toledo (1507–82), Duke of Alba and the *Respublica Serenissima* of Venice tried to hire Pallavicini,⁵⁴ he stayed in Hungary until 1557 (fig. VII.6). His service ended particularly successfully as during the summer of 1556 the Habsburg army had conquered an Ottoman army for the first time since 1526 (fig. VII.7).⁵⁵ The army was able to beat Hadim Ali, Pasha of Buda (1556–57) in several smaller

⁵⁰ His title in German *Oberstfeldmarschall in Ungarn*, in *Latin supremus bellicus mareschallus in Hungaria*. HHStA Vienna, Ungarische Akten (Hungarica), Allgemeine Akten, Fasc. 68, Konv. A, fol. 108r–12v, instruction of Ferdinand I for Pallavicini, 16 November 1552.

⁵¹ Pálffy, *A császárváros*, 73–97.

⁵² Lajos Gecsényi, “Ungarische Städte im Vorfeld der Türkenabwehr Österreichs: Zur Problematik der ungarischen Städteentwicklung”, in *Archiv und Forschung: Das Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv in seiner Bedeutung für die Geschichte Österreichs und Europas*, eds. Elisabeth Springer and Leopold Kammerhofer (Vienna and Munich: Verlag für Geschichte und Politik, 1993), 57–77.

⁵³ Géza Pálffy, “Die Türkenabwehr in Ungarn im 16. und 17. Jahrhundert – ein Forschungsdesiderat”, *Anzeiger der philosophisch-historischen Klasse der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften* 137, no. 1 (2002): 124.

⁵⁴ HHStA Vienna, Ungarische Akten (Hungarica), Allgemeine Akten, Fasc. 75, Konv. A, fol. 74r (Duke of Alba, 8 August 1555); Kenneth M. Setton, *The Papacy and the Levant (1204–1571)*, vol. 4: *The Sixteenth Century from Julius III to Pius V.* (Philadelphia: The American Philosophical Society, 1984), 609 (12 December 1555, Venice).

⁵⁵ János B. Szabó, “An Example for Some – A Lesson for Others: The First Ottoman Siege of Szigetvár and the Military Campaigns of 1555–1556 in Southern Transdanubia”, in *Remembering a Forgotten Siege, Szigetvár 1556*, eds. Péter Kasza and Pál Fodor (Budapest: Research Centre for the Humanities, Hungarian Academy of Sciences, 2016), 136–44.



Fig. VII.6: Jakob Schrenk von Notzingen, *Portrait of Sforza Pallavicini*, 1603. Copper engraving. Jakob Schrenk von Notzingen, *DEr Aller Durchleuchtigsten vnd Großma[e]chtigen Kayser/ Durchleuchtigsten vnd Großma[e]chtigen Ko[e]nigen vnd Ertzhertzogen/ Durchleuchtigen vnd hochgebornen Fu[e]rsten/ wie auch Grafen/ Herren/ vom Adell/ vnd anderer trefflicher beru[e]hmter Kriegshelden (...)* warhafftige Bildtnussen (...). (Innsbruck: Baur, 1603). Private collection, Budapest.

battles while besieging the castle of Szigetvár. The joint central European military manoeuvre was nominally led by Archduke Ferdinand of Tyrol (1529–95), while in fact Pallavicini as *supremus bellicus commissarius*⁵⁶ and Tamás Nádasdy, the Hungarian Palatine (1554–62), the leading man of Hungary's secular elite, were in command. Though the army of the sultan was not defeated, the result was still important, the liberation of one of the most important fortresses of Hungary. It was occupied by Sultan Süleyman only ten years later, during his last campaign.

From 1557 to 1570 Pallavicini served in Venice: first he became captain general of the infantry (*capitano generale della fanteria*) and from 1559 he became captain general of the army of Venice (*governator generale*).⁵⁷ He participated in several campaigns and fortifications of castles, for example in Udine, Verona, Bologna, Bergamo and Zara in Dalmatia and Crete. In 1570, though no longer young, he played a role in the naval expedition to liberate Cyprus besieged by the Ottomans, and he finally fought in the Battle of Lepanto in 1571. Therefore, after serving on the Habsburg frontlines on the mainland, Pallavicini finished his career in the eastern Mediterranean. In February 1572 there was the chance to serve Emperor Maximilian II again,⁵⁸ however, this did not happen according to current research.

On the whole, the great Italian general 'commuted' between the Habsburg theatres of war against the Ottomans in the Mediterranean and in Hungary for decades. His services were not forgotten by members of the Habsburg dynasty either. His comrade in arms from 1556, Archduke Ferdinand of Tyrol, acquired his wonderful cavalry armour (*Reiterharnisch*) for his collection in Ambras in 1576 to be exhibited along with those of the most prominent rulers and generals (fig. VII.8).⁵⁹ Not only the Habsburgs but also the Hungarians are grateful to him as in August 1551, along with Hungarian Hussar officers, he carried the Holy Crown of Hungary to Vienna taken back from Transylvania. Thus he played an indefensible part in preserving the statehood of Hungary, as the legal coronation was only possible with the Holy Crown.⁶⁰

⁵⁶ In German *Oberkriegskommissar in Ungarn*. ÖSt, Kriegsarchiv, Bestellungen No. 25, and HHStA Vienna, Ungarische Akten (Hungarica), Allgemeine Akten, Fasc. 76, Konv. A, fol. 120r–21v.

⁵⁷ Setton, *Papacy*, vol. 4, 609–10, 907, 932.

⁵⁸ ÖSt, Kriegsarchiv, Memoiren 28/1334/11, 215–16 (February 1572).

⁵⁹ Ortwin Gamber, Christian Beaufort and Matthias Pfaffenbichler, eds., *Katalog der Leibrückkammer*, vol. 2: *Der Zeitraum von 1530–1560* (Busto Arsizio: Bramante Editrice, 1990), 127, A1181.

⁶⁰ Géza Pálffy and Kees Teszelszky, "Koronázási jelvényeink leghosszabb távolléte: Erdélyből Bécsen és Prágán át Pozsonyig (1551–1608)", in *A Szent Korona hazatér: A magyar korona tizenegy külföldi útja (1205–1978)*, ed. Géza Pálffy (Budapest: MTA Bölcsészettudományi




Fig. VII.7: The campaign of 1556 in Hungary. Péter Kasza and Pál Fodor, eds., *Remembering a Forgotten Siege, Szigetvár 1556* (Budapest: Research Centre for the Humanities, Hungarian Academy of Sciences, 2016), 146.

Kutatóközpont Történettudományi Intézet, 2018), 192–98; János M. Bak and Géza Pálffy, *Crown and Coronation in Hungary 1000–1916 A.D.* (Budapest: Research Centre for the Humanities, Institute of History, 2020), 171.



Fig. VII.8: Cavalry armour of Sforza Pallavicini, Italy, c. 1550. Kunsthistorisches Museum, Vienna.

Conclusion

In the three decades after the Battle of Mohács in 1526 the principal goal of Sultan Süleyman the Magnificent in Europe was to conquer Hungary and the seat of its new ruler Ferdinand of Habsburg–Vienna. Emperor Charles V played an important part directly and indirectly to ensure that Hungary was not completely conquered by the Ottomans. The direct support mostly meant Spanish and German financial allowances, as well as sending all in all around 25–30,000 Spanish and Italian mercenaries serving the Habsburgs to Hungary, and personally going to war in 1532 with his huge army. Indirectly the diverting actions and expeditions in the Mediterranean (1532 Koroni; 1535 Tunis; and 1541 Algiers) played an important part in weakening the military power of the Sublime Porte. In addition, these battles and manoeuvres were fought in the very period of transition when Ferdinand I had only begun to settle and establish the new border defence system against the Ottomans in Hungary and Croatia for the protection of the Austrian provinces. Thus, this chapter has shown that until the 1570s there were very close connections between the Mediterranean and Hungarian frontier zones of the Habsburgs, and in many aspects they constituted a coherent system, especially in the reign of Charles V. This is proved not only by the actions coordinated by emperor, but also the Spanish and Italian mercenaries appearing on both sides, among whom general Sforza Pallavicini also had an important role to play in establishing the new Habsburg defence in Hungary. In view of this, it can be posited that if after 1526 the Hungarian King Ferdinand I had not had the support of his brother Charles V, the Holy Roman Emperor and Spanish King, the Ottoman conquests would have pushed further into central Europe and for a longer time, according to the military plans of Sultan Süleyman. In this span of half a century the Habsburg-Ottoman rivalry in the Habsburg Mediterranean and in central Europe were relevant and significant for both their futures.