

Vijñānavāda work — better yet, an 'Early Yogācāra'¹ work — as it does either not itself, or only in form of interpolations, contain the characteristic terminology of Yogācāra-Vijñānavāda.²

Much of the evaluations provided above is, without necessarily being completely identical with his views in every respect, mainly based on the evidence provided by SCHMITHAUSEN (e.g., 1969: esp. 819ff.; 1969a, 1973, 1986 [esp. pp. 208, 210, 214f.], 1987 [= *Ālayav.*], 2000c). — For an introduction to the literary extent and complexities the designation '*Yogācārabhūmi*' implies one may refer to the guidelines provided by the entries of *Ālayav.*: 667ff.; for the broad structure of Y, see already SCHMITHAUSEN 1969a: 17ff.³

It has to be noted, however, that Schmithausen does not reflect his textual stratifications in terms of representing distinct features of a philosophical development that can be clearly demarcated in the way it is presently done. He does not strictly differentiate between an Early Yogācāra stage and a Yogācāra-Vijñānavāda stage of philosophical development. Indeed, in spite of the fact that Schmithausen himself has strongly promoted an awareness with regard to the historical and ideological gap between the fundamental corpus of MauBh and the post-Saṃdh parts of Y, not to speak of the gap between MauBh and MSgr, he considers Asaṅga to be an early Yogācāra (*Ālayav.*: 189).⁴

It seems that Schmithausen makes an incision between Asaṅga and (the two) Vasubandhu(s) in order to speak of early Yogācāra and later Yogācāra (cf. *Ālayav.*: n. 1200). While it is true that Asaṅga is a *pūrvācārya* for the Kośakāra, it cannot be overlooked that, in contrast to the gap between MauBh and MSgr, the doctrinal differences between MSgr and MSgrBh, or even MSgr and Tr, are secondary and would fall within the field of Yogācāra-Vijñānavāda (structuring its inner contours).

According to FRAUWALLNER (1956: 296), it is another historical incision

¹ Adopting Schmithausen's (e.g., *Ālayav.* § 1.2; n. 58) expression 'Early Yogācāra', it will be used to technically refer to that stage of Yogācāra(-Vijñānavāda) that is represented by the *Basic Section* of the *Yogācārabhūmi*. 'Early' has the function of distinguishing that stage from the later formation of a full-fledged post-Saṃdhanirmocanasūtra Yogācāra-Vijñānavāda somehow developing from Early Yogācāra. Furthermore, the 'Early Yogācāras' have to be distinguished from those *yogācāras*, who had already firmly consolidated themselves by the 2nd century as that general milieu of 'practitioners of yoga' in North-West India from which Early Yogācāra (in the narrower technical sense) may be assumed to have arisen (in ways and modes of differentiation that remain to be investigated). See also below: Ex. 4.

² Though, as the various later Y.-V. conceptual innovations retrospectively suggest, texts pertaining to the *Maulī Bhūmi*, not least the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* (as a Mahāyāna text), must have been slowly prepared the way of seeing the necessity for a new set of technical vocabulary. We will return to this issue.

³ Cf. also, more recently, AHN 2003; KRITZER 2005: XIIff., and DELEANU 2006: 43ff.

⁴ That is, after having, for idea-historical reasons, rightly rejected the traditional view of regarding Asaṅga as the author of Y. In his "Beitrag zu den Vāda-Traditionen Indiens", also OBERHAMMER (1963: 82ff.) perceives a distinct development between Y and Asaṅga's AS.

that has to be made in order to characterize the development of Yogācāra: one that distinguishes between the beginnings of a Yogācāra school without a philosophical system and the creation of such by two individuals, considered as historical personalities: Maitreya-nātha and Asaṅga. Thus, along with the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* (regarded [*op. cit.*: 265] as the oldest part of Y), the *Samdhinirmocanasūtra* is thought to belong to the beginnings of Yogācāra, said to be still lacking a philosophical system.¹ While Schmithausen's research has shown that Frauwallner has underestimated the *Yogācārabhūmi* in its systematic range and complexity, it is evident that Frauwallner's historical assessment did not distinguish between Early Yogācāra and Yogācāra-Vijñānavāda in terms of representing distinct stages of conceptual development.

[Ex. 3]

cittamātram bho jinaputrā yad uta traidhātukam iti sūtrāt (Vś, beginning)

Das Universum der ausweisbaren Gegebenheiten meiner originalen Erfahrung ist identisch mit dem Universum der ausweisbaren Gegebenheiten meiner rein seelischen und zwar eigenseelischen Erfahrung. (Edmund HUSSERL, HUA IX: 459)

SCHMITHAUSEN 1973: 175f. referred to the *Bhadrapālasūtra*, translated into Chinese as early as in A.D. 179,² as the probable source of the passage "*cittamātram idaṃ yad idaṃ traidhātukam*. This passage — equating the totality of realms/universes accessible to experience with an existential status identified as being purely psychical³ — is most well-known perhaps from the *Daśabhūmikasūtra* (49,10 [= § VI.E]) where, however, it had only been quoted. For the original *Bhadrapālasūtra* passage, see now PrBuSASS 36,21 (*kham gsum pa 'di dag ni sems tsam mo*); for the broader contextual circumstances of the same, the lucid discussion by Paul M. HARRISON (1978) has to be consulted.

Yet, there are other early texts that are quoted for their *cittamātra* passages, such as the *Dharmasaṃgītisūtra* (e.g., MAIVṛ 296) and the *Lokottara-parivarta* (i.e., the *sūtra* anonymously referred to by Vasubandhu right at the beginning of his *Viṃśatikābhāṣya*). Cf. further MAIVṛ 296; BhāvKr 217; *Madhyamakaratnapradīpa*, chapter. IV, ed. LINDTNER 1986a: 192 (where also the

¹ Cf. also FRAUWALLNER, *Kleine Schriften*, p. 641. Various aspects of Frauwallner's pioneering assertions and evaluations have naturally become somewhat problematic in view of more recent research, but this is not the place to generally address the pertinent problems; however, we shall keep in contact with Frauwallner's views on the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* and the *Samdhinirmocanasūtra*.

² By Lokakṣema, in the same year in which he translated the *Aṣṭasāhasrikā*.

³ Regarding whatsoever universe of experiences as being "purely psychical" (*cittamātra*) entails, naturally, no "parapsychological" connotations. The technical choice of this English expression - while adequately conceiving *citta* as something from which psychic/mental experiences arise - has rather been inspired by Husserl's terminology as employed, e.g., in his *Phenomenological Psychology* (tr. J. Scanlon), or in his late article "Phenomenology" for the *Encyclopaedia Britannica* (for online-versions, cf.: www.husserlpage.com).

Ghanavyūhasūtra has been referred to as containing similar statements).

But all these passages and contexts are historically situated before the inception of that trend of Yogācāra-Vijñānavāda we are presently concerned with, however clearly they already had established that the total cosmos of cognitive experiences¹ is to be conceived as a purely psychical one.

Probably we are allowed to draw some lines of connection descending from the *Pratyutpanna-buddha-saṃmukhāvasthita-samādhi-sūtra* to the *Samdhi-nirmocanasūtra* via the *Bodhisattvabhūmi*, which again had linked itself (BoBh_D 227,20f./BoBh_w 332,21f.) to the *Daśabhūmikasūtra*. And proceeding historically in the other direction, the *Pratyutpanna°-sūtra*, as HARRISON (1978: 55) has suggested, may possibly be synthetically based on prior reflections engendered in the *Sukhāvativyūha*² and in some early recension of the *Aṣṭasāhasrikāprajñāpāramitāsūtra*.

Thus, although the extent and specific nature of the concrete influence remains to be established for each link, we would obtain a minimum of the following historical connections of texts:

Aṣṭa/[X]-vyūha → PrBuSaSS → Daśa → BoBh → Saṃdh

It is still another question how far these verbalizations are to be traced back to canonical statements such as the one to be found in SN I: 39,10f.:

cittena nīyate loko cittena parikissati | cittassa ekadhammassa sabbeva vasam anvaḡūti (cf. also AKVy 95,22f.). In any case, later Yogācāra-Vijñānavāda (e.g., MSA151,6f.) did not fail to quote this canonical passage.

[Ex. 4]

When the term *yogācāra* came to be employed with a doxographical connotation, at some point in the history of Indian Buddhism, it had already been in use for a few centuries without such an association: its connotative horizon was one related to spiritual practices, and it designated someone engaged in the practice of *yoga*.

Nevertheless, even with this primary connotation the term entered Buddhism rather late³ — its Pāli cognate *yogāvācāra* is not found in the four *nikāyas* and is only "peculiar to the Abhidhamma literature" (cf. PTSD, s.v.).

¹ Technically the three 'spheres of [cognitive] constitution' (*dhātu*), i.e., that of sensuous experiences, that of subtle form, and that of formlessness.

² The notion of *Sukhāvativyūha* should rather be taken as a reference to the "vyūha-milieu", the early existence of which is attested, than to the text *Sukhāvativyūha*, properly speaking, since the ascription of its translation to Lokakṣema is uncertain (cf. DANTINNE 1983: 14). See now the investigations in J. DUCOR 2004 ("Les Sources de la Sukhāvati, ...").

³ Yet, SILK (2000: 277) is certainly right when he disagrees with ROTH (1970: XLIV), who had postulated "its origin in the early strata of Mahāyāna Buddhism" after finding the term (as a pair together with *bhikṣu/-nī*) in Mahāsāṅghika-Lokottaravāda texts like the *Bhikṣuṅṅī-Vinaya* and the *Abhisamācārika* without being able to trace it in the Pāli Vinaya.

As DEMIÉVILLE's (1954) still unsurpassed study and contextualization of Saṅgharākṣa's *Yogācārabhūmi* has made evident, the notion of *yogācāra* had already consolidated itself so much in the 2nd century North-West Indian Buddhist milieu, as the most general designation to refer to all the three normative personality-categories related to spiritual practice (viz. *prthagjana*, *śaikṣa*, *āśaikṣa* [cf. *op. cit.*: 398]), that it came to be employed as the most meaningful term in the titles of a number of books comprehensively outlining its scope of reference (i.e., as corresponding practically to the whole range of the *mārga*).

Apparently stemming from the same milieu of yoga practitioners, the standing phrase *bhikṣur yogī yogācārah* occurs in the *Revatasūtra* as quoted in the *Śrāvākabhūmi* (ŚrBh_{Sh} 197,12 - 200,20; crit. ed./transl. in SAKUMA 1990, II: A.2.1-A.2.8.1),¹ which came to form a part of yet another *Yogācārabhūmi*. And similar phrases are also found in some of the early Mahāyānasūtras. Thus the *Kāśyapaparivarta* speaks of a *yogācāro bhikṣuḥ* (KP 159,1), whereas the *Saddharma-puṇḍarikasūtra* employs a categorical differentiation between monks and nuns, laymen and laywomen, yogins and *yogācāras* (SDhPu 6,12: *bhikṣubhikṣuṇy-upāsakopāsikā yogīno yogācārā*).²

In the course of investigating the notion of *yogācāra*, R. DAVIDSON (1985: 126ff.) has screened through Hsüan-tsang's translation (T. 1545) of the *Mahāvibhāṣa* and found that of the more than 60 occurrences of the term "all but three relate to *yogācāra* as a term for master meditators" (p. 128). In the case of those three exceptions, the references were to slightly divergent views on theoretical points as maintained (and explicitly identified in one instance) by the Bahirdeśakas or Western Sarvāstivādins³ in contrast to those Sarvāstivādins that lived in Kashmir, traditionally regarded as the most orthodox branch, the Kāśmīra-Vaibhāṣikas, doctrinally represented by the Vibhāṣa.⁴

¹ For a synoptic presentation of ŚrBh, its historical background and for preliminary reflections on its composition in diachronic perspective, see DELEANU 2002 and 2006, chapter one.

² See further J. SILK's (2000) extensive study, whose scope is far more comprehensive than his stated main goal "to try to understand who the *yogācāra bhikṣu* is, most especially in Mahāyāna sūtra literature" (a significant amount of Japanese research on this notion has also been incorporated).

³ That is, designations such as *bahirdeśikāh* and *pāścātyāh* ("the Westerners") for groups of Sarvāstivāda monks residing in the larger Gandhāra area do primarily refer to geographical locations outside the Kashmir Valley (*kāśmīramaṇḍala*), the central Sarvāstivāda-Vaibhāṣika region (cf. AKVy 134,23; 162,17). Yet, pejorative nuances ("provincials, outsiders") may easily have become associated with these terms, especially when doctrinal differences became more frequent and more pronounced.

⁴ The label "*Vibhāṣa Compendia*" refers to a complicated horizon of problems (cf. COX 1998: 229ff.; COX 1995, §§ I. 1-2.). Hence, it may not be easy to determine the relationship of the *Vibhāṣa* version, which Hsüan-tsang had brought from India, to that version said to have been first compiled in the 2nd century (i.e., half a millennium earlier). We may

In North-West India (larger Kashmir, Gandhāra, Afghanistan, Gilgit) new practices of contemplation had evolved (thence spreading to Central Asia and China).¹ In somewhat radical contrast to the previous two most dominant (at times competing, at times coalescing) Buddhist models of achieving liberation,² a shift of emphasis to highly elaborate methods of visionary creation and unfoldment (*bhāvanā*) gradually developed to define what the *yoga* of the *yogācāras* practically consisted in. In a lucid introduction to his edition and partial translation of the fragments of the Kyzyl³ Yoga treatise — which in all likelihood "came from Kaśmīr" (SEYFORTH RUEGG 1967: 157) or its neighbourhood — D. SCHLINGLOFF (1964: 28-56) reconstructed the thematic structures of the visionary experiences, which the *yogācāras* were supposed to produce. According to this manual the *yogācāras* were guided to intensify their spiritual zeal with the help of visionary vividness achieved through projective meditation exercises, thematically related to contemplations of the four elements (*dhātu-prayoga*), to modes of generating repulsion to the physical (*aśubha-prayoga*), etc. Corresponding visionary exercises were related to investigations of, e.g., the aggregates of psychophysical factors (*skandhaparīkṣā*) and the members of the *pratītyasamutpāda* model. Or they were associated with processes of developing the four *apramāṇas*, with those of the inspirational contemplations (*anusmṛti*) of the Buddha, the *dharma*, etc.

Though it is difficult to date this yoga treatise, we may assume that it represented a fairly developed state of these methods, one that is more similar to the state of development reflected in Buddhasena's *Yogācārabhūmi* (= BYb; translated around 413 A.D. by his disciple Buddhabhadra; cf. DEMIÉVILLE 1954: 362) than to the state reflected in Saṅgharakṣa's *Yogācārabhūmi* (= SYb; first translated into Chinese in the second half of the 2nd cent.). The difference between these two texts in terms of their emphasis upon contemplative techniques of visualization is considerable. Reflecting

hardly assume that any references to *yogācāras* in a 2nd century *Vibhāṣa* version would imply doxographical connotations, rather than referring to groups of monks, who were preoccupied with *yoga* practices, but occasionally expressed views (in points of detail) that were different from the Kashmir specialists in Abhidharma thought (cf. also DELEANU 1993: 3). In any case, the view — improperly imputed to Davidson by SILK (*op. cit.*: 287 [apparently understanding Davidson's "doctrinal" to mean "doxographical"]) — that reference is made here "to the Yogācāra-Vijñānavāda school" would be anachronistic.

¹ For the influence of these new practices upon Chinese 5th century meditation texts, cf. YAMABE 1999.

² That is, in contrast to (a) the path of meditative absorption entailing an increasing suppression of all psychic activities with the *nīrodhasamāpatti* as (pen)ultimate achievement and (b) the path of discriminative insight (*prajñā*) related to the *dharma* (as an object of cognition to be perceived in particular attitudes). On these two models, cf. LA VALLÉE POUSSIN 1937; SCHMITHAUSEN 1981; GOMBRICH 1996: 96-135.

³ Spelling according to *The Great Geographical Atlas*, Mitchell Beazley Publishers 1982; other spellings in different publications include variants like Qizil, Kyzil, etc.

this difference has led F. DELEANU (1993), upon whose investigations my present remarks are based, to conclude (p. 8) that "in the centuries following the compilation of the SYb the Śrāvakayāna *yogācāras* in North-West India became increasingly involved in the exploration and interpretation of the psychological phenomena related to the meditative process [in] an attitude similar in many ways to the Mahāyāna visualization *samādhis*."¹

Parallel to the increase of visionary yoga practices, Demiéville and Deleanu registered a growing incorporation, or perhaps rather an additional adoption, of Mahāyāna models of bodhisattva training and life-style (be these related to *śūnyatā*-realizations; or to letting *karuṇā* supersede *upekṣā*; cf. also MAITHRIMURTHI 1999: 149ff. & 234ff.), without that these appendices effected "the basic Śrāvakayānist framework of the SYb and BYb" (DELEANU 1993: 9).²

Thus, though the appellation *yogācāra* got associated with a variety of connotations in the course of time and in diverse environments (only in part related to SYb, BYb and MauBh),³ we have to register that the context-specific significances of that notion were not simply interchangeable.⁴

¹ Which is of course not to assert that the beginning of Mahāyāna should be specifically related to visualization techniques of meditation. DELEANU himself (2000: 69) says that *sūtras* with more or less explicit references to visualizations are "mainly, but not exclusively, associated with the Pure Land Buddhism." However, the promotion of such methods of contemplation in some Buddhist texts — and even though these practices may be particularly designed to lead to an encounter with the Buddhas of the present — does not necessarily imply that those practitioners encouraged to engage in such *samādhis* are always identified as *yogācāras* (e.g., in the PrBuSASS the term is lacking!). On the other hand, it is a significant fact, as has been elaborated by DEMIÉVILLE (1954: 376ff.), that the *yogācāra* milieu, which produced a number of *Yogācārabhūmis*, had indeed a strong tendency to cultivate encounters with Maitreya, resident in Tuṣita, as an almost indispensable source of inspiration and transformation.

² However different and independent from Saṅgharakṣa's and Buddhasena's *Yogācārabhūmis* the *Yogācārabhūmi* traditionally associated with the "Tuṣita-visitor" Aśaṅga might be, its *Basic Section* may formally be conceived as still conforming to, or at least as being reminiscent of, the pattern of supplementing a basically Hinayāna framework with a Mahāyāna appendix (here quite an extensive one in form of the BoBh!).

³ At some time, the notion of *yogācāra* referred very generally to anyone practicing any stage of a non-visionary path; later, in a different context, it designated an expert in visualization techniques; at one place, it is restricted to refer to a Śrāvakayāna monk; in another milieu, a *yogācāra* is the bodhisattva per se; etc.

⁴ As already referred to, a rich adumbration of this spectrum of connotations is found in SILK 2000. It is difficult, however, to agree with J. Silk's conclusion (p. 303): "Our survey above seems to suggest that, in the majority of cases, the reference of *yogācāra* does not in fact seem to be specific at all. On the contrary, it is rather generic. [etc.]"

Contrary to Silk's interpretation, the individual references in given contexts may indeed become highly specific: that is, the *signifier* remains the same, whereas the *signified* may be non-exchangeably particular — two persons may not be equally qualified for the same task just because they happen to bear the same name; e.g., for contemporary German philosophers the name Max Müller refers to an existentialist influenced by

It should be clear, however that in all these instances the term has not yet had any doxographical connotation.

The earliest evidence of employing *yogācāra* with a clearly doxographical connotation seems to stem from the 6th century, where it is attested in texts of authors like Sthiramati, Bhavya and Yaśomitra.¹

The first doxographer to do so is the Mādhyamika Bhavya,² who could not have cared less for the holy aura constructed around Asa ga, the great champion in the competitive field of channeling down and elaborating the newest philosophical messages by Maitreya, a major spokesman of Tusita heaven.³ Chapter five of his *Madhyamakahrdaya-cum-Tarkajvālā* is called *Yogācāratattvaviniscaya-pariccheda* and constitutes a rigorous critique of *Yogācāra*-(Vijñānavāda) philosophemes.⁴ Bhavya explicitly mentions Asa ga

Heidegger; indologists take the name to refer to a pioneer scholar of their discipline; that is, in each context the reference, the signified, is very specific).

¹ Given the doxographical complexity that characterizes the literary production of the Kośakara, his works might be felt as an obvious candidate for introducing the notion of *yogācāra* within a doxographical horizon. Yet, in works like the *Prattiyasamutpādavyākhyā* (cf. MUROI's intro./ed./transl. of the *Samskāra-* and *Vijñānavibhanga*) and the *Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa* (cf. LAMOTTE's intro./ed./transl.), where the concept of *ālayavijñāna* is promoted in direct confrontation with the views of other schools, there is no doxographical reference to *yogācāra*, not even in his *Vyākhyāyukti* (cf. Appendix 5.2 in SKILLING 2000), which contrasts diverse modes of buddhological hermeneutics.

The AKBh offers two contexts in which *yogācāras* are referred to. In one passage, in the commentary to AK VI.10, three grades of the *yogācāra* — as a *yoga* practitioner, who employs the psycho-logical technique of *Bṣi/b/za*-contemplation with growing proficiency — are explained. In the other passage (i.e. AKBh 197), certain *yogācārāḥ* are quoted twice (ad AK IV.4ab) in a discussion of the nature of *rūpa*. Though also in this latter case there is an explicit reference to meditative states (*dhyāna*, *śamadhi*), considered as the standpoint for views on *rūpa* ascribed to some *yogācāras*, these views as such are of course doctrinal views (perhaps shared by diverse fractions of *yogācāras*). And they may have crystallized at other places and eventually be identified in the context of the extant *Yogācārabhūmis*. Anyway, referring to AKVy 355,19fr.; LA VALLÉE POUSSIN (Kosa III: 18 n.1) properly remarks on the present passage: "Il résulte de la Vyākhyā que le terme *Yogācāra* ne désigne pas ici l'adepte une certaine école philosophique mais simplement l'asc te".

² On the names Bhavya/Bhā(va)viveka, see recently D. SEYFORT RUEGG, *Three Studies in the History of Indian and Tibetan Madhyamaka Philosophy. Studies in Indian and Tibetan Madhyamaka Thought*, Part 1. Wien (WSTB 50) 2000:12n. 15.

³ At the beginning of TJ V, Bhavya retaliates and is quick to play out his own trump card in the contest for mythological supremacy: the Tathāgata's presumed prediction of Nāgārjuna as his most cherished philosophical hero (the implicit reference is to verses 165-166 in the *Sagāthakam-appendix* of LAS).

⁴ While the MHK V has been edited by Lindtner (see also his analysis of this chapter in LINDTNER 1986b: 239ff.), HOORNAERT (1999, 2000, 2001a, 2001b, 2002) has edited and translated TJ V. This fifth chapter of MHK/TJ should be supplemented with Bhavya's ontological critique of Y.-V. in the appendix to the 25th chapter of his *Prajñāpradīpa* (ed. by LINDTNER 1984a and translated by ECKEL 1985).