“On a cold, wet, gusty day” in October 1862, William C. Corsan, a Sheffield steel merchant and manufacturer, arrived in New York on an investigative visit to war-torn America. The main object of Corsan’s scrutiny was not, as might have been expected, the capitalist heartlands of the northeast and middle states but the slave South, now fighting for its independence in a life-and-death struggle whose human and material costs were already massively in evidence.¹

Corsan’s itinerary took him first by steamship to New Orleans, now reclaimed to Federal authority, and thence into the Confederacy itself. As he penetrated deeper into the new republic, the Sheffield man found increasing evidence of its ability to sustain its independence. Everywhere he noted “an enormous superabundance” of the “necessaries of Southern life” such as corn, wheat, pork, beef, sweet potatoes, rice, sugar, molasses and poultry. He was equally impressed by the South’s manufacturing potential, now being harnessed to both domestic and military need. Across a range of commodities, from shoes to artillery shells, agrarian Southerners appeared to have thrown off their ante-bellum inhibitions, and driven by necessity, were well on the way to achieving economic self-sufficiency. “Everybody seemed agreed,” Corsan wrote, “that the activity, ingenuity, and energy which were now being directed towards developing the resources of the South were of recent growth, and dated their rise from the time when, about the spring of 1862, their last hope of foreign recognition died out. . . . Then it was that they resolved to see what they could do to help themselves.”²

William Corsan’s point that the South only came to realize the need to develop its internal resources after the hope of foreign recognition was extinguished (oddly dated as the spring of 1862), if true, suggests
both the Confederacy’s ill-preparedness and the importance it placed upon external assistance in achieving its independence aims. Yet how seriously did Southerners believe in the efficacy of foreign help? The question remains an awkward one, the evidence muddling. Corsan himself at one point was “surprised to find so little interest taken in the question, as to whether England and France would interfere or offer mediation” in the American quarrel, yet observed that Southern newspapers “invariably published every scrap of news bearing upon the issue.”

Chatting with members of General Earl Van Dorn’s staff at Abbeville, Mississippi in November 1862, another English visitor found them to be “rather sore” at Europe’s refusal to recognize the Confederacy, especially since, as they put it, “the South American republics had been recognized far more quickly.” On the other hand, Henry C. Fletcher noted that the men also acknowledged that “at the commencement of the war, they had looked too much for external assistance,” and were now “resolved to trust to themselves.”

I want briefly here to re-examine the South’s expectations of European assistance, particularly in regard to Great Britain, with whom slaveholders were in a complex and contradictory relationship. Nothing better embodies the failure of the slaveholders’ ill-prepared bid for independence than the disparity between the expectations of British (and French) support and the support that was ultimately received from across the Atlantic. So much of the focus of this period has been on how close Britain was to intervening in the America war; too little notice has been taken of the slaveholders’ resentment when such intervention did not materialize. The South’s frustration at the failure of Britain and other European powers to recognize its independence bred a deep resentment that resulted, among other actions, in the expulsion in 1863 of all British consuls from the Confederacy. The English have taken merely a “spoiling interest” in the American conflict, lamented the South’s leading propagandist in Europe, and have not woken up to the “universal issues of moral right, national liberty, humanity and civilization involved.”

The expectations that both Northerners and Southerners held about foreign support were crucial to determining their respective responses to the war’s international outcomes. Northern expectations were based on a powerful cocktail of legal, political and moral factors, one of which, the appeal to Europe’s antislavery conscience, was initially undermined by the Lincoln government’s repeated assertion that it was not fighting an abolition war. But what of the South? As
Southern leaders viewed the prospect, the Confederate States had an even greater claim to foreign support than its Federal foe on the basis of its legitimacy. Secession had been a lawful act, they insisted, involving a resumption of original state sovereignty prior to organization into a new confederation. In his founding speeches, the new president, Jefferson Davis, went out of his way to affirm that the Confederacy did not derive from a revolutionary opposition to establish authority but was in fact a counter-revolution forced on Southerners by the tyrannical actions of an abolitionized North. Secession thus met American constitutional tests and Southerners were fully justified in demanding that foreign powers acknowledge, support and recognize the Confederate States as a legitimately-constituted nation. Moreover, Southerners were a distinct people, not only legally required to demand independence but also culturally entitled to do so. After all, had not Britain supported self-determination in Europe and in Latin America? Why would it hesitate to do so now?

The flaws in the North’s appeal for foreign assistance largely arose from the concrete political dilemmas the Federal republic faced as a result of disunion. But when we turn to the South’s expectations, we see a different kind of failure – less pragmatic, more rooted in the slave South’s fundamental shortcomings as a society. Arguments based on principles of legitimacy and self-determination might have struck a chord across the Atlantic had they been consistently pursued, even though, to be honest, their acceptance would ultimately depend on Confederate success on the battlefield – and that did not happen. Instead, the architects of Southern independence chose to rely on an idea that, as the late Peter Parish noted many years ago, masqueraded as a policy: King Cotton.

It is hard to overestimate the extent to which Southerners initially believed that King Cotton could fix everything. As a writer in DeBow's Review, the leading Southern commercial periodical, put it in 1859, “In cotton, [the South] possesses a weapon more formidable than all the inventions of modern warfare. England will ever be held in check by this model king; for she dare not risk revolution at home, by depriving millions of the people of their support.” Extreme confidence in King Cotton even spilled over to those who represented areas not dependent upon the staple. Addressing the US Senate in February 1861, the western North Carolinian Thomas Clingman boasted: “Alexander claimed to have conquered the world; but his dominions were confined to Asia and the territories on the shores of the Bosphorus. Julius Cae-
sar, a still mightier monarch, ruled only on the eastern continent. King Cotton governs two hemispheres, and dominates on land and sea, and the kings of the east and the merchant princes of the west obey his bidding.”

The extent of King Cotton’s grip upon the Southern political imagination is confirmed by the fact that those initially opposed to secession also used it to further their arguments during the critical months leading up to the outbreak of the war. Addressing his state’s General Assembly in November 1860, the Georgia cooperationist, and future Confederate Senator Benjamin Hill, noted that antislavery sentiment in Britain did not derive from fanaticism or philanthropy but “cupidity.” Having failed to see off its great competitor, first through the abolition of slavery in the West Indies which it hoped might effect a similar crippling of production on the mainland, and then through the unsuccessful attempt to raise cotton in India, Britain had now become “the defender of slavery in the South.” “She must have cotton,” Hill insisted. “Four millions of people can’t live without it. It must come from the Southern states.”

So here we have it. As the South’s leadership understood it, the Confederate States, through lawful political establishment, had already met the prime condition for international recognition. But, above all, the British especially would have little choice but to recognize – and actively intervene to support the independence of – the new republic, for if not, they would soon be brought to their knees by the inexorable power of King Cotton. Without American cotton, which in the late 1850s constituted between 60 and 82 percent of the total value of American imports into Britain and upon which an estimated 20 percent of the British population directly or indirectly depended for its livelihood, the South believed British looms would stand idle, with the resulting unemployment eventually inducing social revolution. But Southerners also believed that before such a crisis was reached, the British government would intervene to secure the cotton supply and prevent national catastrophe.

As historians have long acknowledged, King Cotton diplomacy was deeply flawed in theory, practice and, crucially, timing. Cotton stocks in Britain and France at the outset of the war had never been higher – the Southern planters were victims of their own success, with the 1859 crop being especially bountiful. Moreover, Southerners did not have a monopoly of supply; and throughout the antebellum period Britain had taken steps, albeit inadequate ones, to ensure the availabil-
Anglo-Southern Relations in the Civil War Era

ity of other sources, notably in India. The South’s naivety in relation to its most prized asset was evident from the outset of the new republic. At the end of February 1861 the Confederate Congress passed an export tariff of one-eighth of a cent a pound on raw cotton. This action not only undermined the tactical advantage Southerners had gained following the passage by the Federal Congress of the highly protectionist Morrill Tariff a week earlier but also, in transatlantic eyes, committed them to what a leading London newspaper called “that most deplorable of all economic absurdities, an export duty on an article of produce of which the State has no monopoly.”

In essence, the cotton policy amounted to economic blackmail: unless you recognize us, we will deprive you of this essential commodity. Arguments over the Federal blockade were particularly revealing of the policy’s shortcomings. Southern diplomats were required to protest that Lincoln’s blockade of the Southern coastline was ineffective – a ‘paper’ blockade and thus illegal under international law. But in order for the argument to be accepted, they had to explain why, if the blockade was so ineffective, so porous, cotton supplies were not getting through. The answers they gave usually referred to the limited size and availability of the Confederate merchant marine, but the real reason was that Southern planter leaders had imposed an embargo on cotton’s export – an action that extended to the burning of thousands of bales – in an attempt to put pressure on Britain and France. Subsequently, the cotton card was played more intelligently, but in the crucial first two years of the conflict, when Confederate military success was still possible, the attempt to force European compliance was bound to fail. Experienced mid-Victorian statesmen such as Palmerston and Lord John Russell were unlikely to respond favourably to such crude arm-twisting, while the assumption that British foreign policy would or could be determined solely by economic considerations was equally anathema.

Other aspects of Confederate foreign relations contributed to the failure to achieve recognition – including perhaps its choice of diplomats – but the over-reliance on cotton for diplomatic leverage, the deeply flawed belief in its majesty, was surely the most serious. Political naivety aside, the point here is that the Anglo-American economic relationship in the years leading up to the Civil War was far more complex than Southern planter leaders ever understood or bothered to ascertain. Obviously, cotton dominated trade between the two countries, but, for example, the role of American farmers in feeding
Britain's burgeoning population should not be underestimated. After 1846 the U.S. became the major foreign provider of grain and flour, and generally between 1854 and 1861 well over half, and, in some commodities, over three quarters of British imports of essentials such as bacon, beef, lard and pork came from that source. And it almost goes without saying that the vast majority of this produce originated in the free states.13 Add to that the extent and complexities of the British export trade, the vital contribution of capital and technology flows, and we have an Anglo-American economy far removed from the facile portrait painted by Southerners. Moreover, for every area like Lancashire, home of the cotton textile industry, where pressure to recognize the South's independence might have developed, there were others – Birmingham, with its arms manufacturing is a good example – where a different scenario prevailed. Finally, far more influential still than either Lancashire textile workers or Birmingham arms makers in dictating British responses to the war were arguably Anglo-American bankers such as the Barings, the Rothschilds and the Peabodys, recently investigated by Jay Sexton, whose investment in the emergent capitalist order of the northeastern United States strongly predisposed them, all other things being equal, to favour a Union victory.14

By failing to establish a coherent strategy, other than the crudely coercive one, for utilizing its most precious commodity, the Southern planter leadership revealed how little it understood – or indeed cared about – the dynamics and obligations of international reciprocity. How do we explain these general shortcomings? Most explanations for the British failure to intervene on the Confederacy's side downplay the extent to which the slave South – which in the late eighteenth century and early nineteenth century had played a conspicuous role in the transatlantic community – had become alienated from the main landscape of Anglo-American commerce, culture and belief. Diplomacy and foreign relations do not operate in a vacuum. When diplomats present arguments to a foreign government, the points raised are validated or subverted by the layers of interest and the value systems that underpin the relationship between the respective societies. And in my view, the interest and the values underpinning the South's argument for British recognition were both few and shallow – especially when compared to those connecting Britain to the free states in this period.

We know how much Southern cotton was sent to these shores but know far less about how many Southerners were active participants
in the transatlantic networks upon which the cotton trade relied. Even the most cursory glance confirms how un-networked the slave South was before the Civil War. How many influential Southerners had visited Britain, for example, or were in regular communication with leading economic, political or intellectual figures on this side of the Atlantic? In his recent *Conjectures of Order*, Michael O’Brien is seemingly impressed with the extent of the antebellum Southern intellectual elite’s direct familiarity with Europe but in truth his list is a thin one, particularly when he reveals those among the intelligensia – he guesses “perhaps half” – who never left the United States, including such luminaries as John C. Calhoun, Edmund Ruffin, George Fitzhugh and Paul Hamilton Hayne.\(^\text{15}\) Among leading Southern political figures, the list of those with direct experience of Europe is even skinnier, although two of the three occupants of the Confederate State Department had crossed the Atlantic prior to secession. Robert Toombs, the first and worst Secretary of State, visited London and Paris on a shopping and sightseeing visit in 1855; the transatlantic visits of the far more able Judah P. Benjamin, on the other hand, were dictated by his need to see his wife and daughter who were domiciled in Paris.

Direct experience of Europe was also limited among much of the Federal leadership, yet in Massachusetts Senator Charles Sumner, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and his former colleague in the upper house, William H. Seward, the Secretary of State, the Union possessed two men whose internationalism far exceeded anything the South could muster. Sumner’s relationship with leading British liberals is well known; less accepted is Seward’s transatlantic engagement. Although the wily New Yorker delighted in tweaking John Bull’s tail, and in early 1861 even suggested provoking a foreign war as a means of deflecting secession, he was by any yardstick an Anglophile. Seward had made two extended visits across the Atlantic by the time he assumed office, kept in touch with British friends via correspondence, and was a strong advocate of the Atlantic telegraph which he saw as vitally important to fostering Anglo-American friendship.\(^\text{16}\) There were Southerners, such as the influential New Orleans editor James DeBow, who advocated stronger links with Europe, and at the various commercial conventions during the 1840s and 50s there was a lot of huffing and puffing about the need for direct steamship routes to help circumvent the North’s commercial dominance.\(^\text{17}\) But nothing came of it, and as the dogs of secession yelped ever louder, the poverty of the slave South’s internationalism was
strikingly revealed. Independence not interdependence was now the planters’ unceasing cry.

By neglecting the main transatlantic networks, Southerners ensured that independence effectively meant isolation from the dynamic developments that were transforming the Atlantic world. Despite the powerful commercial ties linking Britain and the South, a glance through any mid-century British newspaper will confirm how underrepresented the slave states had become in the Anglo-American information system, with editors overwhelmingly relying on Northern copy for their American news. This information failure reflected the character of Southern society at large. Through the nineteenth century Southern development lagged behind that of every other part of the United States. With a third of the population in 1860, Southerners could muster up only 10 percent of the nation’s manufacturing labour force and only 11 percent of its manufacturing capital, trailing not only New England and the Mid-Atlantic states but also the Midwest which started much later. Quantitatively deficient, the South was also qualitatively at odds with the vigorous entrepreneurial culture of the Mid-Atlantic area where the dynamic mesh of information, capital and technology was producing startling results. “Leveraging their transatlantic contacts and networks with resources of their own,” writes Peter Coclanis, “merchants and manufacturers in the Northeast were able by the 1850s to establish the foundations – economic, social, political, institutional, and cultural – for a modern urban, industrial society.”

Thus in erecting a cultural and intellectual wall around themselves to prevent infection from free-state ideas, slaveholders simultaneously created a barrier between themselves and Europe. And not surprisingly, isolation bred suspicion and hostility to anything and everything that seemed to challenge the values of the slave society. Fear of abolitionism, for example, strongly shaped Southern attitudes towards Europe’s revolutionary upheavals. Always concerned with the implications for slavery, writes Joseph Fry, Southerners “particularly abhorred establishing any precedent for interference in the internal affairs of another country or for endorsing radical actions that overthrew established governments and placed morality over legal order.”

Nowhere is this anxiety over the security of slave society better revealed than in the rampant Anglophobia embraced by so many Southerners in the two decades before the Civil War — those same Southerners, we must remind ourselves, who in 1861 now insisted that Britain support them in their independence struggle.
Anglophobia was widespread in pre-Civil War America but it was in the slave South where hostility to Britain raged most consistently and fiercely. To the general fears that Britain continued to seek if not the destruction at least the curtailment of the American democratic experiment, Southerners added the extra ingredient of abolitionism. During the 1840s Southern politics became infected with virulent Anglophobic rhetoric, as slaveholding politicians, headed by John C. Calhoun, the pre-eminent political and intellectual defender of slave society, raised the spectre of British designs on the then independent republic of Texas. Writing to the British Minister Sir Richard Pakenham, in April 1844, Calhoun, then briefly serving as Secretary of State, interpreted the official British ambition of seeking the general abolition of slavery throughout the world “as a direct threat to the United States.” Calhoun added in the process a detailed lecture on the advantages of slavery to both the black and white races. To this abolition conspiracy argument, Southerners further charged Britain with seeking to destroy the United States as a commercial rival by extending its cotton production into Texas.

Southerners defeated the dastardly British plot by the simple expedient of annexing Texas to the U.S. in 1845, thus expanding their own slaveholding domain – which of course is what the whole issue had been about in the first place. Calhoun himself died in 1850 but his shadow was long, and as the sectional crisis reached its climax at the end of the decade, it is hardly a shock to see Anglophobia again rearing its head. In speeches, pamphlets and letters, Britain was demonised as “the mother of Abolitionism” in the words of one Georgia newspaper in December 1860. The difference was that Southerners now needed to combine anti-British tirades with an explanation of why these same wicked British should now support them in their fight for nationhood.

Southern views of Britain and the British lacked consistency and sometimes reality. Members of the South’s governing class often liked to imagine an identity of interest between themselves and the English gentry, claiming descent from ‘cavalier’ society, and professed to be repelled by industrialization and the miseries experienced, for example, by Lancashire mill workers. Yet the whole theory of King Cotton required the continued expansion of British industry. If demand for cotton slackened, the South’s economy and with it the social, political, and racial authority of slaveholders, would be eroded. In truth, what offended Calhoun and other planter spokesmen was not British com-
mercial policy per se, nor any real fear that the British were about to reduce mankind, Americans included, to economic vassalage, but Britain’s emergence as a leading antislavery power.

So, by the beginning of the 1860s, as the cotton states finally made good their threat to leave the Union, we see Southerners sharpening their view of Britain as a nation and a people whose impulses and interests were predominantly antagonistic to their own. It was hardly a recipe for transatlantic mutuality. In their official discourse, the South’s leaders often spoke the language of shared interest. But scratch beneath the surface, you will find a far more uninhibited expression of slaveholding resentment towards “monarchical” Britain (and to a lesser extent France) and a deep disdain for international interdependence. Here’s the ex-Federal and future Confederate congressman William Russell Smith of Tuscaloosa, Alabama, addressing his state’s secession convention in January 1861:

> We must not depend on foreign alliances. Our institutions are too essentially different from theirs. They will always demand more than they give. They surrender shadows and demand substances . . . England will never forget her colonies. The gap in her crown, caused by the tearing away of those jewels, has not yet been filled. It is the dream of her political philosophy to see those jewels restored; and English pride, with English ambition, is far-reaching. Her revenge is as deathless as the oath of Hannibal . . . Let us beware, then, of foreign friends. England has no feelings in common with us. Her politicians are emancipationists.\(^\text{23}\)

In the view of many in the South on the eve of the Civil War, therefore, Britain represented everything that was antithetical to the values and institutions of a free, democratic, slave society. Although, as noted, the Confederate leadership was more circumspect in its language than Mr. Smith, the underlying belief that the South neither required – nor morally could justify entering into – alliances with countries so alien to its values served to weaken its efforts at acquiring international status. Recognition became an end in itself, a form of validation, rather than a genuine application for membership in international society, with all its rights, obligations, and, vital to the Confederacy’s survival, its practical benefits. And there’s no better representative of the South’s deeply flawed internationalism than the head man himself. President Jefferson Davis, the arch-expansionist, appears to have had only limited understanding or interest in foreign affairs. Even Davis’s most sympathetic modern biographer admits that the South’s elected leader had a “provincial view of the world,” and that he “simply couldn’t understand why European nations . . . consulted their own
national interests in dealing with the recently emerged Confederate States of America.”

William Corsan’s surprise at finding in the South, as he put it, “so little interest” in the question of transatlantic intervention in the sectional war, should not therefore, in hindsight, completely surprise us. By the early 1860s leading Southerners viewed Britain as selfish, corrupt and acutely hostile to the interests and aspirations of a slave-holding society – a virtually identical view to the one Southerners held of their enemy to the north. “We never expected England to interfere, and do not now expect her,” Corsan’s Confederate hosts continued.

We quite understand the policy of the Government of such a country as England. Yours is a rich aristocratic country, and you can afford to keep the poor caused by the Cotton Famine for twenty years, if necessary, if at the end of that time you shall have made yourselves independent of the world for cotton, and such discredit has been thrown on republican institutions by our ruin, as to render their rise for another century impossible. We believe the people of England is [sic] with us: but your aristocracy, which hates a democracy; your capitalists, who hold the United States and Northern stocks; your Manchester men, who are making money out of their stock of manufactured and raw cotton; your Sheffield men, who are selling steel to the Northern Government; your Birmingham men, who are selling rifles, swords and bayonets; your Huddersfield, Leeds, &c. men who are selling shoddy clothes; and your shipowners, into whose hands our Alabamas, &c. are throwing all the carrying-trade of the world—all these classes, who are all powerful in England, are against us, and want the war to go on. But we shall win nevertheless, and some of your greedy people wont make much in the long run, either, by their conduct.

Finally, it is necessary to add one final ingredient to my argument that the slave South was fundamentally at odds with the world from which in 1861 it now demanded support. Nothing more points up the South’s alienation from modernity than its failure to participate in the mass migrations that were transforming the rest of the United States in the middle decades of the nineteenth century. A basic overview demonstrating the pattern of English settlement before the Civil War shows that not only was the South attracting a small minority of English emigrants, but the gap between the slave and free states was widening in the decade before the Civil War, as the South was rapidly overtaken by the new states to the west (see appendix). “If I were a young man I would sever myself from the old world and plant myself in the western region of the United States,” concluded Richard Cobden in 1839, and clearly thousands were following his advice.
Cultural and Capital Exchange

It was not only the English who were avoiding the slave South. If we look at foreign-born residents, we can see how severely limited immigration had been into the eleven future states of the Confederacy, with only Louisiana and Texas registering significant percentages. By contrast, the free states revealed a radically altered ethnic landscape, with immigration here providing the engine for economic and social development. The white South, so confident in its future, was demographically stagnating – at least in terms of the element that had historically played such a vital role in American expansion and renewal: foreign immigration.

The relative lack of ethnic diversity resulting from its failure to attract foreign immigrants reinforced the slave South’s political, intellectual and racial conservatism. Yet, ironically, that is not the way that Southerners themselves saw it. Countless Southerners celebrated the idea that the region had escaped the effects of “mongrelization” brought on by foreign influx, effects, they claimed, that were in part responsible for the free states’ decline into corruption and now tyranny. In his inaugural address, Jefferson Davis waxed lyrical about the “homogeneity” of the South, ironic again in the uniquely bi-racial society he had been elected to lead.27 “Perhaps the strongest feeling in the South,” William Corsan wrote at the end of his 1862 Confederate sojourn, “is that directed against the naturalization of foreigners as citizens. To the influx at the north of uneducated masses, saturated with political fallacies and crotchets, who at once acquired the power of voting, and, consequently, great weight to the State – to this chiefly do Southern people attribute the steady deterioration in political virtue which, they say, has been going on at the North for years.”28

The failure of the slave states to attract English and other European immigrants had consequences which go well beyond the scope of this discussion. But in my view it offers final verification of the white South’s self-imposed estrangement from an Atlantic community into which it now demanded entry as a sovereign, independent nation. By 1861 economic and political momentum belonged not to Old South agrarianism – and even less to the immoral and anachronistic labour system that sustained it – but to its antithesis, what we might tentatively call “New Britain”: the vibrant, interdependent, urban-industrial nexus of the northern North Atlantic. In a recent study of Louisiana, Richard Follett has noted how “the social ethic of southern slaveholding undermined the planters’ capacity to cooperate and com-
pete in the increasingly competitive domestic market.\textsuperscript{29} Follett’s description of planters obsessed with personal autonomy and passionately ill-disposed to cede their independence to anyone or to any group may also help us understand the Confederacy’s failure to achieve its international goals. For, if William Corsan’s testimony is accurate, Southerners not only never believed that Britain would freely support its independence bid nor, if truth be known, did they care whether it did or not. Throughout the secession and Confederate period, the South’s planter leaders betrayed a striking ambivalence towards – if not at times a manifest contempt for – the relationships that they should have been so concerned to nurture. And it is not surprising, therefore, that they should have so conspicuously failed to persuade the wider world, Britain in particular, to support them in their hour of need.

Notes

1 Corsan, \textit{Two Months in the Confederate States} 3. Corsan’s explanation for visiting the South was straightforward. “The firm of which I was a member,” he wrote in his memoir of the trip, published in 1863, “has for years dealt with many Southern merchants, from or of whom we had heard nothing since the commencement of the civil war. I was anxious, if possible, to ascertain whether any of our old friends were living or dead, and solvent or ruined. My intention was, if possible, to penetrate into and travel over the Confederate States, in pursuit of this perfectly innocent inquiry” (5).

2 Ibid. 129.

3 Ibid. 92.

4 \cite{Fletcher}, “A Run through the Southern States” 501.


6 Parish, \textit{The American Civil War} 397.

7 Smith, “A Southern Confederacy” 578.


10 Scholarly evaluation of the Confederacy’s diplomatic record began with Callaghan, \textit{Diplomatic History} and achieved maturity with Owsley, \textit{King Cotton Diplomacy}, first published in 1931 and updated in 1959. Owsley’s research and insights have been supplemented (though not fully supplanted) by numerous studies, the most significant of which, in order of publication, are: Jordan and Pratt, \textit{Europe and the American Civil War}; Blumenthal, “Confederate Diplomacy”; Cullop, \textit{Confederate Propaganda}; Jenkins, \textit{Britain and the War for the Union}; Ball, \textit{Financial
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Failure and Confederate Defeat; Hubbard, The Burden of Confederate Diplomacy; and Sexton, Debtor Diplomacy.

Crawford, The Anglo-American Crisis of the Mid-Nineteenth Century 97.

Owsley, King Cotton Diplomacy 24-49.


See Sexton, Debtor Diplomacy.

O’Brien, Conjectures of Order 100.

See Van Deusen, William Henry Seward 22-23, 182, 211-12, 292-93. The contrasting character and outlook of the two societies is also revealed in the choice of diplomatic representatives: the Confederacy’s principal envoy to Britain, Senator James M. Mason of Virginia, and his Federal counterpart, Charles Francis Adams of Massachusetts. Although in part chosen because of his service as chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, Mason was far better known across the Atlantic as the author of the Fugitive Slave Act, the provisions of which had shocked even the most hardened British observers. In 1858 Mason had turned down the opportunity to serve as the United States’ representative in London. (See Young, Senator James Murray Mason 111). Charles Francis Adams, the son and grandson of presidents, had strong international credentials, beginning with childhood during which he spent six years in St Petersburg and a further two years in England while his father served as American minister to Russia and Great Britain respectively. As Martin Duberman writes, “John Quincy [Charles Francis Adams’ father] expected his children to play a large part on the world stage, assuming this to be the proper role for an Adams” (Duberman, Charles Francis Adams 11).

On antebellum conventions, see Johnson, The Men and the Vision 15-165.

Coelanis, “Tracking the Economic Divergence of North and South” 94.

Fry, Dixie Looks Abroad 67.

Haynes, “Anglophobia and the Annexation of Texas” 130. See also Fry, Dixie Looks Abroad 56-57. It is worth noting that one of the antebellum period’s best known non-slave state Anglophobic politicians, Lewis Cass of Michigan, was also one of its leading “doughfaces,” Northern men with Southern principles. See Richards, The Slave Power 162-63.

The Daily Constitutionalist (Augusta), December 1, 1860, Southern Editorials on Secession, ed. Dumond 284.

The point is effectively argued in Brock, “The Image of England and American Nationalism” 228.


Eaton, Jefferson Davis 164. The three most recent biographies of the Confederate leader, by William C. Davis, William J. Cooper, Jr., and Herman Hattaway and Richard E. Beringer, if only by dint of the very small amount of space devoted to the subject, appear to confirm Davis’ lack of interest in foreign affairs.

Corsan, Two Months in the Confederate States 93.

Quoted in Richards, Britannia’s Children 162.

Richardson, Messages and Papers 1: 35.

Corsan, Two Months in the Confederate States 93. For a recent view of Southern ethnicity that points up the heterogeneity of its population, see O’Brien, “Afterward” 222.
Bibliography


APPENDIX

U.S. English-born population by section, 1850, 1860

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<td>88.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>1860</td>
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Total enumerated: 1850: 278,675; 1860: 431,692

U.S. foreign-born population by state, 1850, 1860 (percentage)

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