Testing Human Feelings and Reactions in a Conflict: The Case of the Greek Revolution of 1821

During the first year of the Greek Revolution, the city of Patras in the Peloponnese, Southern Greece, was besieged by Greek forces. The bombardment had transformed this important city of the Morea into a living hell, but the battle also bore witness to a strange event: the leader of the Greek regiment, Plapoutas, mounted and at risk to his own life, strove in vain to save the life of one of the enemies besieged within a house on the verge of collapse. The reason? Among those in danger was a certain Toufeximbasi, a Turk renowned for his beauty. “It was here that Toufeximbasi was killed, the most beautiful, I believe, of all the men nature has ever created… . If I knew how to paint, I would very much like to have painted this Turk” says the Greek fighter Fotakos, mourning him years later in his memoirs.1

Mourning for a fallen adversary was not so rare during this lengthy struggle. When Kioutahi Pasha received news in 1826 of the death of Georgios Karaiskakis, his brave and fierce adversary from Central Greece, he refused to provide a gift to the messenger who had brought him “the good news,” and he retired to pay his respects to one of the bravest men to have taken part in the conflict.2 According to the Greek fighter Nikolaos Kassoumoulis, Kioutahis’s Albanian soldiers shared his sentiments, and on hearing the news shouted to the Greeks: “Hey you men, Karaiskakis... is dead! You

1 “Εκεί εσκοτώθη ο Τουφεξήμπασης, ο ευμορφότερος άνθρωπος, πιστεύω, αφ’ όσους έκαμεν η φύσις... Τον Τούρκον αυτόν, τον οποίον αν ήξερα ζωγραφικήν ήθελα τον ζωγραφίσει.”, ΦΩΤΟΣ ΧΡΥΣΑΝΘΟΠΟΥΛΟΣ ή ΦΟΤΑΚΟΣ, Απομνημονεύματα περί τῆς Ελληνικής Επαναστάσεως [ Fotios Chrysanthopoulos or Fotakos, Memoirs concerning the Greek Revolution], Athens 1899, vol. I, pp. 304, 305.

should wear black, all of you, for you will never find another like him”. And it was with the same degree of respect that Ibrahim Pasha of Egypt bade farewell in 1825 to the body of Papaflessas, his adversary who had fallen at the battle of Maniaki, in the Peloponnese.

For their part, when they came to write their memoirs, Greek fighters were generous in paying their brave and decent adversaries the respect they deserved. Fotakos, for example, with reference to Deli Ahmed, a senior commander in the army of Ibrahim Pasha of Egypt, has no compunctions about calmly and impartially listing his victories against the Greeks, adding with admiration that Deli Ahmed was “a brave man, an excellent strategist, born to win great victories”. In a similar vein, Greek fighters very often write with admiration and compassion of the exceptional martial or human qualities their enemies displayed in the face of adversity. Describing Turkish resistance in Messolonghi in 1825, Nikolaos Kassoumoulis writes: “…I cannot fail to mention the bravery of the Turks … they have suffered all these difficulties with sang-froid and impressive tenacity…”

In many other cases Fotakos refers with respect to the Turks; see, for example, vol. I, p. 183, 294, 385, vol. II, pp. 459 etc.


It is also worth mentioning that the memoirs of General I. Makriyannis have been translated and published in English and in German; see also similar expressions on pp. 158, 276, 287, 308 etc. of the same. The memoirs of General I. Makriyannis have also been translated and published in English and in German; see also The Memoirs of General Makriyannis (edited and translated by H.A. Lidderdale), Oxford University Press, London 1966 and Wir, nicht ich. Memoiren General Jannis Makrijannis’ (1797–1864)” (translated by Lorenz Gyömörey), Papasissis – Athens 1987. The most recent book on Makriyannis, his ideology and activities, is by Giorgos Giannoulopoulos, Να διαβάζετε τον Μακρυγιάν νη [Reading Makriyannis], Polis Publications, Athens 2004.
years after the event, Fotakos describes the Greeks’ great victory of 1822 over the army of Dramali, Pasha of Larissa, he adds, humbly and thoughtfully with similarly crushing defeats suffered by the Greeks in subsequent years in mind: “We, too, had to suffer every misfortune they suffered, in order to stop writing so frivolously and with such vapid arrogance, that only we, the Greeks, had performed great feats and exploits in war…”

If affording respect to a fallen adversary can be explained with reference to the standard military code of ethics, the efforts of Greeks and Turks alike to save friends or acquaintances even in the midst of great danger must surely be explainable in terms of their common past. Thus it was that Anagnostis Anagnostopoulos, a notable from Achladokambos, a town in the Peloponnese, saved the lives of two Turkish friends of his by hiding them in his home throughout the long war; Kanellos Deliyannis and Dimitrios Papatsonis, Greek notables from the Peloponnese, tried during the siege and capture of Tripolis by Greek forces in 1821 to help and save the families of some of their eminent Turkish friends, who had in the past rescued members of their own families in difficult situations; Andreas Londos, another eminent Greek notable from the Peloponnese, lost no time in establishing an escape route for the Turkish inhabitants of his region at the beginning of the Revolution; Andreas Miaoulis, the legendary Hydriot chief of the Greek Fleet, rushed to Nauplion in the Peloponnese during the capture of the city by Greek forces in 1822 to save the life of Mehmed of Sherif, an eminent Turk who had helped many of Miaoulis’ compatriots in difficult circumstances in the past; Theodore Kolokotronis, the most important of the

9 Ibidem, p. 135.
12 Αντώνιος Μιαούλης, Συνοπτική Ιστορία των υπέρ της ελευθερίας της αναγεννηθείσης Ελλάδος γεννούντων ναυμαχιών [Antonios Miaoulis, A brief history of the naval battles for the liberation of Greece], in EMM. PROTOPSALTIS (ed.), op. cit., vol. VIII, p. 146, fn. 10.
Greek army commanders, displayed a constant and special concern for the Muslim-Albanian inhabitants and warriors of the Lala area in the Peloponnesian, thanks to the many years of friendship between his kin and the Ali-Farmaki family, notables from the Lala region, and to their pre-Revolutionary alliance.\textsuperscript{13} And it was these long-standing friendships that prompted many fleeing Turks to leave their most valuable movable possessions in the houses of their Christian friends at the beginning of the Revolution.\textsuperscript{14}

On the Turkish side, too, such humanitarian acts were not rare. In 1821, after the quelling of the Greek uprising in the city of Naoussa in Greek Macedonia, the father of the Greek fighter Kassomoulis was saved by an old and eminent Turkish friend of his, who “…maintained the friendship … and took care of him as though he were his brother…”\textsuperscript{15} In 1825, the Sehnedjip family did the same for Michail Staikopoulos, thus repaying the Staikopoulos family for what they had done for them during the capture of Tripolis, the capital of the Peloponnese, by Greek forces in 1821.\textsuperscript{16} And in Constantinople and other cities, where the large-scale massacre of Greeks took place in 1821 when news broke of a Greek Revolution, Turks hid Greek priests and friends of theirs in expectation of the violence abating.\textsuperscript{17}

For some, these bonds were to lead to them fighting for their ostensible enemies: Moustafa, a close Turkish friend of Odysseas Androutsos, one of

\textsuperscript{13} The sentiments shared by Kolokotronis and the Albanian Muslims from the Lala district of the Peloponnesian were well known and respected during the Revolution. Kolokotronis himself often refers to the fact in his \textit{Memoirs}, as does Fotakos, his co-fighter and secretary, see \textsc{Theodoros Kolokotronis}, \textit{Απομνημονεύματα [Theodoros Kolokotronis, Memoirs]}, Drakopoulos Publications, Athens, pp. 58, 59, 60, and Fotakos, op. cit., vol. I, pp. 296, 297. The important Greek Deliyannis family had also been acquainted with the Ali Farmakis family before the Revolution, (Kanellos Deliyannis, op. cit., vol. I, pp. 52 – 55).

\textsuperscript{14} \textsc{George Finlay}, \textit{History of the Greek Revolution and of the Reign of King Otto}, Zeno Publishers, London 1971, p. 150.

\textsuperscript{15} N. \textsc{Kassomoulis}, op. cit., vol. I, p. 265: “ο πατήρ μου... πολεμών ανδρείως, εφόνευσε 18 εγθρούς και έλαβεν τρεις πλήγες. Έπειτα από μίαν τοιαύτην πάλην, γνωρισθείς με κάποιον Μεχμέτ Μπέην Διβόλην, παλαιόν φίλον του, παρεδόθη εις τήν τιμήν του. Ο Μπέης εφύλαξε τήν ποιλίαν... και λαβών αυτού τόν επερποκήθη έως αδελφόν…”

\textsuperscript{16} \textsc{Fotakos}, op. cit., vol. II, pp. 92, 93: “τὸν δὲ ειρημένον Μιχαήλ Σταϊκόπουλον εἶχον αιγμαλωτίσει οἱ Σεχνετζιπαίοι Τούρκοι, οἱ οποίοι εγνώριζον αυτὸν παλαιότερα ἀπὸ τὴν Τριπολίτσαν, ἡ δὲ οἰκογένεια τῶν Σταϊκόπουλον εἶχε περιποιηθεί τὴν οἰκογένειάν τῶν Σεχνετζιπαίων, αιγμαλωτισθέαν ὑπὸ τοῦ Κολοκοτρώνη κατὰ τὴν ἀλώσιν τῆς πόλεως. Ἐνεκα, λοιπῶν, αυτῆς τῆς εὐεργεσίας απεφάσισαν νὰ τὸν σώσουν καὶ, αφοῦ τοῦ ἔδωσαν φορέματα Τούρκικα καὶ ενδύθη καὶ ἐν ἀλόγον καλὸν, τοῦ ἐδειξαν πόθεν να φύγῃ...”

\textsuperscript{17} \textsc{G. Finlay}, op. cit., p. 189.
the leaders of the Greek Revolution in Central Greece, stood by his friend and fought at his side against his own people until the end. Another Muslim Albanian stayed to fight devotedly at the side of Plapoutas, a Greek war leader in the Peloponnese. And at the battle of Komboti, Peloponnese, in 1821, contemporary Greek texts refer to eight Turks who fought on the Greek side.

Similarly, hundreds of Greeks continued to fight on the Turkish side for a variety of reasons and motives. Thus it was that Kostas Poulis, a Greek, fought against his compatriots in Kalarrytes, Epirus, in 1821, and a number of Greeks who had been hired by Ibrahim Pasha, fought on the opposing side of their Greek relatives in 1825. Fotakos refers to these fighters as the “Turko-mixed” (“τουρκανάκατοι”).

This situation led to problems on the battlefield. Kanellos Deliyiannis, a notable from Arcadia in the Central Peloponnese and one of the leaders of the Revolution, writes in his memoirs: “At Peta the two armies were so mixed that nobody knew who was on the Greek side and who was with the Turks, because we were all dressed the same...”. And Babis Anninos, the Greek historian born three decades after the beginning of the War of Independence, writes thus of the Turks who fought on the Greek side: “…Those are the ones we know about, because there could possibly be more, due to the degree to which Greeks and Ottomans were mixed at the time. Older people insist that a very old and highly-decorated fighter who only died very recently was actually a Turk, who had converted to Christianity after the War...”.

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20 General Makriyannis, op. cit., p. 109: “Και εκεί, την θέση εκείνη την βαστούσε ο Γώγος, ο Ίσκιος... και ήταν και οχτώ Τούρκοι με τους Έλληνες...”.
22 General Makriyannis, op. cit., pp. 110, 111: “Εις τα τέλη του Γιουνίου [1821]... πολιορκήσαν τον Κώστα Πουλή εις το Μοναστήρι των Καλαρρύτων, οπού ήταν με τους Τούρκους...”. In 1826, Tatsis Magginas, a Greek fighting on the side of the Turks, surrendered to the Greeks, see Artemios Mihos, Απομνημονεύματα [Artemios Mihos, Memoirs], in EMM. Protopsaltis (ed), op. cit., vol.V, p. 46 fn. α.
25 B. Anninos, op. cit., p. 53: “...και λέγω γνωστοί, διότι δεν είναι απίθανον να υπήρξαν και άλλοι: τόση ήτοι τότε η μεταξί Οθωμανών και Έλληνων επιμελεία. Μέχρις εσχάτων εξή υπέργητος της αγωνιστής, φέρων και το μετάλλιον του αγώνος, όστις, ως διετείνοντο
These stories illustrate an important feature of this war: that it was not fought between armies that were foreign and alien to one another, and that personal feelings were involved. To some extent, the war was fought between common people who had lived an everyday life on the Greek peninsula for many years, and – as is normal in every society – who loved, hated, detested or admired one another, different religious beliefs notwithstanding. This was a prominent feature of even the most violent situations, and led to a number of dramatic incidents and stories:

In 1825, during a lull in a battle in the Peloponnese, a Turk asked the officer in charge of the Greek regiment, a former neighbour of his, to fire a round from a rifle now in the Greeks’ possession; the weapon had once belonged to a relative dear to him, whose memory the sound would rekindle. “Kiss it for me” he added, before returning to the fight.

On the eve of the Revolution, the 40,000 Turks of the Peloponnese lived among 400,000 Greeks, with whom they had such pronounced everyday contact, that not a few of them spoke and wrote in Greek, while others were in the habit of drinking wine and baptizing their children, see ΜΙΧΑΗΛ ΣΑΚΕΛΛΑΡΙΟΥ, Η Πελοπόννησος κατά την δεύτερη τουρκοκρατίαν (1715–1821) [Mihail Sakellariou, Peloponnese during the second period of Ottoman Rule (1715–1821)], 1939, reprinted by Hermes Publications, Athens 1978, pp. 226, 227, 228, 282. On religious syncretism on the part of the Turks of the Peloponnese, see also p. 227 of the present paper. For more on the population of Peloponnese between the 13th and 18th century, see ΒΑΣΙΛΗΣ ΠΑΝΑΓΙΩΤΟΠΟΥΛΟΣ, Πληθυσμός και οικισμοί της Πελοποννήσου, 13ος – 18ος αιώνας [Vassilis PanaGiotopoulos, Population and Settlements in the Peloponnese, 13th–18th century], a publication of the Historical Archive of the Commercial Bank of Greece, Athens 1985. The Turks constituted also a relatively small proportion of the population in Central Greece, a mountainous region, see ΙΩΑΝΝΗΣ ΓΙΑΝΝΟΠΟΥΛΟΣ, Η διοικητική οργάνωση της Στερεάς Ελλάδος κατά την Τουρκοκρατίαν (1393–1821) [Ioannis Gianopoulos, The administrative organization of Central Greece under Ottoman Rule (1393–1821)], a publication of the Sofia Saripolou Library, University of Athens, Athens 1971, pp. 69, 82. ΔΗΜΗΤΡΗΣ ΚΑΡΥΔΗΣ in his Χωρο-γραφία Νεωτερική ή λόγος για τη συγκρότηση και εξέλιξη των ελληνικών πόλεων από τον 15ο στον 19ο αι. [Dimitris Karydis, New Choro­graphy, or speaking about the formation and evolution of the Greek cities from 15th to 19th cent.], Athens 1993, pp. 51 –87, provides data on the cities of Central Greece which makes it obvious that the Muslim presence in that area was weak or even scarce.

On the conversations before the battles during the Greek Revolution, see ΑΠΟΣΤΟΛΟΣ ΒΑΚΑΛΟΠΟΥΛΟΣ, Τα ελληνικά στρατεύματα του 1821· οργάνωση, ισχεία, τάκτικη, ήθη, ψυχολογία [Apostolos VakaLoupolos, The Greek troops of 1821: Organization, leadership, tactics, morals, psychology ], Vanias Publications, Thessaloniki 1991, p. 134. The Greek fighters often describe such conversations in their memoirs, especially N. Kassomoulis (see, for ex., vol. II, pp. 95, 104, 125, 215, 221, 238 etc.). During those conversations the “besa” [an agreement based on keeping ones’ word
Fotakos describes “Hadji–Koulele, the famous Turkish gunner,” who was killed in 1821, as “a plump and good-minded man who remained on good terms with the Christians always. He would often come out [of the Turkish bastions] to meet with them, and was always urging them to declare submission [to the Ottomans, in order to stop the war]. He loved wine, which he would drink in Christian company…”.28

In 1822, after the Greeks’ crushing defeat of Dramali Pasha’s army, men, soldiers, Dramali’s former Greek prisoners, and entire families sought shelter for the night in the woods, where they were all mixed together. “Not knowing where to go … everybody was weeping for their own situation, and calling out to those they knew from before, one in Turkish, another in Albanian, yet another in Greek … Hey, Hassan, Hey Ahmed, Hey Thanassis, Hey Kostas; I’m [in Albanian] Geka, I’m Skondra [i.e. from different Albanian tribes], I’m Christian…”.29

The memory of old relationships was also recalled verbally by those involved when both Christian and Turkish populations committed atrocities in the early stages of the Revolution: “Hey brother, we’ve been friends for so many years, what is this [i.e. what is happening to us now] …?” or “… God, why are you so angry with us poor people? Our enemies are slaughtering us, and our friends, too…” were their last words before their neighbour’s knife brought their life to an end.30 And when the Turks of the Peloponnese began to sense the impending uprising, they tried to get on the good side of their Greek neighbours and acquaintances by lending them money, promis-
ing them fields, baptizing their children, and presenting gifts to the babies’ mothers “in accordance with the custom”.31

This war was fought, too, between armies that were not – to some extent – alien to each other, and by individuals who may even have been comrades in the past. Indeed, many of the Greek chieftains in Central Greece had served in the Greco-Albanian army of Ali Pasha of Ioannina, in North-western Greece, before war broke out between him and the Sultan in 1820.32 Now, following Ali Pasha’s defeat and in the context of the Greek Revolution, the Christian Orthodox among them – many of them Greco/Albanian or Greco/Vlach speaking – joined the Greek side,33 while the Muslim Albanians among them joined the Turks, although only after a degree of hesitation.34 That many adversaries shared a common military past is evident in the conversations they had (and which took on the status of near ritual) before each battle.35 Of course, it also manifested itself during negotiations and every other form of contact, where it both set the tone and affected the results.

31 Fotakos, op. cit., vol. I, p. 55: “Οι Τούρκοι... επεχνάσθησαν μιρίους τρόπους διά να ξεσκεπάσουν τίποτε, τους υπόσχοντο να τους δόσουν χρήματα διά να σχορόσουν βόδια, να τους χαρίσουν χωράφια, τους εβάπτιζαν παιδία και εκέρνων της μητέρας διά κουμπάρας κατά την συνήθειαν...”


33 This was the case, for example, with the Albanian speaking Souliots, the warlike inhabitants of the mountains of Souli, North-western Greece, who had joined Ali Pasha’s forces during the last phase of the conflict between the Pasha and the Sultan. Their participation in the Greek Revolution was of great military, social and political significance, see, Fotakos, op. cit., vol. I, pp. 232, 233; G. Finlay, op. cit., pp. 90, 91. On the Souliots, see the dissertation by Vasso Pimoyah, Σούλι και Σουλιώτες: οικονομικά, κοινωνικά και δημογραφικά δεδομένα [Vassos Pimouli, Souli and Souliots: economic, social and demographic data], Ionian University, Department of History [= Athens 1998, 2005].

34 In 1821, during the first months of the Revolution in the Greek Peninsula, Greek chiefs agreed to collaborate with Muslim-Albanian forces from the recently defeated army of the renegade Ali Pasha of Ioannina. However, this alliance proved short lived, since it soon became clear that the line of demarcation in the war was religion: Christian Orthodoxy versus the Muslim faith. On that alliance, see Makriyannis, op. cit., pp. 114, 124–129; Fotakos, op. cit., vol. I, pp. 231, 232; G. Finlay, op. cit., pp. 91–93; Lambros Koutsonikas, Γενική Ιστορία της Ελληνικής Επαναστάσεως [Lambros Koutsonikas, General History of the Greek Revolution], in EMM. Protopsaltis, op. cit., vol. IV, p. 139; Nik. Spiliadis, op. cit., vol. I, pp. 156, 157; See also Ap. Vakalopoulos, The Greek Troops., p. 170.

35 See fn. 27 of the present paper.
Last but not least, this war was waged – as we saw above in the case of the Greeks who tried to save the life of Turkish acquaintances and their friends at the beginning of the Revolution – between notables who had been cooperating and collaborating for centuries, and had only ceased to do so very recently.

This was the case with the Greek notables in the Peloponnese, who from 1715 on played a key role in administering this important region, forming – along with a number of Turkish officials and the Pasha – the central administrative body of the region. Their contact with the Turkish administration and notables (with whom they formed different interest groups and political factions in a complex web of political, economic and social alliances) was so close that the Turks treated early intelligence about an upcoming revolution in the Peloponnese with considerable mistrust. Those are the “Moreot primates” whom G. Finlay, a Scottish historian who fought alongside the Greeks, describes as “justly stigmatized as a kind of Christian Turks”.

This was the case with the high-ranking priests, who, thanks to special privileges granted to the Patriarchate and the Greek Orthodox Church by the Ottomans, played a political role among their flock for centuries, collaborating closely with the Ottoman administration. In the Peloponnese, the territorial core of the War of Independence, the prelates even occasionally participated in the Central Administrative body, the Peloponnisia, which assembled regularly between 1715 and the outbreak of the Revolution to make decisions on important matters concerning the Peloponnese.

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37 Π.Π. ΓΕΡΜΑΝΟΣ, op. cit., pp. 79–87.
38 G. FINLAY, op. cit., p. 396.
This was the case with the Greek warlords of Central Greece, the *armotoloi*, who, as official appointees of the Ottoman administration, had for centuries guarded dangerous passes and villages in the region’s lofty and inaccessible mountains.41

This was also the case with the European-educated Greeks of the Phanar district of Constantinople, who played a key role in the administration of the Empire from the 17th century on, holding such positions as Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs, Vice-Minister of Affairs concerning the Fleet and the Populations of the coasts and islands, Princes of Moldavia and Wallachia (which form modern-day Romania), and serving as ambassadors to various courts.42

This conflict therefore had something of a civil war about it43, a fact that is sometimes clearly expressed in the texts of the period, and even in the admonitions of martial leaders addressing their troops. Thus Panagiotis Papatsonis reminds us in his memoirs that decades before the Revolution, his great-grandfather – a Christian priest – when asked, used to visit Turkish families with sick children in his parish in the Peloponnese to read the appropriate Christian holy texts, which “by God’s grace” sometimes bore the desired result.44 This feature of the war was also referred to by Kolokotronis in a speech exhorting his troops to fight their hardest in the upcoming and crucial battle against Dramali Pasha of Larissa in 1822, in which he reminds them that “living alongside them [the Turks] for so many years in this land, although they were our tyrannical rulers, we also came to consider them our neighbours”. He adds, “many of us have even enjoyed their protection, while many others have received favours from them”. So, if the Greeks had fought devotedly against their ex-neighbours, he concludes, they should now have no qualms about fighting the impersonal army of “these new barbarians” now arraigned against them.45

43 The term is used too by G. Finlay, see op. cit., p. 192.
44 P. PAPATSONIS, op. cit., p. 28: “τόν εκάλουν καὶ αι Τουρκίναι πολλάκις, ἵνα τους διαβάζῃ τα παιδιά των πάσχοντα από διαφόρους ασθενείας καὶ ενίοτε εθεραπεύοντο τη θεία προνοία...”
45 Ν. ΣΠΙLIΔΙΔΗΣ, op. cit., vol. I, pp. 400, 401: “...ζώντες δὲ με αυτούς τοσούτων χρόνων εἰς τό αὐτό ἐδαφὸς, τοὺς εθερορομέν, ἀν καὶ τυράννους μας, ὡς γεήνως... Πολλοὶ δὲ εξ ἕμων απελαύνομεν τας προστασίας των καὶ άλλοι ενεργετηθήκαμεν μάλιστα πάρ’ αὐτῶν.
One prevailing reality of the War of Greek Independence, especially during the first years of the conflict, was that it was a war fought between neighbours, friends, and acquaintances, ex-subjects and ex-rulers. On occasions, however, this aspect of the conflict assumed a broader and more political dimension, which bestowed a fascinating and challenging aspect to the conflict:

In 1829, General Makriyannis, a former small-scale grain merchant who had distinguished himself on the battlefield, was appointed Administrator to the district of Argos in the Peloponnese by Ioannis Kapodistrias, the first Governor of Greece. The renowned fighter, his body covered in wounds, felt restless and underemployed. Almost illiterate, he asked a friend to teach him how to write and began composing the memoirs that are still considered one of the jewels of modern Greek literature. The modern reader is surprised to see that Makriyannis begins his description of the first months of the Greek Revolution with a story of friendship. Having been captured by the Turks as a rebel along with twenty five of his comrades, Makriyannis escapes three months later, the sole survivor of torture and executions, and knocks on the door of Ismael Bey, an eminent local Turk and a friend from the past. A physical wreck, Makriyannis is warmly accepted by his friend who cares for him until his wounds have healed. In a strange reversal of roles, when Makriyannis had regained his strength and was anxious to return to his comrades, his host and protector fell seriously ill. Although it was dangerous to stay by the side of a sick friend who could no longer protect him, Makriyannis considered it his duty to stay and take care of Ismael Bey. Only when Ismael Bey has himself regained his strength do the two friends part, each one departing for the war, following separate paths that will inevitably bring them face to face on the battlefield. The story concludes with an even more paradoxical scene: Ismael Bey not only bids his friend farewell, he also supplies him with weapons for his safety, and advice on the right behavior of the Revolutionary forces, which Makriyannis was setting out to rejoin!46

To those unfamiliar with the realities of the pre-Revolutionary coexistence – and even co-operation – between the Ottomans and certain strata of subordinate, non-Muslim, Balkan societies, the behaviour of Ismael Bey and Makriyannis could be seen as treacherous. However, Makriyannis’s narration makes it clear that neither party considered their actions in this light,

just as Kiamil Bey of Corinth in the Northern Peloponnese did not consider himself a traitor when, captured by the Greeks in the first year of the Revolution, he spoke to them in Greek and bestowed advice upon them as though he were their father, friend and comrade. Nor did Demetrius Ypsilantzis, the Phanariote leader of the Revolution, when he sent a proclamation to the Turkish Vali of Herakleion, Crete, in July 1821, more than three months after the beginning of the Revolution in Greece, asking him to join the Revolution, “because the Greeks are not fighting against the Muslims; they are fighting against the injustice and tyranny of the Ottoman regime”. Nor did the Turkish soldiers consider themselves traitors when, besieged within the city of Tripolis in 1821, they proposed that they and the Greeks stop the war and resume their common life as brothers, with mutual respect to each other’s religion. Even the Turks, when they were besieged within the walls of Patras in 1822 and proposed that they and their Greek besiegers stop fighting each other and join forces against their corrupt leaders and create a society in which the Greeks would be free of the injustice and tortures of the past, would never have considered themselves traitors.

In an early nineteenth-century context, such behaviour is not hard to understand. The corruption and decline of the Ottoman Empire were so obvious from the second half of the eighteenth century on, that even the Sultans had started striving for change. The form this change was to take was still a moot point, and the use of violence had not been excluded. The Ottoman political scene was so troubled, the negative experiences of Ottoman administrative practices so fresh, and the rupture so new, that it took time for people like Ypsilantis and Ismael Bey to realize that the Greek uprising was not destined to develop into the common Turko-Greek, pan-

47 Kassoumoulis (op. cit., vol. I, p. 161) describes how Kiamil Bey, the legendary Pasha of Corinth, a prisoner of the Greeks from the beginning of the Revolution, addressed the Greek primates and warlords surrounding him in Greek: “...Ο Κιαμίλμπεης, γνωρίζον καλά την γλώσσαν μας, ωμίλησεν οὕτως: – Άρχοντες και καπιταναίοι... Ο Θεός ηθέλησεν να σας βοηθήση και επετύχετε. Σας συμβουλεύω, όμως, ως φίλος σας, αν και Τούρκος, να παύσετε τας διχονοίας σας, να γνωρίσετε έναν αρχηγόν να σας κυβερνά...” [“...God has wanted to help you and, therefore, you have been successful. Because I am a friend of yours, although I am a Turk, I suggest you stop quarrelling and recognize a chief amongst you...”]
49 Fotakos, op. cit., vol. I, pp. 200, 201; See also fn. 59 of the present paper.
50 Ibidem, p. 307; See also fn. 58 of the present paper.
51 On the centuries of decline of the Ottoman Empire, see Donald Quataert, The Ottoman Empire, 1700–1922, Cambridge University Press 2003. On the consequences of the empire’s decline on its inhabitants, see also fn. 69 of the present paper.
Balkan cause which Rigas Velestinlis, the trail-blazing Greek revolutionary of the eighteenth century, had dreamed of.\textsuperscript{52} Indeed, it was far from immediately obvious that the nationalist ideology flourishing in Europe at the time and already accepted by the Greeks, coupled with the Turks’ wish to keep their crumbling Empire intact, would turn the Greek Revolution into a lethal confrontation on all levels.

In fact, the political scenery was complex on a local as well as a general level. Some decades before the Revolution, the Greeks and Turks of the Peloponnese had not only, as mentioned above, cooperated in the administration of the region, but had even acted together against persons and situations which both sides considered harmful:

In the 1770s, the Turkish administration of the Peloponnese had sought the help of the Greek klephts and notables in suppressing the unchecked predatory and criminal activities of the Muslim Albanian forces which the Turks had themselves called in earlier in order to suppress the Greek uprising incited by the Russians in 1770.\textsuperscript{53}

In 1806, the population of the Peloponnese, Greeks and Turks alike, had joined forces to hunt down and almost totally eliminate the local klephts under the direction of the regional administration, local Greek and Turkish notables, and the Patriarchate of Constantinople, which threatened any Christians who did not actively espouse the cause with excommunication.\textsuperscript{54}

In 1807–1809, a group of Turkish and Greek notables from the Peloponnese hatched a plot against Veli, the Pasha of Peloponnese, whom both factions considered politically dangerous. Their plan – which was never realized – was to overthrow Veli and replace him with a local government of 12 Turkish and 12 Greek notables who would jointly govern the Peloponnese under Napoleon’s protection, applying an administrative system under which the Greeks would be considered the social equals of the Turks, and would no longer labour under centuries-old discrimination, especially in the spheres of tax and justice.\textsuperscript{55}

\textsuperscript{52} On Rigas Velestinlis (Ferraios), his activities and ideology, see \textit{Πασχαλής Κιτρομηλίδης, Ρήγας Βελεστινλής· θεωρία και πράξη} \textit{[Pashalis Kitromilides, Rigas Velestinlis; theory and action]}, a publication of the Hellenic Parliament, Athens 1998. See also \textit{Λεανδρός Βρανουσής, Ρήγας} \textit{[Leandros Vranoussis, Rigas]}. Vassiki Vivliothiki Publications, Athens 1953, vol.X.


\textsuperscript{55} On the joint plot hatched against the Pasha of the Peloponnese in 1807–1809 by local Greek and Turkish notables, our sources are relatively loquacious and clear. Th. Koloko-
The long-standing, institutionalized, religiously-determined discrimination which non-Muslims suffered as second-class citizens in a Muslim-administered state such as the Ottoman Empire was the focus of discussions between Greek and Turkish adversaries during the War of Greek Independence. During these conversations, propositions were put forward by besieged Turks and independent Turkish fighters alike for a new future without discriminations of this kind.\(^{56}\)

Such propositions could either be sincere, or the fruit of Turkish fears that the life they had lived in the Peloponnese for centuries was in danger of coming to an abrupt end. They could also have stemmed from uncertainty regarding the upshot of the war, which could not but affect the feelings, actions and reactions of both sides, given that the past Greek uprisings had all failed.\(^{57}\) Although this uprising seemed to be progressing more successfully and persistently, nobody could be sure of its final outcome.

Whether motivated by self-preservation or not, the intentions the Turks revealed at certain points during the Revolution are of great interest from numerous points of view. They are rendered even more interesting when the Turks go further and ask the Greeks to participate in a common Greco-Turkish uprising against the leaders on both sides. Indeed, there are cases where the propositions put forward by Turkish soldiers in their pre-battle conversations with the Greeks were more specific and more politically detailed. The future social equality of Greeks and Turks always lay at the centre of their intentions.\(^{58}\) Maria Efthymiou (op. cit., p. 62) writes of it thus in his memoirs: “...και ἦλθαν οι Τούρκοι και Ρωμαίοι οι σημαντικοί και ομιλήσαν εἰς τὴν Ζάκυνθον να κάνωμε μία κυβέρνησις συνθεμένη από 12 Τούρκους και 12 Έλληνας να κυβέρνησιν τον λαὸν. Οι Τούρκοι, επίσης, να καταδικάζονται καθὼς οι Ἑλλήνες... Η σημαία μας από το ένα μέρος το φεγγάρι και από το άλλο το Σταυρό, και το σχέδιό μας ήτον, άμα επατούσαμε τον Μορέα, να κάμωμεν αναφοράς εἰς τον Σουλτάνον και να τον λέγωμεν οτι ημεῖς δεν αποστατήσαμεν εναντίον σου, πλην εναντίον του τυράννου, του Βελή Πασά...”. P. Papatonis (op. cit., p. 40) also mentions this plot, as does K. Deliyannis (op. cit., vol. I, pp. 48–51, 55, 102), both members of important Greek families from the Peloponnese which played a central role in the region’s administration and political life. On the plot, see also M. Sakellariou, op. cit., pp. 248–250; A. Kyriki-Koutoula, op. cit., pp. 117, 118; Dimitrios Stamatopoulos, ‘Κοιματικές φατρίες στην προεπαναστατική Πελοπόννησο (1807–1816): ο ρόλος των ‘Τουρκαλβανών’ του Λάλα ως παράγοντας πολιτικής διαφοροποίησης’ [Dimitrios Stamatopoulos, ‘Party factions in pre-revolutionary Peloponnese (1807–1816): the role of the Muslim Albanians from Lala as a factor of political differentiation’], Histor 10 (1997), 185–233.

\(^{56}\) See ns. 58 and 59.

propositions, but in these cases they add a hint of rebellion, or even of class revolution: “...things cannot be changed” says a Turkish soldier to the Greek besiegers of the city of Patras in 1821, “it would be better for both of us to seize and kill our notables and administrators, because by doing so we will save ourselves from the Europeans in the future. This is the kind of union we want to form, because our lazy, rotten bosses take a tenth of everything – including every hen’s egg – in tax”. In the same crucial year of 1821, the customary exchange of words and views between the two adversaries during the siege of Tripolis, the capital of the Peloponnese, were in a similar vein. Watching the Turks working in the hot sun, the Greeks remind them how much they had made the Greeks suffer performing forced labour in inhuman conditions before the Revolution. The Turks replied as follows: “What can we say? You are right! Only now do we realize that our behaviour was excessive in the past, because we were unjust to you, and God is now making us suffer for it. But let us now unite, and we will share our fields with you half and half. And we will live as brothers, independently of one another’s religion ... Here is what we should do! Together, we should seize and kill our superiors. Once that is done, we will be able to come to an agreement between ourselves...”.

In these discussions, the Turks emphasized three elements which they considered to be central. First, injustice: the Turks have been unjust towards the Greeks in the past, inflicting suffering on them via intensive taxation and forced labour. Consequently, God is now punishing them for that sin. Second, social inequality: the Greeks have suffered social discrimination in

58 Fotakos, op. cit., vol. I, p. 307: “Όταν επολιορκούμεν τις Πάτρας... ένας Τούρκος είπεν ο,τι λέγομεν τώρα, οτι δηλαδή είναι αδιόρθωτα τα πράγματα και οτι καλών είναι να πιάσουμεν ημεις τους μεγαλειτέρους μας αγάδες και εσεις τους ιδικούς σας και να τους σκοτώσουμεν διά να γλυτώσουμεν ύστερον απο τους Φράγγους. Αυτήν την ένοσιν θέλομεν, διότι αυτοί δεκατίζονται και τα αυγά ακόμη οι χωρσούξιδες και αχαίρετοι αφενάδες...”

59 Ibidem, pp. 200, 201: “...Οι δε Έλληνες πάλιν ωμίλουν κάθε ημέραν με τους Τούρκους, και τους αναγκαλούσαν βλέποντες αυτούς να αλονίζουν εις την κάψαν, διότι ήσαν ασυνείς. Μάλιστα τους ενθύμιζαν τον καιρόν, όπου τους ἐβαλλαν αγγάρια και τους ερωτούσαν, πώς τους φαίνεται τώρα το αλόνισμα και το λίχνισμα και τους έλεγαν διατί μας ετυραννούσατε; Οι δε Τούρκοι απεκρίνοντο τι να σας ειπούμεν, έχετε δίκαιον, τώρα το βλέπουμεν και ημεις οτι το επαρακάναμεν, διότι σας αδικούσαμεν και ο Θεός θα μας παιδεύση διά τούτο. Αλλά τώρα ελάτε να ενυθώμεν και σας δίδομεν τα χωρίσμα μας μισακά και σας κάμινομεν αδέλφια έξω από την πίστην μας... Ίδου τι να κάμωμεν, εσεις και εμείς να πιάσουμεν τούς ανωτέρους μας, να τους σκοτώσουμεν και έπειτα μόνοι μας συμφωνούμεν...”
the past, when they were treated as second-class citizens. This has to be changed. And third, Class conflict: it is the leaders, notables, and administrators on both sides that have driven the Turks and the Greeks into their present catastrophic situation. They are responsible for this bloody war. Only if Greeks and Turks unite to eliminate them will the common people be able to find a common solution and protect themselves from upcoming European control.

Injustice. This is a central element of discourse during the Greek Revolution by both sides in the drama. In his remarkable memoirs, General Makriyannis explains why the Greeks have revolted against the Turks: “…we have suffered the injustice of the Turks for so many years. We could suffer it no longer. And because of that tyrannical situation, in which we could be sure neither of our property, nor of our life and honour … we decided to take up arms against that very tyranny. Liberty or death …”.60

Makriyannis’ explanation of the causes of the Greek Revolution is common to most of the texts, proclamations and decisions of the Revolution, as well as to the memoirs of Greek fighters written after the war.61 The same explanation is stressed even by Turkish notables at the beginning of the confrontation. Ismael Bey’s words, addressed to his Muslim friends – high-ranking Ottoman officers and notables who had come to pay him a visit following his recovery – in Makriyannis’s presence, are characteristic: “… Fellow Pashas and Beys, we are doomed; we are doomed for sure; this war is not against the Russians, nor against the English or the French. We have

60 General Makriyannis, op. cit., p. 114: “…αποφάσισαν οι νοικοκυραίοι ότι η τυραγνία των Τούρκων -την εδοκιμάσαμεν τόσα χρόνια, δεν υποφέρνονταν πλέον. Και δι’ αυτείνη την τυραγνία, οπού δεν ορίζαμεν ούτε βιόν, ούτε τιμή, ούτε ζοι… αποφάσισαμεν να σηκώσουμεν άρματα ανατόλιον αυτής της τυραγνίας. Είτε θάνατος, είτε λευτεριά…”

61 Fotakos, for example, in the preface to his Memoirs (op. cit., vol. I, p. κβ’) underlines that the real cause of the Greek Revolution was the Greeks’ exhaustion and desperation in the face of the insults and sufferings the Turks had inflicted upon them: “…η αληθινή αιτία είναι η απελπισία των Ελλήνων οίτινες… καθ’ εκάστην ημέραν εκαταδίκων από αυτούς διά της αρπαγής των πραγμάτων των, της ατιμώσεως των, της σφαγής, της αγ-χόνης, και των άλλων της δουλείας συμφορών…”. N. Kassomoulis (op. cit., vol. I, pp. 184, 185), speaking about the beginning of the Revolution on Mount Olympus in Greek Macedonia, in which he himself participated, writes: “Οι καπιταναίοι ζηλώται -<έτοιμοι> εις το πρώτον, ο λαὸς συγκαταστημένος από τα βαρέματα των Τούρκων… ήτον ανυπόμονοι όλοι να κτυπήσουν να ιδούν την ανάστασιν των…”[ “The warlords were ready and zealot, the people, infuriated by the heavy taxation of the Turks… were all impatient to strike and witness their resurrection…] For the causes of the Revolution as these are revealed in the proclamations of 1821, see Apostolos Daskalakis, Κείμενα – Πηγαί της Ιστορίας της Ελληνικής Επαναστάσεως [Apostolos Daskalakis, Texts – Sources of the History of the Greek Revolution], Athens 1966, vol. I, pp. 139f.
been unjust to the *reayas* [i.e. to the non-Muslim, common people]. We have deprived them of their wealth and their honour. Their eyes have turned black and they have taken up arms. And that donkey of a Sultan has lost touch with reality. His entourage hide the truth from him; this is the beginning of the end of our kingdom…” Some days later, bidding farewell to Makriyannis, Ismael Bey bestowed his blessing upon his dear Greek friend, and asked him to tell the Greek war leaders he was about to join to act justly, “because if they do so, they will have a better future… Because the Turks are going to lose, due to the injustices they have committed”. “They [the Greek leaders] have to act justly” he adds, “so that everything ends, and we, the Turks, find serenity. Because God is going to take our kingdom away from us, for we have strayed from His justice”.

Christians and Muslims alike had for many centuries explained the fortunes of wars in terms of God punishing them for their sins or rewarding them for being just. For the Ottomans, their victories during the first centuries of expansion into the Eastern Mediterranean and the might of their state were constant proof that God was on their side, because they were just and behaved in accordance with God’s will. On the other hand, the same Turkish victories constituted constant proof to the Greeks that they had to suffer defeat and humiliation because of their sins.63 The gradual but steady decline in Ottoman martial might and internal administration of the empire after the seventeenth century, coupled with the rising importance of Greek merchants, seamen, warlords, intellectuals and politicians,64 seemed to indicate that God’s will had now veered the other way. Looked at in this light, the Greek

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62 MakoRIYANNIS, op. cit., pp. 105, 106, 107: “Πασσάδες και μπέηδες θα χαθούμε. Θα χαθούμε!...οτι ετούτοι ο πόλεμος δεν είναι μήτε με τόν Μόσκοβον, μήτε με τόν Εγγλέζο, μήτε με τόν Φραντζέζο. Αδικήσαμεν τον ραγιά και από πλούτη και από τιμή και τον αφανίσαμε. Και μαύρισαν τα μάτια του και μας σήκωσε ντουφέκι. Και ο Σουλτάνος το γομάρι δεν έξερε τι του γίνεται· τον γελάνε οποίον τον τρογυρίζουν. Και η αρχή είναι τούτη οποίο θα χαθή το βασιλείον μας”. And a bit further Makriyannis writes: “... Αφού είδε οποίο δεν θα καθόμουν, μόδοσε την ευκή του και μού είπε να επιβ τών [Ελλήνων] καπετανάιον έξω... νάχουν δικαιοσύνη εις τον κόσμον, να πάνε ομπρός. Οτι τοιούτος έκαναν αδικίες οι Τούρκοι και θα χαθούν. “Νάχουν αυτείνοι δικαιοσύνη, να πάρη τέλος, να ησυχάσουμε κι εμείς οι Τούρκοι, οτι πλέον μας έγινε χαράμι από τον Θεόν το βασιλείον μας, οτι φύγαμε από την δικαιοσύνη του”. Του φίλησα το χέρι να φύγω…”


Revolution itself could be considered proof of the reverse: the Greeks had suffered enough; they had paid for their former sins, which is why God was now guaranteeing their liberty “by warrant… and God’s signature knows no repeal”. The sinners were now clearly the Turks, which is why they were to be punished by God with defeats in war and the loss of their empire. This explanation is prominent even in Yousouf Bey’s historical writings on the Greek uprising. The contemporaneous Turkish historiographer believes that the loss of Tripolis, the capital of Peloponnese, was God’s punishment for the debauchery, voluptuousness, and sins of the city’s Turkish inhabitants.

Justice and injustice are central points of reference for both the Christian and Muslim faiths, but even more so for the Muslim populations of the Ottoman Empire, thanks to the wide-spread influence of Sufism and the activities of a dizzying number and variety of dervish orders. Viewed through the prism of Sufism, questions of justice and equality generally assume a higher place on the social agenda. From Al Gazalis’ teachings and the wonderful Sufi poems on God’s love and human behaviour, to the “communist” uprisings of Bedreddin in Thrace (15th c.) and of the Kızılbaşı rebellion in Asia Minor (16th c.), justice, injustice, love, equality, and criticism of the rich and powerful lie at the heart of Sufi discourse; a discourse that affected not only Muslim adherents to that important Muslim ideology, but Ottoman society as a whole – non-Muslims included – not least of all because a considerable number of Christians felt close to Sufi sensibilities and lines of enquiry, and therefore participated independently in their feasts and ceremonies. The Sufi presence was intense throughout the centuries of Ottoman Rule in the Balkans and, especially, in the Greek peninsula. Thus it was

65 According to N. Spiliadis (op. cit., vol. II, p. 293) Th. Kolokotronis said: “Ο Θεός υπέγραψε την ελευθερίαν της πατρίδος και δεν ακυρώνει την υπογραφή του”. The belief that God had a role to play in their fate was constant in the war proclamations of both sides, see idem, vol. I, pp. 437, 447.

66 ΝΙΚΙΦΟΡΟΣ ΜΟΣΧΟΠΟΥΛΟΣ, Ιστορία της Ελληνικής Επαναστάσεως κατά τους Τούρκους ιστοριογράφους εν αντιπαραβολή και προς τους Ελλήνες ιστορικούς [Νικιφόρος Μοσχοπούλος, History of the Greek Revolution according to Turkish historians, compared with that of Greek historians ], Athens 1960, p. 248. See also fns. 47, 59 and 62 of the present paper.

that the words of Ismael Bey, as well as those of the simple Turkish soldiers who engaged the Greeks in discussion before battle, might well be linked, to some extent, with the influence of the Muslim dervishes, their tekkes [Sufi places of worship] and ideology.

The negative views of the Sultan’s abilities expressed by Ismael Bey, as well as the simple Turkish soldiers’ feelings of hostility towards their lords, superiors, and notables, may or may not be linked to dervish ideas. We can, however, be certain that the entire political and social structure of the Ottoman Empire was facing a profound crisis at the time of the Greek Revolution, driven to the point of collapse by the need to make way for new social equilibria and forces. The Sultans had begun to address these issues in the second half of the eighteenth century, and the Ottoman Empire had embarked upon a period of reform during the reign of Sultan Selim III, which intensified from the mid-nineteenth century onwards. One of the key aims informing these nineteenth-century reforms was the secularization of the empire’s administrative system, and the introduction of equal privileges and equal obligations for all Ottoman citizens. These reforms led to a reduction in the power of the empire’s administrative and military strata, which was reflected in their weakened loyalty to both the Sultan and the Central Divan. Rebellious behaviour on the part of regional pashas and dignitaries as well as the old military corps, especially the Janissaries, became increasingly commonplace in the empire’s political life during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.\footnote{D. Quataert, op. cit., p. 41f, examines the political life within the elite circles at the heart of the empire, as well as the political life in the Ottoman provinces and the tensions between the elite and the common people. See also HALIL İNALÇIK – DONALD QUATAERT, \textit{An Economic and Social History of the Ottoman Empire, 1300–1914}, Cambridge Uni-}

Sufism and the dervish orders played in the Islamization of the inhabitants of the Balkans, see SPEROS VRYONIS, “Religious Changes and Patterns in the Balkans, 14th–16th cent”, in HENRIK BIRNBAUM – SPEROS VRYONIS (ed.), \textit{Aspects of the Balkans; continuity and change, International Balkan Conference, UCLA}, Mouton, Paris 1972, pp. 151–176. See also ΕΥΣΤΡΑΤΙΟΣ ΖΕΓΚΙΝΗΣ, Ο Μπεκτασισμός στη Δ. Θράκη στη Δ. Θράκη στη Δ. Θράκη στη Δ. Θράκη στη Δ. Θράκη στη Δ. Θράκη στη Δ. Θράκη στη Δ. Θράκη στη Δ. Θράκη στη Δ. Θράκη στη Δ. Θράκη στη Δ. Θράκη στη Δ. Θράκη στη Ιστορία της διαδόσεως του μουσουλμανισμού στον ελληνικό χώρο [ΕΥΣΤΡΑΤΙΟΣ ΖΕΓΚΙΝΗΣ, \textit{Bektashism in W. Thrace; a contribution to the history of the spread of Islam through the Greek lands }], a publication of the Institute for Balkan Studies, Thessaloniki 1988. The same author informs us in his book Γενίτσαροι και Μπεκτασισμός [Janissaries and Bektashism], Vanias Publications, Thessaloniki 2002, p. 274, that over 300 dervish tekkes were founded in what is now Greece during Ottoman Rule, whereas the figure for dervish-influenced Albania was only 140. Odysseas Androutsos, one of the most important warlords of Central Greece, was also a member of a dervish order; see ΚΑΡΟΛΟΣ ΜΕΝΤΕΛΣΟΝ-ΜΠΗΡΤΟΥΝΤ, \textit{Ιστορία της Ελληνικής Επαναστάσεως [KARL MENDELSSOHN-BARTHOLODY, \textit{History of the Greek Revolution}]], Athens 1895, vol. I, p. 327.
socially sensitive, a state of affairs which is reflected in the moral support expressed for the Greek cause, as we have seen, by a number of Ottoman dignitaries at the beginning of the confrontation, as well as in the words of sympathy and military and social cooperation addressed to the Greeks by ordinary Turkish fighters.

In fact, ordinary Turks had many more reasons for expressing hostility towards their administrators and lords than the teachings of the dervishes. The degeneration of the land ownership system, the emergence of large çiflikts [estates], and the deterioration of the taxation system had exerted a negative effect on the life of peasants, both Greek and Turkish, during the centuries of Ottoman decline. Apart from that, the peasants (whether Turks or not) had always been considered socially inferior, the cultivators of the soil – forming the bottom of the Ottoman social pyramid. If the situation was worse for Greek peasants (belonging, as they did, to the subjugated element of Ottoman society, with all the social and economical discrimination that brought with it), things were far from good for the Turkish peasants, and especially those living in remote parts of the empire. The Ottoman administrative strata held the simple Turkish peasants and inhabitants of distant counties in disdain, considering them illiterate, coarse, and stupid. They called them “Kaba Turk” [rough Turk] and “Eshek Turk” [donkey Turk], thereby creating a social – and emotional – gap which was to find expression on various occasions in Ottoman history. The aggressive feelings expressed

versity Press, parts II, III and IV. On Ottoman reforms, especially during the 19th century, see ILBER ORTAYLI, Ο πιο μακρύς αιώνας της Αυτοκρατορίας [translated from the Turkish: The Longest Century of the Empire], Papazissis Publications, Athens 2004.

HAİL İNALÇIK, “The Emergence of Big Farms: State, Landlords and Tenants”, in idem, Studies in Ottoman Social and Economic History, Variorum Reprints, London 1985, article no VIII. The same author provides a thorough description of the worsening position of the reayas due to extensive taxation, arbitrary compulsory labour, the çiftlik system etc. in his article “The Ottoman Decline and Its Effects Upon the Reaya”, see HAİL İNALÇIK, The Ottoman Empire: Conquest, Organization and Economy, Variorum Reprints, London 1978, article no XIII.


L. S. STAVRIANOS, The Balkans since 1453, New York 1959, p. 93. G. Finlay (op. cit., p. 36) provides an eye-witness account of the position of Turkish peasants in the Turkish provinces: “…as in most parts of Turkey, those who cultivate the soil, even when they are Musulmans, are considered as forming an inferior grade of society”. In another instance, Finlay (op. cit., pp. 103, 104, 105) describes the position of provincial Turks regarding the central Ottoman administration: “Nothing is more certain than that during a considerable period of Ottoman history, the Turkish population of the provinces was subject to as much moral and political restraint as the Greek”. Based on that reality, Ziya
by simple Turkish fighters of local origin towards their own lords at certain points during the Greek Revolution are but minor manifestations of a greater Ottoman social reality. Of course, the fact that these sentiments were expressed to Greek fighters in the belief that they would fall on receptive ears, is another.

The ordinary Greek inhabitants of Central Greece and the Peloponnese had their reasons for being receptive to such ideas, too. Their landlords, Greek and Turkish alike, owned big farms on which the peasants struggled to eke out a marginal existence, subject to exhaustive taxation and extra duties. It was these same landlords that participated in the bodies of Turkish and Greek representatives which played a key role in the administration of the Peloponnese. Thus, the feelings of the Greek peasantry towards their Greek landlords and notables could also be aggressive under certain circumstances. These tendencies manifested themselves in the 1780s with the common uprising of two inhabitants of Athens – the Greek, Bellos, and the Turk, Bekiris – against the city’s corrupt administration, which ended with the execution of both. It also manifested itself on different occasions during the Revolution. In his memoirs, Kolokotronis, the military leader of the Greek Revolution in the Morea (Peloponnese), and himself a political rival of the peninsula’s landlords and primates, describes the difficulties he faced restraining the hostility of the peasant-soldiers in his regiments towards the Greek notables on several occasions during the Revolution. “The people,” he writes, “had always intended to kill the lords, and were aroused by the slightest provocation …” On another occasion, wanting to prevent his peasant-soldiers from reacting aggressively against the notables, he explained the situation to them as follows: “…If we kill the notables, the kings [i.e. of Europe] will say that these men [i.e. the Greeks] have not revolted for their

Gökalp, the pioneer theoretician of modern Turkish nationalism, is adamant in his work (The Principles of Turkism, Ankara 1920 – reprinted by C.J. Brill, Leiden 1968 – pp. 28, 35, 36) on the feelings of intimidation which the arrogance of the Ottoman administrators had created in the simple Turk and Turkish peasant: “…The ruling cosmopolitans became the Ottoman class and the ruled Turks the Turkish class. The two classes did not love each other. The Ottoman class regarded itself as the superior nation and viewed the Turks whom it ruled as a subject nation. The Ottomans always called the Turk ‘the stupid Turk’. Whenever an official personage visited a Turkish village, everyone fled shouting ‘the Ottoman is coming’.”

73 See fn 36 of the present paper.
74 I. GIANNOPoulos, op. cit., p. 122.
liberty, but to kill their lords, and that they are therefore bad men, Carbonari...”.

The people of Central Greece shared these mixed feelings for the local Greek administrators and law enforcers, the armatoloi, throughout the long centuries of Ottoman rule. A number of these notables played a double role during the Revolution, vacillating between the Greek cause and their loyalty to the Turks in view of the uncertain future of the confrontation and the importance many of them attributed to their positions in the Ottoman administrative system, positions they did not want to lose. This duality was so problematic during the war that Alexandros Mavrocordatos, the Revolution’s political and diplomatic leader, characteristically asked them in 1824 “to stop singing Christian hymns one minute and Muslim ones the next”.

During the Greek Revolution, Greek internal factions and social rivalries between the notables, landlords, prelates, mariners, islanders, Moreots, Roumeliots, armatoloi, klephts, peasants, warlords, and Phanariotes resulted in two rounds of civil war, waged in parallel with the war against the Turks. Although the situation was not so intense on the Turkish side, there was no shortage of tensions there, too. The hatred and rivalry between key pashas and leaders of the Turkish army was legend, and this is reflected in the

75 TH. KOLOKOTRONIS, op. cit., p. 99: “...Ο λαός είχε πάντοτε σκοπό να σκοτώσει τους άρχοντας και σε κάθε παραμικράν αυτίαν ερεθίζετο...”. And, in another instance, (p. 89) he says to the irritated soldiers of his regiment: “... αν σκοτώσωμεν τους προεστούς, θα επιτύχουν οι βασιλείς, ότι τούτοι δεν εσθηκόθησαν διά την ελευθερίαν, αλλά διά να σκοτώθουν συνατοί τους και είναι κακοί άνθρωποι, Καρβονάροι...”


77 JOHN PETROPOLOS: “Forms of collaboration with the enemy during the first Greek War of Liberation”, in N. DIAMANDOYROS (ed), op. cit., pp. 131–143. See also NIKOS KOTARIΔΗς, Παραδοσιακή Επανάσταση και Εικοσιένα [NIKOS KOTARIΔΗΣ, Traditional Revolution and 1821], Plethron Publications, Athens 1993, especially pp. 171–240.


79 On the two rounds of civil war during the Greek Revolution, see. AP. VAKALOPOULOS, History of New Hellenism, op. cit., vol. VI, pp. 407–476, 761–813. The most recent and penetrating work on the civil clashes in the Greek Revolution is that by NIKOS ROTΣΚΟΣ, Επανάσταση και Εμφύλιος στο Εικοσιένα [Nikos Rotzokos, Revolution and Civil War in the 1821], Plethron/ Dokimes Publications, Athens 1997.

80 N. MOSHOPoulos, op. cit., pp. 105, 152; FOTAKOS, op. cit., vol. I, p. 424; K. DELIYANNIS, op. cit., vol. II, pp. 54, 55. On pages 88 and 89, Deliyannis writes when describing the Turkish attack on Messolonghi, Central Greece, in 1825: “…ο Κιουταχή Ρεσίτ πασιά... επειδή δεν είχεν πολλή εμπιστοσύνη εις τον Ομέρ Πασιάν Βρυώνην, ως Αλβανόν και αληπασιαλήν...” [“...Kioutahi Reshit Pasha did not have confidence in Omer Pasha
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decrees issued by the Sultan following the first acts of the Greek Revolution, in which the monarch asked his public servants, ulemas, ministers, and army chiefs “to cease their idleness and their dedication to luxury” and, given the danger, to “let concord reign between them, instead of blaming and accusing one another”.  

If the rivalry between the high ranking public servants of the Ottoman Empire was legendary, so was the rivalry between Muslim fighters of different racial and geographical provenance. Thus the Muslim Albanian soldiers disdained the Turks and vice versa, while the Turks of the Peloponnese looked down upon those from Anatolia; the professional Turkish soldiers disdained both the simple Turkish inhabitants and the irregular troops, and everyone disdained Ibrahim, Pasha of Egypt, who arrived in 1824 with his
Arab army and French military specialists and officers to crush the revolution in the Peloponnese and Central Greece.

The arrogance Ibrahim’s victorious Arab soldiers displayed towards the local Turkish population, fighters and pashas in view of their failure to defeat the Greeks incited Turkish hostility towards them. And in a bizarre turn of events, the local Turks’ humiliation brought them closer to the Greeks, since both sides now viewed Ibrahim and his Arab and French army with almost the same animosity. Consequently, Ibrahim did not credit his Turkish fighters as much as one would have expected. Thus, during a pre-battle conversation between the Greeks and Ibrahim’s army in 1825, Turkish soldiers addressed in Greek a group of Greek fighters from the Peloponnese with whom they had once been neighbours, asking them “to disobey their notables” and to stop that war “so that the Greeks and Turks can get rid of the Arabs together…” 83 A year later, a Turkish Peloponnesian soldier serving in the Arab army secretly encouraged the inhabitants of a Greek village to resist Ibrahim’s assault, 84 and as the war neared its end in 1828, when Turkish and Albanian soldiers serving under Ibrahim openly clashed with his Arab forces, both sides asked the Greeks for assistance! 85 Fotakos, who furnishes us with these accounts, adds: “…Things like that happened on the part of local Turks in the Greeks’ favour. It turns out that the local [i.e. Peloponnesian] Turks felt ashamed because the Arabs and French officers treated them with disdain due to the defeats they had suffered in the past, which hurt their pride, and whenever the Greeks were victorious [over the Arabs], the local Turks rejoiced…” 86 Kassomoulis, who has been present at the siege of Messolonghi in 1826 and experienced first hand the Greeks’ dramatic resistance to Ibrahim, relates the following message conveyed to the besieged Greeks by a messenger on Ibrahim’s behalf: “…He asked me to tell you that he is honest and keeps his word. He does not behave like a

83 Fotakos, op. cit., vol. II, p. 187: “…εμείς, βρε Δημήτρη, είμεθα γειτόνοι...Είμεθα σαν αδέλφοι και από ένα χώμα: η πίστις μας χωρίζει. Ελάτε να προσκυνήσετε, να γλυτώσουμε και εμείς και σας από τους Αραπάδες, να ζήσουμε μαζί, και να μη σκοτώσουμε άδικα και μην ακούτε τους τρανούς σας…”.
84 Ibidem, pp. 313, 314.
85 Ibidem, pp. 468, 469.
86 Ibidem, pp. 313, 314: “...Τοιαύτα και άλλα όμως έγειναν από τους εντοπίους Τούρκους υπέρ των Ελλήνων. Φαίνεται, δε, εκ τούτων, ότι οι εντοπίοι Τούρκοι εντρέψαντο, διότι τους κατεφρόνησαν οι ξένοι Αραπάδες και οι Γάλλοι αξιωματικοί διά τα παθήματά τους πρότερον, και διά τούτο η φιλοτιμία των επειράζετο, και, οσάκις οι Έλληνες ενίκων, οι Τούρκοι οι εντοπίοι εχάρισαν...”
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Turk. He is European, with a regular army under him, and he wants to do everything as it should be done”. 87

Given a context as emotionally, socially, ideologically and politically complex as that of the Greek Revolution, we can expect a good deal of mixed feelings, positions, acts and intentions. With the Revolution of 1821, nationalism, which was already knocking on the door of Balkan societies, established itself in Greece. 88 The Revolution itself would prove a national laboratory for those Greeks who still lacked a solid national conscience and sense of national determination. 89 The formation of the tiny – but independent – Greek State in the wake of the War of Greek Independence made it inevitable that the Balkans and Turkey would sooner or later have to move towards clearer determinations, meaning they began to move towards the formation of their own national ideas and nation states.

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87 N. KASSOMOULIS, op. cit., vol. II, p. 224: “Μ’ είπεν να σας ειπώ ότι αυτός είναι μπεσαλής (πιστός), τίμιος. Αυτός τούρκικα πράγματα δεν κάμνει. Είναι Ευρωπαίος, έχει στρατευμα τακτικόν, και όλα θέλει να τα κάμνη με τάξιν”.


89 Th. Kolokotronis, the almost illiterate military chief of the Greek Revolution, describes the role the Revolution itself played in the consolidation of national feeling among the Greeks in a penetrating and accurate way: “Η κοινωνία των ανθρώπων ήταν [δηλ. πριν το 1821] μικρή, δεν είναι παρά η επανάστασις μας οπού εσχέτευε όλους τους Έλληνας.” [“The sense of community between people was limited (i.e. prior to 1821); it is thanks to our revolution that the Greeks felt a bond with one another.”]