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Unknown Platonic Essays on Love and Beauty by George Pachymeres

with one plate

ABSTRACT: This article brings to light a collection of hitherto unknown philosophical texts—three essays and three shorter notes—by George Pachymeres. These texts are preserved in the last folios of the codex Wien, Österreichische Nationalbibliothek, Vind. phil. gr. 150, and were primarily copied by Pachymeres' pupil, Nikephoros Kallistos (or Kallistou) Xanthopoulos. Pachymeres' essays explore the Platonic themes of divine love and moral beauty, including queries about the state of knowledge and virtue in the human soul. They were mainly written in response to Proclus' Commentary on Plato's *First Alcibiades* but were also inspired by other Platonic dialogues such as the *Theaetetus*, the *Timaeus*, the *Phaedo* and the *Phaedrus*. Pachymeres' essays testify to the Byzantine reception of Plato from the perspective of a Christian philosopher interested in exploring Hellenic doctrines so as to better understand and teach the true doctrine of Christianity.

KEYWORDS: George Pachymeres; Nikephoros Xanthopoulos; Byzantine Reception of Plato

The philosophical work of George Pachymeres (1242–ca. 1310/15), one of the most prolific writers of the Palaeologan era, has drawn considerable scholarly attention over the past two decades[1]. Pachymeres is mostly known for his exegetical work on Aristotle, although it has been duly noted that Plato is the philosopher most frequently quoted in his *History*[2]. Pachymeres wrote a commentary on Plato's *Parmenides*, which supplemented the missing part of Proclus' respective commentary[3]. However, this was not his only work on Plato. The present article brings to light some hitherto unknown Platonic texts by Pachymeres, which were primarily written in response to Proclus' Commentary on Plato's *First Alcibiades*. These texts are preserved in a *codex unicus*, namely the codex Wien, Österreichische Nationalbibliothek, phil. gr. 150 (*Diktyon* 71264), f. 207r–212r.

The Vind. phil. gr. 150, f. 1r–198v, as well as the codex Città del Vaticano, Bibliotheca Apostolica Vaticana, gr. 321 (*Diktyon* 66952), f. 5v–191r[4], are the two manuscripts that contain George

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[1] See P. GOLITSIS, Georges Pachymère comme didascale. Essai pour une reconstitution de sa carrière et de son enseignement philosophique. *JÖB* 58 (2008) 53–68, for an overview of his philosophical work, which comprises both compendia and full-blown commentaries. Pachymeres' Commentary on Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* has been recently published: Georgios Pachymeres, Commentary on Aristotle, >Nicomachean Ethics<, edited by S. XENOPHONTOS, translated by S. XENOPHONTOS and C. ADDEY. Berlin 2022. Golitsis' suggestion (art. cit. 62–64) that Pachymeres may have produced his philosophical work as a consul of philosophers at the imperial school towards the end of the thirteenth century must be rejected in light of P. GOLITSIS, La date de la composition de la *Philosophia* de Georges Pachymère et quelques précisions sur la vie de l'auteur. *REB* 67 (2009) 209–215. Pachymeres produced his philosophical work towards the end of his life, after 1307, for a private circle of pupils and followers.

[2] A. FAILLER, Citations et réminiscences dans l'Histoire de Georges Pachymérès. *REB* 62 (2004) 159–180.

[3] Georgios Pachymeres, Commentary on Plato's *Parmenides* [Anonymous Sequel to Proclus' Commentary], ed. T. A. GADRA – S. M. HONEA – P. M. STINGER – G. UMHOLTZ – L. G. WESTERINK. Athens – Paris – Brussels 1989.

[4] Vat. gr. 321, f. 83–87, originally belonged to a different manuscript. They contain "a comment by Sir John Pediasimos, the consul of philosophers" (σχόλιον τοῦ ὑπάτου τῶν φιλοσόφων κυρίου ἰωάννου τοῦ πεδιασίμου) on the duplication of the cube, which is also treated by Pachymeres in his collection of geometrical theorems useful to the *Organon*. It is not improbable that, unlike Vind. phil. gr. 150, Vat. gr. 321, in which the words "by my teacher" (τοῦ διδασκάλου μου; see below) do not appear, was related to the activities of the imperial school.

Pachymeres' full-blown Commentary on Porphyry's *Isagoge* and Aristotle's *Organon*, which remains unedited[5]. Both manuscripts, which were produced by several hands[6], date from the early fourteenth century and are independent witnesses of Pachymeres' text. Moreover, they both contain a series of constructions of the geometrical propositions mentioned by Aristotle in his logical treatises. There can be little doubt that this geometrical collection, which bears the title ση(μείωσ)αι καὶ ταῦτα συντελοῦντα εἰς τὸ ὄργανον, ὧν σποράδην ἐν τῇ αὐτοῦ πραγματείᾳ ὁ ἀριστοτέλης ἐμνήσθη ("Take notice also of the following [propositions] useful to the *Organon*, which were scatteredly mentioned by Aristotle in his treatise") is also due to Pachymeres, who was the author of a *Quadrivium*[7]. Although the geometrical collection appears as an appendix to the Commentary in Vind. phil. gr. 150 (f. 199r–205v), it was probably written in a separate quaternion by Pachymeres as a preliminary. It is indeed placed before the commentary in Vat. gr. 321 (f. 1r–4r), whereas in Vind. phil. gr. 150 it is followed by a diagrammatical representation of the six definitions of philosophy (f. 206v, the last of the quaternion numbered κζ΄)[8], with which the commentary proper begins[9]. The same diagrammatical representation is found in Vat. gr. 321 at the bottom of f. 6v, the last of the first ternion, which was written after the second quaternion, as it becomes evident through the 'raccord imparfait' at the end of the folio. All this suggests that the geometrical collection of theorems useful to the *Organon* and the diagrammatical representation of the six definitions of philosophy were compiled by Pachymeres later on, that is, after he had completed his Commentary. The last three quaternia of Vat. gr. 321 (f. 192–215[10]) may also be related to Pachymeres' manuscript; they contain Theon of Smyrna's *Mathematics Useful for Understanding Plato*, which probably was the source of Pachymeres' inspiration for his own collection of geometrical theorems useful to Aristotle's *Organon*.

Whereas the geometrical collection is an integral part of Pachymeres' Commentary on the *Organon* and should therefore be included in its edition, a further collection of short texts, transmitted solely by Vind. phil. gr. 150, deserves a separate edition. In f. 207r–212r of the last quire of this manuscript, three philosophical essays and three shorter notes, mostly related to Plato, are contained[11]. These texts were copied by two of the seven copyists involved in the production of the entire manuscript, namely Nikephoros (207r–208r, 209r–212r; subscription in f. 124v), and an un-

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[5] See E. Pappa, Die Kommentare des Georgios Pachymeres zum Organon, in: Lesarten. Festschrift für Athanasios Kambylis, ed. I. Vassis – G. S. Henrich – D. Reinsch. Berlin – New York 1998, 198–210. P. Golitsis, Georges Pachymère comme didascale, 55 and 65. This full-blown commentary has to be distinguished from Pachymeres' synopsis of the *Organon*, which constitutes the first of the twelve books of his *Philosophia* (edition in preparation by the Academy of Athens).

[6] See P. Golitsis, Copistes, élèves et érudits : la production de manuscrits philosophiques autour de Georges Pachymère, in: The Legacy of Bernard de Montfaucon: Three Hundred Years of Studies on Greek Handwriting, ed. Antonio Bravo García – Inmaculada Pérez Martín – Juan Signes Codoñer. Turnhout 2010, 168 and 170.

[7] Ed. P. Tannery – E. Stéphanou, Georges Pachymère, Quadrivium ou Syntagma tōn tessarōn mathēmatōn, arithmetikēs, mousikēs, geōmetrias kai astronomias. Vatican 1940.

[8] There are two distinct numberings of the quires that make up the manuscript, the second numbering beginning tacitly with the actual f. 67 (τοῦ σοφωτάτου πρωτεκδίκου τῆς ἁγιωτάτης τοῦ θεοῦ μεγάλης ἐκκλησίας καὶ διδασκάλου μου τοῦ παχυμέρη ἐξήγησις τῶν ὑποθετικῶν συλλογισμῶν ἀριστοτέλους ["exegesis of the hypothetical syllogisms of Aristotle by the wisest Pachymeres, who is the protekdikos of the holiest great church of God and my teacher"]). This suggests that the copying of the model started with the hypothetical syllogisms probably because its first eight quires were temporarily not available. As the initial numbering reaches the last quire (κ΄, later κη΄), the first eight quires must have been copied last.

[9] H. Hunger, Katalog der griechischen Handschriften der Österreichischen Nationalbibliothek, Teil I: Codices Historici, Codices Philosophici et Philologici. Wien 1961, 256, relates these definitions, somewhat misleadingly, to the *Dialectica* of John of Damascus.

[10] Vat. gr. 321, f. 216–243, with which a new numbering of quires begins, originally formed a distinct codicological unit; they contain Maximus Planudes' *Great Calculation According to the Indians*.

[11] Hunger, Katalog der griechischen Handschriften der Österreichischen Nationalbibliothek, Teil I, 256, describes these texts as "philosophische Exzerpte". In reality, however, these are self-standing and, more or less, original texts; hence our characterizing them as 'essays'.

known scribe (208v). Nikephoros, who was the owner of the manuscript, qualifies Pachymeres as his διδάσκαλος (cf., for instance, the title given in f. 39r: ἐξήγησις τῶν τριῶν σχημάτων. ἀριστοτέλους ἀναλυτικῶν προτέρων πρῶτον. τοῦ πρωτεκδίκου καὶ διδασκάλου μου τοῦ παχυμέρη ["exegesis of the three syllogistic figures. First book of Aristotle's *Prior Analytics*. By the protekdikos Pachymeres, who is my teacher"]) and is, in all probability, to be identified with Nikephoros Kallistos (or Kallistou) Xanthopoulos, the well-known author of the *Ecclesiastical History*[12]. Quite interestingly, one of the Platonic themes discussed in the anonymous essays, namely "the double ignorance", i.e. to not know that one does not know, is found in Nikephoros Xanthopoulos' reply to the letter of 'monk Ignatios':

Vind. phil. gr. 150, f. 208v, lin. 5–8:
Καὶ γὰρ ἡ ἐπιστήμη ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς συμπληρωτική ἐστι· ἡ γὰρ ἀμαθία νόσος ψυχῆς ἐστι, καὶ ἡ ἄγνοια, καὶ μᾶλλον ἡ διπλῆ, μανία λέγεται τῆς ψυχῆς· ὡς γὰρ μαινόμενος οἴεται μὲν τόδε, οὐκ οἶδε δέ· οὕτω καὶ ὁ διπλῇ ἀγνοῶν.

Epistula ad Ignatium monachum, 50–53:

Ἔστι γάρ πως καί τινα μὴ εἰδότα λέγειν εἰδέναι, καὶ τοῦτό ἐστιν ἀγνοεῖν κατὰ Πλάτωνα τὸ τῆς ἀγνοίας διττόν, ὅτι τε ἀμαθῶς ἔχει καὶ ὅτι οὑτωσὶ διακείμενος ἀγνοεῖ[13].

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[12] See P. GOLITSIS, Nicéphore Calliste Xanthopoulos, élève de Georges Pachymère, in: Le livre manuscrit grec : écritures, matériaux, histoire, ed. M. Cronier – B. Mondrain (*TM* 24). Paris 2020, 305–315; A. BERGER (ed.), Nicephori Callisti Xanthopuli Historia Ecclesiastica. Volumen I: Libri 1–6 (*CFHB* 57, 1). Vienna 2022, 27. Nikephoros' handwriting is found in the codex Oxford, Bodleian Library, Baroccianus gr. 142 (*Diktyon* 47429) (hand H), which contains several materials used by Xanthopoulos in the *Ecclesiastical History*, as well as a revealing invocation (f. 10v: κ(ύρι)ε βοήθει τῷ σῷ δούλῳ νικηφόρῳ καλλίστῳ [O Lord, please help your servant Nikephoros Kallistos]), first noticed by N. WILSON, The Autograph of Nicephorus Callistus Xanthopoulos, *The Journal of Theological Studies* 25 (1974) 437–442. C. GASTGEBER, Xanthopuliana: Das Arbeitsexemplar Codex Oxford BL, Barocci 142 – Der Computist Xanthopulos, in: Anekdota Byzantina. Studien zur byzantinischen Geschichte und Kultur. Festschrift für Albrecht Berger anlässlich seines 65. Geburtstags, ed. I. Grimm-Stadelmann – A. Riehle – R. Tocci – M. M. Vučetić. Berlin – Boston 2023, 151, doubts that the invocation has been written by the hand H, i.e. the hand of Nikephoros Xanthopoulos, mostly because of the form of his middle name, which should be in the genitive—say, κύριε βοήθει τῷ σῷ δούλῳ νικηφόρῳ τῷ καλλίστου—in accordance with the self-evocation of the author in the first lines of the prooemium of the *Ecclesiastical History* (νικηφόρος *ὁ* καλλίστου, τὴν ἐκκλησιαστικὴν ἱστορίαν συνέταξεν). But the problem persists, even if the invocation has not been written by the hand H—did the copyist not know what the real name of his employer was? Should we perhaps consider that Xanthopoulos' middle name (would Kallistos be his father, who had become a monk?) was turned into a reverential adjective by his admirers and friends, which he himself occasionally adopted? Or did he turn his middle name (that is, his first family name) into a patronymic solely in his *Ecclesiastical History* out of imitation of Εὐσέβιος ὁ Παμφίλου? At any rate, all the titles mentioning Xanthopoulos in the Barocc. gr. 142 (f. 154v: νικηφόρου καλλίστου τοῦ ξανθοπούλου ὁ πίναξ, f. 205v: ἐκλογαὶ ἀπὸ τῆς ἀρχαιολογίας ἰωσήπου αἱ χρήσιμαι, ἐκλεγεῖσαι παρὰ νικηφόρου καλλίστου τοῦ ξανθοπούλου, f. 212r: ἀπὸ φωνῆς νικηφόρου καλλίστου τοῦ ξανθοπούλου, f. 288r: νικηφόρου καλλίστου τοῦ ξανθοπούλου εἴδησις ἀκριβεστάτη περὶ πάντων τῶν ἐν τῇ κωνσταντινουπόλει ἐπισκόπων καὶ πατριαρχῶν) actually conjugate κάλλιστος with νικηφόρος; otherwise, they would have the form νικηφόρου *τοῦ* καλλίστου. This is also true of the autograph note of lecture found in the codex Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, gr. 216 (*Diktyon* 49787), f. 333v (ἀνεγνώσθη καὶ αὕτη παρὰ νικηφόρου καλλίστου τοῦ ξανθοπ(ού)λ(ου) [this book too was read by Nikephoros Kallistos Xanthopoulos]; see GASTGEBER, Xanthopuliana, 152 table 3). Note that, *pace* GASTGEBER, Xanthopuliana, 141 n. 14 and 150, it is not the "Autorangabe" but the words ἐκ τοῦ α΄ λόγου that, on Golitsis' view, should be ascribed to Nikephoros on f. 205v. Finally, it should be added that the hand A2 (according to Gastgeber's nomenclature of the copyists of Barocc. gr. 142) is the main scribe ('B') of the codex Milano, Biblioteca Ambrosiana, H 44 sup. (Martini–Bassi 432) (*Diktyon* 42862), which contains Pachymeres' Commentary on Aristotle's *Physics*, dedicated to Nikephoros Xanthopoulos.

[13] Ed. R. BROWNING, A Young Man in a Hurry: Two Unpublished Letters of Nikephoros Kallistos Xanthopoulos. *Byzantina* 13 (1985) 147–153. It is worth noting that Nikephoros Xanthopoulos is self-styled *philosophōtatos* in the title given to the first of these two epistles, which is written as if it were sent to him by the monk Ignatios: Τοῦ φιλοσοφωτάτου κυροῦ Νικηφόρου Καλλίστου τοῦ Ξανθοπούλου ἐπιστολὴ πρὸς ἑαυτὸν ὡς ἀπὸ τοῦ ὁσιωτάτου δῆθεν μοναχοῦ κυροῦ Ἰγνατίου ["letter to himself by the most philosophical Sir Nikephoros Kallistos Xanthopoulos, as if it were were by the supposed holiest monk Sir Ignatios"]. There is another parallel between the essays and *The Ecclesiastical History* (Historia ecclesiastica. *PG* 147) but here Nikephoros Xanthopoulos fundamentally reproduces Evagrius 31, 2–7 (ed. J BIDEZ – L. PARMENTIER, The Ecclesiastical History of Evagrius with the Scholia. London 1898):

Indeed, knowledge fulfills the souls in which it dwells; for lack of knowledge is a disease of the soul, and ignorance, especially double ignorance, is said to be a madness of the soul; like a madman, one believes in one thing but does not know it; so it is with the doubly ignorant.

It is possible that one says that he knows without knowing; and this is, according to Plato, to ignore the double ignorance, namely that hone is in a state of lack of knowledge and ignores that he is in such a state.

One would be tempted to identify Nikephoros Xanthopoulos as the author of the Platonic essays contained in Vind. phil. gr. 150, but this cannot be true. In addition to the fact that the transmitted text contains errors of transcription[14], which are unlikely to be imputable to their author, the essays exploit passages from Platonic works that have been copied by Pachymeres himself and, moreover, bear numerous close resemblances with several of Pachymeres' works, such as his Commentary on Aristotle's *Physics*[15], his Commentary on the *corpus areopagiticum*, the *Philosophia*, his *Quadrivium*, even his *Declamationes*[16]. Therefore, the texts contained in f. 207r–212r of Vind. phil. gr. 150 should be ascribed to George Pachymeres, whose pupil, namely Nikephoros Xanthopoulos, copied them in order to preserve them and to freely use them in his own work.

The essays are centered on the Platonic themes of divine love and moral beauty, including queries about the state of knowledge and virtue in the human soul. As already said, they are chiefly inspired by Proclus' Commentary on Plato's *First Alcibiades*, which Pachymeres himself copied in the codex Napoli, Biblioteca Nazionale, E.III.17 (*Diktyon* 46360), f. 1r–98v[17], but also by other Platonic dialogues, such as the *Theaetetus*, the *Timaeus* and the *Phaedo*, as well as the *Phaedrus*, which Pachymeres copied in the codex Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, gr. 1810 (*Diktyon* 51436), f. 17r–93r, together with Hermias' Commentary. The Platonic themes are approached in an original way from the perspective of a Christian philosopher, who is interested in exploring Hellenic doctrines in order to better grasp and teach the true doctrine of Christianity. Plato's dialectic plays a key role in Pachymeres' philosophical thought, as is evident from the hermeneutically unbiased way in which he commented on the second part of the *Parmenides*, and also from his attempt (in his scholium *ad locum*) to mitigate Aristotle's claim about the innovative character of the *Topics* and the *Sophistical Refutations*; Pachymeres acknowledges the value of the *Phaedrus* and

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Vind. phil. gr. 150, f. 209r, lin. 14–18:

Ἐπεὶ δὲ εἰς σῶμα πίπτει ἡ ψυχή, καὶ παμπόλλους χιτῶνας ἐντεῦθεν ἐνδύεται κατὰ Πλάτωνα (λήθην πλάνην ἄγνοιαν φιλοδοξίαν φιληδονίαν καὶ τὰ παραπλήσια), καὶ *ἔσχατον χιτῶνα* κατ' αὐτὸν τοῦτον τὴν φιλότιμον ζωήν, ταῦτα δὲ πάντα διὰ τὴν ὕλην ἐπέρχονται …

But since the soul falls into a body and hence wears numerous tunics according to Plato (oblivion, delusion, ignorance, ambition, love of pleasures, and the like), and it wears its last tunic according to him, namely the life that pursues honours, and all these occur to the soul because of matter […].

Historia Ecclesiastica XIV, 50, 91–97:

Εἰσὶ γὰρ δή τινες οἵ, ἐπὰν διὰ πολλῶν μόχθων τῆς ἀρετῆς τὸ ἀπαθεῖς εἶναι κληρώσαιντο, πρὸς τὸν κόσμον ἐπανήκουσιν αὖθις. παραφόρους δ' ἑαυτοὺς εἶναι σχήμασί τισιν ἀτάκτοις ἐπαγγελλόμενοι, οὕτω τὴν κενὴν δόξαν περιφρονοῦσιν. ὃν *τελευταῖον χιτῶνα*, Πλάτων φησὶν ὁ φιλόσοφος, ἡ ψυχὴ πέφυκεν ἀποτίθεσθαι.

There are some who, once they have acquired impassibility through many labors of virtue, return to the people. Professing to be madmen through their disordered appearence, they despise empty glory, which is the last tunic that the soul sheds, as Plato the philosopher says.

[14] See the *apparatus criticus* to our edition below.

[15] This Commentary has been wrongly edited under the name of Michael Psellos (Michael Psellos, Kommentar zur Physik des Aristoteles, ed. L.G. Benakis [*Corpus Philosophorum Medii Aevi. Commentaria in Aristotelem Byzantina* 5]. Athens 2008). On the authorship, see P. Golitsis, Un commentaire perpétuel de Georges Pachymère à la *Physique* d'Aristote, faussement attribué à Michel Psellos. *BZ* 100 (2007) 637– 676.

[16] See the *apparatus locorum parallelorum* to our edition below.

[17] Neap. III.E.17, f. 149r–159v, which contain Plato's *Laches*, were copied by Nikephoros Xanthopoulos.

the *Parmenides* with respect to the development of dialectic[18]. There follows a short description of Pachymeres' Platonic essays.

(I) The first essay starts with discussing the difference between the vulgar lover and the divine lover[19], who, unlike the former, is in turn loved by the object of his love. The theme of return-love (ἀντέρως), which Proclus brought into the exegesis of the *First Alcibiades* from the *Phaedrus*[20], is related by Pachymeres to matter's being in turn loved by form, a claim that comes as an extension of Aristotle's saying that matter "loves" form[21], and, more crucially, to God's being the lover of the human soul, as the Christian tradition has it[22]. Pachymeres explains that the completion which is sought for in the divine love is not attained through the power to act, as it happens in vulgar love, but through the power to be affected, i.e. to be illuminated and perfectioned by the object of love, which is more powerful than the lover. Like form with regard to matter, God loves the soul of His lover not *per se* but accidentally, since He does not love the lover but loves to be loved, that is, He loves to transmit His goods and to exercise His providence on His creatures. Pachymeres favours Aristotle and criticizes Proclus for positing two distinct sources of goodness and existence. It is God who grants both essence and existence to His creations; it is again God who perfects His lovers through loving them back. Pachymeres rebukes a possible objection to his interpretation, namely that God would still have an object of love *per se*, namely His being loved; he points out that, had this been true, the object of love would fulfill the lover, which is impossible for the all-perfect God. God can be said to have an object of love *per se* only in relation to His objects of love *per accidens* (the human souls) and from the point of view of (the Aristotelian category of) relation, which in itself is an accident to a substance. In reality, to be loved is an accident to God, since this does not by any means perfect His Essence. Finally, Pachymeres explains that one should not be disturbed by the claim that God has accidents, since this is only said through transposition. It is actually an accident for the human souls to love God—they may love God, they may not, but they are still souls—and, thus, it is an accident for God to be loved. It is similar to our saying that to blind is an accident to the shining sun because those who look at it get blinded.

(II) The second essay sets out to solve a puzzle. Why is it, Pachymeres asks, that whereas what is against nature rarely occurs in the bodily realm, it occurs most frequently with regard to the soul? Indeed, vice and ignorance characterize most human souls, which by their own nature should be virtuous and knowledgeable. In his answer, Pachymeres brings in from the *Phaedrus* the theme of the moulting of the soul, i.e. its mingling with matter and body, and its consequent "wearing" several layers of "tunics", which impede the soul to see, i.e. to know, and to act virtuously. Still, taking as guide its intellect (νοῦς), through which it knows the definitions of things, the soul can come to know the multiple, material and particular things immaterially, universally and unitarily, thus acquiring "the beginning of knowledge", as Aristotle has it[23]. Pachymeres takes care to distinguish the unitary definitions, which are the principles of science, from the universals *post rem*, which relate to opinion (δόξα) and seeming wisdom (δοξοσοφία). Taking Alcibiades as an example of the state of ignorance, in which most human souls are because of their embodiment, Pachymeres refers to the *First Alcibiades*, where Socrates asks 'when, in dialectic, one asks and the other answers,

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[18] See G. Savoidakis, Le Commentaire de Georges Pachymère sur le *Parménide* de Platon : une interprétation aristotélicienne de la dialectique de Platon. *Bulletin de Philosophie Médiévale* 65 (2024) 420–425; idem, Le système logique des hypothèses du *Parménide* de Platon dans le Commentaire de Georges Pachymère. *Peitho* 16 (2025).

[19] Cf. Plato, Alc. 103b2–104a4.

[20] Cf. Proclus, In Alc. 127.5–15.

[21] Cf. Aristotle, Phys. A 9, 192a16–25.

[22] Cf. Symeon Metaphrastes, Passio sanctarum Menodorae, Metrodorae et Nymphodorae. *PG* 56, 664C.

[23] Cf. Aristotle, Anal. Post. A 33, 88b36; B 19, 100b15.

who is the one who speaks?' and Alcibiades erroneously answers 'the one who answers'[24]; this is due because of Alcibiades' adhesion to opinion and imagination.

(III) The third essay asks through what state of the soul we come to know the evil, since this cannot occur either through δόξα—since δόξα knows the particular, which is the reason for our confusing the unjust with the just—or through νοῦς, given that the realm of νοῦς is determined solely by moral beauty (τὸ καλόν), just as the realm of the disembodied and perfect soul is determined by justice. As in the previous essays, Pachymeres substantiates his claim by explicitly referring to Aristotle[25]. However, he tacitly excerpts Proclus' Commentary on the *First Alcibiades*, which is here characteristically "purified" from its Hellenic polytheism:

Proclus, *In Alc*. 318.4–12:

Τὸ δὲ ἀγαθὸν *ἅπασαν τὴν θείαν οὐσίαν* ἀφορίζει. […] εἰ τοίνυν τὶ δίκαιον διὰ τοῦ καλοῦ τῷ ἀγαθῷ συνδέδεται, καὶ *πᾶς ὁ ψυχικὸς διάκοσμος διὰ μέσων τῶν νοερῶν ὑποστάσεων ἥνωται τοῖς θεοῖς*, ὥστε μία ἡ ἀσώματος φύσις καὶ ἑνοειδὴς καὶ συννεύει πᾶσα πρὸς τὸ ἀγαθόν.

The whole of the divine nature is determined by the good. […] if therefore something just is linked to the good through the beautiful, and the entire orderly arrangement of the souls is unified with the gods through the intellective hypostases, so that the incorporeal nature is a one and uniform and entirely tends towards the good.

Vind. phil. gr. 150, f. 210r, lin. 9–13:

Μόνην δὲ τὴν θείαν φύσιν τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἀφορίζει. καὶ τριῶν ὄντων, δικαίου τῆς ψυχῆς, καλοῦ τοῦ νοός, καὶ ἀγαθοῦ τοῦ θείου, κατὰ τὴν τριαδικὴν ἕνωσιν συνάπτεται τὸ δίκαιον τῷ ἀγαθῷ διὰ μέσου τοῦ καλοῦ, καὶ *ψυχὴ τῷ θείῳ διαμέσου <τοῦ> νοός*[26].

The divine nature is determined only by the good. And given that there are three things, namely the justice of the soul, the moral beauty of the intellect, and the goodness of the divine, the just is linked to the good via the morally beautiful according to the triadical union, and thus the soul is linked to the divine via the intellect.

To answer the initial question, Pachymeres tacitly brings in a tripartition found in (pseudo-)Timaeus' treatise *On the Nature and the Soul of the Universe*[27], which the Byzantine philosopher has also copied in Par. gr. 1810, 93v–96v. Given that there are three things—matter, form, and their offsprings—and three cognitions—science, bastard reasoning, and perception—we know the morally bad as the privation of the morally beautiful, which we genuinely know through our νοῦς; our causing it is similar to the activity of a doctor, who can accidentally be the cause of a disease[28].

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[24] Cf. Plato, Alc. 113a6–10.

[25] Cf. Aristotle, Metaph. Λ 7, 1072a26; 1072b3.

[26] See C. Steel – C. Mace, Georges Pachymère philologue : le Commentaire de Proclus au *Parménide* dans le manuscrit Parisinus gr. 1810, in: ed. M. Cacouros – M.-H. Congordeau, Philosophie et sciences à Byzance de 1204 à 1453. Leuven 2006, 77–100, for similar 'purifications' with regard to Proclus' Commentary on Plato's *Parmenides*.

[27] [Timaeus], De natura mundi et animae 206.7–10.

[28] Compare with Pachymeres' comment on some lines of the epilogue of the *Sophistical Refutations*, 34, 184a2–4 (οὐ γὰρ τέχνην ἀλλὰ τὰ ἀπὸ τῆς τέχνης διδόντες παιδεύειν ὑπελάμβανον), in which it is explained why the sophists "thought that they should teach by giving, not the art, but the things taken from the art"; Vind. phil. gr. 150, f. 198r9–18: Τέχνη ἐστὶ πᾶσα ἡ συλλογιστικὴ μέθοδος, ἐν ᾗ ἐστι καὶ ὁ ἀληθινὸς ἔλεγχος. ὁ δὲ ταύτην παραδοὺς καὶ τέχνην παραδίδωσι καὶ παιδεύει, αἱ δὲ παραγωγαὶ καὶ οἱ παραλογισμοί, οἱ τρόποι δηλονότι τῆς ἀπάτης οἷς ἐχρῶντο καὶ ἐδίδασκον οἱ σοφισταί, οὐ «τέχνη», ἀλλὰ τὸ «ἀπὸ τέχνης»· ὁ γὰρ ἔχων τὴν δύναμιν καὶ ἐπιστήμην τοῦ συλλογίσασθαι, ἐκεῖνος δηλονότι δύναται [Vat. gr. 321 : δυνατὸς ex δύναται Vind. phil. gr. 150] καὶ παραλογίζεσθαι. ὥσπερ γὰρ ὁ ἔχων τὴν τέχνην τοῦ ὀρθογραφεῖν καὶ ὑγιάζειν, ἐκεῖνος οἶδε καὶ μὴ ὀρθογραφεῖν καὶ νόσον ἐμποιεῖν, οὕτω καὶ ὁ δυνάμενος ἐπιστημόνως συλλογίζεσθαι, ἐκεῖνος οἶδε καὶ παραλογίζεσθαι· ὥστε τὸ παραλογίζεσθαι, ὅπερ ἐπετήδευον οἱ σοφισταὶ καὶ ἄλλους ἐδίδασκον, οὐ τέχνη ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἀπὸ τέχνης δυνάμενον γίνεσθαι ("the entire syllogistic is an art, which also comprises true refutation. Whoever teaches it teaches an art and instructs, whereas the deceptions and the fallacies, namely the modes of deceit employed and taught by the sophists, are not "art", but "from the art". For whoever has the skill and knowledge to make

Pachymeres brings into his essay themes and passages from the *Phaedrus*, which had already been exploited by Proclus in his Commentary on the *First Alcibiades*. He distinguishes the philosopher from the rhetor, who separates the beneficial from the just, because he is ignorant of the unity of virtues in the human soul, which is the essence of human beings. This Proclean doctrine (of Orphic origin) gives to the Byzantine philosopher the opportunity to introduce the distinction between the "I", i.e. the soul, the "mine", i.e. the bodily goods, and the "ours", i.e. the external goods, a distinction found in Plotinus and in late Platonic commentaries[29], and to quote by heart a passage from the *Phaedo*:

> This is why Socrates in the *Phaedo*, when he is asked how he would like to be buried, says: "provided that you can catch me"; [he says so] because the whole of our essence is in our soul[30].

Pachymeres explains that since there is no form of soul (on the contrary, the soul, as Aristotle has it, is the form of the body), the soul receives its moral beauty directly by her Father, i.e. God[31]. The soul is loved only by "the true lover of beauty" (τῷ ὄντως φιλοκάλῳ), who, according to the Christian tradition, is said "to long for the superior" (ἐπιθυμητὴς τῶν κρειττόνων)[32]. At the end, the third essay brings the discussion back to the theme discussed in the first essay. If what makes the soul beautiful, i.e. God, is said to love the soul's beauty, this is not because He is perfectioned through her beauty but because He makes her perfect.

Since it is established in the third essay that the true eudemonic life depends solely on the soul, Pachymeres adds a short note (V) about Aristotle's different conception of *eudaimonia*. This conception is silently judged to be inferior to Plato's, since it involves the bodily goods. The last note (VI) is directly linked to the *Sophistical Refutations*, the last treatise to be commented by Pachymeres in Vind. phil. gr. 150, but also to the *First Alcibiades*. It addresses the sophism of taking 'what thing' (ὃ) collectively rather than severally, which the *First Alcibiades* seems to have inspired to Aristotle[33]. The short geometrical explanation (IV: "Every limiting thing has one

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syllogisms can obviously also produce fallacies. Indeed, just as he who masters the art of writing words correctly and of maintaining a good health knows how not to write words correctly and how to cause a disease, so too he who can syllogize scientifically also knows how to produce fallacies; so the method of making fallacies, which the sophists practiced and taught to others, is not an art, but that which can be produced from the art."). Cf. Michael the Ephesian, In Soph. el. 197.24–198.4. It is noteworthy that, just before this comment, Pachymeres distinguishes the dialectic illustrated in the *Phaedrus* and the *Parmenides* from the sophistic, which is illustrated through the *Gorgias*; see G. SAVOIDAKIS, Le Commentaire de Georges Pachymère sur le *Parménide* de Platon, 420–425.

[29] Cf. Plotinus, Enn. I 1, 7.14–18 and IV 4, 18.10–15; Olympiodorus, In Phaed. 6, 8.9–11; David, Prolegomena 41.5–10; Elias, In Porph. Isag. 22.33–23.1.

[30] Vind. phil. gr 150, f. 211r, lin. 3–5: Διὸ καὶ ὁ ἐν Φαίδωνι Σωκράτης ἐρωτηθεὶς περὶ τοῦ πῶς αὐτὸν θάψουσιν, φησίν, «ἢν με λάβητε τέως», ὡς τοῦ παντὸς τῆς οὐσίας ἡμῶν ὄντος ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ. Cf. Plato, Phaed. 115c3–5: Θάπτωμεν δέ σε τίνα τρόπον; – Ὅπως ἄν, ἔφη, βούλησθε, ἐάνπερ γε λάβητέ με καὶ μὴ ἐκφύγω ὑμᾶς.

[31] This is also reminiscent of Plotinus, Enn. V 1, 3.14–14: ἡ τελείωσις ἀπ' αὐτοῦ πάλιν οἷον πατρὸς ἐκθρέψαντος, ὃν οὐ τέλειον ὡς πρὸς αὐτὸν ἐγέννησεν.

[32] Cf. Origenes, Fragmenta in Io. 42, 27–28 (ed. E. PREUSCHEN, Origenes. Werke, IV [*GCS* 10]. Leipzig 1903) = Theodore of Mopsuestia, Comm. in Io. 22, 6–7 (ed. R. DEVREESSE, Essai sur Théodore de Mopsueste [*StT* 141]. Vatican 1948).

[33] Cf. Aristotle, *Soph. el.* 22, 178b34–36: Καὶ "ἆρ' ὅ τις οἶδεν, ἢ μαθὼν ἢ εὑρὼν οἶδεν; ὧν δὲ τὸ μὲν εὗρε τὸ δ' ἔμαθε, τὰ ἄμφω οὐδέτερον." ἢ ΄ὃ' μὲν ἅπαν, ΄ἃ' δ' οὐχ ἅπαντα ("Again, 'Is it not either by learning or by discovery that a man knows what he knows?' But, supposing that of two things he has discovered one and learnt the other, he has not either discovered or learnt the two taken together. Yet, 'what thing' is equivalent to the whole, whereas 'what things' is not equivalent to wholes"; translation by Forster, modified). Cf. Plato, Alc. 106d4–9: ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ταῦτα μόνον οἶσθα, ἃ παρ' ἄλλων ἔμαθες ἢ αὐτὸς ἐξηῦρες; ΑΛ. Ποῖα γὰρ ἄλλα; ΣΩ. Ἔστιν οὖν ὅπως ἄν ποτε ἔμαθές τι ἢ ἐξηῦρες μήτε μανθάνειν ἐθέλων μήτ' αὐτὸς ζητεῖν; ΑΛ. Οὐκ ἔστιν ("*Socrates*: And you know only the things you have learnt from others or discovered yourself? *Alcibiades*: What could I know besides? *Socrates*: And can it be that you would ever have learnt or discovered anything without being willing either to learn it or to inquire into it yourself? *Alcibiades*: No.").

dimension less than the thing of which it is the limit"), which separates the three Platonic essays from the two shorter notes, is irrelevant[34]. Still, it has a close parallel in Pachymeres' *Philosophia*[35].

In what follows, we publish the texts contained in f. 207r–212r of Vind. phil. gr. 150 with an English translation. Our edition comprises three apparatuses: *apparatus criticus*, *apparatus fontium*, *apparatus locorum parallelorum*. We have normalized the punctuation and the orthography (iota subscripted, enclitics, double accentuation of the conditional ἄν and the antithetic μὲν – δὲ, capitalized letters, separation of words) for the sake of clarity. The scholar interested in the history of Greek writing will find the readings of the manuscript in the *apparatus criticus*.

[34] Although Proclus does speak of the 'limit' (πέρας) in his Commentary on the *First Alcibiades*, he always has its Pythagorean (i.e. metaphysical) sense in mind.

[35] Cf. Pachymeres, Philosophia III 1, 2, 3.7–8: Πᾶν γάρ, φησὶ τὸ ἀξίωμα, τὸ περατοῦν τοῦ περατουμένου λείπεται μιᾷ διαστάσει ("Every limiting thing, according to the axiom, has one dimension less than the thing of which it is the limit").

Edition

cod. = Vindononensis phil. gr. 150



Plate 1: Vienna, Austrian National Library, phil. gr. 150 (*Diktyon* 71264), f. 207r

I

{207r} Ὁ μὲν *φορτικὸς ἐραστὴς* ὑπερβληθεὶς τοῖς τοῦ ἐρωμένου πλεονεκτήμασι, καθὼς ὁ ἐν Ἀλκιβιάδῃ Σωκράτης καὶ λέγει καὶ αὐτοῖς παρίστησι πράγμασι, καὶ παύεται καὶ ἀποδιδράσκει, πλὴν οὐχ ὑπερβληθεὶς ἐν τούτῳ οὗ καὶ ἐρᾷ, οἷον ἴσως τῷ κάλλει, ἀλλ' ἄλλοις τοῖς ἔξωθεν, πλούτῳ καὶ δόξῃ καὶ εὐγενείᾳ· ὁ δὲ *ἔνθεος ἐραστὴς* οὐ πάσχει τοῦτο, ἀλλ' ὅσῳ ἂν τὸ ἐραστὸν μεῖζον ᾖ, τοσούτῳ καὶ πλέον ἐρᾷ καὶ οὐκ ἀφίσταται, εἰ μὴ δι' ἀνεπιτηδειότητα καὶ μονὴν καὶ τὴν εἰς τὰ χείρω ῥοπήν. ὅθεν οὐδὲ *ἀντέρως* πέφυκεν ἐν τῷ οὕτως φορτικῷ γίνεσθαι, ἐν δὲ τῷ ἐνθέῳ καὶ πάνυ. ἐρᾷ γὰρ ἡ ὕλη ὡς ἐφετοῦ καὶ ἐραστοῦ τοῦ εἴδους, ὡς ὁ Ἀριστοτέλης φησί, καὶ ὡς «θῆλυ ἄρρενος», ἀντερᾷ δὲ καὶ τὸ εἶδος αὐτῆς, οὐ τὸν ὅμοιον τρόπον, ἀλλ' ἡ μὲν ὕλη τοῦ εἴδους ὡς τελειοποιοῦ καὶ καλλωπιστικοῦ καὶ τοῦ αἴσχους αὐτῆς ἀποσοβητικοῦ (μόνη γάρ ἐστιν ἡ ὕλη τὸ *ἀληθινὸν ψεῦδος*), ὃ ἐρᾷ ἀποθέσθαι οὐ καθ' αὑτήν (οὐδὲν γὰρ τῆς ἑαυτοῦ ἀπωλείας ἐφίεται) ἀλλὰ διὰ τὴν ἐνοῦσαν στέρησιν· τὸ δὲ εἶδος τῆς ὕλης ἐρᾶν λέγεται, διότι ἐν αὐτῇ ἔχει τὴν καλλοποιὸν δεικνύειν ἐνέργειαν· ἀναπλοῖ γὰρ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ τελεστικὴν εἰς ὃ τελειῶσαι καὶ κοσμῆσαι τὸ ἄκοσμον. διὸ καὶ λέγεται ὁ Θεὸς ἐραστὴς τῆς ἡμετέρας ψυχῆς.

Ζητητέον οὖν εἰ λέγεται καὶ ἡ ὕλη ἐραστόν, ἐπεὶ ὑπὸ τοῦ εἴδους ἐρᾶται, καὶ εἰ ἡ ψυχὴ ἐραστὸν λέγεται τῷ Θεῷ καί, εἰ οὐ λέγεται, κατὰ τί οὐ λέγεται, καὶ δὴ πῶς ἀντέρως οὐ γίνεται ἐν τῷ φορτικῷ ἔρωτι, ὅταν ὑπερβάλληται τὸ ἐρώμενον.

Καὶ πρῶτον τοῦτο, ὅτι πᾶς ἔρως ἐνδεεῖ τινι, οὗ καὶ ἐρᾷ ὁ ἐραστής, γίνεται, εἴτε φορτικός εἴτε ἔνθεος, ἀλλὰ διαφορὰν ἔχει τήνδε, ὅτι ἐπὶ μὲν τοῦ φορτικοῦ ἀποπλήρωσίς τις ζητεῖται τῆς ἐνδείας, ἵνα δύναμιν ἔχῃ εἰς τὸ ἐνεργῆσαι καὶ οὕτως ἀποπληρωθῆναι αὐτόν, ἐπὶ δὲ τοῦ ἐνθέου ἀποπλήρωσις κἀκεῖσε ζητεῖται {207v} τῆς ἐνδείας, ἀλλ' ἵνα δύναμιν ἔχῃ εἰς τὸ παθεῖν καὶ οὕτως ἀποπληρωθῆναι τὸ ἐρῶν. ἐκεῖσε γοῦν ὑπερβάλλοντος τοῦ ἐρωμένου ἡ δρᾶσις καὶ ἡ ἐνέργεια τοῦ ἐρῶντος ἀσθενὴς ἐλέγχεται, καὶ ὑπερφρονεῖται ὁ ἐρῶν, καὶ οὕτω δραπετεύει· ἐνταῦθα δὲ τὸ ἐρῶν δύναμιν ἀναζητοῦν παθήσεως, ἤγουν ἐλλάμψεως ἢ τελειότητος ἢ ἄλλου του τοιούτου, οὐ, διότι ὑπερβάλλεται, ναρκᾷ πρὸς τὸν ἔρωτα, ἀλλὰ καὶ μᾶλλον ἐφιέμενον τῆς τελειώσεως ἑαυτοῦ, ὅσον ἐστὶν ἱκανὸν τὸ ἐρώμενον τελειῶσαι τὸ ἐρῶν, τόσον καὶ μᾶλλον ἐπιμένον ἐφίεται.

Ἡ ὕλη δὲ οὐ λέγεται ἐραστὸν τῷ εἴδει, καίτοι ἐρώμενον ὑπ' αὐτοῦ, οὐδὲ ἡ ψυχὴ τῷ θεῷ, καίτοι ἐρωμένη παρ' ἐκείνου, ὅτι οὐ καθ' αὐτὸ τῆς ὕλης τὸ εἶδος ἐρᾷ καὶ ἐφίεται, ἀλλὰ καθ' αὐτὸ τοῦ ἐρᾶσθαι ἐρᾷ, ὥσπερ δὴ καὶ ποθεῖ τὸ ποθεῖσθαι, κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς δέ· ἐπεὶ τὸ ἐρᾶσθαι καὶ ποθεῖσθαι παρά του γίνεται, ἐρᾷ κἀκείνου. καὶ οὕτως λέγεται τὸ εἶδος ἐρᾶν τῆς ὕλης, καὶ ὁ Θεὸς τῶν ψυχῶν. κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἄρα ἐρᾷ τῆς ὕλης τὸ εἶδος, καθ' αὐτὸ δὲ τοῦ ἐρᾶσθαι. κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἄρα καὶ τὸ θεῖον ἐρᾷ τῶν ψυχῶν καὶ ποθεῖ ταύτας, καθ' αὐτὸ δὲ τὸ ποθεῖσθαι ποθεῖ καὶ τοῦ ἐρᾶσθαι ἐρᾷ, ὅλον ὂν ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὴν εὐεργετικὴν πρόνοιαν ἑαυτοῦ ἐφαπλοῦν ἅπασιν εἰς ἀποπλήρωσιν τῶν αὐτοῦ

I,2 καὶ[1] s.l. 3 οὗ ex ᾧ καλλει cod. αλλ᾽ cod. 6 μόνην cod. 11 ὃ] sc. τὸ αἶσχος 17 κατατί cod. 20 ἀποπλήρωσις τίς cod. 22 αὐτόν] τὸν ἐρῶντα in marg.; immo αὐτόν 29 immo ἐρωμένη 31 καθ᾽ αὐτο cod. κατασυμβεβηκός cod.

I,1 Procl. In Alc. 35.5 1–2 cf. Plat. Alc. 103b5; 103b2–104a4 4 Procl. In Alc. 35.12; cf. Plat. Symp. 180b4 6 Plat. Phaedr. 255e1; cf. Procl. In Alc. 127.5 7–8 ἐρᾷ ... ἄρρενος cf. Arist. Phys. A 9, 192a16–25 11 Plot. Enn. II 5, 5.24 14–15 cf. Symeon Metaphr. Passio sanctarum Menodorae… 664C; [Io. Chrys.] Interpretatio in Danielem 193.28

I,11 Ps.-Psell. In Phys. 6.17–18: ἡ ὕλη γὰρ μὴ ὂν καί, κατὰ Πλάτωνα φάναι, τὸ ἀληθινὸν ψεῦδος. Pach. In Div. nom. 797C: διὸ καὶ ἐνεργείᾳ ἐστὶν εἴδωλον (sc. ἡ ὕλη) καὶ ἐνεργείᾳ ψεῦδος, τουτέστιν ἀληθινῶς καὶ ὄντως ψεῦδος.

I

The vulgar lover, outdone by the superiority of the object of his love, as Socrates both says and shows in practice in the *Alcibiades*, abandons his love and leaves, even though he is not outdone in what he loves (for instance, in beauty) but in other external things, such as wealth, glory and nobility. On the contrary, the divine lover does not experience this; the greater the object of his love is, the more he loves it, and he does not part with it except perhaps because of his own inaptitude, permanence, or inclination towards the worse. This is the reason for which a return-love does not arise in vulgar love, whereas it inevitably arises in divine love. For matter loves form as desirable and lovable, as Aristotle says, and as "the female loves the male"; and form loves matter back, but not in the same way. Matter loves form as that which perfects and beautifies her and keeps away her ugliness (for matter alone is the true falsehood), which she wants to shed not by herself (for nothing desires its own destruction) but due to the privation that inheres in her. Conversely, form is said to love matter because it can manifest its beautifying energy within her: it unfolds its accomplishing [power] to fulfill and order the disordered. Hence the characterisation of God as the lover of our soul.

We shall examine, therefore, whether matter too is said to be an object of love because it is loved by form, and whether the soul is said to be an object of love to God and, if not, in what sense it is not, and, of course, [we shall also examine] why a return-love does not arise in vulgar love when the object of love outdoes the lover.

Let us start with this: every love, whether vulgar or divine, arises from a certain need, which is why the lover loves. But there is a difference between the two: the vulgar lover seeks satisfaction of his need in order to have the power to act and thus satisfy himself; the divine lover also seeks satisfaction but in order to acquire the power to be affected, and thus the lover (τὸ ἐρῶν) is satisfied. In the first case, when the object of love outdoes the lover, the action and energy of the lover (ὁ ἐρῶν) are proven weak, and the lover is despised and thus leaves. But in the second case, the lover (τὸ ἐρῶν), longing for the power to be affected—that is, to be illuminated or perfected or something similar—does not become numb towards its love because it is outdone; on the contrary, since it desires more its own perfection, as long as the object of love can perfect it, the lover desires it even more and persists.

Matter is not said to be an object of love to form, even though it is loved by it, nor is the soul said to be an object of love to God, even though it is loved by Him. This is because, in itself, form does not love and desire matter but loves to be loved and yearns to be yearned; and since being loved and being yearned for come with a subject, it accidentally loves the subject too. It is in this way that form is said to love matter and God to love the souls. Therefore, form loves matter accidentally, whereas in itself it loves to be loved. Similarly, the divine loves and yearns for our souls accidentally; in itself, it yearns to be yearned for and loves to be loved, as it is entirely good and unfolds its beneficial providence to all things so that they be fulfilled with all its

δωρεῶν, καθὸ λέγεται καὶ ὁ αὐτόθεν ἐλεῶν ὅτι μιμεῖται Θεόν· ἔσχατον γὰρ εἴδωλον οὗτος ἐστὶ τοῦ Θεοῦ καὶ τῆς αὐτοῦ προνοίας καὶ διοικήσεως, ὅτι ἓν ὢν οὗτος καὶ ἄπειρα οὐκ ὤν, κατὰ τὸ ὅπερ ἐστὶν εὐεργετεῖν θέλει καὶ τοὺς πλησίον· πλούσιος γάρ, φέρε, χρημάτων ὤν, ἄπειρα οὐκ ἔστιν· οὔτε γὰρ ἰσχυρὸς οὔτε σοφὸς οὔτε καλὸς οὔτε ὁτιοῦν τῶν ἄλλων ἁπάντων. τὸ δὲ θεῖον ἄπειρα τῶν καλῶν ὂν καὶ ἄπειρα τῶν κακῶν οὐκ ὄν, μὴ μόνον τῶν ἀπείρων κακῶν ἐξαίρειν οἶδεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ἀπείρων καλῶν αὐτάρκως ἔχον, τούτων ἁπάντων μεταδιδόναι τοῖς ἐνδεέσιν ἐφίεται. ἐξ οὗ γὰρ ἡ οὐσία ἐκείνοις καὶ ἡ ὕπαρξις, ἐκ τούτου καὶ ἡ τελείωσις πέφυκε γίνεσθαι. καὶ οὐ πειστέον Πρόκλῳ κακῶς καὶ ἀθέως λέγοντι καὶ ἀμφισβητοῦντι περὶ τῶν φανερῶν καὶ οὐκ αὐτόθεν {f. 208r} προσιεμένῳ τὴν τοῦ δαιμονίου Ἀριστοτέλους ἔννοιαν, ἀλλ’ οὕτω που προοιμιαζομένῳ: «*Εἴτε γὰρ ἀπὸ τῆς αὐτῆς ἑστίας καὶ πρωτίστης πηγῆς τό τε εἶναι πρόεισι καὶ τὸ ἀγαθόν, ὡς Ἀριστοτέλης φησίν, ἀνάγκη δήπου κατὰ τὰ μέτρα τῆς οὐσίας καὶ τὸ νοερὸν ἑκάστοις παραγίνεσθαι τῆς τελειότητος, εἴτε ἀπ’ ἄλλης μὲν τὸ ἀγαθὸν αἰτίας ἥκει πρεσβυτέρας καὶ ἁγιωτέρας, ἀπ’ ἄλλης δὲ ἡ οὐσία καὶ τὸ εἶναι τοῖς πράγμασιν, ὡς ἕκαστον μετέχει τοῦ ὄντος ἀμυδρότερον ἢ ἐναργέστερον, οὕτω δήπου καὶ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ μεταλήψεται*». ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν ἐκεῖνος· ἡμεῖς δὲ τὸν λόγον ἐπαναγάγωμεν, ὅτι τὸ θεῖον καθ’ αὑτὸ μὲν ἐρᾷ τοῦ ἐρᾶσθαι, ὑπερπλῆρες ὂν καὶ οὐχ ὅπως, οὐδεμίαν δύσνοιαν ἔχον τοῖς ὑποστᾶσι παρ’ αὐτοῦ, ὡς καὶ Πλάτων μαρτυρεῖ, ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτόθεν ἐξαπλοῦν τὴν τῶν ἀγαθῶν δόσιν εἰς τελειότητα, κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς δὲ τοῦδε ἢ τοῦδε. ὅθεν καὶ οὐκ ἐραστὸν τοῦτο τῷ θεῷ λεχθήσεται· οὐ γὰρ καθ’ αὑτὸ ἀλλὰ κατὰ συμβεβηκός.

Ἀλλὰ φαίη ἄν τις ἴσως ὅτι καὶ ἔσται λοιπὸν ἐραστὸν Θεῷ τὸ ἐρᾶσθαι, ἐπεὶ καθ’ αὑτό ἐστι. καὶ ἔστιν ἀποκρίνασθαι ὡς οὐδὲ τοῦτο· διατί; ὅτι πᾶν ἐραστὸν πληρωτικὸν βούλεται εἶναι τῶν ἐρώντων, οὐ τελειοῖ δὲ τὸ ἐρᾶσθαι παρ’ ἄλλου Θεὸν τὸν αὐτοτέλειον καὶ παντέλειον. εἰ δὲ καὶ καθ’ αὑτό ἐστι τὸ ἐρᾶσθαι πρὸς τὰ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἐραστά, τὰς ψυχάς, ἀλλὰ καὶ συμβεβηκός ἐστιν οἷον Θεῷ, τοῦτο δὴ τὸ ἐρᾶσθαι. καὶ οὐ ξένον τοῦτο, ἐπεὶ καὶ καθ’ αὑτὸ ὂν τὸ ‘δοῦλος πρὸς τὸν δεσπότην’ ἐπὶ τῶν πρός τι, συμβεβηκότος ὄντος καὶ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου καὶ τοῦ Σωκράτους πρὸς τοῦτο, ἀλλ’ ὅμως καὶ αὐτὸ [τὸ] κατὰ τὴν ἰδίαν φύσιν συμβεβηκός ἐστι· οὕτω καὶ τὸ ἐρᾶσθαι συμβαίη ἂν Θεῷ, καὶ γενήσεται καὶ ἀπογενήσεται κατὰ τὴν τοῦ συμβεβηκότος φύσιν. οὐδὲν γὰρ συμβεβηκὸς οὐδεμίαν οὐσίαν τελειοῖ· εἰ γὰρ γινόμενον τελειοῖ, ἀπογινόμενον ἀτελὲς πάντως ποιεῖ· γίνεται δὲ καὶ ἀπογίνεται μυριάκις· τέλειον ἄρα καὶ ἀτελὲς ἔσται τὸ ὑποκείμενον μυριάκις. ἄλλως τε οὐδὲ φύσιν ἔχει δραστηρίαν τὸ συμβεβηκὸς ἐν τῇ οὐσία, ἀλλ’ ἐν αὐτῇ καὶ σὺν αὐτῇ τὸ εἶναι ἔχει. καὶ πρώτως ὄν ἐστιν ἡ οὐσία, {208v} τὸ δὲ συμβεβηκὸς ὂν ἀλλὰ κατ’ αὐτήν, καθ’ αὑτὸ δὲ μὴ ὄν. πῶς οὖν τὸ μὴ ὂν τελειώσει τὸ ὄν; μὴ γὰρ λεγέτω τις τὸ ἐν τῷ πυρὶ θερμὸν καὶ τὸ ἐν τῇ χιόνι ψυχρὸν καὶ τὴν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἐπιστήμην· ταῦτα γὰρ συμπληρωτικὰ εἰσὶ καὶ οὐχ ἁπλῶς συμβεβηκότα. καὶ γὰρ ἡ ἐπιστήμη ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς συμπληρωτική ἐστι· ἡ γὰρ ἀμαθία νόσος ψυχῆς ἐστι, καὶ

42 ὂν ex ὢν 43 ἔχον ex ἔχων 46–47 οὕτω πού cod. 47 ἑστίας scripsimus cum Neap. E.III.17 : αἰτίας cod. 49 τὸ νοερὸν] τὸν ὅρον edd. Procli 52 μεταλήψεται s.l., μεταλήψαιτο in linea 56 τοῦτο ex τούτω 65 τὸ delevimus 72 τίς cod. 73 οὐχ’ cod.

47–52 Εἴτε ... μεταλήψεται Procl. In Alc. 1.9–2.6 53–54 οὐδεμίαν ... αὐτοῦ cf. Plat. Theaet. 151d1 74 cf. Plat. Tim. 86b2–4

66 καὶ γενήσεται ... φύσιν Pach. In Porph., Vind. phil. gr. 150, f. 7r: τοῦτο (sc. τὸ συμβεβηκός) γὰρ ἔχει ἴδιον τὸ γίνεσθαι καὶ ἀπογίνεσθαι καὶ μηδὲν φθείρειν τὸ ὑποκείμενον. In Parm. 27.23–24: ἡ οὐσία τοῦ συμβεβηκότος ἐστὶ τὸ γίνεσθαι καὶ ἀπογίνεσθαι.

gifts. This is why he who shows mercy from himself is said to imitate God; for he is the last image of God, of His providence, and of His governance, since he is one thing and not infinite things, benefiting those in his proximity as much as he can. Being rich, for instance, he is not infinite things; he is neither powerful nor wise nor good nor anything else. Inversely, the divine, being infinitely many beautiful things and not being infinitely many evil things, does not only know how to raise above infinitely many evils but also, being self-sufficient in infinitely many things, desires to give them all to those in need. As essence and existence come from Him, so does perfection. We shall not be persuaded by Proclus, who speaks in an evil and godless manner, raises doubts about manifest things, and does not accept from himself the thought of the divinely inspired Aristotle, but prefaced one of his works as follows: "*Either both being and the good proceed from the same hearth and primal spring, as Aristotle asserts, in which case individual objects must arrive at the intellective part of perfection according to the measure of their essence; or the good has come to things from one source, higher and more holy, and being and existence from another, in which case, as each one shares in being more dimly or more clearly, so also it will participate in the good*"[36]. These are his words. We, however, shall return to our account: the divine, in itself, loves to be loved, overflowing purposefully, having no disaffection towards the things to which it has given existence, as Plato also attests, and unfolding its giving of the goods from itself for their perfection; but it loves this or that accidentally. Thus, the soul cannot be said to be an object of love to God; for it is not in itself loved by God, but is loved by Him accidentally.

However, one might object that being loved is thus the object of God's love since this is in itself. We can answer that this is not true either. Why? Because every object of love fulfilles those who love it; being loved by someone else, however, cannot perfect the self-complete and all-perfect God. And if being loved is in itself with regard to the things that are objects of His love accidentally (i.e. our souls), still, the very fact of being loved is an accident to God. This is not strange, since the entity 'the slave to the master' is in itself in the category of relation, whereas both Socrates and human being are accidents in this respect; but this (i.e. the relation) too, according to its own nature, is an accident. Likewise, being loved is an accident to God and can come to be and perish according to the nature of the accident. For no accident can complete a substance. If it completes it when it comes to be, it makes it incomplete when it perishes; but it comes to be and perishes countless times; therefore, the subject will be complete and incomplete countless times. Besides, the accident does not have any active nature within the substance but has its being in the substance and with the substance; and the substance is the primary being, whereas the accident is a being but according to the substance; in itself, it is a non-being. How could non-being perfect being? And let no one mention the heat in fire, the cold in snow, or knowledge in the soul; for they fulfill these things and are not mere accidents. Indeed, knowledge fulfills the souls in which it dwells; for lack of knowledge is a disease of the soul, and

[36] Translation by O'Neill, adapted.

ἡ ἄγνοια, καὶ μᾶλλον ἡ διπλῆ, μανία λέγεται τῆς ψυχῆς· ὡς γὰρ μαινόμενος οἴεται μὲν τόδε, οὐκ οἶδε δέ· οὕτω καὶ ὁ διπλῆ ἀγνοῶν.

Μὴ ταραττέτω δὲ καὶ τὸ συμβεβηκὸς ῥηθῆναι, τὸ ἐρᾶσθαι, Θεῷ· Θεῷ γὰρ οὐδὲν συμβέβηκε πώποτε, ἀλλ' ἢ ἀγαθόν ἐστι καὶ κατ' οὐσίαν ἔστιν αὐτοῦ, ἢ κακὸν καὶ πόρρω ἀφέστηκε. περὶ γὰρ τῶν κακῶν τί δεῖ λέγειν, ὅπου γε ὁμολογεῖται θεὸν μὲν τῶν ἀγαθῶν αἴτιον εἶναι, κακῶν δὲ ἀναίτιον; ὁ γὰρ μηδ' εἰς αἰτίαν χωρῶν λογίζεσθαι τῶν κακῶν, πῶς ἂν αὐτὸς μετάσχοι κακῶν; μὴ ταραττέτω γοῦν τοῦτο. οὐδὲ γὰρ αὐτόθεν τὸ ἐρᾶσθαι συμβεβηκὸς λέγεται τῷ Θεῷ, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐρᾶν ἄλλους τούτου συμβεβηκὸς ἐκείνοις ἐστί, καὶ ὡς συμβεβηκὸς ἐκείνοις τὸ ἐρᾶν, τὸ ἐρᾶσθαι Θεῷ συμβεβηκὸς λογίζεται ὡς ἀντιστρόφως· ἐπειδὴ τὸ θερμαίνεσθαι συμβέβηκε τοῖς ἐλλαμπομένοις, τὸ θερμὸν συμβεβηκὸς τῷ ἡλίῳ λογίζεται, ἢ μᾶλλον ἐπειδὴ σκοτίζεσθαι συμβαίνει τοῖς ὁρῶσι πρὸς τὸν ἥλιον λάμποντα, εἴποι ἄν τις τὸ σκοτίζειν συμβεβηκὸς τῷ ἡλίῳ. λοιπόν, ἐπειδὴ αἱ μὲν ψυχαὶ οὐ καθ' αὑτὰς ἔχουσι τὸ ἐρᾶσθαι ἀλλὰ κατὰ συμβεβηκός, τοῦ ἐρᾶσθαι καθ' αὐτὸ ὄντος, καὶ πάλιν τὸ ἐρᾶσθαι συμβεβηκὸς οἷον ἐστὶ Θεῷ, οὔτε ψυχὴ Θεῷ ἐραστόν, οὔτε μὴν τὸ ἐρᾶσθαι ἐραστὸν αὐτῷ, εἰ κἀκεῖνος καὶ τοῦ ἐρᾶσθαι ἐρᾷ καὶ τῶν ψυχῶν ἐρᾷ. διὰ γὰρ τὸ ἐρᾶσθαι καθ' αὐτὸ ὃν ἀποπέπτωκε ψυχὴ ἐραστὸν εἶναι Θεῷ. διὰ δὲ τοῦτο πάλιν, ὅτι ψυχή ἐστιν ἡ οὐσία ἡ τὰς ἀναπληρώσεις κατὰ τὰς τελειότητας δεχομένη, καὶ οὐ τὸ ἐρᾶσθαι (τὸ γὰρ ἐρᾶσθαι οἷον συμβεβηκὸς Θεῷ διὰ τὸ συμβαίνειν τὰς ψυχὰς ἐρᾶν τοῦ Θεοῦ), ἀποπέπτωκε καὶ τὸ ἐρᾶσθαι τοῦ εἶναι ἐραστὸν τά τε ἄλλα, καὶ ὅτι οὐ τελειοῖ φύσιν Θεοῦ, οὔτε μὴν {209r} τελειοῦται παρ' αὐτοῦ· ἀλλ' ἀνύπαρκτα εἰσί, καὶ διὰ τὸ τὴν ψυχὴν τελειοῦσθαι καὶ μόνον, λόγον οὐκ ἔχει ἐραστὸν αὐτὸ λέγεσθαι.

II

<Ἐρώτησις> Πῶς ἐπὶ τῶν σωματικῶν καὶ πάντων τῶν ἄλλων τῶν ἐν γενέσει ἐπὶ πλεῖστον μὲν τὸ κατὰ φύσιν, ἐπ' ἐλάχιστον δὲ τὸ παρὰ φύσιν, οἷον τὸ γενέσθαι ἄνθρωπον δικέφαλον ἢ τρίχειρα ἢ τριόφθαλμον, καὶ οἷα τὰ τέρατα ἀναπλάττουσι καὶ ἐπ' ἀνθρώπων καὶ ἐπὶ ἄλλων ζώων, ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς, κατὰ φύσιν μὲν οὔσης ταύτῃ τῆς ἀρετῆς παρὰ φύσιν δὲ τῆς κακίας, καὶ κατὰ φύσιν μὲν τῆς ἐπιστήμης (τελείωσις γὰρ αὕτη ψυχῆς) παρὰ φύσιν δὲ τῆς ἀνοίας (νόσος γὰρ αὕτη ψυχῆς), ἐπὶ πλεῖστον ἐστὶ τὸ παρὰ φύσιν ἐπ' ἐλάχιστον δὲ τὸ κατὰ φύσιν;

<Λύσις> Ῥητέον οὖν ὅτι διὰ τὴν ὕλην καὶ τὸ σῶμα. εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἦν αὐτὴ καθ' αὑτὴν ἡ ψυχὴ δίχα σώματος, τότε ἂν ὡράθη τὸ κατὰ φύσιν πλεῖστον, τὸ δὲ παρὰ φύσιν ἐλάχιστον. ἐπεὶ δὲ εἰς σῶμα πίπτει ἡ ψυχή, καὶ παμπόλλους χιτῶνας ἐντεῦθεν ἐνδύεται

76 ἀγνοῶν ex ἀγνωῶν 79 δεῖ ex δὴ **II**,1 ἐρώτησις in marg. 1–2 ἐπιπλεῖστον cod. 5–6 Alex. In Metaph. 2.21; Simpl. In Phys. 1.6 8 λύσις in marg. 9 τότε ἂν ὡράθη scripsimus : τότ' ἐὰν ὡράθη cod. το[1] cod.

75–76 καὶ μᾶλλον ... διπλῆ cf. Procl. In Alc. 293.14–16 **II**, 10 cf. Herm. In Phaedr. 141.7 10–11 καὶ ... ἄγνοιαν cf. Procl. In Alc. 224.1–5

75–76 ἡ ἄγνοια ... ἀγνοῶν Pach. In Coel. hier. 217D: ἡ ἀγνωσία διττή ἐστιν, ἡ μὲν κατὰ ἀπόφασιν, ὅτε τόδε τι οὐ γινώσκομεν, γινώσκομεν δὲ ὅτι οὐ γινώσκομεν, ἣν καὶ ἁπλὴν ἄγνοιαν λέγουσιν· ἡ δὲ κατὰ διάθεσιν, ὅτε οὐ γινώσκοντες ἀπατώμεθα, καὶ οἰόμεθα γινώσκειν, καὶ οὐδὲ αὐτὸ τοῦτο οἴδαμεν, ὅτι οὐ γινώσκομεν, ἣν δὴ καὶ διπλῆν καλοῦσιν ἄγνοιαν, τῷ τε μὴ γινώσκειν, καὶ τῷ μὴ γινώσκειν ὅτι οὐ γινώσκει. Pach. Declam. IX, 492–493: ὁ διπλῇ [nos : διπλῆν ed.] δ' ἀγνοῶν μωρίαν ὀφλισκάνει ἢ μανίαν, ἢ ἄλλο τι τῶν ὁμοίων παρὰ πολλοῖς. 77–78 Θεῷ ... αὐτοῦ Pach. In Div. nom. 748A: οὐ μὴν δὲ ἀλλ' ὅτι οὐκ ἐπίκτητον καὶ συμβεβηκὸς ἔχει τὸ ἀγαθὸν ὁ Θεός, ὥστε, ἄλλο τι ὄν, ἐπισύμβαμα ἔχειν τὸ ἀγαθόν, ἀλλ' οὐσίᾳ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ αὐτὸς ὑπάρχων ἐκτείνει περὶ πάντας τὴν τῆς ἀγαθότητος αἴγλην φυσικῶς ἐν τῷ εἶναι ἀγαθόν. 79–80 Pach. In Div. nom. 813C: νῦν δὲ ἡμῖν ἀρκούντως τὸ ἀγαθὸν ὕμνηται ὡς πάντων τῶν ἀγαθῶν αἴτιον καὶ τῶν κακῶν ἀναίτιον. **II**,4–5 κατὰ ... κακίας Pach. In Eccl. hier. 464C: πᾶν γὰρ ἀνθρώπινον ἀγαθὸν κατὰ φύσιν, ὡς τὸ κακὸν παρὰ φύσιν. 5–6 Pach. Philos. III 1, 5, 3.16–18: τελείωσις γὰρ ἥ τε ἀρετὴ καὶ ἡ ἐπιστήμη τῆς ψυχῆς, ἡ μὲν εἰς τὸ ἀγαθὴν γενέσθαι ταύτην ἡ δὲ εἰς τὸ γνωστικήν.

ignorance, especially double ignorance, is said to be a madness of the soul; like a madman, one believes in one thing but does not know it; so it is with the doubly ignorant.

Let no one be troubled by our claim that being loved is an accident to God; for no accident has ever occurred to God. Instead, it is either good and according to His essence or evil and far removed from Him. Indeed, what shall we say with regard to the evil things, given that it is universally admitted that God is the cause of good things and the non-cause of evil things? For He who cannot even be conceived as a cause of evil things, how could He participate in evil things? So let no one be troubled by our claim. Indeed, being loved is not said to be an accident that belongs to God Himself; rather, it is an accident in others who love Him. Just as loving is an accident to them, so being loved is conversely considered as an accident to God. Since being heated is an accident to the things under the sun, heat is considered as an accident to the sun or, rather, since being blinded is an accident to those who look towards the shining sun, one could say that blinding is an accident to the sun. Therefore, since souls do not possess the property of being loved by themselves but by accident, whereas being loved is in itself and, again, an accident to God, neither is the soul loved by God, nor is being loved loved by Him, even if He loves to be loved and loves our souls; for [we said that] a soul fails to be loved by God because it is being loved that is in itself. Because of this again, namely because the soul—and not the property of being loved (for being loved is like an accident to God insofar as souls accidentally love God)—is the substance that receives the fulfillments according to the perfections, being loved and the rest fail to be objects of love [to God], and because they do not perfect the nature of God nor are perfected by Him; on the contrary, they do not exist [in God]. Since it is the soul—and only the soul—that is perfected, being loved cannot justifiably be said to be an object of [God's] love.

II

<Question> Why is it that in the realm of bodies and the rest of things in generation, what is according to nature occurs most frequently, whereas what is contrary to nature occurs rarely, such as a man being born with two heads or three arms or three eyes, and the monsters that people imagine about human beings or other animals? Yet, in the realm of the soul, which by nature possesses virtue and, contrary to nature, vice, and by nature knowledge (for this is the soul's completion) and, contrary to nature, lack of knowledge (for this is the soul's disease), what is contrary to nature occurs most frequently, whereas what is according to nature occurs rarely?

<Solution> We must answer: because of matter and body. If the soul existed by itself—that is, without a body—then we would see what is according to nature occur most frequently and what is contrary to nature least frequently. However, since the soul falls into a body and hence takes on numerous "tunics"

κατὰ Πλάτωνα (λήθην πλάνην ἄγνοιαν φιλοδοξίαν φιληδονίαν καὶ τὰ παραπλήσια), καὶ *ἔσχατον χιτῶνα* κατ' αὐτὸν τοῦτον τὴν φιλότιμον ζωήν, ταῦτα δὲ πάντα διὰ τὴν ὕλην ἐπέρχονται, καὶ καθαρῶς οὐδὲν βλέπει (αἰσθήσεσι γὰρ χρᾶται, καὶ ταύταις ζῇ ταῖς ἐπιστήμαις καταμελοῦσα), καὶ τοῦτο ἐστὶν αὐτῇ πτερορρύησις κατ' ἐκεῖνον, εἰκός ἐστι συμμετέχειν αὐτὴν τῶν τῆς ὕλης κακῶν καὶ εἰς τὸ παρὰ φύσιν μεταπίπτειν ἐκ τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν. πλὴν ἔστι καὶ ἀνανεύειν τινὰς αὐτῶν διασχούσας τὴν ὕλην καὶ χρᾶσθαι νῷ ὁδηγῷ, καὶ οὐκ αἰσθήσεσι καὶ φαντασίαις καὶ δόξαις, καὶ τότε κατὰ φύσιν ἐνεργεῖν. ὡς γὰρ τὸ θεῖον, ἐξῃρημένον ὂν τῆς κτίσεως πάσης, τὰ τῶν ὑφειμένων οἶδε πλὴν ὡς ἀμερὲς ἀμερῶς τὰ μεμερισμένα, ὡς δὲ ὑπέρχρονον ὑπερχρονίως τὰ ἔγχρονα, καὶ ὡς ἀδιάστατον μὲν ἀδιαστάτως τὰ διαστατά, ὡς δὲ αἰώνιον αἰωνίως τὰ ὀπωσοῦν ὄντα, καὶ ἡ θεία γνῶσις ἄχραντος μένει καὶ οὐ καταρρυπαίνεται τοῖς πολλοῖς, οὕτω καὶ ψυχή, πολλῷ δὲ μᾶλλον νοῦς, τὸ ταυτὸν ἔχον καὶ ἀδιάστατον καὶ ἀμερές, οἶδε μὲν καὶ τοὺς ὅρους τοὺς ἀμερεῖς (νοῦς γάρ ἐστι κατὰ τὸν Ἀριστοτέλη ᾧ τοὺς {209v} ὅρους γινώσκομεν), οἶδε δὲ καὶ τὰ μεμερισμένα ταῦτα καὶ ἕνυλα πλὴν ἀμερῶς, καὶ τὰ μερικὰ πλὴν καθόλου, καὶ τὰ πεπληθυσμένα πλὴν ἑνικῶς. καὶ τοῦτο ἐστὶν *ἀρχὴ ἐπιστήμης*, ὅθεν ἐπιστήμη προσγίνεται, εἰ μόνον τελειωθείη ψυχὴ ἐν αὐτοῖς καὶ μὴ δοξοσοφίας ἔτι ὁρῷτο πλήρης, ὡς τότε ἴσως κατὰ τὴν δόξαν ἐνεργεῖν πεφυκυίας αὐτῆς, εἴπερ συναιρεῖν τὸ πλῆθος εἰς ἓν ἀναγκάζεται. καὶ δῆλον ἐν τῷ Ἀλκιβιάδῃ ἐξ ὧν κατασκευάζει Σωκράτης ὅτι οὐχ ὁ ἐρωτῶν ἀλλ' ὁ ἀποκρινόμενός ἐστιν ὁ λέγων τὸν συλλογισμόν. «ἐάν σε γὰρ ἔρωμαι», φησί, «τὸ ἓν καὶ τὰ δύο καὶ πότερα πλείω, καὶ φήσεις ὅτι τὰ δύο, καὶ πόσῳ, ὅτι ἑνί», καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν γραμμάτων τοῦ Σωκράτους καὶ ἐφ' ἑκάστῳ λέγων ὁ νεανίσκος τὸ «ἐγώ», ἐπειδὴ ἤκουσεν «ἴθι δὴ ἑνὶ λόγῳ εἰπέ, ὅταν ἡ ἐρώτησις καὶ ἡ ἀπόκρισις γίγνηται, πότερον ἐστὶ ὁ λέγων ὁ ἐρωτῶν ἢ ὁ ἀποκρινόμενος;», ἐπεὶ ἔτι μακρὰν ἦν τῆς ἐπιστήμης ὡς ἔτι μαιευόμενος, «ὁ ἀποκρινόμενος», ἔφη, «ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ ὦ Σώκρατες»· ἀπαιτηθεὶς γὰρ ἑνὶ λόγῳ οἱονεὶ καθολικῷ τε καὶ ἑνιαίῳ καὶ ἀμερεῖ εἰπεῖν περὶ τοῦ ἐρωτῶντος καὶ ἀποκρινομένου πότερος ὁ λέγων ἐστίν, ἐκεῖνος ἅτε δοξοσοφίας πλήρης καὶ ἔτι φαντασίαις καὶ δόξαις συνών, ἃ καθ' ἕκαστον ἀνενδοιάστως ὡμολόγει, ἤνωσε μὲν τὰ πάντα εἰς ἕν, πλὴν οὐ κατὰ τὸν νοῦν, οὐ δὴ κατὰ τὴν ἐπιστήμην, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν δόξαν, «ὁ ἀποκρινόμενος» εἰπὼν «δοκεῖ μοι ὦ Σώκρατες».

Καὶ ἔχεις ἐντεῦθεν πῶς ἐφ' ἡμῶν ἐστι τὸ παρὰ φύσιν ἐπὶ πλεῖστον τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν.

15 αὐτὴν ex αὐτῆς 19 ὡς[1] ~~ὡς~~ cod.

11–12 cf. Procl. In Alc. 138.12–13 14 καὶ τοῦτο ... κατ' ἐκεῖνον cf. Plat. Phaedr. 248c8 23–24 νοῦς ... γινώσκομεν Arist. Anal. Post. A 3, 72b24–25 25 Arist. Anal. Post. A 33, 88b36; B 19, 100b15 30–31 ἐάν ... ἑνί Plat. Alc. 112e10–14 31–32 ἐπὶ ... ἐγώ cf. Plat. Alc. 113a4–6 32–33 ἴθι … ἀποκρινόμενος; Plat. Alc. 113a7–9 34–35 Plat. Alc. 113a10

18–20 Pach. In Div. nom. 884D: κατὰ μίαν καὶ τὴν αὐτὴν γνῶσιν ὁ Θεὸς οἶδε καὶ ἑαυτὸν καὶ τὰ πάντα, διὰ τοῦτο καὶ ἀΰλως τὰ ὑλικά, καὶ τὰ μεριστὰ ἀμερίστως, καὶ τὰ πολλὰ ἑνιαίως· ἄϋλος γὰρ καὶ ἀμέριστος καὶ ἑνιαία καὶ ἁπλῆ ἡ γνῶσις ἡ θεία. εἴπερ ἐλέγομεν ὅτι ἐν τῷ ἑνί, δηλονότι ἐν τῇ μιᾷ καὶ ἁπλῇ δημιουργικῇ δυνάμει ὑπέστησε τὰ διάφορα, οὕτω καὶ ἐν ἑνί, ἤγουν ἐν ἑνιαίᾳ καὶ ἁπλῇ γνώσει, τὰ διάφορα γινώσκει. 27–28 εἴπερ ... ἀναγκάζεται Pach. In Div. nom. 989B–C: ἡ γὰρ ἡμετέρα ἐπίνοια τοὺς πολλοὺς εἰς μίαν συνάγουσα φύσιν, ὅπερ πάντως γίνεται μετὰ τὰ πολλά, τότε τὴν τοιαύτην μίαν φύσιν ὡς ἑνιαῖόν τι κατέχει, καὶ ταύτην συναγομένην οὕτω μετὰ τὰ πολλὰ τῶν πολλῶν προεπινοεῖ ὡς τῶν πολλῶν συστατικὴν καὶ συνοχικήν.

according to Plato (oblivion, delusion, ignorance, ambition, love of pleasures, and the like) and takes on its last—according to him—tunic, namely the life that pursues honors, and since all these befall the soul due to [its association with] matter, and since the soul sees nothing clearly (for it relies on sensations and lives according to them, neglecting knowlegde)—this is for Plato the soul's "moulting"—it is reasonable that the soul shares in the vices of matter and is diverted from what is according to nature to what is contrary to nature. Nonetheless, some souls may succeed in looking upward by distancing themselves from matter and using their intellect as their guide, rather than sensations, imaginations, and opinions, and thereby act according to nature. For, just as the divine, transcending all creation, knows the [essences of all] things beneath it but, being indivisible, knows divisible things in an indivisible manner, being supra-temporal, knows temporal things in a supra-temporal manner, being dimensionless, knows dimensioned things in a dimensionless manner, and being eternal knows what is whatsoever in an eternal manner, and [thus] divine knowledge remains pure and untainted by the multitude of things, so too the soul—or, more precisely, the intellect—being identical with itself, dimensionless, and indivisible, knows indivisible definitions (for, according to Aristotle, the intellect is that through which we know definitions) and knows divisible and material things indivisibly, particular things universally, and the many as one. And this is the beginning of knowledge, from which knowledge arises, provided that the soul reaches perfection in these things and does not remain full of seeming wisdom, because then it acts according to opinion, being forced to unify the multitude. This is evident from Socrates' argument in the *Alcibiades*, according to which it is not the questioner but the answerer who builds the syllogism; he says: "*If I ask you which is the greater number, one or two, you will answer 'two', and if I ask you back 'how much greater', you will answer 'by one'*", and in the case of the letters in 'Socrates' and on any other subject the young man answers "*I*", when he listened to these words: "*Come then and tell me with one word, when we have question and answer, which is the speaker, the questioner or the answerer?*", since he was still far from possessing knowledge as being still in the process of being 'delivered', he answered "*The answerer, I should say, Socrates*"[37]. For when he was asked to say with one word, that is, universally, unitarily and indivisibly, who is the one who speaks when one asks and the other answers, since the young man was full of seeming wisdom and still adhered to imagination and opinion, which he accepted without any hesitation, he unified everything into one, but not according to the intellect—certainly not according to knowledge—but according to opinion, saying "*The answerer, I should say, Socrates*".

And now you know how it can be that in our realm what is contrary to nature exceedingly overwhelms what is according to nature.

[37] Translations by Lamb, adapted.

III

Ζητεῖται περὶ τοῦ κακοῦ, οὐ τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ, τίνι ἕξει τῆς ψυχῆς τοῦτο γινώσκομεν, οἷον ὅτι ἀσύμφορον ἢ ἄδικον ἤ τι τῶν ἄλλων κακῶν. δόξῃ γὰρ οὐ γνωσθήσεται· τὸ γὰρ μερικὸν δοξασθήσεται, ὅθεν πολλάκις καὶ τὸ ἄδικον δίκαιον λογισθήσεται, καθὼς λέγεται διττὸν τὸ δίκαιον, τὸ μὲν τῇ αληθείᾳ τὸ δὲ τῇ δόξῃ. ἀλλ᾽ ἐπιστήμῃ; καὶ λοιπὸν οὐ στέρησίς τις {210r} ἀλλὰ ἕξις τὸ κακόν. ἀλλὰ νῷ; ἀλλὰ νοῦ μεθέξει, ὡς παρ᾽ ἐκείνῳ γινωσκόμενον κἀκείνῳ οἰκειούμενον, καὶ καλὸν τὸ κακὸν γενήσεται· ὡς γὰρ τὸ δίκαιον συνέχει τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς οὐσίαν (κατὰ γὰρ ἀναλογίας ὑφίσταται τὰς ἐν Τιμαίῳ λελεγμένας, καθ᾽ ἃς κατὰ δίκην διαιρεῖται ἥ τε οὐσία καὶ αἱ δυνάμεις αὐτῆς), οὕτως ἀφορίζει καὶ τὸν νοῦν τὸ καλόν. *διὸ καὶ ἐραστόν ἐστιν ὁ νοῦς καὶ ὀρεκτόν, ὡς φησὶν Ἀριστοτέλης, καὶ τὰ νοῦ μετασχόντα καλὰ πάντα*, ὡς μόνης τῆς ὕλης καθ᾽ ἑαυτὴν ἀκαλλοῦς οὔσης [ὅσα] καὶ ἀνειδέου, ἥτις ἅμα τε λαμβάνει μορφὴν καὶ εἶδος καὶ τῆς καλλοποιοῦ δυνάμεως ἐμφάσεις ὑποδέχεται· μόνην δὲ τὴν θείαν φύσιν τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἀφορίζει. καὶ τριῶν ὄντων, δικαίου τῆς ψυχῆς, καλοῦ τοῦ νοός, καὶ ἀγαθοῦ τοῦ θείου, κατὰ τὴν τριαδικὴν ἕνωσιν συνάπτεται *τὸ δίκαιον τῷ ἀγαθῷ διὰ μέσου τοῦ καλοῦ*, καὶ ψυχὴ τῷ θείῳ διαμέσου <τοῦ> νοός.

Ἔστιν οὖν εἰπεῖν ὅτι γινώσκεται τὸ κακὸν ὡς στέρησις κατὰ τὴν ὕλην· καὶ γὰρ καὶ ἡ στέρησις ἐν τῇ ὕλῃ ἐστί. τριῶν οὖν ὄντων, ὕλης ἰδέας καὶ τῶν ἐκγόνων αὐτῶν ἢ καὶ ἀπογεννημάτων, τρία εἰσὶ καὶ τὰ ταῦτα γνωρίζοντα· τὴν μὲν ἰδέαν νοῦς κατ᾽ ἐπιστήμην, τὴν δὲ ὕλην λογισμῷ νόθῳ, τὰ δὲ ἀπογεννήματα αἴσθησις καὶ δόξα. ὡς γοῦν ἡ ὕλη οὐ νῷ ἀλλὰ νόθῳ νῷ γνωρίζεται τῷ μήπω κατ᾽ εὐθυωρίαν νοεῖσθαι, ἀλλὰ κατὰ ἀναλογίαν καὶ ἀφαίρεσιν, οὕτω καὶ τὸ κακὸν ὡς στέρησις νόθῳ λογισμῷ καταληφθήσεται. μανθάνομεν γὰρ τὸ κακὸν τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ τοῦ καλοῦ, ὥστε τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ καὶ τῷ κανόνι τοῦ δικαίου καὶ τοῦ συμφέροντος τὸ ἄδικον καὶ ἀσύμφορον γινώσκομεν· τὸ γὰρ οὐ δίκαιον ἄδικον, καὶ τὸ οὐ συμφέρον ἀσύμφορον. ὥστε καὶ ὑπο ν<ο>ὸς γινώσκεσθαι ὑποπτευθήσεται τὸ κακὸν, ἀ<λ>λ᾽ οὖν κατὰ συμβεβηκός, ὥσπερ ἔστι καὶ ἰατρὸς αἴτιος νόσου κατὰ συμβεβηκός· *ὃ γὰρ παρὸν αἰτιώμεθα τοῦδε, τοῦτο καὶ ἀπὸν αἰτιώμεθα τοῦ ἐναντίου*.

Περὶ δὲ τοῦ δικαίου καὶ τοῦ συμφέροντος ὁ μὲν ῥήτωρ, ἅτε περὶ μερικὰ καταγινόμενος καὶ τὸ νομιζόμενον δίκαιον καὶ καλὸν καὶ συμφέρον καὶ τὸ ὂν ταῦτα μεταχειριζόμενος, ἄλλο ἔχει τὸ δίκαιον καὶ ἄλλο τὸ συμφέρον· ἔστι γὰρ καὶ δίκαιον ἀσύμφορον παρ᾽ αὐτῷ, καὶ συμφέρον ἄδικον· περὶ γὰρ τὰ περὶ σῶμα καὶ ἐκτὸς καταγίνεται. ὁ δέ γε φιλόσοφος *ἐν* {210v} *ἀρετῇ μόνῃ τὸ ἀγαθὸν* περιγράφων οὐδέποτ᾽

III,2 τί cod. 5 στέρησις τίς cod. 8 αἱ ex ἡ 10 νοῦ scripsimus : νοῦν cod. 11 ὅσα delevimus 14 διαμέσου cod. 15 ψυχὴ ex ψυχῆ τοῦ addidimus 17 αὐτῶν ex αὐτῆς 24 νὸς cod. 25 ἀλ᾽ cod.

III,6–13 ὡς … ἀφορίζει cf. Procl. In Alc. 317.19–318.5 7–8 τὰς … λελεγμένας cf. Plat. Tim. 36e6–37a4 9–10 cf. Arist. Metaph. Λ 7, 1072a26; 1072b3 13 cf. Procl. In Alc. 320.1–3 14–15 cf. Procl. In Alc. 318.9–10; 320.6–7 17–21 τριῶν … ἀναλογίαν cf. [Tim.] De nat. mun. et an. 206.7–10 26–27 Arist. Phys. B 3, 195a12–13 32–38 ἐν … ἀγαθῶν cf. Procl. In Alc. 315.12–17

III,17–21 τριῶν … ἀναλογίαν Pach. Philos. X 1, 1, 6.6–13: τριχῶς γὰρ ἡ οὐσία, ἡ μὲν ὡς εἶδος, ἣ δὴ καὶ ἐπιστήμῃ γινώσκεται, ἡ δὲ ὡς ὕλη, ἣ δὴ κατὰ μὲν Πλάτωνα νόθῳ λογισμῷ, κατὰ δ᾽ Ἀριστοτέλην κατ᾽ ἀναλογίαν καταλαμβάνεται, τρίτη δὲ τὸ ἀπογένναμα τούτων κατὰ τὸν Πυθαγόρειον Τίμαιον. τοῦτο δ᾽ ἔστι τὸ σύνθετον· σύνθετον δὲ λέγω οὐ τὸ ἐκ τῶν τεσσάρων στοιχείων συγκείμενον, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐξ ὕλης καὶ εἴδους ἁπλοῦν κατ᾽ οὐσίαν ὄν, ὅτι τὸ ἀπογένναμα καὶ αὐτὸ οὐσία, ὃ δὴ καταλαμβάνει ἡ αἴσθησις. 18–21 τρία … ἀναλογίαν Ps.-Psell. In Phys. 25.6–10: «τρία γάρ», φησὶν ἐν ἄλλοις ὁ κατ᾽ αὐτὸν Τίμαιος, «τρισὶ γνωρίζεσθαι, τὰν μὲν ἰδέαν νόῳ κατ᾽ ἐπιστάμαν, τὰν δ᾽ ὕλαν λογισμῷ νόθῳ τῷ μήπω κατ᾽ εὐθυωρίαν νοῆσθαι ἀλλὰ κατ᾽ ἀναλογίαν, τὰ δ᾽ ἀπογεννάματα αἰσθήσει καὶ δόξᾳ».

III

The question arises with regard to the nature of evil—not the evil present in the sensible realm—through what state of the soul do we come to know it? For instance, how do we know that something is disadvantageous or unjust or anything else among the evils? For we cannot know it through opinion, since it is the particular that is the object of opinion; this is why the unjust is frequently considered as just, given that the just is said in two ways, truly just and just in opinion. Do we know evil through science? Yet evil is not a privation but a state. Do we know it through intellect? But through its participation in the intellect, as it is known by it and is appropriated by it, evil will become morally beautiful; for just as the just gives cohesion to the essence of the soul (for the soul subsists according to the proportions described in the *Timaeus*, by which the essence and the powers of the soul are justly divided), so too moral beauty determines the intellect. This is why the intellect is an object of love and desire, as Aristotle says, and all that participates in the intellect is beautiful, because matter alone is in itself devoid of beauty and form, but when it obtains a share in shape and form, it receives at the same time the reflections of the power that produces beauty[38]; the divine nature is determined only by the good. And given that there are three things, namely the justice of the soul, the moral beauty of the intellect, and the goodness of the divine, the just is linked to the good via the morally beautiful according to the triadical union, and thus the soul is linked to the divine via the intellect.

So we can answer that we know evil as a privation according to matter; for privation also inheres in matter. So, given that there are three things, matter, idea, and their descendants or offsprings, there are also three [faculties of the soul] that know them: (i) the intellect knows the idea according to true knowledge; (ii) it knows matter through bastard reasoning; (iii) sensation and opinion know their offsprings. So just as we know matter not through intellect but through bastard intellect, since matter is not congized straightforwardly but by means of analogy and abstraction, so too evil can be apprehended as privation through bastard reasoning. For we learn evil through our knowledge of moral beauty, so that we know the unjust and the disadvantageous through the knowledge and standard of the just and the advantageous; for what is not just is unjust and what is not advantageous is disadvantageous. Thus, we might say that evil is known by the intellect but accidentally, just as a doctor is accidentally the cause of a disease. For that which, when present, we consider to be the cause of a thing, the same, when absent, we consider to be the cause of its opposite.

Now with regard to the just and the advantageous, the orator, because he is concerned with individual things and deals with what is allegedly just and morally beautiful and advantageous, he thinks that one thing is the just, and another the advantageous; for according to him there is also a just that is disadvantageous, and an unjust that is advantageous; for he is concerned with the bodily and the external things. On the contrary, the philosopher, delimiting the good in virtue alone, would never

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[38] Translation by O'Neill, adapted.

ἂν εἴποι δίκαιον τὸ ἀσύμφορον οὐδέ γε συμφέρον τὸ ἄδικον· *οὔτε γὰρ τὰ περὶ τὸ σῶμα θεωρούμενα ὡς ἀγαθά*, οἷα κάλλος καὶ ἰσχύς, *συντελεῖν τι πρὸς τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην εὐδαιμονίαν* οἰηθείη ἄν, *οὔτε τὰ ἔξω τοῦ σώματος πολλῷ μᾶλλον*, ἤγουν πλοῦτος καὶ δόξα, *πληρώματα τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ καθίστασθαι, ἀλλ' ἓν μόνον τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἐν αὐταῖς ἱδρῦσθαι ταῖς ψυχαῖς, ἄμικτον καὶ καθαρὸν καὶ ἄυλον καὶ μήτε τῶν σωματικῶν μήτε τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀναπιμπλάμενον ἀγαθῶν*. οἱ γοῦν *τὸ συμφέρον* λέγοντες ἐξ ἀδικίας *οὐχ ὁρῶσιν ἐν αὐτῇ <τῇ> ψυχῇ μονίμως ἑστηκὸς* τοῦτο, ἀλλ' ἐν τοῖς ἔξωθεν καὶ ἀναγκαῖον μᾶλλον ἢ ἀγαθόν· οἱ δὲ τῷ δικαίῳ τὸ συμφέρον ταυτὸν λέγοντες *καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου κατ' αὐτὴν ἀφωρίσθαι τὴν ψυχὴν* εἴποιεν ἄν, καὶ *ὅπου τὸ δίκαιον ἐκεῖ καὶ τὸ συμφέρον* εἶναι. ἀλλὰ μὴν *ἐν ψυχῇ* τοῦτο, κἀκεῖνο ἐν ψυχῇ· τοῦτο δέ ἐστι τὸ ἀγαθόν. *ὅπου δὲ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἡμῶν ὑπάρχει διαφερόντως, ἐκεῖ καὶ τὸ εἶναι ἔχομεν. ἐν ψυχῇ ἄρα καὶ ὁ ἄνθρωπος* καὶ τὸ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἀγαθόν, *τὸ δὲ σῶμα ὡς ὄργανον* ἂν λογισθείη τῇ ψυχῇ καὶ οὐχ ὡς μόριον τοῦ συνόλου ἀνθρώπου· *τὰ γὰρ τῶν μορίων πλεονεκτήματα καὶ ὅσα ἐναντία διαβαίνοιτο εἰς τὴν τοῦ ὅλου φύσιν, ἐπειδὴ τὸ ὅλον ἐν τοῖς μέρεσι ἔλαχε τὸ εἶναι, τὰ δὲ τῶν ὀργάνων παθήματα τὰς τῶν χρωμένων ἕξεις οὐ μεταβάλλει, καὶ εἰ πρὸς τὰς ἐνεργείας αὐτῶν ἔστιν ἄρα πολλάκις ἐμπόδια*. ὅθεν οὐδὲ τὰ πλεονεκτήματα τῶν ὀργάνων τὴν τῶν χρωμένων ἕξιν αὐξάνουσι, διὰ τοῦτο οὐδὲ τὰ τοῦ σώματος πλεονεκτήματα, πολλῷ δὲ μάλλον τὰ ἔξωθεν, συμπληρωτικά εἰσι τῆς ψυχῆς εἰς τὴν εὐδαίμονα ζωήν. ὥστε καὶ εἰ ἄδικον ὂν συμφέρον ἐστὶ κατὰ τοὺς ῥήτορας, ἐν τοῖς ἔξωθεν ἔστι τοῦτο, καὶ οὐκ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, καὶ δοκοῦν ἐστι συμφέρον καὶ οὐκ ἀληθείᾳ· τὸ γὰρ ἀληθινὸν συμφέρον καὶ δίκαιον ταυτὸν ὂν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἐστι. καὶ νῷ ταῦτα θεατῇ χρῶνται, ὡς ὁ ἐν Φαίδρῳ Σωκράτης φησί, καὶ τὸ πᾶν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἐν ψυχῇ καὶ μόνον ἐστί· *ἐγὼ* γάρ, φασί, *καὶ τὸ ἐμὸν* καὶ τὸ ἡμέτερον, τὴν ψυχὴν τὸ σῶμα καὶ τὸ ἐκτός. ὥσπερ τοίνυν {211r} διαφορά τις εὕρηται ἐν μέσῳ τῆς πρωτοτύπου ἀντωνυμίας καὶ τῆς κτητικῆς, καὶ ἄλλο μὲν ἐκείνη ἄλλο δὲ αὕτη, οὕτω καὶ ψυχῆς πρὸς τὸ σῶμα μέγα τὸ διάφορον ἐστὶ πρὸς τὸ εἶναι τοῦ ἀνθρώπου. διὸ καὶ ὁ ἐν Φαίδωνι Σωκράτης ἐρωτηθεὶς περὶ τοῦ πῶς αὐτὸν θάψουσιν, φησίν, «ἤν με λάβητε τέως», ὡς τοῦ παντὸς τῆς οὐσίας ἡμῶν ὄντος ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ.

Τριῶν γοῦν ὄντων, ἀγαθοῦ ἐν τῷ θείῳ, καλοῦ ἐν τοῖς εἴδεσι, δικαίου ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς, τοῦ μὲν ἀγαθοῦ πάντα ἀπολαύει (πάντων γάρ ἐστιν ἀρχή), τοῦ δὲ καλοῦ τὰ εἴδους μετέχοντα μόνα, τοῦ δὲ δικαίου τὰ ψυχῆς. εἰκότως ἄρα καὶ ἡ ὕλη ἀγαθοῦ μὲν μετέχει, καλοῦ δὲ ἄμοιρος ἐστί. καὶ ἐπεὶ πάντα τὰ εἰδοπεποιημένα καλά εἰσι, διὰ τοῦτο καὶ *ὁ ἐν τῷ Φαίδρῳ Σωκράτης «δικαιοσύνης», φησί, «καὶ σωφροσύνης οὐδέν ἐστι φέγγος ἐν τοῖς τῇδε ὁμοιώμασι», «νῦν δὲ κάλλος μόνον ταύτην ἔσχε μοίραν, ἐκφανέστατον εἶναι καὶ ἐρασμιώτατον»· ἀφανὲς* γὰρ *ἡ ψυχή*, καὶ ἐν ἐκείνῃ δίκαιόν τε καὶ σῶφρον ἀφανές, ἀφανὲς δὲ ἅπαν τὸ εἰδοπεποιημένον καὶ φανερόν, καὶ μὴ ὅτι ὡς *ἀόρατον* ἡ ψυχὴ τὴν ἐν αὐτῇ δικαιοσύνην οὐκ ἔχει δεικνύειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅτι εἶδος ψυχῆς οὐκ ἔστιν (αὐτὴ γὰρ ἐστὶν *εἶδος σώματος*), εἶδος δὲ εἴδους οὐκ ἔστιν. οὐκ ἄρα καλλοποιηθήσεται ὑπὸ ἰδέας

36 ἓν scripsimus cum Neap. E.III.17 : ἢ cod. 39 τῇ addidimus cum Neap. E.III.17 43 ἡμῶν scripsimus : ὑμῶν cod. 41 εἴποιεν ἄν scripsimus : εἴποιαν cod. 46 διαβαίνοιτὸ cod. 46 τοῖς scripsimus : ταῖς cod. 48 ἐνεργείας scripsimus : ἐνεργὰς cod. 49 διατοῦτο cod. 61 ἀγαθοῦ s.l. 64 διατοῦτο cod

38–40 τὸ … ἀγαθόν cf. Procl. In Alc. 316.5–7 40–41 τῷ … ψυχὴν cf. Procl. In Alc. 316.8–10 41–43 ὅπου ... ἔχομεν cf. Procl. In Alc. 316.17–20 43–44 cf. Procl. In Alc. 316.22–23 44–45 τὸ … ἀνθρώπου cf. Procl. In Alc. 168.13–14 45–48 τὰ … ἐμπόδια Procl. In Alc. 316.13–17 53–54 νῷ … φησί cf. Plat. Phaedr. 247c6–8 55 cf. Olympiod. In Phaed. 6, 8.9–11; Davidis Prolegom. 41.5–10; Eliae In Porph. 22.33–23.1 58–59 ὁ … τέως cf. Plat. Phaed. 115c3–5. 64–67 ὁ … ἐρασμιώτατον Procl. In Alc. 320.11–14; Plat. Phaedr. 250b1–3, 250d6–e1 67, 68 Atticus fr. 9, 10.4 (apud Eusebium, Praep. Evang. XV, 9, 10.3) 69–70 cf. Arist. De an. B 1, 412a19–20

say that the disadvantageous is just or that the unjust is advantageous. For he would never think that the alleged bodily goods, such as beauty and vigour, contribute anything to man's happiness, nor, much more, that the external ['goods'], such as wealth and glory, are complements of the good, but that the good, which is one and only, unmixed, pure and immaterial and is not completed either by bodily or external goods, is established in the souls themselves. Those who claim that the advantageous comes from the unjust do not see that it is firmly established within the soul itself, but they see it in external things and as something necessary rather than good. But those who identify the just with the advantageous would say that the essence of a human being is defined in accordance with the soul itself, and where the just is, there also is the advantageous. But the just lies in the soul, so that within the soul lies also the advantageous; and this is the good, and where our good excellently exists, there also we have our being. So a human being and the good of a human being lie in the soul, whereas the body is an instrument for the soul and not a part of the whole human being. For the advantages and disadvantages of the parts pass over into the nature of the whole, since the whole finds its being in the parts, but what happens to the instruments does not change the condition of those who employ them, even if it can often be an obstacle to their activities. Therefore, neither do the advantages of the instruments enhance the condition of those who employ them, and for this reason nor are the advantages of the body, let alone the external [goods], a complement of the soul for its happy life. So even though what is unjust is considered as advantageous by the orators, it lies in the external parts, and not in the soul, and it is allegedly—not truly—advantageous; for the truly advantageous that is identical with the just lies in the soul. And they use the intellect as their contemplator, as Socrates says in the *Phaedrus*, and the whole of a human being is in the soul and it is only there; for they say "I and mine and ours", meaning the soul, the body, and the external [goods]. Therefore, just as there has been found a difference between the personal pronoun and the possessive one, and the one is one thing and the other another thing, so too there is a big difference between the soul and the body in respect of the essence of the human being. This is why Socrates in the *Phaedo*, when asked how he would prefer to be buried, says "if you can catch me until then", because the whole of our essence lies in our soul.

Therefore, given that there are three things, the good in the divine, the morally beautiful in the forms and the just in the souls, all things enjoy the good (for it is the principle of all things), those participating in forms enjoy only the morally beautiful, and those participating in the soul enjoy the just. And since all that is endowed with form is morally beautiful, for this reason Socrates says in the *Phaedrus*: "*There is no luster in the images here below of justice and moderation: but, as it is, beauty alone has received this prerogative—to be most conspicuous and most lovable*"[39]. For the soul is something inconspicuous, and the just as well as the moderate are inconspicuous in the soul, and all that is endowed with form is invisible and visible, and it is not true that the soul, because it possesses justice invisibly in itself, cannot display it, but also because there is no form of soul (for the soul is the form of body), and there is no form of form. Therefore, the soul will not be rendered beautiful by the idea,

[39] Translation by O'Neill, adapted.

ψυχή, ἀλλ' ἢ ἄρα παρὰ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ πατρὸς αὐτῆς, τοῦ θεοῦ. καὶ ἔστι τὸ αὐτῆς κάλλος οὐ τῷ τυχόντι ἐραστὸν ἀλλὰ τῷ ὄντως φιλοκάλῳ, καὶ ὅς ἐστι καὶ λέγεται *ἐπιθυμητὴς* τῶν κρειττόνων. εἰ δέ γε καὶ αὐτὴ ἡ καλλοποιὸς ἐρᾶν λέγεται τοῦ τοιούτου κάλλους, ἀλλ' οὐχ ὡς ἐφιεμένη παρ' αὐτοῦ τελειώσεως, ἀλλ' ὡς τελείου παρ' αὐτοῦ γεγονότος· πᾶν γὰρ καλὸν οἰκεῖον τῷ καλλοποιῷ θεῷ.

IV

Πᾶν τὸ περατοῦν τοῦ περατουμένου λείπεται μιᾶ διαστάσει. τρεῖς γὰρ αἱ διαστάσεις, μῆκος πλάτος καὶ βάθος, ὅπερ λέγεται καὶ ὕψος καὶ πάχος· καθ' ἃς εἰσὶ καὶ αἱ ἓξ διαφοραὶ τοῦ τόπου, κατὰ μὲν τὸ μῆκος τὸ ἄνω καὶ τὸ κάτω, κατὰ δὲ τὸ πλάτος τὸ δεξιὸν καὶ τὸ ἀριστερόν, κατὰ δὲ τὸ πάχος τὸ ἔμπροσθεν καὶ τὸ ὄπισθεν. τὸ γοῦν σῶμα τριχῇ διαστατόν ἐστιν· ἔχει γὰρ καὶ μῆκος καὶ πλάτος {211v} καὶ πάχος, καὶ περατοῖ αὐτὸ ἡ ἐπιφάνεια, ἥτις ἔχει δύο διαστάσεις, μῆκος καὶ πλάτος. τὴν δὲ ἐπιφάνειαν περατοῖ ἡ γραμμή, ἥτις ἔχει μίαν διάστασιν, μῆκος μόνον. τὴν δὲ γραμμὴν περατοῖ ἡ στιγμή, ἥτις ἔστιν ἀδιάστατος καὶ ἀμερής, ἣ καὶ σημεῖον καλεῖται.

V

<Ἕτερον> Ἰστέον ὡς ὁ μὲν Ἀριστοτέλης τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ἐκ τῶν τοῦ σώματος καὶ ἐκ τῶν ἔξωθεν, μὴ μόνον ἐκ τῆς ψυχῆς, θέλει συγκροτεῖσθαι· οἱ δὲ θιασῶται τοῦ Πλάτωνος ἐν μόνῃ τῇ ψυχῇ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν περιγράφουσι, λέγοντες «*ἐγὼ*» τὴν ψυχήν, «*τὸ ἐμὸν*» τὸ σῶμα, «τὸ ἡμέτερον» *τὰ ἐκτός*· τὸ γοῦν σῶμα οὐχ ὡς μέρος τοῦ ἀνθρώπου λογίζονται, ἀλλ' ὡς ὄργανον τῆς ψυχῆς. καὶ ὥσπερ τὰ τοῦ ὀργάνου, φασίν, ἢ πλεονεκτήματα ἢ ἐλαττώματα οὐ συντελεῖ πρὸς τὴν ἕξιν τῶν χρωμένων (οὐ γὰρ διὸ ἔχει τις καλὸν πρίονα τέκτων καλός ἐστιν, οὐδὲ διὸ ἔχει τις κακὸν δρέπανον θεριστής ἐστι κακός), τὰ δὲ τῶν μερῶν ἢ πλεονεκτήματα ἢ ἐλαττώματα φθάνουσι καὶ ἐν τῷ ὅλῳ—τὰ γοῦν πλεονεκτήματα τοῦ σώματος ὡς ὀργάνου καὶ οὐχ ὡς μέρους οὐ συντελοῦσι πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου· ὡσαύτως οὐδὲ τὰ ἐλαττώματα τοῦ σώματος ἐμποδιστικά εἰσι τῆς εὐδαιμονίας, ὡς ὀργάνου καὶ οὐχ ὡς μέρους ἐλαττώματα.

75 post ἡ καλλοποιὸς fort. αἰτία addendum (cf. [Dion.] Div. Nom. IV 7, 151.5) **V**,1 ἕτερον in marg. 7 τίς[1] cod.

71 cf. Plot. Enn. V 1, 3.14 73 cf. Orig. Fragm. in Io. 42, 27–28 (= Theodor. Mopsuest. Comm. in Io. 22, 6–7) **IV**,1–2 τρεῖς … πάχος cf. Nicom. Introd. arithm. II, 13, 1.3–7 2–4 αἱ … ὄπισθεν cf. Arist. Phys. Γ 5, 205b31–33 **V**,1–4 ὁ μὲν … ἐκτός cf. Hippol. Refut. omn. haer. I, 20, 5.1–5 1–2 Ἀριστοτέλης … συγκροτεῖσθαι cf. Arist. Eth. Nic. A 8, 1099a31–32; H 13, 1153b17–19 2–3 οἱ … περιγράφουσι cf. Olympiod. In Gorg. 32, 5.19–20 3–4 ἐγὼ … ἐκτός cf. Olympiod. In Phaed. 6, 8.9–11

IV,1–8 Πᾶν … καλεῖται Pach. Philos. III 1, 2, 3.5–15: καὶ σώματά εἰσι τριχῇ διαστατά (μῆκος γὰρ ἔχει, πλάτος καὶ βάθος), καὶ τοῦτο εὐλόγως· πᾶν γάρ, φησὶ τὸ ἀξίωμα, τὸ περατοῦν τοῦ περατουμένου λείπεται μιᾷ διαστάσει. τὸ μὲν οὖν σῶμα περατοῦται ταῖς ἐπιφανείαις. καὶ τὸ μὲν σῶμα ἔχει τρεῖς διαστάσεις, ἡ δ' ἐπιφάνεια δύο. καὶ αὖθις τὴν ἐπιφάνειαν περατοῦσιν αἱ γραμμαί. καὶ τῆς ἐπιφανείας ἐχούσης διαστάσεις δύο, ἡ γραμμὴ μίαν ἔχει, τὴν κατὰ μῆκος διάστασιν. καὶ αὖθις γραμμὴν περατοῦσι στιγμαί. καὶ τῆς γραμμῆς ἐχούσης μίαν διάστασιν, ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἡ στιγμή, ὃ δὴ καὶ σημεῖον λέγεται, ἀδιάστατός ἐστιν. 2 Pach. Quadrivium I, 25.19–20; III, 16.23–25: καὶ κατὰ τὴν τρίτην διάστασιν, ἣν λέγομεν πάχος ἢ βάθος ἢ ὕψος. **V**,1–2 Pach. In Eth. Nic. 28.25–30.1: ἵνα μὴ τητωμένων τῶν εὐδαιμόνων ἐμποδίζηται ἡ εὐδαιμονία καὶ τὸ ταύτης καταρρυπαίνηται μακάριον, μὴ μόνον δὲ τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν σωματικῶν δεήσεται.

but rather by the Good and her Father, namely God. And her beauty is loved not by any random human being but by the true lover of beauty, who is said to long for the superior. If [the cause] that produces beauty is said to love this kind of beauty, it is not because it desires to be perfected by this beauty, but because the beauty has become perfect by it; for all that is morally beautiful is proper to God who produces beauty.

IV

Every limiting thing has one dimension less than the thing of which it is the limit. For there are three dimensions, length, width, and depth; the latter is also called 'height' and 'thickness'. Accordingly, there are also six differences of place, upwards and downwards according to length, right and left according to width, front and back according to thicknees. So the body is three-dimensional, for it has length, width, and thickness and is limited by the surface, which has two dimensions, namely length and width. The surface is limited by the line, which has one dimension, namely only length. The line is limited by the point (*stigmē*), which is non-dimensional and partless, and is also called *sēmeion*.

V

<Other topic> We must know that Aristotles wishes to make happiness be constituted of bodily and external [goods], and not solely of the soul, whereas the followers of Plato delimit happiness in the soul alone, saying "I", i.e. the soul, "mine", i.e. the body, and "ours", i.e. the external [goods]. So they do not consider the body as a part of the human being but rather as an instrument of the soul. They say that, just as the advantages or disadvantages of an instrument do not contribute to the condition of those who employ them (for it is not true that one is a good mason because he has a good saw, or that one is a bad reaper because he has a bad sickle), whereas the advantages or disadvantages of the parts concern the whole as well, the advantages of the body, being an instrument and not a part, do not therefore contribute to the happiness of human beings. Similarly, the disadvantages of the body do not impede happiness, since they are disadvantages of an instrument, not of a part.

VI

<Ἕτερον> Σημείωσαι τὸ ἐνιαῖον καὶ ἁπλοῦν *ἢ μαθών* τις ἔχει *ἢ εὑρών*, ἤγουν ὃ *οἶδε* τις ἢ *ἔμαθε* ἢ *εὗρε*, διὰ τοῦτο καὶ τὸ ἅπαν ἔχει. τὸ γὰρ ‘*ὃ*’ ἑνικόν ἐστι, τὸ δὲ ‘*ἃ*’ (εἴπερ τις τὸ μὲν ἐξ αὐτοῦ εὗρε, τὸ δὲ ἔμαθεν) οὐκ ἔχει ἓν ἐπὶ πᾶσιν ἐκ τῶν δύο, ἤγουν ὅτι ἢ ἔμαθεν ἢ εὗρε. διὰ τοῦτο *οὐχ ἅπαντα* τὰ ‘*ἅ*’, ἤγουν πάντα [τὰ] ἐν μιᾷ διαιρέσει οὐκ ἀνάγονται, ἢ ὅτι ἔμαθεν ἢ ὅτι εὗρεν. ὥστε ὁ λέγων «ἃ» οὐχ ἅπαντα {212r} λέγει μονομερῶς ἐν μιᾷ διαιρέσει, ὥσπερ ὁ λέγων «ὃ» ἐν μιᾷ διαιρέσει τίθησιν, ἢ ὅτι εὗρεν ἢ ὅτι ἔμαθεν.

VI,1 ἕτερον in marg. 2 διατοῦτο cod. 3 αὐτοῦ scripsimus : αὐτοῦ cod. 4 τὰ delevimus

VI,1–4 ἢ μαθών … τὰ ‘*ἅ*’ cf. Arist. Soph. El. 22, 178b34–36 2–3 cf. Plato, Alc. 106d4–5

VI

<Other topic> Note that one grasps the unitary and simple either through learning or through discovery, in other words, what one knows has been either learnt or discovered, and so he has also grasped the whole of it. For ‘what thing’ is singular, whereas ‘what things’ (if one has discovered one thing by himself, whereas he has learnt another) is not one out of two applying to all of them, that is, that ‘he has either learnt or discovered’. For this reason ‘what things’ are not all things; that is, they are not all of them reduced to one branch, i.e. either that he has learnt or that he has discovered. Thus, he who says ‘what things’ does not mean all things taken together under one branch, just as he who says ‘what thing’ puts it under one branch, namely that he has either discovered it or learnt it.

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