SCRIPTS AND POLITICS IN MODERN CENTRAL EUROPE

Tomasz Kamusella, Saint Andrews (United Kingdom)*

CONTENTS

Zusammenfassung ................................................................. 10
Summary .................................................................................... 10
1 Where is Central Europe? ...................................................... 11
2 Writing on the wall ............................................................... 13
3 The way of the Cross (and sword) ......................................... 15
4 The Central Europe of many scriptures .............................. 16
5 Printing, religious wars and vernaculars ............................... 17
6 Scripting politics ................................................................. 21
7 Toward monoscripturalism .................................................. 26
8 A type of complication ....................................................... 29
9 Scripts today ........................................................................ 30
10 Conclusion ......................................................................... 34
11 References ......................................................................... 36

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* Dr. Habil Tomasz Kamusella, Lecturer in Modern History, School of History, University of St Andrews, St Katharine’s Lodge, The Scores, St Andrews, Fife KY16 9BA, Scotland, United Kingdom; email: tdk2@st-andrews.ac.uk, http://www.st-andrews.ac.uk/history/staff/tomaszkamusella.html
Zusammenfassung

**Schrift und Politik im heutigen Mitteleuropa**


**Summary**

At present two scripts are employed in Central Europe, Latin and Cyrillic, or three, if we include Greece in the region. In this article I set out to problematise this oversimplistic picture drawing at examples from the past and pointing to various political and identificational uses of scripts today. Until the mid-20th century, also other scripts (and different types of the Latin and Cyrillic script, for that matter) were used for official purposes and in book production, namely Arabic, Armenian, Church Cyrillic, Gothic and Hebrew. In addition, Glagolitic and Runes (both Nordic and Hungarian) were sometimes recalled for ideological reasons. Each of these scripts was used for writing in numerous languages. Initially, script choices were dictated by religion (Latin letters for Western Christianity, Church Cyrillic for Slavophone Orthodox Christians, or the Arabic writing system for Muslims), usually connected to a holy
book in an ecclesiastical language committed to parchment in a specific script. When vernaculars began to make an appearance in writing, especially in the 16th century and later, their users stuck to the scripts of their holy books. Two factors, the process of building ethnolinguistically defined nation-states and changing ideas about what modernity should be about in the sphere of culture, radically limited the number of scripts in official and de facto use. Only in Bosnia-Hercegovina, Kosovo, Macedonia, Moldova, Montenegro and Ukraine are two scripts in official use, to varying degrees in the different countries. The European Union already uses three official scripts, Cyrillic, Greek and Latin; if its actions follow its words and it admits some or all of these states to membership, it stands a good chance of reviving the tradition of European multiscripturality, alongside its legally enshrined commitment to multilingualism.

1 Where is Central Europe?

_Europa Centralis_, the Latin name for this region, sounds ancient and dignified enough, but it is a neo-Latin term, invented to refer to a region that people began to define and notice more widely no earlier than two centuries ago. Until the 18th century, Europe was commonly divided along the line of the Alps into southern and northern sections, as evidenced by the name of the Great Northern War (1700–1721) waged between Muscovy and Sweden, mainly on the territory of Poland-Lithuania. The eastern limit of the continent was _PTOLEMY_’s Tanais, or the River Don, leaving most of the Russian Empire (as Muscovy was renamed in 1721) in Tartary, or Asia (KHAKIMOV et al. 2006, pp. 194–195).

After moving its capital from ’Asian’ Moscow [Moskva] to ‘European’ Saint Petersburg [Sankt-Peterburg] in 1712, Russia became a European power, especially in the second half of the 18th century, thanks to its westward expansion at the expense of the partitioned Poland-Lithuania. The final limit of this expansion was reached with the crushing of the Napoleonic armies, when Russian soldiers were billeted in Paris; the Congress of Vienna [Wien] (1815) granted the tsar further Polish-Lithuanian lands extending west of the River Vistula [Wisła]. These developments, symbolic of the ‘Europeanisation’ of Russia that was desired by Saint Petersburg’s elite, were reflected in the concomitant eastward shift of the boundary of Europe to encompass more of the territory of this new and now clearly European power. In atlases published in that period, the eastern boundary of Europe moved first to the Volga River [Volga] (KHAKIMOV et al. 2006, pp. 308–309, 316–317), reached the northern Urals in 1789 (KHAKIMOV et al. 2006, pp. 342–343) and arrived at its current position at the turn of the 19th century (KHAKIMOV et al. 2006, pp. 408–411).

In this new conception of Europe, Russia accounted for roughly a third of the area of the continent, which gave rise to the new term ‘Eastern Europe.’ It became a classificatory box for ‘European Russia,’ belonging to Europe, but still somehow ‘other’ (WOLFF 1994).

‘Central Europe’ was even slower in the making, having no big imperial project behind it. Not surprisingly, the Jesuits, having created and maintained their Latin-
medium educational system in Catholic Europe since the Counter-Reformation, seem to have invented the term. In the territorial organisation of the Society of Jesus, they identified *Europa Centralis* with Norway, Sweden (including Finland, and what today is Estonia and Latvia), Denmark, the Low Countries, the Holy Roman Empire and Switzerland. Their *Europa Orientalis*, or Eastern Europe, comprised Poland-Lithuania, the Habsburgs’ Kingdom of Hungary and most of the Ottoman Balkans, whereas the ‘rest’ fell to *Europa Occidentalis*, or Western Europe, composed of the British Isles, France, Malta, the Greek-speaking Orthodox territories in the Ottomans’ southern Balkans, 2) western Asia Minor, Crete and Cyprus, and the territories of the former Crusader polities in the Middle East. The Iberian and Apennine peninsulas were excluded from the Jesuit schema, respectively named as the provinces of Hispania and Roma in their own right (FOUCHER 1993, p. 19).

This somewhat quirky (but to the modern eye already recognizable) tripartite division of Europe has obtained from the 19th century to this day. At the turn of the 19th century, the middle of Europe seemed different, because it was not dominated by any significant power, in contrast both to Eastern Europe which coincided with Russia, and to Western Europe which housed the ‘Western powers’ of Britain, France, Spain and Portugal. After the disappearance of the Holy Roman Empire (the oldest, largest and most stable polity in continental Europe 3) from the Middle Ages through the early modern era), the area between Western and Eastern Europe, with its tens of polities, seemed in need of urgent reform to cure it of *Kleinstaaterei-itis*, or the ‘disease of small states’.

In the second half of the 19th century the Kingdom of Italy (1859–1870) and the German Empire (1871), founded as nation-states, swept away many of these statelets, especially in the western section of would-be Central Europe. The Habsburg Empire absorbed the rest and expanded southward into the Balkans, from where the Ottoman Empire was progressively elbowed out, opening the region up as the theatre for the subsequent power struggle between Russia and the West. At the turn of the 20th century nationalism became coupled with imperialism. In the course of the Great War (1914–1918), Germany, allied with Austria-Hungary as the Central (European?) Powers, successfully pushed against Russia, and the sudden extension of their dominion

2) This early modern linking of the Grecophone Balkan areas (that became Greece in the 1820s and 1830s) with *Europa Occidentalis* may explain the contemporary predilection for including this logically Central or Southeastern European country within the ambit of Western Europe. The assignment to Western Europe of this rather peripheral region of modern Europe has allowed the West to claim the tradition of ‘ancient Graecian civilisation’ and ‘Greek democracy’ for itself, however illogical this is from a geographical point of view, whether real or imagined. This incorporation of Greece into Western Europe amounts to quite an ideological gain for the West and is a considerable political bonus to Greece. It contrasts starkly with the conceptual treatment of the countries of the Balkans and of the Middle East, though these countries also stand on the territory of the ‘Greek world’ of Antiquity.

3) What a stealthy and rather anachronistic term ‘continental Europe’ is. As common as ‘continental breakfast,’ which one comes across as far afield as North America and Australia, it came into use with the rise of the British Empire in the 18th and 19th centuries, when the United Kingdom with its numerous imperial possessions appeared to be a world unto itself, with no need for Europe. After World War II and in the wake of decolonisation, this changed and Britain repeatedly sought membership of the European Communities, despite France’s opposition. Finally, in 1973 the United Kingdom (and Ireland) joined the European Communities, but in the minds of Anglo-Saxon and Irish students the British Isles remain a distinct European region (Brito-Celtic Europe), if not an entirely separate continent.
seemed to presage the establishment of a *Mitteleuropa*, or their exclusive sphere of political and economic dominance (*Naumann* 1915). Afterwards, the derived English term ‘Middle Europe’ made an appearance, before transforming into ‘Central Europe’ during the interwar period.

This new Central Europe was shifted eastward vis-à-vis its 19th-century predecessor; Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Austria, Hungary, Romania, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Albania and Greece were included in its embrace. However, Scandinavia, alongside newly independent Finland, somehow ‘drifted away’ from Central Europe. Soon, however, World War II wiped away Central Europe and other geographical-cum-ideological concepts from the political map of the continent, while the Cold War divided Europe into the two unambiguously opposed camps of Western and Eastern Europe. There was no space for Central Europe any longer.

In the wake of the collapse of Communism and the breakups of the Soviet bloc (1989) and of the Soviet Union itself, the concept of Central Europe revived in numerous shapes and guises. There is, however, no popular consensus on where precisely this slippery region is located or on where its boundaries lie. As a solution to this exasperating problem it was proposed that perhaps the vertical midsection of Europe could be usefully identified with Central Europe, while the two other equal sections should be apportioned to Western and Eastern Europe, respectively (*Magočsi* 2002). Somehow, even in this all-inclusive schema, Scandinavia seems to remain outside *Europa Centralis*.

Why? Because Central Europe is a figment of the mind, an invention, a unilateral imposition of concepts on a terrain by the humans who inhabit it or dominate it from outside. In hard geographical terms there is no Central Europe, as, indeed, there is no Europe. The latter, at best, is a prominent western peninsula of Eurasia, similar to the Indian subcontinent that distinctly protrudes from Eurasia’s belly (cf. *Hefferan* 1999).

## 2 Writing on the wall

In Antiquity, the southern section of the commonsensical concept of Central Europe (the midsection of the continent) coincided with some provinces of the Roman Empire extending up to the line of the Danube in the north. In addition, for almost two centuries the Romans controlled their province of Dacia (106–275), today in Romania. The imperial administration and the Roman elites brought the technique of writing to this future southern Central Europe on a grand scale; previously it had tended to be confined to Greek *poleis*. Writing came to the region in the garb of two languages with their own specific scripts, Greek and Latin. (The latter script had evolved from the former, following the founding of Greek colonies in what today is southern Italy, but was the *Magna Graecia* of Antiquity [*Ferrar* 1869, p. 102]). The line of division between these two types of Roman literacy ran, using present-day points of reference,

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4 The Latin alphabet is sometimes referred to as ‘Roman’. Here I have settled on the former moniker, reserving the sobriquet ‘Roman’ for the Roman Empire.
from the Adriatic coast in northern Albania via Sofia [Sofija] to the Black Sea port of Varna. North of this line Latin was employed with its cultural centre in Rome, and Greek in the south, radiating from Constantinople [Istanbul] (Jiřiček 1911, pp. 3–4). The fourth-century division of the Roman Empire did not follow this line, though it coincided with it pretty well; just a sliver of Latin-speaking territories fell to the Eastern Roman Empire (so-called Byzantium5).

At that time writing was unknown in the rest of Central Europe to the north, because there was no immediate need for it. The Turkic-speaking Avars, who established themselves in the Danubian basin in the late 6th century, had no evident difficulty maintaining their extensive khanate for over two centuries without resorting to writing. However, they probably instituted Slavic as their realm’s official language to facilitate communication between groups of inhabitants speaking other mutually incomprehensible languages. This would explain the rapid spread of Slavic across Central and Eastern Europe from the 6th to the 9th century (Curta 2004).

Neither did the Frankish merchant Samo have any need for writing when he founded his Slavophone realm at the expense of the Avars in the first half of the 7th century. Obviously, in Scandinavia and the Baltic basin Norsemen (popularly known as Vikings) used their rudimentary Runes (developed from the Latin alphabet in the 2nd century) for short notes and inscriptions on stones and (perhaps) twigs (Odenstedt 1990). Among the Avars and the Turkicphone Bulgars, who founded their Bulgarian Khanate, the so-called Turkic Runes appeared, especially in the south of Central Europe. Despite their popular name and misleading similarity in shape (a similarity effectively technologically determined because both had to be incised or carved into hard substrate materials), these Runes are not the same as those of the Norsemen. This old Turkic writing system seems to have been developed independently, influenced by the Chinese, Aramaic, Pahlavi and Sogdian scripts (Thomsen 1894). From it the so-called Hungarian Runes evolved, brought to the Danubian basin at the turn of the 10th century by the Finno-Ugric and Turkic coalition of ethnic groups, who later became known as Hungarians. Interestingly, the use of this old Hungarian script survived in Transylvania until the 17th century. (The Nordic Runes had fallen out of use in Scandinavia two centuries earlier.) Recently, the script was revived for nationalist ends in Hungary (Maxwell 2004; Rona-Tas 1987).6

5) The name Byzantium for the Eastern Roman Empire is an early modern coinage developed during the 16th century in the Holy Roman Empire, a century after the Ottomans’ capture of Constantinople. Hence, there was no longer a ‘Roman’ ambassador to protest about this retrospective renaming of their empire, while on the ideological plane, the use of the coveted adjective ‘Roman’ could be thus appropriated for referring to the Holy Roman Empire. This Empire disappeared, too, but the coinage of ‘Byzantium’ for talking about the Eastern Roman Empire remains; its ideological underpinning is all but forgotten (Kamusella 2009a, p. 964).

6) The question of whether paleographs and petrographs found in Slavic-speaking territories (mainly in Eastern Europe) amounted to ‘Slavic runes’ remains undecided, though the evidence gathered allows them to be interpreted as personalised signs and representations that never amounted to a writing system. However, some, for ideological reasons, hail them as the ‘first Slavic script’ (Gromov & Bychkov 2005).
The way of the Cross (and sword)

At the turn of the Second Millennium, Christianity became the main ideology of statehood legitimisation and recognition in Europe, which left no leeway to the rulers in the northern half of Central Europe but to accept this religion or perish at the hands of their already Christian neighbours. The only realistic choice to be made was that between receiving Christianity from Rome or from Constantinople. Greater Moravia, the Slavic polity that succeeded the Avar Khanate, opted for adopting this religion from Constantinople in the 860s. It came along with the specific Glagolitic script, developed on the basis of the Greek alphabet. This was supplemented by the employment of other writing systems in use on the territory of Romania (as the inhabitants of Byzantium referred to their empire in Greek), namely, Armenian, Georgian, Gothic, Hebrew or Syriac (Heinz & Richter 2000; Vondrák 1912, pp. 57–64). But because Greater Moravia bordered directly on the powerful Frankish Empire (which followed the Roman religious obedience), it was politically expedient for it to compromise in the religious sphere; its territory was therefore subjected to Roman ecclesiastical administration, though continuing to adhere to Slavonic for liturgical and official purposes. However, Slavonic, written in Glagolitic, remained the official language of the realm only until 885, when this uneasy compromise unraveled. Clergy writing in Glagolitic-based Slavonic were expelled, and the Latin language and its script were made official (Georgiev 1956; Treštik 2001).

The expelled clergy were welcomed in Bulgaria, which had accepted Christianity from Constantinople in 864. The Bulgarian Church received autonomy from the reluctant Romans (Byzantines) in 870, and the clergy were instrumental in replacing Greek with Glagolitic-based Slavonic in 893, thus fortifying this ecclesiastical autonomy on the plane of separate culture and literacy. Soon, however, Glagolitic itself was replaced with Cyrillic, modeled on the prestigious Greek script (Crampton 1997, pp. 13–16; Vondrák 1912, pp. 64–66).

Glagolitic remained in ecclesiastical use for the Catholic liturgy until the early 20th century on the Kvarner island of Veglia [Krk] (today in Croatia), and was revived as a symbol of Croatian national identity after the country became independent in 1991 (Japundžić 1998; Vajs 1917).

Until the beginning of the 11th century, previously non-Christian territories of Central Europe were divided between Western Christianity stemming from Rome and its Eastern counterpart emanating from Constantinople. The divide mapped the spheres of political and cultural influence exerted by the Holy Roman Empire and the papacy on the one hand and by Byzantium on the other. Western Christianity came with Latin literacy, while the cultural package of Eastern Christianity allowed more space for local languages and scripts other than Greek, that is, Glagolitic and Cyrillic in Central Europe. The political-cum-cultural fault line between these two Christian political and cultural traditions was reaffirmed by the Great Schism of 1054. In the north it extended roughly between Catholic Sweden, Poland and Hungary on one side, and Orthodox Rus’ on the other, while in the south the fault line lay between Catholic Venice, Croatia and Hungary on the one hand, and Orthodox Serbia, Bulgaria (under Roman [Byzantine] control) and Romania (Byzantium) on the other.
The remaining non-Christian areas in Central Europe were up for grabs, as they were inhabited, from the Christian vantage, by ‘heathens.’ Catholicism coupled with Latin penetrated the future Finland when Sweden seized that land in the 12th century, while the Orthodox Rus’ Republic of Novgorod dominated Karelia, bringing Cyrillic-based Slavonic literacy there. During the 13th and 14th centuries the Catholic Teutonic Knights established their crusader state in the southern Baltic littoral (inhabited by Baltic- and Finno-Ugric-speakers), the area that extends today from northeastern Poland to Estonia (Bojtár 1999, pp. 118–128; Hunyadi & Laszlovszy 2001; Kirby 2006, pp. 6–8).

4 The Central Europe of many scriptures

The decline and fragmentation of the Rus’ principalities, deepened by the Mongol invasions in the first half of the 13th century, led to the annexation of the western principalities by the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, Poland and Hungary. In 1386 the two former polities united, forming Poland-Lithuania. In the 13th and 14th centuries, to the east of Hungary and with that country’s involvement, the Orthodox principalities of Walachia and Moldavia (or the core of today’s Romania and Moldova) emerged. The Romanceophone inhabitants of these two principalities adopted Cyrillic and Slavonic, and their choices were followed by their kin Romance-speakers in Hungary’s Transylvania (nowadays in Romania) (Mițu 2001, pp. 236–243). As a result, Poland-Lithuania and Hungary, though themselves Catholic monarchies, became home to both Latin and Cyrillic-based Slavonic literacies. Following the expulsions of Germanic-speaking Ashkenazi Jews from Western Europe in the wake of the Black Death (mid-14th century), they re-established themselves in Poland-Lithuania and Hungary, bringing with them Hebrew-script literacies in both Hebrew and Yiddish (literally ‘Jewish German’) (Foà 2000).

In the south, the Roman (Byzantine) Empire was progressively weakened by Muslim Arabs in the Middle East, by Muslim Turks in Anatolia and by Western European crusaders. It fell to the Ottomans gradually in the first half of the 15th century (culminating in the capture of Constantinople itself in 1453), allowing for the founding of a Muslim Ottoman Empire (also known as the Caliphate from the early 16th century onwards). Islam came as a cultural package complete with the Arabic script and the Arabic language as the language of religion, law, science and literature. In administration, the Ottomans employed Osmanlıca (Ottoman Turkish) and composed poetry in Persian, but invariably wrote the two languages in Arabic script. The subsequent expansion of this empire-cum-caliphate, continuing through the 17th century, brought Arabic-script literacies in Arabic, Osmanlıca and Persian as far north as today’s Hungary, Slovakia and southwestern Ukraine (Hadžiosmanović & Memija 1995; Strauss 1995).

At the same time, in Rumelia (literally the ‘Roman land,’ or the Ottomans’ Balkan territories) in different religious communities (organised as non-territorial autonomous millets [Hupchick 1994]), Cyrillic-based, Greek and Latin literacies continued for the Orthodox and Catholic subjects of the Sultan, respectively. During the second
half of the first millennium within the Byzantine Empire, in southern Rus’ from the 11th century, and within the Black Sea basin beginning in the 14th century. Armenians had established their diaspora over a territory extending from present-day western Ukraine through Romania to the Balkans. The practices of their monophysite Church were intimately bound up with Armenian-script literacy in Grabar (Old Armenian). They also constituted a separate Armenian millet in the Ottoman Empire (cf. TRYJARSKI 2006). Finally, in the wake of the reconquista of Iberia (completed in 1492), Sephardi Jews expelled from Spain and Portugal established themselves in northern Africa and elsewhere in the Ottoman Empire, notably in their vibrant communities across the Balkans. Like their Ashkenazi counterparts they wrote in Hebrew characters and composed books in Hebrew, but in everyday life preferred Ladino (Judeo-Spanish) (FOA 2000, pp. 108–137; HARRIS 1994).

Obviously, prior to modern times only specialists or an elite could read and write, but the pattern was established that a literacy in a script was derived from a holy book in (or its approved translation into) a language written in such a script. Even if a community of faithful chose to write in a different language for the sake of everyday communication, administration, commerce or for other purposes, it invariably adhered to the script of its holy book. That is why Slavophone Muslims in Poland-Lithuania and in Bosnia jotted down their Slavic vernaculars in Arabic letters; Catholics used the Latin alphabet for writing in Bohemian (Czech), German or Polish; Orthodox Christians wrote Ruthenian (the predecessor of Belarusian and Ukrainian) and Walachian (Romanian) in Cyrillic; and Armenians noted their everyday vernacular of the Turkic language of Kipchak in the Armenian script (cf. AKINER 2009, pp. 81–85; HUKOVIĆ 1997; VÎRTOSU 1968).

5 Printing, religious wars and vernaculars

The invention and spread of printing in Europe since the mid-15th century, coupled, in the following century, with the Reformation’s encouragement of the use of vernaculars for the translation and dissemination of the Bible constitute a watershed between the pre-modern and early modern employments of scripts and literacy on the continent. They decisively changed the environment of politics and culture by making books progressively more widely available. At the same time, literacy spread from specialists and a narrow elite to the nobility and burghers – the forerunners of the middle class. Under the influence of the French Revolution, the turn of the 19th century saw the rise of the idea of popular elementary education in Scandinavia and north-western Central Europe, namely, in Prussia, Austria and other successor states of the Holy Ro-

7) As the reader will undoubtedly notice, I do not continue the story of Armenian literacy in Central Europe beyond World War I. By that time assimilation had taken its toll, leaving the few remaining Armenians literate only in the languages of their countries of residence. What is more, the 1915 genocide of Armenians in the Ottoman Empire extinguished their thriving communities across Anatolia. Armenian refugees and economic migrants from post-Soviet Armenia began arriving in Central Europe again in the 1990s, but so far this phenomenon has had no influence on the official use of scripts in the region.
man Empire. In these areas populations became fully literate by the second half of the 19th century (GRAFF 1987, pp. 108–264; JOHANSSON 1987; WANDEL 2011, pp. 67, 78).

Printing and literacy, having developed into instruments of politics and propaganda in the course of the religious wars during the 16th and 17th centuries, spread rapidly in the previously ‘Latin Europe,’ now split into Catholic and Protestant camps. The printing press and the ideal of widespread literacy entered the Slavic Orthodox world by way of emulation in the Orthodox areas of Poland-Lithuania. From the turn of the 17th century the printed book helped Catholic endeavors to ‘detach’ the Orthodox faithful in Poland-Lithuania and Hungary from the Orthodox Church and, in turn, to make them into liturgically distinctive branches of the Catholic Church under ultimate papal authority. It was the beginning of the so-called Uniate (later renamed ‘Greek Catholic’) Churches. As a result, Uniates (Greek Catholics) often shifted to the Latin script in everyday life, but in most cases (apart from Transylvania’s Romanians) preserved Cyrillic for ecclesiastical purposes (MAGOCSI 2008; ZIMMER et al. 1983).

The penetration of printing into the Orthodox world was slower on several accounts. First, Western Christianity was perceived by Orthodox ecclesiastical elites as an ideological enemy and its ecclesiastical Latin (including the script), often, as the ‘language of the devil’. (Yet, in 18th-century Russia it was the established language of learning and science, until it was replaced by French and Russian in the following century.) Secondly, the Orthodox clergy’s (theologically argued) insistence on writing books by hand reaffirmed the ideological difference between Western and Orthodox Christianity at the level of technology. Thirdly, the fact that the southern half of the Orthodox world and the seat of the Ecumenical Patriarch found themselves under Ottoman rule deepened their insulation from both Western Christianity and technological innovation. In addition, Muslims shared Orthodox Christians’ distaste at the idea of mechanical copying of a holy scripture, which reaffirmed the former’s stance in this regard. Fourthly, the Orthodox ecclesiastical centers happened to be located far away from the areas where printing developed (cf. KAMUSELLA 2009a, p. 133; SKINNER 2005).

Printing took off in earnest in Petrine Russia at the beginning of the 18th century and at the turn of the 19th century among Slavophone and Romancephone Orthodox Christians in the Balkans (CRACRAFT 2004, pp. 257–275; PACURARIU 2010, pp. 192–194). Because Ancient Greek was lauded alongside Latin as a language of humanist culture, Greek books had been published in the Apennine Peninsula since the 16th century, but for use by Catholic humanist scholars, not by Orthodox Grecophones speaking in the vernacular (that is, Romaic, or the ‘Roman’ language). In the Ottoman Empire the printing press was shunned. A Jewish press producing books in Hebrew fonts opened there in 1493, followed by its Armenian counterpart in 1576, while Greek-language print shops were founded in the Ottoman Empire only during the early 17th century. However, the continuous tradition of printing Osmanlica, Arabic and Persian in Arabic letters began as late as the early 19th century, and then only under Western influence (BAYSAL 1968; LEHMANN 2005, p. 41).

A similar delay in the development of distinct vernacular languages can be observed when comparing their rise across European territories dominated by Latin (Western) Christianity, by Orthodox Christianity and by Islam. The rise of German, Bohemian (Czech) and Polish began between the 13th and 16th centuries in the Holy Roman Empire.
and Poland-Lithuania, but Latin remained the main language of politics, administration, scholarship and literature until the Reformation. Protestantism and the Catholic reaction in the form of the Counter-Reformation (that in many ways emulated the ways of the Reformation) tipped the scales in favour of vernaculars. The process was slower in Central Europe than in Western Europe. In officialdom and culture German replaced Latin in the Protestant areas of the Holy Roman Empire and in Prussia during the 18th century, and at the same time Swedish became the dominant language in Sweden. In the late 18th century Latin was superseded by German and by Polish in the Habsburg lands within the Holy Roman Empire and in Poland-Lithuania, respectively. In the Kingdom of Hungary (at that time comprised of what today is Hungary, Slovakia, western and northern Croatia, Ukraine’s Transcarpathia, Romania’s Transylvania and Banat, Serbia’s Vojvodina and Austria’s Burgenland), Hungarian and German gradually took over the elevated role of Latin until the change was completed in the mid-19th century. The turning wave also impinged on Jewish autonomies in these areas, as they were compelled to discontinue their employment of Hebrew in favour of official state languages in secular contexts (Beauvois 1977; Kann 1974, pp. 203–207, 288; Robertson 2004, pp. 213–214; Winas 2000, pp. 174–175).

Poland-Lithuania’s Cyrillic-based Ruthenian had been official since the turn of the 14th century, while Polish attained a co-official status with Latin only in the mid-16th century. But in the course of the Counter-Reformation Ruthenian was phased out from any official use by the end of the 17th century. In this way a thriving Orthodox Cyrillic-based vernacular was extinguished prior to the modern period (Stang 1932; Uspeński 1987, pp. 262–263). Walachian (Romanian), also written in Cyrillic, fared better in the Orthodox Danubian Principalities of Walachia and Moldavia and in Hungary’s Transylvania. It entered official use in the two principalities, side by side with Church Slavonic, in the late 16th century, and surprisingly replaced the latter in the liturgy in all three regions at the beginning of the 18th century (Zach 1977, pp. 18–19, 185–187).

Greek also continued to be used across the Ottoman Empire in the Rum (‘Roman’, that is, Orthodox) millet and in ecclesiastical correspondence with other Orthodox Churches outside this empire. It was not, however, a vernacular, but the language of the former Byzantine administration, modeled on the Greek of the Gospels, which had replaced Latin as the official language of the Byzantine Empire as early as the first decades of the 7th century (Ostrogorsky 1969, p. 106). This Byzantine Greek became the main official language of the Danubian Principalities in the early 18th century, when the Sultan entrusted Phanariot (that is, from the eponymous quarter in Constantinople) Greeks with the administration of Walachia and Moldavia, and the language retained this status until the early 19th century (Djuvara 1995, pp. 123–126; Strauss 1995). This antiquated Greek officialese of late Antiquity, slightly modernised as Katharevousa, or ‘pure(ifying) language’, was replaced in Greece itself with a more vernacular-based Demotic Greek only as late as 1976. The decision was symbolic of the return of democracy to Greece, as it was taken just two years after the fall of the military junta (Horrocks 2010, p. 459; Mackridge 2010, pp. 318–335).

The main vernacular of the modern Orthodox world, Russian, developed as a language in its own right in the course of the 18th century, gradually replacing Church
Slavonic in non-ecclesiastical contexts in Russia. The distinction between lay and religious books had been emphasised since the early 18th century, during the reign of Peter the Great, by the use of the new type of Cyrillic (Grazhdanka, or literally ‘civil script’), modeled on the Antiqua type of the Latin alphabet, for books on secular topics, while ecclesiastical texts continued to be printed in Church (or Old) Cyrillic (Cracroft 2004, pp. 276–300; Shitsgal 1959). But Swedish, Polish and German were used in administration and in education in the western provinces of the Russian Empire until the second half of the 19th century, when Russian was gradually introduced there in this capacity (Stalniunas 2007; Thaden 1981).

Emulating the example of Russia and its language, Serbian and Bulgarian were developed as languages in their own right in the 19th century, and books in these languages began to be printed in the Grazhdanka that began to replace the traditional Church Cyrillic in the 1820s; this process was completed in the second half of the 19th century (Kamusella 2009a, pp. 353–354; Milanović 2004, pp. 99–102; Milosavlević 2006, pp. 311–392).

The embracement of vernaculars progressed even more slowly in the Islamic world. In the second half of the 19th century the vernacular Tatar, itself written in Arabic characters, replaced Arabic as the main language of education and written communication among Muslims in European Russia (cf. Nasyri 1977; Tornow 2005, pp. 555–563). On the other hand, in India during the British Raj, the non-native Persian was replaced in 1837 with the equally non-native English as the official language, though the north Indian vernacular of Hindustani (today split by script into Devanagari-based Hindi and Urdu written in Arabic characters) also entered official use (Brass 2005, p. 129). These developments did not change the official language policy of the Ottoman Empire, where the vernacular-based Turkish (at the beginning, literally created on the spur of the moment) replaced Osmanlıca in 1923, when the surviving rump of this empire was transformed into the Turkish nation-state. Five years later, following the Soviet example (where the ‘Latinisation campaign’ had begun in the early 1920s [Jakovlev 1936]) the Latin script, seen as a symbol and instrument of modernisation, was adopted for this language (Lewis 1999; Heyd 1954).8)

The national movements that proliferated in Central Europe during the 19th century created new languages (for instance, Serbo-Croatian or Slovak) or revived vernaculars which had been employed during the Reformation for translations of the Gospels, but which since then had fallen into abeyance. The latter group includes Slovenian and Estonian. Nationalism in Central Europe settled on language as its ideological foundation. Hence, each nation and nation-state in the region has aspired to the undisputed and total possession of its own national language not shared with any other nation or polity (Kamusella 2006). The repeated dividing of Central Europe among ethnolinguistic nation-states after World War I and in the wake of the breakups of the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia has amply evidenced this tendency (Kamusella

8) Interestingly, the shift to vernaculars has not yet occurred in the states where Arabic continues to be official. The official language is derived from the Arabic of the Quran, and thus it differs radically from the Arabic vernaculars of everyday communication (Ferguson 1959).
A linguistic casualty of this fitting of languages to nations and their polities was French, which between the 18th century and World War II functioned as the language of wider communication for elites and for scholarship across Europe, irrespective of any religious differences. Aristocrats, politicians, diplomats and scientists spoke and corresponded in this language in Austria-Hungary, Russia and the Ottoman Empire (cf. Fumaroli 2011).

Unlike in Scandinavia and in the western (‘Germanic’) section of Central Europe, the attainment of full literacy in the east of Central Europe and in the Balkans had to wait until the mid-20th century. Mostly, this achievement is connected with the Communist system, which placed a premium on popular literacy as an instrument of bureaucratic control and indoctrination. The development of heavy industry, equated with modernisation by Soviet-style Communist regimes, could not be achieved without a fully literate workforce (Eklof 1987). In contrast, in stubbornly rural Greece and Turkey, both of which remained in the West’s sphere of influence after World War II, a considerable section of the population remained illiterate well into the second half of 20th and even into the 21st centuries, as was also the case in southern Italy (Harris 1989, p. 23; Nohl et al. 2008, p. 278).

### 6 Scripting politics

First, the ‘enlightened absolutism’ of the 18th century and, secondly, the rise of ethnolinguistic nationalism during the 19th century contributed strongly to often dramatic changes in language policy across Central Europe. These were followed by border changes when newly founded nation-states initially chipped away at the Ottoman Empire. Since 1918 the model of the ethnolinguistic nation-state has become the sole legitimate form of statehood in this part of Europe (Kamusella 2006), leading to the breakups of the avowedly non-national empires of the Habsburgs and the Ottomans. The founding of the Soviet Union (1922) and its Central European empire in the shape of the Soviet bloc after 1945 froze this process for half a century, before it recommenced with a vengeance after the fall of Communism (1989), resulting in the serial breakups of the non-national polities of the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia.

Surprisingly, these upheavals did not rub off very distinctly on the use of scripts in Central Europe. The dynamics of changes in this regard seem to have followed a different pattern, which one (not altogether mistakenly) might like to dub ‘civilizational,’ following Huntington’s rather biased diagnosis of the source of future conflicts (cf. 1996, pp. 22–27). The traditional connection of script to religion professed by a population weathered well the dramatic re-drawing of the political map, and was rarely challenged by national movements or proponents of vernaculars. From the late Middle Ages in Central Europe the Arabic alphabet, Cyrillic and the Latin script were confined to their respective corners, the geographical zones of their use changing only marginally due to the fluctuation of the Ottoman borders in Europe and to the founding of the Uniate Churches in Poland-Lithuania and Hungary. When vernaculars
were committed to paper or made into official languages, Latin letters were adopted for them in Catholic and Protestant Europe, Cyrillic in Slavophone Orthodox lands, and the Arabic script in the House of Islam.

After the fall of Constantinople, the Greek alphabet lost the position of imperial script in Romania (Byzantium) and that of primus inter pares among the writing systems of the Orthodox world. However, it retained its primacy in the Ottoman Empire’s Rum (Orthodox) millet, in which Cyrillic functioned as a poor relation to the Greek script. As a result, a high degree of Greek-Bulgarian bilingualism and Greek-Cyrillic biscripturalism continued among the Bulgarian national elite until the founding of the Bulgarian nation-state in 1878 (Myhill 2006, p. 78). From the 16th to the late 19th centuries a steadily increasing number of vernacular Slavic books were printed and handwritten in the Greek alphabet for Orthodox Slavophones in what today is Bulgaria and Macedonia (Giannelli & Vailant 1958; Mladenova 2007, pp. 5–6; Petkanova-Toteva 1965).

Likewise, motivated in their choice by religion, the Catholic Grecophones of the island of Chios wrote in Latin letters and their Muslim counterparts in the Arabic script (Deedes 2000; Koztzegeorgis 2010, p. 298). The same pattern was followed by Albanian-speakers, the majority of whom professed Islam, but with Orthodox Christian and Catholic adherents among them, too. Their different religious allegiances were paralleled by their use of the Arabic, Greek and Latin scripts, respectively. In addition, Orthodox Albanians sometimes also employed Cyrillic, or rather selected Cyrillic letters. In a manner that resembled the Romanian case (see below), Albanian-speakers (mainly in the 19th century) employed idiosyncratic alphabets that usually mixed Latin and Greek letters, sometimes with the addition of a few Cyrillic and Arabic characters. In 1905–1908 they settled for a Latin alphabet-based Albanian, which let the nascent Albanian national movement override the confessional differences extant among Albanian-speakers, thus facilitating the founding of a cohesive and independent Albania in 1912. It was the first-ever Balkan nation-state set up on an ethnolinguistic basis. The already existing Balkan nation-states had come into being as polities legitimised by religious-based nationalisms (Elsie 2005, pp. 11, 16, 29, 37–38, 76; Moide 2005, pp. 24–27).

Of importance for the history of scripts in Central Europe was the tradition of Greek-alphabet books in Karmanli, or the Turkic vernacular of Orthodox Christians in central Anatolia (Karaman and Cappadocia), produced from the early 18th century to the 1930s (Petropoulos 2007, pp. 96–99). Some of the books were brought by traders to the Russian province of Bessarabia (or today’s Moldova), where, in the late 19th century, they contributed to the rise of religious writings in Greek letters among Orthodox Christian Turkicophone Gagauzes (Bulgar 2005). Similarly, between 1868 and 1941, some periodicals and 40-odd books were published for Bosnia’s Slavophone Muslims in Arabic characters. During this time the region changed hands between the Ottomans, Austria-Hungary and Yugoslavia (Hukovic 1986).

The empires which ruled over the territories of Central Europe usually did not intervene in their subjects’ religiously-motivated choice of script for writing and book production. This approach was modified, though not radically, with the rise of nation-states. The banning of Ruthenian from official use in Poland-Lithuania at the
end of the 17th century, which removed Cyrillic from state offices, was caused, not by nationalism at this early date, but by the ideology of the Counter-Reformation, which reaffirmed the increasingly Catholic nature of this polity, at the expense of the Orthodox Church. The Greek War of Independence (1821–1832) and the eventual founding of Greece as an independent nation-state was interpreted by the Ottoman sultan as marked disloyalty by Greek-speakers, and he reciprocated with the dismissal of the Phanariot Greeks from the administration of Walachia and Moldavia. This development suddenly confined the use of the Greek language and alphabet at the level of state administration to the newly independent Kingdom of Greece. The subsequent founding of the other Balkan nation-states of Montenegro, Serbia and Bulgaria, on the ideological plane, was symbolised by the elevation of Cyrillic to the rank of their national alphabet, and meant the removal of the Arabic script from official use, limiting its employment to external relations with the Ottoman Empire. By the same token (especially in Bulgaria), the Greek language and script were removed from ecclesiastical administration, replaced with the Cyrillic-based Slavonic language, and later, with vernaculars written in that alphabet.

In Hungary’s Transylvania at the turn of the 19th century, the Greek Catholic (Uniate) Church’s increasing use of Latin and the example of the region’s Hungarian and (German-speaking) Saxon elites writing in Latin letters convinced local Greek Catholic and Orthodox Romancephones to start using the Latin script, instead of the traditional Cyrillic, for writing in Walachian (Romanian). This tendency percolated to adjacent Walachia and Moldavia, contributing to the rise of a unique mixed, Cyrillic-Latin script, whose several variants were employed for writing and book production between the 1820s and 1850s. Finally, Walachia adopted the Latin script in 1860 and Moldavia three years later. (This adoption is now extended anachronistically backward in time, as chrestomathies of and excerpts from Walachian texts in Cyrillic are, as a matter of course, nowadays given in Romanian’s present-day Latin script orthography.) When the two principalities were united to form Romania in 1866, the Romanian language was already being written in Latin letters, thus emphasizing the Romanian national movement’s ideological desire to ‘reconnect’ Romanian culture with the Romancephone world of Western Europe, then symbolised by France and its language. Gradually, Slavic elements were purged from Romanian and replaced with neologisms, and with initially Italian and then French linguistic loans (Close 1974, pp. 15–29, 37–45; Niculescu 1981, pp. 119–120, 149–150; Vitroșu 1968, pp. 221–250).

This change of script in Romania is unusual in Central Europe, matched only by Turkey’s wholesale abandonment of the Arabic writing system for the Latin alphabet in 1928. In this way, language and script became the ideological core of modern-day Romanian nationalism. These momentous changes did not extend to Romancephones in Russia’s Bessarabia, who continued to write their strongly Slavicised language of Moldavian (today’s Moldovan) in Cyrillic. When interwar Romania annexed this territory, Moldavian became Romanian, and Latin letters superseded Cyrillic. (The change in script was also extended to Gagauz, which had been written in Cyrillic since the early 20th century.) But Cyrillic-based Moldavian swiftly returned to this territory, reconstituted as the Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic (1940), after the Soviet Union had seized it during World War II. (Likewise, Gagauz had to be written in

In the Russian Empire, the Latin script dominated in the western and Baltic provinces (that is, in present-day Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, east-central Poland, Belarus and central Ukraine), because in these areas the Latin alphabet-based languages of Polish, German and Swedish (and later Finnish, too) were employed in administration and education. The gradual change to Russian (and hence to Cyrillic) began in the wake of the two failed uprisings of the Polish-Lithuanian nobility against the Tsar (in 1830–1831 and 1863–1864). As a result, Polish was replaced with Russian as the official language. first, after 1831 in the Polish-Lithuanian territories directly incorporated into Russia and then, following the 1863–1864 rebellion, in Russia’s autonomous Congress Kingdom of Poland. In this way Cyrillic became the official and dominant script in this area. In the latter half of the 1860s several Polish-language textbooks were published in Cyrillic, but this practice was soon abandoned. (Interestingly, in the late 1860s Saint Petersburg considered the project of an All-Slavic Cyrillic alphabet for all Slavic languages, and, ideally, also for the non-Slavic Estonians, Latvians and Lithuanians [cf. Gil’ferding 1871; Glembotski 2005, pp. 140, 148, 159]). However, beginning in 1865, it was pursued more rigorously vis-à-vis books in Lithuanian and Latvian, before the policy was discontinued in 1904–1905, due in part to the staunch opposition of Catholic Lithuanians, and of Catholic and Protestant Latvians, but mainly thanks to the overall liberalisation of public life in the Empire after the 1905 Revolution (Stalnunas 2007, pp. 197–198, 233–249).

In 1859 St Petersburg banned the Latin script, which in Russia had until then sometimes been employed in White Russian (Belarusian) and Little Russian (Ukrainian) books for Catholics and Greek Catholics. (Among other influencing factors, the Russian move seems to have been provoked by the ultimately failed attempt by Austria-Hungary that same year to replace Cyrillic with the Latin alphabet for Ruthenian [Ukrainian] in its Crownland of Galicia.) Only Cyrillic was allowed to be used for such publishing, before all book production in both languages was completely banned in the wake of the 1863–1864 Polish-Lithuanian uprising. White Russian and Little Russian appeared to St Petersburg to be a ‘Polish intrigue’ to weaken the ethnolinguistic unity of the Great Russian nation (consisting of Little Russians, Russians and White Russians) speaking the Great Russian language (with Little Russian and White Russian as its dialects).

In the 1880s, Russification (necessarily rolled into one with Cyrillicisation) became standard policy in the European half of the Russian Empire. Russian replaced German in the Baltic provinces and in 1900 replaced both Swedish and Finnish in the autonomous Grand Duchy of Finland, though in Finland fierce opposition made the decision a dead letter. Prior to 1905, only Russian and Cyrillic were in official use across Russia’s European provinces. Then the situation changed, but only marginally, when Swedish and Finnish were again permitted in the administration of Finland. Elsewhere Russian continued in this role, though German and Polish returned to schools, publishing in White Russian and Little Russian was legalised, as was publishing in Latin script-based Lithuanian. Although the tradition of employing Latin
letters for Little Russian did not revive, the Belarusian national movement settled for full-fledged biscripturalism in the Cyrillic and Latin alphabets (Miller & Ostapchuk 2009; Thaden 1981).

A similar vacillation in the employment of official scripts was observed in Austria-Hungary’s Balkan possessions. Slavophones in what today is Croatia and in Serbia’s autonomous province of Vojvodina wrote in Latin letters if they were Catholic, or in Cyrillic if Orthodox. The scriptural divide largely coincided with the identificational one, the former being Croats with their Croatian language, while the latter were Serbs with Serbian. Austria-Hungary’s annexation of Ottoman Bosnia-Hercegovina with its Muslim Slav-Speakers (1877), combined with Vienna’s constitutional provision for the employment of vernaculars, complicated the picture by adding the Arabic script to the two other alphabets in the province. The Austro-Hungarian administration was not sure what to call the Slavic vernacular in Bosnia-Hercegovina, which, depending on the period, went by the name of ‘regional language’, ‘Croatian’, ‘Serbo-Croatian’ and ‘Bosnian’ (Šipka 2001). An additional complication was the arrival of the Yugoslav (that is, ‘South Slavic’) national movement on the scene, complete with the project of the biscriptural Serbo-Croatian language. The language materialised clothed in the spectacular garb of the 23-volume authoritative dictionary published between 1880 and 1976 in Zagreb (Jugoslovenska akademija znanosti i umjetnosti 1880–1976). It was printed in Latin letters, or the Croatian variant of the language; the Serbs were slower at replying with their own Cyrillic-script dictionary (Srpska akademija nauke, institut za srpskohrvatski jezik 1959--) (whose publication with the name ‘Serbo-Croatian’ in the title continues, though the language disappeared in the early 1990s).

During the Great War, belligerent powers chose to use language and script policies as instruments of ideological warfare. In 1915 Cyrillic and the ethnonym ‘Serb’ were banned from official use in Austria-Hungary (that is, mainly in Bosnia-Hercegovina and Vojvodina) (Zeman 1977, p. 62), whereas St Petersburg prohibited publishing in any script other than Cyrillic in the ‘war zone’, or Russia’s western provinces, which led to a de facto ban on Jewish books and journals in Hebrew characters, and on Belarusian, German, Latvian, Lithuanian and Polish ones in the Latin alphabet (Koss 2010, pp. 125, 133). In Russia’s Congress Kingdom of Poland, under joint German and Austro-Hungarian occupation, Russian was replaced by German and Polish as official languages; thus, by default, Cyrillic disappeared from view. Berlin extended a similar policy to other occupied Russian territories, organised in the colonial semi-polity of Land Ober Ost that corresponds to today’s Belarus, Latvia and Lithuania. Russian was removed from official use and from education there, and was replaced by German and Polish. The two languages were soon joined by Belarusian, Latvian, Lithuanian and Yiddish, which amounted to their first-ever official use in state administration and schools. Latin letters were encouraged for writing in Belarusian, which, combined with the phasing out of Russian from official use, meant the speedy disappearance of Cyrillic from the public sphere. On the other hand, the official espousal of Yiddish created a Latin-Hebrew biscripturalism in the Land Ober Ost (Liulevicius 2000, p. 117; Presseabteilung des Oberbefehlshabers Ost 1918).
7 Toward monoscripturalism

After 1918 non-national empires vanished from Central Europe and it was divided into a mosaic of ethnolinguistic nation-states. The novel idea of one official language per nation-state also entailed the implication that not more than one script should be employed for writing in such a language. Monoscripturalism became the norm within the borders of the Central European nation-state. Although different official-cum-national languages were in use in interwar Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Germany, Austria and Hungary, the publications and other writing produced in these languages were invariably in Latin characters. Likewise, Cyrillic was the sole official script in Bulgaria, and the Greek alphabet in Greece. Interwar Czechoslovakia almost made it to the club but for Subcarpathian Ruthenia (today’s Transcarpathia in Ukraine), which had been thrust into Prague’s unwilling lap in 1919 by the Allies, wary that this area might fall to Bolshevik Russia. The region’s language (at different periods equated with Russian, Rusyn or Ukrainian) was overwhelmingly written in Cyrillic (cf. MAGOCHI 2007, pp. 76–80).

On the other hand, in Yugoslavia biscripturalism was instituted for the official and national language of Serbo-Croatian-Slovenian (Yugoslavian). In reality Serbo-Croatian and Slovenian failed to become fused into a single language. The latter, invariably in Latin letters, thrived in the Slovenian-speaking northern corner of Yugoslavia. Serbo-Croatian in Latin characters was employed in what today is Croatia, while the Cyrillic-based variant dominated in the areas coterminous with present-day Serbia, Montenegro, Kosovo and Macedonia. In Bosnia-Hercegovina both scripts rubbed shoulders with the low-key and semi-official use of Arabic letters for writing in Serbo-Croatian, too.

The non-national polity of the Soviet Union constituted within itself an even greater challenge to this normative drive for one language in a single script for a nation-state. In a nod to the observable force of nationalism, however, the administrative division of the Communist state was based on ethnolinguistically defined administrative entities (HIRSCH 2005). But in one of them, the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Byelorussian (Belarusian), Polish, Russian and Yiddish became official languages during the interwar period, a policy that was a carry-over from the Land Ober Ost. As a result, three scripts were in official use there, Cyrillic, Hebrew and Latin; a rare sight in post-1918 Central Europe (ZAPRUDSKI 2007, p. 104).

In the 1920s, in order to make themselves different from Tsarist Russia and to harness the force of nationalism, the Bolsheviks set out on the policy of nativisation (korenizatsiia), replacing Russian with other languages as dominant ones in many a union republic and in numerous autonomous republics, areas, and even villages and kolkhozes (MARTIN 2001). At almost the same time other scripts employed for these languages (especially the Arabic and Cyrillic scripts) were replaced with variants of the Latin alphabet then believed to be the very instrument and symbol of progress and modernity (SEBBA 2006, pp. 102–103). (The British social Darwinist, Herbert SPENCER

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9) Due to lack of space, I do not analyse in this article the issue of minorities with languages written in scripts other than those of the official language of their host country. My focus is on states and the scripts of state languages.
had popularised this idea in the late 19th century [KASKE 2006, pp. 242, 255].) On the other hand, such a change in script detached new generations from the established tradition of literacy and writings in their native languages that had existed before the Bolshevik Revolution. In the eyes of the Bolshevik ‘engineers of souls’ this cultural and social discontinuity shielded the youth from the pernicious ideological influences of feudalism (in the case of Central Asia), capitalism, bourgeois values and religion.

There were plans to Latinise Byelorussian (Belarusian), Russian and Ukrainian, but the Latinisation campaign was stopped in its tracks in the early 1930s, perhaps due to the 1928 replacement of the Arabic script with the Latin one for Turkish in Turkey, which exposed the Turkicophone peoples of the Soviet Caucasus and Central Asia to unwanted ideological influence from this country. (Other languages that escaped Latinisation included Armenian, Georgian and Yiddish.) Between the mid-1930s and the early 1940s all the languages native to the territory of the Soviet Union were Cyrillicised, and the dominance of Russian as the language of ‘interethnic communication’ was reaffirmed over them, especially in the wake of the Great Patriotic War. That is how World War II was known in Soviet historiography (and is referred to in today’s Russia); during it Stalin unabashedly turned to Russian nationalism in order to mobilise the populace for the war effort (MILLER & OSTAPCHUK 2009, pp. 188–192; SEBBA 2006, p. 103).

The outbreak of World War II and its aftermath radically altered the political organisation of Central Europe but the changes were not of serious significance for the distribution and official use of scripts. When Hitler and Stalin divided Central Europe in 1939 and 1940, no areas with Cyrillic as their official alphabet were annexed by the Third Reich. The partial replacement of local languages with German took place within the homogenous confines of the Latin script. Moscow preserved the use of the Latin alphabet for the national languages in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania that fell under its rule, though it added Russian to them as the state language. In the wake of the largely unsuccessful Winter War against Finland (1939–1940), the Kremlin founded a Karelo-Finnish Soviet Socialist Republic (1940) with Latin script-based Finnish as its official language, as a step toward the eventual annexation of all of Finland. Because this never happened, in 1956 this union republic was downgraded back into the Karelian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, the lower juridical status it had had prior to 1940 (but Finnish remained the republic’s official language, alongside Russian, before the latter finally became the sole ‘state language’ of Russia’s present-day Republic of Karelia) (TAAGEPERA 1999, p. 109).

Soviet policies were different in eastern Poland, which was annexed by the Soviet Union. Most of the annexed territories had either Belarusian or Ukrainian majorities and were incorporated into Soviet Byelorussia and Soviet Ukraine, meaning Cyrillic became the sole official script there; at that time apart from Russian, Byelorussian was official in Byelorussia and Ukrainian in Ukraine. (Initially, Polish was preserved as a minority language). In 1940 Moscow annexed Bessarabia from Romania, which

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10) Again, with the exception of Armenian, Georgian and Yiddish. The scripts of the three languages were not Cyrillicised, because their antique origins allowed for claiming this desirable pedigree for Soviet culture, and by extension, it bolstered the legitimation of Soviet statehood.
entailed the renaming of the official language there as Moldavian and the replacement of the Latin alphabet with Cyrillic for writing it.

The scriptural uniformity of the Third Reich was challenged when Berlin attacked the Soviet Union in 1941. Western Ukraine was included in Germany’s colonial semi-polity of the Generalgouvernement, where Cyrillic-based Ukrainian was added to the official German and Polish. German civil and military occupation administrations in territories seized from the Soviet Union introduced German as an official language, but in practice they were compelled to employ Cyrillic for day-to-day communication with local populations, conducted in Russian, White Ruthenian (Belarusian), or Ukrainian.

Hungary annexed Czechoslovakia’s Subcarpathian Ruthenia, thus with this region adding Cyrillic to the country’s official Latin script (cf. Magochi 2007, pp. 88–89). Budapest’s partial recapturing of Transylvania from Romania, though followed by a change in official language, did not alter anything in the sphere of script. In this respect more dramatic changes could be observed in the Balkans, where Germany, Italy, Hungary and Bulgaria partitioned and/or occupied Yugoslavia, Albania and Greece. In the instance of Greece and that of those areas of Yugoslavia where Cyrillic was in common use, the Latin alphabet was added as another official script or it even replaced the local script. Most dramatically, with the founding of the Independent State of Croatia (comprised of today’s Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina) in 1941, Cyrillic was banned there (unofficially, but effectively, this measure extended to the Arabic script for writing Serbo-Croatian, too), and the name of the language changed to ‘Croatian’ (Samardžija 1993, p. 40; Samardžija 2008). The unrestricted use of Cyrillic-based Serbo-Croatian, increasingly perceived as Serbian, was limited to a rump Serbia under German occupation.

After 1945 normative monoscripturalism was reintroduced at the state level even more rigorously than before the war. Sadly, it was easier to institute, because in the course of the Holocaust the thriving non-territorial Jewish book production in Hebrew letters (that is, in Hebrew, Ladino and Yiddish) mostly disappeared from Central Europe. With the exception of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania (and until 1956, that of the Karelo-Finnish Republic), the Soviet Union’s new western border doubled as the western frontier of the official employment of Cyrillic in the northern half of Central Europe. Though not the sole reason, but perhaps in part on linguistic and scriptural grounds, after 1945 Moscow compelled the restituted Czechoslovakia to cede Subcarpathian Ruthenia to the Soviet Union, where it was incorporated into Ukraine.

Greece once again became the sole preserve of the Greek script, though with the independence of Cyprus (1960) another state appeared where the alphabet was official. In Bulgaria Cyrillic continues as the exclusive official alphabet. The Latin script is official in Albania. After 1945, however, in Communist Yugoslavia the Latin and Cyrillic writing systems coexisted in numerous differing configurations. Although the resurrected biscriptural Serbo-Croatian became the state language of Yugoslavia, in the socialist republics of Macedonia and Slovenia, Cyrillic and Latin letters, respectively, ruled the day. The Socialist Republic of Croatia stood fast by the Latin alphabet, and preferred to refer to its variant of Serbo-Croatian as Croato-Serbian, or simply, as Croatian. In Bosnia-Hercegovina, both scripts were employed for Serbo-Croatian, while in Serbia’s autonomous provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina, official multilin-
ualism required the employment of both, Cyrillic and the Latin alphabet. With the opening of Yugoslavia to the West in the 1970s, a fashion developed across Serbia and Montenegro for writing and publishing in Latin characters, alongside the official Cyrillic. Yugoslavia’s Bosnia-Hercegovina, Montenegro and Serbia were the sole area in postwar Central Europe where a dynamic grassroots biscripturalism thrived (cf. Bozovic & Ivic 1988). With the privilege of hindsight some propose that biscriptural languages must either settle on a single writing system or face an eventual breakup (cf. Maxwell 2003, p. 129).

8 A type of complication

Printing, when developed in Europe in the mid-15th century, emulated the Gothic minuscule hand of manuscripts, resulting in the Gothic type (also known as ‘Black Letter’ in the Anglo-Saxon world). Different variants of the hand had developed in various regions of Catholic Europe, thus accounting for the wide variety of extant Gothic types that made it onto the printed page. In the early 15th century, when elites developed an interest in Antiquity, prefiguring the Renaissance, this interest was behind the devising, in Tuscany [Toscana], of the humanistic minuscule for writing and printing. It became known as *littera antica*, or today’s Antiqua (literally ‘old letter’), because it was modeled on the Latin hand employed in classical Rome. Antiqua was reserved for printing classical Latin-language books since the 1460s, first in the Apennine Peninsula, and later elsewhere in Europe.

In this way the two basic varieties of the modern printed Latin script arose, Antiqua and Gothic. The initial division of labor between them was such that Latin texts were written and printed in the former, and those in other languages employing Latin characters in the latter. In the 16th century Polish- and Hungarian-language books began to be printed in Antiqua, emulating a similar trend for books published in French and in the Romance vernaculars of Iberia and the Apennine Peninsula. The employment of the Gothic type was mainly limited to the Holy Roman Empire and northern Europe – the Baltic basin and Scandinavia. In the early 16th century a novel form of the Gothic hand, known as *Fraktur* (‘broken letters’), was developed by Albrecht Dürer under commission from the Holy Roman Emperor, Maximilian I. When the religious wars split the Holy Roman Empire into the Protestant north and the Catholic south, the imperial court preferred *Fraktur*, while the Protestant princes sided with the *Schwabacher* (‘Swabian letters,’ another kind of the Gothic type) of the printed edition of Martin Luther’s German translation of the Bible.

Beginning with the Counter-Reformation, Catholic countries increasingly opted for Antiqua, and Protestant ones for the Gothic type. However, inside the Holy Roman Empire, the opposition between Catholics and Protestants continued to be expressed by the employment of *Fraktur* and *Schwabacher*, respectively. Between the 1740s and the 1870s, Sweden and Denmark-Norway replaced the Gothic script with Antiqua, recognizing the former as increasingly connected to German nationalism. Beginning in the mid-19th century Czechs, Slovaks, Slovenians and Sorbs gave up the Gothic type in favour of Antiqua. (Croats, their lands contained in Hungary, or under direct
Italian influence in Dalmatia, had opted for Antiqua as early as the 17th century.) The Gothic type persisted in Russia’s Finland until the turn of the 20th century, because it allowed for marking the difference between the country and its former suzerain, Sweden. The traditional connection of Estonian and Latvian nationalisms to German culture was fortified by their shared Protestantism, despite the palpable national differences that entered politics at the turn of the 20th century. On the other hand, to the south, the two Baltic nationalisms faced the dominant Polish written in Antiqua (and connected to Catholicism), which led to the preservation of the use of the Gothic script for Estonian and Latvian until after World War I.

In Prussia close to 80 per cent of books were published in Gothic characters through the 1850s; Antiqua featured mainly in scientific publications. In the late 1920s less than 60 per cent of all books published in Germany were in the Gothic type. Ironically, in 1941 the Gothic type, which had been frequently hailed as the ‘German script’, was replaced with Antiqua; the decision was ‘justified’ by branding the former as Judenletters (‘Jewish letters’). In this pattern of things Antiqua was elevated to the rank of the Normal-Schrift (‘normal script’) (HARTMANN 1998, pp. 28–33, 339, 405; KAMUSELLA 2009a, pp. 342–350; KAPR 1993, pp. 13–36, 78–82; MORISON 1972).

A similar kind of opposition, as mentioned above, also developed in Cyrillic. In early 18th-century Russia, Grazhdanka (or Cyrillic remodeled to resemble Antiqua as closely as possible) was developed for the production of non-religious books, and thus to mark the divide between the secular powers that be and the Orthodox Church. During the 19th century, this opposition as reflected in script by Grazhdanka and the Church (or Old) Cyrillic, was emulated in other Slavophone Orthodox polities, namely, Bulgaria, Montenegro and Serbia. The output of publications in Church Cyrillic dwindled almost to nil in the wake of the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia, and later in Bulgaria and Yugoslavia following their transformation into Communist states after World War II. With the fall of Communism, a slight revival can be observed in the production of Church Cyrillic publications, mainly Bibles and prayer books in Church Slavonic for popes (or Orthodox priests) (KAMUSELLA 2009a, pp. 351–356).

For all practical purposes, the typographical oppositions both within the Latin alphabet between Antiqua and Gothic characters, and in Cyrillic between Grazhdanka and Church Cyrillic are now gone. There are no ideological differences left to be marked in this manner. In a way, be it Cyrillic or the Latin alphabet, it has been a ‘victory’ for Antiqua. However, apart from specialists, hardly anyone realises that the specific types of Latin and Cyrillic letters as employed at present, one way or another, hark back to ancient Rome.

9 Scripts today

The rearrangement of the political organisation of Central Europe after the end of the Cold War and the breakup of the Soviet Union has followed the normative drive
toward monoscripturalism in nation-states. The independence of Belarus and Ukraine changed nothing in this regard; Cyrillic remains the sole official script there, despite various upheavals in language politics. (For instance, since 1995 Belarus has had two official languages, Belarusian and Russian.) Likewise, the 1993 split of Czechoslovakia into the Czech Republic and Slovakia had no influence on the use of the Latin alphabet in the two successor nation-states.

Script-related problems flared up in Soviet Moldavia, when in 1989, to the chagrin of the republic’s Slavophones and Gagauzes, the Latin alphabet was adopted for the formerly Cyrillic-based Moldavian. They feared that this change, which made Moldovan (now known as Moldovan) identical to Romanian, would open the way for the union of Moldavia with Romania. Following the independence of this republic in 1991, renamed as Moldova, a brief civil war (with Russia’s crucial involvement) was fought on this issue in 1992, leading to the unrecognised secession of Transnistria. Moldovan, Russian and Ukrainian are the breakaway polity’s official languages, all written in Cyrillic, including Moldovan. Until 2007 Moldovan remained Central Europe’s sole official language written in two scripts, though in two different, and as such monoscriptural, territories; the language is written exclusively in the Latin script in Moldova, and only in Cyrillic in Transnistria.

After the breakup of the Soviet Union, Russia became a monoscriptural polity. Overnight Russian and its Cyrillic were removed from official usage in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. Russian ceased to be an official language in Belarus (until 1995) and Ukraine. Similar developments were attempted in Moldova, but in the wake of the civil war Russian and Cyrillic are retained as official in the country’s autonomous regions (Gagauzia and Transnistria; over the latter Chişinău has had no de facto control since 1992). Later, to Moscow’s vexation, independent Armenia, Georgia and Tajikistan ‘decommissioned’ Russian, too, but the matter became serious when such ‘decommissioning’ was coupled with the re-Latinisation of Azeri, Turkmen and Uzbek as the sole official and national languages in Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, respectively. Russian and Cyrillic as the visible signs of Russian cultural and political presence and influence rapidly vanished from these post-Soviet states. Using its muscle in the Commonwealth of Independent States (the Russian-dominated grouping of the post-Soviet states, apart from the Baltic republics and Georgia, which left in 2008), the Kremlin prevented the removal of Russian as a second official language from Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, and the planned Latinisation of Kazakh and Kyrgyz. It appears that Russia was also behind stopping the reintroduction of the Arabic script for Tajik, though Tajikistan’s secular post-Communist elites themselves might have balked at the prospect of their state’s language becoming almost identical with the Farsi (Persian) of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

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11) It is, of course, a simplification, because Russian and Gagauz (the latter still often written in Cyrillic, despite its official Latinisation in 1996) are official in Moldova’s autonomous Gagauzia.
12) Russian and Latin-script Crimean Tatar are co-official languages, alongside Ukrainian, in Ukraine’s autonomous Republic of Crimea. Because of the introduction of the 2012 language law, Kiev seems to be following the Belarusian path toward making Russian another official language in Ukraine.
13) In Uzbekistan’s autonomous Republic of Karakalpakstan, the Turkic language of Karakalpak is official, and its script, too, was changed from Cyrillic to the Latin alphabet.
Moscow’s displeasure, as a former colonial power, at the removal of the colonial language from state offices in newly independent polities has a precedent in Paris’s efforts to maintain the elevated position of French in its former colonies, nowadays under the cultural-cum-linguistic aegis of the Francophonie. But the Russian administration’s opposition to re-Latinisation is a reflection of some Soviet interwar policies vis-à-vis the Soviet Union’s Turkicphones. First, in the 1920s the Turkic languages of Tatar and Chaghatay (widely used by Muslims across the Russian Empire) were replaced with a plethora of newly minted Turkic languages to forestall the possibility of a Turkic/Muslim nation cohering, which in demographic size could be on a par with the Russians (Bücher-Dinc 1997). Secondly, Latinisation was discontinued and replaced with Cyrillicisation during the latter 1930s, also to prevent the Soviet Union’s Turkic republics falling into Turkey’s sphere of ideological and cultural influence. And in the heady days of the 1990s, it was Turkey again, with its project of a Pan-Turkic alphabet for all the Turkic languages, which was behind the Latinisation projects in the post-Soviet Turkicphone nation-states (Pan-Turkic 1993).

Moscow was getting tetchy, because from the formal vantage, today’s Russia is a federation (with 28 official languages), and among its numerous autonomous republics (14) and regions (five) as many as nine are Turkic-speaking. Among them Tatarstan has been most independent-minded within the limits of the Russian law; (Chechnya did cross this thin red line). In 1997, Tatarstan decided that by 2011 Cyrillic would have been gradually replaced with Latin characters for writing Tatar. The Kremlin’s reply was swift. In 2002 the Duma legislated that the federal language (that is, Russian) and the official languages of Russia’s autonomous republics must be written in Cyrillic. This move dashed Tatarstan’s hopes, but in Moscow’s perception it snubbed out the ‘danger of Latinisation’, and reinforced the integrity of the state by making it, for the first time in its history, uniformly monoscriptural, like the vast majority of states in Europe, for that matter (Duma Outlaws Roman Alphabet 2002; Landau & Kellner-Heinkele 2001; Sebba 2006, pp. 106–108, 115–116).

The official use of more than a single script for writing a language is out of fashion today. But in 2007 Montenegrin joined biscriptural Moldovan in this respect, as the official language of Montenegro; Cyrillic and the Latin alphabet are equal and official. Hence, Montenegro is the rare case of a bisscriptural nation-state in present-day Central Europe. However, in everyday practice, the Latin script dominates in this country.

Until recently it was rarely noticed that the 1991–2007 breakup of Yugoslavia (into Bosnia-Hercegovina, Croatia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Slovenia) was followed by the parallel splitting of bisscriptural Serbo-Croatian into (thus far) Bosnian, Croatian, Montenegrin and Serbian. What is still overlooked is the near-disappearance of official bisscripturalism in the successor languages with the exception of Montenegrin. However, the actual practice of using official scripts with these languages sometimes does not follow the law. In Croatia Latin-script based Croatian

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14 Autonomous regions in the Russian Federation have no legal capacity to adopt official languages; hence the federal language of Russian is official throughout all the regions, though local languages are employed in a semi-formal manner, as in the cases of both Yiddish and Hebrew in the Autonomous Jewish Region of Birobidzhan, located in Russia’s Far East.
Scripts and Politics in Modern Central Europe

is in exclusive employment, and no trace of Cyrillic can be discerned, apart from pre-1991 Serbo-Croatian books and present-day imported Serbian books in academic libraries. Bosnia-Hercegovina is a ‘composite state’ consisting of the Federation of Bosnia and Hercegovina and the Republika Srpska. In the former ‘entity’ (as these components are officially called) Bosnian and Croatian are official, and once again, there is no trace of Cyrillic there. Serbian is the official language of the Republika Srpska and by the same token Cyrillic dominates there to the near-absolute exclusion of the Latin alphabet.

Hence, both Bosnia-Hercegovina and Montenegro are biscriptural states, but each in its own manner. In the latter polity the two alphabets rub shoulders across its entire territory, while in Bosnia-Hercegovina a kind of scriptural apartheid is practiced. The Bosnian situation is similar to that in Kosovo, with its official languages of Latin script-based Albanian and Cyrillic-based Serbian. Serbian and its script tend to be confined to the Serbian enclaves, while Albanian with its Latin alphabet dominates elsewhere in the country. Serbia, for that matter, is even more relaxed in its approach to scripts than Montenegro. It appears that, in defiance of the law, half of the book production in the state language is printed in Latin letters. But in Serbia’s autonomous province of Vojvodina, not only does the law provide for six official languages but it also provides for biscripturalism in the Cyrillic and Latin alphabets. Furthermore, in cyberspace there are two biscriptural, Cyrillic and Latin, Wikipedias, Serbian and Serbo-Croatian. The latter language, ‘disappeared’ by politicians from the post-Yugoslav states, continues its stubborn existence on the internet (BADURINA et al. 2009; GREENBERG 2004; GRÖSCHEL 2009; THOMAS 2004).

Post-Yugoslav Slovenia with its Slovenian language in Latin letters is uniformly monoscriptural. On paper, Macedonia follows the same trend with its official Macedonian in Cyrillic. But the reality on the ground is that a quarter of the state’s population are Albanians; their everyday use of Latin letters for their language makes Macedonia de facto biscriptural. However, the semi-official use of the Latin script tends to be confined to the areas inhabited by Albanians.

Moving the perspective from states to languages themselves, there are only two officially biscriptural languages in today’s Central Europe, Moldovan and Montenegrin. The latter, however, is biscriptural in a single country, Montenegro, whereas Moldovan, written in Cyrillic and Latin characters, is monoscriptural in the latter alphabet in Moldova and in the former in Transnistria. Most truly biscriptural, though not de jure, appears to be the Serbian language across the length and breadth of Serbia.

The time of multiscriptural languages in Central Europe seems to have come to an end with World War II. Prior to that Serbo-Croatian was triscriptural in Arabic, Cyrillic and Latin letters. It shared this feature with the Ottoman Empire’s Osmanlica. This language was officially written in the Arabic script, though also in the Hebrew one by Jews, in Greek letters by Orthodox Turkophones, and in the Armenian alphabet by Armenians. Atatürk’s modernizing reforms initially added the Latin script to this tally, before Ottoman Turkish was comprehensively replaced with the Latin alphabet-based modern Turkish. Until the early 20th century, quatroscriptural Albanian (in Arabic, Cyrillic, Greek and Latin letters) and triscriptural Bulgarian (in Cyrillic, Greek and
Latin characters)\(^{15}\) accompanied the at least pentascriptural *Osmanlica*. Furthermore, due to the Stalinist policy of forcing new scripts on languages across the Soviet Union, coupled with the voluntary changes in script during the post-Soviet times, many languages have been multiscriptural over the course of time through their serial monoscripturalism. Azeri, Tatar or Uzbek during different periods were written, first, in the Arabic script, then in the Latin one and eventually in Cyrillic. Now Azeri and Uzbek are Latin script-based, while Tatars are compelled to use Cyrillic for their language.

10 Conclusion

Since the end of the Iberian reconquista (1492) and the subsequent expulsion of the Jews and Muslims from Spain and Portugal, Western Europe has been uniformly monoscriptural, with the temporary complication of the typographical divide arising from the use of Antiqua and the Gothic type. In clear contrast, in Central Europe until World War II, as many as five scripts coexisted in official and semi-official use, namely, Arabic, Cyrillic, Hebrew, Greek and Latin. Under the influence of the normative model of national statehood, stemming from Western Europe, multiscripturalism, which was not unusual in Central Europe’s polities until the interwar period, was gradually replaced with monoscripturalism within the borders of a single nation-state. Nation-building, the two world wars, totalitarianisms, authoritarian regimes, forced and voluntary migrations, ethnic cleansing and genocide have reduced the number of scripts used in Central Europe today to three, Cyrillic, Greek and Latin.

In a way the pre-World War II tradition of Central European multiscripturalism survived and, indeed, developed further in Israel. This is a typical Central European ethnolinguistic nation-state that due to the vicissitudes of history happened to be founded in the Middle East in 1948. The ethnolinguistic nature of Israeli nationalism (Zionism) is a hybrid of the emphasis on language (Hebrew) with an emphasis on religion (Judaism), as was the case with several Balkan national polities. The Hebrew script is the official script for the national language of Hebrew. But the inheritance from the British Mandate for Palestine, (which preceded the establishment of Israel) together with the European heritage of most of Israel’s Jewish population have made the Latin alphabet part and parcel of the Israeli cultural background. Israel took over the British Mandate’s legal tradition of employing Arabic, English and Hebrew. Hence, street names and many public documents in Israel are given in Hebrew, Arabic and English (usually in this order), meaning that the Arabic script is constantly in public use alongside the other two.

The massive inflow of Russophone Jews from the post-Soviet states during the 1990s, who now amount to a fifth of Israel’s inhabitants, has led ineluctably to Russian and its Cyrillic also becoming integral parts of Israel’s public sphere. Furthermore, with the substantial immigration of Ethiopian Jews between the mid-1980s and the early 1990s, their community grew to about 100,000 people, necessitating widespread

\(^{15}\)To this day the Latin alphabet continues to be used for writing the minority language of Banat Bulgarian (Paulician) in Romania and Serbia (İvancioğlu 2006).
public use of Amharic written in its specific script. Nowadays, as many as five official or de facto official writing systems coexist in Israel, namely, Amharic, Arabic, Cyrillic, Hebrew and Latin, which earns this polity the rare badge of pentascripturalism (Remnick 2003; Spolsky & Goldberg 1999, pp. 4, 118–120).

As a whole Central Europe is triscriptural nowadays, but the progressing fitting of languages (and their respective scripts) to states (and sometimes of states to languages) as prescribed by ethnolinguistic nationalism has drastically limited the phenomenon of bi-, let alone multi-scripturalism, in a single polity. In 2011 there were legally or de facto six bисcriptural states in the region, Bosnia-Hercegovina, Kosovo, Macedonia, Moldova, Montenegro and Serbia (Ukraine can be tentatively added to the group on the slim pretext of the Latin script-based co-official language of Tatar in the Crimea). Tellingly, all but one (Moldova) are post-Yugoslav polities and most practice a kind of apartheid bисcripturalism (Bosnia-Hercegovina, Kosovo, Macedonia and Moldova). This leaves Serbia and Montenegro as paragons of genuine bисcripturalism.

It is worth mentioning that Russia’s Kaliningrad enclave (that is, the northern half of pre-1945 Germany’s East Prussia, subsequently incorporated into the Soviet Union), bordering on Lithuania and Poland, constitutes a ‘Cyrillic island engulfed by the sea of Latinity’, now coterminous with the European Union’s borders.

Interestingly, the 1928 adoption of the Latin alphabet for Turkish continues to reinforce the Turkish nation-state’s difference vis-à-vis almost all its neighbours on the plane of writing. Bulgaria and Greece, both bordering on Turkey in Europe, employ Cyrillic and the Greek alphabet respectively for their official languages. Turkey’s southeastern neighbours, Syria, Iraq and Iran use the Arabic script, whereas in the Caucasus, the distinctive alphabets of Armenian and Georgian are in use in Armenia and Georgia, countries that border on Turkey. The country shares Latin characters with Azerbaijan, but until the early 1990s, Azeri had been written in Cyrillic. Across the Black Sea Turkey faces Russia and Ukraine where Cyrillic is official, but also Romania, with which Turkey shares the same alphabet. Off Turkey’s Mediterranean shore there is Cyprus, which had been genuinely bисcriptural until the de facto division of this island in 1974. Now bисcriptural apartheid is the norm there, Greek letters being employed in the Greek south and Latin characters in the Turkish north.

Until the accession of Greece in 1981, the European Communities (today’s European Union) were an entirely monoscriptural creature. The ‘big bang’ enlargement of 2004 did not add a single new script to the EU’s official Greek and Latin alphabets, but opened the gates of the Union to the first-ever bисcriptural member, Cyprus. Three years later, when Bulgaria and Romania joined, the former state’s Cyrillic became (thus far) the EU’s third official script. Interestingly, from Finland to northern Romania the present-day Union’s eastern frontier tightly overlaps with the scriptural border separating the areas where the Latin alphabet and Cyrillic are officially employed in a uniform manner. And tellingly, from 2004 all the territories where the Greek alphabet is official are now contained within the EU.

The accession of Croatia to the EU, planned for 2013, will not change anything in the current use and situation of the three official alphabets, but the Union’s frontiers will then reach the bисcriptural polities of Serbia, Bosnia and Montenegro. And
because all the other post-Yugoslav states and Albania are engaged in membership negotiations with the Union, the importance of Cyrillic is bound to grow in the EU following their eventual accession. When this happens, they will introduce to the Union biscripturalism as a full-blown phenomenon. Should the EU decide to extend membership to Turkey, the country could be then followed by Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia. Such a development would add Armenian and Georgain to the Union’s current three official scripts, pushing up the overall tally to five. This hypothetical and considerably enlarged Union of the future might not shy away from considering willing candidates in the Middle East; Israel, Lebanon and Palestine could apply. If they did, the Arabic and Hebrew writing systems would also become part of such a Union’s heritage, which in this manner would be closely reminiscent of the Central Europe of yesteryear.

Provided multilingualism and multiculturalism are genuinely embraced as part and parcel of the EU’s unique character, then multiscripturalism would be a treasured addition to this trove. Europe could at last recover its own self. First, its human diversity was reduced in the course of religiously motivated expulsions at the onset of modernity. Afterwards this diversity almost irreversibly paled to a faint shadow of itself, during the last two centuries, under the pressure of the relentless pursuit of ethnolinguistic homogeneity in ardently sovereign nation-states. Monoscripturalism and apartheid-style biscripturalism have been indexical of this process.

Multiscripturalism, as shown in this article, has already entered the EU. The problem is that, apart from the Bulgarians, Cypriots and Greeks, the rest of the Union’s citizens are not prepared for this challenge. In Bulgaria, Cyprus and Greece, in addition to their national alphabets of Cyrillic and Greek, children become acquainted at school with the Latin script. Unfortunately, the same is not true of the educational systems in other EU member states (with the partial exception of the Baltic republics, where Cyrillic is widely known, due to the presence of substantial Russophone minorities), where Latin script monoscripturalism rules the day.

Mastering the alphabets of Cyrillic and Greek, so closely related to the Latin one, is not complicated or time-consuming. Thirty school hours for each would suffice. This, in turn, would benefit Latin alphabet-users by enabling them to read road and shop signs in Bulgaria, Cyprus and Greece (and beyond), facilitating the making of the EU into a truly common cultural sphere (cf. Kamusella 2009b). Otherwise, it is a shame that a visitor arriving from Russia or Ukraine (where the Latin script is taught to schoolchildren as a matter of course) can navigate her travels across the EU more easily than the average Union citizen venturing to the two countries.

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