

*tannirodhasamakālam ca tasyaiva sarvabija[ka]sya vijñānasya
sāmarthyāt tadāryasūksmendriyamahābhūtavyatimīro 'nyas
tatsabhāgah sukraṣṇitapīṇḍo jāyate sendriyah / tasyām cāvasthāyām
pratiṣṭhitam vijñānam [baddhah (?)]¹ pratisandhir ity ucyate / sā cāsau
kalalāvasthā / tāni ca tasya kalalasyendriyamahābhūtāni
kāyendriyenaiva sahotpadyante / indriyādhiṣṭhāna-mahābhūtāni ca
tair evendriyamahābhūtāih kāyendriyena ca sahotpadyante / tatas
tānīndriyamahābhūtāny² upādāya cakṣurādīndriyāni krameṇa
niṣpadyante /*

"And just at the time when that [intermediate state] ceases, due to the efficiency of that very same consciousness³ comprising all potentialities, another [state of] analogous immanent correspondence (*tatsabhāga*)⁴ is generated: the globule of sperm-cum-ovum endowed with [genetic] capacities; being mingled together with the subtle genetic matter [it is one that is] different from that [continuity of consciousness in the intermediate state].

And as it is in [the moment of exactly] that normative state [of mingling together] where the consciousness has become (re)established, it is called the [state of] Linking up.⁵

¹ Seems to be superfluous.

² Y 24,13 reads *mahākabhūtāny*

³ Identified as *ālayavijñāna* in the text immediately preceding this passage.

⁴ The notion of "immanent correspondence" (*sabhāga*) is here employed in the "karmic" context of "samsāric" continuity at the crucial moment of Linking up a new existential basis (i.e., at the occasion of being reborn). Or, as Sthīramati once formulated the relationship of the technical notions pertaining to this context: *samsārapravṛttir nikāyasabhāgantareṣu pratisandhibandhah* (TrBh *40,4), "the process of transmigratory existence [refers to] the compulsion of Linking up in other existential settings of immanent correspondence". On *pratisandhi*, cf. *Ālayav.*: 639.

The notion of *sabhāga* is here that of *nikāyasabhāga*, on which, see AKBh 67f. ad AK II.41a; Kośa II: 195ff; COX 1995, chapters 6 and 14. — For another context in which *sabhāga* and *tatsabhāga* are employed, cf. AKBh 27f. ad AK I.39b-d. In that context, the term *tatsabhāga* refers to factors which are not exactly identical with a particular setting of immanent correspondence (*sabhāga*), but are similar, or analogous, to it (cf. AKBh 28,23f.: *ye punar asabhāgās te teṣām sabhāgānām jātisāmānyena sabhāgatvāt tatsabhāgāh | — AKVy 77,10ff.: teṣām sabhāgānām ukta-lakṣaṇānām sabhāgāh sadṛśāh, te tatsabhāgāh. teṣām tair vā sabhāgās te tatsabhāgāh. tulyārthe hy atra sabhāga-śabdō grhyate.*)

⁵ However, in the case that the word *baddhah* (cf. *Ālayav.*: n. 843, but also Y 24 n. 5) should in fact have had its proper place in the original sentence, the translation should be: "And as it is in [the moment of] that state where the consciousness has become (re)established, the 'Linking up' is said to be linked-up." — [Since the requisite conjunctive particle (either as *baddho ca.* or as ... *pratisandhir cocyate*) is absent, *ucyate* can hardly be taken to relate to both *baddhah* and *pratiṣṭhitam vijñānam*. Nevertheless, further research investigating parallel passages thematizing this context of *pratisandhi* seems to be necessary to definitively decide upon the connotation to be conveyed in this instance].

And this is also the normative state of the *kalala*.¹ And those genetic material elements of the *kalala* do exist together with only the capacity of nervous organization. And [this means that in this normative state] the elements of the sensory capacities and [their organic] bases (*indriyādhiṣṭhāna-mahābhūtāni*) do exactly coincide with those genetic material elements (*indriyabhūtāni*) and with the capacity of nervous organization (*kāyendriya*). Therefrom, then, in dependence on² those genetic material elements, the visual and the other sensory capacities are gradually developed."

The last sentence has led us to the next stage: the proper sense faculties, or sensory capacities (*rūpīṅdriyāṇi*), develop secondarily on the basis of *kāyendriya*, the principal capacity of nervous organization. *Kāyendriya*, as such a basic capacity, is thus to be understood with a double connotation, since both (1) the capacity to develop a nervous system in the course of the organic development from a fertilized egg into a fully developed fetus and (2) the basic capacity of a developed organism to produce sensory sensations in any moment of its life are referred to by this term.

As we had seen above, *kāyendriya*, in the sense elaborated, is the decisive ninth factor transforming inorganic matter into organic matter. And the developed state of the ordinary sensory capacity forms the *tenth* constituent (AK II.22d: *daśadriṣṭyo 'parendriyah*). That is to say, any sensory capacity in the proper sense, including tactile capacities (likewise designated by the expression *kāyendriya*), does actually constitute a further specialization, one which presupposes the previous nine ones —

"for wherever there is a visual capacity or an auditory one, etc., there it is necessarily to be brought about by the capacity of nervous organization (*kāyendriya*), since vision, etc., are being processed in dependence upon that" (*yatra hi cakṣuḥ śrotrādi vā tatra kāyendriyena bhavitavyam tat-pratibaddha-ṛttitvāc cakṣurādīnām*; AKVy 123,24f. ad AK II.22).

Not anticipating any longer a serious claim from a modern scholar to the effect that classical Buddhists had opined visual, auditory and other experiences to be possible via the 'sense of touch', there is presently no need to extend this short sketch concerned with the *rūpīṅdriyāṇi* still further. In general, the *rūpīṅdriyāṇi*, being forces functioning on a bio-molecular level,

¹ Scil. of the fertilized egg as the globule of sperm-cum-ovum; cf. also C. SUNESON, "Some Interrelated Terms in Ancient Indian Embryology", in: WZKS 35 (1991): 109-121; and, for a broader background, Rahul Peter DAS, *The Origin of Life of a Human Being. Conception and the Female according to Ancient Medical and Sexological Literature*, Delhi 2003.

² Or: qua assimilating (i.e., conforming to) those genetic material elements; that will say, the sensory capacities develop by becoming similar to what the genetic material contains in terms of its capacity of unfolding a nervous system.

may perhaps be best compared to *neuroelectrical forces* which — when excited— transform these excitements into cognizable information.

Nirodhasamāpatti, however, signifies that normative state in which one is withdrawn from any such impressions; which means that, as long as someone is abiding in such a state, not a single sensory capacity is getting transformed into cognizable sense data.

[Ex. 17]

It is my impression that Schmithausen (e.g., *Ālayav.* §§ 3.13.1ff.) is in some way aware of this problem, but

(a) he interprets 'differences of formulation' in terms of 'temporal/historical distances', and

(b) he seems to consider and evaluate the pertinent relationship existing between *ālayavijñāna* and the *indriyāṇi* only in terms of biological and ontological categories.

Some remarks *ad* (a).

Particular textual assertions tend to gain their complete meaningfulness only from the idea-historically pertinent context in which they are semantically embedded. The nature of interpolations implies that certain materials have been removed from their original context and placed into another one, one which cannot guarantee that all of the conceptual implications of the interpolated materials are supplied by the textual surroundings. It is therefore crucial to be aware about the various implications of interpolated textual materials.

Such materials may constitute concepts, which are explicitly engaging only particular aspects of a larger theoretical model in specific contexts, even while they presuppose a knowledge of the whole. When a model as a whole can be shown to have developed and passed through various stages, it is all the more important to reflect upon the presuppositions, which a given (quoted/commented upon) philosophical or exegetical assertion, related to a certain stage of conceptual development of the model, entails. When older textual materials contain interpolations in the form of materials representing a more developed stage of reflection, one can be almost certain that not all the various aspects of the more developed reflective models are represented in those interpolations, which by their very nature address only particular aspects. Under such circumstances it is hardly permissible to (1) draw the conclusion, on the basis of available interpolations, that those aspects, which were not addressed, had not yet developed at the time when the interpolations were made. And it is naturally quite unacceptable, if furthermore (2) on the basis of such impermissible conclusions, a historical horizon of conceptual development is "outlined" by way of locating (i) the interpolations and (ii) the texts containing more complete descriptions of a

given conceptual model pertaining to the same descriptive stage at altogether different points of the historical scale.

I share Schmithausen's view that the *ālayavijñāna* model has historically developed in the sense that particular features of what the phenomenological notion of *ālayavijñāna* implied in relation to other contextually pertinent aspects have only been gradually realized (and/or thematized) subsequent to the introduction of the concept. But my view differs with regard to what is epistemologically implied when in the *Initial Passage* it is said that *ālayavijñāna* comprises the *bījas* of *pravṛttivijñāna*.

For me the choice of the term *pravṛttivijñāna* entails no restriction with regard to the cognitive states (*dharma*) referred to, but constitutes a rhetoric device applied to this specific thematic context. It has been chosen because, as regards its quality as a defining characteristic, the notion of *pravṛtti-* has a much higher connotative value in this context: it antonymically¹ explicates *ālaya-* as a notion that is referring to both the state of latency as well as the potentialized locus from which cognitive processes (*pravṛttivijñāna*) arise again. No other attribute could have been more explicit in denying that, within the given conceptual framework, the *rūpīṅdriyāni* should be still endowed with a functionally dominant role in *nirodhasamāpatti*.²

Yet Schmithausen does not interpret this *nirodhasamāpatti* passage (i.e., the I. P.) as only one context among others in the *Basic Section* to which various aspects of the new model of *ālayavijñāna* came to be selectively applied. Hence he would not consider the choice of the term *pravṛttivijñāna* as one that has been motivated by the contextually specific topic addressed, but rather as one that has been historically determined by the exegetical stage reached at exactly this point, when the concept of *ālayavijñāna* is supposed to have been introduced. Marking this historical stage, the notion of *pravṛtti-*

¹ That is, I am fundamentally accepting and adopting Schmithausen's hypothesis as expressed in *Ālayav.* § 6.8.3, where he explains that

"the terms 'ālayavijñāna' and 'pravṛttivijñāna' are the antonymic elements of a coherent conceptual structure, and thus intrinsically and originally connected with each other".

According to Schmithausen, the historical starting-point for what we might designate as the "*ālayavijñāna-pravṛttivijñāna* model of consciousness" is his *Initial Passage*.

While fully agreeing with the view that the I. P. applies this "*ālayavijñāna-pravṛttivijñāna* model of consciousness", I differ from Schmithausen with regard to his historical perspective concerning the inception of this model and with regard to his evaluation of its phenomenological implications.

² Probably the classical Y.-V. scholars wished to take no risk in this matter, because formerly this context had invested the *rūpīṅdriyāni sādhiṣṭhānāni* with the function of providing the guaranty for cognitive states to rearise. But presently, so that nobody should misunderstand, they emphasized that whatsoever cognition (*vijñāna*) occurs, particularly on leaving the state of *nirodhasamāpatti*, does so by rearing (*pravṛt-*) — not as previously taught from the *rūpīṅdriyāni*, but: — from the *ālayavijñāna* containing all of the *bījas*.

vijñāna is meant to express a peculiar limitation of the *bījas* with which *ālayavijñāna* is said to be associated at this point. According to Schmithausen, *ālayavijñāna* is associated with "only the 'forthcoming' forms of mind (*pravṛttivijñāna*), i.e., sense perceptions and *manovijñāna*"¹ (*Ālayav.* § 3.13.1; cf. also §§ 2.13.1, 2.13.7).

So, what is lacking? The *indriyas*, or, in the words of Schmithausen, the "material sense-faculties". According to him, *ālayavijñāna* does not yet contain their *bījas* when the *Initial Passage* was composed. Hence he speaks of a "striking time-lag till it came to be conceived of also as containing the Seeds of the material sense-faculties" (*Ālayav.* § 3.13.3).

Schmithausen does not presuppose the validity of the *vijñaptimātra*-ontology for his *Initial Passage* (or in general for MauBh); cf. *Ālayav.* § 2.13.7. In other words, he presupposes the philosophical Early Yogācāra stage of an ontological realism, hence a version of the traditional definition of the generation of sensory consciousness in accordance with that ontology.² Having thus separated *ālayavijñāna* from its function of controlling the specific manifestation of what appears as sensory/visible form (*rūpa*, etc.) as well as eliminated its very capacity of generating what appears as a sensation (*caḥsurindriya*, etc.), the attribute of *ālayavijñāna* to comprise the potentiality (*bīja*) of sensory cognitions (*pravṛttivijñāna*) has been radically deprived of all meaningfulness. What should *pravṛttivijñāna* as sensory perception still refer to?

The *bījas* do not refer to the mere capacity of being conscious, but to specific structures of potential experiences "as the result of the Maturation (*vipāka*) of previous karman" (*Ālayav.* § 3.5). There is no *bīja* apart from being *vipāka*, i.e., the maturation or the repotentialization of a virtual structure. Therefore, to associate *ālayavijñāna* with the attribute of comprising the *pravṛttivijñānabījas* actually means to endow it with the capacity to generate sensory (and other) perceptions with specifically conditioned structures of cognitive actualizations. At the beginning of the *Basic Section* it says that *vijñāna* itself is that (structure) which is present, or is getting established (*pratyupasthitam*), in the cognitive constitution (*vijñapti*) of the objective/noematic reference point (*ālambana*). And, as already noted, *ālambana* hereby refers to all *dharmas* (Y 11,8 + 11: *vijñānaṃ katamat | yad ālambanavijñaptau pratyupasthitam || [...] ālambanaṃ katamat | sarva-dharm[ā] ālambanaṃ ||*).

Schmithausen himself has emphasized that the very notion of *pravṛttivijñāna* implies that of *ālayavijñāna* (§ 6.8.3); they form two poles of a coherent structure within a larger model of consciousness. Naturally, as

¹ And speaking for MauBh as a whole, he adds: "... and, occasionally, the mental factors (*caitasikā dharmāḥ*) accompanying them."

² I.e., a "realistic" version of the model defining a sensory impression (*sparsā*) as something that is generated in the conjunction of three factors (*trisaṃnipāta*), those three being the sensory capacity, an object and consciousness (*indriyaviśayavijñāna*).

referred to above, one cannot expect to find all the implications of this model to be elaborated within the framework of the interpolations in MauBh. Thus there is a lack of textual evidence in MauBh explicitly thematizing the *ālayavijñāna-pravṛttivijñāna* model of consciousness within a *vijñaptimātra*-ontology. Under the influence of this "lack" and under that of his conception of the *nirodhasamāpatti* passage as *Initial Passage*, Schmithausen unfortunately devaluates the great import of his own discovery of the polar coherence existing between *ālayavijñāna* and *pravṛttivijñāna* by considering the latter as "being merely a new designation of the traditional *vijñānas*" (*ibid.*) — as if new technical terms were just arbitrarily invented, i.e., without endowing them with a particular contextual significance.

The polar coherence of the *ālayavijñāna-pravṛttivijñāna* model of consciousness strongly suggests the *vijñaptimātra*-ontology for it to coherently function as an epistemological model.

Some remarks *ad b*: Schmithausen's "biological" and "ontological" determination of the relationship between *ālayavijñāna* and the *indriyas*.

Also on basis of assuming the *pravṛttivijñānas* to correspond only to the traditional *vijñānas*, i.e., without presupposing a *vijñaptimātra*-ontology, it is risky simply to bypass the epistemological function of the *indriyas* in the production of sensory cognitions. But Schmithausen does not address this epistemological aspect. In *Ālayav.* § 3.13.3 he speaks about the "biological" and "ontological" nature of the relationship between *ālayavijñāna* and the so-called "material sense-faculties":

"For the *Initial Passage* suggests that *ālayavijñāna* was, originally, nothing but a hypostasis of the Seeds of mind sticking in the material sense-faculties (see § 2.5-6). This means that, even though the sense-faculties were dependent on *ālayavijñāna* biologically, i.e. were in need of being appropriated by it in order to be protected against decay (cp. § 2.13.4), yet ontologically *ālayavijñāna*, sticking in them and thus requiring them as its support, was rather in its turn dependent on, and subordinate to, the material sense-faculties (cp. § 2.13.7), and could not easily be considered to be their cause".

It is doubtlessly correct that, after *ālayavijñāna* had been introduced, it performs the functions of bodily appropriation within the conceptual framework of the new model of consciousness. And, according to this model, it does not withdraw from the body in state of *nirodhasamāpatti*, thus keeping the body alive. After all, these functions have formally been elaborated in favour of proving the existence of *ālayavijñāna* (HAKAMAYA 1979; GRIFFITH 1986, App. C). Hence, I can only agree¹ with Schmithausen when he states (*Ālayav.* § 2.13.4) that the introductory question "implies" that *ālayavijñāna*

¹ Though, of course, not with the presupposition that his *Initial Passage* constitutes the introductory moment of *ālayavijñāna*, but rather the initiation of thematizing *nirodhasamāpatti* in accordance with the new model of consciousness as interpolated into textual materials pertaining to the *Basic Section*.

has these functions also in his *Initial Passage* (which perhaps even presupposes those formal proofs).

What these proofs likewise demonstrate is how the factual intention of unambiguously referring to the physical organism has to be realized. That is, what these proofs prove in this respect is the necessity of a reference either to *āśraya*, notably in connection with the biological appropriation/assimilation (*upādāna*) of a physical basis, or to *kāya*, particularly in connection with thematizing the possibility of physical experiences (*kāyikānubhava*) or with the question, whether consciousness, in the given condition, has [or has not] left the body (*kāyād [an]apakrāntam*).

In contrast to this evidence, the *Initial Passage* does not contain any positive statement about biological appropriation. *Ālayavijñāna* is not getting related to a physical basis at all, but only to the inactivated sensory capacities of a living organism as we had seen above. The explicit ontological reference is to the *ālayavijñāna-pravṛttivijñāna* model of consciousness.

As far as I see, Schmithausen does not clearly distinguish between organic matter (or the organism as such) and the various *indriyas* functioning as organizing capacities in this organism (whereby in fact it first becomes "organic"). And it is due to this lack of proper distinguishment that it has become possible for him to formulate those specific "biological" and "ontological" characterizations (as quoted above), which are supposed to define the relationship between *ālayavijñāna* and the *indriyas*.

Yet, conceived as forces in the organism, the *indriyas* cannot putrefy. In the *Basic Section* (Y 24,16), *ālayavijñāna*'s biological function of preventing putrefication has been expressed with regard to the proto-embryonic matter (*kalalarūpa*). Under the influence of *citta*, which in this passage corresponds to *ālayavijñāna*, the *kalalarūpa* does not putrefy (*na pariklidyate*, cf. *Ālayav.* n. 250). Comparing this *pratisandhi* situation with that of the *nirodhasamāpatti*, *Ālayav.* § 3.3.1.2 simply juxtaposes the functional presence of *ālayavijñāna* in the *kalalarūpa* with a functional presence of *ālayavijñāna* "in" the *indriyas*.

The end of *Ālayav.* § 3.3.1.2 additionally suggests another function of *ālayavijñāna* in the *pratisandhi* context and regards it as confirming the idea that *ālayavijñāna* may be regarded as "sticking in" the *indriyas* in states of *nirodhasamāpatti*. As the *pratisandhi* passage at Y 24,1ff. elaborates, at the point of Linking up (*pratisandhi*) a new existence in *kāmadhātu*, where gross bodies are generated, *ālayavijñāna* performs its function of merging (*sammūrch-*; cf. *Ālayav.* n. 239) into proto-embryonic matter (*Ālayav.* § 6.3.1-2). Being identified in this passage as *āśrayopādātṛ*, it is likewise necessary to assume that *ālayavijñāna* keeps attached to the organism for life, once it has attached itself to it. Yet, independent of how we describe what technically is designated as *āśrayopādāna*, it is important to notice that this function has been expressed, in the *pratisandhi* passage, with regard to proto-embryonic matter, not with regard to the *indriyas*.

The general nature of the *rūpīṅdriyāṇi* has been discussed above in Ex. 16. And as we had likewise seen, the *pratisandhi* passage has conceived (Y 24,7ff.) the globule of sperm-cum-ovum endowed with *indriyas* as something to be generated due to the efficiency of *ālayavijñāna*. In face of this evidence (to which Schmithausen himself has drawn our attention in *Ālayav.* § 6.3), it is somewhat curious when he writes in *Ālayav.* § 3.13.1 that

"such a view, involving as it does a genetic dependence of the material sense-faculties (or even of corporeal matter as a whole) on *ālayavijñāna*, is, significantly enough, not explicitly stated anywhere in the *Basic Section* of the *Yogācārabhūmi*."

What Schmithausen here denies is a formulation of the relationship between *ālayavijñāna* and the *indriyas* as one between *vipāka* and *vipākaja* in the *Basic Section*. However, exactly that type of relationship is clearly asserted, when Y 24,7-9 says:

tasya — referring to: *sarvabījakam vipāka-saṃgrhītam ... ālayavijñānam — sarvabīja[ka]sya vijñānasya sāmāthyāt ... śukraṣoṇitapīṇḍo jāyate sendriyaḥ*.¹

Here *ālayavijñāna* is identified with all of the *bījas* that are comprised as *vipāka*. That is, *ālayavijñāna* corresponds to that which constitutes all of the *vipāka*. It is thus essentially the *vipāka* aspect of *ālayavijñāna* on account of whose efficiency (*sāmāthyāt*) the *śukraṣoṇitapīṇḍaḥ sendriyaḥ* ("the globule of sperm-cum-ovum provided with [genetic] capacities") is generated (*jāyate*). In other words, both the *indriyas* and the organic matter are explicitly defined as *vipākaja*.

[Ex. 18]

Ālayav. § 3.8.1. is problematizing the aspect of the simultaneous occurrence of more than one *vijñāna*. As already referred to (cf. § 37, note), in principle, Schmithausen has admitted that *ālayavijñāna* is to be taken as a continuous entity (cf. *Ālayav.* §§ 3.4.1; 3.4.3; 3.5). Yet to back up the possibility of ascribing the authorship of the *Initial Passage* to the Early *Yogācāras*, he stands in need

¹ To provide the whole phrase to which the formulation *tasya sarvabījakasya vijñānasya* refers; it reads as follows: *yatra tat sarvabījakam vipākasamgrhītam āśrayopādātṛ ālayavijñānam saṃmūrcchati* | (as emended in *Ālayav.* § 6.3.1; [only °*grhītam* has presently been changed to °*grhītam*]).

Considering *vipākasamgrhītam* ("that which has been gathered/received [or: is comprised] as *vipāka*") as being primarily related to *sarvabījakam*, I do not share the interpretation in *Ālayav.* § 3.12.1 that this line and other passages in which *ālayavijñāna* is conceived as *āśrayopādātṛ* are expressing the view that *ālayavijñāna* itself is comprised in the category of *vipāka* as only one part of the whole *vipāka*. This view has been adopted in *Ālayav.* § 3.12.1, where it is supposed to mark a historical stage in the development of the concept of *ālayavijñāna*. However, the *tasya*-passage clearly speaks of a *sarvabījakam ālayavijñānam*, thereby indicating *ālayavijñānam* as a basic category (rather than as a part of *vipāka*).

of postulating another hypothesis. Therefore, he promotes the hypothesis that *ālayavijñāna*, despite being called a *vijñāna* and being conceived as a continuous one, was initially not regarded by the Yogācāra philosophers as a proper *vijñāna* in the full sense of the term, but only as "hardly anything but Seeds (*bīja*) hypostatized into a new, subliminal kind of mind" (*Ālayav.*: 45). In this way, Schmithausen seems to believe, the introduction of *ālayavijñāna* would not have offended the Abhidharma principle of non-occurrence of simultaneous cognitions. The Abhidharma principle regarding the non-occurrence of simultaneous *vijñānas* had been accepted by the Early Yogācāras in the sense that they subscribed to the view that individual cognitions must necessarily take place successively.¹

Though Schmithausen is aware that "the principle of non-simultaneity of *vijñānas* came to be at least formally violated when *ālayavijñāna* was assumed to be continuous" (*Ālayav.*: 45), he defended the historical and theoretical assumptions of his interpretation of the *Initial Passage* by ascribing "a more or less distinct awareness of this difficulty", yet "a shrinking back from open conflict with the afore-mentioned principle" (*ibid.*), to the authors of the *Basic Section* of the *Yogācārabhūmi*. The argument is that they were not discussing the problem of simultaneity of several *vijñānas* etc.

However, there is of course no need at all to expect such reflections, once the *Initial Passage* is regarded as a later interpolation. As has already been referred to (above, Ex. 12), the manner in which Schmithausen conceived the initial significance of *ālayavijñāna* would factually have amounted to a sort of philosophical regress for the Early Yogācāras. Also in the present case, Schmithausen's hypothesis that *ālayavijñāna* had initially not been regarded as a proper *vijñāna* is founded on the hypothesis that the Early Yogācāras were somehow not quite aware of what they were doing: as fully accomplished Abhidharma masters they are supposed to have introduced a completely new type of *vijñāna*, but at the same time to have shrunk back from realizing what they had done. This methodological principle of (hypothetically) ascribing theoretical inconsistencies and ambivalences to Yogācāra scholars in order to achieve a "basis" for his own semantic evaluations and historical horizons has been taken resorted to on various occasions in Schmithausen's *Ālayav.* Further examples could easily be quoted, but this would only carry me ever deeper into methodological reflections from which I want to desist at this point. For now it is sufficient to state that I do not follow Schmithausen's methodological paradigms on those occasions.

My hermeneutical presuppositions are rather that various stages of exegetical development have taken shape in the form of relatively coherent

¹ In *Ālayav.*: n. 303 (see here for full documentation), Schmithausen demonstrates the Early Yogācāra acceptance of this principle with — among other references — the following quotation from *Y_m* 135b1f. (not at my disposal): *tat (= cittam) punar ... ekaikaśaḥ pravartate, doṭiṭiya-citta-sahāya-virahitatvāt, sahaiva sarvacittāpravartanāc ca.*

conceptual structures. Constituting relatively stable formations, these models represent given stages as synchronic features at different historical points within the tradition's diachronic horizon. The components of a model received designations to indicate their technical function within a particular structural framework. These designations were not simply new names for "something old",¹ but technical terms (referring to specific functions), which could not just be moved around from one model to another.² Of course, some notions could more easily be adopted to older frameworks than others; again, much depended on the context concerned and on the degree of model-specific structural integrity the description of a given context required.³

Yet, taking up Schmithausen's aporia, how can we account for the fact that it was not in the *Basic Section* but first in the *Viniścayasamgrahaṇī* (i.e., in the *Proof Portion*; cf. *Ālayav.* § 3.8.2), where the necessary implications of the introduction of *ālayavijñāna* were explicitly addressed, elaborated and scholastically defended, including the issue that, along with the concept of *ālayavijñāna*, a simultaneous functioning of at least two layers of consciousness had been introduced?

Once we no longer feel compelled to locate the introduction and initial development of the concept of *ālayavijñāna* in the *Basic Section*, it is natural to regard the *Viniścayasamgrahaṇī*, in accordance with the very name of this large treatise, as the proper place for problematizing and additionally clarifying topics, especially those that went along with integrating the materials stemming from the *Samdhinirmocanasūtra*. The *Basic Section* — as we have learnt from Schmithausen's elaborations — contains materials of various and sometimes rather late layers (cf. *Ālayav.* § 1.6.7, n. 132). There is no reason to assume that the Yogācāra-Vijñānavādins would not have cared for a clarifying passage concerning the simultaneity of *ālayavijñāna* and (the) *pravṛttivijñāna(s)*, if they would have felt a need to introduce such a passage into MauBh. Instead, in most of the cases, they seem to have limited the amount of introducing new materials into older contexts to the bare essentials just necessary for roughly updating the accepted conceptual

¹ As, e.g., Schmithausen's (*Ālayav.* § 6.8.3) devaluation of the *pravṛttivijñāna* as "being merely a new designation of the traditional *vijñānas*" implies (cf. above, Ex. 17 [end of "ad (a)"]).

² Accordingly, with reference to the *nirodhasamāpatti*-context, I have coined two expressions in order to refer to two different models: (1) the Early Yogācāra 'bi-polar *bīja*-model' and (2) the Y.-V. '*ālayavijñāna-pravṛttivijñāna* model of consciousness'. The names given to these models refer in each case to very specific features, which cannot be transported from one model to the other.

³ Thus, as regards the concept of *ālayavijñāna* in MauBh, the *Initial Passage* actually demanded a very high degree of model-specific structural integrity of description (necessitating the complete replacement of one model with another). Other contexts of the *Basic Section*, in which *ālayavijñāna* occurs (cf. *Ālayav.* § 6), have made it easier to include the new concept.

framework: sometimes a new concept or a rephrasing; sometimes a redefinition, homogeneous in itself but enlarging the older structure.¹

In the case of *ālayavijñāna* this meant, as said, that a double standard of interpretation had to be employed² for all the assertions that had directly or indirectly been affected by the general acceptance of this neologism and by its introduction into some contexts of the *Basic Section* (cf. *Ālayav.*: n. 131). Therefore, it is evident, at least at the exegetical stage related to the post-Saṃdh parts of the *Viniścayasamgrahaṇī*, that the Y.-V. scholars were still very conscious of the fact that they worked with materials which had originated at various points of time, and that they had to adjust themselves to the changing implications of the different models they had to deal with.

We owe to Schmithausen the reference to the explicit indication of such an awareness with regard to different hermeneutical models on part of the Y.-V. scholars, but Schmithausen himself ignores the characteristic structural differences between these models. He consistently interprets the *Initial Passage's* '*ālayavijñāna-pravṛttivijñāna* model of consciousness' in terms of premises corresponding to the Early Yogācāra non-Mahāyāna ontology, and this he does, while inventing his own sort of a "semi-*vijñāna* model", that is, a model (if not an oxymoron)³ corresponding to a modified, yet fragmentary, version of the 'bi-polar *bīja*-model'. Since, however, all the aspects of our *nirodhasamāpatti*-passage (i.e., the I. P.) are geared to the '*ālayavijñāna-pravṛttivijñāna* model of consciousness', they cannot, of course, be understood in terms of the 'bi-polar *bīja*-model'. Therefore, an immense effort had to be (and has been) invested by Schmithausen, to arrange for the illusionary possibility of such an understanding, so as to save his hypothesis (cf. also above, pp. 81f. [Ex. 14]) conceiving his *Initial Passage* to constitute the historical moment of introducing the concept of *ālayavijñāna*.

¹ *Ālayav.* § 6 provides ample evidence for various possibilities; also SCHMITHAUSEN 2000 — a concise, yet superb study of a particular group of interpolations into MauBh — clearly confirms this impression.

² I.e., historically after the Yogācāra-Vijñānavādins had started to integrate the concept into the *Yogācārabhūmi*.

³ (*Ālayav.* § 3.8.1): "to be sure, *ālayavijñāna* is, in the *Basic Section*, hardly anything but *Seeds (bīja)* hypostatized into a new, subliminal kind of mind".