

V. Tsong kha pa *et al.* on the Bhāviveka-Candrakīrti Debate

This paper consists in an examination of some aspects of the dGe lugs pa interpretation of the famous debate in Candrakīrti's *Prasannapadā* I.13.4-39.4, the section of the *Prasannapadā* that concerns the understanding of Buddhapālita's refutation of the Sāṃkhya's doctrine of production by self. Buddhapālita's controversial reasoning in his *Mūlamadhyamakavṛtti* on the first *kārikā* of Nāgārjuna's *Madhyamakakārikās* was presented as follows in *Prasannapadā* 14.1-3 (ed. L. de La Vallée Poussin; henceforth "Pr."):

ācāryabuddhapālitas tv āha / na svata utpadyante bhāvā / tadutpādavaiyarthiyāt / atiprasaṅgadoṣāc ca / na hi svātmanā vidyamānānām padārthānām punar utpāde prayojanam asti / atha sann api jāyeta / na kadā cin na jāyeta / iti / "However, the Ācārya Buddhapālita has said: 'Entities are not produced from themselves, because their production would be pointless and would incur the fault of absurdity [due to an infinite regress]. For, entities that exist in themselves do not need to be produced again (*punar*). But if, even though existing, [such an entity] were to arise, then it would never fail to arise.'"

In addition to the Japanese translation published in the 1940's by Susumu Yamaguchi, we now possess a new translation of *Prasannapadā* I into Japanese by Prof. Tanji.¹ However, as for translation into a European language, this remains a project that urgently needs to be undertaken again, for the translation in Stcherbatsky 1965 is exceedingly misleading both because of its outdated philosophical terminology and because of its translational errors. [Note added in 2020: We now have this long-desired new translation of *Prasannapadā* I, i.e., MacDonald 2015]. In

¹ Yamaguchi 1947; Tanji 1988.

such a project, Tibetan works, such as Tsong kha pa's *Lam rim chen mo*, *Drang nges legs bshad snying po*, *rTsa she t̄ik chen*, *rTsa ba'i shes rab kyi dka' gnas brgyad*, Se ra rJe bstun Chos kyi rgyal mtshan's *dBu ma'i spyi don*, mKhas grub rje's *sTong thun chen mo*, sGom sde Nam mkha' rgyal mtshan's *Thal bzlog gi dka' ba'i gnas*, can serve as commentaries aiding one in understanding Candrakīrti's words. But, equally, the Tibetan writers make a certain number of philosophically significant contributions based on *Prasannapadā* I.

The debate—in its Indian form or Tibetan interpretation—is far too long and involved to be explained satisfactorily here. We shall have to confine ourselves to a kind of *prolegomenon* to such an explanation and make a subjectively based choice as to what should be known and investigated *before* such an explanation can be attempted. What, then, are some of the main points of interest to be found in Tsong kha pa and other dGe lugs pa writers?

First of all, undoubtedly one of the most interesting philosophical developments is the problem as to whether Mādhyamikas and Realists (*dn̄gos smra ba*) can ever have a debate about the same subject, given that the parties view subjects (*chos can = dharmin*) differently, the Mādhyamika taking them as unreal, the Realist as truly existent. The question becomes known as that of the existence or nonexistence of a *chos can mthun snang ba* (“a *dharmin* that appears similarly [to both parties in a debate]”), and is developed in detail in Tsong kha pa's *Lam rim chen mo* and in mKhas grub rje's *sTong thun chen mo*. This problem, which is sufficiently vast in its Tibetan development that it would require a separate paper or even series of papers, is only indirectly shown in *Prasannapadā* I.29-30.²

² Pr. 29.6 – 30.8: *na caitad evaṃ / yasmād yadaivotpādapraṭiṣedho 'tra sādhyadharmo 'bhipretah / tadaiva dharminas tadādḥārasya viparyāsamātrāsādītātmabhāvasya pracyutiḥ svayam evānenāṅgīkṛtā / bhinnau hi viparyāsāvīparyāsau / tad yadā viparyāsenāsat sattvena gr̄hyate taimirikeṇeva keṣādi / tadā kutaḥ sadbhūtapadārthaleṣasyāpy upalabdhiḥ / yadā cāvīparyāsād abhūtaṃ nādhyāropitaṃ vitaimirikeṇeva keṣādi / tadā kuto 'sadbhūtapadārthaleṣasyāpy upalabdhir yena tadānīm samvṛtiḥ syāt / ata evoktam ācāryapādaiḥ*
yadi kiṃ cid upalabheyam pravartayeyam nivartayeyam vā / pratyakṣādibhir arthaiḥ tadbhāvān me 'nupālabhaḥ // iti
yataś caivaṃ bhinnau viparyāsāvīparyāsau / ato viduṣāṃ aviparītāvasthāyāṃ viparīta-syāsambhavāt kutaḥ sāmṛtaṃ cakṣur yasya dharmitvaṃ syāt / iti na vyāvartate

Secondly, a related philosophical point: we find the question as to whether the Prāsaṅgika ever used reasons (*hetu*) and examples (*drṣṭānta*). In fact, it has been a rather common view amongst Western writers, and perhaps some Tibetans, that Prāsaṅgikas are so called because they never use anything but absurd “consequences” (*prasaṅgas*) drawn from the

‘siddhādhārah pakṣadoṣa āśrayāsiddho vā hetudoṣaḥ / ity aparihāra evāyaṃ /*. *La Vallée Poussin has *‘siddhādhāre pakṣadoṣa.*; de Jong 1978, p. 31, reads *‘siddhādhārah pakṣadoṣa*. Translation: “[Candrakīrti:] Now this is not so [i.e., it is not so, as Bhāviveka had argued, that the *dharmin* is simply the unqualified general term]. For, precisely when the negation of production is intended to be the property to be proved (*sādhyadharmā*) here, then indeed this [philosopher, i.e., Bhāviveka] himself accepts the elimination of the *dharmin* that is the locus for this [*sādhyadharmā*] [and] whose being is found just because of error. Indeed, error and non-error are opposed. And so, when something nonexistent is grasped as existent due to error, as in the case of the hairs and other such [illusions grasped] by those who have [the eye-disease known as] *timira*, then at this time how could there be a perception of even the slightest trace of a real entity? And when no nonexistent thing is superimposed because there is no error, as in the case of the hairs and so forth when someone is free of *timira*, then how [too] could there be perception of even the slightest trace of an unreal entity, so that it would then have to be customarily existent? It is precisely for that reason that the venerable Ācārya [Nāgārjuna] stated [in *Vigrahavyāvartanī* 30]:

‘If, through perception or other states [i.e. *pramāṇas*], I were to apprehend something, I would affirm or negate it. But as such a thing is nonexistent, I am without reproach.’

Now, since error and non-error are thus opposed, then in the unerring state of the wise nothing erroneous can exist, so how would the customary eye [i.e., the general unqualified term] be what is the *dharmin*? Therefore, [Bhāviveka] does not avoid the thesis-fault of an unestablished locus nor the reason-fault of an unestablished basis. And so this was not at all a reply [to our criticisms].”

We should also mention Pr. 35.9 where Candrakīrti stresses that seeking agreement from both parties on an inference is generally pointless: *svārthānumāne tu sarvatra svaprasiddhir eva garīyasī / nobhayaprasiddhiḥ / ata eva tarkalaṣaṅgābhidhānaṃ niḥprayojanam /*. “But in the case of an inference-for-oneself (*svārthānumāna*), it is always just one’s own acknowledgment that is particularly important, not an acknowledgment by both [parties]. For this very [reason] the logical characterizations [of Dignāga and co.] are pointless.” The passage is cited and discussed in *ICang skya grub mtha’* (Sarnath ed.) pp. 407-408.

On the Tibetan development of the problem of *chos can mthun snang ba*, see Yotsuya 1999, Hopkins 1989, Lopez 1987, p. 78 et passim as well my remarks on these and related topics in pp. 105-112 of Tillemans 1982.

opponent's position—if they were to use reasons and examples they would be no different from their Svātantrika coreligionists.³ I think that we can safely say that this view, at least as it stands, is inaccurate and needs to be nuanced to account for Candrakīrti's use of reasons and examples. An examination of Candrakīrti's own text in *Prasannapadā* I.19.8ff. reveals that Candrakīrti himself argued that one could also construe Buddhapālita's argument as having a reason and an example, though the inference would only be recognized as valid by the opponent himself. The long discussion in *Prasannapadā* begins as follows (Pr. 19.8-20.1):

athāpy avaśyaṃ svato 'numānavirodhadoṣa udbhāvanīyaḥ // so 'py udbhāvita evācāryabuddhapālitenā /. “But, if nonetheless [it is said that] one should put forward the fault of [the thesis having a] contradiction with an inference [valid] from the [Sāṃkhya's] own point of view, then [we reply that] this, too, has in fact been put forth by Ācārya Buddhapālita.”

The passage also has the noteworthy feature that Candrakīrti seems to be using, and adapting, the notion of *anumānavirodha* found in Dignāga's definition of the thesis in *Pramāṇasamuccaya* III.2. In other words, he was perfectly familiar with, and probably even partially accepted, one of the most basic definitions in Buddhist logic, that of the thesis (*pakṣa*). (Indeed, in Pr. 19.1-3 he also clearly alludes to another famous verse of Dignāga, i.e., *Pramāṇasamuccaya* IV.6 = *Nyāyamukha* 13). In short, the prevalent idea that Candrakīrti *wholly* rejected Dignāgean logic in favour of a *prasaṅga*-style method is simplistic. What he did do, however, is adapt the structures of Dignāgean logic—such as theses, reasons and examples—to his own purposes and philosophical orientation. This adaptation of the Dignāgean logic of reasons and examples is nicely brought out by Tsong kha pa *et al.*, who took passages such as Pr. 19.8 *et seq.*, as well as Candrakīrti's statements elsewhere that certain *hetu* and *drṣṭānta* are acknowledged

³ Cf. *Lam rim chen mo* p. 252 (*Collected Works*, Tashilhunpo edition, ed. Ngag dbang dge legs bde mo, Delhi, Vol. pa.): *da lta dbu ma thal 'gyur bar 'dod pa dag ni don dam pa dang tha snyad pa gang la brtsam pa 'i khas len ni thal snyad du yang med de gal te de 'dra ba 'i dam bca 'yod na de sgrub byed kyi dpe dang rtags kyang 'dod dgos la de lta na rang rgyud par 'gyur ro*. Cf. also J. May's remarks on Mādhyamika method on p. 15 of his introduction to Candrakīrti, *Prasannapadā Madhyamakavṛtti*. Paris, 1959.

by only the opponent, to come up with the notion of a *gzhan grags kyi gtan tshigs*, or if you like, a **paraprasiddhahetu*, an “other-acknowledged reason.” This *paraprasiddha* quality is quite clear if we look at the actual reasons and examples that Candrakīrti extracts from Buddhapālita. In fact, Candrakīrti comes up with two versions in Pr. 19.8 *et seq.* The first one is rather long, as it is phrased in a five-membered Naiyāyika argument form,⁴ so, for our purposes, let us look at the second and shorter version as it is described in Pr. 22.3-5:

atha vāyam anyañ prayogamārgaḥ / puruṣavyatiriktāḥ padārthāḥ svata utpattivādinaḥ / tata eva / na svata utpadyante / svātmanā vidyamānatvāt / puruṣavat /. “Alternatively, there is this other way [to give] the reasoning: ‘For [the Sāṃkhya,] who professes production from self, entities other than Spirit (*puruṣa*) are therefore not produced from themselves, because they exist by themselves, just like *puruṣa*.’”

Clearly, the reason, *svātmanā vidyamānatva*, and the example, *puruṣa*, are Sāṃkhya tenets and would be totally unacceptable to the Buddhist himself. In short, the Tibetan exegesis here is very credible indeed.

It should be emphasized, then, that Tibetan writers significantly help us to clarify in what sense the Prāsaṅgika can use *hetu*, *drṣṭānta*, etc. in arguing about emptiness (*śūnyatā*). They use them in the sense of *gzhan grags kyi gtan tshigs*—reasons acknowledged by the “other,” i.e., by the opponent alone—but certainly not in the sense of autonomous inferences (*svatantrānumāna*), where the terms in the inference would have to be recognized in common by both parties. In other words, Candrakīrti, in addition to *prasāṅgas*, can use the basic Dignāgean logical structures of reasons and examples, but he strips them of the typical Dignāgean *metalogical* requirement that they be “recognized by both parties” (*ubhayaprasiddha*). Finally, note also in this connection that the Tibetans are clear that when Candrakīrti used *svataḥ* in passages like Pr. 19.8 *et seq.* concerning “other-acknowledged reasons,” he generally meant the

⁴ Cf. the condensed form in Se ra Chos kyi rgyal mtshan’s *dBu ma’i spyi don*, f. 112a: *dn̄gos po r̄nams chos can / slar yang skye ba don med de / rang gi bdag nyid du grub zin pa’i phyir / dper na / mngon par gsal zin pa’i myu gu bzhin no /*. “Take as the subject, entities; their production again is pointless, because they are already established in their own nature, like, for example, the already manifested sprout.”

opponent himself, and not Candrakīrti himself or the proponent. This sort of thing threw Stcherbatsky into misinterpretation on more than one occasion, sometimes in spite of Louis de La Vallée Poussin's helpful hints.⁵

Thirdly, we find a long discussion in dGe lugs pa literature on how we are to construe the *prasaṅga* implicit in Buddhapālita and how we should interpret Bhāviveka's critique of this *prasaṅga*. This discussion has numerous aspects, but for our purposes here, in the rest of the paper, I wish to go into one that is particularly important for our general understanding of Prāsaṅgika philosophy.

Just how do we take Buddhapālita's argument as a *prasaṅga*? To take one version, which the Tibetan literature attributed to Bhāviveka but rejected as not being Buddhapālita's actual thought, we could render it as:

myu gu chos can / skye ba don med dang thug med yin par thal / bdag las skyes pa'i phyir /. "Take the sprout as subject; it follows that its production is pointless and without end, because it is produced from itself."

The problem is that in such a case the contraposition of the consequence (*prasaṅgaviparyaya*) would be:

myu gu chos can / bdag las skyes pa ma yin te / skye ba don bcas dang thug bcas yin pa'i phyir /. "Take the sprout as subject; it is not produced from itself, because its production has a point and has an end."

This, as Bhāviveka pointed out in *Prajñāpradīpa* (see the passage translated below), would lead to the implication that an entity such as the sprout is

⁵ Cf. his translation of Pr. 18.7: *parapratijñāyās tu svata evānumānavirodhacodanayā svata eva pakṣahetudrṣṭāntadoṣarahitaiḥ pakṣādibhir bhavitavyam /*. Stcherbatsky 1965, 98: [Opponent's objection continued:] "However in accusing your opponent of contradiction you must yourself take your stand upon an argument that, in your opinion, would be free of those logical errors to which a thesis, a reason or an example are liable." My version: "However, since one accuses the opponent's thesis of being in contradiction with inference from his point of view alone, then, for himself alone, the thesis and other [members of this inference] must be free of faults concerning the thesis, reason and examples." Cf. La Vallée Poussin's remark in his n. 9 on p. 18: "*svataḥ (rang nyid la)* = à leur point de vue."

in fact produced from something else, for, on the one hand, its production has a point and, on the other hand, the reasoning shows that the sprout is not produced from itself. And that in turn would mean that the negation in *bdag las skyes pa ma yin* (“it is not produced from itself”) is not a non-implicative negation (*prasajyapratishedha*)—as it is supposed to be for a Mādhyamika—but is, rather, implicative (*pariyudāsa*) in that it implies that entities are produced from things other than themselves. In other words, we get a contradiction with a cardinal tenet of the Mādhyamika’s system (*kṛtāntavirodha* = *siddhāntavirodha*). Candrakīrti quotes Bhāviveka’s *Prajñāpradīpa* in Pr. 14.4-15.2:

*atraike dūṣaṇam āhuḥ / tad ayuktam / hetuḍṣṭāntānabhidhānāt / parokta-
doṣāparihārāc ca / prasaṅgavākyatvāc ca prakṛtārthaviparyayeṇa
viparītārthasādhyataddharmavyaktau parasmād utpannā bhāvā
janmasāphalyāt / janmanirodhāc ceti kṛtāntavirodhaḥ syāt //*. “Here certain people [viz., Bhāviveka] set forth the following critique: This [reasoning of Buddhapālita] is incoherent, because (1) it does not state a [valid] reason and example, (2) it does not eliminate [certain] faults that the [Sāṃkhya] adversary states, and (3) since [Buddhapālita’s reasoning] is a statement of a consequence (*prasaṅgavākya*), then because, by contraposing the terms in question [i.e., in the *prasaṅga*] one puts forth a proposition to be proved (*sādhyā*) and its [*pakṣa*] *dharma* as the contrapositives (*viparītārtha*), one would then contradict one’s [own] philosophical system (*kṛtānta* = *siddhānta*) in that entities would be produced from other [things] because their production would have a point and there would be an end to [this] production.”⁶

Later on in *Prasannapadā* I.23.3ff. Candrakīrti makes the move that the Prāsaṅgika does not have to accept the *prasaṅgaviparyaya*:

⁶ Compare the Tibetan of Bhāviveka’s own argument in *Prajñāpradīpa* (*sDe dge Tibetan Tripiṭaka, dBu ma*, Vol. 2, 49a5-50b1). The principal difference is the use of ... *dang / glags yod pa’i tshig yin pa’i phyir te* (= *sāvakāśavacanatvāc ca*) instead of *prasaṅgavākyatvāc ca*. Cf. Tanji, *Akirakana Kotoba I*, n. 118. In effect, we would have something like ...*tad ayuktam / hetuḍṣṭāntānabhidhānāt / paroktadoṣāparihārāc ca / sāvakāśavacanatvāc ca / prakṛtārthaviparyayeṇa* ... Cf. the Tibetan of Pr. given in La Vallée Poussin’s ed. of Pr. 14, n. 5. It differs in punctuation from both *Prajñāpradīpa* and the Skt. of Pr.

prasaṅgaviparītena cārthena parasyaiva sambandho nāsmākaṃ svapratijñāyā abhāvāt / tataś ca siddhāntavirodhāsambhavaḥ /. “It is only the opponent who is linked to the contraposition of the *prasaṅga*, and not we, for there is no thesis of our own. And therefore, we do not have any contradiction with [our] philosophical system.”

If we take this passage as a statement of a *universally applicable methodological principle* for the Prāsaṅgika—i.e., that he never accepts any *prasaṅgaviparyaya* whatsoever—Candrakīrti might look, *prima facie* at least, rather cavalier, avoiding Bhāviveka’s unpleasant implications with a flippant wave of the hand and the cliché that he has no theses. In fact, Tsong kha pa *et al.* give us another interpretation, which presents a different Candrakīrti, one who, with good reason, did not accept the *prasaṅgaviparyaya* in this *specific case* of Buddhapaṇita’s argumentation against production from self but who certainly did not reject *prasaṅgaviparyaya* in each and every case.

Tsong kha pa states in *rTsa she ũk chen*, his commentary on Nāgārjuna’s *Madhyamakakārikās*:

legs ldan gyis kyang slar yang skye ba don med dang thug med du thal ba ‘phangs pa ma dgongs par spyir skye ba don med dang thug med du thal ba ‘phangs par bzung nas bzlog don khas len dgos zhes smras par bstan to //. “Bhāviveka, though, did not think that [Buddhapāṇita] implied the consequence that [entities’] being produced *again* (*slar yang = punar*) would be pointless and without end. Rather he understood [him] as implying the consequence that *in general* (*spyir*) [entities’] being produced would be pointless and without end. And then he said that we would have to accept the contrapositive (*bzlog don = viparītārtha*) [of the consequence].”⁷

As we shall see, it is the word *slar yang/punar* (“again”) that is of capital importance. Suffice it to caution here that *slar yang* should not be *too* quickly dismissed as just simply Tsong kha pa’s addition; Tsong kha pa himself points out that it already figures in the passage from Buddhapaṇita and indeed that it figures in Candrakīrti’s *Madhyamakāvātāra* VI.9ab,

⁷ Page 55.7-9 in Sarnath edition.

which concerns the same argument against the Sāṃkhya's idea of production from self.⁸

An exegetical aside is probably inescapable at this point. Even leaving aside the question of the appropriateness of *slar yang/punar*, it might at any rate be thought that this cannot be the *prasaṅga* at stake in Buddhapālita, because it turns around and changes Buddhapālita's words—it is Buddhapālita's words as they stand which constitute the *prasaṅga*. Such a *prasaṅga* would then be: “It would follow that entities are not produced from themselves, because their production would be pointless and without end.” But, independent of the fact that Tibetan commentators' presentation of the *prasaṅga* does not support this literal rendering, there are, I think, logical arguments to show that such a rendering would be a mistake: notably, the *viparyaya* would be just meaningless. (It would become something like: “Entities' production has a point and has an end, because they are produced from themselves.”)

A more complicated problem does present itself, however, vis-à-vis the Tibetan interpretation of the phrase *prasaṅgavākyatvāc ca* in Pr. 15.1. The phrase naturally leads us to think that Buddhapālita's words themselves are, *in some way*, a statement of a *prasaṅga* so that Bhāviveka could argue that when this *prasaṅga* is contraposed the problem of contradiction with the Mādhyamika's *siddhānta* would ensue. Now, there is some controversy amongst Tibetans as to how we should take this phrase

⁸ *rTsa she ũk chen*, Sarnath edition, p. 54.20-55.6. *sangs rgyas bskyangs kyis yang skye ba don med ces yang gi sgra smos la de'i don ni myu gu rgyu dus na rang gi bdag nyid thob zin pa'i 'og tu skye bar 'dod pas de med ces pa'i don no // tshig gsal las kyang yang gi sgra smos la 'jug pa las kyang skyes zin slar yang skye bar yongs su rtog par 'gyur na ni / zhes gsungs pas yod pa dang slar yang skye ba gnyis 'gal gyi yod pa dang skye ba mi 'gal lo /*. “Buddhapālita stated the word *punar* (‘again’) when he said ‘being produced again is pointless.’* The meaning is that it is held [by the Sāṃkhyas] that a sprout, which at the time of its cause has already attained its nature, is then subsequently produced. Thus, this is nonexistent. In the *Prasannapādā*, too, the word *punar* is stated, and in the *Madhyamakāvātāra* [VI. 9ab] also it is said, ‘Suppose it is imagined that something already produced is produced again.’** Here, ‘existence’ and ‘being produced again’ are contradictory, but ‘existence’ and ‘being produced’ are not contradictory.” *Skt. in Pr. 14.2 reads: *na ... punar utpāde prayojanam asti* (“There is no need to be produced again”). **Cf. *Madhyamakāvātāra* VI. 8cd: *jātasya janma punar eva ca naiva yuktam* (Skt. in Pr. 13.7).

prasaṅgavākyatva, a problem that turns largely on the fact that the actual passage in Bhāviveka's *Prajñāpradīpa* does not have this phrase but rather has a different reading. To state my own point of view first, personally, I think we must take *Prasannapadā*'s reading of *prasaṅgavākyatvāc ca* as showing that *at least Candrakīrti* took the passages from *Prajñāpradīpa* as arguing that the *prasaṅgaviparyaya* leads to a contradiction with the Mādhyamika's *siddhānta*. Candrakīrti's later discussion (Pr. 23ff.), where he speaks of not having to accept the *viparītārtha* of the *prasaṅga* and thus avoiding the contradiction with *siddhānta*, shows beyond reasonable doubt that Candrakīrti *himself* took Bhāviveka's argument as turning on a *prasaṅga* and a *prasaṅgaviparyaya*.

Tsong kha pa *et al.*, however, rely heavily on Avalokitavrata's commentary to Bhāviveka's *Prajñāpradīpa*, the *Prajñāpradīpaṭīkā*, and there it is argued that in the key passage from *Prajñāpradīpa* (given above) Bhāviveka did not criticize Buddhapālita's statement as being itself a *prasaṅga*: instead he simply argued that it is "a statement that presents an occasion [for a reply]" (*glags yod pa'i tshig = sāvakāśavacana; sāvakāśavākya*).⁹ Now, the dGe lugs pa interpretation does, of course, recognize that Buddhapālita's words implicitly contain a *prasaṅga*, and indeed the dGe lugs pa, as we saw above, do argue that Bhāviveka took that *prasaṅga* in a wrong way. Their point seems to be simply that the actual passage from *Prajñāpradīpa* cited in *Prasannapadā* does not *itself* concern the *prasaṅga* and *prasaṅgaviparyaya* at stake.¹⁰ I have attempted to present the basic material on this interpretation of *Prajñāpradīpa* in

⁹ See n. 6. Avalokitavrata (*sDe dge Tibetan Tripiṭaka, dBu ma 4, 74a2*) glosses *glags yod pa'i tshig* as *rgol ba gzhan gyi klan ka'i glags yod pa'i tshig* "a statement where there is an opportunity for a reply from the other party."

¹⁰ Cf. *rTsa she ṭik chen* (Sarnath edition) p. 53.5-7 explained in sGom sde Nam mkha' rgyal mtshan p. 586: *yang kha cig na re / 'dir bsgrub par bya ba bzlog pa'i don mngon pas / zhes pa la / myu gu chos can / skye ba don med dang thug med yin par thal / bdag las skye ba yin pa'i phyir / zhes pa 'di'i rtags bzlog pa gzhung de'i don du byed zer na / de mi 'thad de / skabs 'dir bsgrub par bya ba bzlog pas zhes pa'i bzlog rgyu de bdag las skye ba med de / zhes pa de bzlog dgos rgyu yin pa la / de rtags su ma bkod par bdag las skye ba rtags su bkod pa'i phyir / shes rab sgron mer bsgrub par bya ba bzlog pas / zhes dang / rigs pa'i rgya mtsho las kyang / 'di thal chos kyi rtags bzlog tshul ma yin te / bsgrub par bya ba bzlog pas / zhes dang / bdag skye med pa rtags su ma smras pa'i phyir / zhes gsungs pa'i phyir /.*

the Appendix to the present article. For our purposes now, however, we need only point out that if we follow such an interpretation, we are supposed to take Candrakīrti's use of *prasaṅgavākyatva* as not having its technical sense but as meaning just the same as *glags yod pa'i tshig* (= *sāvakāśavacana*) so that it accords with Bhāviveka's words in *Prajñāpradīpa*. In fact, some Tibetan writers attribute the difference simply to translation—as if *glags yod pa'i tshig* and *thal bar 'gyur pa'i tshig* were just two Tibetan ways to translate the same term in *Prasannapadā* and *Prajñāpradīpa*.¹¹ They probably are not, as we can see in a later passage (Pr. 24.1-2) where Candrakīrti does indeed refer to Bhāviveka's objection by using the word *sāvakāśavacana* (Tib. *glags dang bcas pa'i tshig*). It seems to me that the most natural interpretation of Candrakīrti here is the more literal one, i.e., that *he* took the key passage of *Prajñāpradīpa* as speaking of a *prasaṅga* and *prasaṅgaviparyaya*: the Avalokitavrata-dGe lugs pa strategy seems unnecessarily strained and improbable in having to reinterpret the words *prasaṅgavākya*, *prakṛtārthaviparyaya*, etc. so that they do not have their usual technical sense. It is interesting to note that even many Tibetan writers, spoken about as *pūrvapakṣa* in the dGe lugs pa texts, took *prasaṅgavākyatva*, etc. literally and certainly did not accept the Avalokitavrata-dGe lugs pa view here.¹² Suffice it to say, then, that Avalokitavrata's interpretation of the passage from *Prajñāpradīpa* may perhaps represent Bhāviveka's actual thought but seems to us, and probably some Tibetan writers, too, to distort the way in which Candrakīrti himself took Bhāviveka's argument.¹³

¹¹ See e.g., *dBu ma'i spyi don*, ff.105b6-106a1: *gzhan yang / khyed kyi thal bar 'gyur ba'i tshig yin pa'i phyir / zhes pa sgrub byed 'phen pa'i thal bar 'gyur pa'i tshig yin pa'i phyir / zhes pa'i don du 'chad mi rigs par thal / tshig gsal las / thal bar 'gyur ba'i tshig yin pa'i phyir zhes pa dang / shes rab sgron mar glags yod pa'i tshig yin pa'i phyir / zhes pa gnyis 'gyur khyad ma gtogs don gcig yin pa'i phyir /*. Cf. *rTsa she ſīk chen* 52.12-15.

¹² See n. 10 and 11 above.

¹³ The dGe lugs pa scholastic manuals (*yig cha*), in turn, devote large sections of extremely intricate argumentation to explaining one controversial line from Tsong kha pa's *rTsa she ſīk chen* on the Avalokitavrata interpretation. The controversial passage is: *dnegos zin gyi rtags bzlog dgos na dngos zin gyi dam bca' yang bzlog dgos te mtshungs pa'i phyir ro //*. (Sarnath ed. p. 53.3-4) "If one must negate the explicitly mentioned reason, one must also negate the explicitly mentioned thesis, for they are similar." mKhas grub rje's

Let us now look at the revised version of the *prasaṅga* that the Tibetan authors say can be extracted from Buddhapālita's statements. As Se ra Chos kyi rgyal mtshan gives Tsong kha pa's thought in more detail, let me quote from his *dBu ma 'i spyi don* (ff. 99a-99b):

de sngar gyi 'grel ngag des 'gog tshul ni / myu gu chos can / slar yang skye ba don med par thal / rang gi bdag (f. 99b) *nyid du grub zin pa'i phyir / ma khyab na / khyod thug med du slar yang skye bar thal / rang gi bdag nyid du grub zin kyang slar yang skye dgos pa'i phyir / don bsdu na / myu gu chos can / slar yang skye ba don med par thal / yod pa'i phyir / ma khyab na / de chos can thug med du skye bar thal / yod kyang slar yang skye dgos pa'i phyir* /. "The way in which this previous[ly mentioned] commentarial statement refutes [the Sāṃkhya] is: Take as the subject a sprout; it follows that its being produced again is pointless, because it is already established in its own nature. Should it be said that there is no entailment (*khyab pa = vyāpti*) [between something being already established and the pointlessness of it being produced once again], then [we reply that] it would follow that it [i.e., the sprout] would be produced again and again without end, for although it is established in its own nature, still it must again be produced. In short, take the sprout as subject; it follows that its being produced again is pointless, because it exists. Should [the opponent say that] there is no entailment, then [we reply] that it would follow that this subject is produced [over and over] without end, for although it exists, it must still be produced."

Thus, the *prasaṅga* now becomes either:

(1) *myu gu chos can / slar yang skye ba don med par thal / rang gi bdag nyid du grub zin pa'i phyir* /. "Take as the subject a sprout; it follows that its being produced again is pointless, because it is already established in its own nature."

sTong thun chen mo and most *yig cha* give a long discussion on the phrase *mtshungs pa'i phyir*. This discussion, while interesting for understanding Avalokitavrata, may well be moot when it comes to Candrakīrti's own view of Bhāviveka's argument.

Or, equivalently:

(2) *myu gu chos can / slar yang skye ba don med par thal / yod pa'i phyir /*. “Take the sprout as subject; it follows that its being produced again is pointless, because it exists.”

It is version (2) that Tsong kha pa discusses most, calling it a ‘*gal brjod kyi thal 'gyur*, or “*prasaṅga* stating a contradiction,” specifically the contradiction between *slar yang skye ba* (“being produced again”) and *yod pa* (“existence”). At any rate, there is no real difference between the two versions. A third version, which we find elsewhere in *Se ra Chos kyī rgyal mtshan*, takes *rang gi rgyu dus su rdzogs par grub zin pa'i phyir* (“because it is completely established at the time of its cause”) as the reason instead of *rang gi bdag nyid du grub zin pa'i phyir* or simply *yod pa'i phyir*. Obviously, this reason brings out more clearly the Sāṃkhya’s position of *satkāryavāda*.

Now, on these renderings, what could be the *prasaṅgaviparyaya*? Although the reason in the *viparyaya* is often stated in Tibetan commentaries, the whole *prayoga* is not. But, nonetheless, it must be something like the following:

myu gu chos can / rang gi rgyu'i dus su rdzogs par grub zin pa ma yin te / (or alternatively, *yod pa ma yin te*) *slar yang skye ba don bcas yin pa'i phyir /*. “Take the sprout as subject; it is not already completely established at the time of its cause (or alternatively, it is not existent), because its production again has a point.”

Tsong kha pa’s main point is that in this version of the *prasaṅgaviparyaya*, the reason (“its production again has a point”) is only acceptable to the Sāṃkhya, who holds that things exist qua Primordial Nature (*prakṛti*) and are then manifested or produced again. The Buddhist, of course, will have nothing to do with such a Sāṃkhya position of *satkāryavāda*. In other words, the *prasaṅga* itself is just stated in terms of the Sāṃkhya’s tenets. And equally the reason in the contraposition of the *prasaṅga* is only acceptable to the Sāṃkhya but is in no way accepted by a Mādhyamika, nor *a fortiori* is it established by a source of knowledge (*pramāṇa*).

True, if the *prasaṅga* had been as Bhāviveka made it out to be, i.e., lacking the word *punar*, then Buddhapālita and Candrakīrti themselves

might have been rationally obliged to accept the *viparyaya*—after all, they ought to accept that *prasaṅga*'s *vyāpti* (viz., that if anything is produced from itself its production is pointless and endless) as well as the fact that entities' production has a point and has an end. Thus the faults concerning *prasajyapratishedha/paryudāsa* would have been difficult to avoid, short of saying that Prāsaṅgikas never accept any *prasaṅgaviparyaya* or any thesis *at all*. Tsong kha pa certainly did not want to take this latter tack. As a result he insisted on the qualification *punar* and could therefore say that *in general* Prāsaṅgikas can accept a *viparyaya* but that in the *particular case at hand* in Buddhapālita and *Prasannapadā* the *prasaṅga* is of such a sort that the *viparyaya* is only acceptable to the opponent. As for Candrakīrti's statement in this context that he has no thesis of his own (*svapratijñā*), this is apparently not the same generalized Mādhyamika principle of "no thesis" invoked in e.g., Candrakīrti's *Madhyamakāvātāra* VI, or Nāgārjuna's *Viśvavārtanī*, but seems to apply only to the specific case at hand: the Mādhyamika does not accept the Sāṃkhya thesis that entities being produced again has a point and an end.¹⁴ Tsong kha pa states in *rTsa she ṭik chen* p. 54.11-20:

¹⁴ *Madhyamakāvātāra* VI.173: *sun 'byin pas sun dbyung bya ma phrad sun ni 'byin byed dam / 'on te phrad nas yin zhes smras zin nyes pa 'dir gang la / nges par phyogs yod de la 'gyur gyi bdag la phyogs 'di ni / yod pa min pas thal bar 'gyur ba 'di ni srid ma yin /* "The critique that was stated here—viz., 'Does the refutation refute without any contact with the refuted or with contact?'—will definitely apply to one who has a thesis. But since I do not have this thesis, this consequence is impossible."

The usual dGe lugs interpretation of *phyogs* (= *pakṣa*) in this context is "a thesis that asserts something established by its own nature" (*rang bzhin gyis grub pa dam 'cha' ba'i phyogs*). See e.g., dGe 'dun grub pa's comment: *dbu ma pa chos can / sun 'byin pas sun dbyung bya ma phrad par sun ni 'byin par byed dam 'on te phrad nas sun 'byin pa yin zhes smras zin pa 'i thal bar 'gyur ba 'di ni khyod la srid pa min te / de lta bu 'i nyes pa 'di dag gang la nges par rang bzhin gyis grub pa dam 'cha' ba'i phyogs de la skyon du 'gyur gyi bdag la rang bzhin gyis grub pa dam 'cha' ba'i phyogs 'di ni yod pa min pas so //* (Ff. 37b-38a of dGe 'dun grub pa's *dBu ma la 'jug pa 'i bstan bcos kyi dgongs pa rab tu gsal ba 'i me long*).

The main verse from Nāgārjuna is *Viśvavārtanī* 29: *yadi kācana pratijñā syān me tata eṣa me bhaved doṣaḥ / nāsti ca mama pratijñā tasmān naivāsti me doṣaḥ //*. "If I had some or another thesis (*pratijñā*) I would therefore have this fault, but I have no thesis and thus do not have a fault at all." Seyfort Ruegg 1983 presents the numerous other verses from Indian texts that are relevant here—e.g., *Catuhśataka* XVI.25, XIV.21,

bzlog pa'i don khas blangs pa la skyon brjod pa mi 'jug pa ni "thal ba bzlog pa'i don dang yang pha rol po 'brel gyi kho bo cag ni ma yin te rang la dam bca ba med pa'i phyir ro" zhes gsungs te // 'di ni dbu ma pas 'phangs pa'i thal ba thams cad min gyi sngar 'phangs pa'i bdag skye 'gog pa'i thal ba'o // de'i thal chos ni skye ba don dang thug med du thal ba tsam min gyi slar yang skye ba don dang thug med yin la thal chos de bzlog pa'i don slar yang skye ba don dang thug bcas ni grangs can kho na 'dod kyi rang la de'i khas len med pas de khas blangs pa'i rgyu mtshan gyis grub mtha'dang 'gal ba ga la yod / des na gzhung 'dis dbu ma pas thal ba 'phangs pa thams cad kyi bzlog pa pha rol pos khas len gyi rang gis khas mi len pa dang spyir dam bca' med par bstan pa ma yin no //* *Skt. Pr. 23.3-4: *prasaṅgaviparītena cārthena parasyaiva saṃbandho / nāsmākaṃ svapratijñāyā abhāvāt /*. “The [fact that Bhāviveka’s] critique concerning the acceptance of the contrapositive (*bzlog pa'i don* = *viparītārtha*) does not apply is [to be explained as follows]: [Candrakīrti] says [in *Prasannapadā* I.23.3-4], ‘it is only [our] opponent who is linked to the contrapositive of the *prasaṅga*, (*prasaṅgaviparītārtha*), and not we, for there is no thesis of our own.’ This does not mean all the *prasaṅgas* set forth by Mādhyamikas but rather the *prasaṅga* refuting production by self that was set forth previously [by Buddhapālita]. The predicate of that *prasaṅga* (*thal chos*) was not the mere implication that production is pointless and without an end but rather that production *again* (*slar yang*) is pointless and without end. And the *viparītārtha* of the *prasaṅga*’s predicate—viz., that production again has a point and has an end—is accepted by the Sāṃkhyas alone. It is not accepted by us. Therefore, how could there be a contradiction with our philosophical system (*grub mtha'* = *siddhānta*) on account of our accepting that [*prasaṅgaviparītārtha*]! So

Madhyamakakārikās XXIV.13, etc. It is clear from his study that these other verses’ references to “no thesis” were interpreted by dGe lugs pa scholars in a similar way as in *Madhyamakāvatāra* VI.173: “no thesis asserting a real entity,” or some such similar formulation. We see then that dGe lugs pa do not take the usual “no thesis” claim literally, in that they feel obliged to add a qualification concerning “establishment by own nature” (*rang bzhin gyis grub pa*). Nonetheless, it is clear the Indian “no thesis” claims are interpreted as being general—we are not speaking of one specific thesis. It is thus all the more odd that in *Prasannapadā* I 23.3 the phrase *svapratijñāyā abhāvāt* seems to be interpreted as meaning just the specific Sāṃkhya thesis of *satkāryavāda*.

this text [viz., the *Prasannapadā*] is not saying that the contrapositions of all *prasaṅgas* set forth by Mādhyamikas are accepted by the opponent but not by us and that in general [we] have no theses.”

The passage shows a key methodological and philosophical stance of the dGe lugs pa Prāsaṅgika; Tsong kha pa restates more or less the same passage in other works, such as *dBu ma dgongs pa rab gsal*.¹⁵ For the sake of clarity, let us try to summarize the main points of Tsong kha pa’s interpretation before going on to make a few remarks on *prasaṅgas* in general and, finally, some conclusions.

- (1) Bhāviveka supposedly misunderstood the *prasaṅga* implicit in Buddhapālita; notably he left out the word *punar* “again,” thus leading to contradiction with the Mādhyamika’s view that the negation of production by self must be a *prasajyapratishedha*.
- (2) If we add *punar*, Bhāviveka’s difficulty is avoided, not because the Mādhyamika will *never* accept *prasaṅgaviparyaya*, but because in this *specific case* the Mādhyamika does not accept that the production of entities *again* has a point and has an end. Only the Sāṃkhya could accept that thesis.
- (3) The Prāsaṅgika can accept *prasaṅgaviparyaya* and has theses of his own; he just does not accept the *prasaṅgaviparyaya* and thesis in this case because of the specific nature of the *prasaṅga* being presented.

A brief remark on point (3). Many contemporary writers have, partly on the basis of the argumentation in *Prasannapadā* I, taken *prasaṅgas* as being a rather special logical form. T.R.V. Murti, for example, writes:

¹⁵ *dBu ma dgongs pa rab gsal* (Sarnath ed.) p. 163: *Tshig gsal las / thal bar ‘gyur pa bzlog pa’i don dang yang pha rol po nyid ‘brel ba yin gyi / kho bo cag ni ma yin te / rang la dam bca’ ba med pa’i phyir / zhes dang / zhes gsung pa rnams ji ltar drang snyam na / skyon med de de ltar gsungs pa ni bdag skye ‘gog pa’i skabs kho na yin pas / dbu ma pas ‘phangs pa’i thal ba kun la min gyi / bdag skye ‘gog pa’i thal ba gnyis la yin no // de’i thal chos ni skye ba don med dang thug med du thal ba tsam min gyi / slar yang skye ba don med dang thug med yin la / thal chos de bzlog pa’i don slar yang skye ba don bcas dang thug bcas ni grangs can kho na ‘dod kyi / rang la de’i dam bca ba med pa’i rgyu mtshan gyis / de khas blangs pa’i grub mtha’ dang ‘gal ba med ces pa’i don te lung dang po’i don no //*

“*Prasaṅga* is not to be understood as an apagogic proof in which we prove an assertion indirectly by disproving the opposite. *Prasaṅga* is disproof simply, without the least intent to prove any thesis.”¹⁶

Whether we take an Indian or Tibetan Buddhist perspective, *in general* this is not so and misrepresents many non-Mādhyamika Buddhists’ use of *prasaṅga*—certainly epistemologists, like Dharmakīrti, used *prasaṅgas*, but did not conceive of them in *that* way.¹⁷ It is, however, far less clear as to how the Indian Mādhyamika used *prasaṅga*, for this ultimately begs the question as to how we should interpret Candrakīrti. If we subscribed to a literal interpretation of Candrakīrti as rejecting any and all *prasaṅgaviparyaya* because he has no theses, then certainly Murti’s remarks could not be far wrong. From the dGe lugs pa point of view, however, Buddhapālita’s *prasaṅga* is, as we saw earlier, classified as a ‘*gal brjod kyi thal ‘gyur*, or one “that states a contradiction [in the opponent’s own position]”. This type of *prasaṅga* is said to be one of four sorts used by Mādhyamikas, some of which *can* be contraposed to prove a thesis and some of which cannot.¹⁸ (Indeed, ‘Jam dbyangs bzhad pa even seems to argue that among these ‘*gal brjod kyi thal ‘gyur* some can be contraposed.¹⁹) In short, let us say that *if* we follow the Tibetan Mādhyamika, Candrakīrti and co. do, on occasion, use *prasaṅga* as simple disproof, but that is far from the *only* type of *prasaṅga* that they use.

¹⁶ Murti 1980, 131.

¹⁷ See, for example, *Pramāṇavārttika* IV k.12 and Manorathanandin’s commentary, both translated in my article, “Pramāṇavārttika IV (1),” *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Südasiens*, XXX, 1986, pp. 143-162.

¹⁸ Cf. *dBu ma ‘i spyi don* f. 97b: *gzhan grags kyi rjes dpag skyed byed kyi thal ‘gyur / rgyu mtshan mtshungs pa ‘i mgo snyoms kyi thal ‘gyur / ‘gal (b)rjod kyi thal ‘gyur / sgrub byed bsgrub bya dang mtshungs pas ma grub pa ‘i thal ‘gyur ro //*.

¹⁹ *Grub mtha’ chen mo*, f. 4, p. 891 in the edition by J. Hopkins in *Meditation on Emptiness*, University Microfilms, Ann Arbor, MI, 1973: *phyi rgol gyis mtha’ bzhi gang du khas blangs pa de la ‘gal brjod kyi thal ‘gyur yang dag bzlog don ‘phen pa dang mi ‘phen pa sogs thal ‘gyur ci rigs kyis ‘gal ba brjod nas ‘gog pa ‘og tu ‘chad ‘gyur ltar gtso bor ‘god pa ‘i dbu ma pa de dbu ma thal ‘gyur ba ‘i mtshan nyid dang sgra bshad yang des song ngo /*. “The defining characteristic and etymology of a Mādhyamika-Prāsaṅgika is: A Mādhyamika who, as will be [further] explained below, principally refutes any of the four extremes accepted by the opponent by stating contradictions by means of various *prasaṅgas*, such as, amongst others, valid ‘*gal brjod kyi thal ‘gyur*, which do or do not imply contrapositives (*bzlog don* = *viparītārtha*).”

Concluding remarks. It is not my intention to adjudicate seriously the merits of Tsong kha pa's exegesis here, but some final words on his probable motivation are in order. We know that Tsong kha pa, especially in his *Lam rim chen mo*, had to argue against a number of Tibetan *pūrvapakṣa* that held that Mādhyamikas had no theses at all, that the Mādhyamika only exposed contradictions in his opponents' positions, but held nothing of his own—inevitably these debates turn on the interpretation of texts such as *Prasannapadā* I.²⁰ The problem of the interpretation of the *prasaṅga* and the use of *prasaṅgaviparyaya*, then, has to be seen in the general context of Tsong kha pa's continuing attempt to allow that a Mādhyamika *could* have a thesis—in short that there *could* be a Madhyamaka system. In his desire to construct a global philosophy including all the five treatises (*po ti lnga*), such as *Abhidharmakośa*, *Pramāṇavarttika*, etc., but with the Madhyamaka as the last word, he probably had little choice but to interpret Candrakīrti's pronouncements about Prāsaṅgika method as bearing essentially on the specific case of the *prasaṅga* in *Prasannapadā* I. It is difficult to imagine how he could have constructed his system if he had taken them as universally applicable. So, if we wish to evaluate Tsong kha pa's interpretation, a major point to reckon with is that his *ad hoc* and restricted interpretation of *Prasannapadā*'s “no thesis”/“no contraposition” claim tends to preclude, or at least considerably weakens, the fairly well substantiated interpretation of Prāsaṅgika-Mādhyamika thought as being a radically irenic philosophy outside the fray of philosophical disputation and system building.

***Appendix: The Avalokitavrata-dGe lugs pa interpretation of
Bhāviveka's charge of sāvakāśavacanatva and siddhāntavirodha***

The Avalokitavrata-dGe lugs pa line takes the key passage from Bhāviveka as arguing that the literal statement in Buddhapālita is not a valid reason (*rtags yang dag*) and needs to be corrected: the reason (“because its production is pointless and without end”) must be negated; but then, it is argued, the *sādhya* (“entities are not produced from themselves”) should be suitably changed too, because if the production of entities has a point, then indirectly we know that they are produced from something else. The

²⁰ On these *pūrvapakṣa* see section IV in Seyfort Ruegg 1983.

negation of the *sādhya* in Buddhapālita, then, is “a negation of the mere denial of self-production” (*bdag skye rnam pa bcad tsam ma yin pa*),²¹ or in other words, it yields the affirmation of production from other, and hence we get the contradiction with *siddhānta*. In sum, Bhāviveka’s words *prakṛtārthaviparyayeṇa viparītārthasādhyataddharmavyaktau ...* do not describe the contraposition of a *prasaṅga* (*prasaṅgaviparyaya*), but show which negations occur when we modify Buddhapālita’s words to come up with a valid reason. The Sanskrit terms thus have to be translated differently if we adopt Avalokitavrata’s interpretation.

Avalokitavrata himself gives a word by word commentary²² on the passage from Bhāviveka. The key passages there are taken up, with a few variants, by the dGe lugs pa (Se ra byes) lama sGom sde Nam mkha’ rgyal mtshan (1532-1592). We find the following on folios 586ff.:

*des na bsgrub par bya ba bzlog pas zhes pa de bsgrub bya bzlog tshul
rang la byed pa yin te / spyan ras gzigs brtul zhugs las /
bsgrub par bya ba zhes pa ni / dngos po (f. 587) rnams bdag gi bdag
nyid las skye ba med de / zhes bsgrub par bya ba ’o / de bzlog pa ’i
don mngon pas zhes bya ba ni dngos po rnams bdag gi bdag nyid
las skye ba med de / zhes bya ba bzlog pas dngos po rnams gzhan
las skye ba zhes bya bar mngon pas so //
zhes gsungs pa ’i phyir / de chos bzlog pa ’i don mngon pas so / zhes pa
de yang de ’i dngos zin gyi rtags bzlog pa la byed rgyu yin te / yang de
nyid las /
de ’i chos zhes bya ba ni bsgrub par bya ba de ’i chos te dngos po
rnams bdag gi bdag nyid las skye ba med de / zhes bsgrub par bya*

²¹ See *dBu ma ’i spyi don* f. 100b: ‘*dod na / dngos po rnams bdag skye rnam par bcad pa tsam ma yin pa de / dngos po rnams bdag las skye ba med par sgrub pa ’i dngos zin gyi (b)sgrub bya bzlog pa ’i don yin par thal / ’dod pa gang zhig / dngos po rnams bdag las skye ba ni dngos zin gyi bsgrub bya bzlog pa ’i don ma yin pa ’i phyir /* “If you agree [that you must also negate the thesis as found in Buddhapālita’s commentarial statement], then it follows that ‘it is not so that entities are simply excluded (*rnam par bcad pa tsam*) from production from self’ is the negation of the *sādhya* that was explicitly stated [by Buddhāpālita] when he established that entities are not produced from self. For, you agreed [that the thesis needed to be negated] and ‘entities are produced from themselves’ could not be the negation of the explicitly stated *sādhya*.”

²² *sDe dge Tibetan Tripiṭaka, dBu ma*, Vol. 4, ff. 74a7-74b2.

ba de'i phyogs kyi chos de dag gi skye ba don med pa nyid du 'gyur ba'i phyir dang / skye ba thug pa med pa nyid du 'gyur ba'i phyir / zhes bya'o // de bzlog pa'i don mngon pas zhes bya ba ni / de dag gi skye ba don med pa nyid du 'gyur ba'i phyir / zhes bya ba bzlog pa'i don skye ba 'bras bu dang bcas pa nyid du 'gyur ba dang / skye ba thug pa med pa nyid du 'gyur ba'i phyir / zhes bya ba bzlog pa'i don skye ba thug pa yod pa nyid du 'gyur ba'i phyir / zhes bya ba mngon pas so //
zhes gsungs pa'i phyir /

Translation: Therefore, when [Bhāviveka] says “by negating the *sādhya*,” the way to negate the *sādhya* is to do so with regard to [the *sādhya*] itself [in Buddhapālita’s argument], for Avalokitavrata states the following:

“*Sādhya*” means the *sādhya* “entities are not produced from their own natures.” “Because one puts this [*sādhya*] forth as a negated proposition” (= *viparītārthasādhyavyaktau*) means that by negating “entities are not produced from their own nature” one puts forth [the proposition] “entities are produced from other [things].”

When [Bhāviveka] says “Because one puts forth its [i.e., the *sādhya*’s] property (*taddharma*) as a negated proposition” (= *viparītārthataddharmavyaktau*), this ought to be taken as negating the explicitly stated reason (*dngos zin gyi rtags*) of [Buddhapālita], too, for again [Avalokitavrata] explains:

“Its property (*taddharma*)” means the property of the *sādhya*, in other words, the *pakṣadharmā* of the *sādhya* “entities do not arise from their own natures,” viz., “because their production would be pointless and because their production would be without end.” When he says, “Because one puts forth its negated proposition,” he means the negated proposition of “because their production would be pointless,” namely, “production would be efficacious (*sāphalya*),” and [he means] the negated proposition of “because their production would be without end,” namely, “production would have an end.”