

II. Concepts of Tribes and Domestic Economies: The Anthropological Study of Non-Literate, Sedentary Societies

‘The similarities among societies in different parts of the world were not lost on early anthropologists. Some even assumed that those societies constituted an inevitable sequence of stages, through which all human groups had passed on their way from foraging to civilization. No one believes such a thing today. In fact, some of today’s anthropologists would even deny that recognizable types of societies exist. Such denials are every bit as misguided as our predecessors’ belief in a monolithic sequence of stages.’
Kent V. Flannery and Joyce Marcus²⁰⁷

Introduction

As outlined in the previous section, my research objective follows three analytical steps. First, I address households through multiple lines of evidence available at each site. Second, based on the insights from the first analytical step, I then infer social organization at each site based on the archaeological data and controlled comparison. In a final analytical step, I compare both sites to each other as well as within their wider, regional contexts. The third step in this study resulted in analytical and conceptual results, now informed by socio-cultural anthropological insights.

To achieve this, I draw upon the anthropological literature of models of social organization among more or less sedentary, non-state societies, as documented, compared, and modelled by other socio-cultural anthropologists. These societies I address as tribes, a fuzzy category of imagined communities, which encompasses the segmentary (lineage) system tribes, great man and big man societies among decentralized constellations, as well as chiefdoms with unilineal descent and chiefdoms with a conical clan system among more centralized constellations. All of these models have their respective differences in household organization and ways of imagining the community, which I will present at the beginning of this chapter.

By outlining differences in households and ways of imagining between these five ideal types, the chapter will pave the way towards reviewing previous attempts to identify the social organization in the Aegean Early Bronze Age 1 and 2. In the third section, the chapter provides a review of terminology, and in the fourth, an explanation of how the approach followed in this contribution differs from previous studies of social organization in this wider region and period. This chapter aims to draw attention to households and forms of household organization for discussing models of sedentary, non-state societies. The common denominator of these models is that households are never self-sufficient units but are necessarily embedded in local and, to an extent, regional economies.

II.1. Tribes as Imagined Communities

In this first section, I build up the presentist understanding of tribes as imagined communities. Although this term – imagined communities – was initially coined for addressing the emergence of nation states, tribes are no less imagined than the new political constellations that

²⁰⁷ Flannery – Marcus 2012.

emerged in the 19th century, supported by institutionalized education, mass media, and mass literacy. This argument resonates with Peter Whiteley's²⁰⁸ empirical example of a tribal imagined community, among the 17th century Hopi. Through a historical anthropological approach, he showed how collective resistance to the Spanish state led to a new imagined community thorough reimagining. Collective reimagining was based on shared Hopi features such as knotted cords, shared katsina spirit representations, and the use of peyote as the imaginative fuel.²⁰⁹ The new Hopi imagined community did not, therefore, come into being through 'the loosening of constraints on aggrandizers',²¹⁰ a key feature of transegalitarian societies, which, according to Brian Hayden, encompass complex hunter-gatherer groups, horticulturalists, some agricultural and pastoralist societies, vaguely corresponding to my diverse category of sedentary tribes as a fuzzy category. Among the Hopi and many other cases described below, the imagined tribal communities came into being through bottom-up, collective representations rather than unleashed aggrandizers, who, according to Hayden, built transegalitarian societies top-down. More on this will be explained in the section to come, to underline a heterogeneity in ways of imagining within these transegalitarian or tribal imagined communities. In the 1960s and 1970s, Marshall Sahlins laid the foundation of a theoretically-driven but ethnographically grounded understanding of models of social organization, applicable to non-state sedentary tribal societies. He was inspired by the cultural ecology of (his teacher) Leslie White, senior colleague Julian Steward, and Karl Polanyi's concepts of economic embeddedness. Sahlins drew his conclusions from 'uncontrolled comparison',²¹¹ a method which he explained somewhat vaguely in his seminal article *Poor Man, Rich Man, Big Man, Chief: Political Types in Melanesia and Polynesia*.²¹² With uncontrolled comparison, Sahlins referred to an empirically grounded comparative analysis of different types of political leadership (documented ethnographically) in the search for 'abstracted sociological types',²¹³ also known as 'models' or 'ideal types' in socio-cultural anthropology. An elaborated version of such an undertaking, this time not limited to Polynesia and Melanesia but across time and space, was published in *Tribesmen* in 1968 (see Tab. 1).²¹⁴

In the preface to *Tribesmen*, 'a study of the primitive 'segmentary societies'',²¹⁵ Sahlins argued that the term

'Tribe' is like the 'nation' of older usage, a body of people of common derivation and custom, in possession of their own extensive territory ... a tribe is specifically unlike a modern nation in that its several communities are not united under a sovereign governing authority, nor are the boundaries of the whole thus clearly and politically determined. The tribe builds itself up from within, the smaller community segments joined in groups of higher order ... such a cultural formation, at once structurally decentralized and functionally generalized, is a primitive segmentary society.'²¹⁶

²⁰⁸ Whiteley 2002.

²⁰⁹ Whiteley 2002.

²¹⁰ Hayden 2016, 21.

²¹¹ Sahlins 1963, 286.

²¹² The word 'poor' in this article appears only in the title and cannot be found within the text. This usage of 'poorness' and 'poverty' stands in stark contrast to the usage applied by Brian Hayden and ethnoarchaeologists who argue that the phenomenon of poverty begins with complex hunter-gatherer societies (Hayden 2001, 579). With Sahlins, however, 'poorness' refers to a lack of fame and reputation, as opposed to their accumulation in the realm of a big man.

²¹³ Sahlins 1963, 286.

²¹⁴ For an updated version of what Sahlins calls 'uncontrolled comparison', see Sahlins 2013, 1–2. In the manner of James Frazer, 'ethnographic reports are mainly meant to exemplify rather than verify' (Sahlins 2013, 2) the idea author proposes.

²¹⁵ Sahlins 1968, vii.

²¹⁶ Sahlins 1968, vii–viii.

TRIBE (Sahlins 1968)		
The emergence of tribes	Commonly farmers or herders, but could also be foragers	
Territory	Claim of a common territory by several villages	
Social relations	Dominated by kinship ties through descent and marriage (kinship = social relation of cooperation and nonviolence)	
Law and order	Lack of any specialized institution for its maintenance, peace established through kinship alliances	
Household	Domestic mode of production (DMP), almost self-sufficient, exchange driven by need and not for profit	
Division of Labor	Division of labor by gender and age is the only full-time specialization, labor is not alienated	
Exchange	Generalized, balanced, and negative reciprocity are tied to kinship-residential sectors (household/village/inter-tribal sector)	
	Segmentary Tribe	Chieftdom
Local communities	Politically independent, includes up to a few hundred individuals, if sedentary, they claim a few square miles as their domain, rarely endogamous	Political organization established above and beyond the local community, a village may accommodate a local chieftain or a paramount chief, who may be in control of a hundred square miles of land, integration of specialized local communities
Settlement form	A compact village or an open community of scattered homesteads or hamlets	Homesteads and villages
Primary segments	Structurally and functionally equivalent	Can be specialized
Economy	Anatomistic, local communities are not integrated by a localized division of labor and exchange of complementary goods	Organic economy, local communities are integrated by a division of labor and exchange of complementary goods
Inter-tribal division of labor and trade	Present	Division of labor within a chieftdom may be as great as that between adjacent segmentary tribes
Rank	Absence of rank, age-grades and a gendered division of labor present	Ranked society, hierarchically organized descent groups
Leadership	Petty chieftain, great man or big man – they may accumulate wealth but then distribute it to engender personal loyalties	Chiefs enjoy built-in privileges and obligations regarding definite groups, they are a true authority
Presentist understanding of tribes	Great man societies, big man societies, segmentary lineage systems	Chieftdoms with conical clan, Chieftdoms with lineal descent

Tab. 1 Sahlins’s understanding of tribes: shared and specific characteristics (after Sahlins 1968)

Less than two decades later, in his introduction to *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*²¹⁷ Benedict Anderson made use of the same categories – territory, boundary, and community – as Sahlins had used to describe tribes. However, Anderson used these three categories to explain nations and the process of nation-building. Whereas among tribes, tribal territory and its boundaries are fluid and largely undefined,²¹⁸ among nations, the territory is a finite, bounded category, within which a sovereign state ‘resides’.²¹⁹ Whilst a nation ‘is an imagined political community – and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign’, supported by the top-down principle of print capitalism,²²⁰ a tribe builds itself from within, through kinship ties and oral history.²²¹ Despite these sharp differences regarding territory and boundary, there is a fundamental similarity between tribes and nations: both can be treated as imagined communities since ‘in fact, all communities larger than primordial villages of face-to-face contact (and perhaps even these) are imagined’.²²² Although neither Anderson’s nor Sahlins’s primary aim was to distinguish between tribes and nations, Anderson understood that imagined communities can vary greatly:

‘Communities are to be distinguished, not by their falsity/genuineness, but by the style in which they are imagined. Javanese villagers have always known that they are connected to people they have never seen, but these ties were once imagined particularistically – as indefinitely stretchable nets of kinship and clientship. Until quite recently, the Javanese language had no word meaning the abstraction ‘society.’ We may today think of the French aristocracy of the *ancient régime* as a class; but surely it was imagined this way only very late. To the question ‘Who is the Comte de X?’ the normal answer would have been, not ‘a member of the aristocracy,’ but ‘the lord of X,’ ‘the uncle of the Baronne de Y,’ or ‘a client of the Duc de Z’.’²²³

Therefore, before outlining the commonalities and differences between models of tribal groups – such as the segmentary lineage system, big man, great man, and chiefdom constellations among semi-sedentary non-state societies – it is important to acknowledge that all of these different models of tribes, just like nation states, are imagined communities. Unlike nations, tribes are defined through fluid territorial or ethnic boundaries, which are prone to change but nevertheless in some form ‘persist despite a flow of personnel across them’.²²⁴

For the purpose of this discussion, I do not describe models from the most to the least ‘egalitarian’ in terms of social complexity, but instead prioritize the history of anthropological thought, to understand how these models of tribal societies came into existence within the discipline. Research on ways of imagining among non-state societies had already been of particular interest to early British structural functionalists. However, in *Tribesmen*, Sahlins pursued a different means of classifying societies and placed equal importance on subsistence practices, ecological adaptation, and degrees of socio-political centralization.

Decades before the term transegalitarian societies was coined to indicate complex hunter-gatherer societies and more or less sedentary tribes by ethnoarchaeologists,²²⁵ Sahlins suggested that although most tribal societies are post-Neolithic – meaning that they are farmers and herders – not necessarily all are.²²⁶ Within his tribal examples, Sahlins included the sedentary

²¹⁷ Anderson 2006 [1983].

²¹⁸ Sahlins 1968; Barth 1969.

²¹⁹ Anderson 2006 [1983].

²²⁰ Anderson 2006 [1983], 6.

²²¹ Sahlins 1968.

²²² Anderson 2006 [1983], 6.

²²³ Anderson 2006 [1983], 6–7.

²²⁴ Barth 1969, 1.

²²⁵ Hayden 1995; Hayden 2001; Hayden 2011; Hayden 2014; Hayden 2018.

²²⁶ Sahlins 1968, 3.

Kwakwaka'wakw, a complex hunter-gatherer society and language group residing on coastal river mouths and island shores of the Pacific Northwest Coast. Through this famous example, he argued that tribes could also exist among sedentary hunter-fisher-gatherer communities in rich ecological niches. Hayden and Sahlins agree on this matter; however, the key difference between Hayden's understanding of transegalitarian societies and Sahlins's understanding of tribal societies concerns ritual and the individual. While Hayden understood ritual as the main institutionalized point of departure between the rich and poor within a community (through ritual feasting or the establishment of ritual societies),²²⁷ Sahlins understood ritual as one of the main instruments (apart from kinship and economics) in seeking peace and coherence within a tribal society.²²⁸ Hayden's understanding of ritual fits his interpretation of becoming transegalitarian – he understands that tribes (like nation states) are built from the top down, as the more powerful act in their self-interest and succeed in accumulating more wealth and power than other members of a community. He argues that this is the 'Darwinian imperative for survival'.²²⁹ By contrast, Sahlins emphasized that tribal forms are not built top-down – unlike nation states – but from the bottom up: thus *segmentation* is the key feature of households' integration into a tribal constellation:

'Families are joined in local lineages, lineages in village communities, villages in regional confederacies, the latter making up the tribe or 'people' – itself set in a wider, inter-tribal field ... the tribe as a whole is identified and distinguished from others by certain commonalities of custom and speech ... the smallest units, such as households, are segments of more inclusive units, such as lineages, the lineages in turn segments of larger groups, and so on, like a pyramid of building blocks. We speak of 'segmentary system' not simply because it is built of compounded segments, but also because it is *only* so built: its coherence is not maintained from the above by public political institutions (as by a sovereign authority).'²³⁰

In this perspective, each segment (e.g. a household, a village, a tribal territory) reproduces itself through repetition of the same reproductive practices as every other unit. These units are politically largely autonomous, although economic transactions commonly cut across these politically quasi-autonomous units. However, the last part of Sahlins's argument, that no public political institutions govern compounded tribal segments, does not hold merit. For example, among the Kwakwaka'wakw and other native Northwest Coast peoples the potlatch system is one among such institutions. Potlatch was a well-developed system for expressing laws, obligations, and social positions and relations in a broad sense. Potlatch as an institution was highly public and highly political. Via intermarriage, especially, Northwest Coast elites structured inter-community exchange and alliances that transected the segmentary nature of household/lineage units within an ethnolinguistic community.²³¹

Segmentary organization²³² within tribes was elaborated through ethnographic examples by British social anthropologists such as Radcliffe-Brown, Evans-Pritchard, and Fortes. These scholars linked segmentation with kinship analysis of *segmentary lineage systems*, a model of acephalous tribal society inferred from semi-sedentary horticultural and cattle herding groups

²²⁷ Hayden 2018.

²²⁸ Sahlins 1968, 12.

²²⁹ Hayden 2014, 14.

²³⁰ Sahlins 1968, 15.

²³¹ Boas 1888; Barnett 1938; Kan 1989; Jonaitis 1991; Harkin 2015; High 2018.

²³² The concept of segmentary organization, emphasized by Sahlins as the common denominator for all tribal societies, was originally developed by Émile Durkheim in the late 19th century (Durkheim 1968 [1893]).

in sub-Saharan Africa,²³³ and later extended to North Africa²³⁴ and southwestern Asia.²³⁵ Today, it is generally accepted that ‘pure segmentary lineage systems do not exist in behavioural reality’.²³⁶ However, the claim that segmentary lineage is only an etic²³⁷ cognitive tool²³⁸ is not appropriate either, since segmentary logic in some form existed as an emic concept.²³⁹ As with any other hegemonic ideology, segmentary lineage systems cannot be perfectly translated into practice. Further, segmentary systems may be seen as either coexisting, or as not coexisting, together with lineages.²⁴⁰ The allegedly unavoidable connection between these two factors was shown by French scholars²⁴¹ not to be as important as earlier British theorists²⁴² had thought them in the mid-20th century.²⁴³

II.1.1. Segmentary (Lineage) System: We May or May Not Have a Common Ancestor

Initially, the segmentary lineage system was perceived as the only structural and socio-economically ‘egalitarian’, acephalous, non-state constellation, a conception that has been challenged ever since.²⁴⁴ Evans-Pritchard inferred this model of social organization from participant observation among semi-sedentary groups of Nuer²⁴⁵ living along the White Nile in what is now South Sudan.²⁴⁶ The Nuer, unlike other tribes described prior to the 1940s, belonged to a single lineage of 200,000 members,²⁴⁷ meaning that all Nuer tribal members could trace their ancestry to a common ancestor. Hence the term segmentary *lineage* system tribes. The Nuer inhabited a tribal territory of approximately 78,000km²,²⁴⁸ covered with swamps and open savannah on both sides of the White Nile and its tributaries.²⁴⁹ Nuerland lacked iron, stone, and wood, but locally available mud, clay, and thornwood were utilized for the production of pottery and the construction of houses.²⁵⁰ The Nuer lacked knowledge

²³³ Evans-Pritchard 1940; Bohannan – Bohannan 1953; Bohannan 1955.

²³⁴ Gellner 2001 [1969].

²³⁵ Tapper 1979; Tapper 1997.

²³⁶ Salzman 1978.

²³⁷ Within socio-cultural anthropology, ‘an emic model is one which explains the ideology or behaviour of members of a culture according to indigenous definitions. An etic model is one which is based on criteria from outside a particular culture. Etic models are held to be universal; emic models are culture-specific ... A commonplace assumption about emic models is that they are ‘discovered’ rather than ‘invented’ by the analyst. However, emic models, like phonemic ones, are ultimately exogenous constructions, formalized by the analyst on the basis of distinctive features present in indigenous usage. They are not in themselves ‘the native model’, though anthropologists often loosely identify them in this way’ (Barnard 2002, 275–277).

²³⁸ Gellner 1996; Kraus 1998.

²³⁹ Conte – Walentowitz 2009.

²⁴⁰ Bonte et al. 1991; Gingrich 1995.

²⁴¹ Such as the authors who contributed to the volume edited by Pierre Bonte, Édouard Conte, Constant Hames, and Abdel Wedoud Ould Cheikh (Bonte et al. 1991).

²⁴² Such as Fortes – Evans-Pritchard 1940; Evans-Pritchard 1940.

²⁴³ For a detailed review (in English) of several important theoretical contributions regarding (non-)lineage tribal systems (published in French) in Bonte et al. 1991, see Gingrich 1995.

²⁴⁴ For the earliest critique of Evans-Pritchard’s theoretical model and description of the Nuer see Richards 1941. For a more recent and systematic critique of segmentary, egalitarian, and patrilineal depiction of the Nuer by Evans-Pritchard see McKinnon 2000. As McKinnon 2000 shows, Evans-Pritchard’s theoretical separation between 1) politico-jural domain, 2) subcultural domestic domain, and 3) supercultural sphere of religion and ritual enabled him to portray the Nuer as egalitarian and patrilineal.

²⁴⁵ The Nuer called themselves *Nath* (Evans-Pritchard 1940, 3) and Nuerland was emically referred to as *cieng Nath* (Evans-Pritchard 1940, 136). The word *cieng* had multiple meanings, such as a homestead, hamlet, village, or tribal section (Evans-Pritchard 1940, 136).

²⁴⁶ Evans-Pritchard 1940.

²⁴⁷ Evans-Pritchard 1940, 110.

²⁴⁸ Evans-Pritchard 1940, 110.

²⁴⁹ The Nuer’s tribal area roughly corresponds to the size of the national territories of Panama or Sierra Leone.

²⁵⁰ Evans-Pritchard 1940, 86.

of smelting, but they acquired spears from Arab merchants, which the Nuer knew how to hammer cold.²⁵¹

The Nuer gradually expanded into the land of the Dinka²⁵² through raiding cattle and iron tools, as well as the integration of new members to the tribe on the boundaries of Nuerland,²⁵³ which demonstrates their continuously shifting territorial as well as genealogical boundaries. Unlike politically centralized and ranked chiefdoms previously documented for the Trobriand Islands, in which chiefs with their coercive power could grant defence over a 'tribal' territory, the Nuer were described as an 'acephalous' tribe with 'ordered anarchy' and an 'egalitarian upbringing', and were 'deeply democratic'.²⁵⁴ Lacking legal institutions and a central, hereditary leader, the Nuer resolved conflicts through the fission and fusion of tribal segments, which was always situational and commonly explained through the famous Bedouin saying 'I against my brothers; my brothers and I against my cousins; my cousins, my brothers, and I against the world'.²⁵⁵ Apart for exceptional cases, in which all Nuer, across the tribal territory, could identify with the same enemy (e.g. the British), the Nuer fought according to a segmentary grammar:

'People can thus selve themselves, and can other others according to context, that is, according to the structural level of the conflict or contest, coalition or cooperation that is at stake at any one given moment ... this, however, is impossible in a system that is not, as the Nuer's was, acephalous, that is, without institutionalized political and territorial power structures and without formal political offices.'²⁵⁶

Among the Nuer, each tribal segment was composed of a dominant lineage, into which membership is granted through 'adoption, cognatic kinship, or kinship fictions'.²⁵⁷ The Nuer tribe, spread over a large area, was the largest political unit for the Nuer. The Nuer tribal territory was further segmented into primary, secondary, and tertiary segments.²⁵⁸ According to Edward E. Evans-Pritchard, these geographical tribal segments did not overlap with genealogical distance as members of different clans coresided within each segment. However, segments could change through processes of fission and fusion in cases of conflict or cooperation between members of the Nuer tribe:

'Any segment sees itself as an independent unit in relation to another segment of the same section, but sees both segments as a unity in relation to another section; and a section which from the point of view of its members comprises opposed segments is seen by members of other sections as an unsegmented unit ... the political system is an equilibrium between opposed tendencies towards fission and fusion, between the tendency of all groups to segment, and the tendency of all groups to combine with segments of the same order.'²⁵⁹

²⁵¹ Evans-Pritchard 1940, 86.

²⁵² Leinhardt 1958.

²⁵³ Evans-Pritchard 1940, 7, 120, 125–127, 162.

²⁵⁴ Evans-Pritchard 1940, 181. See McKinnon, who argues that Evans-Pritchard glossed over 'his acknowledgement of the hierarchical implications of affinal and matrilineal relations' (McKinnon 2000, 62) for the sake of portraying the Nuer as egalitarian. Evans-Pritchard in his interpretations of the Nuer applied his own cultural distinctions between secular and sacred, political and ritual. Therefore, he among the Nuer considered secular, political power (rather than religious power) as 'true' and 'real' one (McKinnon 2000).

²⁵⁵ Barth 1974, 13.

²⁵⁶ Baumann 2006, 23.

²⁵⁷ Evans-Pritchard 1940, 228.

²⁵⁸ Evans-Pritchard 1940, 138. The Nuer used only one term – *cieng* – to refer to a territorial section of any size (McKinnon 2000, 43). *Cieng* literary meant 'home' or 'community' (Kiggen 1948, 57; Evans-Pritchard 1951, 3 cited in McKinnon 2000, 47).

²⁵⁹ Evans-Pritchard 1940, 147–148.

The smallest, tertiary Nuer segment was comprised of a number of Nuer villages, which served as the smallest political unit in Nuerland.²⁶⁰ Village members shared communal grazing and cultivating rights but each household owned its own stock of cattle, oxen, sheep, and goats.²⁶¹ Nuer subsistence was primarily based on cattle herding and horticulture with a wooden hoe,²⁶² including the biannual harvest of millet and the annual harvest of maize, beans, and tobacco.²⁶³ Among the Nuer, cattle represented the main item of bridewealth transaction, in which a few heads of cattle were given from the groom's to the bride's family.²⁶⁴ For this reason, cattle were never slaughtered solely for consumption and therefore commonly reached old age.²⁶⁵ Oxen and sheep, however, were frequently sacrificed at ceremonies (e.g. weddings and initiation rites).²⁶⁶ In exceptional cases, such as severe famine and droughts, the Nuer would slaughter their cattle, but under regular conditions they only consumed the meat of an animal that had died of natural causes.²⁶⁷ The Nuer also hunted wild animals for subsistence buffering, although game, in general, was of minimal importance.²⁶⁸ Internally, the Nuer distinguished between members of different clans along with age sets, which were established permanently following an initiation.²⁶⁹ Only towards outsiders did the Nuer tribe, as a whole, act as an undifferentiated political and territorial unit.²⁷⁰

The Tiv, a largely sedentary tribal group of 900,000 scattered across numerous horticultural villages along the Benue River in northern Nigeria, is another group among whom a segmentary lineage system was documented.²⁷¹ Like the Nuer, the Tiv belonged to a single lineage, without institutionalized leadership. The combination of segmented social organization, harsh ecological conditions and the absence of political leaders – and therefore largely unsettled relations with neighbours – can be best illustrated through the Tiv's emic perspective on fluid tribal boundaries: 'we don't have a boundary; we have an argument.'²⁷² The same principle was also documented among the Pashtun, a tribal group in what is now Afghanistan and Pakistan,²⁷³ the largest segmentary lineage system documented ethnographically. This is important for two reasons. First, it demonstrates that the segmentary lineage system is not solely an African phenomenon. Second, Pashtuns, like the Nuer and Tiv, inhabited unfavourable, rather dry environments, in which animal herding was of key importance for marriage transactions but less so for daily subsistence, whereas horticulture played a minor role in marriage transactions but was key to daily subsistence.

Similarities in ecology and the predominant subsistence forms between the Nuer and the Tiv led Sahlins to claim that segmentary lineage systems can be found only among societies

²⁶⁰ Evans-Pritchard 1940, 5. Again, there was no emic concept as a 'tertiary tribal unit' among the Nuer (McKinnon 2000, 43).

²⁶¹ Evans-Pritchard 1940.

²⁶² Evans-Pritchard 1940, 86.

²⁶³ Evans-Pritchard 1940, 87.

²⁶⁴ Evans-Pritchard 1940, 17. Cattle was also an important item for 'childwealth' transactions through which Nuer men would secure patrilineal affiliation of their children (Gough 1971, 91). This implies that patrilineal affiliation among the Nuer was not acquired by birth but achieved through ritual and economic wealth (McKinnon 2000, 61).

²⁶⁵ Evans-Pritchard 1940, 26.

²⁶⁶ The Nuer term *buth* literary means 'to share' sacrificial meat (Evans-Pritchard 1956, 287 cited in McKinnon 2000, 47).

²⁶⁷ Evans-Pritchard 1940, 26–27.

²⁶⁸ Evans-Pritchard 1940, 72–73.

²⁶⁹ Evans-Pritchard 1940, 221.

²⁷⁰ Evans-Pritchard 1940, 4.

²⁷¹ Bohannan – Bohannan 1953; Bohannan 1954. It has already been noted that Evans-Pritchard's 'segmentary lineage system' model of socio-political organization is 'a brilliant theory that applied well to many other societies but not to the one which it was conceived' (Southall 1986, 17 cited in McKinnon 2000, 36).

²⁷² Bohannan 1954, 45 cited in Sahlins 1961, 337.

²⁷³ Tapper 1983.

characterized by the use of limited resources over a long period,²⁷⁴ although some scholars later disagreed.²⁷⁵ Writing from the perspective of the ‘predators’ (the Nuer), Sahlins argued that segmentary lineage is based on ‘predatory expansion’²⁷⁶ of one tribal group to the detriment of the other, since it develops in a predatory group that intrudes into a territory already occupied by other groups (e.g. the Nuer’s expansion into Dinka territory). In turn, writing from the perspective of the victims of state invasion, Scott, in *The Art of Not Being Governed*, claimed that in Zomia, a segmentary lineage system developed as a ‘secondary adaptation’,²⁷⁷ which allowed the segmentation of small groups but also their alliance through genealogy for trade among themselves and war against the state. The opposing viewpoints of Sahlins and Scott further demonstrate how the development of a segmentary lineage system is situational, and not limited to arid and dry areas. It appears to develop among both tribes who are oppressing or expanding as well as oppressed or shrinking tribal constellations, depending on the local context and the power of the ‘other’ (e.g. a segmentary lineage system tribe against the state in the case of Zomia; and a segmentary lineage tribe against the Dinka, another acephalous tribal group, in the case of the Nuer).

Although the segmentary lineage system continues to be treated as a type of acephalous, segmentary society, the segmentary organization in situ has rarely been recorded through empirical ethnographic cases.²⁷⁸ Since the 1940s, anthropologists working in the Middle East have shown that segmentary tribes can also exist without lineages,²⁷⁹ and therefore, we shall understand the segmentary lineage system tribes as including those with and those without lineages, in which members within tribal segments are not necessarily equal in status to one another.²⁸⁰

In the case of segmentary lineage tribes with lineages, such as the Nuer, the lineage ideology linked different segments into a political body through imagined ancestral lines (see Fig. 4). In practice, however, a group as a whole rarely fused into a single political unit or functioned internally precisely in accordance with the segmentary grammar.²⁸¹ This must be the case among all members of the tribe, regardless of the number of its members and despite the limiting capacities of maintaining memory based solely on oral tradition in non-literate societies. Against these odds, the claim of a common ancestor is, in fact, also a fictitious, imaginary process.

For example, at the time of Evans-Pritchard’s fieldwork, the Nuer had a fixed capacity to trace their ancestry back between ten and twelve generations, however, ‘there is no reason to suppose that the Nuer came into existence ten to twelve generations ago.’²⁸² After going back five generations, members of the Nuer tribe – and therefore, of any segmentary lineage system groups – needed to navigate their memory through what Evans-Pritchard called *structural amnesia*.²⁸³ This structural amnesia allowed some ancestors to disappear from memory in order to sustain a unified lineage system in which, across different generations, only ten to

²⁷⁴ Sahlins 1961.

²⁷⁵ E.g. Kelly 1983.

²⁷⁶ Sahlins 1961, 332.

²⁷⁷ Scott 2009, x.

²⁷⁸ For a critical overview and ethnocentric interpretations of the Nuer segmentary lineage system, see McKinnon 2000.

²⁷⁹ Bonte et al. 1991; Dresch – Haykel 1995; Gingrich 1995.

²⁸⁰ McKinnon 2000.

²⁸¹ As McKinnon (2000, 75) argues, it is Evans-Pritchard’s and other theorists’ ‘simple’ models that did not capture the complexities of the Nuer social lives. Instead of searching for explanations among the Nuer, theorists rather found conceptual relief in their own cultural understandings. As she puts it ‘The Nuer were not confused. The analysts were: they became tangled in paradoxes of their own making when ill-fitting analytic categories were imposed on a set of categories whose logic and dynamic resisted their own’ (McKinnon 2000, 76).

²⁸² Evans-Pritchard 1940, 199.

²⁸³ Evans-Pritchard 1940.




Fig. 4 An ideal genealogical and territorial structure of the segmentary lineage system tribes with lineages (Sahlins 1968, fig. 4.1)

twelve generations stand between the present and the past, which linked all the members of a segmentary lineage system with a founding ancestor.

The flexible dynamics of genealogy within segmentary lineage systems have also been observed in the arid regions of southern Arabia.²⁸⁴ Therefore, the segmentary lineage system that British scholars proposed in the mid-20th century was only possible through a continuous combination of remembering, forgetting, and manipulating people's genealogical history, which must be synchronized with the group's tribal genealogy.²⁸⁵ Although anthropologists have observed these processes from etic perspectives, they were emic ideologies to some extent, common to all segmentary tribal constellations with lineages. However, the extent to which the model applied to the Nuer is questionable.²⁸⁶ Therefore, rather than reopening a long-standing dispute over segmentary lineage systems being either an emic or an etic category, it is important here to state my agreement with Conte and Walentowitz,²⁸⁷ who argued that they are both.

From the presentist perspective, several tribes in the Middle East could be classified as based on segmentary (lineage) systems,²⁸⁸ including those in Yemen,²⁸⁹ which, in fact, exist without lineages, similar to the Hopi, a Native American tribe in northeastern Arizona.²⁹⁰ In these cases, segmentary tribal logic and rather 'egalitarian' relations between tribal subgroups (e.g. households) – previously assigned to segmentary systems with lineages – existed despite

²⁸⁴ Dostal 1983b, 19.

²⁸⁵ As well as by continuously drawing theoretical separations between domestic, political, and religious spheres of social lives (McKinnon 2000).

²⁸⁶ McKinnon 2000.

²⁸⁷ Conte – Walentowitz 2009.

²⁸⁸ Bonte et al. 1991.

²⁸⁹ Dresch – Haykel 1995.

²⁹⁰ Whiteley 1985; Whiteley 1986.

Segmentary (Lineage System) Tribes		
	Segmentary Lineage Systems Tribes <i>with</i> Lineages (African Model) (Evans-Pritchard 1940; Fortes – Evans-Pritchard 1940)	Segmentary Tribes <i>without</i> Lineages (Middle Eastern Model) (Bonte et al. 1991; Dresch – Haykel 1995; Gingrich 1995; Conte – Walentowitz 2009)
Genealogies	Long genealogies (remember 10–12 generations) Trace their ancestry from a common ancestor – the existence of lineages	Shallow genealogies (remember 2–5 generations) Do not trace their ancestry from a common ancestor – no lineages
Mobility and type of farming	More or less mobile due to shifting horticulture with a digging stick or pastoralism	More or less sedentary due to (irrigation) agriculture in terraced fields
Relations between sub-groups	Acephalous, segmentary society with egalitarian relations between sub-groups (e.g., households, segments, villages, etc.)	
Segmentary logic	Segmentary logic is not an everyday reality but used in cases of disputes and warfare	

Tab. 2 (Un)shared characteristics of segmentary (lineage system) tribes with and without lineages (after Bonte et al. 1991; Dresch – Haykel 1995; Gingrich 1995; Conte – Walentowitz 2009)

not having a lineage system. Compared to tribes with lineage systems and long genealogies, tribes in the Middle East were based on shallow genealogies, not tracing a group’s ancestry from a single, common ancestor. This key difference in kinship structure also coincides with the predominant subsistence practices. Whereas the African examples of segmentary lineage system tribes with long genealogies mainly consisted of more or less mobile societies practising shifting horticulture with a digging stick or pastoralism, the Middle Eastern examples without genealogies mainly comprised more or less sedentary tribes practising sedentary agriculture in irrigated terraced fields. Both types, however, can be classified as two families of examples of acephalous, segmentary non-state societies with ‘egalitarian’ relations between subgroups, yet inegalitarian relations within these subgroups. In both cases, the segmentary logic is not an everyday principle, yet it can be used as a principle in times of dispute (over land, marriage, etc.) or warfare within the tribe or when fighting a common external enemy (see Tab. 2).

II.1.2. Big Man Societies: We Mobilize Wealth for Personal Networks and Collective Projects

The second group of ideal types of tribal political organization applicable to sedentary non-state societies is the *big man* constellation. This model of social organization was initially inferred from research concerning Melanesian types of political leadership compared to Polynesian chiefs.²⁹¹ According to the *International Encyclopedia of the Social and Behavioral Sciences*, the ‘*big man* has come to stand for a type of polity distinguished, for example, from political systems with formally elected offices or inherited ranks and statuses. It is closely associated with, although not limited to, the ethnography of Melanesia’.²⁹² These so-called big man societies are, on the one hand, acephalous, like segmentary lineage systems: however, big man tribes do not follow strict descent rules from a single ancestor. Instead, tribal alliances maintained through competitive ceremonial exchanges of the potlatch type are prioritized over descent. These exchange networks are established and maintained by the unequal exchange

²⁹¹ Sahlins 1963.

²⁹² Lederman 2015, 567.

of women for things (a bride for a pig or shells), preferably far from home, to establish far-reaching exchange networks based on transactions involving customary valuables.²⁹³

Big man societies were originally inferred from Melanesian sedentary, horticultural communities, which base their domestic economies on tubers (taro and sweet potato) and pig breeding.²⁹⁴ Their domestic economies, however, were not narrowly ‘domestic’, but were also of regional importance for the building and maintenance of alliances beyond the household. In *Pigs for the Ancestors*²⁹⁵ Roy Rappaport discussed the key importance of pig breeding for the maintenance of regional peace and occasional warfare, as well as the ritual importance of pigs for repaying debts to their ancestors who lived on the same territory. Importantly, Rappaport also noted that ‘the Tsembaga almost never kill domestic pigs outside of ritual contexts’,²⁹⁶ which bears similarities to practices also widely observed among the Nuer segmentary lineage tribe.²⁹⁷ During the communal slaughter of pigs, which, among the Tsembaga, on average occurred every 2–3 years, the Tsembaga slaughtered only adult and adolescent pigs, whereas the juveniles were left alive.²⁹⁸

In big man societies, both tubers and pigs (owned by individual households) provided the means for maintaining large personal networks of exchange partnerships, built through ‘periodic exchange festivals of different scales and degrees of social and political complexity’.²⁹⁹ The interdependence and contradiction between female labour involved in horticulture and pig breeding versus male gain in prestige through hosting exchange festivals enabled men to organize themselves in larger cooperative groups. However, a big man’s personal prestige did not translate into political office.

‘Big men make their names not simply by mobilizing wealth for personal network ends – like staging impressive funerary wealth distributions and generously supporting their exchange partners when the latter stage events – but also by successfully orienting their own and their clansmen’s respective network to collective projects.’³⁰⁰

With reference to economic behaviour, ‘the big man societies of Melanesia are intriguingly anomalous’.³⁰¹ These societies do not conform to a simple evolutionary socio-economic model, e.g. ‘less economically productive societies characterized by limited social differentiation and political decentralization tend to give way, over time, to more productive types characterized by elaborate divisions of labour and centralized, hierarchical political system’.³⁰²

Despite universal access to land (which among big man societies is tied to a household and inherited by men) and a surplus of pigs and tubers (based on horticultural means of production using ‘Stone Age’ technology), Melanesian big man societies did not establish central political offices or decision-making councils, but turned their surpluses into a material reflection of personal prestige, linked to a few big men:

‘Indicative quality of big-man authority is everywhere the same: it is *personal* power. Big men do not come to office; they do not succeed to, nor are they installed in, existing positions of leadership over political groups. The attainment of big-man status is rather the outcome of a series of acts which elevate a person above the common herd and

²⁹³ Lederman 2015.

²⁹⁴ Rappaport 2000 [1968].

²⁹⁵ Rappaport 2000 [1968].

²⁹⁶ Rappaport 2000 [1968], 22.

²⁹⁷ Evans-Pritchard 1940, 26.

²⁹⁸ Rappaport 1967; Rappaport 2000 [1968].

²⁹⁹ Lederman 2015, 567.

³⁰⁰ Lederman 2015, 568.

³⁰¹ Lederman 2015, 568.

³⁰² Lederman 2015, 568.

attract about him a coterie of loyal, lesser men. It is not accurate to speak of ‘big-men’ as a political title ... the phrase might be ‘man of importance’ or ‘man of renown’, ‘generous rich-man’, or ‘centre-man’, as well as ‘big-man’.³⁰³

In comparison to the rich anthropological literature on big man societies,³⁰⁴ archaeological literature on big man societies remains rather scarce, except for a few publications on ritual feasting and the emergence of social inequality among complex sedentary hunter-gatherer societies.³⁰⁵ Therefore, in the encyclopaedic entry on *Big Man, Anthropology of*, it was proposed that

‘Contemporary anthropological archaeologists may be persuaded to draw on that literature as an exceptionally well-developed source of insights into the workings of decentralized political systems, on which to model their interpretations of the material evidence of past sociopolitical and exchange systems.’³⁰⁶

I follow this call³⁰⁷ and treat the existing literature on big man societies as one of the possible non-state ideal types of social organization, which awaits scrutiny against the archaeological data from EBA 1/2 in the Aegean basin.

To draw an example from the ethnographic literature, I have chosen a representative and well-studied case of a big man society: the Siuai, a Motuna-speaking people, who, at the time of ethnographic observation in the 1930s, inhabited the fertile hinterlands of Bougainville Island (Solomon Islands), with a population of 4658 in October 1938.³⁰⁸ The Siuai resided in villages close to streams, on land cleared from the rainforest.³⁰⁹ For subsistence, the Siuai mainly relied on taro and sweet potatoes, and, to a lesser extent, on plantains, yams, coconuts, and areca-nut palms.³¹⁰ Among domestic animals, pig breeding was the main occupation. Each household owned at least one pig, and on average, three or four.³¹¹ Horticulture and pig breeding were female domains, whereas men engaged in hunting wild pigs, tree-rats, flying foxes, flying mice, and birds. What cattle represented for the Nuer, pigs did for the Siuai: the pork was seldom consumed within a household and pigs were not slaughtered for regular domestic consumption except at ceremonies (e.g. at births and christenings, at marriages, at death).³¹² Pigs were, therefore, left alive for a long time and played a key role in regional exchange for other desired goods.³¹³ The desire for pork was satisfied by male hunting of wild boar.³¹⁴ Men also searched for fish and eels, while women and girls collected prawns from the shores.³¹⁵ Most of the hunts were occasional but Siuai men also participated in cooperative fish drives, involving up to 80 men.³¹⁶ Oliver reports that among Siuai, a *household* was:

‘The principal residential and subsistence unit. Members sleep together in their own house and preserve a high degree of privacy. Most households also act separately to pro-

³⁰³ Sahlins 1963, 289.

³⁰⁴ Oliver 1955; Sahlins 1963; Godelier 1991; Lederman 2015.

³⁰⁵ Hayden 1995; Hayden 2011; Hayden 2014; Hayden 2018.

³⁰⁶ Lederman 2015, 572.

³⁰⁷ I will return to these models of social organization in Chapters VI, VII and VIII to scrutinize their compatibility with the archaeological data.

³⁰⁸ Oliver 1955, 9.

³⁰⁹ Oliver 1955, 8–9.

³¹⁰ Oliver 1955, 8–30.

³¹¹ Oliver 1955, 32.

³¹² Oliver 1955, 43–45, 348.

³¹³ Oliver 1955, 348–349.

³¹⁴ Oliver 1955, 31.

³¹⁵ Oliver 1955, 31.

³¹⁶ Oliver 1955, 31–32.

duce and consume their own food and many other basic economic essentials ... in other words, households correspond to *nuclear family*, at some stage or other in its cyclical development ... from the standpoint of the individual, the family-household is far and away the most influential kind of group in his life; in it most of his biological needs are satisfied and his personality largely shaped.³¹⁷

Among Siuai Motuna speakers, the shared language was not a basis for tribal organization. Instead, Oliver reported that ‘Siuai do not act together to utilize land; nor as far as I know did they ever fight together to defend tribal borders. In fact, among the natives themselves there is a fuzziness about the boundaries of Siuai.’³¹⁸ He reports that the members from ‘border villages’ marry each other and are bilingual, and apart from belonging to a household, a hamlet, a work team, a men’s society, and a village, Siuai also maintain trade partnerships and political alliances with people outside these groups.³¹⁹ The importance of feasting and consequently, the emergence of a big man, was described in detail by Oliver:

‘Siuai males also associate to prepare feasts, and by frequent repetition of such events the participants develop customary ways of interacting and some consciousness of group unity. Spatial contiguity is one basis for membership in this kind of unit, but such a unit is more than an aggregation of males who happen to be neighbours; it is an organized group, a hierarchy of leader and followers. Unlike many men’s societies in Melanesia, this one requires no formal initiation; as soon as a boy leaves women’s company and begins to frequent club-houses and participate in activities there, he is accepted as a member. Male exclusiveness is emphasized in many ways; for example, the club-house demon kills any female who goes too near.

Leadership in a men’s society depends upon an individual’s ability to mobilize his relatives, friends, and neighbours to help him give feasts. In this fashion the leader establishes and reinforces his *effective authority* over members of his men’s society and at the same time acquires public renown (*potu*) through his largesse. In former days leadership in a men’s society probably also depended upon the leader’s ability to organize and conduct raids, but now the emphasis is on feasts.

The leader has certain rights and obligations. His house is frequently larger than average, but his diet is no better. He is relieved of the onerous tasks of climbing palms and carrying heavy burdens, but he continues to work in his garden. He is treated with respect and deference wherever he goes, but in return must be a generous host. He frequently calls upon his followers to labour for him, but should repay their efforts with pork meals. Nowadays, he has no armed force to back up his orders, but he can control the opinions of most of his followers and thereby make life fairly unpleasant for a disobedient one. And, on top of all this, he has some supernatural sanction for his position.’³²⁰

Like Oliver, Sahlins understood that a big man’s political power is not inherited but achieved, and only extended beyond his household to a certain limit, he also recognized empirical differences between big man constellations in the lowlands and those in the highlands of Melanesia.³²¹ As the achieved status of the big man could not be handed over to his son, men from different households continued to participate in the competition for achieved status, mobilizing their wealth through immediate members of their respective households. If this practice were to be translated to the archaeological record, then it would correspond to the local and regional setting where one of the staple goods, be it pigs or other household-raised items,

³¹⁷ Oliver 1955, 104–105.

³¹⁸ Oliver 1955, 103.

³¹⁹ Oliver 1955, 104.

³²⁰ Oliver 1955, 105–106.

³²¹ Sahlins 1963.

would serve as a means not only of subsistence but also of competition between households. This setting would not contain one household that was continuously privileged over several succeeding settlements or use phases but multiple households in different settlement phases on a local and regional scale.

Fully developed Siuai big man societies, residing on rich alluvial plains, seemed to operate differently from those in the New Guinean highlands. Reducing a key difference in varying degrees of big man-ship between the two groups to environmental differences (e.g. rich alluvial plains versus harsher, hilly terrain in the highlands), Sahlins ascribed a segmentary lineage system organization to the New Guinean highlands, which seemingly limited much of the political authority that could be ascribed to any big man in the highlands.³²² However, this interpretation was later significantly modified, which paved the way for a new model of non-state, sedentary tribal constellation: the so-called great man society.

II.1.3. Great Man Societies: The Accumulation of Personal Prestige Determines our Reproduction

In the 1980s, Maurice Godelier showed that two models of political organization coexisted within the highlands of Papua New Guinea, namely big man (e.g. Mae-Enga, Kayka Melpa, Mendi)³²³ and great man societies (Baruya),³²⁴ the latter being inferred from extensive fieldwork among the Baruya.³²⁵ This research enriched the ‘ideal typology’ within socio-cultural anthropology for non-state societies, and refuted the assumption that a segmentary lineage system was the only possible way of maintaining a relatively acephalous tribe, in addition highlighting the issue of gender in non-state tribal constellations. The Baruya were an acephalous tribe of approximately 2200 members, distributed across 17 villages in the hilly area between two river valleys.³²⁶ The patrilineal tribe was divided into 15 clans, which were associated with a particular territory and a clan’s name.³²⁷ These 15 comprised seven clans of local groups and eight clans of previous migrant groups.³²⁸ Both a clan’s name and its territory were inherited and passed on to the next generations through the male line.³²⁹ Baruya clans were further divided into shallow lineages which were originally also associated with a particular territory, but due to blood feuds, men needed to seek refuge with affinal relatives, which disturbed the ‘one territory – one lineage’ rule. At the time of Godelier’s fieldwork, the Baruya no longer lived in villages in which all men could claim descent from the same patrilineal ancestor.

Based on the study of kinship structure and marriage patterns among the Baruya, Godelier recognized key differences in marriage exchanges between the Baruya and Melanesian societies of the big man type. Whereas big man societies predominantly exchanged persons for things (e.g. a woman was exchanged for bridewealth) and practised so-called *generalized exchange* (including the ritualized, competitive gift exchange of pigs), the Baruya exclusively exchanged a person for a person (e.g. direct sister exchange) – the so-called *direct exchange* of women (and no competitive gift exchange of pigs). This division highlighted the fact that not all Melanesian societies were primarily interested in acquiring things or accumulating wealth, such as was reported for big man societies, since, among the Baruya, accumulation of

³²² Sahlins 1963, 289, n. 9.

³²³ Sahlins 1963; Liep 1991; Lederman 2015.

³²⁴ Godelier 1972; Godelier 1986a; Godelier 1991.

³²⁵ Godelier 1986a; Godelier 1991.

³²⁶ Godelier 1986a, 1.

³²⁷ Godelier 1986a, 4.

³²⁸ Godelier 1986a, 4.

³²⁹ Godelier 1986, 18. Women could only pass on the names to their pigs, commonly resembling names of geographical features. These may include the names of streams and mountains that belong to women’s lineage and mark their ancestors’ territory.

Big Man	Great Man
Competitive ceremonial exchanges Absence of elaborate initiation rituals	Ritual exchanges (non-competitive) Presence of elaborate initiation rituals
Persons exchanged in marriage for things (pigs, shells) Marriage exchange: a woman for bride wealth – <i>generalized exchange</i>	Persons cannot be exchanged in marriage for things Marriage exchange: sister exchange – <i>direct exchange</i>
Material compensation for death	Material compensation cannot compensate for death
Women's productive labor used by big men for the accumulation of wealth and exchange	Women's productive labor used by great men for procreation and the flow of persons

Tab. 3 Differences between big man and great man societies (after Godelier – Strathern 1991)

wealth did not determine their tribe's reproduction. Whereas men in big man societies were dependent on pigs exchanged for a bride, men in the Baruya were not. The distinction between competitive big man and relatively 'egalitarian' great man societies was further elaborated and compared in detail in the edited volume *Big Men and Great Men: Personification of Power in Melanesia*³³⁰ in which scholars meticulously detailed the differences between the two systems (Tab. 3).

Within this edited volume, scholars such as Marilyn Strathern and others emphasized that big man societies cannot be viewed as prototypical *primitive capitalists*³³¹ and instead agreed with Liep that colonialization initiated the process of 'bigmanization'.³³² Godelier highlighted the fact that the compensation of wealth for both the death of a warrior or for a woman is not a Melanesian phenomenon. Therefore, big man societies could well exist beyond this region.³³³ The same should be understood for great man societies, since the direct exchange of women – a practice reported among great man types of societies – is also not unique to Melanesia, and may well have been practised in prehistory as well. However, for theoretical and empirical distinctions between the two systems, Godelier proposed two defining principles, here addressed as a principles a) and b).

- a) 'In societies where the principle of the direct exchange of women dominates the production of kinship relations, one must also encounter systems of male (and sometimes female) initiation calling more upon powers that are inherited or ascribed (ritual powers in particular) rather than merited or achieved.'³³⁴

The initiations among the Baruya and other great man societies in fact served as a mechanism for the integration of its members, as well as a legitimization of hierarchies existing between men and women. Since initiation rituals are largely absent among big man societies, big man societies follow a different principle:

- b) 'When kinship relations are found to depend primarily on the exchange of women for wealth, there should be a development of some system of social integration and forms of male power centered on a sprawling system of competitive exchanges which tie local societies into one regional, intertribal network. These local groups are represented by big men, who symbolize their capacity to produce and/or amass wealth and to redistribute it.'³³⁵

³³⁰ Godelier – Strathern 1991.

³³¹ E.g. Epstein 1968.

³³² Liep 1991.

³³³ Godelier 1991.

³³⁴ Godelier 1991, 278.

³³⁵ Godelier 1991, 277–278.

Among big man societies, differentiated access to wealth can be reflected in the number of pigs and tubers. These are treated as a store of value, but also as having an exchange value – which determines a household's capacity for competitive feasting, the building of alliances, and, consequently, the procurement of foreign objects of higher value and prestige, important to a big man. In stark contrast, among great man societies such as the Baruya, material objects are merely treated as a means of reproduction whereas women's productive labour was used for procreation and the flow of persons.

The Baruya, the best-studied example of a great man society, follow principle a) (or the first principle) in this distinction. Baruya predominantly exchange sisters for marriage, practise male and female initiation, and do not assign importance to achieved status. The Baruya were a patrilineal tribal group in highland Papua New Guinea, of about 2200 people, who primarily based their economies on horticulture by cultivating taro and other tubers, as well as raising pigs for domestic and ritual consumption.³³⁶ Horticulture and pig breeding were inherently female tasks, whereas men contributed to consumption with hunting and the production of salt, which was a more prestigious pursuit than gardening.³³⁷ Salt production was a tribal and regional expertise among the Baruya, who produced it for local and regional consumption. Through the exchange of salt bars, which men in Baruya villages cooperatively produced from locally available plants, the Baruya acquired other things (but not women) from outside.³³⁸

Unlike in big man societies, among the Baruya the status of a man or a household was not dependent on pig breeding. The Baruya slaughtered pigs in two ways: a) *family slaughter*, in which one pig is slaughtered for consumption, and a household gives some parts of the pig meat to close relatives of the husband and wife. This is without ceremonial function and is solely meant for subsistence and the maintenance of peaceful relations with relatives; b) *collective slaughter*, in which a few households kill one or two of their own pigs at the same time, and men take care of the butchering and cooking, which is carried out ceremonially.³³⁹ This differed from big man tribes, where the status of a household depended on the number of pigs raised: therefore pigs were not slaughtered solely for subsistence, but left alive for longer, for the purpose of competitive pig festivals.³⁴⁰ Originally, the Baruya were to some extent immigrants and even refugees, who over a few generations settled with their hosts and thereby established themselves as a new tribe, once they had erected a ceremonial house. This ceremonial house was constructed for politico-religious reasons and for the performance of initiation rituals. A combination of the two – the material (e.g. ceremonial house) and the immaterial (initiation rituals) – in a way held Baruya society together, but also re-enforced the internal distinction between male and female tasks, as well as differences in power, as Baruya women were strictly dominated by Baruya men.³⁴¹

The record of great man societies corresponds to Flannery and Marcus' description of achievement-based societies containing ritual houses.³⁴² Although such houses may be constructed for men or women for successful initiation into the wider community, among the great man societies more specifically, it is important to refer to the uncompromised resistance to any emerging inequality in terms of material wealth. As the accumulation of wealth does not define their household or social organization, great man societies value the achieved status

³³⁶ Godelier 1986a, 4.

³³⁷ Godelier 1986a, 12–14, 96–99, 130–135.

³³⁸ Godelier 1986a, 12.

³³⁹ Godelier 1986a, 14–15.

³⁴⁰ Rappaport 1967; Rappaport 2000 [1968].

³⁴¹ Godelier 1972; Godelier 1986a; Godelier 1991.

³⁴² Flannery – Marcus 2012. For a more detailed description of how to detect ritual houses in prehistory, see Flannery – Marcus 2012, chapter 8.

or personal prestige based on their skills. These may include a great warrior, a great hunter, or a great craftsman, in the case of Baruya, also the person overseeing salt production. These different roles are not accumulated by one person or one household in such socio-political constellations but are acquired by different persons in the local community. Moreover, their importance also differs according to the immediate concerns of the village community and they are not always a conspicuous person in everyday life. Regarding the archaeological record, such a setting would correspond to the evidence of ritual houses that differ from other houses in their household activities, architectural setting, or depositional processes. Regarding the difference between households, the evidence should point towards generalized sharing of goods between households, in which a difference in the amount rather than a type of goods could be evident.

The three models of tribal social organization described above, namely the segmentary lineage system, big man, and great man societies, can generally be classified as acephalous, more or less 'egalitarian' tribal constellations. The 'egalitarian' dimension was inherent to relations among subgroups (e.g. between households, clans, or subtribes) but it was combined with non-egalitarian relations between generations and among men and women within these subgroups.

On the same note, it is important to recognize that although decentralized tribal constellations are commonly equated with acephalous 'egalitarian' units among sedentary societies, any purely 'egalitarian' groups are largely non-existent. Instead, we should strive to understand to what extent privileged individuals respect the common good, since 'social inequality protects the collective interest of primitive communities and is an essential factor in their progress'.³⁴³ In societies without an institutionalized hierarchy and hereditary status, social inequality (apart from differences of age and gender but also artisan skills that could be associated with prestige – see the Baruya description above) has the potential to develop from the conspicuous consumption and usage of rare objects or through gifts, but it remains temporally and contextually limited:

'In practice, inequality is not created, is not justified ideologically, except through services rendered to a community. It always presupposes, and develops, a form of economic disequilibrium between individuals and groups, a disequilibrium which is transferred into an advantageous social relationship both for the community and the individual who claims to play a 'central' role.'³⁴⁴

For that reason, although the primary unit of analysis within this study is the household, it should be acknowledged that even within this unit, individual persons may have had differentiated access to reproductive resources and unequal agency to voice their needs. Moreover, the achieved status or prestige may not be translated into material wealth but only personal prestige, as described for the Baruya above.

Concerning individuals, my work is inspired by the writings of Louis Dumont and Marilyn Strathern, and therefore I prefer to use notions of 'persons' and 'personhood' instead. The individual – as a concept – was largely a product of the European Enlightenment, which built on its predecessors in Late Antiquity. Anthropologists have recognized this empirically, since persons have largely been pre-defined by the group they belong to (e.g. a household, a clan, a village, order of birth, a house), whereas individuals residing within nation states often claim that they are not. Furthermore, the distinction between individuals and persons is important with regard to the political economy, since 'the nation is the political group

³⁴³ Godelier 1977, 118.

³⁴⁴ Godelier 1977, 111.

conceived as a collection of individuals',³⁴⁵ whereas all types of tribes are a collection of segments (i.e. households) arranged in either a segmental or a pyramidal way. If we accept that in sedentary societies a person is commonly tied to a household (also in prehistory) then the differences between households, which are the smallest socio-economic unit that can be traced archaeologically, should provide information regarding the extent to which members or persons belonging to particular households worked towards socio-economic equilibrium or disequilibrium.

These three systems described above – big man societies, great man societies, and segmentary (lineage) systems – lack an office of hereditary tribal leader (e.g. a chief), yet there are apparent (aforementioned) differences between them. However, the three models are not the only possible form of tribal integration. At the other end of the wider continuum, anthropologists identified socio-politically centralized chiefdom constellations, which politically and/or economically incorporate a few villages into a unified political unit under a hereditary chief's leadership.

Chiefdoms with and without a Conical Clan Structure

According to *The International Encyclopedia of Anthropology*, chiefdoms today refer to 'political formulations led by chiefs. Chiefdoms usually comprise the population of thousands of inhabitants'³⁴⁶ and need not necessarily rely on a redistributive economy,³⁴⁷ a feature that was heavily emphasized in connection with Polynesian chiefdoms.³⁴⁸ The main distinction between chiefdoms and the more or less acephalous types of social organization is the presence of a hereditary office of chief, 'which can be defined as political representatives usually selected from among hereditary candidates for chiefly office'.³⁴⁹ In *Tribesmen*, Sahlins proposed a more nuanced definition of chiefdoms, which distinguishes a chiefdom from class societies and segmentary lineage tribes:

'A chiefdom is a ranked society. The descent and community groups of a segmentary tribe are equal in principal, but those of a chiefdom are hierarchically arranged, the uppermost officially superior in authority and entitled to a show of difference from the rest. A chiefdom is not a class society ... it is not divided into a ruling stratum in command of the strategic means of production or political coercion and a disenfranchised underclass. It is a structure of degrees of interest rather than conflicts of interest: of graded familial priorities in the control of wealth and styles of life – such that, if all the people are kinsmen and members of society, still some are more members than others. For some are of superior descent.'³⁵⁰

Chiefdoms can be further divided into those with a conical clan structure or *ramage*, such as Easter Island, Hawaii, Managaia, Mangareva, Marquesas, Tikopia, Tonga, and the Societies,³⁵¹ and those without a conical clan and, instead, with unilineal descent groups, including Futuna, Samoa, and Uvea³⁵² among Polynesian cases, as well as the Trobriand chiefdoms in Melanesia.³⁵³

³⁴⁵ Dumont 1980, 317.

³⁴⁶ Skalník 2018, 815.

³⁴⁷ Earle 1998b; Earle 2002.

³⁴⁸ Service 1962; Sahlins 1963; Sahlins 1968; Service 1971.

³⁴⁹ Skalník 2018, 815.

³⁵⁰ Sahlins 1968, 24.

³⁵¹ Sahlins 1958, 139, 139–180.

³⁵² Sahlins 1958, 181, 181–197.

³⁵³ Malinowski 1922; Malinowski 1935.

II.1.4. Chiefdoms with a Conical Clan Structure: Our Status and Degree of Membership is Defined by Birth

In the anthropological literature, the term conical clan was initially coined to explain social organization and ideology among the Inca elites.³⁵⁴ Kirchhoff originally defined a conical clan as:

‘A group in which every single member, except brothers or sisters, has a different standing; the concept of the degree of relationships leads to different degrees of membership in the clan. In other words, some are members to a higher degree than the others.’³⁵⁵

The conical clan concept was further elaborated within Polynesian ethnography.³⁵⁶ Sahlins argued that conical kinship structures emerged in areas with dispersed ecological resources, which led to the local specialization of households and therefore a need for redistribution, headed by a chief. Conical clans, like other kinship structures, are not limited to Polynesia but have been independently identified through ethnographic cases in at least five societies;³⁵⁷ for example, as *ramage* among the Tikopia³⁵⁸ and as the *gumsa* principle in the highlands of Burma (Southeast Asia) among the Kachin.³⁵⁹ The entry in the *International Encyclopedia of Social and Behavioral Sciences* summarizes how the difference between the chiefly and commoners’ ranks within a conical clan comes into being:

‘Descent groups are internally differentiated into a high ranked, lineage-like, chiefly or noble descent line, and a lower ranked and internally undifferentiated clan-like category of commoners (Kirchhoff, 1959; Friedman, 1979). Chiefly rank in a conical clan is typically based on relative birth order in present and ancestral generations, so that senior sons or daughters of senior ranking ancestors keep careful track of their pedigrees to validate their noble status. Junior offspring of junior ancestors, on the other hand, have little motivation to remember their genealogies, and their affiliation to the group is more categorical, or clan-like, in character.’³⁶⁰

The conical clan is an inherently different genealogical structure from the segmentary lineage system model described above. In the latter constellation, ‘every member of the clan is, as far as clan membership goes, on an absolutely equal footing with the rest: the nearness of relations to each other or to some ancestor being of no consequence for a person’s place in the clan’.³⁶¹ Therefore, anthropologists commonly referred to these types of tribes as ‘egalitarian’, although generations and relative birth order plays a role within this structure. By contrast, within a conical clan, genealogical proximity to a common ancestor or the so-called seniority within patrilineal lines, defines a *degree of membership* in the clan: therefore neither commoners nor the second-born child (unless the first is a girl, in some cases) have any entitlement to take up the chiefly, hereditary office. Lineage types of societies transfer property title and descent only through either the male or the female line. By contrast, most conical clan chiefdoms were patrilineal and therefore prioritized the first-born male for the chiefly office, although, in principle, societies with a conical clan type of social organization tend to prioritize the order of birth over gender.

³⁵⁴ Kirchhoff 1949.

³⁵⁵ Kirchhoff 1955, 6–7.

³⁵⁶ Sahlins 1958.

³⁵⁷ Service 1985.

³⁵⁸ Firth 1959; Firth 1983.

³⁵⁹ Leach 1954.

³⁶⁰ Burnham 2015, 731.

³⁶¹ Kirchhoff 1955, 4.

A tree-like genealogical constellation of chiefdoms with conical clans implies that the person ranking at the top of a conical clan, the chief, is the most closely related to the common ancestor and, consequently, also to the supernatural powers. A chief embodies what Godelier would call a politico-religious function.³⁶² A chief coordinates communal activities such as harvest and ceremonies. Through the former, a chief receives gifts (e.g. taro, yams) and through the latter, he redistributes these back to the commoners, now transformed into food. In each village, a chiefly lineage provides a local, hereditary chief or a local headman (e.g. predominantly local lineage A – chief a, see Fig. 5) who, in some cases, is subordinated to a paramount chief (e.g. Hawaiian chiefdom), or, in the absence of a paramount chief, those local chiefs rank equal to each other and compete between themselves (e.g. Tikopia).³⁶³




Fig. 5 Ideal genealogical and territorial structure of chiefdoms with a conical clan (Sahlins 1968, fig. 2.2)

Commonly, the largest proportion of daily activities in chiefdoms with a conical clan structure are limited to a particular village or settlement, and even more so within a household. However, the paramount chief has the power to mobilize labour beyond his own household and even residential unit for the construction of large sea-going canoes, extensive irrigation complexes, temples, or an exceptional residence for a paramount chief.³⁶⁴ Like the house-society model of social organization³⁶⁵ in which a house cuts across the endogamous and exogamous kinship ties, ‘conical clans are typically neither exogamous nor endogamous. Chiefs are wont to marry close relatives, perhaps within the clan, an arrangement that satisfies their ideas of

³⁶² Godelier 2011.

³⁶³ Sahlins 1958.

³⁶⁴ Sahlins 1958; Service 1962; Sahlins 1968; Earle 1978; Earle 1998b; Earle 2002.

³⁶⁵ Lévi-Strauss 1982.

their nobility and maintains the structure of elitism.³⁶⁶ Unlike in chiefdoms without a conical clan, where the chief accumulates wealth and power primarily through polygynous marriage politics and participation in wide-ranging prestige goods networks³⁶⁷ in a competitive emulation of peer polities,³⁶⁸ descent rather than wealth determines one's position within a conical clan structure, through ascribed status.

A well-documented ethnographic case of a chiefdom social organization with a conical clan is the Tikopia, studied by Raymond Firth. The Tikopia were a small island society of 1200 members, who inhabited an area of 5km².³⁶⁹ Tikopia members were linguistically and culturally homogeneous but geographically divided into two districts, each composed of mostly coastal villages numbering between 50–100 inhabitants.³⁷⁰ The Tikopia's nearest neighbours, the Anuta, were located 70 miles away by sea.³⁷¹ Each important house in Tikopia had a special link to the Anuta, either through friendship or kinship.³⁷² In each Tikopia village, a cluster of households of the same clan predominated numerically and politically, as the local chief originated from one of these houses. Every house or *paito* in Tikopia had a personal name, which was also a lineage name.³⁷³

Regarding subsistence, the Tikopia mainly relied on Stone Age technology, although they had already adopted steel axes and other European goods at the time of ethnographic observation.³⁷⁴ All members of a house worked in the gardens and orchards, where the Tikopia grew taro, coconuts, breadfruit, and bananas. Tikopia primarily relied on starchy foods and the only source of protein intake were hunted birds and fish. While only men were allowed to fish offshore (for which a commoner could borrow a chief's canoe), women collected and trapped seafood in the shallow coastal waters. Apart from cats, which the Tikopia domesticated from those left by white men to protect food and clothes from being eaten by rats, the Tikopia lacked other domestic animals. Although most of the food was produced, prepared and consumed within a household, gift transactions of staple foods between neighbours and kin, as well as gifts from commoners to chiefs, were common practices among the Tikopia (see Fig. 6).

Among the Tikopia the chiefly dwellings were not significantly different from other houses in terms of their construction, nor in the types of items stored within either chiefly or commoner houses.³⁷⁵ Chiefs and the members of their household – which could include several wives and their children – were not detached from production, but cultivated their gardens. Among the Tikopia, 'prestige goods were held by most families and therefore were not insignia of rank'.³⁷⁶ The most marked differences between Tikopia houses related to religious affairs, which created dependency. As Firth noted, 'some are in close relation with important gods, others are dependent upon these for their contact with the higher supranatural powers.'³⁷⁷ To maintain these power relationships, an ideological barrier was imposed on marriage between chiefs and commoners, which shows than strict descent rules, alongside unequal access to

³⁶⁶ Sahlins 1968, 49.

³⁶⁷ Malinowski 1922; Brunton 1975; Friedman – Rowlands 1977.

³⁶⁸ Renfrew 1986.

³⁶⁹ Firth 1983, 21–22.

³⁷⁰ Firth 1959; Firth 1983.

³⁷¹ Firth 1983, 20, 357–358. The sea served as the only form of communication outside Tikopia territory.

³⁷² Firth 1983, 357–358.

³⁷³ Upon Firth's follow-up visit to Tikopia in the 1950s, he noticed that although they had adopted a western approach to the classification of houses (e.g. with a street name and a number) they retained their residential naming system, addressing the house site and its members with the same name (Firth 1959), which demonstrated the persistent importance of conical clan organization among the Tikopia.

³⁷⁴ Firth 1983.

³⁷⁵ Firth 1983, 358–361.

³⁷⁶ Sahlins 1958, 81.

³⁷⁷ Firth 1983, 359.




Fig. 6 Food and kinship among the Tikopia (after Firth 1983, tab. II)

supernatural powers, outweighed negligible differences in wealth between the chiefly and commoner ranks among the Tikopia.

In contrast to the Tikopia, Hawaiian chiefdoms with a conical clan structure had a population of 100,000 members scattered across five inhabited islands of different sizes.³⁷⁸ The Hawaiian chiefdom was divided into three ranks – the paramount chief and his principal advisors; local ‘stewards’, who undertook the administrative tasks; and the commoners.³⁷⁹ Despite the three ranks, Hawaiian chiefdoms were divided into two economic classes.³⁸⁰ The two chiefly ranks controlled the construction of irrigation complexes and agricultural production by commoners, whose rights to land depended entirely on chiefs, and the households of the latter depended entirely on commoners for reproduction.³⁸¹ Although Tikopia commoners were equally dependent on chiefs to claim rights to land, unlike the Hawaiian chiefs, the Tikopia chiefs partook in the production of subsistence items.³⁸²

The two different cases highlight possible socio-economic differences between chiefdoms organized in a conical clan.³⁸³ On the one hand, among the Tikopia, the two ranks – the chiefly

³⁷⁸ Sahlins 1958.

³⁷⁹ Sahlins 1958, 13.

³⁸⁰ Earle 1978.

³⁸¹ Earle 1978.

³⁸² Firth 1959; Firth 1983.

³⁸³ The chosen ethnographic examples for displaying the models of chiefdoms with conical clan structure and chiefdoms with unilineal descent groups mostly comprise island societies. Particular to island societies is the presence of environmental circumscription, which may have triggered ecological specialization, warfare and, consequently, the emergence of chiefdoms for the redistribution of goods (although environmental circumscription is not exclusively an island particularity and can also exist in other contexts) (Carneiro 1981; Carneiro 1988; Carneiro 2012). There are two reasons for choosing the Hawaii and Tikopia examples (for chiefdoms with conical clan structure) and the Trobriand Islands (for chiefdoms with unilineal descent groups)

and the commoner rank – did not materialize in subsistence practices, and only recently manifested in the prohibition of marriage between the two ranks. Both ranks were involved in production, and the commoners could claim some kinship links to the chiefly rank since the prohibition of marriage between members of the chiefly and commoner ranks was a recent phenomenon.³⁸⁴ By contrast, Hawaiian chiefdoms comprised three ranks, of which only the upper two ranks – the members of the paramount chief’s household and the households of local chiefs – could trace kinship to each other, whereas the commoners were not linked to them by kinship.³⁸⁵ The same division corresponded to the division between the producers and the rulers, and therefore the Hawaiian case clearly supports the claim that ‘the alienation of the worker from his product was a general condition long before its notoriety in capitalism’.³⁸⁶

One possible way to achieve the alienation of the worker from his product appears when the elite ideology of kinship excludes or differs entirely from that of the commoners. Therefore, once the kinship links between the chiefs and commoners can no longer be traced, the two initially ideological ranks – previously manifested only through differences in quantity rather than quality (e.g. Tikopia) – then manifest in the quality and quantity (e.g. Hawaii) of reproductive techniques. This includes the possession of prestige goods and involvement in daily productive activities, such as gardening and crafts. However, the differences between Polynesian chiefdoms were already obvious to Firth, who argued that ‘the fortune-hunter is not a type in Tikopia society, even to the extent to which he appears to exist in Ontong Java or the Trobriands’.³⁸⁷

II.1.5. Chiefdoms with a Unilineal Descent Structure: Our Chief Inherits, Accumulates, and Distributes

Although Sahlins treated the conical clan as ‘the main strategy of chiefdom social organization’³⁸⁸ in Polynesia, he understood that chiefdoms organized in unilineal descent systems without primogeniture could be internally stratified in Indonesia³⁸⁹ and elsewhere.³⁹⁰ A well-documented example of the latter – a chiefdom without a conical clan – can be drawn from the Trobriand Islands, where society was organized in matrilineal descent groups.³⁹¹ These were split into chiefly and commoner ranks based on participation or the lack thereof in

for presentation of these two theoretical models. The first stems from the rich ethnographic descriptions and well-researched cases alongside the achieved anthropological excellence in modelling these societies. The second reason for choosing these island examples stems from the empirical archaeological data used in this study. The Aegean basin not only comprises land on each side of the Aegean Sea, where Platia Magoula Zarkou and Çukuriçi Höyük are located, but also the Cycladic Islands and other smaller islands between the Balkan and Anatolian peninsulas. These islands were already colonized during the EBA, and given that obsidian from the Cycladic island of Melos reached both Çukuriçi Höyük and Platia Magoula Zarkou during the Neolithic and the Bronze Age, it is evident that dwellers on each side of the Aegean Sea in some way depended on or interacted with the dwellers on these island sites. Therefore, the incorporation of ethnographic examples of island sites corresponds to the empirical data in a wider, regional sense. It should be understood, however, that the ideal type of a chiefdom with conical clan organization or a chiefdom with unilineal descent is by no means confined to islands. The ethnographic cases such as the *gumsa* principle among the Kachin in highland Burma (Leach 1954) and the Inca conical clan (Kirchhoff 1949; Kirchhoff 1955; Jenkins 2001) are representative examples of societies with a conical clan structure existing on the ‘mainland’, in contrast to the island examples discussed in more detail in this section.

³⁸⁴ Firth 1983.

³⁸⁵ Sahlins 1958.

³⁸⁶ Graeber – Sahlins 2017, 16.

³⁸⁷ Firth 1983, 373.

³⁸⁸ Sahlins 1968, 49.

³⁸⁹ Sahlins 1958.

³⁹⁰ Malinowski 1922.

³⁹¹ Malinowski 1922; Malinowski 1929; Malinowski 1935.

the long-distance exchange of prestige objects by local Trobriand Islands chiefs from which commoners were excluded.³⁹² In *kula*, the prestige objects were exchanged over long distances in multiple directions. The spondylus shell necklaces were exchanged in a clockwise direction, white corus shells were exchanged in an anti-clockwise direction.³⁹³ These objects were exchanged by seafaring, for which the chief mobilized the commoners to construct the largest canoes with the most magic involved in production as well as during the expedition.³⁹⁴ During Malinowski's fieldwork in Kiriwina on the Trobriand Islands, he described the insignificant yet previously important exchange of boar tusks and greenstone adze axes between local Trobriand chiefs (see Fig. 7).³⁹⁵




Fig. 7 Reconstruction of ceremonial (*kula*) and non-ceremonial exchange routes between the Trobriand Islands (Brunton 1975, fig. 1)

Writing from the Omarkana perspective, the ‘capital village’ or chiefly village of Kiriwina Island, Malinowski noted that the ceremonial gift exchanges of prestige objects that were not locally produced generated chiefly prestige.³⁹⁶ Kiriwina Island, located at the northern edge of *kula* exchange, was in a marginal position within the *kula* network,³⁹⁷ which supports the

³⁹² Malinowski 1922.

³⁹³ Malinowski 1922, 81–104, map V.

³⁹⁴ Malinowski 1922, 100–104.

³⁹⁵ Malinowski 1922, 201, 207, 378, 482, 499.

³⁹⁶ Malinowski 1922.

³⁹⁷ Brunton 1975.

spread of chiefdoms throughout the Trobriand Islands through peer-polity interaction³⁹⁸ or so-called ‘competitive emulation’. Although the commoners on Kiriwina and other islands were excluded from this ceremonial exchange, they assisted their local chief in the construction of large canoes for long-distance sea voyages, and by their tribute of yams to the chief at each harvest.

The power of the chief at Omarakana extended to villages throughout the island, but not beyond it.³⁹⁹ The chief’s dwelling, alongside his yam storage house, dancing and burial grounds, was located in the centre of Omarakana village. The chief’s house and storage were both considerably larger than the other village structures, although the ‘chief’s personal dwelling is built like an ordinary house’,⁴⁰⁰ from the same materials and with the same internal organization. More than half of the village was occupied by the chief and his family. However, the settlement and the village society at Omarakana were divided into three parts: the chief and the chief’s wives, who occupied section A–B; the chief’s maternal kinsmen in section A–C; and the commoners who were not related to the chief in section B–C (see Fig. 8). Malinowski explains that this composition was only possible because the descent at Kiriwina was matrilineal, whereas post-marital residence at Kiriwina was avunculocal (a couple resided with husband’s mother’s brother after marriage), and only the chief enjoyed the privilege of polygamy.⁴⁰¹ Therefore, the chief’s kin network, extended through polygamy, was much larger than that of the rest of the community. Through it, the chief of Omarakana pooled and mobilized more goods and labour than any other household on the island as, due to well-established kinship obligations, each wife was entitled to receive goods from her maternal male kinsmen at harvest as well as on ceremonial occasions (e.g. the birth of a child). The chief’s affinal privileges (e.g. multiple wives) were therefore one of the reasons for the accumulation of wealth on the Trobriands, since at each harvest the chief’s wives received taro from their brothers, which were stored in the central chiefly storage house and used for financing local ceremonies and *kula* expeditions, which reflected the chief’s hereditary socio-political power.⁴⁰²

Daily life at Omarakana was centred around the household, composed of a husband, wife, and their children. They cultivated their gardens and prepared meals on a household level, and consumed food within the house. However, much of daily life took place outside the village, and these activities were commonly gendered. While women cooked and collected shellfish, timber, and wild fruits, men built canoes, engaged in fishing and hunting, and occasionally embarked on voyages overseas. Both men and women shared the responsibility of raising children. Men generally did not engage in cooking, but there were exceptions to the rule. Men participated in cooking taro or sago in large clay pots at harvesting time for ceremonial prestige, or out of necessity during the sea voyages, in the absence of women.⁴⁰³

In this first section of the chapter, I focused mainly on sedentary, tribal, non-state constellations, leaving out more mobile groups, such as hunter-gatherer societies and nomadic tribes, which, from the empirical outset, would have been less likely to occupy the settlements of Çukuriçi Höyük and Platia Magoula Zarkou during the EBA. I aimed to highlight differences between different ideal tribal constellations among sedentary non-state societies, as outlined from a presentist model-type understanding and supported by up-to-date encyclopaedia entries. Instead of treating these models as evolutionary stages, I showed the structural and socio-economic differences between different models of tribal societies in non-literate settings. I fully agree with Lawrence Rosen, who proposed:

³⁹⁸ Renfrew 1986.

³⁹⁹ Malinowski 1929.

⁴⁰⁰ Malinowski 1929, 22.

⁴⁰¹ Malinowski 1929.

⁴⁰² Malinowski 1922; Malinowski 1935.

⁴⁰³ Malinowski 1929.




Fig. 8 Omarakana village plan (Malinowski 1935, fig. 2 reproduced in Mosko 2013, fig. 2)

‘If we think of tribes as a family of sociopolitical forms, it may not be in their structural manifestations but in the capabilities that allow them to adapt to varied circumstances that their distinctive features may be found.’⁴⁰⁴

He also suggested that contemporary anthropologists must disengage from the negative discourse about tribes, which today is largely mobilized for political means that portray tribes as violent, backward, immoral, anti-state systems.⁴⁰⁵ Although archaeologists are welcome to join this important anthropological stance in understanding tribes as a family of socio-organizational concepts rather than an apparent threat to the state, I see another important reason why research on tribes should remain on the archaeological agenda. This concerns the issue of non-state imagined communities, which was the case for most of the ethnographically documented non-state constellations, although rarely discussed as such. From the vast body of ethnographic literature, it appears that these sedentary, ‘post-Neolithic’ communities have always associated themselves with polities larger than a household or a village, and maintained

⁴⁰⁴ Rosen 2016, 3.

⁴⁰⁵ For an overview of the negative discourse regarding tribes, including state officials and columnists in liberal magazines, see Rosen 2016.

different levels of political (de)centralization, suitable to their subsistence strategies and socio-ecological landscape. While the boundaries of these non-state imagined communities cannot be drawn easily, such perceptions may encourage researchers to ask why and how any archaeologically visible (permeable) boundaries, which in some cases stretch over a particular region well beyond an archaeological trench, can emerge.

Taking this as a starting point, the socio-economic, political and religious relations observed in non-literate polities of 20th century Melanesia or elsewhere – remote from states – should remain valid when discussing prehistoric material, including the Early Bronze Age Aegean basin. Similar types of socio-economic relations as those described above, played a crucial role in building imagined non-state Bronze Age communities, here addressed as tribes, inherently different from those of states supported by print capitalism. However, it remains possible that the social organization during the EBA in the Aegean basin was inherently different from the models described above. Therefore, the possibility of a model that left no traces within the ethnographic record but could be inferred from the prehistoric archaeological record must remain open.

Concerning the archaeological material, it should also be noted that the initial enthusiasm about Renfrew's work regarding the simplicity of identifying chiefdoms in prehistory compared to more decentralized tribal constellations, has since vanished. Today, scholars outside the Aegean basin prehistory agree that some early temples that emerged with chiefdoms 'were so non-standardized that it can be difficult to identify them'.⁴⁰⁶ Moreover, the emergence of the centralized socio-political constellation can no longer be reduced to the increase of population, production of agricultural surplus, or people accumulating shells or pigs, since the 'inequality is orchestrated'.⁴⁰⁷ A tiny minority of persons – with or without a conductor – that constituted the initial orchestra of staging inequality through the possession of supernatural skills, bravery, or crafting expertise, will therefore remain obscure if we do not consult the ethnographic record. Firmly anchored centrality within chiefdoms was built into the structure of society rather than being based on personal achievement, the latter being an organizing principle of big man and great man societies. As we will see below, however, Renfrew's impact in *The Emergence of Civilization* attracted little or no attention to socio-political constellations other than chiefdoms during EBA 1 and 2 in the Aegean to date. Why this so and how have scholars inferred the social organization of the Aegean EBA 1 and 2 periods?

II.2. Anthropological Models of Social Organization in the EBA Aegean Basin

As already outlined in the introduction, asking questions regarding social organization in the Aegean is not a novel attempt. Therefore, the second section of this chapter presents an overview of similar published attempts in order to avoid the same pitfalls in this study. Since the 1970s, when Colin Renfrew proposed the emergence of chiefdoms as an entirely internal, Aegean phenomenon,⁴⁰⁸ scholars today agree that most Early Bronze Age sites were organized in chiefdoms. As I show in this section, these conclusions lie in the shadows of neoevolutionary theories, implying that chiefdoms should necessarily precede the Aegean Middle Bronze Age early states, and succeed or replace the Neolithic village-based farming societies, as the theoretical model predicts. Based on such unchanged predispositions, Renfrew, in his republished version of *The Emergence of Civilization*, himself noted that understanding of the later Bronze Ages has advanced significantly since his publication, whereas the advancements in

⁴⁰⁶ Flannery – Marcus 2012, 229.

⁴⁰⁷ Flannery – Marcus 2012, 206.

⁴⁰⁸ Renfrew 1972.

connection with the Early Bronze Age have been fewer in number.⁴⁰⁹ As I will show in the section that follows, the limited advances regarding the EBA social organization could be due to theoretical rather than empirical reasons. Almost fifty years after Renfrew's influential book, numerous Early Bronze Age sites have been excavated and provide new opportunities to draw fresh conclusions regarding the Early Bronze Age in the Aegean. However, alternative conclusions will continue to be viewed as far-fetched, if scholars are not willing to step away from the lens of neoevolutionary theories that haunt the Aegean Early Bronze Age I developments, as will be shown below.

The models of tribal social organization outlined above, however, have so far rarely been considered in such a form as for the present purpose. Instead, tribe as a stage in social evolution necessarily proceeding chiefdom on the evolutionary line, rather than as an ideal type of social organization, was taken as an undifferentiated unit of analysis against archaeological data. This issue has arisen in archaeologists' discussions of anthropological models: the topic of this section. In the 1970s, soon after the introduction of the neoevolutionist classification of societies along the line of band, tribe, chiefdom, state,⁴¹⁰ processual archaeologists began to make use of this classification in the Aegean. Pioneering work on the socio-political organization of the Early Bronze Age Aegean argued that the development of chiefdoms⁴¹¹ in Europe would date back to this period.⁴¹² Heavily inspired by neoevolutionist theories, Renfrew attempted to understand the social organization which predated Mycenaean (2600–1100 BC) and Minoan (1600–1100 BC) civilization, the early states in the Aegean World.

Renfrew studied EBA metal objects as a valuable archaeological marker of rank and craft specialization. By assessing the presence or absence of metal objects from the mostly mortuary assemblage and their importance for regional exchange, he concluded that metal-using cultures in the EBA Aegean were socially differentiated by rank, and therefore organized in either individualizing or group-oriented chiefdoms.⁴¹³ Moreover, he supported this evidence by analysing subsistence practices, which, he argued, changed during the EBA from small-scale and self-sustainable (Domestic Mode of Production) to the *Mediterranean polyculture*, which is distributive in nature and relies on three main crops: wheat, olives, and grapes (as opposed to the reliance on pulses and cereals in the previous phases).⁴¹⁴ The third body of evidence supporting the existence of chiefdoms in the EBA was the evidence for settlement hierarchy and monumental architecture (e.g. fortifications, palace-like structures, and the division between larger sites/central places and smaller sites/peripheries), which also emerged during this period.⁴¹⁵

Renfrew's seminal work *The Emergence of Civilisation: The Cyclades and the Aegean in the Third Millennium BC*⁴¹⁶ provided 'an important synthesis – certainly the most important of its kind for several decades'.⁴¹⁷ The book has remained influential and its reprinted version

⁴⁰⁹ Renfrew 2011 [1972], xli.

⁴¹⁰ Sahlins 1961; Service 1962; Sahlins 1963; Fried 1967; Sahlins 1968; Service 1971; Service 1975; Fried 1975.

⁴¹¹ Renfrew and other processual archaeologists followed the model of chiefdom social organization developed by Service 1962 and Sahlins 1968. For the specific characteristics of a chiefdom and a tribe, see Tab. 1 (after Sahlins 1968).

⁴¹² Renfrew 1972.

⁴¹³ Renfrew 1972. Technology as the prime mover of social change was first proposed by Morgan, and taken for granted by many Marxist scholars. Morgan was the first to classify metalworking societies as being at the advanced stage of barbarism. Childe instead argued that metalworking was the key reason for the breakdown in kinship relationships that had united Neolithic societies, and replaced them with class-based societies, since the metallurgists were the earliest class of full-time specialists in the Old World.

⁴¹⁴ Renfrew 1972.

⁴¹⁵ Renfrew 1972.

⁴¹⁶ Renfrew 1972.

⁴¹⁷ Wheeler 1972, 327.

(without revision) saw the light of day in 2011.⁴¹⁸ Subsequent studies have often confirmed Renfrew's contribution. Researchers argued that the EBA evidence at Troy is a perfect example of 'a fully developed chiefdom'⁴¹⁹ and claimed that the period between the 6th and the 3rd millennium BC in the entire region of western Asia can be perceived as a period of transition from 'egalitarian' to stratified societies.⁴²⁰ However, this simplistic view, denying the diversity of social organization within a large geographical region over a long period of time, did not hold for long. Proponents of processual archaeology had not considered the assessment of the EBA Aegean societies through a less rigidly stratified tribal social organization, but instead reached a consensus that it must have been organized in chiefdoms.⁴²¹ This consensus may have been reached due to the very limited pool of evidence (prior to new evidence collected from excavations from the 1970s onwards), focused primarily on domestic architecture at Troy in western Anatolia and Lerna on the mainland Aegean, as well as mortuary evidence from the Cyclades. The second explanation for these outcomes can be assigned to the neoevolutionist theoretical predisposition, in which scholars searched for predecessors of states (implying a necessary continuity between chiefdoms and states), instead of taking local histories as the main focus of study.

A decade later, instead of the initial three, seven categories of archaeological evidence were used to re-assess social organization in the EBA Aegean. In his study, Pullen⁴²² assessed eight categories for social inequality: ranking of the individual, corporate groups, occupation or craft specialization, architectural variation, access to resources and goods, agriculture, trade and exchange, and regional and administrative hierarchies.⁴²³ The outcomes of this research disproved Renfrew's Mediterranean theory of polyculture and refuted the evidence for metallurgical or other kinds of specialization, but supported a two-level hierarchy in which smaller sites were dominated by larger sites during EBA 2.⁴²⁴ A comparison of these results revealed three major shortcomings of Renfrew's research: 1) the absence of comprehensive empirical testing within the narrow region, 2) an overreliance on neoevolutionary theory proposing development along the band-tribe-chiefdom-state model (and therefore arriving at the conclusion that chiefdoms preceded the early states in the Aegean), and 3) the reliance on a system model in which social organization was relegated to a subsystem.⁴²⁵

The post-processual turn, which followed the New Archaeology/Processual Archaeology phase in the late 1980s, left little room for pursuing further any research based on neoevolutionary theory, or on models derived from it. Instead, post-processual archaeologists called for the prioritization of research on local practices and individual agency in a particular (pre) historic context, alongside the interpretative archaeology of symbolic meaning.⁴²⁶ Therefore,

⁴¹⁸ Renfrew 2011 [1972].

⁴¹⁹ Eslick 1988, 39, herself referring to Renfrew 1972.

⁴²⁰ Eslick 1988, 10.

⁴²¹ Renfrew 1972; Eslick 1988.

⁴²² Pullen 1985, 369.

⁴²³ In this follow-up study, the ranking of the individual was addressed through mortuary data, which confirmed differences in wealth in EBA Greece. Corporate groups were assessed through the analysis of tombs and cemeteries, in which a nuclear family or, in some cases, larger groups were represented. Occupation or craft specialization was analysed through metallurgical, seal, and construction technologies, for which data was scarce, and showed little evidence for full-time specialists. Architectural variations identified through the assessment of buildings indicated both domestic (mostly houses) and 'industrial' structures. Access to resources and goods, according to the assessment of metals and obsidian, has proven to be highly differentiated during the EBA. Research on agriculture provided no support for a distributive *Mediterranean polyculture* (as previously proposed by Renfrew), but regional and administrative hierarchies were addressed by the size of sites, which showed a two-level system of administration in which larger sites controlled the smaller ones (Pullen 1985).

⁴²⁴ Pullen 1985.

⁴²⁵ Pullen 1985.

⁴²⁶ Hodder 1985. Hodder's 1980s intervention of historical particularism in archaeology can be compared to Boas' intervention in anthropology that disrupted and transformed the discipline at the beginning of the 20th century.

the majority of archaeologists abandoned approaches of cross-cultural comparison and engagement with neoevolutionary theories to discuss social evolution,⁴²⁷ and instead embraced interpretative, agent-focused archaeological investigations. This aversion to neoevolutionary theory also coincided with the abandonment of analytical concepts such as tribe (though less so ‘chiefdom’) within prehistoric archaeology. However, as I argue in this section, for the sake of cross-cultural comparison and the advancement of anthropological and archaeological theory, the models of non-state social organization should find their place (albeit in a revised version) within the post-processual archaeological agenda, and even more so now in the context of an ontological turn within both disciplines.

Beyond any means of cross-cultural comparison and theoretical advancements, the ideal types of tribes may remain useful when conducting the site-based analysis. To show this, I will look at both some major site-based and region-based conclusions regarding the EBA 1 and 2 social organization on both sides of the Aegean basin. First, I will discuss the sites relevant to my first case study, namely the EBA 1 site of Çukuriçi Höyük, and what type of socio-political organization has previously been inferred from other EBA 1 settlements in the region. Then, I summarize some major conclusions relevant to my second study, namely Platia Magoula Zarkou. In the latter case, I discuss the developments on the Thessalian plain during the EBA 1 and 2 period, to highlight some major differences between the two periods. These are relevant to the contextualization of EBA 1 in the Aegean basin more broadly, beyond western Anatolia, and the immediate comparison of Platia Magoula Zarkou’s EBA 2 layers to other contemporaneous EBA 2 Thessalian sites.

Social Organization in EBA 1 Western Anatolia

First, let us have a look at the EBA 1 developments in discussing social organization relevant to a few EBA 1 sites in western Anatolia. Since the paradigmatic shift from processual to post-processual archaeology, Renfrew’s theory of EBA Aegean chiefdoms has been vigorously challenged. Contemporary scholars agree that EBA Anatolia is not a single entity, and therefore can no longer be analysed by sweeping generalizations.⁴²⁸ Today, an even stronger emphasis is being placed on the distinction between the three main subperiods within EBA 1: EBA 1 early, EBA 1 middle, and EBA 1 late.⁴²⁹ In EBA 1 western Anatolia, scholars have already proposed the emergence of the EBA 1 ‘cultural koine’ organized in chiefdoms, whereas other site-based analyses have argued for either the existence of chiefdoms or more ‘egalitarian societies’. In this first section, I show how useless the idea of egalitarianism or ‘egalitarian’ social organization becomes if we do not identify between whom and how ‘egalitarian’ relations were established at the EBA 1 sites in western Anatolia, or elsewhere. The latter point, as well as the usefulness of site-based household archaeology for discussing social organization at EBA 1 western Anatolian sites, will be derived from the extensive research on the Troy I settlement. As the third point in this section, an important question is being raised regarding Ourania Kouka’s internally heterogeneous uniformity within the EBA 1 western Anatolian ‘cultural koine’ and the increasing popularity of heterarchical social organization within archaeological literature.

New excavations in the western Anatolian and the eastern Aegean islands since 1970⁴³⁰ and comparison of these finds provided additional information and significantly contributed to our

⁴²⁷ After the 1980s, exceptions to the above rule are best represented in the work of Kent Flannery, Keith Wright and Timothy Earle.

⁴²⁸ Algaze 1999; Kouka 2002; Çevik 2007; Özdoğan 2011; Kouka 2013; Fidan et al. 2015.

⁴²⁹ Sahoğlu 2005.

⁴³⁰ These sites comprise of ‘extensively excavated sites, such as Poliochni and Myrina on Lemnos, Thermi on Lesbos, Heraion on Samos, Palamari on Skyros, Troy, Liman Tepe and Bakla Tepe, as well as less extensively excavated sites, such as Skala Sotiros and Limenaria on Thasos, Mikro Vouni on Samothrace, Koukonissi on

understanding of both differences and similarities within this ‘region’. These excavations also drew attention away from Troy, which nevertheless remains a prime site for research on the EBA period. Scholars have demonstrated differences in EBA 1 ceramics between the Anatolian inland and coastal sites,⁴³¹ as well as different settlement patterns in these two ecologically different environments.⁴³² Kouka proposed that at the beginning of EBA 1, the coastal sites of western Anatolia and the northern and eastern Aegean islands represented a ‘cultural koine’,⁴³³ a ‘cultural uniformity in terms of political and economic structures and social dynamics’,⁴³⁴ different from its hinterlands. Scholars meanwhile extended Renfrew’s idea of the EBA 2 ‘international spirit’⁴³⁵ to the Izmir region during EBA 1. They identified it as a common marketplace and a bridge for the transfer of goods, ideas, and technologies between culturally different areas, leading to ‘internationalization’ during the EBA.⁴³⁶

A recent reassessment of Troy I architecture has contested the long-held interpretation of the site as a chiefdom during EBA 1. The EBA 1 layers at Troy I, dating to the beginning of the 3rd millennium BC, have so far been interpreted in multiple, contrasting ways. In the 1950s, C. W. Blegen⁴³⁷ identified House 102 at Troy I as a free-standing, special building, the so-called ‘Megaron’, also seen at later Troy II and other EBA 2 Aegean sites (e.g. Lerna’s House of Tiles).⁴³⁸ Christine Eslick,⁴³⁹ closely following Renfrew, interpreted Troy I as a fully developed chiefdom, based on the evidence of House 102 as the ‘Megaron’ and the enclosure wall surrounding the settlement. Maria Ivanova,⁴⁴⁰ who recently conducted household archaeology at Troy, showed that House 102 was not free-standing but rather an attached building, which did not differ from other houses in domestic activities or internal arrangement. This led her to conclude that Troy I represents a homogeneous community with an ‘egalitarian ethos’,⁴⁴¹ without any specification of what ‘egalitarian’ stands for.

Ivanova does not limit her interpretation to the EBA 1 settlement of Troy I but stretches it to the whole of western Anatolia: ‘The vernacular pattern at Troy I and other contemporary sites in western Anatolia implies homogeneous communities of economically uniform households with low privacy requirements and an egalitarian ethos.’⁴⁴² This example may serve as an excellent case study in which household archaeology can provide new results for evaluating the social organization at a specific site. At the same time, it should be taken into account

Lemnos, Emporio on Chios, Asomatos on Rhodes, Beşik-Yassı Tepe, Yeşilova, Çeşme-Bağlararası, Çukuriçi Höyük, Miletus, Tavşan-Adası and Iasos’ (Kouka 2014, 43).

⁴³¹ Efe 1988; Fidan et al. 2015.

⁴³² Düring 2011.

⁴³³ Kouka 2013, 576. The term ‘cultural koine’ has so far not been contested within archaeological literature, despite being borrowed from linguistics, where it denotes a standard language or dialect that has arisen as a result of contact between two groups speaking different dialects of the same language.

⁴³⁴ Kouka 2013, 117.

⁴³⁵ Renfrew 1972. Given that there were no ‘nations’ at the time, the use of the term ‘international spirit’ (Renfrew 1972) is also misleading for this period. It downplays the fact that in non-state societies people also commonly exchange things beyond their tribal boundaries. The existence of regional, inter-tribal exchange, however, does not mean that there was an ‘international spirit’ as in nation-states or associated institutions that enabled or downplayed these trading interactions. Instead, it seems more appropriate to speak of wider regional, cross- or inter-regional interactions, be they trans-maritime or cross- and inter-continental interactions, without nation-based institutions such as the market, yet with primitive money and a differentiated value of goods, some of which were exchanged more widely than others during this period.

⁴³⁶ Şahoğlu 2008.

⁴³⁷ Blegen et al. 1950, 92.

⁴³⁸ For a more detailed discussion of the contrasting interpretation of House 102 at Troy I and its settlement pattern, see Ivanova 2013; Ivanova 2016.

⁴³⁹ Eslick 1988, 39, by referring to Renfrew’s earlier interpretation.

⁴⁴⁰ Ivanova 2013; Ivanova 2016.

⁴⁴¹ Ivanova 2016, 31.

⁴⁴² Ivanova 2013, 31.

that such site-based results, generated through household archaeology, cannot and should not necessarily be seen as representing the development in the entire region. Is Troy I necessarily a representative case for the whole of EBA 1 western Anatolia? How can we support such a claim and what is it based on? Without addressing these immediate questions to understand its predisposition, it remains challenging to advance generalized claims about the wider region based on the site-based, household archaeology of a particular settlement, without a multi-scalar approach. Therefore, more precautions should be taken in how far we can go with the interpretation of regional developments, beyond the primary site of interest, based on results generated through household archaeology. It may be more constructive to understand site-based analyses and results as complementary or refining, rather than immediately disproving the major regional developments, having the potential to highlight diversity within a region and to outline unequal developments within the overall, seemingly homogeneous yet internally heterogeneous, trajectory.

According to Ivanova, major changes in settlement architecture at Troy and elsewhere appeared during the mid-3rd millennium BC, at Troy II and other EBA 2 sites, which ‘coincide with important social changes. An ‘élite’ form of the long-room structure, the so-called megaron, emerged at this time from the traditional dwelling.’⁴⁴³ Another line of evidence, looking at the indicators and amount of trade in EBA 1/2 Troy, also suggested that this site did not play a major role in long-distance trade during this period.⁴⁴⁴ Therefore, it is highly plausible that an ‘egalitarian’ organization emerged at Troy before the mid-3rd millennium BC, when direct connections were established with Mesopotamian elites. This resulted in sudden changes in the socio-political organization, and the establishment of Trojan elites during the EBA 2 period.⁴⁴⁵

In this context, it is evident that the term ‘egalitarian’ is used as a marker of the absence of social stratification or inequality, but being ‘egalitarian’ remains an extremely vague term when discussing the internal characteristics of social organization. In this context, authors do not refer to ‘egalitarian’ hunter-gatherer groups but to ‘egalitarian’ sedentary communities dependent on farming, and they specify little with regard to why these societies are ‘egalitarian’. By ‘egalitarian’, they do not refer to politically more-or-less centralized chiefdoms but to decentralized entities, possibly tribes. It seems obvious that the term tribe, which may shed more light on the actual social organization of these sites, is often avoided at all costs. A good example of such avoidance is the description of Troy I, where it has been argued that ‘residential units possibly had similar requirements, were equal in their position, and therefore produced dwellings with nearly identical form, size, and internal arrangement’.⁴⁴⁶ This description of the archaeological evidence evokes without reference Durkheim’s mechanical solidarity⁴⁴⁷ or Sahlins’s Domestic Mode of Production,⁴⁴⁸ principles that could only be examined if a tribe is considered as a basic type of social organization. The way in which Ivanova uses the term

⁴⁴³ Ivanova 2013, 31.

⁴⁴⁴ Ünlüsoy 2016.

⁴⁴⁵ Ünlüsoy 2016.

⁴⁴⁶ Ivanova 2016, 46.

⁴⁴⁷ Durkheim 1968 [1893]. Emile Durkheim laid the foundations for the discussion of social organization at the end of the 19th century. In his seminal doctoral thesis, published in 1893, he theorized about two types of solidarity, *mechanical* and *organic*, based on differences in the population and the division of labour. According to Durkheim, *mechanical societies* are those in which members share common values through segmentary integration. Mechanical societies commonly have low populations and material density, and have collective authority. In turn, the strong division of labour, which demands the integration of members with different values, characterizes *organic societies*. These commonly operate through a market economy, allowing high population densities, and priority within organic societies is given to an individual rather than collective action (Durkheim 1968 [1893]). Unlike Morgan, who treated technology as the main driver of change, Durkheim argued that *population growth* and the *division of labour* are the main drivers toward increasing complexity and the development of organic societies.

⁴⁴⁸ Sahlins 1972.

‘egalitarian’ does not make clear in relation to what these domestic units were ‘egalitarian’. The question of whether egalitarianism at EBA 1 Troy refers to ‘egalitarian’ relations between subunits (i.e. households), between generations, or between different genders that belonged to these subunits, remains unanswered.

In the Izmir region, at Liman Tepe, architectural evidence for the existence of ‘elite populations, possibly chiefs’⁴⁴⁹ has been identified in EBA 2, which in this region dates to a few centuries before the mid-3rd millennium BC, around 2700 BC. The evidence for a chiefdom was ascribed to a large building complex located in the courtyard, surrounded by rectangular storage rooms.⁴⁵⁰ A similar interpretation has been inferred from a brief comparison of the small western Anatolian EBA 2 sites, which were supposedly administered by a chief, but apart from the chief’s office, no other religious or administrative classes are reflected in the archaeological record.⁴⁵¹ If compared to the record at Troy, then chiefdoms in the Izmir region preceded the development of chiefdoms in Troy by several centuries. Although this is fairly feasible, the conclusions for Liman Tepe are based exclusively on the interpretation of architecture, whereas at Troy the architecture has been analysed alongside the interiors of the houses. Research from Troy showed that the rooms once interpreted as a ‘megaron’ by the excavator, and later referred to as the seat of the chief, were actually a household structure accommodating one family, which, in its internal composition, was not different from other houses.⁴⁵² This case reveals the considerable advantage of household archaeology approaches for interpreting the social organization at EBA 1 sites. Research at Çukuriçi Höyük, which supposedly belongs to the EBA ‘cultural koine’ of western Anatolia and the northern and eastern Aegean islands,⁴⁵³ can potentially highlight the differences and similarities in the socio-political organization within the ‘cultural koine’ and the Izmir region itself.

Before we proceed to the next section on discussing the social organization in EBA 1 and 2 on the Thessalian plain, it is important to summarize three main conclusions stemming from this section. The first point regards the potential for advancements but also drawbacks of household archaeology. Based on the example of Troy I, it is evident that household archaeology and site-based analysis of domestic architecture and domestic activities may generate new results, refuting older interpretations. However, these new interpretations should, to an extent, remain site-based rather than generalized conclusions applicable to the entire region or period. Second, accepting that household archaeology at Troy I refuted the existence of a chiefdom at this site and instead proposed an ‘egalitarian ethos’, we should establish how and between whom the ‘egalitarian’ ethos was established at a particular site. Equating household activities does not necessarily imply egalitarian relations within households, as becomes evident if we take ethnographic accounts of ‘tribes’ into consideration (see Chapters II and VII). Third, the established EBA 1 littoral ‘cultural koine’, evident from the eastern Aegean islands and western Anatolia,⁴⁵⁴ can be further explored, to address what kind of heterogeneity existed between sites alongside ‘cultural uniformity’, seemingly reflected in both economic structures and socio-political organization, as argued by Ourania Kouka.⁴⁵⁵ Following these three interim remarks on research dealing with social organization in EBA 1 western Anatolia, let us now turn to the Thessalian plain.

⁴⁴⁹ Çevik – Sağır 2016, 270.

⁴⁵⁰ Çevik – Sağır 2016.

⁴⁵¹ Özdoğan 2006.

⁴⁵² Ivanova 2016.

⁴⁵³ Kouka 2013.

⁴⁵⁴ Kouka 2002; Kouka 2013; Kouka 2016a; Kouka 2016b.

⁴⁵⁵ Kouka 2013, 117.

Social Organization in the EBA 1/2 Thessalian Plain

This study's initial aim was to look beyond the EBA 1 Eastern Aegean and western Anatolian 'cultural koine' and compare the results from Çukuriçi Höyük to Platia Magoula Zarkou, located on the other side of the Aegean, outside the 'cultural koine'. But in the course of this research, it has turned out that the EBA settlement at Platia Magoula Zarkou dates to the later EBA 2 period, rather than the initially anticipated EBA 1 period. Therefore, Platia Magoula Zarkou EBA 2 layers and Çukuriçi Höyük EBA 1 layers are, unfortunately, not directly contemporary to each other. Since the start of our DOC-teamwork, doubts had been raised about the EBA 1 dating of the site. This dating was initially inferred from relative chronology: the macroscopic pottery analysis by the excavator, Kostas Gallis seemed to suggest it. However, Constanze Moser, who worked with EBA Platia Magoula Zarkou's pottery assemblage, has continuously voiced her concerns.⁴⁵⁶ The excavator, Kostas Gallis, initially proposed that the Platia Magoula Zarkou EBA layers relatively date to the earliest layers of the Early Helladic I/EBA 1 period.⁴⁵⁷ This relative chronological inference was made based upon the presence of rolled-rim bowls as well as bowls of the Bratislava type, pointing towards the participation of Platia Magoula Zarkou in the Aegean and Balkan networks and the site being supposedly contemporaneous to Late Chalcolithic Mikrothives and Early Helladic I Petromagoula in Thessaly.

The later dating of Platia Magoula Zarkou, to the mid-3rd millennium BC, has been attested through three different pools of data. The first one was the relative chronology of revisited pottery analysis from the site. According to the macroscopic analysis by my DOC-team colleague Constanze Moser, no Bratislava bowls have been attested at the site.⁴⁵⁸ Instead, Constanze at the time believed that the relative chronology at Platia Magoula Zarkou points towards the Early Helladic II period based on the attested sauceboats at the site, typical for the Early Helladic II period, dating to the mid-3rd millennium BC.

Constanze's doubts regarding the dating of Platia Magoula Zarkou's EBA layers have since been confirmed through ¹⁴C dating,⁴⁵⁹ showing that the site's occupation dates to the mid-3rd millennium BC,⁴⁶⁰ instead of the earliest centuries of the 3rd millennium BC initially proposed by the excavator.⁴⁶¹ As the third line of evidence, possible indicators of the later dating of the EBA Platia Magoula Zarkou settlement layers have also been confirmed through geophysical investigation surrounding the magoula. This investigation has confirmed the off-mound settlement and an enclosure surrounding the mound,⁴⁶² both being common features of the Early Helladic II period in the mainland Aegean. Therefore, the Early Bronze Age at Platia Magoula Zarkou does not date to Early Helladic I as initially proposed⁴⁶³ but to the Early Helladic II period, confirmed through the relative pottery chronology,⁴⁶⁴ ¹⁴C dating of animal bones,⁴⁶⁵ and geophysical prospection.⁴⁶⁶

As Platia Magoula Zarkou is located within modern-day mainland Greece (the Thessalian plain), it is important to understand the Bronze Age period as being based on distinct pottery groups, which span over three long periods: Early Helladic (EH), Middle Helladic, and Late

⁴⁵⁶ C. Moser, pers. comm 2017, 2018, 2019.

⁴⁵⁷ Gallis 1996.

⁴⁵⁸ C. Moser, pers. comm. 2019.

⁴⁵⁹ Weninger et al. 2022.

⁴⁶⁰ Weninger et al. 2022.

⁴⁶¹ Gallis 1996.

⁴⁶² Sarris et al. 2022, see Fig. 28 for visualization of some results generated through geophysical investigation at Platia Magoula Zarkou.

⁴⁶³ Gallis 1998.

⁴⁶⁴ C. Moser, pers. comm. 2019.

⁴⁶⁵ Weninger et al. 2022.

⁴⁶⁶ Sarris et al. 2022.

Helladic.⁴⁶⁷ These periods coincide with the Early Bronze Age, Middle Bronze Age, and Late Bronze Age in other regions. The EH period, which follows the Final Neolithic or Chalcolithic in the region,⁴⁶⁸ is further subdivided into EH I (3000–2700 BC), EH II (2700–2200 BC), and EH III (2200–2000 BC),⁴⁶⁹ also known as EBA 1, 2, and 3 in western Anatolia.⁴⁷⁰ EH I has been referred to as ‘enigmatic’ regarding social organization, due to the modest quantity and poor quality of finds related to this period in comparison to EH II, which often dominates the perception and interpretation of the whole Early Bronze Age on the Greek mainland.⁴⁷¹

Following a few initial remarks regarding the chronology of Platia Magoula Zarkou and its wider region, the following section summarizes the major claims useful for discussing social organization in both EBA 1/EH I and EBA 2/EH II in Thessaly and the wider mainland Aegean. The former, EH I period will serve as a comparative view of the EBA 1 developments in western Anatolia, whereas the latter, the EH II period, will serve as the main source for comparison of the EH II sites on the Thessalian plain and in the wider mainland Aegean. In this section, we conclude that the EH I layers on the Thessalian plain show little differentiation from Neolithic settlement layers. However, EH I sites in Thessaly are extremely rare compared to EH II sites and therefore, more data, generated through new excavations, should be collected to support this claim. The stronger distinction between the EH I and EH II sites, however, has led scholars to distinguish between village-based, tribal societies in the EH I period and the EH II incipient chiefdoms in the region. Unlike in western Anatolia, where Renfrew’s ‘international spirit’, initially proposed for the EBA 2 period, has been pushed back to the EBA 1 period by subsequent analyses in the form of the EBA 1 ‘cultural koine’, containing EBA 1 sites homogeneously organized in chiefdoms,⁴⁷² Thessalian EH I sites fall outside this EBA 1 east Aegean and western Anatolian ‘cultural koine’. On the Aegean mainland, the Early Bronze Age scholars agree that most of the sites were organized in chiefdoms during the EH II period; however, they question the emergence of chiefdoms during the EH I period, as will be summarized below.

The earliest investigation of the social organization of EH I in Thessaly argued for little differentiation between the Neolithic and Early Bronze Age modes of life. The argument was that Late Neolithic/Late Chalcolithic finds are not easily distinguished from the EH I layers.⁴⁷³ Scholars argued that until the end of the EH I period, no centre or civilization had developed on the Greek mainland before the earliest signs of social stratification, central authority, and distributive economy – indicating a chiefdom – were identified at Lerna’s ‘House of Tiles’⁴⁷⁴ during EH II.⁴⁷⁵ A follow-up study of Lerna’s EH II deposits has raised some concerns with Renfrew’s research (summarized above), but nevertheless reaffirmed the existence of regional as well as intra-site social differentiation during EH II.⁴⁷⁶ Pullen showed that the inhabitants of the ‘House of Tiles’ structure were able to extract goods from others, which points to the existence of permanent leadership, control, administration, and regional settlement hierarchy

⁴⁶⁷ Wace – Blegen 1918.

⁴⁶⁸ Alram-Stern 2014.

⁴⁶⁹ Wace – Blegen 1918.

⁴⁷⁰ Sahoğlu 2005.

⁴⁷¹ Peperaki 2007.

⁴⁷² Kouka 2002; Kouka 2013; Kouka 2016a; Kouka 2016b.

⁴⁷³ Christmann 1966; Renfrew 1972; Alram-Stern 2004.

⁴⁷⁴ At the enclosed site of Lerna, the ‘House of Tiles’, a two-storey building (12 x 25m), also called a ‘corridor house’ or ‘proto-palace’, was interpreted by Renfrew as a chiefly building due to its size and the fragments of 127 clay seals found within this building (indicating a central authority and redistributive system).

⁴⁷⁵ Renfrew 1972; Wiencke 1989.

⁴⁷⁶ Pullen 1985.

during EH II.⁴⁷⁷ The existence of central places, located 10–20km apart, surrounded by smaller sites during EH II⁴⁷⁸ has also been recently attested for the EH I period.⁴⁷⁹

These ‘central places’ or ‘large sites’ developed during EH I at lower elevations, in stable environments (often coastal plains), and these sites are generally long-lived tell-sites.⁴⁸⁰ By contrast, the ‘smaller sites’ common to EH I and II, were located in a wide variety of environments, usually less stable ones, and were generally short-lived.⁴⁸¹ Platia Magoula Zarkou can be classified among the ‘large sites’ not due to its size but due to its location on the fertile Thessalian plain, 1km from the Pineios River, which seems to have played a crucial role in the site’s longevity, as it was occupied from the Early until the Late Bronze Age.⁴⁸²

In their search for primary and secondary states on the Aegean mainland, scholars proposed the following distinction: autonomous village societies integrated through a tribal/‘egalitarian’ model of social organization during EH I, and incipient chiefdom societies dependent on networks and central authority during the EH II and III periods.⁴⁸³ They also argued that the contemporary tribal societies in the Shala Valley region of Albania may serve as a corresponding parallel for Neolithic and Early Bronze Age Greece, since non-state systems of reciprocal labour exchanges, feasting, and feuding still coexist with the state system in this area.⁴⁸⁴ A diachronic investigation based on archaeological surveys and GIS (Geographic Information System) of the Aegean from the Neolithic to the Bronze Age proposed three types of regional integration of the archaeological sites: small villages connected by networks of trade in the Neolithic, the coexistence of small villages with larger sites in EH I, and competing chiefdoms in EH II (evident from daggers, indicating a higher rank of individuals, and commonly fortified sites).⁴⁸⁵ Additionally, feasting in return for labour exchange has been identified in EBA 2 in the Peloponnese.⁴⁸⁶

Despite these attempts, the social organization of the EH I/II sites on the Thessalian plain remains puzzling. In the introduction to the reprint of *The Emergence of Civilisation*, Renfrew stated that since the 1970s, ‘progress in understanding the social organization of the Aegean Early Bronze Age has not advanced as much as for the later bronze age’.⁴⁸⁷ Apart from the detailed research on Lerna’s EH II ‘House of Tiles’,⁴⁸⁸ most of the research on social organization within the mainland Aegean still predominantly relies on survey data or mortuary assemblages for the EH I period. Common to most of these investigations is still the search for the predecessors of early states, rather than understanding EH I societies in their own right, and alongside their own history in context. Moreover, on both sides of the Aegean Sea, the chiefdom as a form of social organization is widely accepted for EBA 2, whereas EBA 1 social organization remains less clear. Therefore, it is time to now re-examine the latest evidence through household archaeology and to discuss the existing literature in order to see whether a tendency towards a chiefdom form of social organization does indeed stem merely from theoretical predispositions, or if it is also evident from the archaeological record at two contemporaneous but ecologically different settlements. For this reason, both centralized chiefdoms and more decentralized versions of tribes will be examined in this study, detached from the

⁴⁷⁷ Pullen 1985.

⁴⁷⁸ Wiencke 1989.

⁴⁷⁹ Whitelaw 2000.

⁴⁸⁰ Whitelaw 2000.

⁴⁸¹ Whitelaw 2000.

⁴⁸² Pentedeka 2011.

⁴⁸³ Parkinson – Galaty 2007.

⁴⁸⁴ Nakassis et al. 2016.

⁴⁸⁵ Pullen 2011b.

⁴⁸⁶ Pullen 2017.

⁴⁸⁷ Renfrew 2011 [1972], xli

⁴⁸⁸ Pullen 1985; Pullen 2011b.

old notion of tribe, persistent in archaeological writing, which is also the topic of discussion in the section below.

The Disputed Category of a Tribe

Why tribe? The old notion of the tribe has a troubled history in socio-cultural anthropology and prehistory alike. Why should we insist on using this term? Does it bring anything to the discussion of more or less sedentary, non-state societies, given its flaws? It is no secret that most of my anthropology colleagues would agree with abandoning tribe as an analytical tool as it is an outdated, old-fashioned, and politically charged notion not only for the past but also for present societies. Based on India's example, the country with the largest number of indigenous populations today, tribal peoples or *Adivasis* (meaning 'first dwellers') as they call themselves, suffer immensely under the state's assimilationist policies.⁴⁸⁹ I argue that the term indigenous peoples or emically *first dwellers* may be useful for the present-day ethnographic research, to voice and combat the state-sanctioned assimilationist policies of repression, annihilation, and assimilation of the indigenous peoples.⁴⁹⁰

In contrast to the *Adivasis* in today's India, neither the inhabitants of EBA Çukuriçi Höyük nor those of Platia Magoula Zarkou can be labelled as the first dwellers. In fact, they were not. Both sites were already occupied during the Neolithic period and, beyond any trading contacts, it is hard to trace any impact of the Early States in these parts of the Aegean basin at the time. Therefore, for archaeological purposes, first dwellers⁴⁹¹ or indigenous peoples may be a much less appropriate term than a tribe, the latter signifying people's connection to land, territorial boundaries, and social organization beyond the household (see section II.1 above). In archaeology, claims to being 'first dwellers' are in most cases overturned through new excavations that turn those people into second or third dwellers. For these among other reasons, it is more useful to operate with tribes as a socio-political term, without implying their indigenous nature or first-dwelling status, but instead highlighting features that link households into larger socio-political units, beyond houses and households. We can do that only if we understand tribes as a fuzzy category – the topic of the subsequent section – and recognize the tribe's troubled history in both socio-cultural anthropology and prehistoric archaeology, which will be discussed briefly below. We can detach ourselves from these misconceptions of tribes and the term's troubled history by reconceptualizing the idea of tribes rather than proposing a name change, as has recently been the case in some parts of socio-cultural anthropology. While discarding the term tribe's universal significance, its descriptive and regional value remains valid within contemporary socio-cultural anthropology.⁴⁹²

The incompatibility between the empirical and theoretical unit of a tribe has a long history within archaeology and socio-cultural anthropology. William A. Parkinson, who contextualizes the EH I societies as tribal and 'egalitarian',⁴⁹³ is an exception among the archaeologists who, at least in Old World prehistory, does not resist using the term and concept of tribe. Aware of its past misuses, he maintains that tribe should remain in use because 'the term has a long history in cross-cultural anthropology, and because it denotes a form of social organization generally

⁴⁸⁹ India has recently introduced tribal boarding schools, which have been heavily criticized by *Sapiens*: <https://www.sapiens.org/culture/kalinga-institute-of-social-sciences/>. These Indian tribal boarding schools feature some similarities to the 19th- and 20th-century boarding schools in North America, aimed at stripping 'indigenous peoples of their families, languages, and cultural identities'.

⁴⁹⁰ In other contemporary contexts ranging from the US via Australia to Siberia, however, indigenous populations in fact insist on being recognized as 'tribal' in view of ensuing legal rights.

⁴⁹¹ In archaeology, an exception can be made for the first permanent settlers or the so-called pioneering Neolithic communities.

⁴⁹² Gingrich 2001a; Gingrich 2015b.

⁴⁹³ Parkinson 2002; Parkinson – Galaty 2007.

understood to refer to a wide range of social systems that regularly exhibit some degree of institutionalized social integration beyond that of the extended family unit, or band.⁴⁹⁴

Since the 1950s, the analytical value of tribe has been questioned among archaeologists as well as anthropologists, and has frequently been discarded.⁴⁹⁵ Steward labelled ‘tribal society’ as ‘an exceedingly ill-defined catchall’.⁴⁹⁶ In its place, he proposed three different socio-political units – the nuclear family, the folk society, and the state⁴⁹⁷ – a suggestion that has not been implemented since, largely because ‘folk society’ is an empty non-concept. Clarke⁴⁹⁸ turned to ethnographic evidence to examine the usefulness of the term tribe for archaeological investigations. Among Bantu-speaking societies, he mapped overlapping ethnopolitical, linguistic, cultural, sub-racial, and techno-complex features. He showed that material culture can be shared over a large area, beyond the ethnopolitical unit of a tribe, and it is therefore difficult to detect it archaeologically.⁴⁹⁹ Renfrew, familiar with Clarke’s and Steward’s work, likewise avoided classification of small-scale non-state societies as tribal in the Aegean, which created a strong conceptual orientation for the follow-up studies:

‘The recognition of tribes in prehistoric Aegean society, and a fortiori the definition of tribal areas, is thus very much the *imposition of an a priori anthropological model upon the material* ... The archaeological unit ‘culture’ cannot be translated automatically into tribal terms: it is necessary to consider first what such an equation implies. The basic archaeological reality is the *village farming settlement*. These may have been linked to form segmentary tribes but, until we have positive evidence for pan-tribal sodalities, the suggestion is somehow speculative.’⁵⁰⁰

It remains a valid argument that the archaeological cultural unit cannot be easily translated into a tribal unit, since tribes may cut across material or linguistic boundaries.⁵⁰¹ Both kinship sodalities (clan, kindred, segmentary lineage) and non-kinship sodalities (age grades, warrior or ceremonial societies)⁵⁰² are very difficult to identify through the prehistoric record. Although Renfrew advanced the archaeological identification of chiefdoms within the EBA Aegean basin following his preference for neoevolutionary typology,⁵⁰³ Service was of a different opinion. At the time of his writing, Service was convinced that there is no obvious way to detect chiefdoms from the archaeological record:

‘Chiefdoms are not always demarked by a particular technological innovation which would set them off from tribes and states, but are characterized by their form of organization, most of which is not revealed in archaeological deposits; they can only be inferred or conjectured.’⁵⁰⁴

Service’s argument finds support in the ethnographic record. Polynesian chiefdoms arose in the absence of new technologies of production. In this case, the intensification of production and the chief’s utilization of surpluses for political means⁵⁰⁵ played a crucial role in the emergence of chiefdoms. The danger of prioritizing technology for the interpretation of social

⁴⁹⁴ Parkinson 2002, 2.

⁴⁹⁵ Steward 1955; Clarke 1968; Renfrew 1972.

⁴⁹⁶ Steward 1955, 53.

⁴⁹⁷ Steward 1955, 54.

⁴⁹⁸ Clarke 1968.

⁴⁹⁹ Clarke 1968.

⁵⁰⁰ Renfrew 1972, 366, italics mine.

⁵⁰¹ Clarke 1968; Fried 1975.

⁵⁰² Service 1962.

⁵⁰³ E.g. Renfrew 1972; Renfrew et al. 1974.

⁵⁰⁴ Service 1962, 114.

⁵⁰⁵ Malinowski 1922; Sahlins 1963; Firth 1967.

organization (e.g. that all metal-using societies should be organized into chiefdoms⁵⁰⁶ leads to 19th-century evolutionary tendencies to classify societies solely based on technology instead of the relations of production.⁵⁰⁷ Ethnographic studies have shown that metal-using societies cannot be associated with any particular type of social organization, since a smith's socio-political integration depends on local contexts.⁵⁰⁸ Equally, the evidence of settlement hierarchy as an indicator of chiefdoms should be questioned. Before concluding that a two-tiered settlement hierarchy necessarily displays evidence for 'central places' surrounded by 'smaller sites', a core predisposition of centre-periphery theory, it should be considered whether this may be the result of seasonal or post-marital movements, group fission and fusion, etc.⁵⁰⁹ A settlement hierarchy in the case of small sites (below 2 hectares) may, in fact, be contested on methodological grounds, since ethnographical examples from the Papua New Guinea highlands, the Himalayas, and the Upper Amazon indicate ample evidence for settlement hierarchies without political centralization.

In the Aegean basin, prehistorians today use concepts that do not come from either archaeology or socio-cultural anthropology. The term 'cultural koine' is used by Kouka⁵¹⁰ to refer to similarities in house architecture, fortifications, communal buildings, and material cultures (such as pottery and metal artefacts) between the eastern Aegean islands and coastal sites in western Anatolia in EBA 1/2 (3000–2650 BC). She used this term without an explanation of what 'cultural koine' actually means, and how it contributes to archaeological analyses or to understanding of the societies in question. The term 'cultural koine' is borrowed from linguistics, where it denotes the emergence of a new language following contact between speakers of different dialects of the same language. However, Kouka applies it to a shared material, not linguistic, culture in the eastern Aegean, in which the concept denotes shared architectural traits across the eastern Aegean islands and the coastal parts of western Anatolia during the EBA 1/2.

In socio-cultural anthropology, similar concepts are used to refer to regions in which cultural or economic confluence leads to shared similarities over distinct geographical locations. For example, Raymond Firth, in his rich qualitative and quantitative ethnographic study of Malay fishing communities, observed that the fish trade (including the production of nets, boats, and other items for fishing) led to intensive interdependence between island and mainland Malay and non-Malay communities. He showed that because of the fish trade,⁵¹¹ 'the relationships stretched out to embrace in one network at least half a dozen regions: Java, Sumatra, Borneo, Siam and Indo-China',⁵¹² which indicates that the fish trade cut across the existing political boundaries and instead created 'these regions as one organic economic unit'.⁵¹³

The key difference between Firth's notion of the 'organic economic unit'⁵¹⁴ and Kouka's 'cultural koine'⁵¹⁵ lies in our understanding of political organization. Whereas Firth understood that the Malay 'organic economic unit' cuts across the political boundaries and therefore encompasses a variety of political bodies, Kouka equated the EBA 'cultural koine' with shared political organization, here, EBA 1 chiefdoms.⁵¹⁶ Nevertheless, Kouka's analysis of EBA 1

⁵⁰⁶ Renfrew 1972.

⁵⁰⁷ Marx 1867.

⁵⁰⁸ Rowlands 1971.

⁵⁰⁹ Cameron 2013.

⁵¹⁰ Kouka 2002, 300; Kouka 2013, 576; Kouka 2016a, 210.

⁵¹¹ The 'fish trade', as described by Firth, included Malay fishers, Malay and non-Malay (e.g. Chinese) intermediaries or mediators, fishing boat and fishing net craftspersons, and consumers in near and distant, island and mainland, coastal and hinterland villages and towns.

⁵¹² Firth 1946, 12.

⁵¹³ Firth 1946, 12.

⁵¹⁴ Firth 1946, 12.

⁵¹⁵ Kouka 2002, 300; Kouka 2013, 576; Kouka 2016a, 210.

⁵¹⁶ Kouka 2016a.

Cycladic, eastern Aegean, and western Anatolian sites makes a significant contribution to understanding the shared socio-economic traits within this ‘cultural koine’.

The second term which offers an alternative classification of societies that are neither hierarchical nor ‘egalitarian’ is heterarchy, a concept borrowed from cybernetics, but redefined for archaeological purposes. Crumley defines heterarchy as:

‘The relation of elements to one another when they are unranked or when they possess the potential for being ranked in a number of different ways. For example, power can be counterpoised rather than ranked. Thus, three cities might be the same size but draw their importance from different realms: one hosts a military base, one is a manufacturing center, and the third is home to a great university.’⁵¹⁷

Recently, Horejs⁵¹⁸ proposed this type of social organization for EBA 1 Çukuriçi Höyük, based on the analysis of weights found at Çukuriçi Höyük resembling those used in the Near East. Others refer to heterarchical social organization in terms of house societies,⁵¹⁹ in which houses compete between each other and do not conform to any ‘conventional’ forms of kinship organization. With reference to the political economy of non-state societies, a heterarchical organization might be interpreted and understood as loosely corresponding to both the Melanesian *big man* forms as well as the great man models of society (see Chapter IV), in which power is distributed heterogeneously rather than in a centralized manner.⁵²⁰ For example, among the Baruya, a great cassowary hunter, a great shaman, and a great salt maker were not one but multiple persons (including their competitors), and therefore, depending on the nature of the task, some fields of prestige and power shifted between these senior male members of the Baruya. In short, the term heterarchy includes a ‘plurality’ (heter-) of power (-archy) that indeed corresponds to a limited number of different ethnographic models with internally diverse logics of reproduction.

If ‘the addition of the term heterarchy to the vocabulary of power relations reminds us that forms of order exist that are not exclusively hierarchical and the interactive elements in complex systems need not be permanently ranked relative to one another,’⁵²¹ then heterarchy may well correspond to an overarching, inclusive category for big man and great man societies (see section II.1 above). In the latter two models of non-state social organization, the special positions of certain actors are not permanently ranked but could be ranked in several ways, depending on the task or activity performed. For the purpose of this discussion and as an exercise in translation between non-socio-cultural anthropological concepts, I draw upon a local scale of heterarchy, resembling Crumley’s initial lively depiction of a heterarchical principle: ‘a spiritual leader might have an international reputation but be without influence in the local business community.’⁵²²

For example, among the Baruya, the *tsaimaye* – the salt maker – possessed the necessary technical and magical secrets for salt making, but needed to hunt and farm like everyone else. Only when he set out to work, which is for five days and five nights in a year to watch over the fire in the kiln, did the *tsaimaye* separate himself from everyday life.⁵²³ Knowledge of magical and technical secrets for salt making did not entitle him to either decision-making powers or possession of more salt. Whereas a *tsaimaye* was in charge of a crucial step for the production of salt – among the Baruya, a precious object for use and exchange – for the rest of the year

⁵¹⁷ Crumley 1995.

⁵¹⁸ Horejs 2016b.

⁵¹⁹ González-Ruibal 2005; González-Ruibal – Ruiz-Gálvez 2016.

⁵²⁰ For a summary of dialectical correspondence between heterarchical social organization and a great man society model of social organization, see Cveček – Horejs 2021.

⁵²¹ Crumley 1995, 3.

⁵²² Crumley 1995, 3.

⁵²³ Godelier 1986, 132.

he was a farmer and a hunter. This is the first example of how, within great man societies, as described among the Baruya, specialized craftsmanship does not encompass a permanent hierarchy and a permanent material break from everyday life but only a temporary one, which was symbolically accompanied by an overarching, more enduring boost to personal prestige. That applies not only to the salt maker, but also to a shaman, and great hunters among the Baruya, who, based on their knowledge and skills, take up only temporary leading positions that benefit the local community.

The second example of a temporary leading position could be seen from the Siuai, here representing big man societies. As several scholars have noted, a big man neither represents a central political office and political title nor any permanent hierarchy.⁵²⁴ As personal prestige in these societies is not inherited but achieved, in theory all men may compete in mobilizing relatives, friends, and neighbours for hosting feasts, as observed by Douglas Oliver.⁵²⁵ The power of big men, therefore, is not permanent but shifts through competition between various big men on the local and regional level. And whereas big men do gain prestige during short periods of feasting, for the rest of the non-feasting period their decision-making powers reside exclusively within a household. In addition, they remain symbolically indebted to those who have supported them from outside their own household. Oliver has also reported that big men's houses may at times be larger than other houses. By contrast, the big man's diet remained the same as the rest of the local community,⁵²⁶ which further highlights the need to compare multiple lines of evidence for addressing either permanent hierarchies or heterarchical relations within the archaeological record.

Carole L. Crumley has argued that 'heterarchy is both a structure and a condition.'⁵²⁷ Although big man societies and great man societies differ crucially – whereas the achieved personal wealth defines a big man, the achieved personal prestige and knowledge define a great man – the common denominator in their social organization is a lack of permanent centralized political office and permanent hierarchy that coexist with temporarily ranked social positions, and, as a consequence, underlying hierarchies between genders as well as within one gender based on age. This structural similarity between big man and great man societies also coincides with conditions in how to establish temporary ranking positions within a community, a trait that, according to Carole L. Crumley, defines heterarchical relations of power.⁵²⁸ Both wealth and personal knowledge could be acquired in a big man and great man society. In the case of big man societies, a man would need to ask his family, friends, and neighbours to support him in feasting to become a big man, whereas to become a great man such as a salt maker within the Baruya great man society, he had to 'ask an experienced maker and persuade him to share his knowledge.'⁵²⁹ In both cases, a person's agency was a condition that enabled him to either establish a network of supporters or to acquire new knowledge that could grant a few actors some temporary personal prestige. Spatial and temporal limits of ranking that characterize heterarchy can now be translated to socio-cultural anthropological models of big man and great man societies.

With reference to EBA 1 western Anatolia, concepts such as 'cultural koine' and heterarchy should therefore not be thought of as opposing concepts for this period and region. Although one indeed prioritizes interregional similarities ('cultural koine') and the other inter- and intra-regional differences (heterarchy) between EBA 1 sites, they can be useful for understanding (non-)shared socio-political arrangements within the EBA 1/2 Aegean basin. However, socio-economic links and shared material evidence does not imply that these societies were

⁵²⁴ Oliver 1950; Sahlins 1963; Lederman 2015.

⁵²⁵ Oliver 1955, 105–106.

⁵²⁶ Oliver 1955, 105–106.

⁵²⁷ Crumley 1995, 4.

⁵²⁸ Crumley 1979; Crumley 1987; Crumley 1995; Crumley 2007.

⁵²⁹ Godelier 1968, 132.

organized into the same political structure, as Firth⁵³⁰ showed for Malay fishers or Clarke⁵³¹ for Bantu groups.

Despite the much richer ethnographic collection of decentralized tribes than chiefdoms, the concept of tribe has been a contested analytical unit within socio-cultural anthropology. At the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century, the term tribe was abused due to the colonial agenda of addressing non-state societies outside the Western premises as primitive and underdeveloped in terms of technology and even mental capabilities, and as inherently different from states.⁵³² Neoevolutionist scholars have used it without these erroneous ideological predispositions as a comparative category of socio-political organization of unrelated societies.⁵³³ Still, some contemporary scholars continue to argue that tribe should be relegated to the dustbin of anthropological concepts, due to its colonial, ethnocentric legacy and uselessness as an analytical tool.⁵³⁴ Some scholars have even questioned the existence of the tribe, except for some very specific contexts, such as the secondary effect of a group's external contact with a state.⁵³⁵ Others saw it as an incoherent category as it refers to a 'vast number of primitive societies juxtaposed in large congeries without clear boundaries'.⁵³⁶

Instead of the disputed category of tribe, some scholars have suggested thinking instead of 'communities'⁵³⁷ or a 'principality'.⁵³⁸ Most commonly, today use of the term tribe is interchangeable with the term 'ethnic group',⁵³⁹ a generally accepted but 'no less vague term',⁵⁴⁰ as Cheikh stated recently in *The International Encyclopedia of Anthropology*. I agree that the proposed substitution of terminology does not resolve the empirical issues it addresses.⁵⁴¹ Whereas the concept of a tribe may be useless for contemporary research even in some post-colonial settings, it may be unavoidable in others, such as the Arabian Peninsula, some regions of Pakistan and Afghanistan, India, Sudan, etc. Therefore, I acknowledge that the analytical concept of tribe as a category of socio-political organization should remain on the research agenda within the fields of archaeological anthropology, some contemporary anthropology, and history, liberated from its ideological connotations and facilitating comparative, cross-cultural, and diachronic research.⁵⁴² However, it should and can only be useful if we understand tribes as a 'family of sociopolitical forms',⁵⁴³ or what I refer to as a fuzzy category in the section below. It is not the name change that truly changes our perception of concepts. Since the signifier (i.e. symbol) always entails the signified (i.e. a class of objects), it is because of their conventional relationship and not a logical one. A change in this relationship would not only affect the system, but also other concepts in their relation. For example, if a tribe is constituted of households that build up a village and subsequently a tribe, then both households and villages should be understood in relation to tribes (see section II.1). As the starting point, we should conceptualize tribes for our present purposes as a fuzzy category or a family of socio-political organization applicable to sedentary non-state societies as discussed below,

⁵³⁰ Firth 1946.

⁵³¹ Clarke 1968.

⁵³² Morgan 1877; Morgan 1881.

⁵³³ Service 1962; Sahlins 1968.

⁵³⁴ Sneath 2007; Blumi 2010; Sneath 2016. For a detailed discussion of the term 'tribe', its problematic history and its possible usage in today's and future socio-cultural anthropology, see Sneath 2007; Gingrich 2015b.

⁵³⁵ Fried 1975.

⁵³⁶ Godelier 1977, 89.

⁵³⁷ Blumi 2010.

⁵³⁸ Sneath 2007.

⁵³⁹ Barth 1969.

⁵⁴⁰ Cheikh 2018, 6204.

⁵⁴¹ Gingrich 2015b.

⁵⁴² Gingrich 2015b.

⁵⁴³ Rosen 2016, 3.

before changing our corresponding understanding of subunits such as households and villages, discussed later in the book.

II.3. Understanding Tribe as a ‘Fuzzy’ Category

As the term tribe is a largely disputed category within socio-cultural anthropology and archaeology alike, the third section of this chapter proposes thinking of tribes as a family of concepts that includes both decentralized and centralized socio-political constellations that come into being through several different ways of imagining, as outlined in the first section of this chapter. With this approach, we could acknowledge multiple pathways towards increasing and decreasing social complexity and social inequality rather than just one. Moreover, we may also recognize that sedentary, non-state, non-literate societies differ with regard to their social inequality, gender relations, and ways they are ‘imagined’ to reproduce themselves as a society. By treating them as models, or ‘abstracted sociopolitical types’⁵⁴⁴ we can acknowledge their possible coexistence in time and space, as well as their ability to reimagine and transform themselves in multiple ways, without drawing conclusions applicable for the whole (archaeological) region. Instead of building a single model based on the aggrandizing behaviour of a single individual, as proposed by Brian Hayden, we should recognize that aggrandizers are not a universal feature among more or less sedentary transegalitarian societies or tribal, imagined communities. Aggrandizers such as big men were only a shared feature among one model of socio-political constellation among sedentary tribal communities, namely among ‘big man societies’, while lacking in other socio-political forms. Moreover, the ‘aggrandizer’ individuals such as big man described above are also not as individualistic as Brian Hayden⁵⁴⁵ has portrayed them. Big men gained their renown by serving and giving back to the community. By outlining the presentist understanding and current debates on tribes within socio-cultural anthropology and prehistoric archaeology, this section provides a grounded argumentation of why and how we should, could, and, in a way, must keep tribes on the archaeological anthropological agenda, in this ‘fuzzy’ constellation.

Understanding tribe as a ‘fuzzy’ category that encompasses decentralized models such as great man societies,⁵⁴⁶ big man societies,⁵⁴⁷ segmentary lineage systems⁵⁴⁸ and politically centralized chiefdoms with and without a conical clan,⁵⁴⁹ allows this research to consider a wide range of models of social organization to be tested against the archaeological record which were outlined in the introductory section. This approach has two advantages for prehistoric research. Firstly, reading ethnography across these different models avoids technological determinism, in which material culture necessarily determines a group’s social organization. Instead, it emphasizes the relations of production – the social, economic, and technological aspects of production – that define a group’s social organization. Secondly, the simultaneous consideration of decentralized and centralized forms of tribe necessarily implies the possibility of the temporal and spatial coexistence of different models of social organization and modes of production during the EBA in the Aegean basin.

⁵⁴⁴ Sahlins 1963, 286.

⁵⁴⁵ Hayden 1995.

⁵⁴⁶ Godelier 1986a; Godelier 1991.

⁵⁴⁷ Oliver 1955; Sahlins 1963; Godelier – Strathern 1991; Lederman 2015.

⁵⁴⁸ Evans-Pritchard 1940; Bohannan – Bohannan 1953; Bohannan 1955; Sahlins 1961; Dostal 1983b; Scott 2009; Burnham 2015.

⁵⁴⁹ Malinowski 1922; Malinowski 1929; Malinowski 1935; Firth 1951; Sahlins 1958; Firth 1959; Sahlins 1963; Sahlins 1968; Earle 1978; Carneiro 1981; Firth 1983; Johnson – Earle 2000; Earle 2002.

A tendency to classify societies into the same model of social organization within a particular period or region persists among researchers in the EBA Aegean or Aegean basin.⁵⁵⁰ However, the insights from socio-cultural anthropology point to a different scenario. One of the most famous cases demonstrating the contemporaneous coexistence of different types of social organization can be drawn from Melanesian big man societies and Polynesian chiefdoms. The Trobriand Islands, located in western Melanesia, a region where big man societies were a 'typical' and predominant social organization, were organized into a chiefdom system at the time of fieldwork,⁵⁵¹ which was initially considered to be 'unusual for Melanesia'.⁵⁵² Within Melanesia, some of these big man societies were later identified as great man societies,⁵⁵³ which clearly indicates that multiple socio-political constellations can coexist within a given region.

Another case can be drawn from the Swat Valley in Pakistan. Frederik Barth's research, conducted in the 1950s, showed that sedentary, multi-caste, lowland Pashto-speaking Pathans practised plough agriculture and specialized craft production. Their landholding was organized through unilineal descent groups and an established coresidence with highland Gujars. These were less hierarchically organized nomadic herders breeding cattle, sheep, goats, and buffalos, practising little agriculture and outmarriage.⁵⁵⁴ Even though Pathans owned the highlands exploited by the Gujars, the Pathans found this land useless and difficult to cultivate. Barth⁵⁵⁵ argued that the symbiotic economic relations between two different ethnic groups, relying on different modes of production and distinct social organization, are possible when two distinct groups exploit different ecological niches.

The final example, taken from recent prehistoric research, documented the contemporaneous coexistence of early farming communities (e.g. Boncuklu) with foraging communities that resisted farming (e.g. Pınarbası) during the mid-9th millennium BC.⁵⁵⁶ This evidence showed that the spread of farming in central Anatolia was not uniform, and refuted a faulty argument that 'Neolithic societies came to coexist within Palaeolithic societies in time but not in space'.⁵⁵⁷ Moreover, it proves that the coexistence of not only different models of social organization, but also different modes of production are equally a thing of the present as of the past. These three cases highlight the importance of avoiding broad generalizations of a particular or 'typical' social organization model throughout a certain period or region in prehistory (e.g. chiefdoms in the Early Bronze Age Aegean⁵⁵⁸) without a detailed examination.

If we acknowledge that different models of socio-political organizations can coexist in time and space, then we can move on not only to what constitutes these different constellations, but also to how they coexist in the region. The question of whether chiefdoms emerged through peaceful or violent means has polarized the discourse on chiefdoms. These polarized discourses cannot be easily resolved and this is also not the aim here. I argue that it remains important to acknowledge multiple pathways towards the emergence of chiefdoms: through both peaceful and violent means, through the redistributive and non-redistributive economy, and through the presence or lack of long-distance exchange of prestige goods, among other things. The following section also identifies a further potential in exploring circumscription

⁵⁵⁰ Renfrew 1972, Kouka 2002.

⁵⁵¹ Sahlins 1963.

⁵⁵² Irwin 1983, 30.

⁵⁵³ Godelier 1986a; Godelier 1991.

⁵⁵⁴ Barth 1956.

⁵⁵⁵ Barth 1956.

⁵⁵⁶ Baird et al. 2018.

⁵⁵⁷ Service 1962, 110.

⁵⁵⁸ Renfrew 1972.

theory, which is missing in the current scholarly debates on the Aegean Early Bronze Age.⁵⁵⁹ As today's prevailing explanation for the emergence of chiefdoms in the Aegean builds upon Renfrew's EBA 2 'international spirit'⁵⁶⁰ and the long-distance exchange of prestige goods,⁵⁶¹ it may be fruitful to explore further any means of circumscription alongside the latter. This could include ecological circumscription (dwelling in naturally circumscribed areas), resource circumscription (dwelling close to rare and desired natural resources), or social circumscription (dwelling in densely populated areas).⁵⁶² All these three types of circumscription, possibly the basis for conflict between groups, may well exist alongside the peaceful, international-spirit-like earliest chiefdoms in the Aegean. The focus of this manuscript, however, is not on the emergence of chiefdoms. Instead, whether both centralized and decentralized societies coexisted in the region – and if so, how they coexisted during the Early Bronze Age – is within the realms of possibility that will be explored. It is important to bear in mind that chiefdoms are here considered as subversions of tribes (see section II.1 above) and not as a stage in social evolution, as chiefdoms have previously been considered in socio-cultural anthropology and archaeology.

The Lack of Circumscription Theory for the Emergence of Chiefdoms in the Aegean Basin

Although chiefdom social organization has often been promoted for the EBA Aegean, the model of chiefdom social organization was introduced relatively recently to socio-cultural anthropology, when Oberg⁵⁶³ identified it as a structural type in pre-Columbian America, south of Mexico in the 1950s.⁵⁶⁴ Soon after, a chiefdom became an evolutionary stage,⁵⁶⁵ and then a model of social organization.⁵⁶⁶ The emergence of the chiefdom has been discussed in a number of volumes dealing with the emergence of early states,⁵⁶⁷ in which chiefdom is discussed as a complex multi-village socio-political unit, either preceding the state or coexisting with it. However, the emergence of chiefdoms remains debated through two bodies of conflicting theories: voluntaristic and coercive.⁵⁶⁸ I agree with Godelier that 'it would be equally vain to try to imagine a durable power of domination and oppression based solely either on naked violence and terror or on the total consent of every member of society.'⁵⁶⁹ Instead, it is important to recognize that in 'all societies, including the most egalitarian classless ones ... a mixture of common and particular interests ... are constantly conflicting and compromising'.⁵⁷⁰

Carneiro, however, viewed the theories of warfare and the peaceful emergence of chiefdoms as theoretically mutually exclusive. Therefore, he classified the authors that support the emergence of chiefdoms by peaceful means as proponents of voluntaristic theories. These peaceful means for the emergence of chiefdoms include the intensification of production and a

⁵⁵⁹ A fruitful re-exploration of circumscription theory for the emergence of early states has recently been conducted in the valley of Oaxaca through archaeological evidence combined with agent-based modelling (see Redmond – Spencer 2012; Spencer – Redmond 2001; Spencer – Redmond 2004; Williams 2019).

⁵⁶⁰ Renfrew 1972.

⁵⁶¹ Friedman – Rowlands 1977.

⁵⁶² Carneiro 2012.

⁵⁶³ Oberg 1955.

⁵⁶⁴ Oberg identified six different typologies: (1) Homogeneous Tribes, (2) Segmented Tribes, (3) Politically Organized Chiefdoms, (4) Feudal Type States, (5) City States, and (6) Theocratic Empires (Oberg 1955, 473).

⁵⁶⁵ Service 1962.

⁵⁶⁶ Sahlins 1963; Sahlins 1968.

⁵⁶⁷ Carneiro 1970; Service 1975; Claessen – Skalnik 1978; Feinman – Marcus 1998; Johnson – Earle 2000; Grinin 2004; Blanton – Farger 2008.

⁵⁶⁸ Carneiro 1970; Carneiro 1988; Carneiro 2012.

⁵⁶⁹ Godelier et al. 1978, 767.

⁵⁷⁰ Godelier et al. 1978, 767.

redistributive economy,⁵⁷¹ irrigation,⁵⁷² the exchange of prestige goods,⁵⁷³ or the establishment of bottlenecks in the resource flow through the emergence of attached specializations, resource ownership, and specialized transport⁵⁷⁴ under the chief's leadership. My approach largely follows Earle, who maintains that

‘Despite pointed criticism of evolutionary typologies, the chiefdom and related formulations provide a framework for comparative studies of evolution aimed at understanding the development of central decision-making hierarchies and social inequalities.’⁵⁷⁵

Although my own interest does not lie in a discussion of social evolution but in the social organization at the two sites of inquiry, there is a strong tendency to prioritize voluntaristic theories of chiefdoms, proposing that individual aggrandizers acted in their own self-interest and previously autonomous villages voluntarily surrendered their sovereignty to a higher political authority. However, evidence for any redistributive economy during EBA 1 is lacking in western Anatolia, apart from the hinterland site of Karataş. Therefore, the question of how and why chiefdoms arose in EBA 1 western Anatolia, if they did, remains unresolved.

This may be related to the absence of Carneiro's circumscription theory in the discussion on the emergence of chiefdoms in the EBA Aegean basin.⁵⁷⁶ Carneiro argues that multi-polity organizations, such as chiefdoms and states, always emerge by violent means and treats violence, not as a ‘mere hypothesis, but an established fact’.⁵⁷⁷ This conclusion is further supported by a number of ethnographic cases, and Carneiro⁵⁷⁸ differentiates between three different types of circumscription: environmental, resource and social circumscription. Firstly, environmental circumscription emerges where environmental features sharply delimit the area that simple farming communities could occupy or cultivate, and these can vary from narrow valleys, the sea, mountains, or deserts in different regions. These conditions, combined with population growth, lead to warfare and, consequently, political integration beyond the village level. Secondly, resource concentration may affect communities residing close to rich soils that enable the production of an abundance of food. These communities commonly sustain high reproduction rates, and when population growth reaches a critical point, it results in competition and warfare over land. This applies not only for habitable land that can be cultivated, but also for settlements close to natural resources such as obsidian, jadeite, tin, and other commodities which are naturally restricted but highly desirable. Thirdly, social circumscription refers to the filling of an area⁵⁷⁹ resulting in a high population density, and its effects may equally lead to conflict and consequent integration into chiefdoms.

In all of the above cases, the chiefly office comes into existence not as a central authority in charge of a redistributive economy,⁵⁸⁰ which has been severely questioned,⁵⁸¹ but through the introduction of a temporary war leader (or pendragon) who leads an alliance of several villages in conflict with a common enemy. If these efforts are victorious, then a temporary war

⁵⁷¹ Service 1962; Sahlins 1968; Renfrew 1972.

⁵⁷² Steward 1955; Wittfogel 1976.

⁵⁷³ Friedman – Rowlands 1977.

⁵⁷⁴ Earle 2002; Earle 1998b; Earle et al. 2015.

⁵⁷⁵ Earle 1987.

⁵⁷⁶ Carneiro 1981; Carneiro 1988; Carneiro 2012.

⁵⁷⁷ Carneiro 2012, 14.

⁵⁷⁸ Carneiro 1981; Carneiro 1988; Carneiro 2012.

⁵⁷⁹ The ‘filling of an area’ here refers to multiple reasons, such as fission and the follow-up establishment of new settlements within the same area, increase in biological reproduction, or migration into a particular area.

⁵⁸⁰ Service 1962, Sahlins 1968, Renfrew 1972, Renfrew et al. 1974.

⁵⁸¹ Peebles – Kus 1977, Carneiro 1981, Earle 1998a.

leader may become a permanent chief of the allied villages. The chief then holds a political and military office.⁵⁸²

From the above discussion, the key role of the environment in the emergence of chiefdoms can be seen, and therefore coercive theories should be considered as plausible as voluntaristic ones for the emergence of chiefdoms in the EBA 1 Aegean basin. At the same time, my own understanding follows the proponents of historical ecology, who claim that we cannot treat the environment as a static, fixed entity with limited resources to which social groups adapt. Instead, anthropologists should recognize the multigenerational knowledge that arises through practice and facilitates the active management of the landscape, not only adaptation to it.⁵⁸³ Interaction with the environment within this study will be documented on a household level, which will provide information about the community and changes in diet or herding practices, and question the role of environmental circumscription. This approach allows us to pursue a dwelling perspective, fundamental to which is the recognition that the ‘production of life involves the unfolding of fields of relations that crosscuts the boundary between human and non-human’.⁵⁸⁴ Research collaboration between archaeologists and anthropologists has recently called for more work on the mode of household and village organization alongside ecological practices.⁵⁸⁵ This approach, combining household archaeology with household ecology and the domestic economy, is described in the following section.

In summary, the environment surrounding many Early Bronze Age sites in western Anatolia and Thessaly was limited in most cases by either surrounding mountains, rivers, and/or the seashore. Therefore, circumscription may be a topic that could be further explored in the future. Whether and how circumscriptive pressure promoted the emergence of chiefdoms during EBA 1 and 2 in the Aegean remains open. Until a systematic study on the effect of circumscription on the development of chiefdoms in the region is conducted, the question of circumscription will remain unresolved.

II.4. Preview: Domestic Economies and the Household Archaeology Approach

By acknowledging tribes as a fuzzy category, the fourth and last section of this chapter will deepen our understanding of domestic economies and household archaeology as pursued in this study. In the absence of a redistributive economy and specialized workshops within settlements, these (village) settlements could nevertheless be integrated into centralized socio-political constellations such as chiefdoms, but only if a special residence with visible, special features could be attested. Household archaeology or micro-scale archaeology may help us tackle this issue.

By looking at the localized perspective of households and comparing them to each other, we can test the evidence of *haute cuisine*,⁵⁸⁶ or the extent to which food was either shared or pooled within households. Another way remains to trace it through unusual architecture: e.g. a larger house, an unusual installation inside the house, pointing towards a chiefly or ritual dwelling. The concentration of prestige goods within a particular household, repeated in different settlement phases, could be another such archaeological marker for a possible chiefdom organization. But most important of all would be continuity of these ‘irregularities’, within the same houses, between different settlement phases, to support the inherited status and the existence of chiefdoms within the Domestic Mode of Production. If this is not the case

⁵⁸² Carneiro 1981; Carneiro 1988; Carneiro 2012.

⁵⁸³ Balée 2002; Balée – Erickson 2006.

⁵⁸⁴ Ingold 2005, 504.

⁵⁸⁵ Wengrow – Graeber 2018, 238.

⁵⁸⁶ Goody 1976; Goody 2006.

and the evidence indicates households mobilizing different types of ‘prestige’ that could shift within settlement phases and between house use lives, then it is more appropriate to consider a more or less decentralized ‘heterarchical’ social organization, in which the same village group may consist of households or persons that pool their renown either from different material items, knowledge, or skills that are either unranked or ranked in many different ways (see section II.2 above).

Household archaeology, a new approach for analysing data from settlement sites, emerged at the beginning of the 1980s in response to processual archaeology, which was preoccupied with diachronic investigations into non-state or early-state societies along evolutionary lines. Wilk and Rathje, who coined the term ‘household archaeology’ with the aim of inferring economic behaviour from the material record, define the household as

‘The most common social component of subsistence, the smallest and most abundant activity group. This household is composed of three elements: (1) *social*: the demographic unit, including the number and relationships of the members; (2) *material*: the dwelling, activity areas, and possessions; and (3) *behavioral*: the activities it performs.’⁵⁸⁷

The main aim of household archaeology was to ‘bridge the existing ‘mid-level theory gap’ in archaeology’⁵⁸⁸ by examining theories of change in household organization instead of looking at ‘ceramic types’ across a number of sites to address the grand theories, such as the rise of the state.⁵⁸⁹ The household archaeology approach is deeply rooted within the socio-anthropological interest in domestic units that emerged in the 1950s, which questioned the assumption of the static manner of domestic groups and investigated changes within and between households spatially and diachronically.

The view of the household as a dynamic, emergent, processual, and cyclical phenomenon, shaped through everyday practices, emerged as a new analytical category within socio-cultural anthropology in the late 1950s,⁵⁹⁰ which generated a stronger interest in domestic economies. Goody argued that changes in technology, namely the introduction of the plough across Eurasia and the shift from human labour-intensive to labour-extensive agriculture assisted by animal power, led to the production of agricultural surpluses across Eurasia during the Bronze Age.⁵⁹¹ This facilitated the emergence of full-time specialists, detached from food production, and the emergence of stratified societies in an urban setting reproduced through local and kinship endogamy. Building upon Marxist theories that the (sexual) division of labour by gender depends on the type of farming, and that relations of production depend on means of production, Goody also argued that the shift from horticulture to agriculture brought about changes in domestic organization. Female power declined, whereas male power gained in importance as female labour in gardens was replaced by men in charge of plough agriculture in fields and male ownership of large stock. The increase in productivity generated by the introduction of ploughs (or ards) divided groups into ruling groups, which were not involved in food production, and producers. The latter, in Eurasian villages, were further ranked as rich and landed vs. poor and landless peasants. Before the invention of plough agriculture, sedentary societies practising small-scale cultivation and animal husbandry seemingly followed different principles. However, a comprehensive theory rooted in ethnographic cases from those latter societies was still lacking within socio-cultural anthropology, and to an extent, these views still disregarded the emergence of craft specialists.

⁵⁸⁷ Wilk – Rathje 1982, 617, italics theirs.

⁵⁸⁸ Wilk – Rathje 1982, 617.

⁵⁸⁹ Wilk – Rathje 1982.

⁵⁹⁰ Fortes 1971 [1958]; Goody 1971 [1958]a; Goody 1972.

⁵⁹¹ Goody 1976.

To date, the best model to discuss the labour organization within households or what households do in non-state, non-ploughing societies, remains what Sahlins⁵⁹² termed the Domestic Mode of Production. This type of production stands for the gendered and age-based division of labour within households, in which households do not support any full-time specialists and are not geared towards overproduction but rather towards ‘underproduction’. Nevertheless, the surplus can emerge in different spheres – not only subsistence, but also through game hunting, the collection of wild plants, and employing crafts, which can be variously integrated into the Domestic Mode of Production. Based on surpluses generated in some of these economic spheres, crafting and other centres may emerge, which can be further used for analysing archaeological data. A short overview of Sahlins’s Domestic Mode of Production model will be discussed below.

Domestic Mode of Production Beyond the Stone Age

Two exceptional publications emerged in 1972. These shaped specific fields of archaeology and social anthropology, and continue to play an important role in this study. Renfrew published his seminal work *The Emergence of Civilisation*, a systematic overview of the Aegean Late Neolithic and Early Bronze Age societies, and socio-cultural anthropology benefitted from Sahlins’s advancement of substantivist theories for a domestic economy in *Stone Age Economics*. By theorizing about previously published data on hunter-gatherer, horti-/agricultural, and pastoral groups, Sahlins’s comparative work turned hunter-gatherer groups previously perceived as poor into the ‘original affluent society’.⁵⁹³ More importantly, Sahlins developed his theory of the Domestic Mode of Production (DMP hereafter), a model primarily based on Chayanov’s rule⁵⁹⁴ and an extension of Polanyi’s householding principle.⁵⁹⁵

Prior to Sahlins, Polanyi had argued that householding should not be perceived as an older economic system than reciprocity and redistributive systems, since ‘the practice of catering for the needs of one’s household becomes a feature of economic life only on a more advanced level of agriculture ... its pattern is the closed group’.⁵⁹⁶ It is unclear what Polanyi defines as a ‘more advanced level of agriculture’, and Polanyi himself was ambiguous about the principle of householding.⁵⁹⁷ For Sahlins, the principle of householding – the term is avoided by Sahlins in his writing⁵⁹⁸ – or DMP can only be sustained through three systematically interrelated elements: a ‘small labour force differentiated by sex, simple technology, and finite production

⁵⁹² Sahlins 1972.

⁵⁹³ Sahlins showed that hunter-gatherers generally enjoy more leisure time and dedicate less effort to food acquisition than sedentary farming groups.

⁵⁹⁴ In the 1920s, the Russian agronomist Alexander Chayanov developed a theory that members of a peasant household would work as hard as they needed in order to meet the subsistence needs of the family, and no more. This implies that a peasant community by itself would not transform into a capitalist system generating a surplus for exchange except in cases where external factors impact the community (Chayanov 1966, Sahlins 1972).

⁵⁹⁵ Polanyi 1944. Polanyi defined three general types of economic systems in pre-market societies: a *householding* system based on the principle of autarky, in which individual households produce for their own needs; a *reciprocity* system based on the principle of symmetry, in which societies are linked through reciprocity of gifts; and a *redistributive* system based on the principle of centrality, in which trade and production are organized by a central authority/a tribal leader (Polanyi 1944). According to Polanyi, prior to capitalism, all societies were characterized by one or a combination of the three economic systems (householding, reciprocity, redistribution).

⁵⁹⁶ Polanyi 1944, 55.

⁵⁹⁷ Gregory 2009.

⁵⁹⁸ Sahlins, acknowledged his indebtedness to Polanyi (see footnote 3 in Sahlins 1972, 188). However, Sahlins did not adopt the term *householding* but coined a new one, the so-called DMP as well as departing from Polanyi’s threefold scheme of principles of integration (e.g. householding system, reciprocity system, and redistributive system).

objectives', which makes this system an 'anti-surplus system'.⁵⁹⁹ Within the DMP model, simple technology refers to Neolithic or Stone Age technology. Thus, sedentary Neolithic communities are generally motivated by meeting the subsistence needs of a domestic unit in which production is not separated from consumption. Also, over-production or over-exploitation of available resources is absent in an overall sense, as such a society is not growth-oriented.⁶⁰⁰ Households within the DMP do not support any full-time, but may accommodate part-time specialists. This ostensibly makes the self-sufficiency of DMP households possible. Notwithstanding the theoretical self-sufficiency of DMP domestic units, Sahlins acknowledged that

'The households of primitive communities are not usually self-sufficient, producing all they need and needing all they produce. Certainly, there is exchange. Even aside from the presents given and received under inescapable social obligations, the people may work for a frankly utilitarian trade, thus indirectly getting what they need.'⁶⁰¹

This implies that the key criteria of more complex societies should not be analysed exclusively through exchange, as this is a cultural universal. Instead, the production and transmission of particular objects exchanged should be conducted on a local (single-site) but also regional level (multiple sites) for a thorough understanding of regional interdependency, beyond the domestic unit or household. If we look at both exchange and transmission, then we can follow two different and complementary flows within the DMP: spheres of surplus for exchange beyond households, and spheres of surplus for pooling within households. These spheres are simultaneously embedded in the economic activities of the DMP households, in which the members navigate between producing for mainly their own use but also producing for exchange.

Moreover, if we think of DMP households as loci of underproduction, in which households mostly produce for their own use, then it would, by definition, be impossible to imagine any centralized economy compatible with this type of (under)production. But this transformation or coexistence of the DMP with some elite control of specific goods (e.g. metal objects, game, trophies, etc.), is a possible key towards understanding the emergence of chiefdoms. The coexistence of the DMP with long-distance exchange of prestige goods is not necessarily linked to the emergence of crafting centres which are perfectly compatible with the DMP. The latter are not necessarily embedded into any elite-controlled long-distance trade. Such crafting centres may equally emerge in villages close to clay sources, salt plants⁶⁰² or copper-rich sediments, which could be utilized locally for both local consumptions and for long-distance exchange, without elite-controlled distribution of these items being necessary. And if the DMP stands for 'economies organized by domestic groups and kinship relations',⁶⁰³ how can the DMP be translated into material, archaeological data, if household archaeology's initial aim was to move beyond the study of kinship in archaeology?

Use of the DMP in Archaeology

The earliest attempts to (re)consider the DMP in archaeology were established in household archaeology, which emphasized the importance of identifying domestic activities within the household for assessing self-sufficiency or degrees of specialization between domestic groups. Scholars proposed an important distinction between *dwelling*s and *household*s, since

⁵⁹⁹ Sahlins 1972, 82.

⁶⁰⁰ Sahlins 1972.

⁶⁰¹ Sahlins 1972, 83.

⁶⁰² The Baruya residing in Papua New Guinean highlands produced plant-based salt from locally available 'salt plants' (Godelier 1986), see Chapter VII.

⁶⁰³ Sahlins 1972, 41.

archaeologists do not excavate social units (such as households) but dwellings and artefacts.⁶⁰⁴ Therefore, for any deduction concerning households from the archaeological record, a researcher should follow key methodological steps. Firstly, dwellings should be inferred from the material record⁶⁰⁵ manifested through architecture (walls, buildings, and other physical structures), and secondly, households can only then be inferred from the dwelling units⁶⁰⁶ by analysing the clustering of activity zones.

This method allows for the testing of anthropological theories since established knowledge about the basic subsistence and economy of any society under archaeological examination (e.g. hunter-gatherers, sedentary horticulturalists, sedentary agriculturalists, and nomadic herders) allows the researcher to infer the kind of household units that were present. However, as I mentioned in the introduction, the ‘household’ is a problematic unit of study for mobile non-resident production groups (e.g. mobile hunter-gatherer societies). Since there is no ‘house’ in these types of societies, it is difficult to speak of households, similarly to the way in which the concept of the ‘international spirit’ was inappropriate for times when no nations existed. With regard to sedentary societies, as a topic of inquiry in this research, material evidence from dwellings and other settlement structures can be used to test against anthropological theories of householding practices.⁶⁰⁷ In this manner, households, as social units identified ethnographically, are not being imposed on the archaeological data, but rather used as a matrix against which archaeological material records can be examined. The results of such testing may then either (i) confirm the expected outcomes; (ii) refute what was previously seen as the most likely household organization; (iii) provide more contextualization for the degree of likelihood of one or another household organization; or (iv) propose another model of domestic organization, which has not previously been recorded among already existing ethnographic cases.

The DMP was extensively tested in an archaeological investigation of the Jutland area of Denmark during the Bronze Age. Results showed that this period can be categorized as a transitional period between chiefdoms and early states, through cycles of chiefly evolution and decline.⁶⁰⁸ Through diachronic research on the subsistence and political economies of Thy in Denmark, Earle demonstrated that the DMP played a crucial part in the Bronze Age chiefdom economy, which reaffirms Aristotle’s and Polanyi’s claims that the production of surpluses for exchange does not necessarily destroy the self-sufficiency of households.⁶⁰⁹ According to Earle, the DMP remained stable throughout the Bronze Age in Jutland, since most goods were produced and consumed at the household level; an exception to this being the elite-controlled, long-distance import of metal that altered political organization towards the integration of villages into chiefdoms.⁶¹⁰ Highly desirable metal agricultural tools were not produced locally in Jutland. Therefore, they needed to be acquired from outside, through the exchange of hides and other items produced locally within the Danish peasant societies. In this case, the chiefdoms emerged without the development of a redistributive economy of staple goods, but through the long-distance exchange of hides for metal. The DMP remained a stable mode of production through the cycles of decline and emergence of chiefdoms that were based on elite long-distance exchange of metals.⁶¹¹ With this research, Earle showed that Sahlins’s DMP may exist beyond the Neolithic or Stone Age, and that this mode of production may support centralized chiefdoms as well as decentralized tribal communities.

⁶⁰⁴ Wilk – Rathje 1982.

⁶⁰⁵ Wilk – Rathje 1982.

⁶⁰⁶ Wilk – Rathje 1982.

⁶⁰⁷ Wilk – Rathje 1982, 619.

⁶⁰⁸ Earle 2002.

⁶⁰⁹ Polanyi 1944, 56.

⁶¹⁰ Earle 2002.

⁶¹¹ Earle 2002.

In contrast to the constructive application of the DMP model within archaeology, socio-cultural anthropologists have criticized Sahlins's treatment of domestic groups in the DMP.⁶¹² According to some scholars, Sahlins treated domestic groups as given rather than acknowledging the kinship ties that constitute them. This would be a repetition of the mistake made by Marx: in an analogous manner, he also overlooked the importance of kinship for the reproduction of things and labour.⁶¹³ In the same vein, among archaeologists themselves, the theory of the DMP has been regarded as a neo-Marxist idealist account of the mode of production.⁶¹⁴ In a recent edited volume, the authors called for the retirement of the DMP 'for the sake of definitional clarity',⁶¹⁵ and instead suggested using Eric Wolf's distinction of three modes of production for archaeological research: *kin-oriented*, *tributary*, and *capitalist*.⁶¹⁶ Wolf's is a simplified version of Marx's model for deploying the worldwide evolution of social labour. Although such a call has the potential to restore the importance of kinship to prehistoric archaeology, I understand the DMP as a 'mode of subsistence', or 'householding', which will be scrutinized through the archaeological record under consideration here. My reading of Sahlins is, in a way, complementary to Polanyi's work, who initially discussed 'householding' as an ancient economic system, primarily embedded in kinship relations.

In addition, concepts related to the DMP may be further refined and improved through a subsequent level of analysis, by suggesting after the first series of analyses what kind of kinship correlates may or may not have corresponded to the DMP in question. While in a systemic way, the formation of the DMP generally presupposes kinship ties *a priori* for recruitment and alliances, in a methodological and analytical sense, the identification of any specific kinship correlations with a given DMP form may become an *a posteriori* step in the investigation. Moreover, conceptualizing a 'tributary' mode of production on any larger regional scale need not necessarily exclude that this may encompass DMP units on smaller-scaled, local levels.

Following the two steps to identify what kind of kinship we could expect and whether any specific kinship constellations could be read from the archaeological data, this inquiry into the EBA households draws from both the archaeological data available and socio-cultural anthropological interpretations of material evidence. As both sites of this inquiry are settlement sites, with ample evidence of houses, the study does not consider house societies as an ideal type of social organization.⁶¹⁷ Instead, houses are here perceived as a proxy for close social relations between persons, including kinship among others. Houses as *loci* of kinship⁶¹⁸ as well as a 'minimal social arena', in Victor Turner's sense,⁶¹⁹ where important socio-economic and socio-political decision take place, allow us to further explore the underlying rules of proximity and sharing between houses, rather than taking a house as an organizing principle or a model for social organization.⁶²⁰ What kind of kinship or rules of proximity were established at Çukuriçi Höyük and Platia Magoula Zarkou will be explored through household archaeology.

⁶¹² Gingrich – Schweitzer 2014, 30.

⁶¹³ Gregory 1984.

⁶¹⁴ Trigger 1993.

⁶¹⁵ Rosenswig – Cunningham 2017, 16.

⁶¹⁶ Wolf 1982, Rosenswig – Cunningham 2017. According to Wolf, the *capitalist mode of production* gained momentum in the 18th century. Before then, societies across the world were organized in either a *tributary* or a *kin-oriented* mode (Wolf 1982, 7). A *kin-oriented mode* of production is present in pre-state societies, in which kinship serves as the mediator of human labour and the only means to claim labour from another person. In the *tributary mode*, according to Wolf (1982), centralized or decentralized ruling elites extract the surplus from producers for managerial, defensive, and other purposes.

⁶¹⁷ For a detailed explanation of reasons for not treating house societies as an ideal type of social organization, see Chapter IV.

⁶¹⁸ Carsen – Hugh-Jones 1995; Sahlins 2013.

⁶¹⁹ Turner 1974, see Chapter III.

⁶²⁰ Gillespie – Cunningham 2000; González-Ruibal 2005; Boric 2008; Brama et al. 2016; González-Ruibal – Ruiz-Gálvez 2016; Kuijt 2018.

Although household archaeology was initially established to move away from discourses on kinship,⁶²¹ in my understanding, we cannot ascribe a house and its household activities a purely material(istic) and economic character, but should also recognize a house as a locus and ‘minimal social arena’ of kinship, both old and new. How kinship can be further addressed through household archaeology, complemented with a socio-cultural anthropological understanding of household economies, will be discussed below.

Household Archaeology and the Anthropological Contribution

Today, the well-developed and commonly applied approaches of household archaeology in Mesoamerica contrast with the emergence of a young field ‘becoming’ important in Eastern Mediterranean prehistory. Some exceptions to this are the recent pioneering studies of Neolithic households in Thessaly (Greece)⁶²² and Neolithic Southeastern Anatolia in Turkey.⁶²³ Within the EBA I Aegean basin, the earliest attempt at a household archaeology approach was undertaken at Troy⁶²⁴ and has proven to be fruitful for discussions of domestic units and local social organization. Within Near Eastern archaeology, the absence of household archaeology was attributed to difficulties in identifying household compounds,⁶²⁵ and the same can be said for the Aegean basin. Consequently, instead of detailed analysis of material remains within domestic premises, prehistoric archaeologists in the Eastern Mediterranean have largely focused on analysing house forms and settlement patterns from architectural perspectives.⁶²⁶ This allows the studying of the architectural remains beyond the local, bounded space of the excavated site. It also enables a comparison of house sizes, settlement patterns, and other architectural features on local, regional or supra-regional scales. Finally, it stimulates discussion regarding the uniformity and diversity of built space, and the (dis)similarities of the contemporary sites in question.

Both a macro-scale comparative settlement pattern approach and micro-scale household archaeology have their respective drawbacks. The former prioritizes the discussion of long-term changes (e.g. population growth, resource control, etc.) affecting the whole group, and less emphasis is given to short-term changes and diversity among different groups, often for the sake of discussing the evolutionary trajectory.⁶²⁷ By contrast, household archaeology prioritizes a ‘humanized reconstruction of the past’⁶²⁸ by looking at the intra-settlement relations through the local built environment. This bottom-up approach is based on local and micro-regional history, and thereby facilitates tackling the ‘big questions’ such as the principles of social organization from a localized perspective.

There is a large body of anthropological literature that can make a significant contribution to our understanding of prehistoric societies along with a household archaeology approach, including cross-cultural studies. Such studies can point towards general patterns and correlations between specific variables across samples. It has been shown that the size of domestic units correlates with two different types of neolocal post-marital residence. While in patriloc societies the average living floor area is usually smaller than 550–600ft² (51.1–55.7m²), in matriloc societies this area generally exceeds these dimensions.⁶²⁹ Follow-up studies have

⁶²¹ R. Wilk, pers. comm. 2017.

⁶²² Souvatzi 2008; Souvatzi 2014; Souvatzi 2012.

⁶²³ Özbal 2006; Özbal 2012.

⁶²⁴ Ivanova 2013; Ivanova 2016.

⁶²⁵ Özbal 2006, 321.

⁶²⁶ Christmann 1966; Renfrew 1972; Pullen 1985; Düring 2001; Kouka 2002; Erkanal 2011; Georgiadis 2012; Schwall – Horejs 2015.

⁶²⁷ Tringham 2015.

⁶²⁸ Tringham 2015, 219.

⁶²⁹ Ember 1973.

produced similar results.⁶³⁰ For sedentary and semi-sedentary societies – the focus of this study – the dimensions of domestic units have been adjusted to less than 43m² for patrilocal and more than 80m² for matrilineal societies.⁶³¹ Although the cross-cultural comparison of house floors was meant to contribute to the study of prehistory, it has not been widely implemented. In this regard, I agree with the proposal that ‘cross-cultural studies may be used for hypotheses but should not be the source of interpretation’.⁶³² However, cross-cultural anthropological studies may fruitfully inform archaeological interpretations.⁶³³ Therefore, based on the small size of domestic units at Çukuriçi Höyük and Platia Magoula Zarkou, we should expect a patrilocal residence pattern.

A recent cross-cultural study, which tested the correlation between food sharing and resource stress across 98 samples relying on a subsistence economy, confirmed that food sharing beyond the household is a socio-cultural universal. However, societies frequently affected by resource stress share food beyond the household more frequently, while in times of major environmental catastrophe, households instead tend to pool resources and not share beyond the household.⁶³⁴ In order to evaluate differences or similarities of dietary patterns between different households at each site, we should, then, expect a high variability of diet between households in times of environmental catastrophe, medium variability between households when environmental stress was not present, and a more uniform diet when the societies were frequently affected by environmental challenges. This allows us to look at diet within a framework of environmental conditions that play a major role in subsistence in non-state societies.

However, food in non-state sedentary societies should not be treated solely as a means for subsistence, but equally as a marker of rank and distinction. Goody argued that *haute cuisine* in Bronze Age Eurasia was another trait that distinguished an urban class of rulers from the peasants, in which the rulers enjoyed exotic food with complicated recipes and cooking techniques. On the one hand, testing for the presence of *haute cuisine* in a particular household or household cluster may confirm the existence of elites at each of the two sites. On the other hand, a homogeneous diet across the settlement and an absence of *haute cuisine* should not be taken as a marker of the absence of social inequality, since different types of cuisine may support the same socio-political organization:

‘Differences between the centralized societies of Africa and Eurasia are highlighted in the household economy. While Eurasia had a *haute cuisine* as well as a lower *basse cuisine*, Africa had neither; its cooking was demotic ... intermarriage prevented too great a separation, too complete an isolation, to develop between the strata. There was broad homogeneity in marriage, cooking, and other aspects of culture even though the strata had differentiated access to political office.’⁶³⁵

In this study, therefore, food will be treated as a marker of distinction but also as a proxy for social relations. Food sharing between households must have been of significant importance as local residential groups throughout (pre)history dealt with seasonal droughts in the Aegean.⁶³⁶ Whether this has resulted in pooling (indicating major catastrophes) or sharing (indicating seasonal droughts) between domestic groups at a particular settlement will be discussed through zooarchaeological data. A third, possible factor for contextualizing zooarchaeological records consists of a possibility that certain food items may have been consumed only by one social

⁶³⁰ Divale 1977; Peregrine 2001.

⁶³¹ Divale 1977; Ensor 2013.

⁶³² Ensor 2013, 60.

⁶³³ Ember – Ember 1995; Peregrine 2001; Ensor 2021.

⁶³⁴ Ember et al. 2018.

⁶³⁵ Goody 1976, 104.

⁶³⁶ Halstead 1995.

subgroup, e.g. by men or women, adults or children.⁶³⁷ Such nuanced inequalities of consumption within houses, however, remain challenging to address through macroscopic zooarchaeological data. As a socio-cultural anthropologist, I cannot deny differences and possible inequalities within households in spheres of consumption, but discuss such inequalities only in cases that indicate possible inequalities between or within houses and household members. Moreover, this study also leaves open the possibility that some foods, such as game or other collected wild plants, could be items of regional competition for achieved or inherited status, which can, furthermore, be addressed through zooarchaeological material. If we consider that a certain household may gain a local or regional reputation based on diet or accumulation of any food items, then this consideration must, furthermore, be taken into account when discussing the zooarchaeological, mostly statistical interpretations, through people-centred, local, historical perspectives.

This last section of the chapter has established the anthropological approach in this study, which builds upon the micro-scale analysis of household archaeology, complemented with cross-cultural studies of ethnographic material, and the so-called ‘uncontrolled’, qualitative comparison of archaeological and ethnographic evidence, to address local histories at both sites. Regarding the cross-cultural studies, it should be noted that these will only serve as the major guideline rather than the means for detailed interpretations. To truly understand the local histories at the two sites being considered in this study, qualitative comparison with more detailed ethnographic cases will be preferred.

Chapter Summary and Conclusion

In this literature review, I aimed to demonstrate that despite dealing with prehistoric data from anthropological perspectives, my main objective is not to contribute to the studies of social evolution, but rather to dwell upon local history. If one’s habitus is the product of history, then the material culture being examined should likewise be treated as a form of local, personal, and collective histories at each site under investigation. Such an approach separates this study from the neoevolutionary conceptions, which, at least within the EBA Aegean, have primarily been concerned with the search for the predecessors of early states, rather than focusing on local and micro-regional, socio-cultural historical developments. I have shown in section II.2 that the evolutionary model of *band-tribe-chiefdom-state* has resulted in a bias towards chiefdom social organization in the EBA Aegean basin⁶³⁸ since, according to the neoevolutionary model, chiefdoms necessarily predate the emergence of early states. Consequently, much less attention has been paid to the examination of decentralized tribal constellations within this period and region. The strong reliance on neoevolutionary models has already been discussed by Pullen, whose critique of Renfrew’s approach I consider comprehensive and viable for the avoidance of similar pitfalls in my own work.⁶³⁹

Another problematic, albeit very common, tendency has been pointed out regarding the classification of various societies into the same social type of chiefdom across the ecologically diversified Aegean basin during the EBA. Both rich ethnographic data and recent archaeological work support the contemporary and spatial coexistence of different modes of production/subsistence and models of social organization within a particular region. Therefore, it is important to recognize that chiefdoms could coexist with decentralized tribal constellations, or that sedentary farming communities could develop a symbiotic relationship with pastoral groups in various constellations of regional and supra-regional heterogeneity and diversity. For that

⁶³⁷ For a detailed discussion of these possibilities, see Chapter VII.

⁶³⁸ E.g. Renfrew 1972.

⁶³⁹ Pullen 1985.

reason, I approach tribe as a ‘fuzzy’ category, as a common denominator for a wide variety of social organizational models, including segmentary lineage systems, great man societies, big man societies, and ranked chiefdoms (sometimes also including conical clans) that could be applied to more or less sedentary or mobile groups. The fact that DMP or kin-based modes of production may be the basis of all of the above models does not imply that these societies would be entirely self-sufficient (neither for reproduction nor for subsistence). Therefore, an understanding of exchange will be included alongside scrutinizing household organization at each site within this study.

Regarding household archaeology and research on domestic groups, I have argued that household archaeology provides a methodological framework for the discussion of domestic groups, while its latent predispositions are largely functionalist – discussing the similarities or differences between households to understand the local social organization. This, however, still leaves aside the question of social relations, which are crucial for a certain patterning of material culture. At root, as I have shown in the first section of this literature review, principles of kinship tend to ‘govern’ non-state societies, including social, political, and economic contexts. The majority of household archaeologists, however, avoid the topic of kinship, since ‘the field was created to move away from deterministic kinship studies’.⁶⁴⁰ Despite the difficulties in tracing kinship archaeologically, by relying upon ethnographic cases I recognize that ‘the elementary forms of kinship, politics and religion are all one’.⁶⁴¹ Therefore, a clear-cut separation between the three should also be avoided when dealing with the available prehistoric data.

This study does not make a clear distinction between kinship and the archaeological record, thereby failing to fulfil the initial aim of household archaeology. The step away from considering the house as the only kinship structure detectable archaeologically will be further explained in Chapter IV. If the reader wonders why the ‘house societies’ model has not been listed among the five models of non-state societies, the answer is simple: house societies are not an ideal type of social organization. Why this is so, is explained in more detail in Chapter IV, through multiple ethnographic examples and the archaeological example of Çukuriçi Höyük. Now, let us dive into relations between house dwellers at the two archaeological sites. The next chapter discusses the EBA ecology at Çukuriçi Höyük, EBA subsistence practices, and their dwelling perspectives. As I will argue, dwellers at this site were embedded into regional mixed economies through their on-site and off-site subsistence activities, within and beyond households.

⁶⁴⁰ R. Wilk, pers. comm. 2017.

⁶⁴¹ Sahlins 2008, 197.

