

### III. Two Tibetan Texts on the “Neither One nor Many” Argument for *śūnyatā*

The present article is my third in a series on the Buddhist argument that entities are empty (*stong pa; śūnya*) of intrinsic nature (*rang bzhin; svabhāva*) because they are neither individuals (i.e., “ones”) nor many different things.<sup>1</sup> The reason (*gtan tshigs; hetu*; or equivalently, *rtags; liṅga*) on which this argument depends, that is to say, “being neither one nor many,” or more literally, “being free from one(ness) and many(ness),” comes to be known in Indian and Tibetan literature as the “neither one nor many” reason (*gcig du bral gyi gtan tshigs; ekānekaviyogahetu*).

Now, undeniably, the basic theme of this style of argumentation was used in its broad outlines by diverse branches of Buddhist philosophy and for a variety of purposes: Vasubandhu, Dharmakīrti, and Prajñākaragupta, to take a few of the many possible examples, used it to show the impossibility of such notions as universals and partless atoms; Nāgārjuna and Candrakīrti used it to analyze the relationship between the self (*bdag; ātman*) and the aggregates (*phung po; skandha*) and, in general, to reduce to absurdity the part-whole relationship.<sup>2</sup> But, although Mādhyamika and

---

<sup>1</sup> The first article was a paper presented in 1981 at the Csoma dc Körös symposium in Velm, Austria, and appeared in 1983 in the *Proceedings of the Csoma dc Körös Symposium*, in the series *Wiener Studien zur Tibetologie und Buddhismuskunde*, Tillemans 1983. The second article, i.e., Tillemans 1982, appeared in *Études de lettres* of the University of Lausanne.

<sup>2</sup> For Vasubandhu’s refutation of partless atoms, see the *Viṃśatikā*, in particular, *kārikā* 12. For the arguments against the Nyāya universal (*sāmānya*), which is held to be a unity inherent in many particulars, see Prajñākaragupta’s *Pramāṇavārttikabhāṣya* ad *Pramāṇavārttika* IV k. 12 (p. 478-482 *Sāmānyanirāsaḥ* in Sāṅkṛtyāyana’s edition). Cf. also the *Pramāṇavārttikavṛtti* of Manorathanandin p. 367: . . . *yathā sāmānyasya paropagatānekavṛtītvād anekatvam āpādyate* /. (“ . . . just as it would follow that a universal is a multitude, because the other accepts that it is present in a multitude [of particulars]”). A good example of the Prāsaṅgika’s use of this type of argumentation is

non-Mādhyamika alike used this argument in one form or another,<sup>3</sup> it finds an especially sophisticated development in the \*Svāntantrika-Mādhyamika philosopher Śāntarakṣita, who employed it as the central idea around which he structured his influential text, the *Madhyamakālaṃkāra*.

In Tibet, a considerable indigenous literature grew up around Śāntarakṣita's *Madhyamakālaṃkāra*. Some works, such as the *dBu ma rgyan gyi rnam bshad* of the rNying ma pa scholar Mi pham rgya mtsho (1846-1912) and the *dBu ma rgyan gyi brjed byang* of rGyal tshab rje (1364-1432), commented directly on Śāntarakṣita's text, but others, in particular the dGe lugs pa monastic textbooks (*yig cha*), combined Śāntarakṣita's exposition of the "neither one nor many" argument with their commentary on the homage (*mchod brjed*) of Maitreyaṅātha's *Abhisamayālaṃkāra*.<sup>4</sup>

---

the "sevenfold reasoning" (*rnam bdun gyi rigs pa*) found in Candrakīrti's *Madhyamakāvātāra* VI, verses 150-161. This argument, which analyses the relationship between a cart and its parts, is an elaboration on Nāgārjuna's fivefold argument (*rnam lnga'i rigs pa*) found in the *Madhyamakakārikās*.

<sup>3</sup> In Tillemans 1983, I distinguished monadic and dyadic forms of the argument. For example, "... is one," or "... is many," are monadic predicates, whereas "... is one with..." or "... is different from ..." express dyadic relations. Among the examples cited in note 2, those from Prajñākaragupta and Manorathanandin represent monadic uses of the argument, while Candrakīrti and Nāgārjuna are using a dyadic form. Śāntarakṣita's presentation of the argument is phrased in the monadic form, but he and Kamalaśīla frequently alternate between the two different forms.

<sup>4</sup> The background problem that the Tibetans are seeking to resolve is how to rationally justify believing in the existence of the three omnisciences (*thams cad mkhyen pa gsum; tisraḥ sarvajñatāḥ*) spoken about in the *Abhisamayālaṃkāra*'s homage. These three aspects of the *prajñāpāramitā* ("perfection of wisdom") have, as their respective objects, the bases (*gzhi; vastu*) (i.e., entities, but particularly, persons), the *śrāvaka, pratyeka,* and *bodhisattva* paths (*lam; mārga*), and all phenomena or all aspects (*rnam pa; ākāra*). Thus they are termed the "knowledge of the bases" (*gzhi shes; vastujñāna*), the "knowledge of the paths" (*lam shes; mārgajñāna*), and the "knowledge of all aspects" (*rnam pa thams cad mkhyen pa; sarvākārajñatā*). Cf. Se ra chos kyi rgyal mtshan's *Don bdun cu* p. 16-17 in the edition of S. Onoda.

The Tibetan commentator's answer to this problem is to say that by using the "neither one nor many" argument one arrives at the conclusion that the objects of these omnisciences are all empty of true existence (*bden par yod pa*) and true production (*bden par skye ba*). At that point, when one is rationally convinced of this emptiness, one is justified to believe that there can be a consciousness that directly realizes this emptiness. Cf. Tsong kha pa's *Legs bshad gser phreng* T. Vol. *tsa* p. 49-50, rGyal tshab rje's *rNam*

As an Indian precedent for situating the “neither one nor many” argument in the context of the *Abhisamayālaṃkāra*’s homage, these textbooks would cite certain passages from Haribhadra’s commentary, *Sphuṭārthā*.<sup>5</sup>

In my first two articles, I compared certain aspects in the Indian and Tibetan treatments of the argument, and I introduced the important themes present in the texts translated below. I had originally thought to include, in the second article, a translation of these Tibetan texts, which together give a representative sample of the dGe lugs pa discussion of the argument. But this proved to be impossible, and a third article was thus necessary.

Of the texts in question, the first, a “lesson on the ‘neither one nor many’ argument” (*gcig du bral gyi rnam bzhag*) is a chapter from Se ra rje btsun pa Chos kyi rgyal mtshan’s (1469-1546) commentary on the first chapter of the *Abhisamayālaṃkāra*, i.e., the *sKabs dang po ’i spyi don*. It presents the dGe lugs pa interpretation of the argument and its Indian textual backing. The second, an excerpt from Tsong kha pa’s (1357-1419) *dBu ma rgyan gyi zin bris*, deals with the logical fallacy of *āśrayāsiddhahetu* (“a reason whose locus is not established”; *gzhi ma grub pa ’i gtan tshigs*), a technical problem often associated with the “neither one nor many” argument. The difficulty arises as soon as one seeks to use the argument to prove that pseudo-entities such as the Self (*ātman*), the Primordial Nature (*prakṛti*), *Īśvara*, etc.—in short, the various speculative fictions of the non-Buddhist

---

*bshad snying po ’i rgyan* f. 11b-12a, and the *sKabs dang po ’i spyi don* f. 20b-21b. Note in passing that the latter work follows very closely *rNam bshad snying po ’i rgyan*.

<sup>5</sup> *Abhisamayālaṃkāravṛtti* of Haribhadra, Bibliotheca Indo-Tibetica edition, p. 4, P. 94a 2-4: *chos kyi rjes su ’brang ba rnams kyang gcig dang du ma ’i ngo bo nyid dang bral ba ’i phyir zhes bya ba la sogs pa ’i tshad mas gzhi dang lam dang rnam pa skye ba med par yongs su shes pa tshigs su bcad pa ’i don gyi mtshan nyid kyi yum la gnod pa ma mthong nas shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa thams cad mkhyen pa nyid gsum gyi bdag nyid tshul gsum pa can / sangs rgyas la sogs pa bskrun par mdzad pa ni gdon mi za bar srid pa nyid do zhes nges par gzung ste / de la rab tu dang ba bskyed par byed pa nyid do /*

“Moreover, followers of the *Dharma*, by means of *pramāṇas* such as [those based on the reason] ‘because of being neither of the nature of oneness nor manyness,’ perceive no [possible] refutation of the Mother [*prajñāpāramitā*] characterized by the *kārikā* [i.e., the homage], that is to say, the realization that the bases, paths, and aspects are not produced. Thereupon, they arrive at the certainty that the *prajñāpāramitā*, which has the threefold nature of the triple omnisciences, is most definitely able to lead to buddhahood, etc. And thus, they are greatly inspired by this [*prajñāpāramitā*].” Tsong kha pa, rGyal tshab rje, and Chos kyi rgyal mtshan cite this passage.

schools—are in fact nonexistent. How is one to avoid that all successful nonexistence proofs become self-refuting, if one agrees that the loci, or subjects (*chos can; dharmin*) of valid proofs must in some sense exist? It is a question that has elicited much discussion from Western scholars, and perhaps Tsong kha pa's text will be useful here as it concisely presents certain important ideas of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti, as well as Kamalaśīla's basic approach to the problem in his work, the *Madhyamakāloka*.<sup>6</sup>

Finally, a word on the editions I have used. The chapter from the *sKabs dang po'i spyi don* forms a small part of the voluminous collection of textbooks composed by Se ra Chos kyi rgyal mtshan that have been reprinted at Se ra byes monastery in Bylakuppe, Mysore, India. This reprint is completely identical with the text included in the United States Library of Congress Collection of Tibetan Literature in Microfiche. (Microfiche R-1021 in *Tibetan Religious Works: PL 480 SFC Collections*, published by the Institute for the Advanced Studies of World Religions, Stony Brook, New York). According to the information given by E. Gene Smith on the microfiche itself, it would seem that the blocks were made in Buksa (*sBag sa*), Bengal during the 1960's. At any rate, for our purposes, we shall simply speak of the "New Se ra" edition. We have also consulted the "Old Se ra" edition, which is probably a late nineteenth century or early twentieth century reprint of Chos kyi rgyal mtshan's works (*Tokyo University Catalogue* No. 21; *Tōhoku Catalogue* 6815 A).

The excerpt from *dBu ma rgyan gyi zin bris* is based on a comparison between the text found in the supplement to the Peking edition of the Tibetan canon (*bstan 'gyur* Vol. 153), an edition of unknown origin published by the Central Institute of Higher Tibetan Studies in Sarnath, Varanasi, India and finally the bKra shis lhun po ("Tashilhunpo") edition of Tsong kha pa's *Collected Works*, kept in Klu 'khyil monastery's library (Ladakh) and recently reprinted in Delhi by Ngag dbang dge legs bde mo.<sup>7</sup> As well, *lCang skya grub mtha'*, the extensive work on philosophical systems (*grub*

---

<sup>6</sup> Cf. Tillemans 1982 for an explanation of these various ideas.

<sup>7</sup> I might also mention an edition of Tsong kha pa's *Collected Works* that was recently published in Delhi by Lama Gurudeva. However, this edition, like that of the Peking *bstan 'gyur* supplement, was printed at dGa' ldang phun tshogs gling (Lha sa zhol press) and states on its title page "reproduced from the 1897 Lha sa old zhol (dGa' ldang phun tshogs gling) blocks."

*mtha'*; *siddhānta*) composed by lCang skya Rol pa'i rdo rje (1717-1786), reproduces verbatim approximately two thirds of the excerpt in question; this has also proved to be very useful, in spite of the fact that it was not possible to determine the source of the edition used by lCang skya himself.

Here then are the abbreviations to be used: New = the New Se ra edition; Old = the Old Se ra edition; P = the Peking *bstan 'gyur* and supplement; T = the Tashilhunpo edition of Tsong kha pa's *Collected Works* (reprinted in Delhi); S = the Sarnath text; lCang = *lCang skya grub mtha'*.

### ***Translation of a chapter of the sKabs dang po'i spyi don***

[N. 24a6] Our own position: I. Recognizing the property to be refuted (*dgag bya'i chos*; *pratiṣedhyadharmā*) by the reason that the teacher [Haribhadra] propounds:<sup>8</sup> II. Explanation, involving other loci, of the reasonings that refute this [property].

I. [24a7] “Something established by virtue of its particular mode of being, [and] not brought about because of appearing to mind (*blo*)”—this is the property to be refuted by the reasons that analyze the ultimate. For, if the person and the aggregates were to exist in such a way, then they would have to withstand logical reasonings that analyze the ultimate [status of entities], and they would have to be perceived during the meditative equipoise (*mnyam bzhag*; *samāhita*) of the *Āryas* (“Noble Ones”).<sup>9</sup>

<sup>8</sup> According to Tibetan *grub mtha'* texts, Haribhadra was a member of the same school as Śāntaraksita: *rnal 'byor spyod pa'i dbu ma rang rgyud pa* (\**Yogācāra-Mādhyamika-Svātantrika*). In texts such as Tsong kha pa's *dBu ma dgongs pa rab gsal* (p. 129-136, ed. Sarnath) and lCang skya Rol pa'i rdo rje's *Grub mtha'* (p. 371-377, ed. Sarnath), the Svātantrika's understanding of what constitutes “true existence,” or the “property to be refuted” (*dgag bya'i chos*), is explained in considerable detail, and is contrasted with the Prāsaṅgika counterpart. We see in these works that the “property to be refuted” as specified on 24a7 of the *sKabs dang po'i spyi don* is said to be common to all Svātantrikas, be they of the Svātantrika-Mādhyamika or Yogācāra-Mādhyamika tradition.

<sup>9</sup> The *Ārya bodhisattvas*, when meditating on *śūnyatā*—that is, the simple lack of any truly existent entities—are said to directly perceive the ultimate truth, or the absolute (*de kho na nyid*; *tattva*, i.e., “reality”). Mādhyamikas maintain that if anything existed ultimately, the *Āryas* would have to perceive it at this time, and conversely, anything perceived at this time would have to be ultimate.

[24b1] An analogy: Take the case of a magician making pebbles and pieces of wood appear to be horses and elephants. Now suppose that when the pebbles, pieces of wood, etc. appeared in this way, these same [appearances] were not brought about by a deceived mind but were so established from the side (*ngos nas*) of the pebbles, pieces of wood, etc. Then, as these [appearances] would be the result (*lag rjes*) of the antecedent like-moments (*rigs 'dra snga ma*) making up the [pebbles, etc., it would follow absurdly that] people whose eyes were not affected [by the magician's spells] should also see [these "horses" and "elephants"].<sup>10</sup>

[24b2] Furthermore, in this vein, the *Satyadvayavibhaṅga* [of Jñānagarbha] states:

“Since [customary truth's] nature is [simply] just as it appears, one does not subject it to analysis. If the yogi [however] does analyze it, then he will commit [the fault of speaking about a] different matter (*don gzhan; arthāntara*) and will hence be refuted.”<sup>11</sup>

[24b3] Moreover, it [i.e., the property to be refuted] is as stated above, because “an existence brought about because of appearing to the mind” is the meaning of “customary existence.” For, [Kamalaśīla's] *Madhyamakāloka* states:

<sup>10</sup> The analogy is that the appearances represent customary truth, but that the tendency to grasp them as being independent of the mind is like “grasping at true existence” (*bden 'dzin*). Cf. *dBu ma dgongs pa rab gsal*, ed. Sarnath, p. 132 et passim.

<sup>11</sup> *Kārikā* 21. Here the text differs from that found in the *sDe dge* edition of the *Satyadvayavibhaṅga*: *ji ltar rang bzhin\* ngo bo'i phyir // 'di la dpyad pa mi 'jug go // rnam par dpyod pa byed na don // gzhan du song bas gnod par 'gyur //* (sa 2b4). \*The *Vṛtti* makes it clear that we should read *snang bzhin*. The reading found in the *sKabs dang po'i spyi don* also occurs in earlier texts such as the *dBu pa blo gsal grub mtha'*. Cf. Mimaki 1982, 170-171 and n. 462. Cf. also *ibid.* n. 463 for the logical fault of *arthāntara*, one of the points of defeat (*tshar gcad pa'i gnas; nigrāsthāna*). This interpretation of *arthāntara* is borne out by the *Satyadvayavibhaṅgapañjikā* of Śāntarakṣita, D. 39a3: *don rnal ma las don gzhan zhes bya ba ni / ma 'brel ba'i don te / de tshar gcad pa'i gnas su rnam par gzhas pa ni rigs pa\* dang ldan pa yin no /*. “A matter different from the principal matter’ means one that is unrelated. This is properly considered a point of defeat.” \*The text has *rig pa*.

“So, therefore, all [those] natures that are deceptive entities [existing] because one thinks of them, [these natures] exist only customarily.”<sup>12</sup>

And the commentary on [Candrakīrti's] *Madhyamakāvatāra* [Tsong kha pa's *dBu ma dgongs pa rab gsal*] states:

“In the *Madhyamakāloka*, the opposite of what is termed the customary mode of existence is known as that which exists ultimately, or as truly established.”<sup>13</sup>

And [finally], as the *Satyadvayavibhāṅga* states:

“What is only as it appears, this is customary [existence]. What is other [than such a characterization] is the opposite [i.e., ultimate existence].”<sup>14</sup>

[24b5] Thus, there is nothing that is truly established, ultimately established, in reality established, etc. But there are [phenomena] that are [customarily] established by their own defining characteristics (*rang gi mtshan nyid kyis grub pa*), from their own side (*rang ngos nas grub pa*), by their intrinsic natures (*rang bzhin gyis grub pa*), and that are [customarily] established as being substances (*rdzas su grub pa*).<sup>15</sup>

II. [24b6] In general, there are many reasonings proving selflessness (*bdag med; anātman*): (1) the “neither one nor many” reason (*gcig du bral gyi gtan tshigs; ekānekaviyogahetu*), which analyzes the nature of phenomena; (2) the “diamond-splinters” reason (*rdo rje gzegs ma'i gtan tshigs; vajrakāṇahetu*), which analyzes the cause; (3) the reason refuting production of existence or nonexistence (*yod med skye 'gog gi gtan tshigs; \*sadasadutpādapratiṣedhahetu*), which analyzes the effect; (4) the reason that refutes production according to the four points (*mu bzhi skye 'gog gi gtan tshigs; catuṣkoṭyutpādapratiṣedhahetu*), which analyzes both [the

<sup>12</sup> *Madhyamakāloka* P. 254a6.

<sup>13</sup> *dBu ma dgongs pa rab gsal* p. 130.

<sup>14</sup> *Satyadvayavibhāṅga* k. 3, D. 1b3.

<sup>15</sup> Cf. Tillemans 1982 on these equivalent terms. *Grub mtha'* texts stress that as Svātantrikas are Mādhyamikas, intrinsic nature, etc. are *only* accepted customarily.

cause and the effect]; (5) the “king of reasonings” (*rigs pa'i rgyal po*), which is the reason from dependent arising (*rten 'brel gyi gtan tshigs; pratīyasamutpādahetu*).<sup>16</sup>

<sup>16</sup> The “diamond-splinters” reason is so called because it is said to “vanquish the rock of those who assert real entities.” (See *dBus pa blo gsal grub mtha'*, p. 216 in Mimaki 1982: *'di ni dngos por smra ba'i brag // 'joms byed rdo rje gzegs ma yin //*). Important in the formulation of all these reasonings is the use of the qualifier “ultimately” (*don dam par; paramārthatas*), or what performs the same function, the word “truly” (*bden par*). The famous controversy, in the *Prasannapadā*, between the Svātantrika Bhāviveka and the Prāsaṅgika Candrakīrti takes up the question as to whether this qualifier should be present in Madhyamaka-style reasonings or not. Finally, it is interesting to note that Chos kyi rgyal mtshan is presenting five reasons, rather than the four that we see in certain Indian and Tibetan texts. Bhāviveka, in the *Madhyamakārthasamgraha* k. 6 (P. 381a2), speaks of “four reasons such as the refutation of production according to the four points, etc.” (*mu bzhi skye 'gog la sogs pa'i gtan tshigs bzhi*). See Lindtner 1981, 200, n. 14. Moreover, Atiśa, in the *Bodhimārgapradīpapañjikā* (P. 322a7-324a; Lindtner p. 205-211), explains, by name, the *catuṣkoṭyutpādapratīṣedhahetu*, the *vajrakaṇahetu*, the *ekānekaviyogahetu*, and the *pratīyasamutpādahetu*. Cf. also Mimaki 1982, 213-227 for dBus pa blo gsal's presentation of these four. However, Atiśa's explanation of the first reason, i.e., the *catuṣkoṭy*°, is in terms of the four points “existence,” “nonexistence,” “both,” and “neither.” But in our text the four points of the *catuṣkoṭyutpādapratīṣedhahetu* are quite different, and deal with “many producing one,” “many producing many,” “one producing many,” and “one producing one.” What Atiśa termed the *catuṣkoṭy*° is now being termed by Chos kyi rgyal mtshan the \**sadasadutpādapratīṣedhahetu* (*yod med skye 'gog gi gtan tshigs*), a reasoning that involves only the two lemmas of “existence” and “nonexistence.”

As for the reasoning that our author terms the *catuṣkoṭy*°, it was the principal argument used by Jñānagarbha to prove emptiness (*sūnyatā*), and was also extensively used by Kamalaśīla in the *Madhyamakāloka* and *Sarvadharmaniḥsvabhāvasiddhi* (cf. P. 322a et passim); however, the term *catuṣkoṭy*° is probably not used in these texts in this context; the closest thing that I have been able to find—and this is not very close—is the *Satyadvayavibhaṅgapañjikā* (D. 28b6-7) speaking about *rnam par rtog pa bzhi*.

This fivefold presentation of the reasons for emptiness is not without some basis in the Indian texts and was certainly not just a simple invention on Chos kyi rgyal mtshan's part. lCang skya (*grub mtha'* p. 378) traces it back to the *Madhyamakāloka: slob dpon chen po* Ka ma la śī la'i dBu ma snang ba las ni sems tsam pas dbu ma pa la rgol ba'i tshul mang po zhiḡ gsungs nas de dag gi lan 'chad par lugs rigs mang du mdzad pa'i rigs pa'i skabs su [ 1 ] rdo rje gzegs ma dang / [ 2 ] yod med skye 'gog dang / [ 3 ] mu bzhi'i skye 'gog dang / [ 4 ] gcig du bral dang / [ 5 ] rten 'brel gyi gtan tshigs rnam kyang rgyas par gsungs so /. And in fact Kamalaśīla does present these five, not by name, but at



(1) [25a1] The first is explained below. (2) The second is as follows: “The sprout is not ultimately produced, because ultimately it is not produced from itself, nor from others, nor from both [self and others], nor from no cause.” As it is said in the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikās* [of Nāgārjuna]:

“It is not [produced] from self, other, both, or no cause. Never, nowhere, is any entity whatsoever produced.”<sup>17</sup>

(3) [25a2] The third [reason]: “The sprout is not ultimately produced, because either it exists at the time of its cause, and is thus not produced, or it does not exist at the time of its cause, and is not ultimately produced.” States the *Madhyamakāloka*:

“An existent is not produced,  
A nonexistent is like the lotus in the sky.”<sup>18</sup>

(4) [25a4] The fourth [reason]: “The sprout is not ultimately produced, because many causes do not ultimately produce just one effect; nor do many causes ultimately produce only many effects; nor does one cause ultimately produce only many effects; and nor does one cause ultimately produce just one effect.” The *Satyadvayavibhāṅga* states:

“Many do not create one entity,  
Nor do many create many.  
One does not create many entities,  
Nor does one create one.”<sup>19</sup>

(5) [25a6] The fifth [reason]: “The sprout is not truly existent, because it is a dependent arising—like, for example, a reflection.”

---

least in roughly the order in which ICang skya specifies them: (1) = *Madhyamakāloka* P. 147a6-7; (2) = 148a8; (3) = 148b7-8; (4) = 149b4-5; (5) = 149a7-8. It seems, therefore, that we have two differing classificational schemata for the Madhyamaka-reasonings, both to some degree attested in Indian texts, and both being taken up by Tibetan authors.

<sup>17</sup> *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* I k.1: *na svato nāpi parato na dvābhyāṃ nāpy ahetutaḥ / utpannā jātu vidyante bhāvāḥ kvacana kecana //*.

<sup>18</sup> So far, unfindable in the *Madhyamakāloka*.

<sup>19</sup> *Satyadvayavibhāṅga* k. 14, D. 2a5.

(1) [25a6] Amongst these [reasons] we shall now explain the first. Here, there are two points: A. The presentation of the reason; B. The establishment of its [three] characteristics (*tshul; rūpa*).

A. [25a7] The bases (*gzhi; vastu*), paths (*lam; mārga*), and aspects (*rnam pa; ākāra*) are not truly established, because they are not established as being either truly one or many—just like, for example, a reflection.<sup>20</sup> As the *Madhyamakālamkāra* [of Śāntarakṣita] states:

“Entities as asserted by ourselves and others are in reality (*yang dag tu; tattvatas*) without the nature of oneness or manyness. Thus they are not truly existent—like a reflection.”<sup>21</sup>

B. [25b1] [Establishing the three characteristics]: (a) the *pakṣadharmatva* (“the fact that the reason qualifies the subject”; *phyogs chos*); (b) the entailment (*khyab pa; vyāpti*).<sup>22</sup> Under point (a) there are two: (i) establishing that the [bases, etc.] are not truly ones; (ii) establishing that they are not truly many.

<sup>20</sup> Cf. n. 4 and 5.

<sup>21</sup> *Madhyamakālamkāra* k. 1. Chos kyi rgyal mtshan has substituted *bden par med* (“not truly existent”) for *rang bzhin med* (“without intrinsic nature”; *niḥsvabhāva*). The Tibetan translation of the *Madhyamakālamkāra* (P. 101 sa 48b) has. . . *rang bzhin med de gzugs brnyan bzhin*. The Sanskrit text found in the *Bodhicaryāvatārapañjikā* 173, 17-18 is: *niḥsvabhāvā amī bhāvās tattvataḥ svaparoditāḥ / ekānekasvabhāvena viyogāt pratibimbavat //*. Tsong kha pa, in *dBu ma rgyan gyi zin bris* and *dBu ma dgongs pa rab gsal*, formulates Śāntarakṣita’s argument as proving *don dam par rang bzhin med pa* (“ultimately being without intrinsic nature”), but rGyal tshab rje, in *rNam bshad snying po rgyan* p. 13a, speaks of *bden par med pa*, and Chos kyi rgyal mtshan then goes so far as to incorporate this notion into *kārikā* 1. It might perhaps be that rGyal tshab and Chos kyi rgyal mtshan wished to avoid any possible confusion concerning the view *tha snyad du rang bzhin yod pa* (“customarily there are intrinsic natures”)—a position that the dGe lugs pa attribute to the Svātantrikas. Thus, they chose a completely different term, *bden par med*, instead of *rang bzhin med* or *don dam par rang bzhin med pa*.

<sup>22</sup> For the three characteristics of a valid reason, see n. 38. Note that in this context the *anvayavyāpti* (“positive entailment”) and the *vyatirekavyāpti* (“contraposition”) are not treated individually by Chos kyi rgyal mtshan. Rather, he simply speaks of the entailment (*khyab pa; vyāpti*) between the reason and the property to be proved (*bsgrub bya’i chos; sādhyadharmā*). What this comes down to is proving that for all *x*: if *x* is neither truly one nor many, then *x* is not truly existent.

(i) [25b2] The bases, paths, and aspects are not truly ones, because they have parts (*cha bcas*; *sāvayava*). They have parts, because (a’) they exist; (b’) it is impossible that a knowable thing (*shes bya*; *jñeya*) be without parts; (c’) “having parts” is directly contradictory (*dnegos* ‘gal) with “being partless.”

[25b3] What is the *pramāṇa* (“source of knowledge”) that refutes the possibility of partless knowable things? Suppose that we are using the reason “because it has parts” to prove that the bases, paths, and aspects are not truly ones. To ascertain this by means of an inferential (*rjes dpag*; *anumāna*) *pramāṇa*, there are three [other] *pramāṇas* that must precede [the inference]: the *pramāṇa* that ascertains [the meaning of] “having parts,” the reason in question; the *pramāṇa* that ascertains “not being truly one” is directly contradictory with “being truly one”; the *pramāṇa* that refutes [the possibility of] a common element (*gzhi mthun*) qualified by “having parts” and “being truly one.”<sup>23</sup> Amongst these [three], it is the third that is the most difficult to understand: so let me explain this [point].

[25b5] Let us hypothesize that there are common elements [such as vases, etc.] qualified by “having parts” and “being truly one.” Now, it would follow that a vase [, for example,] would appear, to the conceptual cognition (*rtog pa*; *kalpanā*) that grasped it, as being essentially different (*ngo bo tha dad*; *bhinnarūpa*) from its parts but would [however] be [customarily] established as essentially identical (*ngo bo gcig*; *ekarūpa*) with its parts. For, although [the vase] might appear to such a cognition as being essentially different from its parts, it is essentially one with them.<sup>24</sup>

<sup>23</sup> I have been unable to find a clear Indian source for these three *pramāṇas*. rGyal tshab rje speaks about them extensively in *rNam ‘grel thar lam gsal byed*, Vol. 1 p. 37; the context is rGyal tshab’s discussion of k. 15 of *Pramāṇavārttika*’s *Svārthānumānapariccheda*, a *kārikā* in which Dharmakīrti is arguing for the inclusion of the word “certainty” (*nges pa*; *niścaya*, *niścita*) in the definitions of the three characteristics. Nonetheless, these *pramāṇas* seem to be fairly peripheral to Dharmakīrti’s own meaning and thus may possibly be a later, Tibetan elaboration and development. Cf. also Chos kyi rgyal mtshan’s *rNam ‘grel spyi don* f. 53a.

<sup>24</sup> “Customarily essentially one” means indistinguishability to the direct perception (*mngon sum*; *pratyakṣa*) of ordinary, or non-*Ārya*, sentient beings. The idea is that when one *thinks* or speaks of parts and wholes, subjects and predicates, actions and agents, etc., one thinks of them separately even though the differences between them are only conceptually created. Such differences can not be remarked by direct perception. Cf. Tillemans 1983 for a more detailed explanation.

If it were not so [that the vase and its parts were essentially one from the point of view of customary truth], it would follow absurdly (*thal lo*) that the vase would have to be partless.<sup>25</sup>

[25b7] But suppose that one agreed to the root proposition [that to a conceptual cognition a vase appears as being essentially different from its parts, although it is essentially one with them]. It would then follow absurdly that the vase would be a deceptive phenomenon (*brdzun pa; mṛṣā*). The entailment is as follows: Given a deceptive mode of being, there would be no contradiction in the fact that from the standpoint of appearance [things such as vases and their parts] might appear as being essentially different, even though in terms of the way they exist (*sdod lugs*) they are essentially one. But there is a contradiction when [we mean] things that have a true mode of being.<sup>26</sup>

[26a] A further reason [why what has parts cannot be truly one]: it would follow absurdly that the whole and its many parts would not be different (*tha dad*), because if they are, they will have to be seen as

---

<sup>25</sup> Tsong kha pa, in *Drang nges legs bshad snying po* (Sarnath ed.) p. 137, stresses that “from the point of view of customary truth, it is certainly not contradictory for one phenomenon to be of the nature of many parts” (. . . *chos gcig cha du ma'i bdag nyid du yod pa tha snyad pa'i don la mi 'gal mod* . . .). In other words, customarily parts and wholes must be essentially one if there is to be a part-whole relationship at all. It is from the perspective of ultimate truth that this relationship becomes incoherent.

<sup>26</sup> Tsong kha pa, in *dBu ma dgongs pa rab gsal* (Sarnath ed.), p. 135-136, maintains that this argument is an “abbreviated, easily understood” (*mdor bsdus go sla bar*) way to understand the Svāntarikas' position. Moreover, on p. 136 he says—with far from obvious textual justification—that it is what Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla held (*zhi ba 'tsho yab sras kyi bzhed pa*). There are, it seems to me, three key steps in Tsong kha pa's presentation of this argument:

(a) Parts and wholes appear as being essentially different to the conceptual cognition that thinks of them (*rtog pa la ngo bo tha dad du snang ba*), although they are customarily essentially identical.

(b) Therefore, the way in which parts and wholes appear (*snang tshul*), and the way they customarily are (*gnas tshul*), are not in accord (*mi mthun pa*). Thus, they are like an illusion and are deceptive phenomena (*brdzun pa*).

(c) Whatever is truly established (*bden par grub pa*) can not be deceptive in any way (*rnam par thams cad du brdzun pa spangs*).

If we accept (a), (b), and (c), the conclusion that parts and wholes are not truly established phenomena would follow.

different during an *Ārya*’s meditative equipoise, and such is not the case.<sup>27</sup> The first part [of the reason] would follow, because if they are different, they will have to be truly different, and if they were [truly different], they [the *Āryas*] would have to see them as such. Here, the first part [i.e., the fact that if they are different, they will have to be truly different] follows, because [the parts and the whole] are [hypothesized as being] things that, on the one hand, seem to be essentially different from the standpoint of appearance but are in their mode of being essentially identical, and that, on the other hand, are also truly established.<sup>28</sup>

[26a3] The second part [of the above reason] is established [i.e., if the parts and the whole were truly different, the *Āryas* would have to see them as such], because if they were [truly different], then [this difference] would have to be established absolutely (*de kho na nyid du*).<sup>29</sup>

[26a3] Now suppose that one agreed to the root proposition [that parts and wholes are not different]. Then it would follow [absurdly] that the many parts would be one [i.e., identical], because they would be established and they would not be different from the whole. Here, one could not agree [that the many parts are one], because the [parts’] being one would be countered by the *pramāṇa* that knows them to be many. [Similarly] it would follow absurdly that the whole would be many, because it would be established and would not be different from [its] many parts. Here

---

<sup>27</sup> The dGe lugs pa maintain the (at first sight) rather confusing position that parts and wholes are different (*tha dad*) but not essentially different (*ngo bo tha dad*). Parts and wholes differ in that they have differing names and can be the subjects of different beliefs and attitudes. Cf. Phur bu lcog Byams pa tshul khriims rgya mtsho’s *bsDus grwa chung* p. 12b. In modern terminology, we could say that they differ in that they are not intersubstitutable *salva veritate* in epistemic contexts such as “. . . knows that. . .” or “. . . believes that . . .”. The terminology used in *bsDus grwa* and *lCang skya grub mtha’* is that they have “differing exclusions” (*ldog pa tha dad*). Cf. n. 52 below. This notion of *ngo bo gcig ldog pa tha dad* (“essentially one but having different exclusions”) crops up frequently in dGe lugs pa philosophy, and is used to explain the relation between such things as the two truths, as well as subjects and their qualities.

<sup>28</sup> My translation here is not literal. Where the Tibetan speaks of “common elements” (*gzhi mthun*), I use the construction “on the one hand . . .,” “on the other hand . . .”

<sup>29</sup> Cf. n. 9.

[again], one could not agree, because the [whole's] being many would be countered by the *pramāṇa* that knows it to be one.<sup>30</sup>

[26a5] [Thus], by means of this line of reasoning, one denies that there is a common element qualified by “having parts” and “being truly one.” For, according to this approach, one denies that if wholes and parts are different, they have to be seen as different during the *Āryas*’ meditative equipoise. By denying this, one denies that they are truly different. And by this, one denies that there is a common element qualified by “having parts” and “being truly one.”<sup>31</sup>

[26a6] To summarize the sense: The bases, paths, and aspects are not truly ones, because they have parts. The entailment holds, because if anything were to be truly one, it would have to be one [thing] that does not depend on anything [else] whatsoever, and in such a case, it could not have parts. [However,] they [i.e., the bases, etc.] do have parts, because (a’) they are established bases (*gzhi grub*);<sup>32</sup> (b’) it is impossible that a knowable thing be partless; (c’) “having parts” is directly contradictory with “being partless”.

(ii) [26bl] [Establishing that the bases, etc. are not truly many:] They are not truly many [different things], because they do not exist as true

---

<sup>30</sup> This is the usual Indian form of the “neither one nor many” argument. To take an example from Śāntarakṣita, in *Madhyamakālaṃkāra* k. 22 we find him arguing against a Sautrāntika-Sākāravādin school who believed that the manifold aspects and the single consciousness were non-dual (*sna tshogs gnyis med pa*). In the *Vṛtti* he states: *rnam pa de dag sna tshogs pa ‘di ni rigs pa ma yin te / rnam par shes pa gcig dang tha dad ma yin pa ‘i phyir shes pa de ‘i rang gyi ngo bo bzhin no / (57b8) ...rnam par shes pa de rnam pa du ma dang tha dad pa ma yin pa ‘i lus yin na ni / rnam pa de dag gi bye brag bzhin du du mar ‘gyur ro / (58a3)*. “The manifold aspects are incoherent. As they are not different from the one consciousness, they will be similar to it in nature [and will also all become one].” ... “If consciousness were a body (*lus*) indistinct from its many aspects, then it [too] would be many, just as are the various aspects.”

<sup>31</sup> An argument by contraposition. If *x* has parts and is truly one, then *x* is truly existent. Hence, the whole and parts of *x* would be truly different, and this difference would have to be perceived during the *Āryas*’ meditations. Since it is not so perceived, it follows by a number of applications of *modus tollens* that *x* is not something that both has parts and is truly one.

<sup>32</sup> “Established basis” (*gzhi grub*) is equivalent to “existent” (*yod pa*) and “knowable thing” (*shes bya*). Cf. n. 53 below and *bsDus grwa chung* chapter II (*gzhi grub kyi rnam bzhag*).

ones [i.e., as individuals]. The entailment holds, because manyness must be posited in dependence on oneness.<sup>33</sup>

(b) [26b1] Establishing entailment [between “being neither truly one nor many” and “not being truly existent”].

[26b1] If one is to ascertain with a *pramāṇa* that the bases, paths, and aspects are not truly existent, using the reason “neither truly one nor many,” then there are three [other] preliminary *pramāṇas* needed; the *pramāṇa* that ascertains [what it means to be] neither [truly one nor many]; the *pramāṇa* that ascertains that “not truly existent” is directly contradictory with “being truly established”; the *pramāṇa* that refutes [the possibility of] a common element qualified by “being neither [truly one nor many]” and “truly established.”

[26b3] As the latter is [again] the most difficult to understand, let me explain this [point]. Suppose that with regard to a reflection one ascertains, with a *pramāṇa*, that oneness and manyness are mutually exclusive (*phan tshun spangs ‘gal; parasparaparīhāraviruddha*)<sup>34</sup> and directly contradictory. Now, in dependence on this *pramāṇa*, one can refute [the possibility of] a common element qualified by “being neither truly one nor many” and “truly established.”<sup>35</sup> For, by the action of this *pramāṇa*, and without having to depend on any other mediate *pramāṇa*, one can understand that such a common element is impossible.<sup>36</sup>

<sup>33</sup> This argument is found in *Madhyamakālamkāra* k. 61-62.

<sup>34</sup> Cf. *Madhyamakālamkāravṛtti* ad k. 1 (P. 52b6): *rang bzhin zhig yod par gyur na ni gcig pa ‘am cig shos pas mi ‘da ‘o // de dag ni phan tshun spangs te gnas pa ‘i mtshan nyid yin pas phung po gzhan sel bar byed do /*. “If an intrinsic nature did exist, then it could not be anything but one [i.e., individual] or the opposite [i.e., many]. These [i.e., oneness and manyness] are mutually exclusive characteristics and thus admit of no other alternative.” Cf. *Madhyamakālamkārapañjikā* P. 89a6 for a fuller explanation. The locutions *phung po gzhan sel bar byed pa* or *phung po gzhan med pa* (*Pañjikā*), or sometimes, *phung gsum srid pa ‘i sgro ‘dogs chod pa* (*lCang skya grub mtha’* p. 393), correspond to the formulation *tertium non datur* of the Law of Excluded Middle.

<sup>35</sup> The length of the Tibetan sentence necessitated a somewhat non-literal rendering. I chose to split it into two and repeat the word *pramāṇa* (*tshad ma*).

<sup>36</sup> The idea seems to be that one first knows that a reflection is neither one thing nor many different things and is therefore nonexistent. On the basis of this understanding, one generalizes and then comes to understand that oneness and manyness are “mutually exclusive” and “directly contradictory,” that is, that there is no third alternative between oneness and manyness for existent things (Cf. n. 34). In other words, one understands

[26b5] [Conclusions]: Therefore, the intelligent disciple, for whom the *Abhisamayālamkāra* is destined, has a [particular] way of developing faith in the nature of the Mother [*prajñāpāramitā*]: he develops this faith by establishing, with a *pramāṇa*, the existence of the Mother three omnisciences (*mkhyen pa gsum; tisraḥ sarvajñatāḥ*).<sup>37</sup> He also has a [particular] way to develop faith in the power of the Mother [*prajñāpāramitā*]: this faith he develops by establishing, with a *pramāṇa*, that the [Mother] three omnisciences are capable of effectuating the perfection that is the professed purpose of their *Ārya* [*bodhisattva*] sons.

*An excerpt from Tsong kha pa's dBU ma rgyan gyi zin bris*

[P. Na 77b3] [Objection:] But suppose that one takes this proof [i.e., the proof that entities are neither truly one nor many] as a *svatantra* [*hetu*] (“autonomous reason”; *rang rgyud*). Then since subjects (*chos can; dharmin*) such as the *ātman* (“Self”), *Īśvara* (“God”), etc., asserted by non-Buddhists, and [the notions of] suffering and partless consciousness, asserted by our co-religionists, are not established, it would follow that the *paṅśadharmatva* would not be established. Hence, [using a *svatantrahetu*] would be incoherent.<sup>38</sup>

---

the principle, for all  $x$ : if  $x$  is not one thing and  $x$  is not many different things, then  $x$  does not exist. If one understands this much, then one can *immediately* understand that for all  $x$ : if  $x$  is not truly one thing and  $x$  is not truly many different things, then  $x$  is not truly existent. It suffices to add the word “truly” to the previous principle.

<sup>37</sup> Cf. n. 4 and 5. The Tibetans frequently abbreviate *thams cad mkhyen pa gsum* by simply *mkhyen pa gsum*; in Tillemans 1983 I translated this as “three wisdoms.”

<sup>38</sup> Generally, Mādhyamikas understand by *svatantrahetu*, or *svatantrānumāna*, a proof along the lines of the Dignāga-Dharmakīrti model, where the reason (*gtan tshigs; hetu*) possesses the three characteristics (*tshul; rūpa*) necessary for validity: (a) the *paṅśadharmatva*, the fact that the reason does qualify the subject; (b) the *anvayavyāpti*, the fact that the reason entails the property to be proved; (c) the *vyatirekavyāpti*, the fact that the negation of the property to be proved entails the negation of the reason. Note, however, that the dGe lugs pa view of what constitutes a *svatantrahetu* demands certain additional conditions—see chapter V below and Tillemans 1982.

Since Dignāga, Buddhist logicians have recognized that the subject's being nonexistent is one among a number of sufficient conditions for saying that the *paṅśadharmatva* of the *svatantrahetu* does not hold. Cf. *Pramāṇasamuccaya* III k. 10, P. 130 ce 7a3:



[77b4] [Reply:] Now in the *Madhyamakālamkārapañjikā* [of Kamalaśīla] it is said that one can prove only *prasaṅgas* (“consequences”) in the case of unacknowledged entities imputed by non-Buddhists, but that with regard to acknowledged entities [which possess] their own natures, both [*prasaṅgas* and *svatantrahetus*] are without fault.<sup>39</sup> [Moreover,] Phya pa Chos kyi seng ge and other Tibetan scholars also said that a *svatantra* was inappropriate in the case of a [nonexistent] subject imputed by non-Buddhists.<sup>40</sup>

[77b6] [However,] [Kamalaśīla’s] *Madhyamakāloka* explains that even if one takes a subject of the sort previously described, so long as the reason (*rtags*; *liṅga*), and property [to be proved] (*chos*; *dharma*) are mere negations, a *svatantra* is most definitely appropriate; this is stated many times.<sup>41</sup> If reasons and properties [to be proved] only applied to established

---

*gnyi ga la grub chos kyi \* ni //*  
*tha snyad bya phyir gnyi ga dang //*  
*gcig la ldog dang the tshom dang //*  
*gzhi ma grub la mi ‘dod do //*

\*The *Vṛtti* (trans. Kanakavarman and Dad pa shes rab) ce 127b6-7 reads *kyis*. “One should apply the term [*pakṣa*] *dharma* to what is established for both [the debaters]. Thus, if one or both negates [the reason], or if it is in doubt, or if its locus is not established, it is not admitted [as the *pakṣadharmā*].”

Finally, note that Tibetan authors frequently cite a line from the *Madhyamakālamkāravṛtti* ad k. 1 as the basic source for situating the problem of *āśrayāsiddha* in the context of the “neither one nor many” argument. The key passage is (P. 52b7-8): *gtan tshigs ‘di ma grub po snyam du ma sems shig* / “Do not think that this reason is unestablished.” An “unestablished reason” (*ma grub pa’i gtan tshigs: asiddhahetu*) is one where the *pakṣadharmatva* does not hold.

<sup>39</sup> A *prasaṅga* is a proposition implied by the opponent’s position and need not be accepted by its proponent.

<sup>40</sup> For more on Phya pa Chos kyi seng ge (1109-1169), an influential figure in the development of the Tibetan Pramāṇa tradition, see van der Kuijp 1978 and 1983.

<sup>41</sup> Cf. *Madhyamakāloka* P. 188a3-6 cited in *lCang skya grub mtha’* p. 379: *gang la dngos po’i chos yod pa’i ngo bor sgrub par mi ‘dod kyi / ‘on kyang sgro btags pa’i chos rnam par bcad pa sgrub pa tsam zhig brjod par ‘dod pa de la ni ma grub pa nyid la sogs pa’i / nyes pa brjod pa tha snyad du yang dngos por gyur pa’i chos can mi dgos te / de ni de’i chos ma yin pa’i phyir ro // de la bltos nas kyang de’i chos can nyid du mi ‘thad pa’i phyir ro // de ma grub tu zin kyang bsgrub par bya ba med na mi ‘byung ba’i gtan tshigs mngon par ‘dod pa’i don grub pa la gegs byed pa med pa’i phyir ro /*. “When one does not wish to prove that a [certain] property of a real entity does in fact occur but wishes

[i.e., existent] bases (*gzhi grub*), then *svatantras*, [or in other words,] proofs that are not *prasāṅgas*, would be inappropriate for these types of subjects. But if there is nothing contradictory for a reason or a property that is a non-implying negation (*med par dgag pa*; *prasajyapratishedha*) to also [qualify] an unestablished basis, then for such [nonexistent] subjects, too, the *svatantra* will be thoroughly proper. This is the teacher and scholar Kamalaśīla's position.

[77b8] [Objection and reply:] But then what was previously explained in the *Madhyamakālamkārapañjikā* does not correspond to the *Madhyamakāloka*. As Dharmamitra, however, held that the *Pañjikā* was by Kamalaśīla, it should be investigated if [Kamalaśīla] might not have composed this text [i.e., the *Pañjikā*] specifically at a time when his thought was [still] immature.<sup>42</sup>

[78a1] Well then, what is our own position with regard to these types of [nonexistent] subjects? In this context, the *Mahātman* Dignāga states:

“By means of objects of direct perception, inference, belief, and convention, [and] pertaining to its actual basis (*rang rten la 'o*).”<sup>43</sup>

---

merely to prove a negation of a projected property, then if it is said that there are faults such as *asiddha*, etc., [we reply] that it is not necessary that the subject be a real entity, even customarily. For, it [i.e., the property to be proved] is not [in fact] the property of that [nonexistent subject]. Moreover, it [i.e., the nonexistent subject] is not properly the subject of that [property] which would depend on it. And although it [i.e., the subject] is granted to be unestablished, this does not constitute an obstacle to the establishment of the object intended as the reason that is necessarily linked to the [property] to be proved.”

<sup>42</sup> For the problem of the authorship of the *Madhyamakālamkārapañjikā* and the lost commentary by Dharmamitra on the *Madhyamakālamkāra*, see Mimaki 1982a, 371, n. 39.

<sup>43</sup> See *Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti* P. 43a6 (trans. Vasudhararakṣita and Seng rgyal), as well as the sDe dge and Co ne *bstan 'gyur* versions of *Pramāṇasamuccaya* III k. 2 (The sDe dge/Co ne version of this *kārikā* has *brtan la 'o* rather than *rten* or *brtan la 'o*). This verse, which is frequently cited by such dGe lugs pa authors as rGyal tshab rje (cf. *rNam 'grel thar lam gsal byed*, Vol. 2, p. 316) and lCang skya rol pa'i rdo rje (cf. *lCang skya grub mtha'* p. 121), only figures in one of the translations of the *Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti*; it is not in the Peking version of the *Pramāṇasamuccaya*, nor is it commented upon in Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇaviniścaya* or Jinendrabuddhi's *Pramāṇasamuccayaṭīkā*. The following verse, however, is found in the Peking version of the *Pramāṇasamuccaya* and is commented on in both translations of the *Vṛtti* as well as in the *Pramāṇaviniścaya* (cf. P. 294a):

Thus, in explaining that the basis [i.e., the subject] and the property [in a proper thesis (*pratijñā* or *pakṣa*)] are not refuted, he did not merely say [the words] “with regard to the subject” (*chos can la'o*) but rather “its actual subject” (*rang gi chos can; svadharmin*).<sup>44</sup> And Śrī Dharmakīrti explained the thought behind saying these words as follows: Although the proposition (*tshogs don*) composed of the [merely] nominal subject (*chos can 'ba' zhig pa; kevaladharmin*) and the property to be proved might be

---

*rang gi ngo bo kho na bstan //*  
*bdag 'dod rang gi chos can la //*  
*mngon sum don dang rjes dpag dang //*  
*yid ches grags pas ma bsal ba'o //*

Now, instead of this reading, Tsong kha pa has obviously followed the sDe dge/Co ne version of k. 2 and Vasudhararakṣita and Seng rgyal's translation of the *Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti*, where *rang rten la'o* is substituted for *rang gi chos can la* (= *svadharmini*) ...*ma bsal ba'o* (= *anirākṛtaḥ*), which makes for a difficult reading. It seems probable that Tsong kha pa understood *rang rten la'o* as meaning the same thing as *rang gi chos can la* and then introduced the term *rang rten chos can*. And even though the verse from the *Pramāṇasamuccaya* is most likely a corruption of the text, it did have quite an importance for the dGe lugs pa. Post-Tsong kha pa writers frequently cite this verse and use the terminology *rang rten* and *rang rten chos can*; rGyal tshab rje, to take an example, in *rNam 'grel thar lam gsal byed*, Vol. 2, interprets quite a number of *kārikās* in *Pramāṇavārttika* IV in the light of this questionable verse.

[Remarks added in 2020]: It is now clear that the Peking version of PS k. 2 is no doubt the right version. It gives Dignāga's definition of a thesis as commented by Dharmakīrti and others. See Tillemans 2000, 3-6 for a translation of PS and PS-Vṛtti to k. 1 and 2; see also *ibid.*, 47. The Sanskrit of PS k. 2 can be reconstructed from quotes in these works as follows:

*svarūpeṇaiva nirdeśyaḥ svayam iṣṭo 'nirākṛtaḥ /*  
*pratyakṣārthānumānāptaprasiddhena svadharmini //.*

“[A valid thesis] is one that is intended (*iṣṭa*) by [the proponent] himself (*svayam*) as something to be stated (*nirdeśya*) in its proper form alone (*svarūpeṇaiva*) [i.e., as a *sādhya*]; [and] with regard to [the proponent's] own subject (*svadharmin*), it is not opposed (*anirākṛta*) by perceptible objects (*pratyakṣārtha*), by inference (*anumāna*), by authorities (*āpta*) or by what is commonly recognized (*prasiddha*).”

<sup>44</sup> I translated *rang gi chos can* (“its own subject”) by “its actual subject,” and *rang rten* by “its actual basis,” to better bring out the contrast with “nominal subjects” (*chos can 'ba' zhig pa*). More exactly, it is the proponent's own intended subject.

negated, there is no fault, as this property [to be proved] does not negate the subject that is the actual basis of the property to be proved.<sup>45</sup> Thus, he [Dignāga] says “basis” in order to show that the fault occurs when one negates the subject that is the actual basis of the property to be proved, and [hence negates] the [proposition] composed of the two [i.e., of the actual basis and the property].

[78a5] Now is there [thought to be] a fault in refuting the nominal subject? This is extensively explained in passages of the *Pramāṇavārttika* such as, “For example, space, etc. by others...,” and in connection with the Vaiśeṣika position.<sup>46</sup>

[78a6] The so-called “nominal subject” means one that is stated as the subject but is not [in fact] the basis of the property to be proved in question; it is, thus, an unrelated (*yan gar bar*) subject.<sup>47</sup> [Objection:] “If it is so that when [presenting] a *svatantra*, the *pakṣadharmā* has to qualify whatever might happen to be the locus of debate (*rtsod gzhi*),<sup>48</sup> then there will be no sense in making a difference between the nominal subject and the subject that is the actual basis. Hence, when one takes *ātman*, *pradhāna*

<sup>45</sup> Cf. *Pramāṇavārttika* IV k. 136-148. Note that Kamalaśīla in the *Madhyamakāloka* P. 188b-189a quotes quite a number of these particular *kārikās* from *Pramāṇavārttika* IV. Cf. also n. 41.

<sup>46</sup> *Pramāṇavārttika* IV k. 141 and 142.

*yathā parair anutpādyāpūrvarūpaṃ\* na khādikam /  
sakṛc chabdādyahetutvād ity ukte prāha dūṣakah //  
tadvad vastusvabhāvo 'san dharmī vyomādir ity api /  
naivam iṣṭasya sādhyasya bādhā kācana vidyate //*

\*Miyasaka 1972 and Sāṅkṛtyāyana 1953, 550 have the reading *anutpādyā pūrvarūpan*, but I have preferred to follow Manorathanandin (*Vṛtti* p. 407.5). Cf. the Tibetan of 141ab: *dper na mkha' sogs gzhan dag gis / sngon med rang bzhin skyed med min /*. “For example, when one states that space, etc. are not novel natures unproduced by other [conditions] because they are not causes for [producing their qualities such as] sound etc. all at once, the [Vaiśeṣika] adversary might say that in that case the subject, space, etc., would not have the nature of a real entity. But, like that [i.e., when the subject is the Vaiśeṣika’s notion of space], there is no refutation whatsoever of the desired proposition to be proved.”

<sup>47</sup> Cf. *rNam 'grel thar lam gsal byed*, Vol. 2, p. 317: *bsgrub bya 'i chos dang 'brel med kyi chos can 'ba'zhig pa ...* “the nominal subject, which is unrelated to the property to be proved ...”

<sup>48</sup> In other words, whatever is simply being spoken about, be it existent or nonexistent.

(“the Principal”),<sup>49</sup> etc. as the loci of debate, then the *svatantraliṅga* (*rang rgyud kyi rtags*)<sup>50</sup> will [still] be inappropriate.” [Reply:] But such [a position stems from] not differentiating the viewpoint of the two lords of logic [i.e., Dignāga and Dharmakīrti] from that of the infidels. Having in this way cited the texts of the *sūtra* [i.e., Dignāga’s *Pramāṇasamuccaya*]<sup>51</sup> and the *Pramāṇavārttika*, [the matter] will be more extensively explained in accordance with the *Madhyamakāloka*.

[78bl] In the *Madhyamakāloka* it is said that it is not sufficient to refute *ātman*, *pradhāna*, etc. by just *prasaṅgas* but that [these pseudo-entities] should also be refuted by *svatantraliṅgas*. And furthermore, the refutations should pertain to the [objects’] own double negatives (*rang ldog nas*).<sup>52</sup> On account of these two requirements, it is necessary that [*ātman*, etc.] be taken as loci of debate for *svatantra* proofs. And in this case, although the reason that proves they [i.e., *ātman*, etc.] are not real entities (*dngos med*; *abhāva*)<sup>53</sup> ends up refuting the subject, [the irreality of *ātman*,

<sup>49</sup> In the Sāṃkhya system, *pradhāna* is equivalent to *prakṛti*, the primordial matter or nature. Cf. *Sāṃkhyakārikābhāṣya* ad k. 3: *mūlaprakṛtiḥ pradhānam* /. In Tibetan translations of the Sāṃkhya terminology, *gtso bo* equals *spyi gtso bo*.

<sup>50</sup> *svatantraliṅga* (*rang rgyud kyi rtags*) = *svatantrahetu* (*rang rgyud kyi gtan tshigs*).

<sup>51</sup> *Sūtra* (*mdo*) refers to *tshad ma’i mdo*, i.e., the *Pramāṇasamuccaya* of Dignāga.

<sup>52</sup> This is a complicated way of saying that it is *pradhāna*, etc. *themselves* that should be refuted. In the dGe lugs pa texts on *Pramāṇa*, the *rang ldog* of *x* means simply *x* itself, or more exactly, the exclusion of everything that is *in anyway different* (*tha dad*) from *x*. There are a series of these important terms using *ldog pa*: *rang ldog*; *gzhi ldog* (“the exclusion that is the basis [for applying a term]”); *don ldog* (“the exclusion that is the meaning [for applying a term]”), etc. See the *ldog pa ngos ‘dzin* chapter (“recognizing the exclusion”) of *bsDus grwa chung* p. 10b-11a.

<sup>53</sup> I have used “real entity” rather than just “entity” or “existent” to avoid confusion between *dngos po* and *yod pa*, concepts that are quite distinct in the dGe lugs pa Tshad ma philosophy. This school’s ontology can be represented as follows:

The set A of existent things (*yod pa*) = the set of knowable things (*shes bya*) = the set of established bases (*gzhi grub*)

Proper subset of A: the set of permanent things (*rtag pa*) = the set of uncomposed phenomena (‘*dus ma byas kyi chos*) = the set of unproduced phenomena (*ma byas pa’i chos*)

Proper subset of A: the set of real entities (*dngos po*) = the set of impermanent things (*mi rtag pa*) = the set of products (*byas pa*) = the set of things able to perform a function (*don byed nus pa*)

etc.] is proven according to both ways [i.e., *prasaṅgas* and *svatantras*] without fault.

[78b3] [Dharmakīrti's] *Pramāṇavārttika*, the sense of Dignāga's utterances, states the following:

“The existence of the conventions of what is to be inferred (*dpag bya; anumeya*) and what infers (*dpog par byed pa; anumāna*) is imputed in dependence on a difference that is established for a [conceptual] consciousness.”<sup>54</sup>

Following this [line of thought], in cases where the locus must be a real entity, such as [when one is] proving that sound is impermanent because it is a product, or that there is fire on the smokey hill, the directly [intended] basis (*dnogs rten*) for these proofs and refutations is just the object that is the conceptual image [lit. “appearance” (*snang ba*)] of *sound* or *hill* as not-not-sound or not-not-hill.<sup>55</sup> *Sound* and *hill*, themselves, are not the directly [intended] bases, because they do not directly appear to the conceptual cognition (*rtoḡ pa*) that effectuates the proofs and refutations; and if one phenomenon [, such as *sound*, etc.,] is established, then at the same time

---

As for the term “not a real entity” (*dnogs med; abhāva*), it covers both what is permanent and what is completely nonexistent (*med pa*). A more extensive exposition of this ontology is to be found in the Sautrāntika chapters of *grub mtha'* texts. Cf. also *bsDus grwa chung* chapter II, *gzhi grub kyi rnam bzhag*.

<sup>54</sup> *Pramāṇavārttika* IV k. 183:

*anumānānumeyārthavyavahārasthititv iyam /  
bhedam pratyayasamsiddham avalambya prakalpyate \*/*

\*Cf. PV *Bhāṣya*, Miyasaka: *ca kalpyate*. Tib. *rnam par brtags pa yin*.

<sup>55</sup> Literally, “The very objects that are *sound* and *hill* appearing, to conceptual cognition, as what is excluded from not-those two.” I have, however, simply translated *ma yin pa las log pa* by “not-not-,” as the Tibetans themselves make no distinction between *ma yin pa las log pa* and *ma yin pa ma yin pa*. An important point to be noted is that conceptual images—also often known as “object-universals” (*don spyi*)—are not real entities (*dnogs med*). They are, however, said to be permanent and are thus not completely nonexistent (*med pa*)—see n. 53. Furthermore, to every item, existent or nonexistent, there corresponds such an image, and though the item (e.g., *pradhāna*) may be nonexistent, its image is not.

all its properties [, such as impermanence, etc.,] are also established [, but in logical reasoning, this does not occur].<sup>56</sup>

[78b6] However, [in these examples] the image’s locus (*snang gzhi*), which appears in this way [i.e., as not-not-sound or not-not-hill], is *sound* or *hill*.<sup>57</sup> Thus, the locus must be a real entity. But [take] cases where the locus, i.e., the subject, need not be a real entity—when [, for example,] *pradhāna*, *Īśvara*, etc. are taken as the loci of debate. The conceptual image as not-not-*pradhāna* or not-not-*Īśvara*, however, does exist, and it is just this that one apprehends when proving that [*pradhāna*, etc.] are not real entities. Therefore, this locus [i.e., the image] does not have the defect that it is not the opponent’s object of inquiry, or that it is not what the proponent wishes to infer. Moreover, suppose that one is refuting that the image’s locus [i.e., *pradhāna*, etc.] is a real entity, because it is devoid of ability to perform a function, or that one refutes the true existence of the image’s locus by [proving that] it is neither truly one nor many. Now, these two reasons will qualify the simple image as not-not-*pradhāna* and not-not-*Īśvara*. And [thus] this very image is the subject that takes as its property the property to be proved, and is designated the *pakṣa* of which

---

<sup>56</sup> Tsong kha pa’s point in introducing *Pramāṇavārttika* IV k. 183 was that it shows the oft-discussed theme that the difference between subjects and their properties is only conceptually created (cf. rGyal tshab *op. cit.* Vol. 1, p. 97). In other words, when one says or thinks that sound is impermanent, even though there is in fact no difference between the *svalakṣaṇa* (i.e., the real entity) sound and its impermanence, there seems to be such a difference to thought. The consequence is that although the *svalakṣaṇa* sound is indirectly denoted (*brda’i zhen yul*) by the word “sound,” what directly appears to the mind, the “directly [intended] basis” (*dngos rten*) when one says “sound,” can not be the *svalakṣaṇa* sound: if it were, then sound’s impermanence, and all the other properties that are in fact not different from sound, should also appear. An inference of sound’s impermanence would thus become superfluous, as this could be established by simply hearing the word “sound.” Thus, *svalakṣaṇa* can only be (indirectly) referred to via the medium of their conceptually created counterparts; it is these images that are ultimately responsible for the separation between subject and predicate and that are the direct objects of discursive thought.

<sup>57</sup> The image’s locus is, as it were, the “original” of the copy. Thus, for example, *sound* is the locus of the conceptual image as not-not-sound, and *pradhāna* is the locus of the image as not-not-*pradhāna*.

is predicated the *dharma* in *pakṣadharmā*.<sup>58</sup> So even though the nominal subject is refuted, this does not lead to the fault that the *pakṣadharmā*[*tva*] is not established.

[79a2] If one is using [the reason] [“because it is] a product” to prove sound’s impermanence, then as the double negative image (*snang ldog*),<sup>59</sup> which is the appearance as not-not-sound, is not a real entity, the reason, *product*, does not qualify it. Rather, *product* must qualify the image’s locus, *sound*. This is due to the fact that the reason and property to be proved are real entities.

[79a4] If [however] “devoid of ability to perform a function” or “neither truly one nor many” are taken as reasons, then both the image’s locus [*pradhāna*, etc.] and the double negative image [i.e., the conceptual image as not-not-*pradhāna*, etc.] would be qualified by the reasons. And granted that the image’s locus is qualified by the reason, then although this [i.e., the image’s locus] might be refuted, the double negative image would [still] be established as the subject on which depends the property to be proved and the *dharma* of the *pakṣadharmā*.<sup>60</sup>

[79a5] This has been a summary of the essentials. For a more extensive [explanation] one should consult the *Madhyamakāloka*.

---

<sup>58</sup> Usually, the term *pakṣa* means the thesis, composed of the subject and the property to be proved. But in the term *pakṣadharmā*, *pakṣa* refers only to the subject. Cf. *Pramānavārttikasvavṛtti* ad k. 1 (*Svārthānumāna*): *pakṣo dharmī / avayave samudāyopacārāt* /. “The *pakṣa* is the subject. For [here] the part is metaphorically designated as the whole.” Note that the term *dharma* in *pakṣadharmā* refers to the reason, whence the meaning of *pakṣadharmatva*: “the fact that the reason is a quality of the subject.”

<sup>59</sup> In other words, the image itself.

<sup>60</sup> Cf. Tillemans 1982, 116-118. It should be remembered that because a conceptual image as not-not-*pradhāna* is permanent, it is, in this system, not a real entity and is devoid of ability to perform a function. Cf. n. 53.



***Tibetan text of the selection from the sKabs dang po'i spyi don***

[New 24a6; Old 2la] / rang lugs la / slob dpon gyis bzhed pa'i rtags gyi dgag bya'i chos ngos gzung ba dang / de gzhi gzhan gyi steng du 'gog byed [24a7] kyi rigs pa bshad pa'o //

dang po ni / blo la snang ba'i dbang gis bzhag pa ma yin par rang gi thun mong ma yin pa'i sdod lugs kyi ngos nas grub pa de / don dam dpyod byed kyi rtags kyi dgag bya'i chos yin te / gang zag dang phung po de ltar grub [24b1] na / don<sup>61</sup> dam dpyod<sup>62</sup> byed kyi rigs pas dpyad bzod<sup>63</sup> cing 'phags pa'i mnyam gzhag gis gzigs dgos pa'i phyir te /

dper na sgyu ma mkhan gyis<sup>64</sup> rde'u shing rta glang du sprul pa'i tshe / rde'u shing bu sogs rta glang du snang ba na de nyid blo 'khrul ba'i [24b2] dbang gis bzhag pa ma yin par / rde'u shing bu sogs kyi rang ngos nas grub pa yin na / de dag gi rigs 'dra snga ma'i lag rjes su 'gyur bas mig ma bsld pa rnams kyis kyang mthong dgos pa bzhin no //

de ltar yang / *bDen gnyis las* /

ji ltar [24b3] snang bzhin ngo bo'i phyir // 'di la dpyad pa mi 'jug go // rnal 'byor dpyod par byed na don // gzhan du song bas gnod par 'gyur //

zhes gsungs /

gzhan yang / de de yin pa'i phyir te / blo la snang ba'i dbang gis bzhag pa'i yod pa de kun rdzob tu [24b4] yod pa'i don yin pa'i phyir te / *dBu ma snang ba las* /

de'i phyir de dag gi bsam pa'i dbang gis dngos po brdzun pa'i ngo bo thams cad ni kun rdzob tu yod pa kho na'o //

zhes dang / *'Jug ṭīkā las* /

<sup>61</sup> Old *den*.

<sup>62</sup> Old *dpyad*.

<sup>63</sup> Old *bzad*.

<sup>64</sup> New, Old *gyi*. *rNam bshad snying po rgyan* p. 12b4 has *gyis*. (As I mentioned in Tillemans 1982, the *sKabs dang po'i spyi don* is an elaboration of rGyal tshab rje's *rNam bshad snying po rgyan* and quotes many passages almost verbatim).

*dBu ma snang bar* kun rdzob<sup>65</sup> tu yod tshul [24b5] gsungs pa'i ldog  
phyogs kyi yod pa ni don dam par bden grub tu yod par shes pas /

zhes dang / *bDen gnyis* las /

ji ltar snang ba de kho na //  
kun rdzob gzhan ni cig shos so //

zhes gsungs pa'i phyir /

des na bden par grub pa / don dam par [24b6] grub pa / yang dag par  
grub pa sogs med kyang / rang gi mtshan nyid kyi grub pa / rang ngos nas  
grub pa / rang bzhin gyis grub pa / rdzas su grub pa sogs yod do /

gnyis pa la / spyir bdag med gtan la 'bebs pa'i rigs pa la du ma yod de /  
chos [24b7] rnams kyi ngo bo la dpyod pa geig du bral gyi gtan tshigs /  
rgyu la dpyod pa rdo rje gzegs ma'i gtan tshigs / 'bras bu la dpyod pa yod  
med skye 'gog gi gtan tshigs / rgyu 'bras gnyis ka la dpyod pa mu bzhi  
skye 'gog gi gtan tshigs / rigs pa'i [25a1] rgyal po rten 'brel gyi gtan tshigs  
rnams su yod pa'i phyir /

dang po de 'og tu chad / gnyis pa ni / myu gu chos can / [Old 21b]  
don<sup>66</sup> dam par mi skye ste / don dam par bdag dang / gzhan dang / gnyis  
ka dang / rgyu med gang rung las [25a2] mi skye ba'i phyir te / *rTsa ba*  
*shes rab* las /

bdag las ma yin gzhan las min //  
gnyis las ma yin rgyu med min //  
dngos po gang dag gang na yang //  
skye ba nam yang yod ma yin //

zhes gsungs pa'i phyir /

gsum pa ni myu gu chos can / [25a3] don dam par mi skye ste / rang gi  
rgyu'i dus su yod par yang mi skye / rang gi rgyu'i dus su med par yang  
don dam par mi skye ba'i phyir te / *dBu ma snang ba* las /

yod pa rnam par mi skye ste //  
med pa nam mkha'i pad mo bzhin //

---

<sup>65</sup> New *rdzobs*.

<sup>66</sup> Old *dan*.

zhes gsungs pa'i phyir /

[25a4] bzhi pa ni / myu gu chos can / don dam par mi skye ste / rgyu  
du mas 'bras bu gcig kho na don dam par skyed pa yang ma yin / rgyu du  
du mas 'bras bu du ma kho na don dam par skyed pa yang ma yin / rgyu gcig  
gis 'bras bu du ma kho na don dam par skyed pa yang ma [25a5] yin / rgyu  
gcig gis 'bras bu gcig kho na don dam par skyed pa yang ma yin pa'i phyir  
te / *bDen gnyis las* /

du mas gcig gi dngos mi byed //  
du mas du ma byed pa'ang min //  
gcig gis du ma'i dngos mi byed //  
gcig gis gcig byed pa yang min // [25a6]

zhes gsungs pa'i phyir /

lga pa ni / myu gu chos can / bden par med de / rten 'brel yin pa'i  
phyir / dper na / gzugs brnyan bzhin zhes pa lta bu'o //

de rnam kyī nang nas / gtan tshigs dang po de 'chad pa la / rtags 'god  
pa dang / tshul<sup>67</sup> sgrub [25a7] pa gnyis las /

dang po ni / gzhi lam rnam gsum chos can / bden par ma grub ste / bden  
grub kyī gcig dang bden grub kyī du ma gang rung du ma grub pa'i phyir /  
dper na gzugs brnyan bzhin / zhes pa lta bu yin te / *dBu ma rgyan las* //  
[25b1 ]

bdag dang gzhan smra'i dngos 'di dag //  
yang dag par ni gcig pa dang //  
du ma'i rang bzhin bral ba'i phyir //  
bden par med de gzugs brnyan bzhin //

zhes gsungs pa'i phyir //

gnyis pa la phyogs chos sgrub pa dang / khyab pa sgrub pa [25b2]  
gnyis las / dang po la / bden pa'i gcig bral du sgrub pa dang / bden pa'i du  
bral du sgrub pa gnyis las /

dang po ni / gzhi lam rnam gsum chos can / bden par grub pa'i gcig tu  
med te / cha bcas yin pa'i phyir / de chos can / cha bcas [25b3] yin te / yod

---

<sup>67</sup> Old *chul*.

pa gang zhig / cha med shes bya la mi srid / cha bcas cha med dang dngos  
‘gal yin pa’i phyir /

cha med shes bya la srid pa ‘gog pa’i tshad ma de gang zhe na / cha  
bcas kyi rtags kyis gzhi lam rnam gsum bden grub kyi gcig [25b4] min par  
grub pa’i rjes dpag tshad<sup>68</sup> mas nges pa la tshad<sup>69</sup> ma gsum sngon du ‘gro  
dgos te / de la rtags kyi mtshan gzhi cha bcas nges [Old 22a] pa’i tshad  
ma dang / bden grub kyi gcig min pa bden grub kyi gcig dang dngos ‘gal  
du nges pa’i tshad [25b5] ma / cha bcas dang bden grub kyi gcig gi gzhi  
mthun ‘gog byed kyi tshad ma gsum sngon du ‘gro dgos pa’i phyir / de  
rnams kyi nang nas tshad ma gsum pa ‘di rtags dka’ bas / de bshad na /

cha bcas dang bden grub kyi gcig gi gzhi [25b6] mthun yod na / bum  
pa chos can / rang ‘dzin rtog pa la rang gi cha shas rnams dang ngo bo tha  
dad du snang ba dang / rang gi cha shas rnams dang ngo bo gcig tu grub  
par thal / rang ‘dzin rtog pa la rang gi cha shas rnams dang ngo bo tha dad  
du snang ba gang zhig / rang gi cha [25b7] shas rnams dang ngo bo gcig  
yin pa’i phyir / ma grub na / bum pa cha bcas ma yin par thal lo //

rtsa bar ‘dod na / bum pa chos can / brdzun par grub par thal lo // khyab  
ste / snang lugs la ngo bo tha dad du snang yang sdod lugs la ngo bo gcig  
tu grub pa [26a1] / brdzun par grub pa’i sdod lugs la mi ‘gal yang bden par  
grub pa’i sdod lugs la ‘gal ba’i phyir //

de’i rgyu mtshan yang cha can dang cha du ma chos can / tha dad du  
med par thal / tha dad du yod na / tha dad du ‘phags [26a2] pa’i mnyam  
gzhas gis gzigs dgos pa las / des tha dad du ma gzigs pa’i phyir / dang po  
grub ste / tha dad du yod na bden par grub pa’i tha dad yin dgos / de yin  
na de’i gzigs ngor tha dad yin dgos pa’i phyir / dang po der thal / snang  
[26a3] lugs la ngo bo tha dad du snang yang sdod lugs la ngo bo gcig tu  
grub pa dang / bden par grub pa’i gzhi mthun yin pa’i phyir /

gnyis pa grub ste / de yin na de kho na nyid du grub dgos pa’i phyir //

rtsa bar ‘dod na / cha du ma chos can / gcig tu thal / grub [26a4] cing  
cha can dang tha dad du med pa’i phyir / ‘dod mi nus te / khyod gcig yin  
pa la khyod du mar ‘jal ba’i tshad mas gnod pa’i phyir / cha can chos can /  
du mar thal / grub cing cha du ma dang tha dad du med<sup>70</sup> pa’i phyir / ‘dod

<sup>68</sup> Old *chad*.

<sup>69</sup> Old *chad*.

<sup>70</sup> New, Old *yod*. Cf. *rNam bshad snying po rgyan* 13b2: *med*. I have not noted my occasional transformations of single *shad* (/) into double *shad* (//).

mi nus te / khyod du ma yin pa la khyod [26a5] gcig tu 'jal ba'i tshad mas gnod pa'i phyir //

rigs pa 'di la brten nas cha bcas dang bden grub kyid gcig gi gzhi mthun khegs te / de la brten nas cha can dang cha du ma tha dad du yod na tha dad du 'phags pa'i mnyam gzhag gis gzigs dgos [26a6] pa de khegs / de khegs pas de gnyis bden grub kyid tha dad yin pa de khegs / de khegs pas cha bcas dang bden grub kyid gcig gi gzhi mthun khegs pa'i phyir //

don bsdu na / gzhi lam rnam gsum chos can / bden grub kyid gcig tu med de / cha [26a7] bcas yin pa'i phyir / khyab ste / bden grub kyid gcig yin na gang [Old 22b] la'ang bltos med kyid gcig yin dgos / de yin na cha bcas ma yin dgos pa'i phyir / de chos can / cha bcas yin te / gzhi grub pa gang zhig / cha med shes bya la mi srid / cha bcas [26b1] cha med dang dngos 'gal yin pa'i phyir //

gnyis pa la / de chos can / bden grub kyid du mar med de / bden grub kyid gcig tu med pa'i phyir / khyab ste / du ma gcig la bltos nas bzhag dgos pa'i phyir //

gnyis pa khyab pa sgrub pa ni /

bden grub kyid [26b2] gcig dang bden grub kyid du ma gang rung dang bral ba'i rtags kyis / gzhi lam rnam gsum bden med du tshad mas nges pa la tshad ma gsum sngon du 'gro dgos te / de la de gang rung dang bral ba nges byed kyid tshad ma / bden med bden grub dang dngos [26b3] 'gal du nges pa'i tshad ma / de gang rung dang bral ba dang bden grub kyid gzhi mthun 'gog byed kyid tshad ma gsum sngon du 'gro dgos pa'i phyir /

tshad ma phyi ma 'di rtogs dka' bas bshad na gzhi gzugs brnyan gyi steng du gcig dang du ma [26b4] gnyis phan tshun spangs 'gal gyid dngos 'gal du nges pa'i tshad ma la brten nas bden grub kyid gcig dang bden grub kyid du ma gang rung dang bral ba dang bden grub kyid gzhi mthun 'gog nus te / tshad ma de'i byed pa la brten nas bar du [26b5] tshad ma gzhan brgyud pa la bltos mi dgos par / de 'dra ba'i gzhi mthun mi srid par rtogs nus pa'i phyir //

des na rGyan gyi ched du bya ba'i gdul bya dbang rnon chos can / yum gyi ngo bo la dad pa skye tshul yod de / yum mkhyen gsum yod par [26b6] tshad mas grub pa'i sgo nas yum la dad pa skye ba'i phyir / yum gyi nus pa la dad pa skye tshul yod de / mkhyen gsum de rang sras 'phags pa'i bzhed don phun tshogs sgrub nus su tshad mas grub pa'i sgo nas yum la dad pa skye ba'i phyir //

*Tibetan text of the excerpt from dBu ma rgyan gyi zin bris*

[P.Nga 77b3; T. 427; S. 41] gal te sbyor ba ‘di rang rgyud du byed na / gzhan gyis smras pa’i bdag dang / dbang phyug la sogs pa dang / rang sdes smras pa’i<sup>71</sup> sdug bsngal dang / shes [77b4] pa cha med kyi chos can ma grub pas / phyogs chos ma grub par ‘gyur bas / mi ‘thad do zhe na /

‘di *dKa*’ ‘*grel* las gzhan sdes btags [T. 428] pa’i ma grags pa la ni / thal bar sgrub pa kho na yin la [77b5] grags pa’i rang gi ngo bo rnam la ni / gnyis ka ltar na yang nyes pa med ces ‘chad cing / **Cha pa** la sogs pa bod kyi mkhas pa rnam kyis kyang / gzhan gyis btags pa’i chos can la rang rgyud mi rung [77b6] bar ‘chad do //

*dBu ma snang ba* las ni sngar bshad pa lta bu’i chos can du bzung ba la yang / rtags chos rnam bcad tsam yin na rang rgyud shin tu yang rung bar lan mang du bshad [S. 42] de / rtags dang chos [77b7] gzhi grub kho no la ‘jug pa yin na ni / chos can<sup>72</sup> de ‘dra ba la thal ‘gyur min pa rang rgyud mi rung la / rtags chos med dgag gzhi ma grub pa la’ang mi ‘gal ba yin na ni / chos can de ‘dra ba la’ang rang rgyud [77b8] rung ba legs par bsgrub pa ni / slob dpon mkhas pa **Ka ma la śī la**’i lugs so //

des na *dKa*’ ‘*grel* las sngar ltar bshad pa ‘di *dBu ma snang ba* dang mi mthun no // *dKa*’ ‘*grel* ‘di **Ka ma la śī** [78a1] **la**’i yin par **Chos kyi bshes gnyen** yang bzhed pas / ‘di ni slob dpon thugs ma rdzogs pa’i skabs su gcig tu mdzad dam brtag go //

‘o na chos can de ‘dra ba la rang [78a2] lugs ji ltar yin zhe na / ‘di la bdag nyid chen po **Phyogs kyi glang pos** /

mngon sum don dang rjes dpag dang yid ches grags pas rang rten la’o /<sup>73</sup>

zhes rten te chos la ma bsal ba ‘chad [78a3] pa na / chos can la’o zhes pa tsam ma smos par rang gi chos can [S. 43] zhes pa’i [T. 429] tshig smos pa’i dgongs pa dpal ldan **Chos grags** kyis bshad pa’i tshe / chos can ‘ba’ zhig pa dang / bsgrub bya’i chos gnyis [78a4] tshogs pa’i tshogs don bsal<sup>74</sup>

<sup>71</sup> P. *rang sngas smras pa’i*. S. *rang sdes pa’i sdug bsngal*.

<sup>72</sup> The sense of the passage would seem to suggest *chos can*, instead of *chos* as found in P.T.S.

<sup>73</sup> P.T. *rang brten la’o*. Cf. *Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti* ce 43a6: *rten*, and *lCang* p. 121: *rten*.

<sup>74</sup> P. *gsal*.

yang chos des<sup>75</sup> bsgrub bya'i chos rang gi rten chos can ma bsal pas<sup>76</sup>  
 skyon min no // des na bsgrub bya'i chos rang gi rten gyi chos can dang  
 de gnyis tshogs pa bsal na / skyon yin pa [78a5] bstan pa'i don du rten  
 zhes gsungs pa bshad do // chos can 'ba' zhig pa bkag pa la skyon ji lta bu  
 yin pa ni /

dper na mkha'<sup>77</sup> sogs gzhan dag gis /

zhes sogs *rNam 'grel* las rgyas par [78a6] bshad de / **Bye brag pa**'i 'dod  
 pa la 'byung ngo //

chos can 'ba' zhig pa zhes pa ni / chos can du smras kyang skabs de'i  
 bsgrub bya'i chos kyi rten min pas / chos can yan gar bar<sup>78</sup> song ba'i don  
 no // [78a7] rang rgyud kyi skabs su rtsod gzhir gang<sup>79</sup> byung de nyid la  
 phyogs chos 'grub dgos na / chos can 'ba' zhig pa dang / rang rten gyi  
 chos can gnyis 'byed pa'i don med pas bdag dang gtso bo sogs rtsod gzhir  
 [S. 44; 78a8] bzung ba'i tshe / rang rgyud kyi rtags mi rung zhes pa ni /  
 rigs pa'i dbang phyug gnyis kyi rang gi lugs dang / mu stegs kyi khyad  
 par dbye ba ma phyed pa'o / tshul 'dis *mDo* dang *rNam 'grel* gyi gzhung  
 [78b1] drangs nas rgyas par *dBu ma snang ba* las gsungs so //

'di yang *dBu ma snang ba* las bdag dang gtso bo sogs 'gog pa ni thal  
 'gyur tsam gyis mi chog gi rang rgyud kyi rtags kyis kyang dgag dgos pa  
 [T. 430] dang / [78b2] de yang rang ldog<sup>80</sup> nas dgag dgos pa gnyis kyis  
 rang rgyud kyi sbyor ba'i rtsod gzhir bzung dgos pa dang / de'i tshe de dag  
 dngos med du bsgrub pa'i rtags kyis chos can bkag kyang / skyon ma yin  
 pa'i [78b3] tshul gnyis kyis bsgrubs so //

**Phyogs glang** gis gsungs pa'i don *rNam 'grel* las /

dpag bya dpog<sup>81</sup> par byed pa yi //  
 don gyi tha snyad gnas pa 'di //

<sup>75</sup> S. *das*.

<sup>76</sup> P.T. *chos can pas*. S. *chos can bsal pas*. Tsong kha pa's thought, as shown in the lines immediately below, must be *chos can ma bsal pas*.

<sup>77</sup> P.T.S. *mkhas*. Cf. *Pramāṇavārttika* IV k. 141 (ed. Miyasaka): *mkha'*.

<sup>78</sup> ICang p. 122: *yan ga bar*.

<sup>79</sup> P.T. *gar*.

<sup>80</sup> P. *rang sdog*.

<sup>81</sup> P. *dpag*.

shes pa la grub [S. 45] tha dad la //  
brten [78b4] nas rnam par brtags pa yin //

zhes gsungs pa ltar gzhi dngos po dgos pa byas pas sgra mi rtag pa dang / du ba la la<sup>82</sup> me yod du bsgrub pa la yang rtog pa la sgra dang la gnyis / de gnyis ma yin [78b5] pa las log par snang ba'i don nyid dgag sgrub kyi dngos rten yin gyi sgra dang la nyid dngos kyi rten min te / dgag sgrub byed pa'i rtog pa la dngos su mi snang ba'i phyir dang / chos gcig cig bsgrubs na de'i [78b6] chos thams cad cig car du bsgrubs par 'gyur ba'i phyir ro //

'on kyang de ltar snang ba'i snang gzhi ni sgra dang la yin pas gzhi dngos por gyur pa dgos / gzhi chos can<sup>83</sup> dngos po yin pa mi dgos pa gtso [78b7] bo dang dbang phyug la sogs pa rtsod gzhir bzung ba la yang rtog pa la gtso bo dang dbang phyug ma yin pa las log par snang ba ni yod la / de nyid la dmigs nas dngos por med ces bsgrub pas gzhi [78b8] de la phyir rgol la shes 'dod dang / [S. 46] snga rgol la dpag 'dod med pa'i skyon med la / snang gzhi dngos [T. 431] por yod pa<sup>84</sup> don byed pa nus<sup>85</sup> stong dang / snang gzhi bden par yod pa bden pa'i gcig du [79a1] bral gyis<sup>86</sup> bkag pa na / rtags de gnyis gtso bo dang dbang phyug ma yin pa las log par snang ba de nyid la 'grub<sup>87</sup> la / de nyid bsgrub bya'i chos gang gi chos su 'jog pa'i [79a2] chos can dang / phyogs kyi chos gang gi chos su bzhag pa'i phyogs su btags pa nyid yin pas chos can 'ba' zhig pa bkag pas kyang phyogs chos mi 'grub pa'i skyon med do //

byas pas sgra mi [79a3] rtag par bsgrub pa na / rtog pa la sgra ma yin pa las log par snang ba'i snang ldog dngos por med pas / byas pa rtags de la 'grub pa min gyi / snang gzhi sgra la grub dgos te / dngos po rtags [79a4] dang bsgrub bya'i chos su byed pa'i gnad kyi so//

don byed pas stong pa dang gcig<sup>88</sup> du bral rtags su byed pa'i tshe ni<sup>89</sup> / snang gzhi dang snang ldog [S. 47] gnyis ka rtags de yin par grub cing /

<sup>82</sup> P.T.S. *du ba la*. Cf. lCang p. 123: *du ba la la*.

<sup>83</sup> P.T.S. *gzhi chen*. Cf. lCang p. 123 *gzhi chos can*.

<sup>84</sup> P.T.S. *med pa*. Cf. lCang p. 124: *yod pa*.

<sup>85</sup> P.T.S. *gnyis*. Cf. lCang p. 124: *nus pa*.

<sup>86</sup> P.T.S. *gyi*. Cf. lCang p. 124: *gyis*.

<sup>87</sup> S. *grub*.

<sup>88</sup> P.T.S. *dang du bral*. Better to read *dang gcig du bral*.

<sup>89</sup> S. *na*.



snang gzhi<sup>90</sup> rtags de yin [79a5] par grub na / de bkag kyang snang ldog  
 bsgrub chos dang / phyogs chos kyi chos gnyis brten pa'i chos can du  
 'grub bo //

'di ni snying po bsdus pa ste / rgyas par *dBu ma snang ba* las shes dgos  
 so //

---

<sup>90</sup> P. *snang gzha*.

