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“*ARAI*” IN GREEK LAWS IN THE CLASSICAL AND HELLENISTIC PERIODS: DETERRENCE OR CONCESSION TO TRADITION?

In 1895 Ziebarth published the first systematic survey of the epigraphical evidence for *arai* as a deterrent in the legislation of the Greek cities. Primarily on the basis of the epigraphical material available at the time, Ziebarth arrived at three important conclusions. First, that the threat of the *ara* as a means of encouraging compliance with the *polis*' legislation was not confined to any particular region or regions of the Greek world. Ziebarth found several attestations in inscriptions from Mainland Greece and Sicily in addition to the more prolific evidence from the Aegean islands and the Greek and Hellenised communities in Asia Minor. Second, that this type of deterrent was not connected with any particular type of constitution: there is no evidence to suggest that it was more prevalent as a type of deterrent in legislation passed by narrow oligarchies or aristocracies than in *poleis* with a broader-based constitutional framework (including democracies). And, third, that the attestations of *arai* in various types of *polis* legislation are not confined to any one period: the evidence ranges from the earliest archaic inscriptions to legislation passed by *poleis* under Roman domination, although Ziebarth detected a higher frequency of attestation in the material from the earliest period.

However, Ziebarth himself added an important modification to his observations on continuity as evidenced in the inscriptions. In his view, the threat represented by the public curse declined gradually and continuously from the archaic period onwards, and he ascribed this decline to a 'general decline in religious sentiment'.¹ On Ziebarth's interpretation, the survival of the public *ara* in late classical and Hellenistic inscriptions should be interpreted primarily as a testimony to the conservatism that determined the framing of Greek legislation, long after the *ara* had lost its original significance and efficacy.

Ziebarth's general conclusions were later to provide the main point of departure for Latte's treatment of the *ara* in his *Heiliges Recht*. Like Ziebarth, Latte

¹ Ziebarth (1895: 70): 'Die Mehrzahl der Beispiele gehört freilich der alten und ältesten Zeit der griechischen Geschichte an, und das ist natürlich. Denn nur die äusserste Sucht nach Erhaltung alter Formen konnte gerade diese Rechtssitte in Zeiten hinein bewahren, in welchen sie ihre Wirksamkeit mehr und mehr verlieren musste wegen des gänzlichen Schwindens des religiösen Sinnes'.

interpreted the attestations of the public imprecation in texts dating from the late classical period and later as essentially empty formulae retained in legal systems that had in other respects undergone a process of secularisation, a ‘Verweltlichung’.² Latte’s general evolutionary schema was, like that of Ziebarth, informed by a wider scholarly consensus that the traditional religious structures and institutions of the Greek cities were declining throughout the classical period and had lost most of their significance by the end of the fourth century.

However, there was a second strand in Latte’s argumentation, which had not been developed by Ziebarth: the decline in the importance of the *ara* as a legal deterrent was to be ascribed not only to changes in religious perceptions but should at the same time be interpreted also as a result of the increasing power of the political institutions within individual Greek communities. Originally, the reliance on the divine agency for the punishment of offenders reflected the weakness of the *polis*’ institutions – that is, primarily, its courts and officials – which made it difficult to enforce sanctions against individual transgressors. As the power of these *polis* institutions grew, the protection offered by the *ara* gradually became redundant, so that in the Hellenistic period these sanctions had turned into ‘mere ornaments with which even the most trivial honorary decree was lavishly adorned.’³

Since the publication of *Heiliges Recht*, there has not, to my knowledge, been any attempt to produce further comprehensive, diachronic discussions of the public *ara* as a form of legal deterrence. In more recent discussions, attention has tended to focus on archaic and early classical instances, although the continued importance of the public imprecation in the late classical and Hellenistic *polis* has also been asserted in discussions of individual inscriptions from these periods.⁴ Important challenges to Latte’s model of decline have been made especially in relation to individual inscriptions from the mid-fifth century. Examples are Thür (1998: 25-26) on *IP Ark* 8, and Koerner (1987: 460-461 and 467-468) on the *ara* in *IK Erythrai* 1 which regulated the terms of appointment of *grammateis* and on the famous *dirae*

² Latte (1920: 76): ‘Um 300, wenn nicht schon früher, ist also die Rolle des Fluches als wirksamen Rechtsschutzes in der hellenischen Welt ausgespielt. Das hindert nicht daß die *leergewordene* Form namentlich auf Stiftungsurkunden immer wiederkehrt, bald allein, bald mit anderen Strafbestimmungen zusammen.’ (my italics) Unlike Ziebarth, however, Latte made an exception in relation to the Greek communities of Asia Minor: here the threat of the *ara* retained its original force as a deterrent because of the influence of oriental religious perceptions and practices.

³ Latte (1920: 87). *ibid.* on the redundancy of ‘sakrale Strafformen’: ‘Abgesehen von wirklich religiösen Verbrechen treten sie in historischer Zeit ursprünglich nur ein, wo die Macht des Staates gegenüber dem einzelnen zur Ahndung noch nicht hinreichte. (...) Als der Staat an Geschlossenheit gewann, seine Macht gegenüber dem einzelnen Bürger immer mehr wuchs, da mußten diese Formen überlebt erscheinen, zumal der Glaube, den sie voraussetzten, seine zwingende Kraft für weite Kreise verlor.’

⁴ See Lambrinudakis and Wörrle (1983: 310-313) on *SEG* 33.679 (Paros, C2), and Knoepfler (2001: 229-238) on *SEG* 51: 1105 (Eretria, C4).

Teiorum. While both scholars agree with the traditional proposition that the *ara* reflects a very ancient type of sanction, both of them also urge that the inscriptions testify to a continuous belief in the communities that produced the texts that the threat of divine punishment and divine intervention in the process of law enforcement was very real indeed.⁵

However, if the *ara* as a sanction has recently been interpreted as more than just an ‘empty formula’, especially as far as our fifth-century evidence is concerned, the Hellenistic attestations of its use still need to be reassessed in the context of a general survey. The call for such a reassessment is all the more urgent because of the development that has taken place generally in modern scholarship on Greek religion in the Hellenistic period, a development that has led to a fundamental revision of the 19th century model of decline.⁶

This paper will concentrate on evidence for public imprecations in inscriptions dating from the fourth century down to about 150 B.C., with reference to the archaic and early classical material primarily for the purposes of identifying areas of continuity as well as of change. In addition to the *arai* pronounced by officials of individual communities, sometimes with the assistance of priests, the discussion will take into account some of the evidence for the practice of self-imprecation as the confirmation of an undertaking made by oath. There are two reasons why this type of curse is relevant to the present discussion. First, although the *ara* is pronounced personally by the potential target of divine punishment for breach of the terms of the oath, its inclusion in oath formulae must, at least originally, have been based upon the same belief in the reality of divine intervention and divine sanctions as that which underpinned the pronouncement of *arai* at festivals and political gatherings. Second, there is a conspicuous overlap between the areas protected by *arai*

⁵ On the basis of the evidence of *IP Ark 8*, Thür (1998: 26) concludes that ‘Fluchtäfelchen oder “Orakeljustiz” funktionieren *aus dem festen Glauben, daß Gottheiten ständig in das menschliche Leben eingreifen*. In diesen neuerdings wieder mehr beachteten Texte ist zwar ἰμενφές nicht mehr zu finden, wohl aber Formen des ἵλαος, und zwar meistens verneint: “nicht segensreich”. *Eid und Fluch im griechischen Volksglauben bilden die Brücke zum offiziellen Prozeß der archaischen Zeit.*’ (my italics). As far as the efficacy of the *ara* is concerned, the most monumental testimony to its survival in the postclassical era is the *ara epitymbios*, for which see, above all, *IK 52* Ἀραὶ Ἐπιτύμβιοι. However, this evidence does not in itself undermine Latte’s evolutionary model: as indicated in n. 2, Latte regarded Asia Minor, from which most attestations of this type of *ara* derive, as an exception to the rule.

⁶ For continuity in patterns of religious observance and for the lack of a clear hiatus in the Hellenistic period, see e.g. Habicht (1997: 166-170), Mikalson (1998: 315-323 with references to studies of cults in other Hellenistic cities), Pakkanen (1996: 131-137), Parker (1996: 256-281), and Parker (2005), esp. 76-77 on the continued importance of the public imprecation ‘persisting well down into the Hellenistic period’. It must be noted that the scholars cited all identify areas of change and development in religious practices and organisation, but change and development are not necessarily to be interpreted as signs of a ‘crisis’.

pronounced on behalf of the community and those which were protected by prayers and curses in oaths to be sworn by individual members of the citizen body.

As noted earlier, part of the basis of Latte's contention that the public imprecation had been reduced to a mere formality by the end of the fourth century was his observation that, in the later period, even the most trivial decrees were sometimes 'adorned' with the threat of the *ara* directed against individuals who attempted to revoke or in other ways undermine the decision. However, closer inspection of the individual inscriptions in which the public imprecation is invoked as a deterrent does not in my view support the contention that such a trivialisation had indeed taken place.

It is an incontrovertible fact that the late classical and Hellenistic periods have not yielded any single piece of evidence for the contents of public *arai* that comes anywhere near the wealth of detail preserved in the *dirae Teiorum* from the fifth century. The scope of the two surviving Teian *arai* is also wider and more comprehensive than any other individual attestations of such public imprecations, be they archaic, classical or Hellenistic. Indeed, one of the Teian texts, Meiggs and Lewis 30, states explicitly that the text of the inscription contained the very words that were to be pronounced at the festivals of the Anthesteria, the Herakleia and of Zeus. The two Teian inscriptions are not entirely unique: one inscription from third-century Delos contains the wording of a public imprecation to be pronounced by priests and priestesses against individuals guilty of unlawful abduction of slaves as well as other offenders. But it is still fair to say that no other Greek community of any period has yielded comparable epigraphical evidence for the wording of such public imprecations.

On the other hand, as far as the specific contents of the Teian *arai* are concerned, that is, the individual areas to which the imprecations apply, there are a considerable number of parallels, including parallels dating from the late classical and early Hellenistic periods. In the appendix to this article I have set out for comparison the main themes of Meiggs and Lewis no. 30, the earlier of the two *dirae Teiorum*, along with a survey of the evidence for the application of the public *ara* in inscriptions from the fourth century and later. Apart from the first three inscriptions listed under heading a.i, which are entrenchment clauses of apparently trivial honorary decrees,⁷ all of the other later attestations can be said with some justification to fall within the broad areas protected by the public *arai* in fifth-century Teos. Arguably, the categories from b. to f. were anything but trivial: the

⁷ The decree honouring Thersippos of Pordoselene (*IK Adramyttion* 34) constitutes a warning that the political context of an honorary decision could render the decision itself highly controversial to the point of actually constituting a threat to the internal stability and the external safety of the community in question. The Pordoselenian decision, by elevating the political standing of Polyperchon's ally Thersippos, constitutes an unmistakable token of loyalty to Polyperchon at a time when his position was clearly threatened by an alliance between Antigonos, Lysimachos, Ptolemy and Kassandros.

matters to which the imprecations relate range from actions that could potentially lead to destabilisation of the entire community to protection of ritual and sacred property to control of individuals whose actions might otherwise be difficult or, in some instances, impossible to prosecute and punish by other means.

The fact that the late classical and early Hellenistic *arai* are often applied to individual decisions with a narrowly defined scope is not in itself an indication of ‘trivialisation’ or change: indeed such applications are equally well attested in the archaic and early classical material, and again, there is a remarkable element of continuity in the types of decision that were secured by *arai*.⁸ One area where continuity is especially noticeable is that of offences committed in relation to religious ritual, sanctuaries and sacred property. While this is not at all surprising, the continued reliance on the deterrent constituted by divine punishment, sometimes in combination with penalties administered by the institutions of the *polis*, does suggest that the public imprecation had not been emptied of its original religious significance.

However, if the elements of continuity are more conspicuous than have traditionally been recognised, there are also important indications of change in the application of the public imprecations. As noted earlier, Latte did not just explain the reduced significance of the public imprecations as a result of a general decline in traditional religious sentiment: he also pointed to the rise of the power of the political institutions of individual communities as a factor that contributed to making the reliance on divine sanctions increasingly redundant. This second strand of Latte’s argumentation may indeed account for the low number of attestations in the late classical and early Hellenistic material of imprecations directed specifically at officials with the aim of limiting their powers and of making them comply with the terms of their office.

I have not been able to find a single late classical or Hellenistic parallel to the early classical examples of regulations in which the imprecation serves to ensure that officials impose penalties for individual offences committed within their area of responsibility.⁹ As for the *ara* being used as a deterrent in order to force officials to step down from a position of power after a specified period, along the lines of *IK*

⁸ Examples of archaic and C5 decisions and regulations with *arai* in narrow context: Koerner no. 29, *IG IV* 506 (Argos C6): imprecation on persons who destroy the text of the law (a.), *IG IX* 1 (2) 609 = Koerner no. 47 (Naupaktos, C6/5): imprecation on persons who instigate redistribution of land or *stasis* with the aim of securing a redistribution of land (b.), *PEP Chios* 76c (Chios C5): imprecation on Pentekaideka who fail to impose penalty on other officials for failing to punish offences against *horoi* (c.), *IP Ark* 20 (North Arkadia C6): imprecation on female who fails to dedicate garment worn unlawfully in sanctuary (d.), *IK Rhodische Peraia* 251 (Lindos C5): imprecation on *strategoï* who fail to collect contribution from individual soldiers (e.), *PEP Chios* 76d (Chios C5): imprecation on any individual who attempts to render sale of land invalid (f.)

⁹ e.g. *PEP Chios* 76c (Chios, C5), *IP Ark.* 8 line 23 with commentary (Mantineia, C5) and more generally Koerner (1987: 467–485) on enforcement of the ‘Strafpflicht’ of officials.

Erythrai 1, I have as yet found only a single example.¹⁰ A regulation from third century Teos, which concerns the merger of Teos and the smaller settlement of Kyrbissos, contains detailed regulations on the election of *phourarchoi* to take charge of a stronghold in Kyrbissos, each for a period of four months. If a *phourarchos* refuses to hand over the stronghold to his successor upon the expiry of his term of office, he is to ‘flee Teos and Abdera and their territories under a curse, his property is to be confiscated and no blood guilt shall attach to the person who kills him’.¹¹ The following line of the inscription shows clearly that what the community was attempting to guard itself against was a real and immediate threat of *stasis*: ‘if the *phourarchos* dies fighting, his property is to be confiscated’.¹² The *phourarchos*, like other military commanders, differed from even the most powerful officials in charge of the internal administration of a Greek community in that he had military resources at his immediate disposal, resources which might allow him to resist by armed force any attempt to force him to comply with the formal limitations imposed on his power. What is at stake here, then, is not just the question of accountability and limitation of the political powers of individuals: the curse along with the other penalties was most likely intended to guard the community against an outright armed conflict.

As for the more general problem of ensuring that officials carried out their tasks as specified, I have found only one instance of the public imprecation as a deterrent, namely in the law on educational provision in second-century Teos. The mention of the *ara* occurs towards the end of the text, and it is clearly aimed at the citizens generally as well as at officials in charge of the administration of the educational trust: ‘The one who makes a proposal or acts in contravention of this law or who fails to carry out the tasks as stipulated in the law, let him and his *genos* be destroyed’. This is followed by further deterrents in the form of penalties as prescribed for persons guilty of *hierosylia*, along with an enormous fine of ten thousand drachmai payable to the *polis*, and prosecution by *ho boulomenos* by actions both public and private.¹³

¹⁰ *IK Erythrai* 1 (C5): ὅσοι ἤδη ἐγραμμάτευσαν ἀπὸ Χαλκίδευ ἕκαθεν, τούτων μὴ ἐξεῖναι γραμματεῦσαι ἔτι μηδενὶ μηδεμίῃ ἀρχῇ, μηδὲ τὸ λοιπὸν γραμματεῦεν ἐξεῖναι μηδενὶ πλεόν ἢ ἄπαξ τῇ αὐτῇ ἀρχῇ, μηδὲ ταμίῃ πλεόν ἢ ἐνὶ μηδὲ δύο τιμαῖς τὸν αὐτὸν· ὅς δ’ ἄγ γραμματεύσει ἢ ἀνέλῃται ἢ εἴτηι ἢ ἐπιψηφίσει, κατάρητόν τε αὐτὸν εἶναι καὶ ἄτιμον καὶ ὀφείλειεν αὐτὸν ἕκατὸν στατήρας· For a detailed discussion and further references, see Koerner (1993: 451-463).

¹¹ *SEG* 26.1306: ὅς δ’ ἂν παραλαβὼν τὸ χωρίον μὴ παραδῶ[ι τ]ῶι φρουράρχω[ι] τῶ[ι] ὑπὸ τῆς πόλεως ἀποσ[τελ]λομένωι ἀεὶ καθ’ ἐκάστην τετράμη[νο]ν, φ[ε]ύγειν τε αὐτὸν ἀραιὸν ἐκ Τέω καὶ ἐξ Ἀβδήρων καὶ ἐκ τῆς χώρας καὶ τῆς Τηίων καὶ τῆς Ἀβδηρ[ι]τῶν καὶ τὰ ὄντα αὐτοῦ δη[μό]σια εἶ[ν]αι, καὶ ὅς ἂν ἀποκτείνῃ αὐτὸν μ[ὴ] μιὰρὸς ἔστω·

¹² *SEG* 26.1306: ἐὰν δὲ μαχόμενος [ἀποθάνῃ, ὑπάρχ]ε[ι]ν αὐτοῦ δημόσια τὰ ὄντα·

¹³ ὀφειλέτω δὲ καὶ τῇ πόλει ἕκαστος τῶν πρηξάντων τι παρὰ τόνδε τὸν νόμον περὶ τοῦ ἀργυρίου τούτου ἢ μὴ ποιούντων τὰ προστεταγμένα δραχμαῖς μυριά[ας,] δικασάσθω δὲ αὐτῷ ὁ βουλόμενος καὶ ἐν ἰδίαις δίκαις καὶ ἐν δημοσίαις καὶ μετὰ τοῦ λόγου τοῦ

In this text, the Teian *arai* are directed as much against the ordinary citizen who might exercise his right in a legislative forum to make proposals in contravention of the law as against the individual officials who are charged with administering the money belonging to the trust, and it is significant that the officials are not highlighted as the main threat. Moreover, the elaborate specification of the procedural means by which offenders could be brought before the courts testifies to a confidence on the part of the community that its political and legal institutions would be capable of limiting the power exercised by its officials to a considerable degree. This text may, then, illustrate Latte’s point that, as the central political institutions became increasingly powerful, the perceived need to invoke divine sanctions as penalties for specific offences decreased as a result, and it might be tempting to interpret the presence of the *ara* in the Teian regulations on their school trust as a concession to tradition.

However, matters may not be as simple as that. The powerful archaic official who, because of his personal prestige and resources, might use his office to ensconce himself in an impregnable position, *de facto* beyond the reach of the *polis*’ laws, may have been perceived as less of an intractable problem in the late classical and early Hellenistic communities. Fifth century Chios relied on the gods as the last resort, at the top of a chain of accountability which prescribed punishment of individual offenders by a board of *horophylakes*, punishment of the *horophylakes* by the Fifteen, and punishment of the Fifteen through divine destruction invoked in an imprecation. In the later periods, most attested Greek communities would have replaced the gods with other institutions at the very top of their chains. But if the threat posed by the unaccountable individual official was perceived as less acute in the late classical and early Hellenistic *poleis*, the problem of political power exercised without accountability broadly defined arguably persisted in relation to judges who cast their votes in secret ballots and participants in large political gatherings. Likewise, persistent problems were posed by offences of omission, which were notoriously difficult to detect and prosecute.

The imprecations intended to guard the community against *stasis* and subversive activities are, like the imprecation in the Teian educational regulations, directed as much against ordinary citizens exercising their political privileges in large, collective decision-making bodies as against individuals who exercised power *ex officio*. Likewise, entrenchment clauses with imprecations were typically directed as much against individual proposers of motions that might undermine the decision in

ἐπιμνήνιου τὴν ἀπήγησιν καὶ ἐγ καὶρῶν ὧν ἂν βούληται, προθεσμίαι δὲ μὴδὲ ἄλλοι τρόποι μὴθὲν ἐξέστω τῶν δικῶν τούτων μηδεμίαν ἐγβαλεῖν, ὁ δὲ ἀλίσκόμενος ἐκτινέτω διπλάσιον καὶ τὸ μὲν ἡμισυ ἔστω τῆς πόλεως, ἱερὸν Ἑρμοῦ καὶ Ἡρακλέους καὶ Μουσῶν, καὶ καταχωριζέσθω εἰς τὸν λόγον τὸν προγεγραμμένον, τὸ δὲ ἡμισυ τοῦ καταλαβόντος ἔστω... The final clauses of the law have recently been discussed by Fröhlich (2004: esp. 109-112) who does not, however, comment on the deterrent constituted by the public imprecation.

question as against those who presided over the political meeting and had responsibility for putting decisions to the vote. In many instances the imprecation would undoubtedly have been complemented by regular legal actions comparable to the Athenian procedures of the *graphe paranomon* and the *graphe nomon me epitedeion theinai*. Nevertheless, the deterrent offered by the public imprecation may still have been perceived as necessary – as indeed the Athenian evidence suggests that it was even as late as the fourth century – partly because of the unpredictability of the outcome of trials of this type, and partly because of the uncertainty surrounding the will of individual citizens to initiate the prosecutions.

Indeed, some of the public imprecations suggest that it was not the lack of power of the *polis*' courts and officials *vis à vis* individual offenders that was perceived as the problem in the fourth century and later: the weakest link in the process of law-enforcement was the individual citizen whose agency was required for setting the process of law-enforcement in motion. Hence, we find the public imprecation complementing the procedures and penalties that depended on individual prosecutors for their activation,¹⁴ and, equally significantly, there are three attestations of the imprecation being directed against individuals who fail to

¹⁴ In addition to *SEG* 26.1306, the following inscriptions provide examples: *PEP* Chios 80 (C4, imprecation combined with a sacred fine of a thousand drachmai), *IG* XII.2 526 = *RO* 83 (Eresos, C4; imprecation combined with prosecution warranted by law concerning the removal of stelai concerning tyrants and their descendants), *I di Cos* ED 53 (Kos, C4; imprecation combined with other *epitimia*), *IK* Adramyttion II 34 (Pordoselene, C4; imprecation combined with sacred fine of 300 stateres, hereditary *atimia* and prosecution warranted by law on *katalysis tou demou*), *IP* Ark. 2 (Tegea, C4; imprecation combined with fine of a hundred drachmai), *SEG* 25.447 = *IP* Ark 24 (Alipheira, C3; imprecation combined with sacred fine of ten thousand drachmai), *IK* Ephesos 4 (Ephesos, C3; imprecation combined with prosecution for insubordination and plotting against collective interests), *Labraunda* III 8 (Mylasa, C3; imprecation combined with *atimia*, fine and confiscation of property as well as prosecution by *ho boulomenos*), *SEG* 44.949 (Teos, C3; imprecation combined with confiscation of precious metal unlawfully withheld and *phasis* by *ho boulomenos*), *ID* 1520 (local association at Delos, C2; imprecation combined with information lodged by *ho boulomenos*), *SEG* 33.679 (Paros, C2; imprecation combined with *agon timetos* initiated by *ho boulomenos*). The co-existence in such text of the threat of the curse and provision for regular court procedures and punishment has long been regarded as an indication that communal trust in the efficacy of divine sanctions was waning (see recently Lambrinudakis and Wörrle (1983) 313: 'Die Kombination ist auch sonst – und schon im 5. Jahrhundert – zu beobachten und verrät natürlich mangelndes Vertrauen in die praktische Verbindlichkeit religiöser Vorstellungen und Normen, die man deswegen doch nicht für verzichtbar gehalten hat.' See also, more recently, Horster (2004: 44–46)). For a different interpretation of the co-existence of divine and human sanctions as deterrents see Parker (2005: 77) who comments on the fifth-century *dirae Teiorum* that 'it is inconceivable that the Teians would simply have left traitors, for instance, to be punished by the gods. (...) There is no incompatibility, no tension, between threatening the same offender with both punishment and curses.'

report an offence that they have witnessed (see Appendix, heading c). Failure by a witness to report an offence – sometimes an offence so serious that it might threaten the very existence of the community as a whole – is an offence of omission that must have been exceedingly difficult to detect and almost impossible to prove before a court.

In an earlier context, I have commented on the question of how individual communities attempted to combine the volunteer principle with the desire to ensure maximum efficiency in the actual process of law-enforcement. While the incentives offered to volunteers in the form of financial rewards as well as the political prestige to be derived from a successful high-profile prosecution are well known, I was able to find only one attestation, from fifth-century Chios, of a penalty threatened against an individual who failed to report on a criminal act that he had observed.¹⁵ I failed to discover any other examples of pressure being placed on potential volunteer informers comparable to the responsibilities placed on officials to take action in connection with offences committed within their area of jurisdiction. I was therefore tempted to conclude that, while the stick was frequently employed against officials who in some contexts clearly could be taken to task for failing to initiate a legal process when required, the carrot was not only the preferred method but normally the *only* method by which other citizens might be spurred into action.

However, if it is assumed that the threat of divine punishment for failing to report to the *polis*' authorities was perceived as both real and serious in the fourth century and later, the Chian example is not as exceptional as I first thought. Although the three inscriptions documenting the application of the public imprecation against reluctant informers cannot, with the best will in the world, be said to be overwhelming, the notion that failure to act was punishable – not with fines, *atimia* or death, but with destruction through divine intervention – recurs in the formulae of self-imprecation pronounced with certain types of oaths. In the appendix to this article I have set out examples of the kind of undertakings that were confirmed with compulsory oaths sealed by *euchai* and *arai*.¹⁶

As was the case of the public imprecations, the material pertaining to compulsory self-imprecations shows a remarkable affinity to the contents of the fifth-century *dirae Teiorum*, but the attestations of divine destruction invoked by individual citizens on themselves for failing to report on acts of treason, planned revolutions and other serious offences constitutes a conspicuous difference. Where the fifth-century Teian *arai* invoked divine retribution on the offender directly, a

¹⁵ *PEP Chios* 1 = *LSAG* 116 (Chios, C4): the individual who observes unlawful herding, depositing of manure or removal of sacred equipment from sacred groves is obliged to report the offence to the *basileis* under the threat of a sacred fine of five stateres.

¹⁶ I have not included examples from inter-state treaties (which merit a discussion of their own), except those that concern acts of *sympoliteia*, where the oaths sworn by members of the merging communities bear as strong resemblance to attested citizen oaths. Nor have I included evidentiary oaths that serve to corroborate specific facts.

number of self-imprecations, particularly those associated with citizens' oaths, recognise the crucial role played by the individual citizen in the process of law enforcement. In those contexts the passivity of an individual is equated with his condoning the offence and leaves him open to divine retribution.

Like the public imprecation, the Hellenistic self-imprecation of course has a long and distinguished pedigree. And it might still be possible to argue with both Ziebarth and Latte that its preservation in texts from the fourth century and later simply reflects a traditional ritual that was perceived as essential in defining the identity of the community, but which had nonetheless lost its real religious significance, and with that its significance as a legal deterrent. This, however, runs counter to the evidence, which suggests that individual communities took particular steps and sometimes invested considerable resources to ensure that everybody required to swear oaths with imprecations actually did so at specified times.

In fourth-century Eretria, for example, all individuals who had sworn the oath confirming their arrangements with an individual contractor were registered by name, and a similar practice is attested for third-century Ioulis.¹⁷ At Dreros, the responsibility for administering the oath to the new cohorts of young citizens rested with an official who would be liable to prosecution before the *boule* if he failed to carry out his duty.¹⁸ At Teos it seems that individuals who refused to swear the required oaths upon the merger with Kyrbissos would be liable to penalties,¹⁹ although perhaps not as severe as that attested for third-century Itanos: here the penalty for refusing to swear the citizen's oath was loss of citizen privileges and complete exclusion from all communal activities sacred and profane.²⁰

These are but a few examples taken from a very rich body of material which deserves further systematic investigation. I hope, however, that they may prove sufficient to establish a plausible case for seeing the religious sentiment that lent a

¹⁷ *IG XII*, 9 191 (Eretria, C4) ὁμόσαι τοὺς πολίτας π]άντας Χαιρεφάνει ἐν Ἀπόλλωνος Δαφνηφόρου· ὅς δ' ἂν μ[ὴ ὁμόσει, ἄτιμος ἔστω· ἐξορκούντων δὲ] οἱ πρόβουλοι, ἐξορκ[κ]ούντων δὲ καὶ οἱ στρατηγοὶ κατὰ [ἔτος τοὺς ἐφήβους· ὅπως οὖν τὴν γῆν] καρπίζηται τὰ ἔτη τὰ σ[υ]γκείμενα Χαιρεφάνης, ἀναγ[ράφειν καὶ τὸ ψήφισμα καὶ τὸν ὄρκον ἐν στήλει λιθ]ίνει καὶ στήσαι ἐν τῷ ἱερῷ τοῦ Ἀπόλλωνος τοῦ Δα[φνηφόρου]· ἀναγράφειν δὲ κα]ὶ τοὺς ὁμόσαντας· ἀ]ναγράφειν δὲ καὶ τῶ[ν] ἐφήβων τοὺς ὁμόσαν[τας ἐν στήλει]... Although some of the restorations proposed by the editors are very doubtful indeed, the main point about the registration of oath-takers seems secure. cf. *IG XII Suppl.* 235 (Ioulis, C3), and *IK Magnesia Sip.* 1.

¹⁸ *IC I ix 1*: part of the citizen's oath was the undertaking: ἧ μὰν ἐγὼ τὸν κόσμον, αἴ κα μὴ ἐξορκίζονται τὰν ἀγέλαν τοὺς τόκα ἐγδυομένους τὸν αὐτὸν ὄρκον τόνπερ ἄμεξ ὁμώκαμες, ἐμβαλεῖν ἐς τὰν βωλάν, ἅ κα ἀποστάντι τοῦ μηνός τοῦ Κομνοκαρίου ἧ τοῦ Ἀλιαίου· ἅ δὲ β[ω]λὰ πραζάντων ἕκαστον τὸν κοσμίοντα στατήρας πεντακοσίους ἀφ' ἅς κα ἐμβάλῃ ἀμέρας ἐν τριμήνῳ·

¹⁹ *PEP Teos* 48 (C3): ἐὰν δέ τις μὴ ὁμόσει, [ζ]ημίαν ψηφίσει κα]τ' αὐτοῦ τὸν δήμον ὡς ἀδικούντος·

²⁰ *IC III iv 7*: ὅς δέ κα ἐπίδαμος ἐὼν τῶν πολιτῶν μὴ λῆι ὁμόσαι μὴ ἔστω πολίτας ἀλλὰ ἐργέσθω καὶ θίνων καὶ ἀνθρωπίνων.

force of deterrence to the publicly imprecations as well as the self-imprecations incorporated in oaths of various types as being still very much alive in the Hellenistic period. They lend additional force to Thür’s observation in relation to *IP Ark 8* that ‘oath and curse in Greek popular religion constitute the bridge back to the official procedures of the archaic period’, a bridge, moreover, that reaches well into the Hellenistic period and beyond.

To sum up. The continuity attested in the material in regard to the areas that were wholly or partially protected by the threat of divine sanctions suggests that the trivialisation of such imprecations, as suggested by Latte, must be rejected. As for the question whether the threat of divine punishment was taken seriously in the fourth century and later, the adaptations that appear to reflect changing political realities and power structures within individual communities do together point to the conclusion that they continued to matter.²¹

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²¹ I am grateful to the Leverhulme Trust for granting me a research fellowship in 2004-2005, during which period this article was written.

APPENDIX

The public imprecation in the late classical and Hellenistic periods

Themes in ML 30: areas of protection (thematic, not following the order of the stone)

- a. protection of the stelai bearing the words of the *ara* itself
- b. protection against installation of *aisymnetes* (i.e. narrowing of constitution/tyranny)
- c. protection against betrayal of the city and its territory, including protection against individuals knowingly giving bad advice to the Teians in matters of foreign policy
- d. protection against *timouchoi* failing to pronounce the *ara* at specified times
- e. protection against magic (φάρμακα δηλητήρια) employed against individuals or the community as a collectivity
- f. protection against undermining of grain supply to the city

*Areas of application*a. Entrenchment clauses

i. entrenchment clauses in (apparently) straightforward honorary decrees

IK Ilios 24 (Ilios, C4/3): entrenchment of a decree granting extensive *ateleia* to four Tenedian honorands and anyone who trades with them. The political background and significance of this decision cannot be assessed. The decree may be trivial, but is not necessarily so.

TAM III 1 (Termessos, C2): honorary decree, apparently straightforward, but note that neither the name of the honorand, nor any indication of the decree's original political context have survived.

SEG 41.1379 (Limyra, *koinon* of Pernitai, C4): simple honorary decree for Pylimatis Masatos. The background is unknown: the decree appears to have been straightforward.

IK Ilios 36 (Ilios, C3/2): entrenchment clause protecting against reversal of decisions made in favour of royal family. Potentially of high political significance with implications for the collective safety of the community.

SEG 45.1876 (unidentified *polis* in Kolchis, C4/3)?: context lost, possibly entrenchment clause, but restoration is uncertain.

ii. entrenchment clauses in decisions likely to have serious implications for the community as a whole

FD III 1.294 (Delphi, C5/4): entrenchment clause with imprecation on anyone who, in his capacity as *damiourgos* or ordinary citizen (*damoteumenos*), abolishes the law on lending.

PEP Teos 41 (Teos, C2): entrenchment of law on administration of educational trust set up by Polythros, and imprecation on anyone who is in breach of its terms whether by omission or commission.

SEG 4.58, IG XIV 432 (Tauromenion, C2): entrenchment of law pertaining to admission of new members of the gymnasium. Imprecation most likely also on those who violate its stipulations.

b. Protection against treason, *stasis* or actions that may lead to *stasis*

FD III 1.294 (Delphi, C5/4): imprecation on individuals who propose redistribution of land or cancellation of debts, along with entrenchment clause pertaining to the law on lending in its entirety.

SEG 51.1105 (Eretria, C4): imprecation on individuals who attempt to abolish the law against tyranny and oligarchy or act in contravention of its stipulations.

IK Mylasa 1 (Mylasa, C4): prohibition against overturning the sentence passed on individuals convicted of treason against Mausollos. Corresponds closely to *IG XII,2 526* = *RO 83* (Eresos, C4)

IK Mylasa 2 (Mylasa, C4): prohibition against overturning the sentence passed on individuals convicted of treason against Mausollos. Corresponds closely to *IG XII,2 526* = *RO 83* (Eresos, C4)

IK Mylasa 3 (Mylasa, C4): prohibition against reversing sale of property confiscated from individuals convicted of treason against Mausollos. Corresponds closely to *IG XII,2 526* = *RO 83* (Eresos, C4) which places a curse on anyone who attempts to restore confiscated property to the descendants of Agonippos.

IG XII,2 526 = RO 83 (Eresos, C4): imprecation on judges voting against the *polis*' interests in trials of Eresian tyrants.

IG XII,2 526 = RO 83 (Eresos, C4): imprecation on anyone who assists in returning the exiled descendants of Agonippos, if the latter is convicted, or attempts to restore confiscated property to them.

IK Adramyttion II 34 (Nasos/Pordoselene C4): being an honorary decree for a prominent citizen, Thersippos, this appears on the surface to be one of Latte's trivial decisions, the entrenchment of which is secured by a curse. But it appears from lines A23-29 that Thersippos had sided decisively with Polyperchon and that his policy in this regard had implications for the entire *polis* vis à vis the king and, equally importantly, the King's rivals. The honours voted for Thersippos were thus anything but trivial: they were an important token of allegiance to an outside potentate and at the same time potentially contentious within Nasos/Pordoselene itself. Within the *polis*, there was undoubtedly a risk that a rival faction might attempt to undermine Thersippos' position (and with that, the position of Polyperchon) by bringing about a shift in the *polis*' allegiance to Polyperchon's enemies and using this a stepping stone to gaining power for themselves. It is indicative that the curse upon individuals who attempt to reverse the decision is accompanied by another deterrent, namely that such individuals may also be prosecuted for *katalysis tou demou!* On this interpretation, this instance may be grouped with other examples of the *ara* as a protection against *stasis*.

SEG 50.1304 (Sagalassos, C4/3): clearly connected with on-going *stasis*. Divine destruction is invoked against a faction which has occupied stronghold in the city's territory.

SEG 25.447 = IP Ark 24 (Alipheira, C3): protection against breach of amnesty following *stasis*.

SEG 26.1306 (Teos, C3): imprecation on garrison commander at fortress in Kyrbissos if he fails to hand over fortress to his successor (the following clause 'if he dies fighting, his property shall be confiscated' suggests a clear perceived threat of internal armed conflict).

c. Ensuring that offence is reported and/or punished

FD III 1.294 (Delphi, C5/4): failure by anyone knowing of offence to report it (text lacunose).

IG XI,4 1296 (Delos, C3): failure by anyone witnessing the abduction of slaves from Delos or any sanctuary belonging to the god to the detriment of the slave's master to report the offence to the *astynomoi*.

SEG 33.679 (Paros, C2): failure by anyone witnessing damage or destruction of documents in public archive, deposited in sanctuary, to report the offence to the relevant officials (cf. heading d.).

d. Protecting ritual and/or sacred property and precincts

IP Ark. 2 (Tegea, C4): the law contains regulations of herding within the sanctuary. The priest is obliged to tie and lead away (*inphorbiein?*) small livestock. Failure to do so results in

his becoming *katarwos*. In so far as the priest incurs the penalty if he fails to take action against an offence that he has witnessed, the text may be regarded as belonging also under heading c.

I di Cos ED 53 (Kos, C4): the contents of the law are lost, but most likely relate to sanctuary.

PEP Chios 80 (Chios, Klytidai, C4): protection against unauthorised use of building constructed in sanctuary for storage of *ta koina hiera*.

IK Tralles 3 (Tralles, C4): protection of supplicants.

IK Ephesos VII,1 3401 (pertains to the sanctuary of Meter Galesia in Metropolis, C4): protection of supplicants.

SEG 27.942 (Xanthos, C4): entrenchment of decision relating to the construction of an altar to Basileus Kaunios and regulations for sacrifices.

IG XI,4 1296 (Delos, C3): abduction of slaves from Delos or any sanctuary belonging to the god to the detriment of the slave's master and imprecation on anyone who generally offends against *ta patria*.

Syl. (3) 1219 = LSAM 16 (Gambreion, C3): protection of funerary legislation. The ten-year ban on transgressors sacrificing as 'guilty of *asebeia*' suggests that the curse is first and foremost intended as a protection of ritual, but individual funerals would obviously have been difficult to control in practice (heading e).

TAM II i-iii 1 (Telmessos, C3): imprecation on ordinary citizens and officials if they fail to perform annual sacrifices at altar to Zeus Soter, constructed at the behest of King Ptolemy.

SEG 9.73, SEG 13.618 (Kyrene, C2/1): protection against unauthorised use of equipment of Apollo sanctuary.

I Priene 201 (Priene, C2): entrenchment of terms of sale of priesthood and its privileges.

I Priene 203 (Priene, C2): entrenchment of terms of sale of priesthood and its privileges.

SEG 33.679 (Paros, C2): imprecation on individuals who damage or destroy documents deposited in public archive in sanctuary of Apollon, Artemis and Leto. Note that imprecation applies only to acts of destruction or damage to documents that have been carried out *after* the transfer of the archive to the sanctuary: εἴ τις τῶν γραμμάτων τῶν ἐν τῷ ἱερῷ τῶν μνημονικῶν τῶν ἀνενηνεγμένων ἠδίκηκε τι ἢ ἐξ ἀλήλιπέ τι ἢ ἐγγέγραφε ἄφ' ὃ ἀνηνεγθή εἰς τὸ ἱερόν, ἐξώλη εἶναι αὐτόν κτλ.

e. Protecting against offences that are difficult or impossible to detect and prosecute

i. directed against officials:

Labraunda III 8 (Mylasa, C3): protection of ban on *euthynai*: ἐὰν δὲ ἦ] παραλάβῃ τις τὴν εὐθυναν ἢ εισαγάγῃ ἢ δικασ[σῆς δικάσῃ ἢ δῶι παρὰ] τὰ δεδογμένα παρευρέσει ἠτιν(ι)οῦν, ἐξώλης [ἔστω αὐτὸς καὶ οἱ ἐξ αὐ]τοῦ καὶ ἐπικατάρματος καὶ ἄτιμος καὶ προσαπο[τεισάτω δραχμὰς] ας καὶ ἔστω τὰ ὑπάρχοντα αὐτοῦ ἱερά Διὸς Ὅσ[ογω καὶ ἐξέστω τῷ βου]λομένωι εὐθύνειν τὸν μὴ ἐμμείναντα ἄνευ π[ροθεσμίας παρευρέσει μη]δεμιᾶι ἐκκλειομένωι. Context is unclear, but there is a clear parallel to Koerner no. 27 (Halieis?, C5): αἶ τισις [ἔ τὰ]ν βολὰν τ[ὰ]ν ἀνφ' Ἀρίσστονα ἔ τὸν(ς) συναρτῦοντας [ἔ ἄ]λλον τινα ταμίαν εὐθύνοι τέλος ἔχον ἔ δικάσ[ζο]ι ἔ δικάσζοιτο τὸν γρασμάτων. Héneka τὰς καταθέσιος ἔ τὰς ἀλιάσσιος κτλ. In this text, the *boule* collectively interpreted as 'incurring a sacred fine', if they fail to enforce the penalties of exile and confiscation of property against offenders. May in fact belong under heading b.

PEP Teos 41 (Teos, C2): protection against maladministration or unauthorised diversion of funds by officials responsible for the educational trust set up by Polythros.

ii: directed against individuals who will cast votes in collective decision-making processes

IG XII,2 526 = RO 83 (Eresos, C4): imprecation on judges voting in secret ballot against the *polis*' interests in trials of Eresian tyrants. See also b. above.

Syl. (3) 577 (Miletos, C3/2): imprecation on individuals who vote to elect *paidotribai* and teachers against their better judgement. That such appointments were potentially contentious in political terms is suggested by the phrase καὶ μηδεμίαι φιλοτιμίαι παρὰ τὸ δίκαιον προσνέμοι τὴν αὐτοῦ γνώμην.

IC III iv 7 (Itanos, C3): public imprecation combined with self-imprecation in oath sworn by the entire citizen body of Itanos. The undertaking in the oath itself has not been preserved, but most likely corresponds to that of **IC III iv 8** protecting against *i.a.* treason, conspiracy to overthrow the constitution, failure to report conspiracies, cancellation of debts.

iii: directed against individuals generally who by omission may cause harm to the collectivity
SEG 44.949 (Teos, C3): imprecation (combined with self-imprecation in oath) on residents in Teos who withhold precious metals and objects required for payment of ransom to pirates. The inscription as a whole suggests that the entire community was under a serious threat.

IC II xii 22 (Eleutherna, C2): imprecation on individuals who fail to report to the *kosmoi* of Eleutherna on leaving the πολ[ι]τήϊαν τῶν Ἀρτεμιτῶν.

f. protecting property of individuals or the community

SEG 28.1224 (Telmessos, C3): imprecation on individuals who request a *polis* or *kome* belonging to Termessos as a gift from King or Queen.

IK Ephesos 4 (Ephesos, C3): imprecation on individuals who give or receive, without authorisation, documentation relating to individual compromises in connection with post-war settlement of debts.

Self imprecation

Affinity with publicly pronounced arai:

Koerner (1993: 166) noted the close correspondence with the oath formula in the public imprecation of **IG IX 1(2) 609 = Koerner no. 47** ('Bronze Pappadakis'), Naupaktos, ca. 500 B.C.: ἔμην τῶι ταῦτα παρβαίνοντι ἐξζόλειαν αὐτῶι καὶ γενεῶι καὶ πάντεσιν, τῶι δ' εὐσεβέοντι Ηίλαος ἔσστο. For a parallel, see **SEG 9.3 = ML 5.46-51**.

SEG 31.985 = Koerner no. 79 (Teos, 480-450) combines text of imprecation against officials (τιμὴν ἔχων) with the text of an oath the main objective of which was clearly to protect against *stasis*. It is not absolutely clear whether the oath was to be sworn by all citizens of Teos or specifically by incoming officials only:

ἐπανάστα[σ]ιν οὐ βολεύσω οὐδὲ ποιήσω οὐδὲ λυ[ή]σω ο[ὐ]δὲ διώξω ο[ὐ]δὲ [χρ]ήμ[α]τὰ δημιώσω οὐδὲ δῆσω. οὐδὲ κατ[ακ]τε[ί]ν[ε]ω ἄμ μὴ σ[ὺ]ν [... ..]Ι[]ΙΣΙΝ ἐν Τέωι [ἢ] πλέροσ[ι]ν [κ]αὶ ἄμ μὴ ὑπ[ὸ] πόλεω[ς] ν[ό]μο καταλαφθέν[τ]α ἐν δὲ Ἀβδή[ρ]οισιν [σ]ὺμ πεντακο[σ]ίοισιν ἢ πλ[έ]οσιν αἰσυμνήτην οὐ στήσω [ο]ὔτε σὺμ πολλοῖσι[ν]; the rest is lost.

Areas of application

a. Entrenchment clauses (very widespread in treaties throughout the period)

IG XII,9 191 (Eretria, C4): self-imprecation by all citizens undertaking not to alter agreement with contractor and his heirs in draining project.

b. Protection against treason, *stasis* or actions that may lead to *stasis*

RFIC 70:15 (Telos, C4/3): citizen oath with undertaking not to engage in subversion and to abide by post-*stasis* settlement.

IC I ix 1 (Dreros, C3/2): citizen oath with undertaking not to betray *polis*, not to initiate *stasis* or participate in conspiracy.

IG XII Suppl. 235 (Ioulis, C3): undertaking not to form ties with enemies of the community.

Tit. Cal. pp.9-10 T xii (merged community of Kos and Kalymna, C3): undertaking to remain loyal to democracy and to abide by its laws and decrees, to remain loyal to King Ptolemy, not to support tyranny or oligarchy or any conspiracy that may destabilise the constitution.

IK Magnesia Sip. 1 (Magnesia on merger with Smyrna, C3): undertaking to stay loyal to King Seleukos and the *polis* of Smyrna, to abide by *sympolitēia* agreement and the laws and decrees of Smyrna, to uphold *autonomia*, *isonomia* and *dēmokratia* of Smyrna.

IK Magnesia Sip. 1 (Smyrna on merger with Magnesia, C3): undertaking to abide by agreement with residents of Magnesia Sip. and to stay loyal to King Seleukos. Undertaking to co-exist with new citizens on equal terms and admit them to relevant civic subdivisions.

PEP Teos 48 (Teos, C3): undertaking not to demolish the nucleated settlement of Kyrbissos by Teian citizens upon merger of Teos and Kyrbissos.

IosPE 1(2) 401 = Syl. (3) 360 (*koinon* of Taurian Chersonnese, C3): citizen oath undertaking not to betray the *koinon* or its territory, to remain an enemy of those who plot against or betray the *koinon*, to serve as *damiourgos* and *bouleutēs* in the best interests of the community, without taking bribes or engaging in harmful activities against any individual citizen, and not to participate in any *synōmosia* against the *koinon* or any individual citizen who remains loyal to the *koinon*.

IC III iv 8 (Itanos, C3): citizen oath with undertaking not to betray *polis* or to engage in any conspiracy against the *polis* or any individual citizen, not to engage in *anadasmos gēs* or cancellation of debts, and to live as a citizen according to the *polis* laws.

Labraunda III 47 (Mylasa, C2): citizen oath with undertaking not to overthrow democracy or any of its decisions.

c. Ensuring that offence is reported and prosecuted

IG II(2) 1196 (Athens, Aixone, C4): undertaking by *dēmotai* to uphold decision and to report any transgressions to fellow demesmen. καὶ ἐς τὸν λοιπὸν χρόνον ἀποφανῶ τοῖς δημόταις, ἐάν τινα τι εἰδῶ ποιοῦντα τούτων ἐν τοῖς [ἀ]γοραῖς.

RFIC 70:15 (Telos, C4/3): citizen oath with undertaking to lodge information with *polis* officials about revolutionary activities or conspiracies: αἱ δὲ κα ἀΐσθωμαί τινα νεωτερίζοντα ἢ συλλόγους συνάγοντα ἐπὶ καταλύσει τοῦ δάμου, δηλωσέω τοῖς ἄρχουσιν·

IC I ix 1 (Dreros, C3/2): citizen oath with undertaking to lodge information about conspiracy with *polis* officials, and to report *kosmos* to *boule*, if *kosmos* fails to exact oath from members of the *agela* who have escaped the oath on the stipulated occasion. εἰ δὲ τινας κα πύθωμαι συνομνύοντας, ἐξαγγελίω τοῦ κόσμου τοῖς πλίσασιν·

PEP Teos 48 (Kyrbissos on merger with Teos, C3): undertaking to report conspirators against territory or phrourarchos to the Teian *polis* (?) and phrourarchos: καὶ ἂν [εἰδῶ τινα] ἐπιβουλεύοντα τῷ χωρίῳ ἢ τῷ φρου[ρ]άρχῳ δηλώσω τῆ[ι πόλει] καὶ τῷ φρουράρχ[ῳ] καὶ οὐκ [ἐπ]ιτρέψω κατὰ δύναμιν τὴν [ἐμήν].

IK Magnesia Sip. 1 (Magnesia on merger with Smyrna, C3): undertaking to report conspiracies against *polis* and its territory as well as conspiracies to overthrow *dēmokratia* or *isonomia* to the Smyrnaian Assembly. καὶ ἐάν τινα αἰσθάνωμαι ἐπιβουλεύοντα] τῆ πόλει

ἢ τοῖς χωρίοις τοῖς τῆς πόλεως, ἢ τὴν δημοκρατίαν ἢ τὴν ἰσονομίαν καταλύοντα, μηνύσω τῶι δήμῳ τῶι Σμυρναίων καὶ βοιθηθῶ ἀγωνιζ[όμ]ενος μετὰ πάσης φιλοτιμίας, καὶ οὐκ ἐγκαταλείψω κατὰ δύναμιν τὴν ἑμαυτοῦ·

IK Magnesia Sip. 1 (Smyrna on merger with Magnesia, C3): undertaking to report any plan to harm the Magnesians admitted as Smyrnaian citizens or their descendants or their property, and to assist the victims. καὶ ἐάν τινα αἰσθάνωμαι ἐπιβουλεύοντα αὐτοῖς ἢ τοῖς ἐκγό[νοις] αὐτῶν ἢ τοῖς ὑπάρχουσιν αὐτῶν, μηνύσω ὡς ἂν τάχιστα δύναμαι, καὶ βοι[ηθήσ]ω μετὰ φιλοτιμίας·

IosPE 1(2) 401 = Syl. (3) 360 (*koinon* of Taurian Chersonnese, C3): citizen oath with undertaking to report any conspiracy to betray *koinon* or undermine its institutions to the *damiourgoi kata polin*. οὐδὲ τῶι προδιδόντι καὶ καταλύοντι ἐπιτρέψω οὐδὲ συγκρυσθῶ, ἀλλὰ ἐξαγγελῶ τοῖς δαμιουργοῖς τοῖς κατὰ πόλιν·

IosPE 1(2) 401 = Syl. (3) 360 (*koinon* of Taurian Chersonnese, C3): citizen oath with undertaking to report and judge any offence causing harm to an individual citizen of the *koinon*. οὐδὲ ἐπιβουλεύσῶ ἄδικον πρᾶγμα οὐθενὶ οὐθέν τῶμ πολιτᾶν τῶμ μὴ ἀφεστακῶτων, οὐδὲ τῶι ἐπιβουλεύον[τι ἐπιτρέψω οὐδὲ συγκρυσθῶ οὐθέν οὐθε]νί, ἀλλ’ εἰσαγγελ[ῶ] καὶ κρινῶ ψά[φωι] κατὰ τοὺς νόμους·

IosPE 1(2) 401 = Syl. (3) 360 (*koinon* of Taurian Chersonnese, C3): citizen oath with undertaking to report on any *synômosia* threatening the *koinon* to the *damiourgoi*. καὶ εἴ τινα κα συνωμοσίαν αἴσ[θ]ῶμαι εὐόσαν ἢ [γι]νομένην, ἐξαγγελῶ τοῖς δαμ[ιορ]γοῖς·

IC III iv 8 (Itanos, C3): citizen oath with undertaking to report any *synômosia* or *syllagos* set up to betray the *polis* of Itanos to the *polis* officials. πόλιν τᾶν Ἰτανίων οὐ προδ[ω]σέω, οὐδὲ χάραν οὐδὲ νά[σ]ου[ς] τὰς τῶν [Ἰ]τανίων, οὐδὲ [πολ]εμίους ἐπαξέω, οὐδὲ ναῦ[ς] τὰς τῶν Ἰτανίων προδωσέω, [οὐδὲ] τῶν πολιτᾶν προδωσέω [οὐδέν]α, οὐδὲ χρήματα πολιτ[ᾶν], οὐδὲ σύλλογον οὐδὲ συνωμο[σίαν] ποιησέω ἐπὶ τῶι κακίονι τ[ᾶς] πόλ]ιος ἢ τῶν πολιτᾶν, οὐδὲ ἄλλ[λω]ι συνεσσεόμαι οὐδενί, αἴ τίς κα χ[ρ]ήιζηι τούτων τ[ι] π[ο]ιεῖν, ἀλλ’ ἐρέω ποτὶ τοὺς ἄρχοντας·

Milet I,3 150 = Syl. (3) 633 (Miletos and Herakleia, C2): in principle, the oath to be taken by *all* citizens of the two communities constitutes an entrenchment of a treaty, but the effect of the treaty is the merger of the *poleis*. One undertaking to which the self-imprecation relates is to report any breach of the agreement to the *boulê* and the Assembly. καὶ ἐάν τινα ἄλλον πυνθάνωμαι παραβαίνοντα τὰς ὁμολογίας, οὐκ ἐπιτρέψω κατὰ δύναμιν τὴν ἐμήν, ἀλλὰ δηλώσω τῆι βουλῆι καὶ τῶι δήμῳ.

Milet I,3 149 (Miletos and Pidasa, C2): in principle, the oath to be taken by *all* citizens of the two communities constitutes an entrenchment of a treaty, but the effect of the treaty is the merger of the *poleis*. One undertaking to which the self-imprecation relates is to report any breach of the agreement to the *boulê* and the Assembly. καὶ ἐάν τινα ἄλλον πυν[θ]άνωμαι αἰρούμενον παραβαίνειν τὰς ὁμολογίας, οὐκ ἐπιτρέψω κατὰ δύναμιν τὴν ἐμήν, ἀλλὰ δηλώσω τῆι βουλῆι καὶ τῶι δήμῳ.

d. Protecting ritual and/or sacred property and precincts

Unattested, except in very general contexts of certain citizen’s oaths.

e. Protecting against offences that are difficult or impossible to detect and prosecute

i. self-imprecation by officials or quasi officials

CID I.9 = RO 1 (Delphi, Labyadai, C4): protection against maladministration of funds, undertaking to administer oath to successors in office.

IG II(2) 1183 (Athens, Myrrhinous, C4): self-imprecation by *logistai* and individuals acting as *synêgoroi* in accounting procedure.

SEG 26.136 (Athens, Thorikos, C4): self-imprecation by *euthynos* and his *paredroi*.

CID I.10, SEG 28.100, IG II(2) 1126 (Delphi, C4): self-imprecation by *grammateus* (?) undertaking to draw up records according to the instructions of *hieromnamones*, parallel undertaking by *kérykes*.

Syl. (3) 577 (Milet, C3): self-imprecation by candidates for elected office undertaking not to rig election.

I di Cos ED: 196 (Kos, C3): self-imprecation by official undertaking not to engage in maladministration (particularly embezzlement).

PEP Teos 48 (Teos, C3): undertaking to propose only the most suitable candidate for the elected office of *phrouarchos* (corresponds closely to Syl. (3) 577 (Miletos, C3/2) relating to election of *paidotribai* and teachers).

IG II(2) 1243 (Athens, Tetrapoleis, C3): undertaking by officials to obey instructions and to administer same oath to successors in office.

IG XII, 207 (Eretria, C3): undertaking by individuals appointed to assign contracts to *technitai* to make the awards without bribes or any regard to *charis* or individual enmity.

IC III vi 7 (Praisos, C3): undertaking by official to administer oath with self-imprecation to the citizens generally within specified time. The rest of the oath relates to entrenchment of treaty with Stalitai.

IG XII,7 515 (Aigiale, C2): undertaking by officials to designate *epimelêtês* from among *euergetai* and *aleitourgetoi* (the first part of the oath is 'evidentiary', confirming integrity of the officials' own past conduct in office).

FD III 1:362 + 4:354 (Halai and Boumeliteia, C2): undertaking by quasi officials (= guides who will show judges round disputed territory and point out *horoi*) only to show them the original *horoi* and not to fabricate any new ones.

FD III 1:362 + 4:354 (Halai and Boumeliteia, C2): undertaking by quasi officials (= *dikastagôgoi*) not to exert undue influence on judges, their secretary or their slaves or to bribe them prior to the hearing of the dispute.

SEG 43.381 (Beroia, C2): undertaking by *gymnasiarchoi* to discharge their duties according to laws, and not to be influenced by *charis* or enmity.

ii. self-imprecation by individuals who will cast votes in collective decision-making processes
IG II(2) 1183 (Athens, Myrrhinous, C4): self-imprecation by individuals who will assume decision-making role in accounting process of officials.

CID I.10, SEG 28.100, IG II(2) 1126 (Delphi, C4): self-imprecation by *amphiktyons* acting in a judicial capacity as well as agents of implementation of penalties.

IK Knidos I 221 (Knidos, C4/3): self-imprecation by individuals judging dispute between Kalymna and the descendants of a Koan citizen.

Tit. Cal. pp.9-10 T xii (merged community of Kos and Kalymna, C3): undertaking by citizens of the merged community to cast votes (openly as well as in secret ballots) that will benefit the *polis*, without regard to *charis*.

FD III 4:278 (Delphi, C2): undertaking to judge without regard to *charis*, *philia* or enmity, to restore property to Apollon immediately after verdict, and not to accept bribes or engage in embezzlement.

f. Protection of grain imports

IosPE 1(2) 401 = Syl. (3) 360 (*koinon* of Taurian Chersonese, C3): citizen oath with undertaking not to import grain except to the Taurian Chersonese (close correspondence with ML 30, public imprecation, Teos C5: ὅστις ἐς γῆν τὴν Τηϊνὴν κωλύει σῖτον ἐσάγεσθαι ἢ τέχνην ἢ μηχανῆν ἢ κατὰ θάλασσαν ἢ κατ' ἤπειρον ἢ ἐσαχθέντα ἀνωθεοίη, ἀπόλλυσθαι καὶ αὐτὸν καὶ γένος τὸ κένο).