4

ISSUES IN INDIAN PHILOSOPHY AND ITS HISTORY

4.1

DOXOGRAPHY AND CATEGORIZATION

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Les "Six doctrines de spéculation" (*ṣaṭtarkī*) Sur la catégorisation variable des systèmes philosophiques dans l'Inde classique*

ayam eva tarkasyālaṃkāro yad apratiṣṭhitatvaṃ nāma
(Śaṅkara ad *Brahmasūtra* II.1.11,
cité par W. Halbfass, *India and Europe*, p. 280)

Les sixaines de *darśana*

"During the last centuries, the six-fold group of Vaiśeṣika, Nyāya, Sāṃkhya, Yoga, Mīmāṃsā, and Vedānta (…) has gained increasing recognition in presentations of Indian philosophy, and this scheme of the systems is generally accepted today."[1] C'est en effet cette liste de systèmes philosophiques (*darśana*) qu'évoque le plus souvent, pour l'indianiste, le terme *ṣaḍdarśana*. Il est cependant bien connu, également, que le regroupement sous cette étiquette de ces six systèmes brahmaniques "orthodoxes" est relativement récent, sans doute postérieur au XIIe siècle;[2] un survol de la littérature doxographique sanskrite fait apparaître qu'il n'est du reste pas le plus fréquent parmi les configurations censées comprendre l'ensemble des systèmes.[3] La plupart des doxographies incluent en effet des descriptions des trois grands systèmes "non brahmaniques", c'est-à-dire le matérialisme,[4] le bouddhisme et le jaïnisme. Le Yoga en tant que tel et le Vedānta, par contre, sont souvent absents de la liste des systèmes, en particulier avant les XIIIe-XIVe siècles.

Il n'en reste pas moins que les *darśana* sont souvent considérés comme étant au nombre de six, quelle qu'en soit la liste. La prégnance de cette association, qui apparaît dès la première doxographie, le fameux *Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya* ("Compendium des six systèmes") du jaina Haribhadra (VIIIe s. ?), est bien illustrée par la classification des *darśana* que propose Mādhava Sarasvatī au début de sa *Sarvadarśanakaumudī* (début du XVIe s.): ils sont divisés d'abord en "védiques" et "non védiques", la seconde catégorie comprenant le bouddhisme, le matérialisme et le jaïnisme, la première étant subdivisée en *tarka* (= Nyāya et Vaiśeṣika), *tantra* (= *mīmāṃsā*) et *sāṃkhya*. À ce premier niveau de cardinal six s'en ajoutent deux autres, par

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[1] Wilhelm Halbfass, *India and Europe*: *An Essay in Understanding*, Albany 1988, p. 353. Mon rapide survol des "sixaines de *darśana*" doit beaucoup au 19e chapitre de cet ouvrage, "The Sanskrit Doxographies and the Structure of Hindu Traditionalism" (pp. 349-368), ainsi qu'aux travaux sur les doxographies jaina contenus dans l'ouvrage posthume de Kendall W. Folkert édité par John E. Cort (*Scripture and Community*: *Collected Essays on the Jains*, Atlanta 1993).

[2] Cf. Ganganatha Jha, *Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā in its Sources*, 2e éd., Varanasi 1964, pp. 1-2 (dont certaines données manquent cependant de précision, cf. par exemple *infra* n. 39).

[3] Voir le tableau donné dans l'*Annuaire de l'EPHE*, art. cité (voir n. *), pp. 180-181.

[4] Je m'en tiendrai aux termes "matérialisme" et "matérialiste" pour rendre les termes sanskrits *lokāyata*, *cārvāka*, etc.

Karin Preisendanz (ed.), *Expanding and Merging Horizons*: *Contributions to South Asian and Cross-Cultural Studies in Commemoration of Wilhelm Halbfass*, Wien: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 2007, pp. 239-258.

la division traditionnelle du bouddhisme en quatre écoles d'une part, par la dérivation des six *darśana* "brahmaniques" dans la première catégorie d'autre part.[5]

En réalité, les premières doxographies (toutes jaina, incidemment) ne décrivent pas six systèmes, mais sept: matérialisme, bouddhisme et jaïnisme, Vaiśeṣika, Nyāya, Sāṃkhya et Mīmāṃsā. À l'aube même de l'histoire de la doxographie indienne, une alternative est exposée par Haribhadra:[6] ayant énuméré, dans la 3e stance de son opuscule, les six systèmes constituant pour lui les *darśana* (bouddhisme, Nyāya, Sāṃkhya, jaïnisme, Vaiśeṣika, Mīmāṃsā), il en expose, dans cet ordre, les principales doctrines; ceci fait, il note (st. 78-79) que certains penseurs traitent comme un seul *darśana* les systèmes du Nyāya et du Vaiśeṣika, et parviennent au nombre de six *darśana* en ajoutant la doctrine des matérialistes, qu'il expose ensuite.

Le nombre 6 peut ainsi être obtenu de deux façons. Soit l'on exclut le matérialisme, appelé d'ordinaire *nāstika* par les doxographes jaina. Cette configuration se rencontre dans le *Ṣaḍdarśananirṇaya* de Merutuṅga (XIVe s.), mais aussi dans le *Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya* de Rājaśekhara (XIVe s.), qui refuse au matérialisme la dignité de *darśana*. Ou alors, configuration apparemment plus courante, l'on regroupe le Nyāya et le Vaiśeṣika sous une même étiquette – parfois *tarka*, ou *śaiva*.[7]

Le but du présent article est de proposer une explication à cette instabilité, c'est-à-dire une explication au fait qu'il y a, à la fin du 1er millénaire et au début du second, *sept darśana*. L'hypothèse avancée ici est qu'un autre groupement de six systèmes philosophiques était courant avant les deux attestés par Haribhadra, un groupement que j'appellerai "les six *tarka*"[8] ou "la sixaine des *tarka*" (*ṣaṭtarkī*), comprenant les écoles décrites par Haribhadra *à l'exception* non pas du matérialisme, mais de la Mīmāṃsā:

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[5] Voir le schéma dans l'*Annuaire de l'EPHE*, art. cité (voir n. *), p. 182; voir aussi ibid., p. 176, et W. Halbfass, *India and Europe* (voir n. 1), pp. 352-353. Un exemple extrême de l'association *darśana* – 6 est donné par une institution dont Catherine Clémentin-Ojha a dépouillé le registre: à Udaipur, au XIXe s., une sorte de ministère des Affaires religieuses est appelé "le département 'des Six Systèmes' (*ṣaḍdarśana*, prononcé localement khaḍdarśana), lequel est au royaume du Mewar ce que le département des Mérites est à Jaipur" (*Le Trident sur le palais*: *une cabale anti-vishnouite dans un royaume hindou à l'époque coloniale*, Paris 1999, p. 140); le terme *darśana* dénote ici les affaires religieuses de façon générale (y compris celles des jaïns), sans référence particulière à une liste fixe.

[6] Cf. l'édition et la traduction du *Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya* par Olle Qvarnström, "Haribhadra and the Beginnings of Doxography in India", dans N.K. Wagle et O. Qvarnström (éd.) *Approaches to Jaina Studies*: *Philosophy*, *Logic*, *Rituals and Symbols*, Toronto 1999, pp. 169-210 (je remercie Mme Nalini Balbir de m'avoir fait connaître ce travail); voir aussi *Annuaire de l'EPHE*, art. cité (voir n. *), pp. 176-179.

[7] Des informations sur les configurations de systèmes philosophiques, à diverses époques et dans diverses régions de l'Inde, pourraient être obtenues de sources épigraphiques. À titre d'exemple, voir la st. 36 de l'inscription du Xe-XIe s. éditée par F. Kielhorn, "A Stone Inscription from Ranod (Narod)", *Epigraphia Indica* 1 (1892), pp. 351-361, où le śivaïte Vyomaśiva est comparé à Maheśa pour les *siddhānta*, puis aux "fondateurs" des sept systèmes décrits par Haribhadra; voir aussi la st. 15 de l'inscription du XIIe s. éditée par F. Kielhorn, "Malhar Stone Inscription of Jajalladeva, of the (Chedi) Year 919", *Epigraphia Indica* 1 (1892), pp. 39-45. Une recherche systématique mériterait d'être entreprise.

[8] Dénotant la spéculation, le raisonnement, la réflexion, le terme *tarka* a des emplois divers (cf. *Annuaire de l'EPHE*, art. cité [voir n. *], p. 183), dont un emploi technique en Nyāya qui, on le verra plus loin, interférera avec l'acception "système philosophique fondé sur le raisonnement pur" (N. Stchoupak, L. Nitti et L. Renou, *Dictionnaire sanskrit-français*, Paris 1980).

six *tarka*	Haribhadra-I	Haribhadra-II
matérialisme	bouddhisme	matérialisme
bouddhisme	jaïnisme	bouddhisme
jaïnisme	Vaiśeṣika	jaïnisme
Vaiśeṣika	Nyāya	Nyāya–Vaiśeṣika
Nyāya	Sāṃkhya	Sāṃkhya
Sāṃkhya	Mīmāṃsā	Mīmāṃsā

La Mīmāṃsā et les six *tarka*

▪ Les six *tarka* de l'inscription C. 38E de Po Nagar

L'inscription sanskrite C. 38E de Po Nagar de Nha Trang, au Campā (actuel Vietnam), a pour objet l'érection par le roi Indravarman d'une statue de la déesse Bhagavatī, en *śaka* 840, soit 918 de n. è.[9] Des quatre strophes qui la composent, la troisième vise à montrer l'étendue des connaissances du roi:

> *mīmāṃsa**ṣaṭtarka**jinendrasūrmmis sakāśikāvyākaraṇodakaughaḥ |*
> *ākhyānaśaivottarakalpamīnaḥ paṭiṣṭha eteṣv iti satkavīnām ||.*[10]

La strophe présente un certain nombre de difficultés, et je ne me hasarderai pas à en proposer une nouvelle traduction après celles de Bergaigne et de Majumdar.[11] Je m'en tiendrai à la chaîne *mīmāṃsaṣaṭtarka*. Bergaigne aussi bien que Majumdar l'interprètent en suppléant un *ādi*, le premier en remarquant qu'"il manque en outre un mot tel que *ādi*: car les Mīmāṃsās sont les deux premiers des six systèmes philosophiques: *shaṭtarka*".[12] Bien évidemment, Bergaigne (et à sa suite Majumdar) a ici en tête la liste des six *darśana* "brahmaniques" (Mīmāṃsā et Vedānta, Sāṃkhya et Yoga, Nyāya et Vaiśeṣika); *mīmāṃsa-ṣaṭtarka* de l'inscription référerait donc à ces six systèmes philosophiques, en tout cas à une liste comportant la Mīmāṃsā. Mais cette interprétation, qui, prétextant de la piètre qualité du sanskrit de nombre d'inscriptions du Campā, va contre l'interprétation obvie ("la/les Mīmāṃsā *et* les six *tarka*"), est-elle vraiment nécessaire?

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[9] Édition et traduction *princeps* par Abel Bergaigne, *Inscriptions sanscrites de Campā et du Cambodge*, Paris 1893, pp. 78-79. Des corrections de lecture ont été apportées par Édouard Huber, "Études indochinoises", *Bulletin de l'École française d'Extrême-Orient* 11 (1911), pp. 259-311, à la p. 268 (XII. L'épigraphie de la dynastie de Dong-Duong). Nouvelle édition et traduction anglaise par R.C. Majumdar, *Ancient Indian Colonies in the Far East*, Vol. I: *Champa*, Lahore 1927, Book III, pp. 138-139.

[10] "La forme *mīmāṃsa-* est un barbarisme garanti par le mètre" (Bergaigne, op. cit., p. 79, n. 1; voir aussi note suivante). – *sakāśikā-*: Chatterjee (cf. *infra*) corrige en *sakāśika-*. – *-udakaughaḥ*: lecture de Huber et Majumdar (Bergaigne lit *-udako yaḥ*, mais note que "l'*o* final [de *-udako*] ressemble assez à *au*").

[11] "Lui qui, se jouant dans les belles ondes des six systèmes philosophiques, à commencer par les Mīmāṃsas, et dans celles de Jinendra, fréquentant les eaux de la grammaire et de la Kāçikā, était comme un poisson dans les légendes et dans l'Uttarakalpa des Çivaïtes: car il était, entre les meilleurs des sages, le plus versé dans tous ces écrits" (Bergaigne, op. cit., p. 79, avec cinq notes); "He who (skilfully played in the) good waves which were the six systems of Philosophy beginning with Mīmāṃsā and those of Jinendra (i.e. Buddha), and in the mass of water which was (Pāṇini's) Grammar with Kāśikā, who was a fish (in the water) which was the Ākhyāna and the Uttarakalpa of the Śaivas; because among the learned, he was the most skilful in all these subjects" (Majumdar, op. cit., p. 139). – À propos des inscriptions sanskrites du Campā, Bergaigne notait que "le tortillage des constructions dans les stances, où l'hyperbate va parfois jusqu'à l'amphigouri, n'est que l'exagération des libertés propres à la versification indienne; il est inutile d'y insister" (op. cit., p. 4); s'agissant des inscriptions C. 38 de Po Nagar, il précisait que "pour la correction, toutes ces inscriptions se valent à peu près, et valent les précédentes" (ibid., p. 70).

[12] Bergaigne, op. cit., p. 79, n. 1 (suite de la remarque citée *supra* n. 10).

Autant que je sache, le premier et seul savant à avoir proposé un autre référent pour le composé *ṣaṭtarka* est D. Chatterjee, dans un court article paru en 1943.[13] Il y a montré que l'expression *mīmāṃsa-ṣaṭtarka-* doit bien être comprise comme signifiant "la/les Mīmāṃsā *et* les six *tarka*"; pour ce faire, il excipe de deux parallèles – qui plus est contemporains de l'inscription C. 38E – qui présentent une liste de six *tarka* dont la (les) Mīmāṃsā est (sont) exclue(s): cette liste est très précisément celle du *Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya*, privée de la Mīmāṃsā.

▪ Les six *tārkika* de l'*Abhidhānacintāmaṇi* de Hemacandra

Avant d'examiner ces deux parallèles, ajoutons-y un troisième, connu depuis longtemps. Dans son *Abhidhānacintāmaṇi*, Hemacandra (XII[e] s.)[14] conclut les données consacrées aux brahmanes par les vers suivants, énonçant des synonymes pour chacun des six *tārkika*, c'est-à-dire des six (adeptes) de *tarka*:

> *syādvādavādy ārhataḥ syāc chūnyavādī tu saugataḥ* ||861||
> *naiyāyikas tv ākṣapādo yaugaḥ sāṃkhyas tu kāpilaḥ* |
> *vaiśeṣikaḥ syād aulūkyo bārhaspatyas tu nāstikaḥ* ||862||
> *cārvāko laukāyatikaś caite* ***ṣaḍ*** *api* ***tārkikāḥ*** |.

> Ein Bekenner des Skepticismus, ein G'aina (2 W[örter]). – Ein Bekenner der Lehre vom Nichts, ein Buddhaist (2 W.). – Ein Anhänger der Njâja-Lehre (3 W.). – Ein Anhänger der Lehre des Kapila (2 W.). – Ein Anhänger der Vaiçeshika-Lehre (2 W.). – Materialist (4 W.). – Alle 6 heissen mit einem gemeinschaftlichen Namen târkika's, d. i. Anhänger einer philosophischen Schule.[15]

L'énoncé de Hemacandra suppose, sous-jacent, un groupe de six *tarka*, "doctrines de spéculation": jaina, bauddha, naiyāyika, sāṃkhya, vaiśeṣika et matérialiste. Le Mīmāṃsaka, lui, n'est pas un *tārkika*.

Les six *tarka* en poétique

▪ Les six *tarka* de la *Kāvyamīmāṃsā* de Rājaśekhara

Le premier des deux parallèles invoqués par D. Chatterjee est bien connu. Dans le second chapitre de sa *Kāvyamīmāṃsā*, Rājaśekhara (fin du IX[e] – début du X[e] s.)[16] expose la littérature normative, les *śāstra*, considérée comme l'une des deux branches de la littérature (*vāṅmaya*),

[13] Durga Charan Chatterjee, "A Note on the Expression Ṣaṭ-tarka in an Inscription of Champā", *The Journal of the Greater India Society* 10/1 (January 1943), pp. 154-156. Je remercie M. Kamaleswar Bhattacharya de m'avoir signalé cet article et de m'en avoir procuré une copie.

[14] Plus précisément, 1087/1088–1172/1173: cf. Claus Vogel, *Indian Lexicography*, Wiesbaden 1979, pp. 335-336.

[15] Texte et traduction dans Otto Boehtlingk et Charles Rieu, *Hemak'andra's Abhidhânak'intâmani, ein systematisch angeordnetes synonymisches Lexicon*, Osnabrück 1972 [réimpr. de l'éd. de 1847], pp. 159-160 (voir aussi les notes p. 370, avec les variantes *akṣapādo* pour *ākṣapādo* et *yogaḥ* pour *yaugaḥ*). Le *Śabdakalpadruma* de Rājā Rādhākāntadeva (Calcutta 1822-1858) cite à l'entrée *tārkika* les quatre derniers *pāda* du passage en question (*vaiśeṣikaḥ … tārkikāḥ*), créant ainsi une liste de six *tārkika* ne comprenant que des adeptes du Vaiśeṣika et des "matérialistes". Cette interprétation, erronée, en dit long sur l'oubli dans lequel est tombé le groupe des six *tarka* qui fait l'objet de cet article, oubli dont nous aurons d'autres preuves encore.

[16] Cf. P.V. Kane, *History of Sanskrit Poetics*, 3[e] éd. rév., Delhi 1961, p. 216 (je ne sais sur quoi se fonde D. Chatterjee pour dater Rājaśekhara des environs de 1000 A.D. [voir art. cité en n. 13, p. 155]). Les datations des traités de poétique mentionnées ci-après suivent le travail de P.V. Kane.

l'autre étant les belles-lettres (*kāvya*).[17] En réalité, sa description est pour une part une tentative de synthèse entre deux systèmes de classification, de catégorisation, des savoirs ou sciences (*vidyā* ou *vidyāsthāna*), en y ajoutant la Poésie ou la science de la composition poétique (*sāhityavidyā*). Avant d'y revenir, il me faut rappeler ces deux systèmes.

Le premier est celui des quatorze ou dix-huit "sièges des savoirs" (*vidyāsthāna*), tout entier tourné vers l'explicitation du *dharma* brahmanique; il est attesté au moins, pour sa version à quatorze éléments, depuis la *Yājñavalkyasmṛti*:

> *purāṇanyāyamīmāṃsādharmaśāstrāṅgamiśritāḥ |*
> *vedāḥ sthānāni vidyānāṃ dharmasya ca caturdaśa* ||.[18]
>
> Les (quatre) Veda accompagnés par l'Antiquité, le *nyāya*, l'Exégèse, le Traité de la Loi et (les six) membres (auxiliaires du Veda) sont les quatorze sièges des savoirs et du *dharma*.

Un examen d'autres sources énumérant ces quatorze sièges des savoirs (en y ajoutant éventuellement quatre autres sièges) fait apparaître une grande stabilité pour toutes les appellations, sauf pour la seconde: le terme *nyāya* est parfois remplacé par *tarka* (qui est du reste peut-être la leçon originale de la *Yājñavalkyasmṛti*; cf. *infra*), souvent par *nyāyavistara* (… *mīmāṃsā nyāyavistaraḥ* …).[19] Vijñāneśvara (début du XII[e] s.) le glose d'ailleurs par *nyāyas tarkavidyā*, "le *nyāya* est la science du raisonnement". Si la très grande majorité des textes consultés (commentaires, autres énumérations des *vidyāsthāna*, littérature secondaire) s'accorde à considérer le *nyāya* ou *tarka* ou *nyāyavistara* comme un des quatorze sièges des savoirs, il faut cependant signaler l'interprétation de Viśvarūpa (entre 750 et 1000 de n. è.), qui arrive différemment au nombre 14: "le terme *nyāyamīmāṃsā*, quant à lui, réfère à un seul siège des savoirs; et le terme *purāṇa* englobe l'Épopée et l'Antiquité [soit deux sièges des savoirs]" (*nyāyamīmāṃseti caikaṃ vidyāsthānam. purāṇam iti cetihāsapurāṇayor grahaṇam*). Cette interprétation est sans doute fondée sur le fait que la Mīmāṃsā est conçue comme un "faisceau d'arguments" (*yuktikalāpa*),[20] une "analyse en mille axiomes des énonciations védiques" (*nigamavākyānāṃ nyāyaiḥ sahasreṇa vivektrī mīmāṃsā*, *Kāvyamīmāṃsā* p. 3, traduction pp. 33-34). Elle peut s'appliquer également aux versets où la liste des quatorze sièges des savoirs comporte le *pāda* pair *mīmāṃsā nyāyavistaraḥ*: "la Mīmāṃsā, (cette) profusion de *nyāya*".[21] Bref, le siège des savoirs représenté par les termes *nyāya*, *tarka*, *nyāyavistara*, fait problème.

Décrivant d'abord les *śāstra* de la liste classique des quatorze *vidyāsthāna*, Rājaśekhara n'emploie aucun des trois termes en question: il appelle *ānvīkṣikī* ("Philosophie") ce siège

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[17] Texte dans l'édition de C.D. Dalal et R.A. Sastry, *Kāvyamīmāṃsā of Rājaśekhara*, 3[e] éd. rev. et augm., Baroda 1934 (Gaekwad's Oriental Series 1); traduction par Nadine Stchoupak et Louis Renou, *La Kāvyamīmāṃsā de Rājaśekhara, traduite du sanskrit*, Paris 1946.

[18] *Yājñavalkyasmṛti* I.3 (voir aussi *infra* n. 33). Éditions consultées: T. Ganapati Sastri (éd.), *The Yâjnavalkyasmriti with the Commentary Bālakrīda of Visvarûpâchârya*, Trivandrum 1922 (Trivandrum Sanskrit Series 74); Narayana Shastri Khiste et Jagannatha Shastri Hoshinga (éd.), *The Yājñavalkya Smṛti with Viramitrodaya the Commentary of Mitra Misra and Mitakshara Commentary of Vijnanesvara*, Benares 1930 (Chowkhambā Sanskrit Series); *Yājñavalkyasmṛti* avec le commentaire d'Aparārka, Poona 1903 (Ānandāśrama Sanskrit Series 46). Pour les dates des commentateurs, voir P.V. Kane, *History of Dharmaśāstra*, Vol. I, 2[e] éd. rév. et augm., Poona 1990 (réimpr.) et 1975.

[19] Cf., *ubi alia*, Bh. Jhalakīkar, *Nyāyakośa*, rév. et rééd. par V. Abhyankar, Poona 1978, s.v. *vidyā*, p. 753.

[20] C'est ainsi que Kumārila caractérise la Mīmāṃsā; cf. W. Halbfass, *Tradition and Reflection*: *Explorations in Indian Thought*, Delhi 1992, pp. 30 et 34.

[21] Cf. ibid., p. 30. – Au reste, ce *pāda* peut se lire aussi: *mīmāṃsānyāyavistaraḥ*, "la profusion des *nyāya* de la Mīmāṃsā".

des savoirs – s'autorisant, sans doute, d'une équivalence *ānvīkṣikī* = *tarkavidyā* établie, par exemple, dans l'*Amarakośa*[22] – et renvoie pour son élucidation à sa description ultérieure des "sciences", c'est-à-dire des quatre *vidyā*, inspirée de l'*Arthaśāstra* de Kauṭilya:

> *ānvīkṣikī trayī vārttā daṇḍanītiś ceti vidyāḥ*.
>
> Philosophie, Triple Savoir, Économie et Politique, voilà les sciences.[23]

La description même de cette "Philosophie" introduit le terme *tarka*, que je propose de considérer comme une "abréviation" de *tarkavidyā*, "science (fondée sur) le raisonnement":

> *dvidhā cānvīkṣikī pūrvottarapakṣābhyām. arhadbhadantadarśane lokāyataṃ ca pūrvaḥ pakṣaḥ, sāṃkhyaṃ nyāyavaiśeṣikau cottaraḥ. ta ime* ***ṣaṭ tarkāḥ*** [var.: *ṣaṭ tarkāḥ* om. B].
>
> La Philosophie est de deux sortes, suivant (qu'on envisage) les Thèses liminaires ou les Thèses finales. Les doctrines jaina, bouddhiste et le matérialisme (*lokāyata*) sont les thèses liminaires; le Sāṃkhya, le Nyāya–Vaiśeṣika, (les thèses) finales. Tels sont les six (Modes de) raisonnement.[24]

Nous retrouvons donc exactement la liste des six *tarka* sous-jacente à celle des six *tārkika* de Hemacandra. Si la leçon du manuscrit B nous laissait le moindre doute, il serait levé par les indications que Rājaśekhara nous donne, au chapitre huit, sur la *pramāṇavidyā* ("science des Normes [de connaissance]") comme source des sujets de poésie:

> *dvividhaḥ prāmāṇiko maimāṃsikas tārkikaś ca*.
>
> (La source) tirée des Normes (de connaissance) est de deux sortes, celle de l'Investigation (sacrée) et celle de la Spéculation (texte p. 36,19; traduction p. 117).

Au moment de donner des exemples tirés des "(doctrines de) Spéculation" (*tarka*), Rājaśekhara les énumère à nouveau:

> *tarkeṣu sāṃkhyīyaḥ* (...). *nyāyavaiśeṣikīyaḥ* (...). *bauddhīyaḥ* (...). *laukāyatikaḥ* (...). *ārhataḥ* (...).
>
> Parmi les (doctrines de) Spéculation, celle du Sāṃkhya (...). Celle du Nyāya–Vaiśeṣika (...). Celle du bouddhisme (...). Celle du matérialisme (...). Celle du jainisme (...) (texte pp. 37-38; traduction pp. 118-120).

Encore une fois, la Mīmāṃsā est distinguée des *tarka*; toutefois, elle se retrouve subsumée avec eux sous le chef commun de *pramāṇavidyā*, de "science des moyens de raisonnement", une indication dont nous verrons la portée plus loin.

▪ Développements ultérieurs: poétique jaina

Le chapitre huit de la *Kāvyamīmāṃsā* a été utilisé par Hemacandra dans son *Kāvyānuśāsana-Viveka*, sous le *sūtra* 1.8 où la *vyutpatti* ("culture") nécessaire au poète est définie comme étant l'habileté dans les choses du monde, dans les *śāstra* et dans les *kāvya*.[25] Plusieurs des

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[22] *Amarakośa*, I.5(*śabdādivarga*).5ab: *ānvīkṣikī daṇḍanītis tarkavidyārthaśāstrayoḥ*, dans Krishnaji Govind Oka (éd.), *The Nâmalingânuśâsana* (*Amarakosha*) *of Amarasimha*, *with the Commentary* (…) *of Kshîrasvâmin*, Poona 1913, p. 28.

[23] *Kāvyamīmāṃsā* p. 4,6-7 (texte), p. 35 (traduction); c'est là, *verbatim*, le texte de l'*Arthaśāstra* 1.2.1 (texte et traduction dans R.P. Kangle, *The Kauṭilīya Arthaśāstra*, 3 vol., Bombay 1960-1965, Vol. I, p. 4 et Vol. II, p. 6).

[24] *Kāvyamīmāṃsā*, p. 4,16-18 (texte), pp. 36-37 (traduction). – On notera le couplage non seulement du Nyāya et du Vaiśeṣika (qu'on retrouvera plus loin), mais encore des *darśana* jaina et bouddhiste. On relèvera aussi que, bien que Rājaśekhara ne donne pas explicitement l'équation *tarka* = *darśana*, il met clairement les deux termes sur le même plan, contrairement à d'autres auteurs, plus tardifs, qui parleront de "*tarka* des *darśana*" (cf. *infra* n. 47 et 72).

[25] *Kāvyānuśāsana* (*with Alaṃkāracūḍāmaṇi and Viveka*) *of Ācārya Hemacandra* (…), 2e éd. rév., Rasiklal C. Parikh et V.M. Kulkarni (éd.), Bombay 1964, p. 7.

śāstra énumérés coïncident avec ou correspondent à des sources de sujets de poésie objet du chapitre 8 de la *Kāvyamīmāṃsā*, en particulier les six premières: *śruti*, *smṛti*, *itihāsa*, *purāṇa*, *pramāṇavidyā* – ici remplacé par *tarka*(*grantha*) –, *samayavidyā* – remplacé par *āgama*-(*grantha*) –; dans le *Viveka*, Hemacandra reprend presque tous les exemples que la *Kāvyamīmāṃsā* donne pour ces six premières sources;[26] mais ayant remplacé la *pramāṇavidyā* par les *tarka*(*grantha*), il ne mentionne nulle part la Mīmāṃsā, et considère que le *tarka* est de six sortes: jaina, bauddha, matérialiste, sāṃkhya, nyāya–vaiśeṣika; pour chacun de ces *tarka*, les doctrines et stances données en exemple sont très exactement celles de la *Kāvyamīmāṃsā*.[27] Dès lors, il est probable que la liste des six *tārkika* donnée par Hemacandra dans son *Abhidhānacintāmaṇi* (cf. *supra* p. 242) tire son origine de la *Kāvyamīmāṃsā*.

C'est sans doute par l'intermédiaire de Hemacandra que la liste des six *tarka* de Rājaśekhara aura trouvé son chemin dans le (*Kāvyakalpalatāvṛtti-*)*Parimala* d'Amaracandra (XIIIe s.). Car la section qu'il y consacre à l'habileté (*kauśala*) dans toutes les *kalā* reprend dans sa très grande majorité le texte même du *Viveka* de Hemacandra sur les *śāstra* dans lesquels le poète doit faire preuve d'habileté (*naipuṇa*);[28] en particulier, le passage concernant les six *tarka*[29] est identique à celui du *Viveka* cité *supra* n. 27, à l'exception du terme *naipuṇa* modifié en *kauśala*! Et tout comme Hemacandra, Amaracandra ne mentionne pas la Mīmāṃsā. Nous retrouverons Amaracandra plus loin …

Une synthèse étrange entre les données de la *Kāvyamīmāṃsā* et celles du *Viveka* semble avoir été effectuée par Vāgbhaṭa II (XIVe s. ?). Dans son *Kāvyānuśāsana*, la *vyutpatti* est définie d'une façon assez proche de celle de Hemacandra, mais c'est le terme *pramāṇa*(*śāstra*) qui réapparaît dans la liste des *śāstra* en lieu et place des *tarka*(*grantha*); dans l'auto-commentaire *Alaṅkāratilaka*, toutefois, il n'est plus question que de six sortes de *tarka*; cependant, la liste donnée, agglutinant le Nyāya et le Vaiśeṣika en un système dénommé *śaiva* et introduisant la Mīmāṃsā sous l'appellation *bhāṭṭa*, correspond en fait à la liste des *darśana* du type Haribhadra-II:

tarkaḥ ṣaṭprakāraḥ:
jinaṃ sāṃkhyaṃ śivaṃ bhāṭṭaṃ bauddhaṃ laukāyataṃ tathā |
ṣaḍ etā dṛṣṭayaḥ proktāḥ śeṣāḥ pāṣaṇḍavṛttayaḥ ||.[30]

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[26] On trouvera dans les notes de Stchoupak et Renou à leur traduction de la *Kāvyamīmāṃsā* (p. 115 sq.) l'indication des très nombreux passages du 8e chapitre repris par Hemacandra (avec références à l'édition de la *Kāvyamālā*); il faut cependant supprimer la mention "phrase reprise Hem. p. 6" dans la n. 20 et ajouter la mention "strophe reprise Hem. p. 7" à la n. 77.

[27] *tarkaḥ ṣaṭprakāraḥ*. *tatrārhato yathā* (…). *tannaipuṇaṃ yathā* (…). *bauddhīyo yathā* (…). *tannaipuṇaṃ yathā* (…). *laukāyatiko yathā* (…). *tannaipuṇaṃ yathā* (…). *sāṃkhyīyo yathā* (…). *tannaipuṇaṃ yathā* (…). *nyāyavaiśeṣikīyo yathā* (…). *tannaipuṇaṃ yathā* (…) (*Kāvyānuśāsana-Viveka* pp. 9-10; on notera que les systèmes sont énoncés dans l'ordre adopté par la *Kāvyamīmāṃsā* au chapitre 2). Mentionnons également que des trois *samaya* illustrés par la *Kāvyamīmāṃsā* (*śaivasiddhāntīya*, *pāñcarātra* et *bauddhasiddhāntīya*), Hemacandra ne retient comme *āgama* que le 1er et le 3e.

[28] La portion conservée du *Parimala* est publiée en appendice de R.S. Betai (éd.), *Amaracandrayati's Kāvyakalpalatāvṛttiḥ* (*with Two Commentaries – Parimala and Makaranda*), Ahmedabad 1997 (L.D. Series 117). Le passage concerné y figure aux pp. 39-42 (pagination défectueuse), à comparer avec les pp. 7-13 du *Viveka*. L'édition ne signale malheureusement pas cet emprunt massif (qui se poursuit d'ailleurs jusqu'à la p. 45 par la copie du *Viveka* des pp. 14-18), et une comparaison détaillée des deux passages permettrait sans doute de montrer que c'est bien Hemacandra qui est copié, et non Rājaśekhara. Mentionnons seulement que, comme chez Hemacandra, le Pāñcarātra est ignoré (cf. n. précédente).

[29] Ibid., pp. 39-40.

[30] Pt. Shivadatta et K.P. Parab (éd.), *The Kâvyânuśâsana of Vâgbhatta with his Own Gloss*, Bombay 1894 (Kāvyamālā 43), p. 5,16-17. Chacun des six systèmes est illustré par une stance: *jainaṃ yathā* (…). *sāṃ-*

Ce faisant, Vāgbhaṭa tient bien compte des sept *pramāṇavidyā* de Rājaśekhara, mais en niant la distinction que ce dernier établit entre la Mīmāṃsā et les *tarka*.

La "sixaine des *tarka*" dans la *Nyāyamañjarī* de Jayanta Bhaṭṭa

Le second passage auquel D. Chatterjee fait référence figure dans le prologue de la *Nyāyamañjarī* du philosophe naiyāyika Jayanta Bhaṭṭa (vers 900 de n. è.),[31] à nouveau dans le contexte d'une discussion des quatorze *vidyāsthāna*. Dans la mesure où, on va le voir, son interprétation n'est pas tout à fait obvie, il faut nous y arrêter plus longuement. Ayant décrit les différents sièges des savoirs, Jayanta poursuit:[32]

(...) *tānīmāni caturdaśa*$^{\alpha}$ *vidyāsthānānīty ācakṣate. yathoktam*:
purāṇatarkamīmāṃsādharmaśāstrāṅgamiśritāḥ |
vedāḥ sthānāni vidyānāṃ dharmasya ca caturdaśa ||[33] *iti*.
anyatrāpy uktam:
aṅgāni vedāś catvāro mīmāṃsā nyāyavistaraḥ |
purāṇaṃ dharmaśāstraṃ ca vidyā hy etāś caturdaśa ||[34] *iti*.

pūrvatra$^{\beta}$ *tarkaśabdenopāttam uttaratra ca nyāyavistaraśabdenaitad eva śāstram ucyate. nyāyas tarko 'numānam*; *so 'sminn eva*$^{\gamma}$ *vyutpādyate. yataḥ sāṃkhyārhatānāṃ*$^{\delta}$ *tāvat kṣapaṇakānāṃ kīdṛśam anumānopadeśakauśalam*, *kiyad eva tattarkeṇa*$^{\varepsilon}$ *vedaprāmāṇyaṃ rakṣyata iti nāsāv iha*$^{\zeta}$ *gaṇanārhaḥ.*$^{\eta}$ *bauddhās tu yady apy anumānamārgāvagāhana*$^{\theta}$*naipuṇābhimānoddhurāṃ*$^{\iota}$ *kandharām*$^{\kappa}$ *udvahanti*, *tathāpi vedaviruddhatvāt tattarkasya kathaṃ vedādividyāsthānasya*$^{\lambda}$ *madhye pāṭhaḥ*? *anumānakauśalam api kīdṛśaṃ śākyānām iti pade pade darśayiṣyāmaḥ. cārvākās tu varākāḥ pratikṣeptavyā eveti*$^{\mu}$ *kaḥ*$^{\nu}$ *kṣudratarkasya tadīyasyeha gaṇanāvasaraḥ*? *vaiśeṣikāḥ pu-*

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khyīyo yathā (…). *śaivo yathā* (…). *bhaṭṭānāṃ yathā* (…). *bauddhīyo yathā* (…). *laukāyatīyo yathā* (…) (ibid., p. 5); seul des exemples donnés par Vāgbhaṭa, celui relatif au *tarka = dṛṣṭi = darśana śaiva* reprend celui par lequel la *Kāvyamīmāṃsā* et le *Viveka* de Hemacandra illustrent le système Nyāya–Vaiśeṣika.

[31] Cf. Walter Slaje, "Untersuchungen zur Chronologie einiger Nyāya-Philosophen", *Studien zur Indologie und Iranistik* 11-12 (1986), pp. 245-278, à la p. 274.

[32] Texte dans *Tail*. (éd. Gaṅgādhara Śāstrī Tailaṅga, Benares 1895 [Vizianagram Sanskrit Series 10], pp. 3-4), *Śukla* (éd. Surya Nārāyana Śukla, 2e éd., Varanasi 1971 [Kashi Sanskrit Series 106], p. 4), *Varad*. (éd. K.S. Varadacharya, Vol. I, Mysore 1969 [Oriental Research Institute Series 116], pp. 8-9), *Sastri* (éd. Gaurinath Sastri, Vol. I, Varanasi 1982, p. 9); *All*. désigne les leçons d'un ms. d'Allahabad données en appendice de l'éd. *Varad*., *ka* celles du ms. de l'Oriental Research Institute de Mysore relevées dans la même édition. – Je renverrai aussi aux traductions anglaises de Janaki Vallabha Bhattacharyya, *Jayanta Bhaṭṭa's Nyāya-mañjarī*, Vol. I, Delhi 1978, et de V.N. Jha, *Nyāyamañjarī of Jayantabhaṭṭa* (Āhnika-I), Delhi 1995; ce dernier avait déjà donné une traduction annotée de l'introduction de la *Nyāyamañjarī* dans le *Bulletin of the Deccan College Research Institute* 36 (1976-1977), pp. 36-43, qui ne présente pas de divergences fondamentales sur les points qui nous intéressent ici. Le commentaire *Nyāyamañjarīgranthibhaṅga* de Cakradhara est malheureusement lacunaire pour ce passage.

[33] *Yājñavalkyasmṛti* I.3 (cf. *supra* n. 18). Toutes les éditions de la *Yājñavalkyasmṛti* que j'ai pu consulter lisent *-nyāya-* au lieu de *-tarka-* dans le *pāda* initial, et c'est apparemment cette leçon qui est commentée par Viśvarūpa (entre 750 et 1000 de n. è.), Vijñāneśvara (début du XIIe s.) et Aparārka (XIIe s.). Il est cependant certain que Jayanta vise bien ici cette *smṛti*, et qu'il la connaît avec la leçon *-tarka-*; dans sa discussion de la validité de l'*Atharvaveda*, il cite en effet la même strophe (avec *tarka*) pour montrer que "Yājñavalkya, en énumérant les quatorze sièges des savoirs [citation], fait connaître qu'il y a bien quatre Veda; en effet, on n'obtient pas sinon le nombre quatorze", *yājñavalkyaś caturdaśavidyāsthānāni gaṇayan purāṇatarkamīmāṃsā* (…) *caturdaśeti catura eva vedān āvedayate*; *nānyathā hi caturdaśasaṃkhyā pūryate* (*Śukla* p. 233, *Varad*. p. 618, *Sastri* p. 358). Selon Karin Preisendanz (comm. personnelle, 18/05/01), il est bien possible que ce soit là la leçon originale. Quoi qu'il en soit de la source de Jayanta, la leçon *tarka*, dans la *Nyāyamañjarī*, est assurée: elle conditionne la discussion qui suit.

[34] Cf. *Viṣṇupurāṇa* 3.6.26, 27 ou 28 (selon les éditions). Jayanta cite à nouveau la même strophe, l'introduisant par *smṛtyantare ca spaṣṭam evoktam*, dans sa discussion de la validité de l'*Atharvaveda*, juste après avoir cité *Yājñavalkyasmṛti* I.3 (cf. note précédente).

nar asmadanuyāyina eveti.[ξ] *evam asyāṃ janatāsu prasiddhāyām api* ***ṣaṭtarkyām*** *idam eva tarkanyāyavistaraśabdābhyāṃ śāstram uktam*.

Variantes: α. caturdaśa *Tail*., *Varad*.; caturdaśa- *Śukla*, *Sastri*. – β. pūrvatra *edd*.; pūrvatra śloke *All*. – γ. eva *Tail*., *Śukla*, *Sastri*; eva śāstre *Varad*. – δ. -ārhatānāṃ; -āhatānāṃ *Śukla*. – ε. kiyad eva tattarkeṇa *edd*.; kiyad iva tarkeṇa *ka*. – ζ. nāsāv iha *edd*.; nehāsau *ka*. – η. gaṇanārhaḥ *edd*.; gaṇitaḥ *All*. – θ. -mārgāvagāhana- *edd*.; -avagāhana- *ka*. – ι. -naipuṇābhimānoddhurāṃ *Tail*., *All*.; -naipuṇyābhimānoddhurāṃ *Śukla*, *Sastri*; -naipuṇoddhurāṃ *Varad*. – κ. kandharām *edd*.; om. *ka*. – λ. -sthānasya *Tail*., *Śukla*, *Sastri*; -sthāna- *Varad*. – μ. eveti *Śukla*, *Sastri*; eva *Tail*., *Varad*. – ν. kaḥ *edd*.; ka iva *All*. – ξ. Toutes les éditions ont ici le sandhi *evety evam*.

(…) On appelle ces (sciences) les quatorze Sièges du savoir. Comme il a été dit:

> "Les Veda accompagnés par l'Antiquité, le *tarka*, l'Exégèse, le Traité de la Loi et (leurs six) membres (auxiliaires) sont les quatorze sièges des savoirs et du *dharma*."

Ailleurs aussi, il a été dit:

> "Les membres (auxiliaires du Veda), les quatre Veda, l'Exégèse, l'exposé détaillé des arguments (*nyāyavistara*), l'Antiquité et le Traité de la Loi; ce sont là les quatorze Savoirs."

C'est ce même traité [à savoir le traité d'Akṣapāda] qui est énoncé dans la première (strophe) par le mot *tarka*, et dans la suivante par le mot *nyāyavistara*.

Le fait même que Jayanta consacre les lignes qui suivent à la démonstration de la thèse ainsi avancée confirme, tout d'abord, que la place du Nyāya (entendez: la discipline codifiée par Akṣapāda) dans le système des quatorze *vidyāsthāna* n'était pas assurée (cf. *supra* p. 243). Mais, surtout, la démonstration même ne se comprend que si l'on admet que Jayanta a présente à l'esprit une liste précise de disciplines susceptibles d'être couvertes par le terme *tarka* (et par celui de *nyāyavistara*); elle va consister à examiner leur prétention à la dignité de *vidyāsthāna*.

Le *nyāya* est le *tarka*, (à savoir) l'inférence;[35] c'est dans *ce* (traité) qu'il est enseigné.

Car quelle habileté, pour commencer, ont les ascètes mendiants que sont les **Sāṃkhya** et les **Ārhata** dans l'enseignement de l'inférence?[36] Dans quelle mesure leur *tarka* protègera-t-il la validité des Veda? Il ne vaut donc pas d'être compté ici [c.-à-d. dans le groupe des *vidyāsthāna*].

Quant aux **bouddhistes**, quand bien même ils se haussent du col par la haute opinion qu'ils ont de leur savoir-faire en l'immersion dans le [= dans la compréhension du] chemin de l'inférence, néanmoins comment leur *tarka*, puisqu'il est opposé au Veda, serait-il énuméré parmi les sièges des savoirs tels que les Veda, etc.? Nous montrerons d'ailleurs à chaque pas quelle est l'habileté des bouddhistes dans l'inférence.

Quant aux misérables **Cārvāka**, il faut tout bonnement les repousser; quelle raison aurions-nous de compter ici leur minable *tarka*!

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[35] Le lemme qui ouvre la démonstration de Jayanta est plutôt piquant, quand on se souvient que le terme *tarka* désigne dans le Nyāya la 8[e] des seize catégories et qu'il y est, précisément, soigneusement distingué de l'inférence (*anumāna*); cf. les textes cités dans G. Oberhammer, E. Prets et J. Prandstetter, *Terminologie der frühen philosophischen Scholastik in Indien*, Vol. 2, Wien 1996, s.v. *tarka*.

[36] J. Bhattacharyya et V.N. Jha considèrent que le terme *kṣapaṇakānām* renvoie aux bouddhistes: "The Sāṅkhyists, the Ārhats (the Jainas) and the Kṣapaṇakas (the Buddhists) superficially initiate a very small section of their disciples into the deep science of inference" (J. Bhattacharyya, op. cit. [voir n. 32], p. 5); "Because, what sort of skill in the art of teaching of *anumāna*, after all, do the propagators of *Śaṁkhya*-, *Jaina*-, and *Bauddha*-systems, have (…)?" (V.N. Jha, op. cit. [voir n. 32], p. 6). Cette interprétation me paraît aller contre la syntaxe du sanskrit. Il faut donc admettre, en l'état actuel du texte, que *kṣapaṇaka*, entendu comme "ascète mendiant", qualifie à la fois les tenants du Sāṃkhya et les Jaina (*ārhata*). Je n'exclus pas que *kṣapaṇakānām* soit, à l'origine, une glose de *-ārhatānām*, qui aura été insérée dans le texte de la *Nyāyamañjarī*.

> Les **Vaiśeṣika**, eux, nous suivent tout bonnement.
>
> Ainsi, bien que la sixaine des *tarka* soit bien connue parmi les gens, c'est ce seul traité [à savoir celui du Nyāya] qui est désigné par les termes de *tarka* et de *nyāyavistara*.

Mon interprétation se fonde sur l'insertion d'une ponctuation (cf. ci-dessus la "variante" ξ), et diffère de celles de J. Bhattacharyya et V.N. Jha. Le premier rend ainsi les dernières phrases du passage:

> But the Vaiśeṣikas closely follow the Naiyāyikas. "Tarka" or "Nyāyavistara" which figures in the six systems of logic widely known among people denotes the science of Logic of the Vaiśeṣikas as well (op. cit., p. 5);

le second:

> In spite of the Vaiśeṣika-system being well known amongst the people in the form of Saṭtarkī (system having the Six *padārthas*) because they are only [our] followers, by the words *Tarka* and *Nyāyavistara* this very (= Nyāyaśāstrā) system is intended (op. cit., pp. 6-7).

La première traduction (qui laisse de côté *api*) ne rend pas compte du mouvement du texte, qui doit conclure au fait que les mots *tarka* et *nyāyavistara* désignent bien le Nyāya dans les deux strophes citées; la seconde ne convient pas mieux: quand bien même le terme *ṣaṭtarkī* désignerait le Vaiśeṣika,[37] la démonstration de Jayanta suppose que ce soit le mot *tarka* lui-même qui puisse s'appliquer au Vaiśeṣika. Dans l'interprétation que je donne de ce passage (qui est celle de D. Chatterjee),[38] Jayanta a bien à l'esprit une "sixaine" de *tarka* célèbre, une *ṣaṭtarkī*, comportant le Sāṃkhya, le jaïnisme, le bouddhisme, le matérialisme, le Vaiśeṣika et le Nyāya, soit les six systèmes que Rājaśekhara appelle *tarka*. La Mīmāṃsā n'y figure pas.[39]

Preuves de la "popularité" d'un groupement de six *tarka*

Jayanta, écrivant au Cachemire aux alentours de 900 de n. è., nous apprend que la *ṣaṭtarkī* est bien connue des gens (*asyāṃ janatāsu prasiddhāyām api ṣaṭtarkyām*). Qu'au moins la notion de six *tarka*, excluant la Mīmāṃsā, faisait partie d'un certain bagage culturel sanskrit à cette époque est confirmé par son apparition dans l'inscription de Po Nagar, au Campā, datée de 918 de n. è. Avec Rājaśekhara, d'origine marathe mais œuvrant sans doute à Kānyakubja, nous restons dans les environs de l'an 900. Au vu des passages cités de Hemacandra, actif au XIIe siècle au Gujarat, il semble qu'on soit fondé à admettre que la liste des six *tarka* de Rājaśekhara a été courante dans une grande partie de l'aire culturelle indienne de la fin du IXe

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[37] En faveur de cette interprétation, on pourrait peut-être alléguer le sens qu'Annambhaṭṭa, dans l'autocommentaire à son *Tarkasaṃgraha*, donne au terme *tarka* dans ce titre: *tarkasaṃgraha iti*. *tarkyante pratipādyanta iti tarkā dravyādisaptapadārthāḥ* (…) (Y.V. Athalye [éd.] et M.R. Bodas [introduction, traduction], *Tarka-Saṃgraha of Annaṃbhaṭṭa with the Author's own Dīpikā and Govardhana's Nyāya-Bodhinī*, 2e éd. rév. et augm. [3e impr.], Poona 1974, p. 2). *ṣaṭtarkī* serait alors un synonyme de *ṣaṭpadārthī*, et désignerait par métonymie le Vaiśeṣika en tant que système traitant de la collection des six catégories? C'est très improbable …

[38] Cf. D. Chatterjee, art. cité (voir n. 13), pp. 155-156, n. 10 (où l'emploi du terme *ṣaṭ-tarka* au lieu de *ṣaṭ-tarkī* résulte sans doute d'une coquille).

[39] Je ne sais pas sur quoi repose l'affirmation de Ganganatha Jha dans sa *Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā in its Sources* (op. cit. [voir n. 2], p. 2), selon laquelle "*Jayanta-Bhaṭṭa* in his *Nyāyamañjarī* (tenth century A.C.) speaks of '*Ṣaṭ-tarkī*', 'the Six Theories'; but includes under the name, *Mīmāmsā*, *Nyāya*, *Sāṅkhya*, *Ārhata*, *Bauddha* and *Chārvāka*. The names of '*Vedānta*,' '*Yoga*', '*Vaisheṣika*' are absent here" (G. Jha ne renvoie pas au texte, mais il doit s'agir de notre passage, le terme *ṣaṭtarkī* n'apparaissant pas, à ma connaissance, ailleurs dans la *Nyāyamañjarī*); c'est peut-être sur cette affirmation que se fonde K. Satchidananda Murty pour déclarer – sans références – dans sa traduction du *Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya* de Haribhadra (2e éd. rév., Delhi 1986, p. 99) que "the tenth-century writer Jayanta in his 'Nyāyamañjari' speaks of *Ṣaṭ-tarki* (the six logics or the six theories) and enumerates them as Mīmāmsā, Nyāya, Sāṅkhya, Jaina, Bauddha and Cārvāka".

siècle jusqu'au XIIe-XIIIe siècle. L'extrait cité du *Kāvyānuśāsana* de Vāgbhaṭa II (XIVe s.?) montre cependant que cette sixaine n'aura pas longtemps résisté à une liste de six *tarka* incluant la Mīmāṃsā. Une étude plus fine nécessitera de trouver d'autres attestations du groupement de six systèmes, explicitement énumérés, sous l'étiquette "sixaine de *tarka*".

Je n'en ai, hélas, pas rencontré. Il est cependant aisé de montrer que la notion de six *tarka* – quels que soient les six systèmes, ou autres objets, ainsi groupés – est – ou du moins a été – bien connue en Inde.

▪ Autres occurrences des termes *ṣaṭtarka* et *ṣaṭtarkī*

Les composés *ṣaṭtarka* et *ṣaṭtarkī*, au sens de collection (*samāhāra*), apparaissent dans plusieurs contextes impliquant que leur référent est ou est supposé bien connu. Les quelques occurrences qui suivent ont été principalement glanées au hasard de lectures et de rencontres, et ont bénéficié de la consultation du scriptorium du Deccan College;[40] les trois premières, extraites d'inscriptions, nous rappellent tout l'intérêt qu'il y aurait à ce que les dictionnaires à venir tiennent compte de l'épigraphie.

L'inscription K. 253S de Vat Thipdei (province de Siem Reap, Cambodge), du début du Xe s. de n. è., relate les fondations pieuses de Śikhāśiva, *ācārya* śivaïte qui fonda entre autres, en 832 *śaka* (910/911 de n. è.), le temple qui porte l'inscription. Loué pour sa connaissance des *śāstra* et son enseignement de la conduite selon le (Śaiva-)Siddhānta (st. 14), ce maître est dit s'adonner avec passion à l'étude des "six doctrines de spéculation":

> *viśuddhāsaṃkhyatarko pi śavdavidyādivāṅmaye |*
> *ṣaṭtarkkābhyāsarāgaṃ yo na tatyāja kadā cana* ||15||.
>
> Bien qu'ayant résolu les innombrables doutes (*asaṃkhyatarka*) dans les littératures de la science du langage, etc., il n'abandonna jamais sa passion pour l'étude de la sixaine des doctrines de spéculation (*ṣaṭtarka*).[41]

Une inscription sur plaque de cuivre d'Aṇahilapāṭaka (Gujarat), datée de 1074 de n. è., enregistre une donation du *pāśupatācārya* Megharāśi, disciple de Bṛhaspatirāśi, lui-même disciple du *pāśupatācārya* Viśuddharāśi. Alors que ce dernier est loué pour sa connaissance des systèmes sāṃkhya et pātañjala ainsi que des Purāṇa, Bṛhaspatirāśi est donné comme étant "habile en la connaissance complète des six *tarka*:"[42]

> *śrīvikramasaṃvat 1131 caitraśudi 15 suke 'dyeha śrīmadaṇahilapāṭake* (…) ***ṣaṭtarkka****parijñānanipuṇaḥ paṇḍitaśrībṛhaspatirāśis tatpādānudhyātaparamapāśupatācāryaḥ* (…) *śrīmegharāśiguruḥ* (…).

Une inscription de Gadag (Karnataka), datée de l'an 23 de l'ère Cālukya-Vikrama (= 1098 de n. è.), en écriture kannara et comportant des portions sanskrites et kannara, concerne la fondation par Someśvara Miśra d'une école pour l'enseignement de la Prābhākara-Mīmāṃsā. Parmi les strophes énonçant les qualités de ce brahmane, la suivante loue sa connaissance de divers *śāstra*:

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[40] Je tiens à remercier Mme Pascale Haag, qui a bien voulu consulter pour moi le scriptorium du Deccan College de Poona, et M. Somadeva Vasudeva, qui m'a signalé l'inscription d'Aṇahilapāṭaka.

[41] Texte selon George Cœdès, "Les deux inscriptions de Vat Thĭpdĕi, Province de Siem Rãp", dans *Mélanges d'indianisme offerts par ses élèves à M. Sylvain Lévi*, Paris 1911, pp. 213-229. Ma traduction diffère de celle de Cœdès.

[42] L'inscription a été publiée par Lakṣmaṇabhāi Bhojaka, "Pāśupatācārya Megharāśinuṃ tāmrapatra", *Sambodhi* 21 (1997-1998), pp. 103-104 (la photographie publiée sur le feuillet inséré entre les pp. 102 et 103, censée être celle de cette inscription, en reproduit une autre).

vedhā vedacatuṣṭaye sa hi guhaḥ śabdānvaye śaṃkaraḥ
***ṣaṭtarkkyāṃ** kavitāvivecanavidhau vālmīkir eva svayaṃ |*
sākṣād byāsamuniḥ purāṇasaraṇau smṛtyartthasārtthe manuḥ
śrīsomeśvaramiśra eva bhuvane brāhmaṇyapuṇyārṇṇavaḥ || [40].

A Creator [Brahman] in the Four Vedas, a very Guha [Kumāra] in the sequence of grammar, a Śaṅkara in the six courses of logic, Vālmīki himself in the manner of discriminating poetry, a Vyāsa Muni manifest in the series of Purāṇas, a Manu in the multitude of the matters of religious law, the blest Someśvara Miśra indeed is an ocean of the holiness of the Brāhmaṇic race in the world.[43]

Alors que toutes les autres occurrences ici rassemblées des termes *ṣaṭtarka* et *ṣaṭtarkī* s'expliquent au mieux en prenant *tarka* au sens de "(doctrine de) spéculation" ou, éventuellement, de "(mode de) raisonnement (propre à un *darśana*)", un emploi du second de ces termes par le philosophe vedāntin Śrīharṣa (XII[e] s.),[44] dans son *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādya*, se fonde sur le sens "technique" que le Nyāya, en particulier, a donné au mot *tarka*, et qu'on rend souvent par "réduction à l'absurde":[45] *ṣaṭtarkī* y désigne en effet la collection des six sortes de *tarka* tels que le cercle vicieux, la régression à l'infini, etc.[46] Nous reviendrons sur cet emploi.

On ne s'étonnera pas de rencontrer le composé *ṣaṭtarka*(*jña*) dans une autre œuvre, encore, de Hemacandra, le *Dvyāśrayakāvya*. Établit-il une distinction entre les six *tarka* de la stance I.66 et la sixaine des *darśana*, *ṣaḍdarśanī*, apparaissant dans la stance précédente? Selon le commentateur Abhayatilaka, qui glose le second terme sans donner la liste des *darśana*, précisant seulement qu'il s'agit des *śāstra* jaina, etc., le composé *ṣaṭtarka* s'analyserait comme "les *tarka* des six *darśana*",[47] signifiant peut-être les "(modes de) raisonnement" des six systèmes.

Le fameux 25[e] *sarga* du *Śrīkaṇṭhacarita* de Maṅkha (1[re] moitié du XII[e] siècle, Cachemire) dépeint une assemblé littéraire (*sabhā*); la strophe suivante joue sur l'association de deux sixaines:

*vidvadvādavidhis tasya **ṣaṭtarkī**rasajanmabhūḥ |*
karṇayoḥ ṣaḍrasāhārasiddhyai ciram akalpata ||134||.

Der Disputierplatz der Gelehrten, welcher die Heimstätte der Quintessenz der sechs philosophischen Systeme ist, gereichte endlich dessen Ohren zum Gelingen der Speise der sechs Geschmacksarten.[48]

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[43] Texte (p. 353) et traduction (p. 359) dans Lionel D. Barnett, "Gadag Inscription of Vikramaditya VI: The 23rd Year", *Epigraphia Indica* 15 (1919-1920): 348-363. Cf. *Annuaire de l'EPHE*, art. cité [voir n. *], p. 186.

[44] Cf. Dineshchandra Bhattacharya, *History of Navya-Nyāya in Mithilā*, Darbhanga 1958, p. 47 (où il faut modifier, à la ligne 2, "1225-50 A.D." en "1125-50 A.D.").

[45] Il ne saurait être question de rentrer ici dans une discussion de ce type de *tarka*, et ceci bien que, par l'importance qu'il a prise dans les débats philosophiques indiens, il ait probablement contribué à l'occultation de la "sixaine des *tarka*" entendus comme systèmes philosophiques (cf. *infra*). Sur ce type de *tarka*, voir, *ubi alia*, Sitansusekhar Bagchi, *Inductive Reasoning*: *A Study of Tarka and Its Role in Indian Logic*, Calcutta 1953.

[46] Cf. S. Bagchi, op. cit., p. 152.

[47] *ṣaḍdarśanyāṃ ṣaṇṇāṃ darśanānāṃ matānāṃ jainādiśāstrāṇāṃ samāhāre*. (…) *ṣaṇṇāṃ darśanānāṃ tarkāḥ ṣaṭtarkās tān jānāti ṣaṭtarkajñaḥ* (Abaji Vishnu Kathavate [éd.], *The Dvyâśrayakâvya by Hemachandra, with A Commentary by Abhayatilakagaṇi*. *Text – Cantos I to X*, Bombay 1915 [Bombay Sanskrit and Prakrit Series 69], p. 46). Pour un autre exemple de ce type de rapport entre *tarka* et *darśana*, voir *infra* n. 73.

[48] Texte dans *The Śrîkaṇṭhacharita of Mankhaka* (…), éd. Durgaprasada et K.P. Paraba, Bombay 1887 (Kāvyamālā 3), p. 358; traduction dans Elisabeth Kreyenborg, *Der XXV. Gesang des Śrīkaṇṭhacaritam des Maṅkha*: *Ein Beitrag zur altindischen Literaturgeschichte*, Münster 1929, p. 69 (qui rappelle la leçon *saḍurkī-*

Le *Gaṇeśapurāṇa*[49] contient, dans le chapitre 46 de son *Upāsanākhaṇḍa*, une récitation de mille noms de Gaṇeśa (*Gaṇeśasahasranāma*), dont une partie (st. 136 *sq*.) est structurée par l'association à des entités de cardinal croissant. Parmi les "noms" liés au nombre 6:

> *ṣaḍvairivargavidhvaṃsī ṣaḍūrmibhayabhaṃjanaḥ* |
> ***ṣaṭṭarka****dūraḥ ṣaṭkarmaniratataḥ ṣaḍrasāśrayaḥ* ||145||.[50]

Composée au début du XVe siècle, la *Gurvāvalī* de Munisundara donne la succession (*āvalī*) des maîtres jaina du Tapāgaccha. Sa strophe 70 concerne Municandra Sūri (mort en VS 1178, auteur de commentaires à des œuvres de Haribhadra):

> ***ṣaṭṭarkī****paritarkakelirasiko yaḥ śaivavādīśvaraṃ*
> *prajñādhaḥkṛtavākpatiṃ nṛpasabhe jitvograhetvāśugaiḥ* | (…).[51]

Lui qui, amateur des jeux de l'examen de la *ṣaṭṭarkī*,[52] vainquit dans l'assemblée royale, à l'aide des flèches puissantes de (ses) raisons, Śaivavādīśvara [le Seigneur des disputants *śaiva* (peut-être nyāya–vaiśeṣika?)], qui surpassait par son intelligence le Maître de la parole (…).

Le dérivé *ṣaṭṭarkī* apparaît deux autres fois dans cette œuvre, aux stances 150 (… ***ṣaṭṭarky****abhijñāgraṇīḥ* …) et 280 (***ṣaṭṭarkī****paritarkakarkaśamati-* …).

▪ *tarka* au sens de "six"

Que la notion d'une sixaine de *tarka* ait été répandue en Inde se déduit également de l'emploi du mot *tarka* pour désigner le nombre "six". Selon une pratique courante dans les traités sanskrits d'astronomie, de mathématiques ou de métrique, ainsi que dans les datations d'inscriptions ou de manuscrits, un nombre peut être exprimé par le nom d'objets, d'êtres ou de concepts "traditionnellement" groupés en un ensemble ayant ce nombre pour cardinal;[53] par exemple, le terme *ṛtu* sert à désigner, par métonymie,[54] le nombre "six" en raison du partage traditionnel de l'année en six saisons. L'emploi de *tarka* au sens de "six" présuppose de même qu'il y a eu un ensemble de six *tarka* "bien connu" des lecteurs cultivés, ou du moins qu'il a été bien connu que les *tarka* étaient au nombre de six.

Plusieurs savants, à commencer par al-Bīrunī (auteur de l'*Indica*, env. 1030 de n. è.), ont dressé des listes de mots non numéraux désignant des nombres.[55] Mais aucune de ces listes –

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que Bühler présentait dans son *Detailed Report* […] de 1877). Il n'est pas sûr que le 25e *sarga* du *Śrīkaṇṭhacarita* ne soit pas une addition postérieure.

[49] Sans doute "récent", en tout cas du second millénaire; cf. Ludo Rocher, *The Purāṇas*, Wiesbaden 1986, p. 174.

[50] *Gaṇeśapurāṇa*, édition lithographiée, Mumbai 1892, fol. 32r. Cf. Greg Bailey (introduction, traduction, notes et index), *Gaṇeśapurāṇa*, Part I: *Upāsanākhaṇḍa*, Wiesbaden 1995, p. 266: "(…) who is beyond the six systems of philosophy (…)".

[51] *Gurvāvalī*, Bénarès 1911.

[52] L'édition dont je dispose présente la variante *ṣaṭṭarkī* hors de composé (*ṣaṭṭarkī paritarka-*), donc le nominatif d'un mot *ṣaṭṭarkin*. Cette lecture (qui est celle qu'enregistre le scriptorium du Deccan College) n'est pas impossible, et l'on traduirait alors par "lui, (qui connaît) la sixaine des *tarka*, amateur des jeux de la réflexion (*paritarka*)". Mais le parallèle de la st. 280 montre qu'il est plus simple de voir ici le thème féminin *ṣaṭṭarkī-*.

[53] Sur cet usage, voir, *ubi alia*, G. Bühler, *Indische Palaeographie* (…), Strassburg 1896, pp. 80-82; Alfred Debrunner et Jacob Wackernagel, *Altindische Grammatik*, III: *Deklination der Nomina*, *Zahlwörter*, *Pronomina*, Göttingen 1929, § 171 (pp. 335-336).

[54] Sur le caractère métonymique de cet emploi, voir Pierre Sylvain Filliozat, "Les incertitudes de l'histoire de la numération indienne", *Bulletin de l'Association des Professeurs de Mathématiques de l'Enseignement Public* 398 (avril-mai 1995), pp. 542-547, à la p. 543.

[55] Cf., *ubi alia*, Edward C. Sachau, *Alberuni's India* (…), London 1910, pp. 178-179; A.C. Burnell, *Elements of South-Indian Palæography from the Fourth to the Seventeenth Century A.D.* (…), 2nd ed., London

à ma connaissance – ne renvoie régulièrement aux occurrences textuelles; il est donc parfois difficile, en tout cas pour le non spécialiste, de déterminer les fréquences relatives des divers emplois, leurs dates d'apparition, leurs aires d'extension géographique, etc. Sans doute inutile pour un mot tel que *rasa* ("saveur") employé au sens de "six", une recherche plus fine serait nécessaire pour les termes *darśana* et *tarka*, désignant tous deux le même nombre. À nous fier aux listes énumérées ci-dessus (n. 54), il semblerait que le premier ait été utilisé plus fréquemment que le second;[56] une recherche non systématique suggère toutefois que cette image est peut-être erronée: je n'ai pas rencontré d'occurrence de *darśana* au sens de "six",[57] alors que le terme *tarka* dans le même sens est assez bien attesté. La liste suivante a été dressée au hasard des lectures; elle nécessiterait, dans plusieurs cas, des commentaires plus détaillés qu'il me faut ajourner.

L'occurrence *apparemment* la plus ancienne – la seule, semble-t-il, à être signalée par les dictionnaires – figure dans le *Sūryasiddhānta*, un traité d'astronomie datant des environs de 800 de n. è.[58] Le terme *tarka* y désigne "six" dans un passage qui fait peut-être partie d'un groupe de strophes interpolées:

*svarbhānor veda**tarkā**ṣṭadviśailārthakhakuñjarāḥ* ||. (*Bhūgolādhyāya* 88cd)

[The orbit] of the moon's node [is] eighty million, five hundred and seventy-two thousand, eight hundred and sixty-four (= 80.572.864) [*yojana*].[59]

Le second exemple est tiré du *Gaṇitasārasaṃgraha* du jaina Mahāvīra, œuvrant en pays kannara, un traité mathématique du IXe siècle:[60]

*guṇacāpakṛtiviśeṣāt **tarka**hṛtāt padam iṣuḥ samuddiṣṭaḥ* |.

The measure of the arrow [*iṣu*] is taken to be the square root [*pada*] of one-sixth [*tarkahṛta*] of the difference [*viśeṣa*] between the square [*kṛti*] of the string [*guṇa*] and the square of the (bent stick of the) bow [*cāpa*].[61]

Cette règle, qui semble donner la mesure exacte de la flèche, est erronée!

1878, pp. 77-78; Lewis Rice, *Mysore Inscriptions*, Bangalore 1879, pp. xx-xxii (liste compilant les données de trois manuscrits, dont un de la *Kavikalpalatā*, cf. *infra*); G. Bühler, op. cit., pp. 80-81; Jean Filliozat, dans L. Renou et J. Filliozat, *L'Inde classique*: *manuel des études indiennes*, t. II, Paris, 1985 [1re éd. 1953], pp. 708-709; D.C. Sircar, *Indian Epigraphy*, Delhi 1965, pp. 230-233.

[56] *darśana* relevé par Burnell, Rice, Bühler, Filliozat, Sircar; *tarka* par Burnell, Rice, Sircar.

[57] Voir cependant *infra* les listes de la *Kāvyakalpalatā* et de la *Kavikalpalatā*, qui ne constituent pas des *occurrences* de *darśana* au sens de "six". Une remarque de D.C. Sircar nous mènerait, si la rareté de l'emploi de *darśana* dans ce sens était avérée, sur la piste d'une explication: le terme pouvant désigner également les yeux (cf. *dṛṣṭi*), son emploi pour désigner un nombre risquait d'entraîner une ambiguïté ("deux" – ou même "trois" – ou "six").

[58] Cf. David Pingree, *Jyotiḥśāstra*: *Astral and Mathematical Literature*, Wiesbaden 1981, p. 23.

[59] Texte dans l'édition de Jīvānanda Vidyāsāgara avec le commentaire de Raṅganātha, 2e éd., Calcutta 1891, p. 308; traduction dans Ebenezer Burgess, "Translation of the Sûrya-Siddhânta, a Text-Book of Hindu Astronomy", *Journal of the American Oriental Society* 6 (1860), p. 397. Une note en p. 399 de cette traduction nous prévient cependant que "The last six verses of the chapter [= st. 85-90], which contain the numerical data, may very possibly be a later addition to its original content (...)".

[60] Cf. D. Pingree, op. cit., p. 60.

[61] Texte et traduction dans M. Raṅgācārya, *The Gaṇita-sāra-saṅgraha of Mahāvīrācārya*, Madras 1912, pp. 119 (chapitre *Kṣetragaṇitavyavahāra*, st. 74½) et 204. Dans un appendice présentant une liste des termes non numéraux employés pour désigner un nombre, M. Raṅgācārya donne une preuve de l'oubli dans lequel est tombée, au début du XXe siècle, la notion de "six *tarka*"; sans explication, il rend en effet (p. 290) le terme *tarka* par "evidence" et justifie son emploi dans le sens de "six" par le fait que "the six kinds of evidence are *pratyakṣa*, *anumāna*, *upamāna*, *śabda*, *arthāpatti*, and *anupalabdhi*", c'est-à-dire les six "moyens de connaissance valide" (*pramāṇa*) admis par les Mīmāṃsaka de la branche bhāṭṭa.

La date de composition de la *Lakṣaṇāvalī*, un manuel de Vaiśeṣika dû à Udayana, est donnée dans une formule faisant intervenir le terme *tarka*:

> ***tarkā****mbarāṅkapramiteṣv atīteṣu śakāntataḥ* |
> *varṣeṣūdayanaś cakre subodhāṃ lakṣaṇāvalīm* ||.
>
> When Nine, Zero, Six, years had been measured from the end of the Śakas [i.e., in Śaka 906, 984 A.D.] Udayana made the *Lakṣaṇāvalī*, which is easy to understand.[62]

Cependant, cette strophe ne figure, selon D. Bhattacharya, que dans un seul des manuscrits de l'œuvre, daté de *saṃvat* 1708,[63] et les travaux de ce même savant conduisent à en rejeter le témoignage et à dater Udayana du XIe siècle.[64]

Que la *Gurvāvalī* de Munisundara, qui nous a déjà fourni son lot d'occurrences de *ṣaṭtarkī* (cf. *supra* p. 251), emploie le terme *tarka* au sens de "six" n'a rien pour étonner:

> *te lebhire janma manupramābdaśateṣu yāteṣv adhikeṣu bāṇaiḥ* |
> *hayendubhiḥ saṃyamam induvedaiḥ padaṃ kha****tarkais*** *tridivaṃ ca turyam* ||335||.[65]

Le *Grahalāghava* de Gaṇeśa Daivajña (fils de Keśava, de Nandigrāma au Gujarat), manuel de *jyotiṣa* composé en 1520 de n. è.,[66] emploie à trois reprises le terme *tarka* au sens de "six":[67] p. 19, st. I.15b: *tarkāśvinaḥ* = 26; p. 126, st. VII.3d: *tarkarāmāḥ* = 36; p. 186, st. XI.1b: *ṣaṭtarkāḥ* = 66.

La moisson la plus abondante d'occurrences est fournie par le *Kuṭṭākāraśiromaṇi* et son auto-commentaire *Mahālakṣmīmuktāvalī* de Devarāja, un traité de mathématiques consacré au "pulvérisateur" (méthode de résolution des équations diophantiennes); le terme *tarka*, sur 53 pages d'édition, apparaît une vingtaine de fois.[68]

Dans la mesure où les lexiques sont censés enregistrer les seuls sens premiers d'un mot, on ne s'étonnera pas que l'emploi métonymique de mots pour exprimer un nombre n'y soit en règle générale pas relevé. Il est d'autant plus intéressant de constater que le grand lexique de Keśava, le *Kalpadrukośa* (XVII^e^s.),[69] consacre trois lignes à cet usage, donnant pour chaque nombre compris entre 1 et 10 deux noms; ceux pour "six" sont *ṛtu* et *tarka*:

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[62] Texte et traduction dans Musashi Tachikawa, *The Structure of the World in Udayana's Realism*, Dordrecht 1981, pp. 86-87.

[63] D. Bhattacharya, op. cit. (voir n. 44), p. 2.

[64] Ibid., pp. 51-54; B.K. Matilal, *Nyāya–Vaiśeṣika*, Wiesbaden 1977, p. 71.

[65] "Il [Jñānasāgara, pontife du Tapāgaccha] naquit quand cent années mesurées par les Manu (14), augmentées des flèches (5), furent passées [c.-à-d. en *vikramasaṃvat* 1405 = 1347 de n. é.], prit ses vœux quand (elles furent augmentées) des chevaux (7) et de la lune (1) [VS 1417], le siège (de pontife quand elles furent augmentées) de la lune (1) et des Veda (4) [VS 1441], le quatrième (état, à savoir) le ciel (quand elles furent augmentées) de l'espace (0) et des *tarka* (6) [VS 1460]". Dates identiques dans la *Paṭṭāvalī* résumée par Johannes Klatt, "Extracts from the Historical Records of the Jainas", *The Indian Antiquary* 11 (September 1882), pp. 245-256.

[66] D. Pingree, op. cit. (voir n. 58), p. 36; voir aussi le *New Catalogus Catalogorum* V (Madras 1969), p. 274 et VI (Madras 1971), p. 258.

[67] J'ai consulté l'édition du Pandit Shri Sita Ram Jha, *The Graha Laghava of Shri Ganesh Daivajna*, 2e éd., Benares 1941.

[68] J'ai utilisé l'édition de l'Ānandāśrama Sanskrit Series 125, Poona 1981; l'édition originale, dans la même série, serait de 1944: cf. D. Pingree, op. cit. (voir n. 58) p. 64. Selon cet auteur, l'œuvre aurait été composée "sometime after Bhāskara", soit quelque temps après le XIIe s… – Liste des occurrences: pp. 9,22; 9,23; 13,16; 14,3; 14,12 (deux fois); 21,13; 21,17; 22,19; 24,24; 27,4; 27,11; 28,1; 30,1; 30,13; 32,27; 33,5; 33,13; 41,22; 45,24.

[69] Cf. C. Vogel, op. cit. (voir n. 14), pp. 364-365.

bhūcandrabhujanetrāgniguṇavedayugā api ||493||
*bhūtendriyartu**tarka**arṣivājībhavasavo grahāḥ* |
nandā diśaś ca paṅktiś ca saṃkhyāsaṃjñā hy anukramāt ||494||.[70]

Aucun de ces passages, bien sûr, ne donne la liste des six *tarka* et, partant, la raison de l'emploi du terme *tarka* au sens de "six". Bien que d'autres explications aient été avancées (cf. *supra* nn. 37 et 61) ou soient théoriquement possibles, il me paraît certain – et cela semble être l'opinion courante des indianistes – que cet emploi est motivé par le sens "doctrine de spéculation" ou "système philosophique" de *tarka*, et très probable qu'il est né de la "sixaine des *tarka*" attestée vers 900 de n. è. En particulier, l'idée que cet emploi pourrait être motivé par la liste des six *tarka* au sens "technique" donnée par Śrīharṣa (cf. *supra* p. 250) est hautement improbable: la classification des *tarka* de ce type, comme le montre S. Bagchi, se fait le plus souvent sous cinq chefs, parfois dix ou onze, et la liste de Śrīharṣa semble un cas isolé,[71] qui ne remplit pas les conditions nécessaires à cet emploi. Quant à supposer qu'il soit *né* de cette liste, la date tardive d'apparition de cette dernière s'y oppose.

Quand bien même nous tiendrions là l'origine de cet emploi, la variabilité des configurations de six systèmes philosophiques, qu'ils soient appelés *darśana* ou *tarka* (cf. *supra*, p. 245, la liste de Vāgbhaṭa II), suggère que le terme *tarka* pouvait évoquer, selon le locuteur et l'époque, des listes différentes. L'extrait suivant, de plus, montre que dans l'esprit d'un même auteur, la liste des six *tarka* et celle des six *darśana* ont pu diverger.

L'évocation d'un nombre par un mot fait l'objet d'un chapitre de la *Kāvyakalpalatā* (XIIIe siècle), manuel d'instruction du poète attribué à Arisiṃha et à Amaracandra, dont le commentaire *Parimala* a été cité plus haut. Pour le nombre 6, on lit:

*rasarāgavajrakoṇās triśironetrāntarāriguṇa**tarkāḥ** |*
darśanaguhamukhabhūkhaṇḍacakriṇaḥ syur iha ṣaṭsaṃkhyāḥ ||.[72]

Dans cet énoncé, *tarka* et *darśana* ne peuvent être synonymes; c'est ce que le commentateur Śubhavijayagaṇi aura bien senti, qui définit, dans son commentaire *Makaranda* composé au début du XVIIe s., le *tarka* comme "l'investigation (menée) par les six *darśana*", donnant pour ces derniers une liste du type "Haribhadra-II": jaina, mīmāṃsaka, bauddha, sāṃkhya, śaiva (soit naiyāyika et vaiśeṣika) et nāstika.[73] Qu'en est-il pour Amaracandra? La *Vṛtti* qu'il a composée sur la *Kāvyakalpalatā* est muette sous la stance considérée, et la partie afférente de son commentaire *Parimala* n'est pas disponible. Cependant, deux autres passages de ce même *Parimala* nous donnent les listes dont nous avons besoin. À la suite d'une disquisition sur les divinités, Amaracandra y reprend en effet in extenso la section du *Vivekavilāsa* de

[70] *Kalpadrukośa of Keśava*, éd. Rāmāvatāra Śarmā, Baroda 1928 (Gaekwad's Oriental Series 42), p. 187 (l'édition lit *saṃkhyā saṃjñā* pour *saṃkhyāsaṃjñā*). On notera que la donnée, pour le nombre 6, du terme *tarka*, plutôt que du très courant *rasa* ("saveur"), n'est pas déterminée par la métrique: *bhūtendriyarasarturṣi-* aurait convenu.

[71] Cf. S. Bagchi, op. cit. (voir n. 45), p. 151 sq., en particulier le tableau inséré entre les pp. 182 et 183.

[72] *Kāvyakalpalatā*, dans l'édition par R.S. Betai de la *Kāvyakalpalatāvṛtti* (voir n. 28), p. 224. L'édition donne, au *pāda* b, *-antarāṇi guṇatarkāḥ*, mais le commentaire *Makaranda* de Śubhavijayagaṇi incite à adopter la présente leçon: *antarārayaḥ kāmakrodhalobhamānamadaharṣarūpāḥ* (p. 225).

[73] *tarkaḥ ṣaḍdarśanavicārarūpaḥ. darśanāni jainamīmāṃsakabauddhasāṃkhyaśaivanāstikarūpāṇi* (*Makaranda* dans l'édition de la *Kāvyakalpalatāvṛtti*, p. 225). Cf. *supra* n. 47.

Jinadatta, son *guru*, consacrée aux *darśana*;[74] ces derniers sont énumérés dans la stance d'introduction de ce passage:

> *jainaṃ maimāṃsakaṃ bauddhaṃ sāṃkhyaṃ śaivaṃ ca nāstikam |*
> *svasvatarkavibhedena jānīyād darśanāni ṣaṭ ||.*
>
> Qu'on connaisse les six *darśana*, à savoir le jaïnisme, la Mīmāṃsā (ici des deux types), le bouddhisme, le Sāṃkhya, le "śivaïsme" (= Nyāya et Vaiśeṣika, considérés comme les deux *tarka* du *śaivadarśana*!) et le matérialisme, chacun par sa variété propre de *tarka*.

La liste des six *darśana* est donc du type "Haribhadra-II", incluant la Mīmāṃsā et groupant le Nyāya et le Vaiśeṣika sous l'appellation *śaiva*. Cet énoncé implique qu'à chacun des six *darśana* énumérés corresponde un *tarka* particulier, un "mode de raisonnement" qui lui soit propre (encore que le cas du "śivaïsme" fait problème), et c'est sans doute là l'origine de la glose de Śubhavijayagaṇi à la stance de la *Kāvyakalpalatā* considérée plus haut. Mais il est hautement probable que pour Amaracandra lui-même, la liste des six *tarka* qu'il a en vue dans cette stance soit celle qu'il donne expressément dans le *Parimala* quand il s'inspire du *Viveka* de Hemacandra consacré à l'habileté dans les six *tarka* (cf. *supra* nn. 28 et 29), c.-à-d. la liste de la *Kāvyamīmāṃsā*. Ainsi s'expliquerait que la stance en question – si elle est bien d'Amaracandra, et non pas d'Arisiṃha – énumère côte à côte, comme renvoyant à un groupe de six, les deux termes *tarka* et *darśana*: ce ne serait pas tant leurs sens qui divergent que les listes mêmes qu'ils recouvrent![75]

La *Kavikalpalatā*, autre manuel d'instruction de l'apprenti-poète composé au début du XIVe siècle par Deveśvara ou Devendra, s'est apparemment inspirée de la *Kāvyakalpalatā*;[76] elle comporte également un chapitre consacré aux entités évoquant des nombres.[77] La strophe relative au nombre six est la suivante:

> *ṣaḍ vajrakoṇatriśironetra**tarkā**ṅgadarśanam |*
> *cakravartimahāsenavadanartuguṇā rasāḥ* [var. *-vadanāni guṇā rasāḥ*] ||.[78]

Toute lecture non prévenue de cette strophe y verra, parmi les termes désignant des entités groupées par six, les trois mots *tarka*, *aṅga*, et *darśana*.[79] Cependant l'*auto*-commentaire figurant dans l'édition de la Bibliotheca Indica – qui donne pour le terme *darśana* la liste des six *darśana* brahmaniques (*darśanāni vaiśeṣikanyāyamīmāṃsāvedāntasāṃkhyapātañjalākhyāni*) – ne semble pas considérer *tarka* et *aṅga* comme deux mots séparés, mais comme un composé *ṣaṣṭhītatpuruṣa tarkāṅga* signifiant les composantes du *tarka*, ce dernier terme étant pris dans le sens technique qu'il a dans l'occurrence *ṣaṭtarkī* chez Śrīharṣa (cf. *supra* p. 250).[80] Confronté à ce nœud difficultueux, je renonce, pour l'heure, à tenter de le trancher.

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[74] *devasvarūpam uktvā devapratibaddhadarśanavicāre kramo 'smadguruśrījinadattasūriviracitaśrīvivekavilāsato likhyate*, *Parimala* dans l'édition de la *Kāvyakalpalatāvṛtti*, p. 101. Sur cette section du *Vivekavilāsa*, voir Folkert, op. cit. (cf. n. 1), pp. 130-132 et 399-409 (traduction).

[75] Il n'est cependant pas possible d'exclure, si la stance est d'Arisiṃha, que ce dernier ait songé au groupe de six *tarka* "techniques" de Śrīharṣa!

[76] Cf. P.V. Kane, op. cit. (voir n. 16), p. 407.

[77] Ce chapitre a été dépouillé par Lewis Rice, op. cit., p. xx-xxii (cf. *supra* n. 55).

[78] Sarat Chandra Sastri (éd.), *Kavi-kalpa-latā*: *A Work on Rhetoric by Devesvara*, *Together with his Own Commentary*, Calcutta 1913 (Bibliotheca Indica), p. 112.

[79] C'est du reste ces trois termes qu'enregistre L. Rice (cf. *supra* nn. 55 et 77). La valeur "six" pour *aṅga* peut s'expliquer soit par les six membres du corps (J. Filliozat, op. cit. [voir n. 55], p. 709), soit par les six Vedāṅga (G. Bühler, op. cit. [cf. n. 53], p. 81).

[80] *vyāpyaprasaṅge vyāpakaprasaṅga iti tasyāpy avayavāḥ viṣayapariśodhanavyāptigrāhakādayaḥ ṣaṭ*. J'avoue ma perplexité devant cet énoncé. Traditionnellement, le *tarka* "technique", du moins en Nyāya, a cinq composantes (*aṅga*), et non six (cf. Bh. Jhalakīkar, op. cit. [voir n. 19], s.v. *tarka*, 7-*ka*, p. 322); les deux termes

Le commentaire de la *Kavikalpalatā* pourrait bien être le plus ancien témoignage de l'oubli progressif dans lequel est tombée notre "sixaine de *tarka*", oubli dont quelques preuves modernes ont été données plus haut.[81] L'extrait de l'*Alaṅkāratilaka* de Vāgbhaṭa II cité ci-dessus montre, quant à lui, que la liste des *tarka* a pu évoluer, parallèlement à celle des *darśana*, et il est fort possible que dans l'esprit de certains des auteurs qui ont employé l'expression *ṣaṭ-tarka*/*ṣaṭṭarkī* ou le terme *tarka* au sens de "six", les six *tarka* étaient les six *darśana* brahmaniques. Enfin, la distinction des termes *tarka* et *darśana* effectuée par Śubhavijayagaṇi et le témoignage d'Amaracandra dans son *Parimala* nous incitent à nous interroger sur l'équation implicite *tarka* = *darśana* à la base de cette recherche: quand bien même les expressions *ṣaṭtarka*/*ṣaṭṭarkī* ou l'emploi du terme *tarka* au sens de "six" seraient nés de la liste la plus anciennement attestée de *tarka* – bauddha, jaina, lokāyata, Sāṃkhya, Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika –, quel indice avons-nous que cette liste a jamais coïncidé avec une liste de *darśana*?

Les six *darśana* dans l'*Upamitibhavaprapañcā Kathā*

C'est en 906 de n. è. que le jaïn Siddharṣi compléta son *Upamitibhavaprapañcā Kathā*.[82] Ce roman fait d'allégories édifiantes contient également (pp. 665-669) une doxographie des sept systèmes décrits dans le *Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya* de Haribhadra. L'épisode qui l'introduit, résumé ici en suivant de près le synopsis de Jacobi (p. lxvi), est le suivant: Prakarṣa ("Prééminence") ayant demandé à voir les agissements de Mithyādarśana ("Point de vue erroné") et de sa femme Kudṛṣṭi ("Mauvaise vue"), Vimarśa ("Délibération") lui indiqua six cités (*pura*) à l'intérieur de Bhavacakra ("Roue de l'existence"): elles sont appelées Naiyāyika, Vaiśeṣika, Sāṃkhya, Bauddha, Mīmāṃsaka et Lokāyata, leurs habitants portant, dans les cinq premiers cas, le même nom que celui de leur ville, dans le dernier le nom de Bārhaspatya. Tous ces gens sont sous l'influence de Mithyādarśana et de son épouse. À ce point de l'exposé de Vimarśa, Prakarṣa l'interroge:[83]

> *ṣaḍ atra yāni śrūyante maṇḍale lokavārtayā* |
> *darśanāni kim etāni tāny ākhyātāni me tvayā* ||.

Les six *darśana* dont les gens parlent (*śrūyante lokavārtayā*) dans ce territoire, sont-ce ceux dont tu m'as parlé?

Réponse de Vimarśa:

> *etāni pañca tāny eva mīmāṃsakapuraṃ vinā* ||
> *arvākkālikam etad dhi mīmāṃsakapuraṃ matam* |
> *tena darśanasaṃkhyāyām etal lokair na gaṇyate* ||.

Cinq d'entre eux, à l'exception de la cité des Mīmāṃsaka, sont bien ceux (dont je t'ai parlé). En effet, cette cité des Mīmāṃsaka est considérée comme postérieure (aux autres); c'est pourquoi elle n'est pas comptée par les gens (*lokaiḥ*) au nombre des *darśana*.

Insistons sur le fait que, à suivre Siddharṣi, c'est bien dans "l'usage courant" (*lokavārtayā*, *lokaiḥ*) que la Mīmāṃsā n'est pas comptée comme un des six *darśana*. Vimarśa va le répéter, après avoir développé son assertion sur le caractère postérieur (*arvākkālika*) de la Mīmāṃsā:

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donnés par le commentaire de la *Kavikalpalatā* comme des exemples de composantes (*avayava*) du *tarka* ne font pas partie de ces *aṅga*; en revanche, le même *tarka* "technique" est dit être de cinq (parfois de 11, cf. *supra* p. 254) sortes (cf. ibid., 7-*ca*, p. 325), et la cinquième est de deux types: *vyāptigrāhaka* et *viṣayapariśodhaka*. De toute évidence, ce passage du commentaire nécessite de plus amples investigations!

[81] Cf. *supra*, p. 241, Bergaigne et Majumdar sur l'inscription C. 38E de Po Nagar; nn. 15, 37 et 61.

[82] Peter Peterson et Hermann Jacobi (éd.), *The Upamitibhavaprapañcā Kathā of Siddharṣi*: *An Allegory of Mundane Life*, Calcutta 1899-1914 (Bibliotheca Indica), pp. vii-viii.

[83] *Upamitibhavaprapañcā Kathā*, p. 662.

jaiminir vedarakṣārthaṃ dūṣaṇoddhāraṇecchayā |
cakāra kila mīmāṃsāṃ dṛṣṭvā tīrthikaviplavam ||
tasmād etāni pañcaiva mīmāṃsakapuraṃ vinā |
lokair darśanasaṃkhyāyāṃ gaṇyante nātra saṃśayaḥ ||.

Jaimini [l'auteur des *Mīmāṃsāsūtra*], ayant vu la confusion des adeptes des systèmes philosophiques, composa, dit-on, la Mīmāṃsā en vue de protéger les Veda, désireux d'écarter les objections.[84]
C'est pourquoi seules ces cinq (cités), à l'exception de celle des Mīmāṃsaka, sont comptées par les gens (*lokaiḥ*) au nombre des *darśana*, il n'y a là point de doute.

À la légitime question de Prakarṣa,

(…) *yady evaṃ tato brūhi kva vartate |*
tat puraṃ māma yal lokair gīyate ṣaṣṭhadarśanam ||.

S'il en est ainsi, alors dis-moi, mon cher oncle, où est cette cité que les gens (*lokaiḥ*) appellent le sixième *darśana*?

Vimarśa répond:

yad idaṃ dṛśyate 'traiva vivekavaraparvate |
nirmalaṃ śikharaṃ tuṅgam apramattatvanāmakam ||
vistīrṇam idam atyartham atraiva ca niveśitam |
puraṃ lokottaraṃ vatsa taj jainam abhidhīyate ||
tasya te kathayiṣyāmi ye guṇāḥ śeṣajitvarāḥ |
tathāpi lokarūḍhyaiva ṣaṣṭhaṃ hi tad udāhṛtam ||.

Ce pic proéminent que l'on voit sur cette même montagne excellente (nommée) Viveka ("Discernement"), immaculé, appelé Apramattatva ("Vigilance"), il est très étendu; et c'est là-même, mon cher enfant, qu'a été fondée une cité extraordinaire, elle s'appelle Jaina. Je vais t'en raconter les qualités, qui surpassent (celles des) autres (cités). Néanmoins, c'est par l'usage même, bien établi dans le monde, que cette (cité) est appelée le sixième (*darśana*).

Nous sommes dans un roman jaina, édifiant, et le jaïnisme a forcément ici une position à part des autres systèmes, que symbolise sa position sur la cime d'une montagne, à l'écart de l'emprise de Mithyādarśana, comme le montrera la suite du texte; néanmoins (*tathāpi*), malgré ses qualités exceptionnelles, il est compté dans l'usage courant (*lokarūḍhyā*) – et peut-être seulement là – comme le sixième *darśana*.

Conclusion

Le groupe des six *darśana* dont Siddharṣi, en 906, dit qu'il est reconnu par l'usage courant (*lokaiḥ*, *lokarūḍhyā*) est très précisément celui des six *tarka* (pour *tarkavidyā*) – la *ṣaṭtarkī* – dont j'ai tenté de montrer qu'il devait être "bien connu des gens" (*janatāsu prasiddhāyām api ṣaṭtarkyām*, *Nyāyamañjarī*) vers 900 de n. è. Folkert (op. cit. [voir n. 1], pp. 137-138) trouve curieuse l'exclusion, par Siddharṣi, de la Mīmāṃsā du groupe des six *darśana*, plutôt que celle – attestée par Haribhadra et quelques autres doxographies – du matérialisme. Je propose néanmoins de prendre l'énoncé de Siddharṣi au sérieux. Aux alentours de 900 de n. è., il était courant de grouper ensemble les systèmes philosophiques du bouddhisme, du jaïnisme, du matérialisme, du Nyāya, du Vaiśeṣika et du Sāṃkhya sous les appellations *ṣaṭtarkī* ou *ṣaḍdarśana*; conformément au schéma des quatorze *vidyāsthāna*, la Mīmāṃsā n'appartenait *pas* à ce groupement, bien qu'il fût connu et reconnu qu'elle partageait de nombreuses probléma-

[84] Sur *tīrthika*, cf. Kamaleswar Bhattacharya, *Recherches sur le vocabulaire des inscriptions sanskrites du Cambodge*, Paris 1991, s.v. L'affirmation de Vimarśa, bien que contestable du point de vue historique, met cependant bien en lumière le caractère secondaire de certains thèmes proprement philosophiques dans la Mīmāṃsā, développés à partir de sa défense de la validité du Veda.

tiques avec ces six écoles (elle est, par exemple, elle aussi une *pramāṇavidyā*, selon Rājaśekhara), et bien qu'elle fût depuis longtemps déjà un partenaire obligé des débats entre les adeptes des systèmes philosophiques (les *tīrthika* de Siddharṣi).

Aussi je suggère que l'intrus, dans le groupe des six *darśana*, n'est pas, comme le laisse entendre Haribhadra, le matérialisme, mais bien la Mīmāṃsā. L'impossibilité de l'écarter plus longtemps de ce groupement aboutit à une aporie: d'une part nous sommes en présence de *sept* véritables *tarka* ou *darśana*, systèmes philosophiques, d'autre part le nombre six est traditionnel pour le décompte de ces systèmes. Nous avons vu quelles étaient les deux solutions de Haribhadra, explorées pendant quelque temps par la tradition doxographique: exclusion du matérialisme, abhorré par tous les autres *tīrthika*; réunion en un seul système du Nyāya et du Vaiśeṣika, qui tendront d'ailleurs de plus en plus à fusionner.[85]

L'inclusion de la Mīmāṃsā, jointe à d'autres facteurs, aura donné le branle au mouvement qui aboutira au groupe fameux des six *darśana* brahmaniques. En effet l'introduction de la Mīmāṃsā, en tant que Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā, ne pouvait manquer de faire entrer bientôt dans la configuration la seconde Mīmāṃsā, le Vedānta, qui avait déjà sa place et allait en prendre de plus en plus dans les débats philosophiques; elle pouvait aisément être couplée à la première, sur le modèle du couple Nyāya–Vaiśeṣika. Ajoutons à cela que les Sāṃkhya étaient eux-mêmes divisés, si l'on en croit Haribhadra, en Sāṃkhya non théistes et Sāṃkhya théistes, les seconds identifiés aux tenants du Yoga. On obtient ainsi six systèmes "védiques" (*vaidika*), qui pouvaient certes être envisagés comme trois *darśana*, mais pouvaient aussi, pour des lettrés "hindous" qui n'étaient plus confrontés à des interlocuteurs bouddhistes en chair et en os – sans parler de matérialistes –, être considérés comme les six véritables *darśana*, tout comme Rājaśekhara refusa au matérialisme le statut de *darśana* dans son *Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya*.

La plus grande fréquence, si elle est avérée, de l'emploi du terme *tarka* au sens de "six" pourrait indiquer que l'appellation *ṣaṭtarkī* fut plus courante, à date ancienne, que celle de *ṣaḍdarśana*. Elle met l'accent sur l'emploi de la raison, des arguments (*yukti*, *nyāya*), de la réflexion, comme point commun des systèmes philosophiques, dans une opposition à l'autorité de la Tradition (*āgama*). Si l'hypothèse développée ici est exacte, le groupe des six *darśana* brahmaniques, reconnaissant l'autorité des Veda et présentés souvent comme orientés vers la délivrance, aurait paradoxalement son origine dans un groupe de disciplines fondées sur l'examen rationnel des données de l'expérience et de l'*āgama*. Toutefois, l'opposition entre *tarka* et *āgama* ne doit pas être durcie: l'*āgama* lui-même a besoin d'une réflexion, d'un raisonnement, d'une argumentation pour révéler son sens plein. Or la Mīmāṃsā, à l'origine extérieure à la *ṣaṭtarkī*, a précisément cette fonction et peut donc légitimement prétendre, elle aussi, au statut de *tarka*, comme ce fut le cas depuis Kumārila (VIIe s.) au moins![86] Sans doute cette revendication a-t-elle concouru à la faire entrer dans la "sixaine des *tarka*".

[85] L'hypothèse d'une *ṣaṭtarkī* excluant la Mīmāṃsā qui serait plus "originelle" que les autres groupements de six *darśana* soulève certes quelques problèmes et demandera de plus amples investigations, en particulier s'agissant du rapport entre le *Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya* de Haribhadra et le texte de Siddharṣi. Le second auteur serait en effet un disciple direct ou – opinion plus probable? – un disciple à quelques générations du premier, dont on semble convenir qu'il a vécu au VIIIe siècle. Comment alors se fait-il que Siddharṣi considère encore la Mīmāṃsā comme ne faisant pas partie des *darśana*, alors que pour Haribhadra, le point est déjà acquis?

[86] Cf. Wilhelm Halbfass, *Tradition and Reflection* (voir n. 20), p. 34.

Marek Mejor

Sarvamatasaṃgraha: An Anonymous "Compendium of All Systems"

A comprehensive comparative study of Indian doxography still remains a desideratum of Indology. An excellent survey of the subject has been offered by Wilhelm Halbfass – one chapter of his book *India and Europe* is devoted to a succinct description of the most important Sanskrit doxographical texts.[1] Among others Halbfass paid attention to an otherwise little known anonymous text entitled *Sarvamatasaṃgraha*, "Compendium of All Systems."[2]

It has been observed by Halbfass (1988: 350) that

> this obviously not very old work first provides a survey of doctrines concerning the means of knowledge, *pramāṇa*, and then utilizes the number of the means of knowledge which each of the particular philosophical schools recognizes as a guideline for its doxographic discussion; there it follows a model which we find first documented around AD 500, in Cāttanār's Tamil verse epic *Maṇimēkhalai*.[3]

In another place Halbfass (1988: 354) gave a longer characterisation of our text:

> The *Sarvamatasaṃgraha* deals with the classification of the sciences in a chapter on *āgama*, "authoritative tradition," which is part of its introductory discussion concerning the means of knowledge (*pramāṇa*). Here, a distinction is made between two types of tradition: that which is of human origin and that which is not: *āgamo dvividhaḥ pauruṣeyāpauruṣeyabhedāt*. The Vedas and their auxiliary sciences (*vedāṅga*) are considered to be of "non-human origin," while the "fifth Veda," i.e., the *Mahābhārata* and the Purāṇas, the "additional Vedas," and the Smṛti (i.e., Dharmaśāstra) are of "human origin." The philosophical systems are then connected with this schema in such a way that they are either assigned to the *pūrvakāṇḍa*, the "earlier" portions of the Veda which refer to "works," or to the *uttarakāṇḍa*, the "knowledge section" of the Veda. In a direct and obvious manner, this applies only to the position of the Mīmāṃsā and the Vedānta. But insofar as they are suited to defend against anti-Vedic attacks, the Nyāya and the Vaiśeṣika, as "additional limbs" (*vedopāṅga*), are also, though more indirectly, related to the Veda. The Sāṃkhya and Yoga are described as parts of the "fifth Veda," i.e., of the *Mahābhārata* and the Purāṇas (*itihāsapurāṇe 'ntarbhūtam*).

As a humble contribution to the Wilhelm Halbfass Commemoration Volume I would like to offer a preliminary description of the *Sarvamatasaṃgraha* and – as a specimen of the text – an annotated translation of chapter 1 and a fragment of chapter 2.

The text of the *Sarvamatasaṃgraha* (*SMS*) was edited by T. Ganapati Shastri in 1918 in the Trivandrum Sanskrit Series. It was based on two palm-leaf manuscripts, written in Malaya-

[1] Halbfass 1988: 349-368 (Chapter 19, "The Sanskrit Doxographies and the Structure of Hindu Traditionalism"); cf. also Halbfass 1979. Recently an important contribution on the beginnings of Indian doxography was presented by Olle Qvarnström (1999), which includes a new edition and translation of Haribhadra's *Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya* and an abundant bibliography on the subject. For calling my attention to Qvarnström's article as well as for valuable comments on the present paper I am very much obliged to Dr. Piotr Balcerowicz.

[2] Cf. the brief note in Winternitz 1968: 420-421: "Ein ganz kurzes, zusammenfassendes Werk über alle Systeme der Philosophie ist auch der *Sarvamatasangraha* von einem unbekannten Verfasser (leider auch aus unbekannter Zeit). Nach einer über die Erkenntnismittel handelnden Einleitung werden hier zwei Arten von śāstras, vedische und nichtvedische, unterschieden. Und als die 'sechs Darśanas' werden drei vedische (Mīmāṃsā, Sāṃkhya und Tarka) und drei nichtvedische Systeme (Buddhismus, Jinismus, Materialismus) aufgezählt. Zuerst werden die drei letzteren beschrieben; dann folgen Darstellungen der Lehren des Kaṇāda, des Akṣapāda, des theistischen und des atheistischen Sāṃkhya (d.i. Yoga und Sāṃkhya), der Mīmāṃsā und des Vedānta."

[3] On the *Maṇimēkalai* see Veluppillai 1997.

Karin Preisendanz (ed.), *Expanding and Merging Horizons*: *Contributions to South Asian and Cross-Cultural Studies in Commemoration of Wilhelm Halbfass*, Wien: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 2006, pp. 259-273.

lam characters, in possession of Paramesvaran Potti of Changarappalli Mathom. The author and the date of the text are unknown (no *maṅgalaśloka*, no colophon). Halbfass several times referred to the *Sarvamatasaṃgraha* (Halbfass 1988: 350; 351; 352, n. 12; 353, n. 15; 353, n. 17; 354, nn. 20, 21), with a suggestion that it may be "perhaps the work of Rāghavānanda." In this presumption he probably followed Potter's *Bibliography*[4] where the *Sarvamatasaṃgraha* is listed as a work of a certain Rāghavānanda, however without any further specification.

Another text bearing the same title,[5] viz. *Sarvamatasaṃgraha* (*SMSN*), composed by Nārāyaṇabhaṭṭa (AD 1560–1656)[6] in 147 stanzas, was edited by M. Madhavan Unni in 1977. It deals with the following systems: Cārvāka, Ārhata, Bauddha, Vaiśeṣika, Naiyāyika, Seśvara- and Nirīśvarasāṃkhya, Prābhākara, and Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsā. Pāśupata and Rāmānuja are also mentioned. This should be regarded as an early work of Nārāyaṇabhaṭṭa, son of Melputtur (Meppattūr) Mātṛdatta, the well-known author of the *Mānameyodaya* (*MMU*), composed in the middle of the seventeenth century. The latter part of the *Mānameyodaya* (i.e., the *meya* portion, "on the objects of valid cognition") was completed by another Nārāyaṇa, during the reign of his patron, King Mānaveda, identified as the Zamorin of Calicut (AD 1655-1658).[7] It will be shown below that our *Sarvamatasaṃgraha* contains a quotation from the *meya* portion of the *Mānameyodaya*.

The *Sarvamatasaṃgraha* is composed in prose, occasionally interspersed with verse quotations from other texts.[8] It can be divided into sixteen chapters[9] in two major parts. The first part represents a sort of general introduction in which the author discusses the recognized means of valid cognition (*pramāṇa*). In his presentation he often follows Bhāsarvajña's *Nyāyasāra* (*NSā*) (ca. AD 950).[10] At the close of the first part the author explains the method of division of the different philosophical systems (*matabheda*). The second part contains expositions of the different systems of Indian philosophy. A detailed investigation of the doctrinal contents of presented systems and/or schools and precise identification of the sources must be left for future research. The specific feature of our text is its relatively broad treatment of the means of valid cognition and then their application – in ascending numerical order – to the examination of the different systems of thought. Thus the examined systems are arranged according to the number of accepted *pramāṇa*s, beginning with the Cārvākas (*SMS* p. 15,3ff.) – here the quotations from Kṛṣṇamiśra's allegorical drama *Prabodhacandrodaya* (*PCU*) are conspicuous – and closing with the Paurāṇikas who admit six or eight *pramāṇa*s (*SMS* p. 43,1). On the whole, the *Sarvamatasaṃgraha* shows an eclectic character since its author freely avails himself of the definitions taken from different texts, yet he seems to put his own imprint on his explication of a given doctrine. Moreover, occasionally the author makes comparative remarks on the presented doctrines. Following Qvarnström's threefold division of Indian doxographical texts, our *Sarvamatasaṃgraha* belongs to the third type of texts, which "simply outline one system after the other in separate chapters, without

[4] Potter, *Bibliography*, # DU 554: (Mahāmahopādhyāya) Rāghavānanda – *Sarvamatasaṃgraha*. No date.

[5] According to the editor (p. i, n. 4), the name of the text seems to be *Siddhāntasārasaṃkṣepa*.

[6] See Ramaswami Sastri's Introduction to his edition of the *Tattvabindu* (*TB*), pp. 107-111.

[7] See the Preface to the second edition of the *Mānameyodaya*, p. xvii.

[8] Jacobi 1929: 589, n. 1: "Der Sarvamatasaṃgraha ist frühstens im 12. Jahrhundert abgefasst, weil darin Rāmānuja genannt wird ([*SMS*] p. 32)"; cf. Halbfass 1988: 353: Brahmadatta, Bhāskara, Rāmānuja, and Ānandatīrtha (Madhva).

[9] Divisions in the printed edition seem to be inserted by the editor.

[10] Potter, *Bibliography*, # 494.

refutations of the positions of which they give an account"; it also shows a "hierarchical categorization of the systems under consideration" (Qvarnström 1999: 174).

The quotations from the *Mānameyodaya* (in chapter 9) and from the *Tarkasaṃgraha* (*TS*) of Annambhaṭṭa (ca. AD 1700)[11] (in chapter 1), as well as other references allow us to place the work after AD 1700.

Below I give the divisions of the *Sarvamatasaṃgraha* (figures in brackets refer to the pages and lines of the printed edition) with a brief description of the contents of each chapter. In the following comments special attention will be paid to the explicit quotations and textual references contained therein.

[I. Introduction (1-14)]

1. *Pramāṇanirūpaṇa* (1)
2. *Pratyakṣanirūpaṇa* (2)
3. *Anumānanirūpaṇa* (4)
4. *Āgamanirūpaṇa* (6)
5. *Upamānādimānāntaranirūpaṇa* (13)
6. *Matabheda* (14)

[II. Systems of philosophy (15-43)]

7. *Cārvākamatanirūpaṇa* (15)
8. *Kṣapaṇakamatanirūpaṇa* (16)
9. *Sugatamatanirūpaṇa* (18)
10. *Kaṇādamatanirūpaṇa* (22)
11. *Akṣapādamatanirūpaṇa* (26)
12. *Seśvaranirīśvarasāṃkhyamatanirūpaṇa* (27)
13. *Prabhākarādimīmāṃsakamatanirūpaṇa* (31)
14. *Saguṇabrahmavādimatanirūpaṇa* (39)
15. *Nirguṇabrahmavādimatanirūpaṇa* (40)
16. *Paurāṇikamatanirūpaṇa* (42-43)

Comments

Ad 1. Examination of the means of valid cognition (*pramāṇanirūpaṇa*).

Altogether eight *pramāṇa*s are listed: *pratyakṣa*, *anumāna*, *āgama*, *upamāna*, *arthāpatti*, *abhāva*, *sambhava* and *aitihya*. The definition of *pramāṇa* is similar to that in Bhāsarvajña's *Nyāyasāra* (for details see the Appendix). Interestingly, in this relatively short chapter the author pays special attention to the definition of *smṛti* (p. 1,5), which has the same wording as in *TS* § 34 with the inclusion of the word *mātra*.[12] It seems that the debate on the use of *-mātra* was characteristic of the *Tarkasaṃgraha* and its commentaries (see also *Nyāyakośa* [*NK*] p. 1045, s.v. *smṛti* (1), where is said that "the word *mātra* was not necessary for the earlier Naiyāyikas"). Therefore this may also point to the late date of our text.

[11] See Ramaswami Sastri's Introduction to his edition of the *TB*, p. 137.
[12] Cf. *TS* (*D*) with the substantial note 7 on pp. 176-177; cf. also *TK* (2) p. 6 and n. *ga*.

Quotations: p. 1,9 (*yathāhuḥ – anubhūtiḥ pramāṇam* ...) = Śālikanātha's (ca. AD 690–760)[13] *Prakaraṇapañcikā* (*PP*) v. 132; p. 1,14-17 (*tad uktaṃ śrībhagavatpādaiḥ – atra brahmavidyopaniṣacchabdavācyā* ...) = Śaṅkarabhagavatpāda's *Bhāṣya* on the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka-Upaniṣad* (beginning, *nāmanirukti*).

Ad 2. Examination of perception.

Here too our text follows (more or less) the main definitions in Bhāsarvajña's *Nyāyasāra* (cf. the Appendix), as if the author was commenting on it.

Ad 3. Examination of inference.

The author takes over almost *verbatim* the text of Bhāsarvajña's *Nyāyasāra*. Beginning (p. 4,11): *avinābhāvena samyakparokṣānubhavo 'numānam = NSā* II.1: *samyag avinābhāvena parokṣānubhavasādhanam anumānam*. Interestingly, our author says that the syllogism consists of three members, whereas five are explicitly mentioned by Bhāsarvajña, only to add the remaining two in a somewhat odd manner (p. 4,22f.: *paropadeśas tu tryavayavaṃ vākyam*. *pratijñāhetūdāharaṇāni vodāharaṇopanayanigamanāni vāvayavāḥ*). In the following, with the exception of the last part (p. 6,1-19), which looks like his own explication, the author quotes the characteristic definitions of Bhāsarvajña.

Ad 4. Examination of authoritative tradition.

This is the longest chapter of the *Sarvamatasaṃgraha*. *āgama* is defined on p. 6,21: *śabdavijñānāt samyagasannikṛṣṭārthānubhava āgamaḥ*, cf. *Tarkarahasya* (*TR*) p. 19,18-20: *śabdajñānād asannikṛṣṭe 'rthe jñānaṃ śabdaḥ*; see also the definitions of *dharmajñāna* (p. 8,19-21) and *brahmajñāna* (p. 8,21-23). The following elucidation of *āgama* resembles that of Madhusūdana Sarasvatī in his *Prasthānabheda* (*PBh*) (ca. AD 1600). The *Sarvamatasaṃgraha* says (p. 7,6ff.): Authoritative tradition is twofold: of "human origin" (*pauruṣeya*) and of "non-human origin" (*apauruṣeya*). To the former belong the four Vedas together with their six "members," i.e., the science of phonetics, grammar, etc.; the latter is threefold, consisting of the fifth Veda, the auxiliary Veda (*upaveda*), and the Smṛti (i.e., the works of Manu and others on *varṇāśramadharma*). The fifth Veda is twofold, as it contains "legends" (*itihāsa*), i.e., the epic poem *Mahābhārata*, and "ancient tales" (*purāṇa*), i.e., the eighteen Purāṇas. The auxiliary Veda consists of *Āyur-*, *Dhanur-*, *Artha-* and *Gāndharvaveda*. The fourfold Veda is divided into "former portion" (*pūrvakāṇḍa*) and "later portion" (*uttarakāṇḍa*) according to its object, *dharma* and *brahman*, respectively. So also the fifth Veda, because it forms their explanation. The knowledge of *dharma* is "invisible" (*parokṣa*), whereas the knowledge of *brahman* is "not invisible" (*aparokṣa*) (p. 8,16-18). Further, *dharma* is divided into two: by means of obtainment or avoiding of a desirable end (*iṣṭaprāpti*) or an undesirable end (*aniṣṭaprāpti*) (p. 9,1-10,2), respectively; the former consists of performing new and full moon sacrifices and the like. *brahman* is twofold: "with attributes" (*saguṇa*) and "without attributes" (*nirguṇa*) (p. 9,17-22). The Mīmāṃsā doctrine has as its purpose the reflection on the meaning (*arthavicāra*) on the part of a person who is determined to attain the ultimate aim, because it has encompassed by intended meaning the precepts concerning the study of the Vedas which are divided into "former portion" and "later portion" (p. 10,3-5). It consists of twenty chapters in three parts (p. 10,3-6). The *pūrvamīmāṃsā* has twelve chapters and is grounded on the *karmakāṇḍa*. Its main expounder (*sūtrakartṛ*) was Jaimini, the main com-

[13] See Ramaswami Sastri's Introduction to his edition of the *TB* pp. 48-50.

mentator (*bhāṣyakāra*) was Śabarasvāmin, and the two commentators were Bhaṭṭa Kumāra (Kumārila) and Prabhākara. The *uttaramīmāṃsā* is twofold, grounded in *brahman* "with attributes," and grounded in *brahman* "without attributes." It has eight chapters composed by Vyāsa (p. 10,11-12). One part that is grounded in *saguṇabrahman* and consists in *devatā-kāṇḍa* has four chapters; its commentator was Saṅkarṣa (p. 10,12-14). The other part that is grounded in *nirguṇabrahman* and consists in *jñānakāṇḍa* also has four chapters; its commentator was Śaṅkarabhagavatpāda (p. 10,22-23). Its sectarian teachers like Brahmadatta, Bhāskara (ca. ninth century), Rāmānuja (AD 1017–1127), Ānandatīrtha (Madhva, AD 1197–1273) and others composed quasi-commentaries (*bhāṣyābhāsa*) on it, due to differences in opinion (p. 11,1-2). The science of logic (*tarkaśāstra*) is considered to be an auxiliary member of the Veda. It is twofold: *naiyāyika* and *vaiśeṣika* (p. 11,16-20). The former refers to sixteen categories (*padārtha*) as conceived by Akṣapāda, the latter refers to six categories conceived by Kaṇāda (p. 10,20-21). The two kinds of the Sāṃkhya doctrine, *nirīśvara-* and *seśvarasāṃkhya*, are included under the rubric of *itihāsapurāṇa* and therefore do not count separately (p. 11,22-23). The former, based on twenty-five principles, was created by Kapila, the latter, based on twenty-six principles, was created by Patañjali who "favoured (followed) the commentary" (*bhāṣyam anugṛhītam*) on the *Aṣṭādhyāyī* (*Aṣṭ*) composed by Pāṇini (p. 12,2-4). Thus we finally arrive at a number of eighteen branches of knowledge (*vidyāsthāna*) (cf. *PBh*). They were favoured by the supreme spirit (*paramapuruṣa*) for the sake of *brahman* at the beginning of the eon (*kalpādau*) (p. 12,4-5), and introduced in this world through the mouth of the sage Marīci and others; however, in this mundane period (*yuga*), due to the deficiencies consisting in a short life, meagre intellect, etc., people are unable to uphold them entirely, and therefore the supreme lord himself, having taken the form of Vyāsa, has abbreviated them (p. 12,17-20).

In this chapter the following explicit quotations have been found: p. 7,3-5 (*yathāhuḥ – śabda-vijñānajā* ...), not traced; p. 7,12-18 (*tathā ca vāyavīye – daśadhā cāṣṭadhā caitat* ...) = *Śiva-purāṇa* (*ŚP*), *Vāyavīyasaṃhitā*, *pūrvabhāga*, *adhyāya* 1, vv. 38-40; p. 7,22-23 (*manvatri-viṣṇuhāritā* ...), not traced; p. 8,1-2 (*parāśaravyāsaśaṅkhalikhitā* ...), cf. *Yājñavalkyasmṛti* (*YS*) I.4-5; p. 8,5-10 (*yathoktaṃ vāyavīye – yo vidyāc caturo vedān* ...) = *ŚP*, *ibid*., vv. 35-36; p. 12,6-16 (*tathā ca śrīvāyavīye – aṅgāni vedāś catvāraḥ* ...) = *ŚP*, *ibid*., vv. 22-26; pp. 12,21-13,4 (*yathoktaṃ dvitīyaskandhe – kālena mīlitadṛśām avamṛśya* ...) = *Bhāgavata-purāṇa* (*BhāgP*) II.7.36.

Ad 5. Examination of comparison and other means of valid cognition.

(1) The definition of *upamāna* is provided with a quotation (p. 13,12-14): *yathāhuḥ – avyut-pannapadopeta- = Tārkikarakṣā* of Varadarāja (*TāR*) (ca. AD 1100) v. 22 (cf. *NK* s.v. *upa-māna*, p. 167 [ca]). (2) Definition of *arthāpatti* (p. 13,15): *anyathānupapattisambhūto 'nu-bhavo 'rthāpattiḥ*. (3) Definition of *abhāva* (p. 13,21): *yogyatve saty anupalambhād abhāva-niścayo 'bhāvapramāṇam*. (4) Definition of *sambhava* (p. 14,1-2): *sambhāvito 'yam artha iti jāyamāno 'tīndriyārthaniścayaḥ sambhavaḥ*. (5) The definition of *aitihya* (p. 14,3f.) corresponds to that in *Nyāyabhāṣya* (*NBh*) ad 2.2.1; cf. *Sarvadarśanakaumudī* (*SDK*) p. 55,20. The chapter closes with concluding stanzas in which *pramāṇa*s and their adherents are enumerated (p. 14,7-13): *pratyakṣam ekaṃ cārvākāḥ ... – iti nyāyavidāṃ vacanāt*.[14] This quotation has not been traced; cf., however, *Pramāṇamīmāṃsā* of Hemacandra (*PM*) (fl. AD 1150) § 29,

[14] Also quoted by Swami Dwarikadas Shastri in his edition of *Nyāyadarśana* (1989), p. 136, n. 1, with the following comment: ... *ity abhiyuktoktyā pramāṇavibhājakasaṃkhyāyāṃ saṃśaya iti bhāvaḥ*.

MMU I.15(3) and *Bauddhatarkabhāṣā* of Mokṣākaragupta (*BTBh*) (between AD 1050 and 1202) p. 17,13-16 (see also Kajiyama 1998: 30, n. 27).

Ad 6. Difference of opinions.

The systems are characterized by the *pramāṇa*s accepted by them, with specifications of the "knower" (*pramātṛ*) and the "object of knowledge" (*prameya*) (p. 14,15-17) (cf. the definitions in *NSā* I: *pramāśrayaḥ pramātā* and *pramāviṣayaḥ prameyam*). The *Sarvamatasaṃgraha* continues to state that here two kinds of systems of reflection (*vicāraśāstra*) are distinguished: those based on the Vedas (*vaidika*) and those not based on the Vedas (*avaidika*). Each division consists of a set of three traditions: the systems of Mīmāṃsā, Sāṃkhya and Tarka belong to the former, the systems of the Bauddhas, Jainas and Lokāyatas to the latter division. The latter systems are called *avaidika* because they are based on the "apparent Vedas" (*vedābhāsa*) created by their founders Buddha, Kṣapaṇaka and Bṛhaspati respectively. Thus, there are altogether six systems of thought (*darśana*) (pp. 14,18-15,2).

Ad 7. Examination of the system of the Cārvākas.

For the Cārvākas the body alone is the knower (*pramātṛ*), the four principles earth, water, fire and wind are the objects of knowledge (*prameya*), and perception (*pratyakṣa*) is the single means of cognition (*pramāṇa*). *kāma* "sensual enjoyment" and *artha* "wealth" are the sole aims of man (*puruṣārtha*); the Vedas of the Cārvākas are the *Arthaveda* ("science of polity") and the *Gāndharvaveda* ("science of music and theatrical performance"). There is neither *dharma* nor *adharma* and no god, and death is liberation (*mokṣa*) (p. 15, 4-18).

Quotations: p. 15,18-20 (*tathā ca tadvacanam – agnihotraṃ trayo vedāḥ ...*) = *PCU* (second half of the eleventh century) II.26 = *Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha* (*SDS*) I.3 and I.13; p. 15,21 (*trayo vedasya kartāraḥ ...*) = *SDS* I.21ab; pp. 15,22-16,1 (*svargaḥ kartṛkriyādravya- ...*) = *PCU* II.19; p. 16,2-3 (*pratyakṣādipramāsiddha- ...*) = *PCU* II.4.

Ad 8. Examination of the systems of the Jainas.

Quotation: p. 17,6-8 (*yathāhuḥ – syādvādaḥ sarvadaikāntatyāgāt ...*) = *Āptamīmāṃsā* (*ĀM*) of Samantabhadra (ca. AD 550) v. 104 = *Bhāmatī* of Vācaspatimiśra (*Bh*) (ca. AD 960) ad II.2.33 = *SDS* III.46.

Ad 9. Examination of the system of the Bauddhas.

There are four schools of followers of the Buddha: Mādhyamikas, Yogācāras, Sautrāntikas and Vaibhāṣikas. Among them the Mādhyamikas are foremost with their teaching of "emptiness" (*śūnyatā*). In fact, says our author (p. 21,14-17), the other three schools also ultimately accept the *śūnyavāda*: the Yogācāra school admits the emptiness of the external object (*bāhyārthasya śūnyatvam*), the Sautrāntikas admit the emptiness of the perceptible external object (*pratyakṣasya bāhyārthasya śūnyatvam*), and the Vaibhāṣikas claim the emptiness of the external and internal transient world (*bāhyasyāntarasya cāsthirasya jagataḥ śūnyatvam*). The concluding stanzas are taken from *Mānameyodaya* which is dated to the middle of the seventeenth century and thus marks the *terminus a quo* of our text (p. 21,17-21): *atra saṃgrahaḥ – mukhyo mādhyamiko vivartam akhilam ...* = *MMU* II.6.31, p. 306.

Ad 10. Examination of the Vaiśeṣika system.

Quotations: p. 25,14 (*yato vetyādiśrutayaḥ ...*) = *Taittirīya-Upaniṣad* (*TaiU*) 2.1.1 (cf. *SDS* p. 242); p. 25,14 (*aham ādiś cetyādismṛtayaḥ ...*) = *Bhagavadgītā* (*BhG*) 10.20c; p. 25,15 (*parāsya śaktiḥ ...*) = *Śvetāśvatara-Upaniṣad* (*ŚU*) 6.8; p. 25,17 (*jyotiṣṭomenetyādiśrutivākyāni ...*), cf. *Mīmāṃsānyāyaprakāśa* (*MNP*) § 23, n. 13 (with references) and *SDS* XII § 14, p. 569; p. 26,5 (*yo vai bhūmetyādiśrutivākyeṣu ...*) = *Chāndogya-Upaniṣad* (*ChU*) 7.23.1.

Ad 11. Examination of the Nyāya system.

Reference is made to a Naiyāyika who takes a separate position (*naiyāyikaikadeśin*) claiming that there are three *pramāṇa*s, viz. *pratyakṣa*, *anumāna* and *āgama*; this is obviously the standpoint of Bhāsarvajña.

Quotations: p. 26,18-21 (*tathā ca tatsūtram – pramāṇaprameyasaṃśaya- ...*) = *Nyāyasūtra* (*NS*) I.1.1; p. 27,4-6 (*tathā cākṣapādasūtram – duḥkhajanmapravṛtti- ...*) = *NS* I.1.2.

Ad 12. Examination of the system of Sāṃkhya "with god" and "without god."

The author makes some comparative remarks on the standpoints of the *naiyāyikaikadeśin*, Prabhākara and Bhaṭṭa Kumāra (p. 28).

Quotations: p. 28,3 (*māyāṃ tu prakṛtiṃ vidyād ityādiśruteḥ ...*) = *ŚU* 4.10, cf. *SDS* IV § 8 (p. 200); p. 28,17 (*nāciketam upākhyānam ...*) = *Kaṭha-Upaniṣad* (*KU*) I.3.16; p. 28,18 (*anādinidhanā nityā ...*) = *Mahābhārata* (*MBh*) XII.224.55cd; p. 30,2-4 (*yathāha – mūlaprakṛtir avikṛtiḥ ...*) = *Sāṃkhyakārikā* (*SK*) 3; p. 30,6-7 (*janmamaraṇakaraṇānām ...*) = *SK* 18; p. 30,10-11 (*dharmeṇa gamanam ūrdhvam ...*) = *SK* 44; pp. 30,21-31,2 (*yathāhuḥ – ātmano vai śarīrāṇi bahūni ...*), source not traced (Purāṇa?), but the verse is also quoted in commentaries on the *Nyāyasāra*:[15] *Nyāyasārapadapañcikā* of Vasudeva (*NSāP*) p. 90,4-5 (*purāṇe*), and *Nyāyatātparyadīpikā* of Jayasiṃhasūri III.121, p. 271 (*purāṇādiṣu*).

Ad 13. Examination of the Mīmāṃsā system.

The chapter is concluded with the following statement (pp. 38,22-39,2): There are two kinds of *brahmavādin*s: *aupaniṣada*s and *paurāṇika*s. The former are twofold: those chiefly dependent on *saguṇabrahman* and those chiefly dependent on *nirguṇabrahman*. The system of *saguṇabrahman* is represented by Rāmānuja (AD 1017–1127) and others, while that of *nirguṇabrahman* is represented by Ācārya Śaṅkarabhagavatpāda (AD 788–820) and others.

Quotations: p. 32,6 (*tama āsīd ityādiśruti ...*) = *Taittirīya-Brāhmaṇa* (*TaiBr*) 2.8.9.4; p. 32,18-20 (*tad uktaṃ bhaṭṭapādaiḥ – tamaḥ khalu calaṃ nīlam ...*), source not traced; the stanza is quoted twice in the *Sarvadarśanakaumudī* (p. 9,2-3; 94,15-16) (*mīmāṃsakāḥ*); cf. also *TS* (*D*) § 3, p. 3, n. 2, and *MMU* II.2.20ff.; p. 33,20-22 (*tathā ca tadvacanam – buddhīndriyaśarīrebhyaḥ ...*), not traced; p. 34,15 (*svargakāmasya jyotiṣṭomayāge niyoga iti*), not identified; p. 34,16 (*phalavat sannidhāv aphalaṃ tadaṅgam iti nyāyāt*), cf. *Bh* ad I.4.14 (p. 319) and *Siddhāntabindu* (*SB*) of Madhusūdana Sarasvatī (ca. AD 1600) p. 52,1-2; p. 38,5-7 (*tam eva bhāntam anubhāti sarvam ... iti śruteḥ*) = *KU* 2.3.1 = *ŚU* 4.14.

[15] The number of eighteen commentaries on Bhāsarvajña's *Nyāyasāra* as given by Guṇaratna in his *Tarkarahasyadīpikā* is also found in Rājaśekhara's *Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccaya* (*ṢDSR*) (p. 10, vv. 101-102ab).

Ad 14. Examination of the *saguṇabrahman* system of Vedānta.

Quotations: p. 39,7-8 (*indro māyābhiḥ pururūpa īyata – iti śruteḥ ...*) = *Bṛhadāraṇyaka-Upaniṣad* (*BĀU*) 2.5.19; p. 39,15-20 (*yathoktaṃ śārīrakasaṃgrahakṛdbhiḥ – ajñānāni bahūny asaṃkhyavapuṣaḥ ...*) = *Saṃkṣepaśārīraka* of Sarvajñātmamuni (*SŚ*) (ca. AD 900) II.133.

Ad 15. Examination of the *nirguṇabrahman* system of Vedānta.

Quotations: p. 42,4 (*ajām ekām ...*) = *ŚU* 4.5; p. 42,4-5 (*indro māyābhiḥ ...*) = *BĀU* 2.5.19, see above.

Ad 16. Examination of the system of the Paurāṇikas.

Quotations: p. 42,21 (*dvā suparṇā ityādiśruteḥ ...*) = *Muṇḍaka-Upaniṣad* (*MuU*) 3.1.1 = *ŚU* 4.6; cf. *PCU* VI.20 and *SDS* IV § 16 (p. 220); p. 42,22 (*īśvaraḥ sarvabhūtānām ityādismṛteḥ ...*) = *Mahānārāyaṇa-Upaniṣad* (*MNU*) 17.5 = *BhG* 18.61a; p. 43,11-12 (*ātmā vā are draṣṭavya ityādiśrutyā ...*) = *BĀU* 2.4.5; cf. *SDS* IV § 30, 31 (pp. 234, 236) and XVI § 3 (p. 757).

Appendix

Sarvamatasaṃgraha
Compendium of All Systems

[Chapter 1.] *Pramāṇanirūpaṇa*
Examination of the Means of Valid Cognition

iha samyaganubhavaḥ pramāṇam.
Here, the means of valid cognition is correct apprehension.[16]

samyaggrahaṇaṃ saṃśayaviparyayāpohārtham.
The [word] "correct" is used to exclude doubt and misapprehension.[17]

tatrānavadhāraṇajñānaṃ saṃśayaḥ. yathā sthāṇur vā puruṣo vāyam ityādi.
Among these, doubt is knowledge [which is] lacking ascertainment,[18] as for example [the doubt:] "Is this a tree trunk or a man?" etc.[19]

mithyādhyavasāyo viparyayaḥ. yathā dvau candramasāv ityādi.
Misapprehension is false ascertainment,[20] as for example [the erroneous vision of] two moons, etc.[21]

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[16] *NSā* p. 10,1: *samyaganubhavasādhanaṃ pramāṇam* and p. 104,1: *samyaganubhavaḥ pramā*. Cf. also *Saptapadārthī* (*SP*) (2) 213: *tattvānubhavaḥ pramā*; *TBh* § 5 and *TK* (1) § 38: *yathārthānubhavaḥ pramā*; *Ṣaḍdarśanīsiddhāntasaṃgraha* (*ṢDSS*) p. 5737: *pramā ca yathārthānubhavaḥ*.

[17] *NSā* p. 10,1: *samyaggrahaṇaṃ saṃśayaviparyayāpohārtham*.

[18] *NSā* p. 11,1: *tatrānavadhāraṇaṃ jñānaṃ saṃśayaḥ*. Cf. *SP* (2) 215: *anavadhāraṇaṃ jñānaṃ saṃśayaḥ*.

[19] Cf. *NBh* ad I.1.23; *NSā* pp. 12,1-16,1: *tadyathā – samānadharmāt kim ayaṃ sthāṇuḥ puruṣo veti ...* .

[20] *NSā* p. 26,1: *mithyādhyavasāyo viparyayaḥ*. Cf. *TS* (*D*) § 64: *mithyājñānaṃ viparyayaḥ*.

[21] *NSā* p. 26,1: *tadyathā dvau candramasau*.

smṛtivyavacchedārtham anubhavagrahaṇam.

The use of [the word] "apprehension" has the purpose of differentiating [it] from recollection.[22]

saṃskāramātrajaṃ jñānaṃ smṛtiḥ. yathā sā me mātetyādi.

Recollection is the knowledge arisen from mental impression(s) only,[23] as for example [in the cognition:] "She is my mother," etc.

prācīnānubhavavāsanā saṃskāraḥ.

A mental impression is the trace [left] by a former apprehension.[24]

sa ca sadṛśavastusandarśanodbuddhaḥ smṛtihetuḥ.

And it is the cause of recollection [which has been] awakened upon the seeing of a similar object.[25]

kathaṃ punar anubhavagrahaṇena smṛtivyavacchedaḥ.

But how [is] the differentiation from recollection [accomplished] by the use of [the word] "apprehension"?

smṛtyanyajñānasyānubhavatvāt.

Because a knowledge other than recollection is apprehension.

yathāhuḥ – anubhūtiḥ pramāṇaṃ sā smṛter anyā iti.

As was said [by Śālikanātha]: "Valid cognition is apprehension; it is different from recollection."[26]

saṃskāramātrajam iti mātracā pratyabhijñā vyāvartitā.

[In the qualification of recollection as] "originated from mental impression only," recognition is excluded by means of [the word] "only."[27]

saṃskārasamprayogābhyāṃ jāyamānaṃ jñānaṃ pratyabhijñā. yathā sa evāyaṃ ghaṭa iti.

Recognition is knowledge which comes into existence by means of a connection [with the perceived object] and a mental impression,[28] as for example [the recognition] "This is that pot."

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[22] Cf. *NSā* p. 89,1: *smaraṇājñānavyavacchedārtham anubhavagrahaṇam*. Cf. also *SP* (2) 212: *asmṛtirūpaṃ jñānam anubhavaḥ*; *SP Jinavardhanī* ad 212: *smṛtivyatiriktaṃ yaj jñānaṃ sa anubhavaḥ*; *TBh* § 5: *anubhava iti smṛter nirāsaḥ. anubhavo nāma smṛtivyatiriktaṃ jñānam*; *TK* (1) § 38: *smṛtibhinnaṃ jñānam anubhavatvajātimān vānubhavaḥ*; *ṢDSS* p. 5737: *anubhavo nāma smṛtivyatirekaṃ jñānam*.

[23] Cf. *TS* (*D*) § 34 (cf. p. 22, n. 1) and Notes on § 34 (7); *TK* (1) § 38: *saṃskāramātrajanyaṃ jñānaṃ smṛtiḥ* (see *TK* [2] p. 6,16, n. *ga*, and Note 33). Cf. also *PP*, *mūlaśloka* 132, p. 10: *... smṛtiḥ punaḥ | pūrvavijñānasaṃskāramātrajaṃ jñānam ucyate* ||; *NK* p. 1045 s.v. *smṛti*.

[24] Cf. *TK* (1) § 38: *tatra pūrvānubhavaḥ karaṇam, saṃskāro vyāpāraḥ*. Cf. also *NK* p. 741 s.v. *vāsanā* 1: (*guṇaḥ*) *smṛtihetuḥ saṃskāraviśeṣaḥ*.

[25] Cf. *TS* (*D*) § 75: *anubhavajanyā smṛtihetur bhāvanātmamātravṛttiḥ*; *TK* (1) § 88: *pūrvānubhavajanyaṃ smṛtihetuḥ saṃskāro bhāvanā. sa jīvamātravṛttiḥ.*

[26] *PP* v. 132.

[27] Cf. *TS* (*D*) ad § 34: *pratyabhijñāyām ativyāptivāraṇāya mātreti* (cf. also Notes ad § 34, pp. 176f.). On *mātrac* cf. *Aṣṭ* 5.2.27.

[28] Cf. *SP* (2) 256 [167]: *atītāvasthāvacchinnaṃ vastugrahaṇaṃ pratyabhijñānam*; *TBh* § 143: *pūrvānubhavajanitasaṃskārasahakṛtendriyaprabhavā pratyabhijñā*. Cf. also *NBh* ad III.1.7: *pūrvaparayor vijñānayor ekaviṣaye pratisandhijñānaṃ pratyabhijñānam*.

nanv anubhavasyaiva pramāṇatve kuta āgamādiṣu pramāṇatvavyavahāraḥ.

[Objection:] Inasmuch as [it was said that] apprehension alone is characterised as valid cognition, why is the [expression] "being a means of valid cognition" used with regard to authoritative tradition, etc.?

pramāṇajanakatvād eveti brūmaḥ.

[To this] we reply [that it is] precisely because [they] (i.e., authoritative tradition, etc.) generate valid cognition.

tad uktaṃ śrībhagavatpādaiḥ – atra brahmavidyopaniṣacchabdavācyā, *tatparāṇāṃ sahetoḥ saṃsārasyātyantāvasādanāt*, *upanipūrvasya sades tadarthatvāt*. *tādarthyād grantho 'py upaniṣad ucyate iti*.

This has been said by Śrībhagavatpāda [Śaṅkara]: "Here, the knowledge of *brahman* is designated by the word *upaniṣad* because for those who are completely dedicated to this [knowledge of *brahman*] *saṃsāra* together with its cause is ultimately coming to an end because [the root] *sad* with the prefixes *upa* and *ni* has that meaning; [thus] because of [its] having that meaning also the book/text is called *upaniṣad*."[29]

tac ca pramāṇam aṣṭavidhaṃ pratyakṣam anumānam āgama upamānam arthāpattir abhāvaḥ sambhava aitihyam iti.

And this valid cognition is eightfold, viz. perception, inference, authoritative tradition, analogy (comparison), implication (presumption), absence, inclusion and traditional hearsay.[30]

[Chapter 2.] *Pratyakṣanirūpaṇa*
Examination of Perception.

tatra samyagaparokṣānubhavaḥ pratyakṣam.

Among these [valid cognitions], perception is correct apprehension of what is perceptible.[31]

tad dvividhaṃ savikalpakaṃ nirvikalpakaṃ ceti.

It is twofold, viz. determinate and indeterminate.[32]

tatra saṃjñādiviśiṣṭārthaviṣayaṃ savikalpakaṃ yathā ghaṭo 'yam iti.

Among these [two], determinate [perception] has something distinguished by a name, etc., as its object, as for example [the cognition] "This is a pot."[33]

tadanullikhitārthaviṣayakaṃ nirvikalpakaṃ yathedam iti vastumātrānubhavaḥ.

Indeterminate [perception] has something not marked by it (i.e., a name, etc.) as its object, as for example the apprehension of a mere thing [having the form] "this."[34]

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[29] Śaṅkara's commentary on *Bṛhadāraṇyaka-Upaniṣad*, Introduction.

[30] Cf. *NK* s.v. *pramāṇa*, pp. 553-556.

[31] *NSā* p. 109,1: *tatra samyagaparokṣānubhavasādhanaṃ pratyakṣam*.

[32] *NSā* p. 180,1: *tac ca dvividhaṃ savikalpakaṃ nirvikalpakaṃ ceti*; *TS* (*D*) § 42 (see Notes ad § 42, pp. 215ff.); *TBh* § 20; *TK* (1) § 50.

[33] Cf. *NSā* p. 180,2-3: *tatra saṃjñādisambandhollekhena jñānotpattinimittaṃ savikalpakaṃ yathā devadatto 'yaṃ daṇḍītyādi*; *TK* (*D*) § 50: *viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyasambandhāvagāhi pratyakṣaṃ savikalpakam*; *TS* (*D*) § 42: *saprakārakaṃ jñānaṃ savikalpakaṃ yathā ḍittho 'yaṃ brāhmaṇo 'yaṃ śyāmo 'yam iti*.

[34] Cf. *NSā* p. 183,1: *vastusvarūpamātrāvabhāsakaṃ nirvikalpakaṃ yathā prathamākṣisannipātajaṃ jñānam*; *TK* (1) § 50: *viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyasambandhānavagāhi pratyakṣaṃ nirvikalpakam*; *TS* (*D*) § 42: *tatra niṣprakārakaṃ jñānaṃ nirvikalpakaṃ yathedaṃ kiṃcit* [Ms. E reads: *kiṃcid idam iti vastumātrāvagāhijñānam*].

tat punar dvividhaṃ yogipratyakṣam ayogipratyakṣaṃ ceti.

It is again twofold: yogic perception and non-yogic perception.[35]

tatrendriyasannikṛṣṭārthaviṣayam ayogipratyakṣam.

Among these [two], non-yogic perception has something drawn near by the senses as its object.[36] (...)

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[35] Cf. *NS* 1.1.4; *NSā* p. 114,1: *tad dvividhaṃ yogipratyakṣam ayogipratyakṣaṃ ceti*; *TK* (1) § 51: *pratyakṣaṃ punar api dvividhaṃ laukikālaukikabhedāt*.

[36] Cf. *NSā* p. 114,1: *tatrāyogipratyakṣaṃ* [115,1] *prakāśadeśadharmādyanugrahād indriyārthasambandhaviśeṣeṇa sthūlārthagrāhakam*.

TS — *Tarka Sangraha*, *with the Commentaries of Nyayabodhini*, *Nirukti*, *Padakritya*, *Dipikaprakasa*, *Vakyarthabodhini and Bhashapariccheda*. Madras 1952.

TS (D) — *Tarka-Saṃgraha of Annaṃbhaṭṭa with the Author's Own Dīpikā*, *and Govardhana's Nyāya-Bodhinī*. Ed. with critical and explanatory notes by the late Yashwant Vasudev Athalye, together with introduction and English translation of the text by the late Mahadev Rajaram Bodas; revised and enlarged second edition – second impression by A.D. Pusalker. [Poona] 1963. (Bombay Sanskrit Series 55)

NK — *Nyāyakośa or Dictionary of Technical Terms of Indian Philosophy* by Mahamahopadhyaya Bhimacharya Jhalakikar. Revised and re-ed. by Vasudeva Shastri Abhyankar. 4th ed. Poona 1978. (Bombay Sanskrit and Prakrit Series 49)

NTD — *Nyāyatātparyadīpikā*, in *Nyāyasāraḥ*: *A Rare Brāhmaṇic Work on Medieval Logic by Ācārya Bhāsarvajña*, *Together with the Commentary called Nyāyatātparyadīpikā by Jayasiṃha Sūri*. Ed. Satis Chandra Vidyabhusana. Calcutta 1910. (Bibliotheca Indica N.S. 1240)

NBh — *Nyāyabhāṣya*, cf. *NS*.

NS — *Nyāyasūtra*, in *Nyāyadarśanam*: *Nyāya Sūtras of Maharṣi Gautama and Bhāṣya of Maharṣi Vātsyāyana* (*Vātsyāyanabhāṣyasaṃvalitam Gautamīyaṃ Nyāyadarśanam*), Critically ed. and tr. [into Hindi] by Dwarikadas Shastri. Varanasi 1989. (Bauddha Bharati Series 11)

NSā — *Nyāyasāraḥ of Bhāsarvajña*, *with the Commentaries Nyāyamuktāvalī of Aparārkadeva and Nyāyakalānidhi of Ānandānubhavācārya*. Critically ed. with introduction, notes etc. by S. Subrahmanya Sastri and V. Subrahmanya Sastri. Madras 1961. (Madras Government Oriental Series 167)

NSāP — *Nyāyasārapadapañcikā*. In: *Nyāyasāra of Āchārya Bhāsarvajña with the Nyāyasārapadapañchikā of Vāsudeva of Kashmir*. Critically ed. with notes including translation by Vasudeva Shastri Abhyankar and C.R. Devadhar. Poona 1922.

PCU — *Prabodhacandrodaya*, in *Un drame allégorique sanskrit. Le Prabodhacandrodaya de Kṛṣṇamiśra*. Texte traduit et commenté par Armelle Pédraglio. Paris 1974. (Publications de l'Institut de Civilisation Indienne, Série in-8° 36)

PP — *Prakaraṇa Pañcikā of Śrī Śālikanātha Miśra with Nyāyasiddhi*. Ed. with introduction and notes by A. Subrahmanya Sastri. Banaras 1961. (Banaras Hindu University Darśana Series 4)

PBh — *Madhusūdanasarasvatīkṛtaḥ Prasthānabhedaḥ*. Ed. G.C. Tarkadarsanatirtha. Calcutta 1939.

PM — *Hemacandra's Pramāṇamīmāṃsā*. Text and translation with critical notes by Satkari Mookerjee, in collaboration with Nathmal Tatia. Varanasi 1970. (Prachya Bharati Series 11)

BĀU — Bṛhadāraṇyaka-Upaniṣad, ed. in *Eighteen Principal Upaniṣads* (cf. *KU*).

BTBh — *Bauddha-Tarkabhasha of Moksakaragupta*. Ed. and tr. with exhaustive notes by B.N. Singh. Foreword by G.C. Pandey. Varanasi 1985.

Bh — *Bhāmatī of Vācaspatimiśra*, in *Brahmasūtra-Śaṅkarabhāṣyam*, *with the Commentaries*: *Bhāṣyaratnaprabhā of Govindānanda*, *Bhāmatī of Vācaspatimiśra*, *Nyāyanirṇaya of Ānandagiri*. Ed. J.L. Shastri. Delhi 1988.

BhāgP *Bhāgavatapurāṇa of Kṛṣṇa Dvaipāyaṇa Vyāsa*. Ed. with Sanskrit Commentary *Bhāvārthabodhinī* of Śrīdharasvāmin by J.L. Shastri, Delhi 1983.

BhG *Bhagavadgītā*, ed. in R.C. Zaehner, *The Bhagavad-Gītā with a Commentary Based on the Original Sources*, London 1969.

MuU *Muṇḍaka-Upaniṣad*, ed. in *Eighteen Principal Upaniṣads* (cf. *KU*).

MNU *Mahānārāyaṇa-Upaniṣad*, ed. and tr. in Jean Varenne, *La Mahā Nārāyaṇa Upaniṣad*, 2 vols., Paris 1960. (Publications de l'Institute de Civilisation indienne 11, 13)

MNP *Mīmāṃsānyāyaprakāśa*. In: *Mīmāṃsā Nyāyaprakāśa of Āpadeva*. Ed. with an original Sanskrit commentary by A. Chinnaswami Sastri (alias Venkatasubrahmanya Sastri). Benares 1925. (Kashi Sanskrit Series [Haridas Sanskrit Granthamala] 25. Mīmāṃsā Section 1)

MBh *Mahābhārata*. Crit. ed. V.S. Sukthankar, S.K. Belvalkar, P.L. Vaidya *et al*. 19 vols. Poona 1933-1966.

MMU *Mānameyodaya of Nārāyaṇa*. *An Elementary Treatise on the Mīmāṃsā*. Ed. with an English translation by C. Kunhan Raja and S.S. Suryanarayana Sastri. 2nd ed. Madras 1975. (The Adyar Library Series 105)

YS *Yājñavalkyasmṛti of Yogīśvara Yājñavalkya with the Commentary Mitākṣarā of Vijñāneśvara*. Ed. with notes, etc., by Narayan Ram Acharya. 5th ed. Bombay 1949.

ŚU *Śvetāśvatara-Upaniṣad*, ed. in *Eighteen Principal Upaniṣads* (cf. *KU*).

ŚP *Śivapurāṇa*. Ed. Pañcānana Tarkaratna. Calcutta 1908.

ṢDSR *Maladhāri-Śrī-Rājaśekharasūri-vicaritaḥ Ṣaḍdarśanasamuccayaḥ*. Ed. Śrāvakaharagovindadāsa and Becaradāsa. Varanasi, n.d. (Śrīyaśovijayajainagranthamālā 17)

ṢDSS *Ṣaḍdarśanīsiddhāntasaṃgraha*, Extracts from the unpublished manuscript, no. 7631 in *A Descriptive Catalogue of the Sanskrit Manuscripts in the Tanjore Mahārāja Serfoji's Sarasvatī Mahāl Library*, *Tanjore*, Vol. 13, ed. P.P.S. Sastri, Srirangam 1931, pp. 5734-5743.

SK *Sāṃkhyakārikā*, ed. in Albrecht Wezler und Shujun Motegi, *Yuktidīpikā*: *The Most Significant Commentary on the Sāṃkhyakārikā*, Vol. 1, Stuttgart 1998, Appendix 2, pp. 278-285. (Alt- und Neu-Indische Studien 44)

SDK *The Sarvadarśanakaumudī of Mādhavasarasvatī*. Ed. K. Sambasiva Sastri. Trivandrum 1938. (Trivandrum Sanskrit Series 135)

SDS *Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha*, in *The Sarva-darśana-saṃgraha of Mādhavācārya*. Ed. with an exhaustive Hindi commentary, copious appendixes and Anglo-Hindi introductions by Uma Shankar Sharma "Rishi." Varanasi 1964. (The Vidyabhawan Sanskrit Granthamala 113)

SP Saptapadārthī, in (1) Śivāditya's Saptapadārthī, with the Commentary Candrikā by Śeṣānanta. Crit. ed. with introduction and notes by V.S. Ghate. Bombay 1909; (2) Śivāditya's Saptapadārthī with a Commentary by Jinavardhana Sūri. Ed. J.S. Jetly. Ahmedabad [1963]. (Lalbhai Dalpatbhai Series 1)

SB *Siddhāntabindu by Madhusūdanasarasvatī*: *A Commentary on the Daśaślokī of Śaṃkarācārya*. Ed. with an original commentary by Vasudev Shastri Abhyankar, Poona 1986.

SMS *Sarvamatasaṃgraha* of Rāghavānanda. Ed. T. Ganapati Sastri. Trivandrum 1918. (Trivandrum Sanskrit Series 62)

SMSN *Sarvamatasaṃgraha of Nārāyaṇa Bhaṭṭa*. Ed. by M. Madhavan Unni. Published by K. Raghavan Pillai. Trivandrum 1977. (Trivandrum Sanskrit Series 245)

SŚ *Saṃkṣepaśārīraka of Sarvajñātman*. Crit. ed. and tr. N. Veezhinathan. Madras 1972.

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Ramkrishna Bhattacharya

What is Meant by *Svabhāvaṃ Bhūtacintakāḥ*?*

The hemistich *svabhāvaṃ bhūtacintakaḥ* occurs twice in the *Mahābhārata* (*Mbh*.), first in the *Śāntiparvan* (224.50d) and again in the *Āśvamedhikaparvan* (48.24d).[1] The *Śāntiparvan* verse runs as follows:

> *kecit puruṣakāraṃ tu prāhuḥ karmavido janāḥ |*
> *daivam ity apare viprāḥ svabhāvaṃ bhūtacintakāḥ ||.*

Some who know what activity is say that (everything is due to) human effort, other sages say it is destiny; those who think (in terms) of the elements (speak of) *svabhāva*.

A variant of this verse which is found a litte later in the *Śāntiparvan* (*Śānti*) (230.4) does not, however, refer to the *bhūtacintaka*s:

> *pauruṣaṃ karaṇaṃ kecid āhuḥ karmasu mānavāḥ |*
> *daivam eke praśaṃsanti svabhāvaṃ cāpare janāḥ ||.*

With respect to activity some say that human effort is the cause (of success), others praise destiny; still others (speak of) *svabhāva*.

The *Āśvamedhikaparvan* (*Āśvamedhika*) passage (48.23-24) expresses the bewilderment of the sages confronted with so many contradictory views on what is to be cherished:

> *yajñam ity apare dhīrāḥ pradānam iti cāpare |*
> *sarvam eke praśaṃsanti na sarvam iti cāpare ||23||*
> *tapas tv anye praśaṃsanti svādhyāyam apare janāḥ |*
> *jñānaṃ saṃnyāsam ity eke svabhāvaṃ bhūtacintakāḥ ||24||.*

Some sober men praise the sacrifice; others praise the gift. Some praise all, some do not praise all. Some others praise asceticism, others praise Vedic studies. Some praise knowledge [and] renunciation; those who think (in terms) of the elements praise *svabhāva*.

What does *svabhāvaṃ bhūtacintakāḥ* signify? E. Washburn Hopkins thought that the *bhūtacintaka*s "are perhaps materialists."[2] E.H. Johnston also thought so,[3] and Debiprasad Chattopadhyaya was absolutely convinced of it. "That the word *bhūtacintakāḥ* here referred to the materialist will not be doubted."[4] Torn out of context and considered by itself, the expression may be explained in that way. But there is a problem. A *bhūtacintaka* is one who is supposed to think (in terms) of the *bhūta*s, the elements, viz., earth, air, fire, water and ether. Why should he speak of *svabhāva* which is a rival doctrine of *bhūtāni* (elements) as the first cause

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[1] All references are to the critical edition of the *Mahābhārata*, ed. V.S. Sukthankar et al., Poona 1927-1966.

[2] Cf. E.W. Hopkins, *The Great Epic of India*, London / New York 1901 (repr. Delhi 1993), p. 89, referring presumably to the *Āśvamedhikaparvan* verse.

[3] Cf. E.H. Johnston, *Early Sāṃkhya*: *An Essay on its Historical Development According to the Texts*, London 1937 (repr. Delhi 1974), p. 67.

[4] Cf. Debiprasad Chattopadhyaya, *Indian Atheism*: *A Marxist Analysis*, Calcutta 1969, p. 64, referring to the *Śāntiparvan* verse. The passage has been reproduced *verbatim* in his *History of Science and Technology in Ancient India*, Vol. II, Calcutta 1991, p. 62.

Karin Preisendanz (ed.), *Expanding and Merging Horizons*: *Contributions to South Asian and Cross-Cultural Studies in Commemoration of Wilhelm Halbfass*, Wien: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 2007, pp. 275-281.

mentioned in the enumerative verse *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad* (*Śv.Up.*) 1.2?[5] *svabhāva* in the *Mbh*. then must mean something different from what it means in the *Śv.Up*.

The word *bhūtacintaka* is also found in *Śānti* 267.4:

> *yebhyaḥ sṛjati bhūtāni kālo bhāvapracoditaḥ |*
> *mahābhūtāni pañceti tāny āhur bhūtacintakāḥ ||.*
>
> Those from which Time, moved by the desire to produce physical forms, creates (all) beings, are called "the five great elements" by those who think (in terms) of the elements.

There are also some parallel expressions in the *Mbh*. itself, such as *muhūrtacintaka* (12.267. 4d) "those who think (in terms) of the moment" (i.e., Time), *kālacintaka* (12.295.12d) "those who think (in terms) of Time," *jñeya-* and *jñānacintaka* (12.294.33f and 295.12d) "those who think (in terms) of what is to be known" and "... of knowledge."

The word *bhūtacintā* also occurs in the *Suśrutasaṃhitā*.[6] Vātsyāyana mentions the *arthacintaka*s, "those who think (in terms) of wealth (alone)." Their views are quoted in *Kāmasūtra* 1.2. 40-45 and refuted in 1.2.46-47.[7]

Why should then the *bhūtacintaka*s speak in terms of *svabhāva*, instead of *bhūta*? In order to unravel this knot, we have to see whether the word *svabhāva* in these contexts signifies anything other than what it literally means, viz., "own being," and, if so, in which context or domain it is found in ancient texts. No standard Sanskrit dictionary, whether the monumental *Śabdakalpadruma* or *Vācaspatyam*, the *Sanskrit-Wörterbuch* or the Sanskrit–English lexicons compiled by Wilson, Monier-Williams or Apte, records any special sense of *svabhāva*, and the word *bhūtacintā* is merely literally glossed.[8]

As to the commentators on the *Mbh.*, Nīlakaṇṭha, as in many other philosophical contexts, is a poor guide. Failing to understand the implication of the word in *Śānti* 224.50, he associates *karman*/*puruṣakāra* with the Mīmāṃsakas, *daiva* with the astrologers and *svabhāva* with the *svabhāvavādin*s, without explaining what *svabhāva* means.[9] He then quotes *Sv.Up*. 1.2ab and, in explaining the words *svabhāva*, *niyati*, *yadṛcchā* and *bhūtāni*, associates them with the doctrines of the transformationist (*pariṇāmavādin*) Sāṃkhyas, ritualist (*karmāvadin*) Mīmāṃsakas, accidentalists (*aniyamavādin*), and the Arhatas (Jains) and Lokāyatas respectively. In his glosses on *Śānti* 183.5 (176.5 in the critical edition), however, in connection with the same line of the *Śv.Up*., he associates *svabhāva* with the Buddhists and Laukāyatikas.

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[5] Cf. *Eighteen Principal Upanisads*, ed. V.P. Limaye and R.D. Vadekar, Vol. I, Poona 1958, p. 283:
kālaḥ svabhāvo niyatir yadṛcchā bhūtāni yoniḥ puruṣa iti cintyam |
saṃyoga eṣāṃ na tv ātmabhāvād ātmāpy anīśaḥ sukhaduḥkhahetoḥ ||.

[6] Cf. *The Suśruta Saṃhitā with Dalhaṇa's Commentary*, ed. Vaidya Jadavji Trikamji Acarya, Varanasi 1980, *Sūtrasthāna* 3.15 and *Śārīrasthāna* 1.1. Kunjalal Bhisagratna translates *bhūtacintā* as "cosmology" and "the science of Being" respectively (*The Sushruta Samhita*, Varanasi 1963, Vol. 1, p. 24 and Vol. 2, p. 115). Apparently he follows Dalhaṇa who explains *bhūta* as *sarvāṇi bhūtāni sthavirajaṅgamāni*, *mahābhūtāni pṛthivyādīni vā* (p. 338).

[7] *Kāmasūtra* (*KS*), n.d. (Chaukhambha Sanskrit Series, Benares). The word *kālacintaka* also occurs in Gauḍapāda's commentary on the *Sāṃkhyakārikā* v. 8 (ed. Jivananda Vidyasagara, Calcutta 1892).

[8] There is no entry for *bhūtacintā* in the major Sanskrit–Sanskrit lexicons; the *Sanskrit-Wörterbuch* refers to the *Suśrutasaṃhitā* only (not to the *Mbh.*), glossing the word as "Untersuchung der Elemente" (examination of the elements) as does Monier Monier-Williams ("investigation into the elements") in *A Sanskrit-English Dictionary*, Oxford 1899.

[9] *Mahābhārata* with Nīlakaṇṭha's Commentary, ed. Pancanana Tarkaratna, Vol. 2, Kalikata 1826 (*śaka*) (= vulgate), p. 1635.

While commenting on *Śānti* 230.4 (237.4 in the vulgate[10]), the above-quoted variant of *Śānti* 224.50, he writes: *svabhāva* is mere *svarūpa*, i.e., own form or shape, or character, condition or peculiarity. Then again (in his glosses on *Śānti* 231.51) he attributes the doctrine of *karma* and *puruṣakāra* to the Mīmāṃsaka, of fate, planets and Time to the astrologer (*daivajña*), and of *svabhāva* to the *śūnyavādin* (i.e., a branch of the Buddhists or the Buddhists in general) as well as the Lokāyatas. Ānandapūrṇa Vidyāsāgara (c. 1350), a Vedāntin commentator of the Mokṣadharma section of the *Mbh*., identifies the *bhūtacintaka*s with the Lokāyatikas.[11]

What all these commentators and explicators failed to note is that the word *svabhāva* is also used in a quite different context or domain, other than the determination of the first cause. Take the following verse that is found in some mss. of the *Yājñavalkyasmṛti* (1.349):

> *kecid daivāt svabhāvād vā kālāt puruṣakārataḥ |*
> *saṃyoge kecid icchanti phalaṃ kuśalabuddhayaḥ ||*.[12]

> Some (say that success is) due to destiny, (some that it is) due to *svabhāva*, (some that it is) due to Time, (some that it is) due to human effort. But some competent people recognize the result in the combination (of all these).

A variant version of the same verse found in the text followed by Aparārka as well as by Viśvarūpa in his *Bālakrīḍā* runs as follows:

> *kecid daivād dhaṭhāt kecit kecit puruṣakārataḥ |*
> *sidhyanty arthā manuṣyāṇāṃ teṣāṃ yoniṣu pauruṣam ||*.[13]

> Some (expect success) from fate, some from accident, some from human effort. (In whichever way) man's objects are achieved, their origin is resoluteness.

Here, instead of the four claims, we have three: *kāla* (Time) is omitted and *svabhāva* is replaced by *haṭha*, "accident" or "chance." Elsewhere in the *Mbh*. (e.g., *Śānti* 172.10ab: *bhūtānām utpattim animittataḥ*), and in *Āśvamedhika* 50.11cd (which will be discussed below), *svabhāva* also stands for "accident," barely distinguishable from *yadṛcchā*.[14]

Thus there are two domains in which *kāla*, *svabhāva* and *niyati* are found to appear. The first domain relates to the question of the first cause while the second is concerned with ascertaining what causes success in human life. In the first domain, *svabhāva* in the course of time came to suggest accidentalism and thereby became synonymous with *yadṛcchā*.[15] In the second domain, too, *svabhāva* came to signify accidentalism and consequently *akriyāvāda*, inactivism, a philosophy of life that considers all human efforts to be vain. One is reminded of the concept of *týchē* (chance, fortune) as expressed in Jocasta's speech in *Oedipus Tyrannus* vv. 977-979:

> No. No, mortals have no need to fear when chance reigns supreme. The knowledge of the future is denied to us. It is better to live as you will, live as you can.[16]

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[10] Cf. n. 9.

[11] Cf. the Critical Notes on *Mbh*., *Śānti* 224.50, p. 1257.

[12] *The Mitākṣarā with Viśvarūpa and Commentaries of Subodhinī and Bālambhaṭṭī*, ed. S.S. Setlur, Madras 1912, pp. 213-214.

[13] *The Yājñavalkyasmṛti with the Commentary Bālakrīḍā of Viśvarūpācārya,* ed. T. Ganapati Sastri, Part 1, Trivandrum 1921 (repr. New Delhi 1982), pp. 195-196.

[14] Cf. V.M. Bedekar, "The Doctrines of Svabhāva and Kāla in the Mahābhārata and Other Old Sanskrit Works," *Journal of the University of Poona* (Humanities Section) 13 (1961): 1-16.

[15] Cf., for instance, Śāntarakṣita's *Tattvasaṅgraha* with Kamalaśīla's *Pañjikā* vv. 110-112 (ed. D.D. Shastri, Varanasi 1968, pp. 78-79).

[16] Translation by Luci Berkowitz and Theodore F. Brunner, New York 1966, p. 22.

In most of its occurrences in the *Mbh*., the term *svabhāva* relates to the second domain and appears as a member of a triad or tetrad. The dyad of fate and human effort is well known. Manu and many others (particularly poets and dramatists) normally speak of *two* contending forces: fate on the one hand and human effort on the other.[17] Those who uphold the former declare all human effort to be utterly futile: what is destined to happen is bound to happen, *bhavitavyaṃ bhavaty eva*, *qué será será*. It thus leads to inactivism because of the acceptance of predeterminism.

Those who uphold human effort, however, deny the very existence of fate. To them, there is neither any planetary effect nor any divine dispensation. What is called destiny (*daiva*) is merely the sum total of one's activities in one's former births. In the *Yogavāsiṣṭha*(*-Rāmāyaṇa*), *Mumukṣuprakaraṇa* 7.22 we read:

> *na daivaṃ dṛśyate dṛṣṭyā na ca lokāntare sthitam |*
> *uktaṃ daivābhidhānena svarloke karmaṇaḥ phalam ||*.[18]

Of course, true to the Indian tradition, there was also a reconciling approach, in this case of those who declared that both fate and human effort are necessary for achieving success – the typical syncretism (*samuccayavāda*) also found in connection with knowledge (*jñāna*) *vis-à-vis* activity (*karman*).[19]

What is often overlooked or ignored is that, side by side with this dyad of fate and human effort, there was also a doctrine of *svabhāva* or *haṭha* which denied both predeterminism and its opposite (i.e., that man can determine his own fate). This third doctrine preaches inactivism that logically follows from the denial of causality in the affairs of human life (cf. *Mbh*., *Śānti* 172.10-11 in which Ajagara speaks of *svabhāva* and the origin of all beings *animittataḥ*). It is rather strange that the word *svabhāva* instead of the more appropriate *yadṛcchā* was employed to designate this doctrine. But it is in this sense that the Buddhists right from Aśvaghoṣa (first century CE) and other philosophers used this term.[20] In the Nyāya tradition, too, the example of the sharpness of the thorn suggests *nirnimittatā*, the de-

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[17] *Manusmṛti* (*Manu*) 7.205 (ed. J.H. Dave, Vol. 4/1, Bombay 1985, pp. 159-160). See J. Jolly, "Fate (Hindu)," in: James Hastings (ed.), *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics*, Vol. 5, Edinburgh 1915, pp. 790-792, at p. 792. Many more instances could be cited from the Epics, gnomic poetry and plays, e.g., Bhaṭṭanārāyaṇa's *Veṇīsaṃhāra* 3.37 which is quoted in *Hitopadeśa* p. 7, v. 31 (ed. Narayana Rama Acarya, Bombay 1949).

[18] *Yogavāsiṣṭha* (*Rāmāyaṇa*), ed. with Hindi translation by Mahaprabhulal Goswami, Part 1, Varanasi 1988, p. 133. Surendranath Dasgupta, *A History of Indian Philosophy*, Vol. 2, Cambridge 1931 (repr. Delhi 1975), p. 256, favourably impressed by such a strong denial of *daiva* and the exaltation of free will, declares: "This view of *puruṣa-kāra* and *karma* seems to be rather unique in Indian literature." The view, however, is not that unique. One may mention *Mbh*., *Anuśāsanaparvan* 6.12-28 and 7.23; *Yājñavalkyasmṛti* 1.349: *tatra daivam abhivyaktaṃ pauruṣaṃ paurvadehikam*; Vijñāneśvara in his commentary on this verse explains *daiva* as *pūrvadehārjitaṃ pauruṣam* (ed. S.S. Setlur, Madras 1912, p. 216); and *Matsyapurāṇa* 220.2. (ed. Brahmadatta Trivedi, Calcutta 1954) Vātsyāyana (*KS* 1.2) also upholds *puruṣakāra* and denounces (as his commentator says) *daivamātravāda* (see also *Hitopadeśa* p. 8, v. 33).

[19] See, e.g., *Mbh*., *Sauptikaparvan* 2.3: "Our acts do not become successful in consequence of destiny alone, nor of exertion alone, O best of men! Success springs from the union of these two" (translation by K.M. Ganguli, Calcutta 1890, p. 8). Medhātithi in his commentary on *Manu* 7.205 (pp. 159-160) also quotes some similar verses. See also *Yājñavalkyasmṛti* 1.350 which has been quoted in *Hitopadeśa* p. 7, v. 32.

[20] Aśvaghoṣa, *Buddhacarita* 9.57cd-62 (ed. E.H. Johnston, Lahore 1936, repr. Delhi 1978); Śāntideva, *Bodhicaryāvatāra* 9.117 (ed. Jyotipala Sthavira, Dhaka 1977, p. 251), and Śāntarakṣita, *Tattvasaṅgraha* vv. 110-112. Dharmakīrti refers to the doctrine but does not connect it with *svabhāva*, which Manorathanandin, his commentator, does (cf. *Pramāṇavārttika*, ed. D.D. Shastri, Varanasi 1968, p. 64, vv. 162cd-163ab); Manorathanandin explains *kecit* as *svabhāvavādinaḥ* (ibid.).

nial of any efficient cause in the world (though not of the material cause), or even denial of any cause whatsoever (*ahetu*).[21]

We have spoken of a tetrad. The fourth claim in this domain concerned with ascertaining what determines success and failure in life centers on *kāla* (Time). Now, *svabhāva* and *kāla* are also at the center of two rival doctrines in the first domain (i.e., the debate concerning the first cause). It is possible that the meaning which *svabhāva* acquired in the second domain, viz., "chance, accident," came to penetrate the first domain as well (also *vice versa*, see below), and, pushing *yadṛcchā* out of the ring, *svabhāva* came to suggest "accident" instead of what it originally stood for, viz., that there is no creator, without the world being lawless: the nature of every object is its own determinant. Such an interpenetration of the two domains is evident in the commentatorial works. Most of the commentators on the *Mbh*. try to make sense of *svabhāva* (in whichever context it may have occurred) in relation to its use in the first domain. However, *svabhāva* in the *Mbh*. is mostly related to the second domain.

We first come across the triad associated with the second domain not in the *Śāntiparvan*, but much earlier, in the *Āraṇyakaparvan*. In 33.11 (32.19 in the vulgate) Draupadī tells Yudhiṣṭhira:

> *yaś ca diṣṭaparo loke yaś cāyaṃ haṭhavādakaḥ |*
> *ubhāv apasadāv etau karmabuddhiḥ praśasyate* ||.[22]

> Those in the world who rely on destiny and those who speak of chance are both wretched. He who minds activity is praiseworthy.

In the given context, as also in others, *haṭha* can mean nothing but "chance." Strangely enough, Nīlakaṇṭha associates *haṭhavādika* (his reading in 32.13, vulgate) with *cārvāka* and repeats this in his comments on 32.32 (33.14 in the critical edition). However, in his glosses on 32.16 (33.4 in the critical edition) he explains *haṭha* rightly as "suddenly" (*akasmāt*), gaining anything without premeditation (*acintitasyātarkitasya ca lābho haṭhaḥ*). He provides an apt example of what *haṭha* means in his gloss on 32.19 (33.17 in the critical edition): gaining a gem while searching for a lost penny (*naṣṭakapardikānveṣaṇapravṛttasya ratnalābhaḥ*).[23]

This, and not the earlier interpretation (viz., *haṭhavādika* referring to the Cārvāka or a person similar to a Cārvāka), truly fits the context. In the light of this *Āraṇyaka* verse, *svabhāva* in *Śānti* 224.50d may very well be taken to mean "chance." This meaning of *svabhāva*, although unnoticed by the lexicographers as well as the commentators on and translators of the *Mbh*., is encountered in *Āśvamedhika* 50.11. In one of the many accounts of cosmogony, it is said:

> *devā manuṣyā gandharvāḥ piśācāsurarākṣasāḥ |*
> *sarve svabhāvataḥ sṛṣṭā na kriyābhyo na kāraṇāt* ||.

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[21] *Nyāyasūtra* 4.1.22-24 (= 4a.22-24, ed. Walter Ruben, *Die Nyāyasūtra's*, Leipzig 1928). For a survey of this section, see *Nyāya Philosophy*, Part IV: *Fourth Adhyāya, First Āhnika, a Free and Abridged Translation of the Elucidation of Phanibhusana Tarkavagisa's Bengali Commentary by Mrinalkanti Gangopadhyaya*, Calcutta 1973, pp. 27-31.

[22] In this chapter Draupadī refers to *Bṛhaspatinīti* as well (v. 57). But the teachings expounded by her are, as Jacobi says, "at any rate as orthodox as one can wish!" (cf. "Zur Frühgeschichte der indischen Philosophie" [1911], in: *Kleine Schriften*, ed. Bernhard Kölver, Wiesbaden 1970, p. 737 [552], n. 1; English translation by V.A. Sukthankar in *The Indian Antiquary* 47 [1918]: 104, n. 1). Perhaps the very mention of Bṛhaspati made Nīlakaṇṭha think of Cārvāka, although this Bṛhaspati must be a different person altogether.

[23] Haricarana Vandyopadhyaya in his Bengali–Bengali dictionary *Vaṅgīya Śabdakoṣa* (New Delhi 1966, originally published in 1340-1353 Bengali Sāla), records this sense of *haṭha* (3) and refers to Nīlakaṇṭha.

> Gods, men, celestial beings, goblins, demons and monsters – all are produced by *svabhāva*, not by any actions, nor by any [other] cause.

It is also to be noted that this account of cosmogony begins and ends with five elements (50.10). Apparently there were some elementalists (*bhūtavādin*s, or rather *mahābhūtavādin*s) who were accidentalists as well as inactivists. The word *bhūtacintaka* most probably refers to them, not to the Cārvākas or their predecessors who were to arrive much later on the philosophical scene and who spoke of only *four* elements instead of *five* (as the *bhūtacintaka*s did).[24]

The question that automatically arises at this juncture is how *svabhāva*, which was originally quite distinct from *yadṛcchā*, could become synonymous with it. Unfortunately, we are not in a position to offer any definite solution. But it may be suggested that from at least the first century CE, *svabhāva* had come to refer to both accidentalism and inactivism, distinguishing the doctrine both from theism (*īśvaravāda*) and fatalism (*niyativāda*). The concept of *svabhāva* was employed by the later Buddhist philosophers as well as by the Nyāya–Vaiśeṣikas (although the latter did not employ the term *svabhāva* but *ākasmikatva*[25] when they spoke of a doctrine identical with it). This change of meaning in the first domain (related to the first-cause controversy) seems to have penetrated into the second domain (related to what determines success in man's life) and thus *svabhāva* became synonymous with *haṭha*. In any case, in both the domains *svabhāva* came to stand for the denial of causality. The two passages in the *Mbh*. in which the hemistich *svabhāvaṃ bhūtacintakāḥ* occurs belong to the second domain.

svabhāva has other meanings in other contexts in the *Mbh*. itself as also elsewhere. In the *Bhagavadgītā* (17.2) and *Bhāgavatapurāṇa* (10.21.13-30), for instance, *svabhāva* stands for the traits inherited from former births.[26] A study of these other meanings, however, is better postponed because it will lead us into areas far away from the one under discussion. We propose to conclude with the following observation: *svabhāva* is a polysemous word, and in the context of *Śānti* 224.50 and *Āśvamedhika* 48.24 it means "chance" and nothing else. The word *bhūtacintaka*, both in these contexts and elsewhere, merely refers to those who thought in terms of the five elements and were inactivists to boot. So, *svabhāvaṃ bhūtacintakāḥ* should be rendered as "The elementalists (speak in terms) of chance."

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[24] Only the Jains speak of the *tajjīva-taccharīravādin*s as believing in the existence of five elements. Cf. *Sūtrakṛtāṅgasūtra* 1.1.1.7-9 and Śīlāṅka's commentary, p. 10ff. (ed. Muni Jambuvijayaji, Delhi 1978); *Jain Sutras*, Part 2, pp. 236-237 (translated by H. Jacobi, Sacred Books of the East 45, Oxford 1895). See also Śīlāṅka, p. 185ff. and Jinabhadra Gaṇi, *Gaṇadharavāda* 3.101-103 (1649-1651) (ed. Muni Ratnaprabha Vijaya, Ahmedabad 1942). An oft-quoted Cārvāka aphorism, however, specifically declares: "Earth, air, fire, and water are the only principles" (for its sources see Mamoru Namai, "A Survey of Bārhaspatya Philosophy," *Indological Review* [Kyoto] 2 [1976]: 38-39 and n. 12). The opponents of the Cārvākas also refer to them as *bhūtacatuṣṭayavādin*s. Guṇaratna (*Tarkarahasyadīpikā*, ed. L. Suali, Calcutta 1905-1914, p. 300) also admits this but adds that there was another group of Cārvākas who believed in the existence of *five* elements. This view is not attested by any source known to me. The *Maṇimēkalai*, in fact, makes a distinction between the *bhūta*(*pañcaka*)*vādin*s and the Lokāyatikas (retold by L. Holmström, Hyderabad 1996, Ch. 20, p. 170).

[25] The term *ākasmikatvaprakaraṇa* is used by Uddyotakara, Vācaspatimiśra and Viśvanātha, to designate *NS* 4.1.22-24. See *Nyāyadarśanam with Vātsyāyana's Bhāṣya*, *Uddyotakara's Vārttika*, *Vācaspati Miśra's Tātparyaṭīkā and Viśvanātha's Vṛtti*, Vol. 2, ed. Amarendramohan Tarkatirtha and Hemantakumar Tarkatirtha, Calcutta 1944.

[26] *Bhāgavatapurāṇa* (crit. ed.) 10.21.13-30 (*Śrībhāgavatam*, ed. K.K. Shastree, Ahmedabad 1997, Vol. 4/1) = 10.24.13ff. in the vulgate.

Any definite association of the doctrine of *svabhāva* (relating to the first domain) with the Cārvākas or Lokāyata is not encountered before the tenth century CE.[27] However, a hint may be found in an anonymous commentary on the *Sāṃkhyakārikā* translated into Chinese by Paramārtha in the sixth century CE.[28] Vidyāraṇya (fourteenth century CE), too, associates *svabhāva* with the Bārhaspatyas.[29] But nowhere is the Cārvāka made to deny causality or preach inactivism. To Sāyaṇa-Mādhava (fourteenth century CE) the Cārvākas are not accidentalists: they rather admit *svabhāva*, "inherent nature," to be the determinant:

> But an opponent will say, if you thus do not allow adrishṭa, the various phenomena of the world become destitute of any cause. But we (*sc*. the Cārvākas) cannot accept this objection as valid, since these phenomena can all be produced spontaneously from the inherent nature of things.[30]

Somadevasūri (tenth century CE) presents the Cārvāka as positively championing human effort against fatalism and inactivism.[31] However, commentators on the *Mbh*., like Ānandapūrṇa Vidyāsāgara and Nīlakaṇṭha, must have been influenced by the later concept that sought to associate *svabhāva* (relating to the first domain) with the Cārvākas. Accordingly, they interpreted the verses under discussion in different ways. In short, the *bhūtacintaka*s are not to be identified with the Cārvāka materialists, but with some elementalists who may have preached both accidentalism and inactivism and, due to this, incurred the wrath of Vyāsa in *Śānti* 229.3-10.[32]

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[27] Bhaṭṭotpala in his commentary on Varāhamihira's *Bṛhatsaṃhitā* 1.7 (ed. Avadha Vihari Tripathi, Varanasi 1968, Part 1, p. 9) writes: … *laukāyatikāḥ svabhāvaṃ jagataḥ kāraṇam āhuḥ*, "The Laukāyatikas call *svabhāva* the first cause (lit. the cause of the world)."

[28] J. Takukusu, *The Sāṃkhya Kārikā*: *Studied in the Light of the Chinese Version*. Translation by S.S. Suryanarayana Sastri, Madras, n.d., p. 36, on v. 27. Referring to the verse "What produces the white colour of the *haṃsa*s," etc., the commentator says: "This verse is found in the work of the Lokāyatas."

[29] *Vivaraṇaprameyasaṃgraha*, pp. 210-211 (ed. R. Tailanga, Benares 1893).

[30] *Sarvadarśanasaṃgraha*, Ch. 1, p. 11 (ed. K.L. Joshi, Ahmedabad/Delhi 1981; translation by E.B. Cowell).

[31] *Yaśastilakacampū*, Ch. 3, vv. 60-66 (ed. Sivadatta and V.L. Panasikar, Part 1, Bombay 1916, p. 382). See also Krishna Kanta Handiqui, *Yaśastilaka and Indian Culture*, Sholapur 1949, p. 146.

[32] Cf. Ramkrishna Bhattacharya, "*Svabhāvavāda* vis-à-vis Materialism: A Review in the Light of Some *Mahābhārata* Passages," *Anvīkṣā* 18 (1999): 92-101, particularly pp. 98-99. – For two further recent contributions by the present author dealing with materialism in ancient India, cf. "Cārvāka Fragments: A New Connection," *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 30/6 (2002): 597-640, and "Jain Sources for the Study of Pre-Cārvāka Materialist Ideas in India," *Jain Journal* 38/3 (2004): 145-160.

4.2

MĪMĀṂSĀ

Jan C. Heesterman

For the Sake of Dharma
An Essay on the Term *Dharmamātra*

1

At the heart of the Mīmāṃsā – the ritualistic Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā as well as the vedāntic Uttara-Mīmāṃsā – lies the problem of the enigmatic relationship between the world and the ultramundane. The way the Mīmāṃsā ritualists deal with – as different from solve – this problem is to act it out in the drama of sacrifice in which man surrenders himself to a power that surpasses him. Breaking in on the lived-in order of the world the sacrifice opens out onto the ultramundane, and as the dynamic pivot between the two worlds it partakes of both. As such it offered the obvious mold for thinking about man's relationship to what surpasses him and his world.

This, however, required that the age-old institution of sacrifice be submitted to rational thought.[1] That is, it had to be stripped of magic and numinosity, of its transgressiveness and its agonistic uncertainty. Put briefly, it had to be deprived of its disruptive potential that at the same time gave sacrifice its sacrality and social binding force. In other words, sacrifice was de-sacralized and, by the same token, de-socialized. Lifted out of its worldly social moorings sacrifice was "transcendentalized," turned into a transcendent realm of its own. Deprived of its original capacity to awe and thrill – but still, as we shall see, bearing the distinctive mark of sacrifice – it became the ritualists' template for handling the refractory problem of how man relates to the transcendent Absolute. The rationally systematized and regulated ritual of Vedic sacrifice offered the model for man's conduct in his precarious situation, suspended as he was between the conflicting requirements of world and transcendence.

This system of ritual, then, is the essential brahmanic *dharma*, studied by the Mīmāṃsā scholars on the basis of Jaimini's *sūtra*s whose self-proclaimed object is the investigation of *dharma* (*dharmajijñāsā*). It is in this context and against the background of sacrifice that we must consider the somewhat puzzling term *dharmamātra*, "solely for the sake of *dharma*."[2]

2

Before addressing this term we first must consider the concept of *dharma* from which it is derived. I do not intend to go into its multiple meanings. The important point that requires our attention is the inherent ambiguity of *dharma* – an ambiguity that is no other than the fundamental ambiguity of sacrifice noted above. On the one hand, it addresses man living in the world, while on the other it is concerned with the transcendent. It is in this way that we

[1] See J.C. Heesterman, "Rituel et rationalité," in: J. Bronkhorst (ed.), *La rationalité en Asie = Études de Lettres* 3 (2001) : 153-164. More generally, id., *The Broken World of Sacrifice*, Chicago 1993, Chs. I and II.

[2] The term *dharmamātra* has been studied by F.X. Clooney, "Dharmamātra Karma: A Re-evaluation of the Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā-Sūtras 2.1.9-12," *Journal of Oriental Research* 47-55 (1989): 157-168; see id., *Thinking Ritually*, Vienna 1990, pp. 49f. and 156f. See also below n. 56.

Karin Preisendanz (ed.), *Expanding and Merging Horizons*: *Contributions to South Asian and Cross-Cultural Studies in Commemoration of Wilhelm Halbfass*, Wien: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 2007, pp. 285-302.

must understand Jaimini's definition of *dharma* as the *artha*, the object or purpose, that is characterized by the *codanā*, the call to sacrifice.[3]

The two operative words are *artha* and *codanā*. *artha* is "object" as well as "meaning" of a word, aimed at an object, and so also "object" in the sense of the aim or purpose of an activity. "Object," "meaning" and "purpose" coincide in *artha*. Hence the basic axiom of the naturally given connection (the *autpattikaḥ saṃbandhaḥ*) between word (*śabda*) and "meaning," as well as "object" (*artha*), which has absolute authority where no other authoritative sources of knowledge are available.[4] This is the case of the Veda word which, being eternal and superhuman, is by definition transcendent, beyond the grasp of human means of cognition. The relevant Veda word is the *codanā*, the call to sacrifice, in the standard form: "who desires heaven should sacrifice" (*svargakāmo yajeta*), in which the name of the particular sacrifice is inserted. The *codanā*, then, signals the "taking up," the *ārambha*, of the sacrificial "work" (*karman*), implying the whole of the intricate complex of acts and *mantra*s of the relevant sacrifice.[5]

Given the fact that *dharma* according to Jaimini, as we saw, is the *artha* that is marked by the *codanā*, the "call to sacrifice" is no less than the summons to realize the *dharma*. To comply with the summons will (in due time) bring about the result incontrovertibly promised by the transcendent *codanā*, be it heaven or the fulfilment of more mundane wishes. Conversely, the sacrificer is defined in the *codanā* as entertaining a wish which he must solemnly proclaim at the start of the proceedings,[6] thereby submitting himself to the unquestionable authority of the transcendent *dharma*.

3

Viewed in this light it would seem that the drama of sacrifice and its uncertain outcome has been replaced by the absolute rule of ritual, which lays down the minute details of the proceedings with the same incontrovertible certainty as it promises the predetermined result. Ritualism, it seems, has taken over from sacrifice. The usual understanding of *dharma* as a detailed system of rules appears to confirm this impression. However, for all the ritualistic "overkill" full weight is still given to the distinctive feature of sacrifice that sets it apart from the gift. This feature is the element of destruction, when the offering – the supposed gift – is committed to the sacrificial fire.[7]

The meticulously built up material sacrifice implodes, leaving the vacuum created by abandoning the offering to the fire; only its ashes remain. As Śabara – true to the Mīmāṃsā's staunch rationality – makes clear, the ashes are just that and consequently, being inert matter, are incapable of producing anything at all, let alone the transcendent "fruit" (*phala*) of sacri-

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[3] *Jaimini-Sūtra* (*JS*.) (in *Mīmāṃsādarśana*, ed. K.V. Abhyankar and G.A.J. Joshi, Poona 1970-1976) 1.1.2: *codanālakṣaṇo 'rtho dharmaḥ*, "*dharma* is the purpose defined by the injunction [to sacrifice]."

[4] *JS*. 1.1.5: *autpattikas tu śabdasyārthena saṃbandhaḥ*, *tasya jñānam upadeśo 'vyatirekaś cārthe 'nupalabdhe*, *tat pramāṇaṃ bādarāyaṇasyānapekṣatvāt*, "The natural connection of word and meaning is source of knowledge, a teaching and unerring in case of a non-observable matter; according to Bādarāyaṇa this is the authority because of its independence."

[5] Cf. *JS*. 2.1.5: *codanā punar ārambhaḥ*, "But [it is] the call to sacrifice [that causes] the undertaking." This *sūtra* is generally taken to refer to the undertaking of the whole complex of the sacrifice from beginning to end (see K. Yoshimizu, *Der* "*Organismus*" *des urheberlosen Veda*, Vienna 1997, pp. 91f.).

[6] See W. Caland and V. Henry, *L'Agniṣṭoma*, Paris 1906-1907, p. 2; also *Baudhāyana-Śrauta-Sūtra* 2.1 (p. 34,11).

[7] Heesterman, *The Broken World of Sacrifice* (cf. n. 1), Ch. I, esp. pp. 13-18.

fice. At this point the ritual opens up, revealing the fundamental "brokenness" of sacrifice, its *bhaṅgitva*.[8] It is here that the enigma of the relationship between world and transcendence becomes manifest.

dharma, being the purpose or aim that is defined by the call to sacrifice, fully partakes in the paradoxical "brokenness" of sacrifice. It rules the material build-up – its details being known as so many *dharma*s – leading up to the critical moment of destruction that opens out to the single, transcendent *dharma*. It is this ambiguity that makes for the traditional view of its perplexing subtlety. As it is said, "Dharma and Adharma do not go about saying 'Here we are'; nor do gods, *gandharva*s or ancestors say, 'This is *dharma*, that is *adharma*.'"[9] The true *dharma* is, in fact, disconnected from this world, its distinctive characteristic being a total lack of worldly motivation.[10] Or, as Louis Dumont succinctly put it, "le dharma règne de haut sans avoir, ce qui lui serait fatal, à gouverner."[11]

4

The consideration of the concept of *dharma* has unavoidably brought us to the pivotal point of abandonment, when the scrupulously prepared offering is given over to destruction in the sacrificial fire. Known as *tyāga* or *utsarga*, "relinquishing," it is the central act of sacrificial ritual.[12] In Jaimini's *sūtra*s the verb *yajati*, "to sacrifice," refers specifically to this act. Thus *yajati*, as occurring in the call to sacrifice, is paraphrased as "substance, deity and act" (*dravyadevatākriyam*). Śabara explains the triad as the act (*kriyā*) of abandoning a substance, while referring it to a deity.[13] Jaimini's paraphrase is echoed in Kātyāyana's *Śrautasūtra*, where *kriyā* is indeed replaced with *tyāga*, abandonment.[14]

In this connection it should be noted, though, that the abandonment does not involve a gift to the deity. While the gift does involve an abandonment, its distinctive characteristic is a transfer to someone else's ownership; *yajati* is abandonment pure and simple (*utsargamātra*).[15] The cautiously worded phrase "referring to a deity" (*devatām uddiśya*) is clearly meant to avoid the notion of a gift. The god neither receives gifts nor brings about the result, the

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[8] See Śabara ad *JS*. 2.1.5 (Poona ed. [cf. n. 3], pp. 359, 378); cf. Heesterman, "Zum Begriff des *apūrva*," in: G. Oberhammer and M. Schmücker (eds.), *Raum-zeitliche Vermittlung der Transzendenz*, Vienna 1999, pp. 115-129, at p. 127.

[9] *Āpastamba-Śrauta-Sūtra* 1.7.20.6.

[10] *Vāsiṣṭha-Dharmaśāstra* 1.7; cf. *Āpastamba-Dharma-Sūtra* 1.1.4.9-10, 1.4.12.8, 12 and 1.7.20.1-4; Śabara ad *JS*. 1.3.3-7. Cf. also R. Lingat, *Sources du droit dans le système traditionel de l'Inde*, Paris 1967, pp. 30 and 175.

[11] L. Dumont, *Homo hierarchicus*, Paris 1966, p. 107.

[12] *tyāga* refers specifically to the formula uttered by the sacrificer when the offering is committed to the fire – "This is for [name of the god], not for me." *utsarga* is the more general term.

[13] *JS*. 4.2.27: *yajaticodanā dravyadevatākriyam*, *samudāye kṛtārthatvāt*, "The injunction using the verb 'to sacrifice' comprises offering substance, deity and act, because in combination the purpose [of the sacrificial injunction] is effected."

[14] *Kātyāyana-Śrauta-Sūtra* 1.2.1-2: *yajñaṃ vyākhyāsyāmaḥ* (1). *dravyaṃ devatā tyāgaḥ* (2).

[15] Śabara ad *JS*. 4.2.28 (sub fine): *yajatidadātijuhotiṣu sarveṣūtsargaḥ samānaḥ*; *tatra yajatir devatām uddiśyotsargamātram*, *juhotir āsecanādhikaḥ*, *dadātir utsargapūrvakaḥ parasvatvena saṃbandhaḥ*. "The act of sacrificing, the gift and the libation have the [element of] abandonment in common; the act of sacrificing is pure abandonment with reference to a deity, the libation [is marked] moreover by the pouring, the gift is change of ownership accompanied by abandonment."

"fruit" (*phala*) of sacrifice. As Śabara pointedly states, "the prosperity the devotees enjoy does not come from their god but from what they abandon in sacrifice."[16]

Although the term *yajati* presupposes the detailed build-up of the ritual complex, the decisive act that is to bring about the promised result is the abandonment of the offering to the fire. It is both the breach between the mundane and the transcendent and the hinge connecting them.

5

Our brief examination of the main act of sacrifice should enable us to evaluate what is usually viewed as a basic statement of Jaimini's ritualism and view of *dharma*. I am referring to the well-known *sūtra* which states, "Man's wish to obtain what gives him happiness (*prīti*) is characterized by the aim (*artha*), because of inseparability (*avibhaktatvāt*)."[17] The crux of the *sūtra*, as we shall see, is in the words *artha* and *avibhakta*.

Generally speaking, the statement concerns the important question of *puruṣārtha*, "man's aim" (or when used as a *bahuvrīhi* adjective, "what is directed at man," "has man as its purpose"). The question is, what element in the whole complex "work" (*karman*) of sacrifice brings about the fulfilment of the sacrifice's aim? The opposite of *puruṣārtha* is the ritual framework of acts, materials and *mantra*s that support the main act of sacrifice and is therefore called *kratvartha*, "having the sacrifice as its purpose." Put differently, the *puruṣārtha* part of sacrifice is essentially the act of abandonment, designated by the verb *yajati* that brings about the "fruit" (*phala*) of sacrifice.

Now the *artha*, the aim that in Jaimini's *sūtra* determines the desire to obtain (*lipsā*) what gives happiness, is taken by Śabara to be man's aim in the strict ritualistic sense of *puruṣārtha*. "Man's aim is inseparable from happiness. Whatever brings about happiness is *puruṣārtha*."[18] Although undoubtably true, Śabara's interpretation raises many doubts. Rather than being identical with man's aim in the strict sense, the *artha* would seem to be the aim of the desire, the two – aim and desire – being "inseparable." Distinguishing between man's aim and the aim of his desire may seem rather fatuous, but it would be consonant with the stress Jaimini puts on the immediate link between act and aim; the act ends with bringing about its aim.[19] At any rate, the *artha* spoken of in the *sūtra* need not necessarily be identical with the sacrificial *puruṣārtha*.

In its mundanely utilitarian orientation the *sūtra*'s statement – in fact a banal truism – hardly seems related to the sacrificial *puruṣārtha*. Indeed, as Śabara observes, the desire owes nothing to the transcendent Vedic scripture (*śāstra*) but is solely a matter of mundane human aims.[20] Instead of *puruṣārtha* it seems to be more akin to its opposite, *kratvartha*, the material

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[16] Śabara ad *JS*. 9.1.9 (p. 1656): *devaparicārakānāṃ tu tato bhūtir bhavati devatām uddiśya yat tyaktam*, "The prosperity the worshippers of the gods enjoy comes [not from the gods] but from what they, referring to the god, abandon." Cf. M. Biardeau, *Théorie de la connaissance et philosophie de la parole*, Paris / La Haye 1964, p. 87.

[17] *JS*. 4.1.2: *yasmin prītiḥ puruṣasya*, *tasya lipsārthalakṣaṇāvibhaktatvāt*.

[18] Śabara ad loc. (p. 2,9-10): *avibhakto hi puruṣārthaḥ prītyā*; *yo yaḥ prītisādhanaḥ sa puruṣārthaḥ*.

[19] For the immediate link of act and aim cf. *JS*. 3.1.10: *phalaṃ tu saha ceṣṭayā*, "The result [comes] together with the act"; also *JS*. 11.1.27f. (see below, n. 30). The link between act and purpose is identical with the *autpattikaḥ sambandhaḥ* of word and meaning (see above, n. 4).

[20] Śabara ad *JS*. 4.1.2 (p. 752,8): *tasya lipsārthenaiva bhavati*, *na śāstreṇa*; *kratvartho hi śāstrād avagamyate*, *nānyathā*, "His desire is caused only by [man's human] interest, not by the scripture, for it is what is in the interest of the sacrifice that is known from the scripture [not through man's interest].

underpinning of sacrifice. Curiously, though, it is exactly this *kratvartha* understanding of the *sūtra* that is explicitly rejected by Śabara. He does so on the ground of the specious argument that what is *kratvartha* can only be known from the *śāstra*, whereas *puruṣārtha* being inseparable from happiness does not need any scriptural urging.

Prabhākara, in his subcommentary, the *Bṛhatī*, demurs at Śabara's cavalier exclusion of the Vedic *śāstra* as the authority for what is *puruṣārtha*. Reversing Śabara's view he holds that only from the *śāstra* one learns that heaven is realized through sacrifice and granted to the sacrificer. Accordingly the aim that characterizes man's desire is not independent of the transcendent *śāstra*. On the contrary, in Prabhākara's view the aim is the realization of the *śāstra*'s injunction to perform sacrifice (*niyogasiddhi*) which, as the *śāstra* teaches, will grant heaven.[21] Thus the ground for the fulfilment of man's desire is the inseparability of man, as a sacrificer, from the connective web of sacrifice (*kratusaṃbandha*).[22]

Here Prabhākara, though not attacking Śabara head-on, turns his view around. Whereas Śabara rejects the *kratvartha* orientation of the *sūtra*, Prabhākara's expression *kratusaṃbandha* appears to point at *kratvartha*. It suggests that man's desire, rather than being autonomous, is tied up with faithfully executing the minutiae of the sacrificial framework. For, as we saw, the Vedic injunction (that promises heaven) instigates man's desire which therefore is characterized by the aim of realizing the injunction and so involves him in the network of rules for the build-up of sacrifice. In this way, then, man as a sacrificer becomes part of the *kratvartha* elements of sacrifice.[23]

6

Apart from Prabhākara's imaginative exegesis the *sūtra* we discussed (4.1.2), though supposed to define the term *puruṣārtha*, cannot tell us more than the unsurprising truth that man is wont to seek what gives him happiness. If anything, it puts us on the track of *kratvartha*. It is only in the next *sūtra* (4.1.3) that the *puruṣārtha* as determined by *śāstra* comes into its own. Referring to the (predominantly mundane) happiness that is the focus of the preceding *sūtra*, it states:

> At the abandonment of that [happiness] (*tadutsarge*) the [prescribed] acts [are conducive] to man's purpose (*puruṣārthāya*), because the *śāstra* cannot be doubted; nor is it intended that a material object (*dravya*) be prepared; because of his connection with that purpose (namely *puruṣārtha*) man['s involvement] is expressly mentioned in the authoritative text (*śruti*) with regard to the [main] act (*kriyāyām*).[24]

Here then we have a clear characterization of *puruṣārtha*. As our discussion of the term *yajati* would have made us expect, the act that clinches the matter is the *utsarga*, when the sacrificer utters his *tyāga* formula and the *adhvaryu* officiant gives up the offering into the fire. Related to this is the second defining feature, namely the absence of a tangible result. The end is the void left by the *utsarga*. Śabara, having committed himself – apparently not without encountering ample opposition, as seems clear from his extended commentary – to a purely mun-

[21] See Yoshimizu, op. cit. (cf. n. 5), pp. 137f.

[22] Ibid., pp. 139f. and n. 136.

[23] On the sacrificer as a *śeṣa*, an accessory of sacrifice, see *JS*. 3.1.6: *puruṣaś ca karmārthatvāt*, "Man is also [a *śeṣa*] because his purpose is sacrifice." The sacrificer is at the same time master of and subservient to sacrifice.

[24] *JS*. 4.1.3: *tadutsarge karmāṇi puruṣārthāya śāstrasyānatiśaṅkyatvāt*, *na ca dravyaṃ cikīrṣyate*, *tenārthenābhisaṃbandhāt kriyāyāṃ puruṣaśrutiḥ*.

dane motivation of the sacrificer, sidetracks the clear intention of the *sūtra* by inserting a concessive *api* after *tadutsarge*, "even in the case of giving up happiness" (*prītyutsarge 'pi*). Since all authoritative texts urging sacrifice relentlessly promise happiness in this and the yonder world, Śabara is hard put to find a convincing example where such happiness is given up or at least simply absent and nothing tangible is brought about. He must resort to a fairly obscure vow (*vrata*) enjoining one not to look at the rising or setting sun, with no promise of any happiness as a result. On that score it fits Śabara's view of the "abandonment of happiness."[25] Moreover, the vow is not part of a sacrificial ritual nor does it produce a tangible result and consequently cannot be *kratvartha* and so may be rated *puruṣārtha*, somehow benefitting man.[26]

Still, apart from the fact that *utsarga* is not just a matter of absence but a conscious act of abandonment, Śabara's example is singularly inept. It has nothing to do with sacrifice and reduces the *sūtra*'s clear outline of *puruṣārtha* to a marginal exception that is hardly relevant. Moreover, the case – unconvincing as it already is – is finally spoiled when Śabara – or do we have here an early interpolation? – nevertheless comes up with a happy result for the vow not mentioned elsewhere, namely freedom from sin.[27] This does, of course, underline the *puruṣārtha* character of the vow but destroys the argument regarding *utsarga*. All that Śabara's example does is offer a simple *casus* for discussion that will be carried forward from commentary to commentary up to and including modern scholarship.

7

We have seen, then, two entirely different, even opposite, views of *puruṣārtha* abruptly juxtaposed in two successive *sūtra*s (4.1.2 and 3).[28] It is, however, only the first of the two that – notwithstanding its lack of clarity, or perhaps rather because of it – was made the stamping ground for commentarial exercises. Even Prabhākara, whose thinking tends to be not far removed from the tenet of the second *sūtra*, at least as regards the primacy of *śāstra* as well as the sacrificial and dharmic content of *puruṣārtha*, gives no special attention to it.

The reason for this neglect may well be Śabara's side-tracking the *sūtra* as a hardly relevant exception. The ample attention given to the *sūtra* on man's happiness, however, has its own reason. It was clearly of the greatest importance to the Mīmāṃsaka – at least theoretically – to connect the mundane order of human existence as smoothly as possible with the indubitable promise of transcendence offered by sacrifice. Clearly aware of the gap, the *bhaṅgitva* that separates the two spheres, the Mīmāṃsakas directed all attention to attempting to overcome it. Hence Śabara hypothesizes *apūrva* – the immaterial force that will bring about in due time the fruit of sacrifice – while Prabhākara stakes all on the *niyoga*, the scriptural injunction itself, as also Jaimini appears to do.

Against this background it becomes understandable that Śabara wants to deemphasize the gap of *utsarga* by making *puruṣārtha* purely mundane and at the same time opening out towards

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[25] *Kauṣītaki-Brāhmaṇa* 6.6 (*prajāpativrata*). Cf. *Praśna-Upaniṣad* 1.15. See P.V. Kane, *History of Dharmaśāstra*, Poona 1968-1975, Vol. 5, pp. 849f.

[26] One might wonder why Śabara did not take the *tadutsarge* phrase in the sense of a painful postponement of satisfaction – *per aspera ad astra*. The reason would seem to be the immediate link between act and purpose which excludes an indefinite postponement (cf. above, n. 19).

[27] According to *Praśna-Upaniṣad* 1.15 the *prajāpativrata* promises offspring.

[28] This glaring discrepancy led Yoshimizu to the conclusion that no generally valid definition of *puruṣārtha* is given in the *sūtra*s; see Yoshimizu, op. cit. (cf. n. 5), p. 135.

the bliss of the ultramundane. But it is equally understandable that this attempt does not really solve the problem and calls for other no less bold attempts. In fact, the problem is inherently unsolvable. The abrupt juxtaposition of the *sūtra*s is a telling illustration of the existential conundrum.

8

After this lengthy detour through mīmāṃsist thought we should finally be in a position to approach the meaning of the term *dharmamātra*, "solely for the sake of *dharma*." The term was studied earlier by F.X. Clooney in a subtle reinterpretation of a key passage, *JS*. 2.1.9-12, and Śabara's commentary.[29] A clear definition, though, is found elsewhere, at *JS*. 11.1.27-28. Having first asserted that acts normally are finished when they have visibly achieved their aim, Jaimini points out that in the case of a *dharmamātra* act no visible result is brought about. Hence, because of the invisibility of the result, the aim is achieved on the strength of the injunctive word (*śabdārthena*).[30] A *dharmamātra* act is more than just acting in conformity with the prescript without there being any visible result. What is concerned in the act is *dharma*; the act, therefore, has no mundane motivation or purpose.[31]

The key passage mentioned above, *JS*. 2.1.9-12, discusses the question of how the *dharmamātra* act is to be classified. In the two preceding *sūtra*s acts are divided into two categories, those that are *pradhāna*, "primary," "the chief element," and those that are *guṇa*, "secondary," "subservient." In the latter case a material object or substance (*dravya*) is made or prepared; the *dravya* is the aim of the act and so is *pradhāna*. In the opposite case, when the act is not aimed to produce or prepare a *dravya*, it is the act that is *pradhāna* and the *dravya* that is involved in the act is *guṇa*, subserving the act.[32] Thus, for instance, the substance offered in the fire is subservient to the act of sacrifice.[33] Next Jaimini states that "in the case of a *dharmamātra* act it is the act (*karman*) [that is *pradhāna*] because no (visible) result is brought about (*anirvṛtteḥ*) as in the case of a fore-sacrifice (*prayājavat*)."[34]

So the *dharmamātra* act falls within the purview of *sūtra* 7, since no substance is made or prepared. In that sense it reminds us of the *utsargasūtra* (4.1.3) discussed above. There, in the case of the sacrificial abandonment, we found the same defining feature of nothing tangible being produced (*na ca dravyaṃ cikīrṣyate*). The *dharmamātra* act, then, appears to be related to *puruṣārtha*. The difference is the *dharmamātra* act's equation with the fore-sacrifices, the *prayāja*s – a point to which we shall have to return. It is clear, however, that Jaimini accords the *dharmamātra* act a special status.

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[29] See above, n. 2.

[30] *JS*. 11.1.27-28: *kriyāṇām arthaśeṣatvāt pratyakṣatas tannirvṛttyāpavargaḥ syāt* (27). *dharmamātre tv adarśanāc chabdārthenāpavargaḥ syāt* (28), "[Normally] acts, being subservient to their aim, and by visibly realizing their [aim] (27). However, in the case of a *dharmamātra* act, because of the invisibility [of the result the act reaches its] end by virtue of a [injunctive] word (28)."

[31] See above, §§ 2-3 and nn. 3 and 10.

[32] *JS*. 2.1.7-8: *yair dravyaṃ na cikīrṣyate*, *tāni pradhānabhūtāni dravyasya guṇabhūtatvāt* (7). *yais tu dravyaṃ cikīrṣyate*, *guṇas tatra pratīyeta tasya drayvapradhānatvāt* (8).

[33] This case is discussed by Śabara ad *JS*. 2.1.12 (see below, n. 40).

[34] *JS*. 2.1.9: *dharmamātre tu karma syād anirvṛtteḥ prayājavat*.

9

Śabara's commentary on *adhikaraṇa* 2.1.9-12 is strangely ambiguous. *sūtra* 9, claiming a special *pradhāna* status for the *dharmamātra* act, is in the light of the two previous *sūtra*s (7 and 8) fairly clear. The following *sūtra* (10), however, denies the special status. "[No,] due to similarity (in form) of the authoritative texts (*śruti*) [the prescript of the *dharmamātra* act] is of the same character (*sadharma*)."[35] As against *sūtra* 9, which Śabara takes to be a *pūrvapakṣa*, *sūtra* 10 appears to be the concluding *siddhānta*. As Śabara explains it, the prescript in question is similar to those that prescribe acts which are subservient (*guṇa*) to the material that is the direct object of the relevant verb. Thus, for instance, the prescript to husk the rice-grains (from which the cakes to be offered will be made) is similar to the one that enjoins offering a cake in the fire. In both cases there is a verb with a direct object in the accusative. Although Śabara invokes a grammatical rule to the effect that the accusative ending marks what is "most wanted" (*īpsitama*) by the agent,[36] we may legitimately doubt that this should mean that as a rule the act designated by the verb is subservient to its object. The grammatical rule is not concerned with the question of *pradhāna* and *guṇa*. It would seem that Śabara misconstrues the purpose of the *adhikaraṇa*. Whereas the *adhikaraṇa* deals with the purport of the *dharmamātra* act which, as Clooney has observed,[37] is concerned with act and result, Śabara is exclusively interested in the relationship of act and material object. In fact, it runs counter to the general rule that a material object put in connection with an act is subservient (*guṇa*) to that act.[38] But in any case, whatever the reasoning, the two *sūtra*s 9 and 10 are consistent with the usual *pūrvapakṣa–siddhānta* pattern. So far so good, except for the last two *sūtra*s of the *adhikaraṇa*. They reject the conclusion reached in the preceding *sūtra* but without there being a clear connection with it other than the one contrived by Śabara.

These *sūtra*s read as follows. Question: "[What] if the authoritative teaching enjoins a material object?" (11); answer: "No, [it can not be the dominant factor] because it has the act as its purpose, as in mundane usage, and so is subservient (*śeṣa*) [*vis-à-vis* the act]" (12).[39] Śabara's commentary on *sūtra* 11 does not so much address the conclusion in *sūtra* 10, but rather the grammatical reasoning. In fact, it is difficult to see how the two *sūtra*s, 10 and 11, relate to each other otherwise than through Śabara's commentary.

The next *sūtra* (12), the last of the *adhikaraṇa*, explicitly states that such an object, as suggested by the question in the preceding *sūtra* (11), has to be subservient to the act. Nevertheless Śabara still holds on to the primacy of the material object. The direct object of a transitive verb must, according to him, be the *pradhāna*. But then, in a move reminiscent of his treatment of the *utsargasūtra* (4.1.3), he concedes that in the case of an offering in the fire (as well as in a number of other examples) his rule of the direct object's primacy is cancelled by a stronger argument (*balīyasā hetunā*). The offering substance cannot possibly be the *pradhāna* dominating the offering act. The accusative here stands for the instrumental (*tṛtīyāyāḥ*

[35] *JS*. 2.1.10: *tulyaśrutitvād vetaraiḥ sadharmaḥ syāt*.

[36] Pāṇini 1.4.49.

[37] Clooney, "Dharmamātra Karma" (cf. n. 2), p. 166.

[38] *JS*. 6.1.1: *dravyāṇāṃ karmasaṃyoge guṇatvenābhisaṃbandhaḥ*, "When connected with [sacrificial] acts, material objects are related to them as subservient." Curiously, this *sūtra* is considered there as *pūrvapakṣa*. This is unwarranted and belied by the sequel (*sūtra* 3) which confirms the primacy of the act. Moreover, in connection with *sūtra* 12 Śabara quotes 6.1.1 in a positive sense (see below, n. 40). The reason appears to be Śabara's wish to insert in 6.1.1 a consideration of "heaven" being the aim to which the sacrificial act is subservient.

[39] *JS*. 2.1.11-12: *dravyopadeśa iti cet* (11); *na tadarthatvāl lokavat tasya ca śeṣabhūtatvāt* (12).

sthāne).[40] So in the end Śabara acknowledges that there are (ritual) acts when not the material but the act is the dominant factor. But as we have seen before, Śabara does so by way of an exception. And remarkably, the *dharmamātra* act as such is not mentioned anymore after the first *sūtra*. His conclusion, though, as we shall see further on, fits in with his generalization of the *dharmamātra* act (see § 17).

10

Clooney, though more interested in the relationship between act and result than Śabara, who stresses the act–material connection, stays close to Śabara's line of reasoning and finally comes to the same conclusion regarding the *adhikaraṇa*. Further, like Śabara, he takes the starting point of the *adhikaraṇa*, *sūtra* 9, to be a *pūrvapakṣa*. But instead of being *pradhāna*, as Śabara understands it, the *dharmamātra* act would be *guṇa*, subservient to its material. Picking up Śabara's grammatical reasoning Clooney takes the *karman* of *sūtra* 9 in the grammatical sense of direct object of an action verb and as such the *pradhāna* served by the *dharmamātra* act. This rather implausible proposition is, of course, refuted by *sūtra* 10 (the prescripts being similar to those for the other – in Clooney's view primary – acts).

Clooney's argument for this reversal is the phrase *anirvṛtteḥ*, "on the ground of not bringing about [a result]" in *sūtra* 9. Clooney takes the term (*a*-)*nirvṛtti* to refer – as it often does – to the *phala*, the ultimate result of sacrifice.[41] Since the *dharmamātra* act is not the decisive main act that in due time will produce the "fruit" of the sacrifice – otherwise the equation with the fore-sacrifices would be impossible –, it should be understood to have a *karman*, a direct object. Clooney's translation of *sūtra* 9, then, runs as follows: "When the action is purely one of *dharma*, there should be an object, because there is no accomplishment [of any result]."[42]

Clooney's revision, though interesting and rightly critical of Śabara's interpretation, is no less forced. For one thing it cuts off the key *sūtra* 9 from its basis, the definition of *guṇa* and *pradhāna* (*sūtra*s 7 and 8). Instead *sūtra* 9 is linked with Śabara's grammatical reasoning regarding the accusative in his commentary on *sūtra* 10, not with the *sūtra* itself. Further it is not quite clear why an act – *in casu* a *dharmamātra* act – should be understood as having a direct object in the sense of *sūtra* 8, making or preparing a substance (*dravya*), in lieu of bringing forth a (future) *phala*. As for (*a*-)*nirvṛtti*, we have seen that it can indeed refer to a visible, mundane result. It simply means the realization of the aim that concludes an act.[43] Moreover, taking *karma* in *sūtra* 9 in the grammatical sense of direct object of an act would make *sūtra* 11 – "What if an object is prescribed?" – pointless.

When compared with the characterization given by *sūtra* 11.1.28 – the result being beyond observation – the *dharmamātra* act reaches its conclusion through the meaning of the injunc-

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[40] Śabara ad *JS*. 2.1.12: *balīyasā hetunā nāsti pradhānyam ity avagamyate. kutaḥ*? *na homasya kenacit prakāreṇa saktvarthatāvakalpyate* (p. 387,1-2), "By virtue of a stronger argument it is understood that there is no pre-eminence [of the groats for offering]. Why? The oblation act can in no way be imagined to be subservient to the groats." Then, quoting *sūtra* 6.1.1 (see above, n. 38), Śabara concludes: *tenocyate tṛtīyāyāḥ sthāne dvitīyeti. tena tadarthatvād dhomārthatvāt saktūnāṃ na pradhānyaṃ dvitīyasaṃyoge 'pi*, "Therefore it is stated that the accusative [here] stands for an instrumental. So, because the groats are there for this purpose, that is for the purpose of the oblation, they are not primary, in spite of the accusative."

[41] Clooney, *Thinking Ritually* (cf. n. 2), p. 49; id., "Dharmamātra Karma" (cf. n. 2), pp. 162f.

[42] Ibid., pp. 49 and 156.

[43] See above, nn. 19 and 30.

tive word;[44] we may thus rest assured that our *sūtra* 2.1.9 equally holds that the *dharmamātra* act does not produce a visible, mundane, result and so has a special status. Clooney's hypothetical *pūrvapakṣa* that the *dharmamātra* act is subsidiary, subserving a material object, does not clarify the issue, nor is it necessary.

11

The main crux of the *adhikaraṇa*, however, is the connection – or rather the lack of it – between *sūtra*s 9 and 10 on the one hand, and on the other, the next two *sūtra*s, 11 and 12. So far we have mainly dealt with Śabara's commentary. But what about Jaimini's *sūtra*s themselves? To get a clearer view of the *adhikaraṇa* we shall have to disentangle the tortuous relationship between the *sūtra*s and the commentarial overgrowth choking them.

When we look at the *sūtra*s themselves, we notice that the *adhikaraṇa* consists of two pairs of *sūtra*s, each forming a separate whole. The first pair, *sūtra*s 9 and 10, holds the proposition of the *dharmamātra* act's special status as a *pradhāna* and the denial of this proposition. But in what way does the second part of the *adhikaraṇa* – raising and answering the issue of the relevant text enjoining a material object that might figure as the *pradhāna* – relate to the preceding *sūtra* 10 and its rejection of the initial proposition?

The simple answer is that there is no relation. The *adhikaraṇa* does not form a single coherent chain of argumentation. It presents two entirely different lines of reasoning that do not even touch each other. The oppositional question, regarding a material object prescribed by the injunctive text (*sūtra* 11), refers back to the original proposition in *sūtra* 9, which stresses the non-production of a material object as proof of the *dharmamātra* act being *pradhāna*. The critical question is then triumphantly answered in the sense of *sūtra* 7; the prescribed *dravya* serves the act – as the offering substance serves the act of offering – and so is secondary (*sūtra* 12). But the clear-cut confirmation of the *dharmamātra* thesis is in no way related to its equally clear-cut rejection (in *sūtra* 10). We have, then, two independent discussions, or discussion fragments, abruptly juxtaposed, as in the case of *puruṣārtha*. And, as we saw in that case too, the discrepancy remains unresolved. Insofar as Śabara, unconvincingly welding the two fragments together by means of his grammatical argumentation, in the end reaches a positive conclusion regarding acts being *pradhāna* (without, however, mentioning the *dharmamātra* act), it is – again as we saw before – by way of an exception to a general rule. But the discrepancy remains unresolved.

Incidentally, and beyond our present purpose, this may also tell us something about the nature of the compilation of Jaimini's *sūtra*s and Śabara's handling of the compilation. At the very least, the *sūtra* compilation ascribed to Jaimini does not seem to be a monolithically coherent corpus, as we are for the sake of convenience inclined to assume. Rather than a unitary doctrine it is to a considerable extent an arena for the struggle between conflicting opinions that Śabara tries to put in line with each other. We may possibly have to see behind the single name Śabara various authors holding divergent opinions.

12

Our two key passages – the somewhat problematic *sūtra* 2.1.9 and the *sūtra*s 11.1.27f. – have shown us that the foremost characteristic of the *dharmamātra* act is that it does not aim at

[44] See above, n. 30.

producing or preparing a material object or substance and so is *pradhāna*, the dominant element, with regard to the object or substance connected with it in a subservient (*guṇa*) function (2.1.9). This is then formulated in a different, clearer way in *sūtra*s 11.1.27f., where it is stated that its aim is not *pratyakṣa*, directly observable, and that it is realized on the strength of the (injunctive) word (*śabdārthena*). What this means can be elucidated by two other instances – the question of whether the giving of *dakṣiṇā* by the sacrificer to the brahmin officiant is a *dharmamātra* act, and the delicate problem of the *śulka* or "bride-price."

It is proposed in *sūtra* 10.2.22, that on the strength of the verb *dadāti*, the gift to the brahmin officiant (*ṛtvigdāna*) is an act of pure *dharma* (*dharmamātrārtha*).[45] In Mīmāṃsā parlance the verb *dadāti*, "to give," is a sacrificial term like *yajati* and *juhoti* (to pour into the fire).[46] However, in order to be an act of pure *dharma*, giving the *dakṣiṇā* should be free of any self-interested mundane motivation. This requirement the *dakṣiṇā* cannot fulfill. Neither the giver nor the recipient can be disinterested. The sacrificer wants to engage the services of the brahmin expert by offering him a wage and the brahmin desires material compensation for his efforts. So the *dakṣiṇā* cannot be a purely dharmic, disinterested gift. On the other hand, if it were a gift in Marcel Mauss' sense of creating lasting ties of mutual obligations – obligation to give, to accept and to reciprocate – sacrificer and brahmin would remain caught in an unending cycle of mutuality.[47] Viewed in this light, giving and receiving the *dakṣiṇā* can best be handled as a *hic et nunc* transaction without lasting ties of "post-contractual" obligations.

The *dakṣiṇā*, then, can on no account be a "gift" in the Maussian sense – as it originally undoubtedly was. The bone of contention is whether the gift is *dharmamātra*, an entirely disinterested gift, or a wage for services rendered. In this connection the presence of *prasarpaka*s – visitors at a sacrifice who are allowed a place in the *sadas* tent where the *soma* is drunk – raises a problem. They normally share in the *dakṣiṇā* distribution, albeit in a minor way.[48] But in the case of a *sattra* – a long-lasting "session" of daily *soma* sacrifices performed by a group of brahmins who are both sacrificers as well as officiants – there is no distribution of *dakṣiṇā*s, because there are no "hired" officiants from outside the group. In this situation, what about the *prasarpaka*s? It is suggested that what they receive does not fall under the *dakṣiṇā* rubric – as visitors they can hardly be "hired" – but is given *dharmamātra*, solely for the sake of *dharma*. This reasoning, however, is rejected on the ground that the gifts they customarily receive are included in the category of *dakṣiṇā*. Being given at the time of *dakṣiṇā* distribution they do indeed belong to the same context. And so the *prasarpaka*s – if there would be any – will have to leave empty-handed.[49] Nevertheless the *pūrvapakṣa* proposition

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[45] *JS.* 10.2.22: *ṛtvigdānaṃ dharmamātrārthaṃ syād dadātisāmarthyāt*. Cf. Ch. Malamoud, "Terminer le sacrifice," in: M. Biardeau and Ch. Malamoud, *Le sacrifice dans l'Inde ancienne*, Paris 1976, pp. 155-198, esp. pp. 179-182. For the reason why the *dakṣiṇā* should not be considered a gift, see Heesterman, *The Broken World of Sacrifice* (cf. n. 1), pp. 209f.; id., "Gift, Marriage and the Denial of Reciprocity," in: *Vidyārṇava-vandanam*: *Essays in Honour of Asko Parpola* (Studia Orientalia 94), Helsinki 2001, pp. 243-255 (esp. pp. 246-249).

[46] See above, n. 15. Similarly Śabara ad *JS.* 2.2.1, see below, n. 64.

[47] See M. Mauss, "Essai sur le don," in: M. Mauss, *Sociologie et anthropologie*, Paris 1950 (reprint), Ch. III, § II.

[48] See *Āpastamba-Śrauta-Sūtra* 13.5.6; *Baudhāyana-Śrauta-Sūtra* 8.6 (p. 241,13) with 21.2 (p. 109,1-5).

[49] *JS.* 10.2.37-38: *syād vā prāsarpikasya* [*dānasya*] *dharmamātratvāt* (37). *na dakṣiṇāśabdāt*, *tasmān nityānuvādaḥ syāt* (38), "There is [an exception], though, because of the *dharmamātra* character of [the gift] for the *prasarpaka*s. No [there is no exception] because the term *dakṣiṇā* [is used]; therefore there is an unbroken confirmation [of the no-*dakṣiṇā* rule]." The previous *sūtra*s (34-36) have pointed out that at a *sattra* there is no installation of officiants (*ṛtvij*), hence no "hiring," nor any *dakṣiṇā* distribution. In the above *sūtra*s it is pro-

is quite reasonable. For further on we find the rule that *dharmamātra* acts also have to be performed in sacrifices, which are derived from an archetype where such acts are functionally prescribed but in their new context appear superfluous.[50] That is why the *prasarpaka* gifts could only be cancelled by arguing that they form part of the *dakṣiṇā* distribution.[51]

A similar problem, immediately following the *prasarpaka* case, concerns the concluding sacrifice (*udavasānīya*) of a *sattra*. Is the *udavasānīya* part of a *sattra* or is it an independent sacrifice? The question affects the *dakṣiṇā* giving. Would it be part of the *sattra* – as it is of the archetypal *soma* sacrifice –, *dakṣiṇā*s would formally not be *dakṣiṇā*s but *dharmamātra* gifts. However, this latter proposition can be easily rejected. The *udavasānīya* is clearly an independent sacrifice, performed separately by each participant who obviously has to "hire" officiants for this occasion; so regular *dakṣiṇā*s are in order.[52]

13

The question of the so-called "bride-price" (*śulka*) addresses the legal capacity of women, more specifically of married women. Since ritualism is in a way the laboratory for legal questions, the starting-point is, of course, woman's entitlement (*adhikāra*) to take part in sacrifice as co-sacrificer alongside her husband – who, conversely, cannot act as a sacrificer without his wife. Sacrifice being based on material property this topic naturally concerns her rights of ownership. In this respect the *śaulka* marriage, in which the bridegroom offers a nuptial gift (*śulka*) to the bride's father, is of crucial importance. Does it amount to a sale, through which the wife legally becomes the property of her husband and therefore incapable of owning and managing property? If so, however, it would ruin the institution of sacrifice which requires

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posed that there is an exception to this rule, namely the *prasarpaka* gifts. The answer, however, is that they come under the *dakṣiṇā* rubric and so are equally excluded. Śabara, on the contrary, holds that the word *dakṣiṇā* refers exclusively to what the officiants receive, so that the *prasarpaka* gifts would not be touched by the no-*dakṣiṇā* rule. To support this interpretation he must twist the use of *na* followed by an ablative, which rejects the previous proposition – *in casu* the exception in favour of the gifts to the *prasarpaka*s –, which Śabara wants to maintain. We noticed similar twists in the commentaries on the *sūtra*s 2.1.9 and 4.1.3.

[50] *JS*. 10.2.62: *kriyā syād dharmamātrāṇām*, "*dharmamātra* acts are [anyway] performed." Cf. *Kātyāyana-Śrauta-Sūtra* 1.8.7: *dharmamātreṣu samuccayo 'virodhe*, "Regarding *dharmamātra* acts there is cumulation, barring conflict [with other rules]." So, unless this would lead to conflict with other rules, *dharmamātra* acts keep the place they occupy in the ritual of the archetype in its variants.

[51] Interestingly, Śabara, commenting on the above *sūtra* (10.2.62), argues that the installation of officiants (*varaṇa*) and the gift – here specified as the gold given to a Brahmin of an Ātreya lineage (*Āpastamba-Śrauta-Sūtra* 13.6.12) but otherwise similar to the *prasarpaka* gifts –, which obviously have no function in a *sattra*, should be maintained as *dharmamātra* acts (*yad dhi varaṇaṃ dānaṃ vā na bhavaty ānatyartham*, *tat svayaṃkartṛke 'pi na virodham upaiti*; *tasmāc codanānugrahāya kriyā syāt*, "Since the installation or the gift are not meant to make [the officiants] inclined [to give their services], even in the case where the sacrifice is performed by the sacrificers themselves – as at a *sattra* – there is no incompatibility. Therefore, the [relevant] act is executed in order to comply with the [original] prescript.") As we shall see further on (§ 13), Śabara intends to give as much scope as possible to the *dharmamātra* acts (and its *apūrva*s). See also next note.

[52] *JS*. 10.2.39-40: *udavasānīyaḥ sattradharmā*, *tadaṅgatvāt tatra dānaṃ dharmamātraṃ syāt* (39). *na tv etatprakṛtitvāt vibhaktacoditatvāc ca* (40), "The concluding sacrifice [comes under] the same rules [as the *sattra*]. … It is not so, because of the [*udavasānīya*'s] archetype and its being separately enjoined." On the concluding sacrifice, see *Āpastamba-Śrauta-Sūtra* 21.3.7. Since the participants have broken up from the *sattra*, they perform the concluding sacrifice (*udavasānīya*) individually so that each has to "hire" his own officiants. In the present case the attempt to enlarge the scope of the *dharmamātra* act fails. The gifts at the concluding sacrifice are simply *dakṣiṇā*s and hence no real gifts in the *dharmamātra* sense. But, as we saw, Śabara tries again to increase the range of *dharmamātra* cases in his commentary on *sūtra* 10.2.62 (see previous note).

the active cooperation of the wife as co-sacrificer.[53] As the long (and rambling) discussion makes clear, sacrifice is a cooperative (*dviyajña*) affair.[54] Apart from the ugly suggestion of selling one's daughter, the denial of woman's proprietary and therefore ritual rights is clearly unacceptable. The obvious way out is then to declare the gift of the *śulka* to be *dharmamātra*, a matter of pure *dharma*.[55]

It is striking, though, that the conclusion is the reverse of the one reached in the case of *dakṣiṇā*. The same argument that excluded the *dakṣiṇā* from being *dharmamātra* – the mundane aim of inducing the brahmin to make his services available – might have been used in the case of the *śulka* too. The purpose might well be to persuade the father to part with his daughter. However, while the *dakṣiṇā*, notwithstanding its hallowed sacrificial context, can easily be argued to be a wage for a service rendered during a short and strictly limited time, marriage cannot possibly be considered a single isolated transaction between the two parties and their families. The *śulka*, defined as a disinterested free gift in the sense of a *dharmamātra* act, can provide a proper foundation to sacrifice as a joint enterprise of husband and wife – a jointness that is absent in the temporary contract between *dakṣiṇā*-giving sacrificer and *dakṣiṇā*-receiving officiant.

The *śaulka* marriage, then, is based on two disinterested gifts that are independent of each other – the father giving his daughter of his own accord, the son-in-law independently giving his *śulka*, both acting in the exclusive interest of pure *dharma*. Cut free from their mundane moorings the lasting mutual prestations are no longer linked with each other. This is, of course, a highly artificial construction. The essential point, however, is that it does justice to the transcendent *dharma*.

14

Having surveyed the occurrences of the term *dharmamātra* in Jaimini's *sūtra*s it is time to summarize our findings. In the first place we noticed that the term characterizes acts, not things. But what is the nature, the special status of these acts? In terms of Jaimini's *sūtra*s the relevant question would be – what is the distinctive *artha*, the aim or purpose of these acts? As there is a "natural," indissoluble connection (*autpattika saṃbandha*) between word and

[53] The ritual and legal position of women (esp. married women) is dealt with at length in *JS*. 6.1.6-24. See Heesterman, "The Sacrificer in Ancient Indian Ritual," *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Südasiens* 44 (2000): 135-155 (esp. pp. 135-144). In general, see Stephanie W. Jamison, *Sacrificed Wife / Sacrificer's Wife*, New York / Oxford 1996, pp. 207-250.

[54] See *JS*. 6.1.22: *dvyādhānaṃ dviyajñavat*, "[The sacrificial fire] is established by both [husband and wife], as in the case of joint sacrifice." The expression *dviyajñavat* – also used to characterize a *sattra* (cf. *JS*. 10.2.42: ... *dviyajñavat sahaprayogaḥ* …) – would mean perfect equality, as among *sattrin*s. Perfect equality is denied but at the same time her (indispensable) participation in her own right is guaranteed by the mention of two prescripts that are typical for the part of the sacrificer and so qualify her as co-sacrificer. See Heesterman, op. cit. (cf. n. 53), pp. 138f. and 143.

[55] *JS*. 6.1.15: *krayasya dharmamātratvam*, "The [alleged] purchase has the character of a *dharmamātra* [act]." Cf. Heesterman, op. cit. (cf. n. 53), p. 126, n. 7; id., op. cit. (cf. n. 45), pp. 246-254. See also Jamison, op. cit. (cf. n. 53), pp. 213-215. The reason for the orthodox brahmanic rejection of the "bride-price" marriage is according to Professor Jamison that a straight "sale" would cut short the chain of mutual prestations. Although in itself true enough, it is not applicable to the case in hand. Exactly brahmanic orthodoxy – whatever actual practice may require – is, as I have argued, the dead opposite of such enduring (as against incidental) ties of mutual obligation. In passing it may be noted – again in spite of what may be actually practiced – that scriptural orthodoxy is not as bleakly anti-feminist as one is usually inclined to think.

meaning, an act is inextricably one with its aim, the act being considered to end when it has achieved its aim. So what is the *artha* of the *dharmamātra* act?[56]

Now acts are of two kinds, as we saw, those that are meant to produce a material object and those that are not so meant. In the first case the act is secondary, subservient (*guṇa*) and the object the aim of the act (*pradhāna*). In the other case the object that may be involved is *guṇa* and the act *pradhāna*. The *dharmamātra* act belongs to the latter category and so is *pradhāna* (*sūtra* 2.1.9). This is helpful but not sufficient. We then learned that the *artha* of the *dharmamātra* act is invisible (*sūtra* 11.1.28). This invisibility is not just a matter of time and distance. The discussions we found on the *dakṣiṇā* and the *śulka* show that something different is involved, something that transcends the phenomenal world. They also show us with uncompromising clarity the dividing line between this world and transcendence. Any aim tainted by worldly interest is excluded from the transcendent realm of the *dharmamātra* act, as the *dakṣiṇā* is.

Viewed in this light the *dharmamātra* act is, as we noticed, closely related to the *utsarga* or *tyāga*, the abandonment of the offering to destruction in the sacrificial fire, and thereby to what is *puruṣārtha*, conducive to man's ultimate good. This ultimate good, we were led to conclude, is the realization of *dharma*. Thus, as the word itself already suggests, the aim or purpose of the *dharmamātra* act is that *artha* that is marked by the Vedic injunction (*codanā*), namely *dharma*. In other words, the act is of the same kind as the main act of sacrifice.

There is, though, a difference. The act of *utsarga* is, of course, an act of pure *dharma*, but this does not mean that other *dharmamātra* acts are equivalent to it. In this respect the expression *prayājavat* we found in *sūtra* 2.1.9 – "In the case of a *dharmamātra* act it is the act [that is the dominant factor], as is the case of the fore-offerings" – is crucial.[57] At the fore-offerings, immediately preceding the main offering, no part of the sacrificial substance is offered. Instead, ghee is poured in the fire. Yet the fore-offerings have the full format of the main offering, including the *tyāga*. On the other hand, nothing is said about their *artha* or result. In leading up to the main offering they may be rated as subservient to it, as they will originally have been, namely inasmuch as they service the fire with ghee in preparation for its receiving the burnt offering.[58] Even though the connection between fore- and main-offering is not made explicit, the expression *prayājavat* is often used to indicate subservient status.

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[56] Clooney views the meaning of the *dharmamātra* act as "purely relation-making." It does "nothing more than establish a certain relationship within the sacrifice, linking two elements in a specific fashion at a certain point" (*Thinking Ritually* [cf. n. 2], p. 157; "Dharmamātra Karma" [cf. n. 2], p. 160.). As a description this is serviceable, but as an explanation it will not do. It does not go beyond the outward appearance of the ritual and neglects what for Jaimini was its *artha*, the "invisible" purpose that cannot be known by human means but only through the scriptural *codanā*. It is in this sense that the term *dharmamātra* – in full *dharmamātrārtha* (as in *sūtra* 10.2.22) – is to be understood.

[57] The expression *prayājavat* is not commented upon by Śabara. Clooney suggests that it might be a later addition ("Dharmamātra Karma," [cf. n. 2], p. 167, n. 19). But even if so, the addition need not be "erroneous," but rather specifying the *sūtra*'s meaning.

[58] The *tyāga* appears to have proliferated. Thus it was also inserted in the *sāmidhenī* ritual of fuelling the fire with wood – as the fire is equally serviced with ghee by the *prayāja*s. A. Hillebrandt (*Das altindische Neu- und Vollmondsopfer*, Jena 1880, pp. 77, n. 2, and 85, n. 4) mentions only later sources (*prayoga*s) for this insertion. The commentary on *Kātyāyana-Śrauta-Sūtra* 3.2.1 says that each offering, even simple libations (*homa*), should be accompanied by the *tyāga*. In this way these acts are made into separate acts independent of the main sacrificial act – a point that we shall return to further on.

In this way the *prayāja*s are characteristic *dharmamātra* acts, on the one hand equal in form to the main offering and, one may assume, having their own "invisible" result; on the other hand, paradoxically, subordinate to it.

15

This paradoxical status makes the *dharmamātra* act an acute illustration of the ambiguity of *dharma*. Here our investigation comes full circle. As argued at the start, the *dharma* fully shares in the ambiguous "brokenness of sacrifice."[59] This comes out clearly in the double aspect of *dharma*. There is the notion of an ill-defined but coherent whole, closed and cut off from the world, its only clear characteristic being the rejection of worldly interests. Its terrestrial counterpart, the ritualistic *dharma*, is its exact opposite. Where the transcendent *dharma* is ill-defined but coherent, its terrestrial representative is a countless plurality of disconnected *dharma*s. Instead of being closed and impervious to worldly needs the atomized *dharma*s allow an all but endless variety of ritual constructions meant to answer these worldly needs.

How is this welter of acts, objects, qualities and *mantra*s to be reduced to a coherent whole? Jaimini offers a cyclical design of cohesion. Dealing with the nature of subservient elements – here called *śeṣa*, "remainder," and defined as having their purpose (*artha*) in the next element – he points out that the sacrificial acts (*karmāṇi*), their result (*phala*) and man (*puruṣa*) should also be considered to be *śeṣa*s. The sacrificial act is *śeṣa* because it is aimed at the result (*phalārthatvāt*), the result because it is directed at man (*puruṣārthatvāt*) and, finally, man again finds his purpose in the sacrificial act (*karmārthatvāt*).[60] Each element is in turn both *śeṣa* and *artha*.

This cyclical design, turning on ever-shifting *artha*, seems to hark back to the archaic pattern of a cycle of ever-repeated sacrificial exchanges between contending parties.[61] This internally coherent cyclical pattern was broken up, its broken parts were reorganized in a linear arrangement and its two poles, the contending parties, collapsed into the single sacrificer of classical *śrauta* ritual. As the cyclical exchanges were broken up, so was the original coherence. The cyclical concatenation was replaced by a linear sequence of independent elements with no other connection with each other than their place in the sequence by virtue of scriptural prescript. Hence the *sūtra* immediately following the *śeṣa–artha* cycle offers the counterthesis. Not *artha*, providing an organic and cyclical coherence, but prescript, laying down the linear sequence, provides the unity of the ritual.[62] The organic unity was replaced with an artificial one based on regulation.

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[59] See above, § 3.

[60] *JS.* 3.1.1-7: *athātaḥ śeṣalakṣaṇam* (1). *śeṣaḥ parārthatvāt* (2). *dravyaguṇasaṃskāreṣu bādariḥ* (3). *karmāṇy api jaiminiḥ phalārthatvāt* (4). *phalaṃ puruṣārthatvāt* (5). *puruṣaś ca karmārthatvāt* (6). *teṣām arthena saṃbandhaḥ* (7). The last *sūtra* (7) underlines the constituent function of *artha* – the *śeṣa*s are all connected with *artha*. See Heesterman, op. cit. (cf. n. 53), pp. 150f.

[61] On the cyclical nature of archaic sacrifice, cf. Heesterman, *The Broken World of Sacrifice* (cf. n. 1), pp. 38-40.

[62] *JS.* 3.1.8: *vihitas tu sarvadharmaḥ syāt saṃyogato 'viśeṣāt prakaraṇāc ca*. "[The connection] that is laid down concerns all elements because there is no difference as regards their being joined together and because of their context." So, in contrast to the previous *sūtra* (7) it is here maintained that not *artha* but *vidhi*, regulation, is decisive for the inner connections of the ritual. This extreme thesis is then countered by stating that *artha* cannot be ruled out for there is no (sacrificial) act without purpose or aim (*sūtra* 9, *arthalopād akarma syāt*). But this appears to refer to the main sacrificial act and its invisible *phala*, "fruit," as made clear by *sūtra* 10: *phalaṃ saha ceṣṭayā*; *śabdārtho 'bhāvād viprayoge syāt*, "[Normally] the 'fruit' comes together

Basically this means that the undivided *dharma*, when coming down from its transcendent haven to manifest itself in the terrestrial garb of sacrificial ritual, can do so only when atomized into a plurality of disconnected *dharma*s. This, one might say, is the fatality, that, as Louis Dumont suggested,[63] befalls the *dharma* when it descends from on high to rule the world through the *codanā*.

16

The atomized condition of the *dharma* is, as one may expect, directly reflected in – even aggravated by – the *dharmamātra* act. Thus Śabara, in his commentary on *sūtra* 2.2.1, views the three sacrificial acts – sacrificing, libation and (disinterested) gift (*yajati*, *juhoti*, *dadāti*) – as disparate entities. They are all three based on abandoning (*utsarga*) and accordingly are aimed at a transcendent result. In Śabara's language each has its own *apūrva*, its capacity to bring about this transcendent result.[64] In other words, they are all three *dharmamātra* acts, occurring within the compass of a single sacrifice. Clearly the case for the unity of sacrificial ritual is dubious.

In terms of *apūrva* the principle of unity is either one collective *apūrva*, arising from the conglomerate of the various acts taken *en bloc*, or only from the main act, other sacrificial acts being subservient. Śabara takes the first proposition as *pūrvapakṣa* and the latter as the concluding *siddhānta*, but it is significant that he does not explicitly reject the *pūrvapakṣa*.[65] Apparently he did not feel quite sure. At any rate, the various acts are not organically linked to each other.

We encounter the same problem again in connection with preparatory acts (*saṃskāra*). The *sūtra*s 9.1.1-3 state that such acts, as one will expect, are subservient to the (main) sacrificial act. Their details in turn are subservient to the preparatory act. The latter proposition, however, is rejected in favour of lumping the *saṃskāra* and its details together as being *en bloc* subservient to the (main) sacrificial act – a proposition we also found in the previous case as *pūrvapakṣa*. Śabara, however, after commenting on the relevant *sūtra* 9.1.3 in this sense, makes a volte-face and ends by positing separate subsidiary transcendent results (*aparamāpūrva*), which remain intact next to the main one (the *paramāpūrva*).[66]

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with the act, in case [act and 'fruit'] are disjoined the purpose [is fulfilled through] the authoritative word, because [an immediate result] is absent." For the immediate connection act–result and the role of *śabdārtha*, see above n. 30. It may be noted that the *sūtra*s 2-7 when understood in a linear sense can mean either a conglomeration of the successive *artha*s in a single, final one or a break-up into a multiplicity of *artha*s. On the divergence of perspective, see below, n. 66.

[63] See above, § 3, sub fine.

[64] Śabara, commenting on *JS*. 2.2.1 (*śabdāntare karmabhedaḥ kṛtānubandhatvāt*, "The use of a different word [means] a separate act because of [the act's] implications"), points out the similarity and the difference of the three sacrificial verbs *yajati*, *juhoti* and *dadāti*, as he also does ad *JS*. 4.2.28. See above n. 15. For Śabara this means separate *apūrva*s. It should be noted that *juhoti*, "to make a libation," is also part of the *yajati* act. What is meant here is the libation (*homa*) as a separate act.

[65] See Śabara summarizing his commentary on *JS*. 2.2.1: *pūrvapakṣe samudāyād apūrvam*, *siddhānte tu yāgasya phalavattvād itarayor guṇabhāvaḥ*, "The *pūrvapakṣa* holds that the *apūrva* [arises] from the aggregate [of the separate acts]; the *siddhānta*, however, is that the two other acts [gift and libation] are subservient, because it is the [definitive] sacrificing act that produces the 'fruit' of sacrifice."

[66] *JS*. 9.1.1-3: *yajñakarma pradhānam*, *tad dhi codanābhūtam*, *tasya dravyeṣu saṃskāras tatprayuktas tadarthatvāt* (1). *saṃskāre yujyamānānāṃ tādarthyāt tatprayuktaṃ syāt* (2). *tena tv arthena yajñasya saṃyogād dharmasaṃbandhaḥ*, *tasmād yajñaprayuktaṃ saṃskārasya tadarthatvāt* (3), "The act of sacrifice is the predominant element, because it is brought about by the call to sacrifice; the preparation spent on the materials of

Although Śabara makes his preference for a disparate plurality of acts and *apūrva*s clear, he can do no better than put the opposite theses next to each other. There is no unequivocal solution to the dilemma of the ritual's unity.

17

Here we come upon a rift between Jaimini's *sūtra*s and Śabara's commentary. At one end we find Jaimini holding back the tendency to multiply the transcendent effects, in Śabara's language the *apūrva*s. Or, as an unnamed opponent of Śabara soundly puts it: "The assumption of the benefit of unseen results should be kept to a minimum ... In case one assumes an unseen result, only one *apūrva* will be assumed to arise from the aggregate of acts, because it is on account of the whole of its parts that sacrifice fulfils its purpose."[67] Thus we saw Jaimini reject the ascription of *dharmamātra* status to the gifts of the *prasarpaka*s. In a similar vein he proposes to subsume all sacrificial acts and their transcendent effects under one undifferentiated whole.[68]

Śabara on the other hand positively appears to welcome the proliferation of *apūrva*s of the sacrificial acts that are part of the same ritual complex. This comes out clearly in his treatment of the sacrificial acts (commentary on 2.2.1) and the recognition of subsidiary *apūrva*s (ad 9.1.3). Similarly we saw him argue, against the *sūtra*, for the *dharmamātra* status of the *prasarpaka* gifts (ad 10.2.38). Also his final conclusion on the crucial *adhikaraṇa* 2.1.9-12, where he implicitly concedes the *pradhāna* character of the *dharmamātra* acts, points in the same direction.

The background of this serious dissension would seem to be the fundamental – because irresolvable – tension between mundane and transcendent *dharma*. The arena where this tension is fully exposed is sacrifice. Hence the irredeemable fragility of sacrificial ritual.

The ritual of sacrifice seemingly pretends to be the exact image of transcendent *dharma*. Closed and set apart from the surrounding world it does indeed exhibit confident signs of this pretension. But then, how should it confront the world and be accessible to man? It does so, as we have seen, by being broken up into a plurality of independent *dharma*s. In fact, they are the broken fragments of the archaic sacrifice that could still unite the mundane and the ultramundane in a cyclical pattern and did not yet admit the linearity that is broken in the middle by the gap of transcendence.

It is at this point of rupture that the *dharmamātra* act is crucial. It opens the bounded material world of ritual to the "invisible" realm of immaterial transcendence by puncturing the hard but fragile carapace of ritualistic regulation that holds the disparate mass of *dharma*s to-

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sacrifice is occasioned by it, because it has that [act of sacrifice] as its purpose (1). Since the materials used in the preparation have that [preparation] as their purpose, they are occasioned by it (2). However, by virtue of their relation with sacrifice the [preliminary] details are connected with that pupose [*sc*. sacrifice]; hence the [preliminary detail] is occasioned by sacrifice, because the preparation has that [sacrifice] as its aim (3)." This tells us that in Jaimini's view, there is no functional hierarchy of acts; all acts of the sacrificial complex are integrated through each of them being directly connected with the central sacrificial act that is explicitly enjoined by the *codanā*. Śabara on the other hand – in the fourth part of his commentary on *JS*. 9.1.3 – turns against this view. Instead he argues for subsidiary, "non-ultimate" (*aparama*) *apūrva*s. These, however, are not absorbed in the ultimate *apūrva* (*paramāpūrva*) but remain independently valid.

[67] See Śabara ad *JS*. 2.2.1 (p. 3): *adṛṣṭānām upakārakalpanālpīyasī nyayyeti*. ... *adṛṣṭe kalpyamāne 'vayavānāṃ samudāyaṃ praty arthavattvād ekam apūrvaṃ samuccayāt kalpitaṃ bhaviṣyati*.

[68] *JS*. 9.1.3. See above, n. 66.

gether. By the same token, however, the proliferation of *dharmamātra* acts threatens to dissolve the ritual's unity. But both Jaimini's attempts to limit the range of *dharmamātra* acts and amalgamate them, so as to bring about a single transcendent result, as well as Śabara's differentiation in a single main *apūrva* as against many subservient *apūrva*s, are equally dubious.[69] Neither can offer a satisfactory solution. Unresolved ambiguity, then, is still the password.

18

But what about man? Setting sacrifice in motion he is the dynamic factor. Called upon to sacrifice he is *karmārtha*, "having the work of sacrifice as his aim." Conversely, sacrifice is *puruṣārtha*, fulfilling man's ultimate aim, the realization of *dharma*.[70] If this sounds inextricably involute, conflating man, sacrifice, *artha* and *dharma*, the reason is that it is meant to be.

With the break-up of the archaic bipolar pattern of cyclically recurrent contest the uncertainty, each time, of its outcome was replaced with the certainty of unresolved ambiguity. The contending parties cyclically exchanging the burden and the benefit of sacrifice have collapsed into the single sacrificer. Put differently, the now single sacrificer internalizes sacrifice. Executing the *tyāga*, the act of abandonment, he comes to terms with the ambiguity of sacrifice and so realizes the *dharma* in his inner Self. Or, as the *Śatapatha-Brāhmaṇa* asserts, "sacrifice is the *ātman*, the Self."[71] In it all comes together.

The sacrificer and his apparent antagonist, the renouncer, differ only in the world-renouncing radicalism of the latter. They find each other in the *tyāga* of Vedic sacrifice.[72]

[69] The notion of a transcendent effect being transcended by another such effect is, of course, doubtful. Hence it is stated that it remains valid in its own right. But this clearly puts the unity of the sacrifice's ritual in jeopardy. The opposite view – each element directly connected with the main act (and its *apūrva*) – is no less doubtful. It deprives the subsidiary sacrifice of its scripturally guaranteed transcendent effect. Why then go through the protracted trouble of the complex ritual? Both views make the appeal to the iron rule of transcendent prescript all the more unavoidable.

[70] *JS.* 3.1.5-6. See above, n. 60.

[71] Cf. Heesterman, "Feuer, Seele und Unsterblichkeit," in: G. Oberhammer (ed.), *Im Tod gewinnt der Mensch sein Selbst*, Vienna 1995, pp. 27-42, at p. 28.

[72] Cf. Heesterman, "Puruṣārtha," in F.X. D'Sa and R. Mesquita (eds.), *Hermeneutics of Encounter*, Vienna 1994 (= Festschrift Gerhard Oberhammer), pp. 137-151, at pp. 148-150.

Kunio Harikai

The Mīmāṃsā Interpretation of the Particle *Hi* in Brāhmaṇa Literature: Is *Anumāna* Possible in the Veda?*

Following upon *Mīmāṃsāsūtra* (*MS*) 2.1.32 (*taccodakeṣu mantrākhyā* "The appellation *mantra* applies to instances of instigation of that [i.e., application]"), *sūtra* 33 attempts to define the scope of the term *brāhmaṇa* as follows: "To the remainder the word *brāhmaṇa* applies" (*śeṣe brāhmaṇaśabdaḥ*). As this *sūtra* does not explicate any instances of *brāhmaṇa*, Śabarasvāmin (henceforth Śabara), after providing a short word-by-word explanation of the *sūtra*, introduces the Vṛttikāra's view on the various types of *brāhmaṇa*. The Vṛttikāra enumerates twelve items which may constitute a *brāhmaṇa*: (1) something abounding in the particle *iti*; (2) something containing the phrase "so he says"; (3) something anecdotal; (4) a reason; (5) an explanation; (6) a depreciation; (7) a eulogy; (8) a doubt; (9) an injunction; (10) something done by another person; (11) ancient history; (12) an assumption of transposition. Śabara thereafter introduces two verses stating ten outward types of *brāhmaṇa* which may be part of an older Mīmāṃsā tradition. In these verses three items of the above list (i.e., [1], [2] and [3]) are missing and one new item, namely, *upamāna* "analogy," is added.[1]

According to the above passage of the Vṛttikāra, a Brāhmaṇa may consist of statements belonging to ten or twelve categories, such as *hetu*, etc. The illustrative sentence for the category *hetu* proposed by the Vṛttikāra is *śūrpeṇa juhoti*, *tena hy annaṃ kriyate* ("She offers an oblation by means of a winnowing basket (*śūrpa*), because food is prepared by means of it"). The reason why the Vṛttikāra chose this two-phrase sentence as an illustration is obviously the fact that its latter phrase contains the particle *hi*, which often denotes a reason. Consequently, the Vṛttikāra teaches us that the particle *hi* in the above Brāhmaṇa passage expresses the reason for the sacrificial action, namely, an offering with a winnowing basket (*śūrpahoma*) prescribed in the preceding prescriptive passage. At first sight this does not seem to be problematic. However, is it self-evident that in this case the particle *hi* denotes the reason for the *śūrpahoma* and that in general there should be a sentence that expresses the reason of some action to be performed that is prescribed in a prescriptive sentence? What is the true purport of a sentence stating the reason or grounds for a prescription?

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[1] *Śābarabhāṣya* (*ŚBh*) pp. 436,7-437,1: *vṛttikāras tu śiṣyahitārthaṃ prapañcitavān – itikaraṇabahulam*, *ityāhopanibaddham*, *ākhyāyikāsvarūpam*, *hetuḥ* (*śūrpeṇa juhoti*, *tena hy annaṃ kriyata iti*), *nirvacanam* (*tad dadhno dadhitvam*), *nindā* (*upavītā vā etasyāgnayaḥ*), *praśaṃsā* (*vāyur vai kṣepiṣṭhā devateti*), *saṃśayaḥ* (*hotavyaṃ gārhapatye na hotavyam iti*), *vidhiḥ* (*yajamānasammitodambarī bhavati*), *parakṛtiḥ* (*māṣān eva mahyaṃ pacatīti*), *purākalpaḥ* (*ulmukair ha sma pūrve samājagmur iti*), *vyavadhāraṇakalpanā* (*yāvato 'śvān pratigṛhṇīyād iti*).

> *hetur nirvacanaṃ nindā praśaṃsā saṃśayo vidhiḥ |*
> *parakriyā purākalpo vyavadhāraṇakalpanā ||*
> *upamānaṃ daśaite tu vidhayo brāhmaṇasya tu |*
> *etad vai sarvavedeṣu niyataṃ vidhilakṣaṇam ||.*

Karin Preisendanz (ed.), *Expanding and Merging Horizons*: *Contributions to South Asian and Cross-Cultural Studies in Commemoration of Wilhelm Halbfass*, Wien: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 2007, pp. 303-313.

Jaimini, the author of the *Mīmāṃsāsūtra*, may have composed as an answer to such questions, a topical section named *Hetuvannigada*[2] *Adhikaraṇa*, the third in the second section of the first volume (*adhyāya* 1, *pāda* 2, *adhikaraṇa* 3) of the *Mīmāṃsāsūtra*, which is part of a series of discussions starting with a topical section on the meaning of *arthavāda* (*adhyāya* 1, *pāda* 2, *adhikaraṇa* 1). Jaimini's answer to the first two questions formulated above is negative. Regarding the first question in particular, Jaimini unambiguously denies the possibility of a causal function of *hi*. The views of Jaimini and the Vṛttikāra thus seem to be contradictory. It is therefore necessary to examine whether the particle *hi* in Brāhmaṇa literature really expresses the reason for a prescription or not, and what the true purport of the particle is in such cases.

In the following I shall investigate these questions and attempt to throw some light on Śabara's *Bhāṣya* and then on Bhaṭṭa Kumārila's *Tantravārttika* (*TV*) on the *Hetuvannigada Adhikaraṇa*. Generally speaking, in the *Weltanschauung* of the Brāhmaṇa period (ca. 1000-700 BC), the particle *hi* appears originally to have been used to denote the reason for a prescription of some action or for the pronouncement of certain *mantra*s, reflecting the magico-ritualistic way of thinking of the Brāhmaṇa priests who composed those works. In the Sūtra period (ca. 400 BC onward) a kind of rationalism akin to ours seems to develop. Consequently, the following study may contribute to clarifying our knowledge of the different views on causality of the priestly thinkers belonging to these two epochs.

1. I shall first briefly explain the *Hetuvannigada Adhikaraṇa* by introducing the *Bhāṣya* by Śabara, whose date is uncertain but may be placed around the fifth or sixth century AD. The section has only one *pūrvapakṣasūtra*, i.e., *MS* 1.2.26: "Or it would be a reason because of its having significance and suitability" (*hetur vā syād arthavattvopapattibhyām*). To explicate this *sūtra* Śabara cites the same Brāhmaṇa passage that is cited by the Vṛttikāra under *sūtra* 2.1.32 as an illustration (*udāharaṇavākya*, *viṣayavākya*) meant to corroborate the *pūrvapakṣasūtra*: *śūrpeṇa juhoti*, *tena hy annaṃ kriyate*.[3] With regard to the passage *tena hy annaṃ kriyate* Śabara expresses the following doubt (*saṃśaya*): Is this passage just praising the *śūrpahoma* or does it state a reason for its performance? If the latter is the case, the particle *hi*

[2] The term *hetuvannigada* seems to refer to a prose sentence denoting a pseudo-reason. It is unclear to me why the term *nigada* is employed here. On the meaning of *nigada*, see Einoo 1985.

[3] In the *Varuṇapraghāsa* section of the *Śatapathabrāhmaṇa* (*ŚBr*) (2.5.2.23) one finds the injunction *śūrpeṇa juhoti* ("She performs a *homa* [of *karambha* leaves in the southern fire] by means of a winnowing basket"), followed by the sentence *śūrpeṇa hy aśanaṃ kriyate* ("because food is prepared by means of a winnowing basket"). Concerning the performer of the *śūrpahoma*, different opinions are expressed in the Saṃhitās (and Śrautasūtras). According to the *ŚBr*, the performer must be the wife (*patnī*) of the *yajamāna*; cf. Einoo 1988: 112-114. See *ŚBr* (Mādhyandina recension) 2.5.2.23: *pātrāṇi bhavanti*, *pātreṣu hy aśanam aśyate*, *yavamayāni bhavanti*, *yavān hi jakṣuṣīr varuṇo 'gṛhṇāt*, *śūrpeṇa juhoti*, *śūrpeṇa hy aśanaṃ kriyate*, *patnī juhoti*, *mithunād evaitad varuṇapāśāt prajāḥ pramuñcati* (cf. also Oertel 1930: 8, n. 1, and Garge 1952: 119). Eggeling translates the relevant sentence as follows: "From the winnowing basket she offers, because food is prepared by means of the winnowing basket" (Eggeling 1882: 398). Kumārila refers to this *udāharaṇavākya* in his *TV*: *iha ye hetuvan nigadyante hiśabdādibhir na ca* (*TV* [*OX*] omits *ca*) *paramārthahetavas ta udāharaṇam* (*TV* p. 138,22). Someśvara comments on *paramārthahetavaḥ* in this *TV* passage: *na ca paramārthahetava ity anena hetuvad iti vater vyāvartyaṃ darśitam – caturgṛhītāny ājyāni bhavanti*, *na hy atrānuyājān yakṣyan bhavati* (*ŚBr* 3.4.1.18) *ityādayaḥ paramārthahetavaḥ. ātithyeṣṭāv anuyājābhāve 'py aṣṭāv upabhṛti gṛhṇātīti prakṛtau vihitasyopabhṛtyaṣṭagṛhītasya codakaprāptasya nivṛttyarthaṃ caturgṛhītatve vidhīyamāne 'nuyājābhāvasya hetutvābhidhānād yatra yatrānuyājābhāvas tatra tatrāṣṭagṛhītābhāva iti jñāyate. prakṛtau cāṣṭagrahasya catuṣṭvadvayalakṣaṇārthatvadyotanāt prayājārthaṃ juhvāṃ samānayane niyogato 'rdham eva samānetavyam iti jñāyate* (*Nyāyasudhā* [*NS*] p. 82,18-25). In the present paper I shall not discuss *paramārthahetu* passages.

should be interpreted as expressing a reason, which is the *pūrvapakṣin*'s view. Śabara explains this with the terse phrase *hetuḥ syād annakaraṇaṃ homasya.* The meaning of this passage is rather vague. I suggest the following rendering: "The [winnowing basket's being a] utensil for the preparing of food (*annakaraṇa*) is a reason for the (*śūrpa-*)*homa*." According to the *pūrvapakṣin* the purport of the whole illustrative sentence would thus be: Because food is prepared by means of a winnowing basket (*śūrpa*), one should offer the *homa* by means of a winnowing basket. Śabara clarifies this *pūrvapakṣa* by presenting three criticisms.

(1) It is impossible to state the reason for something whose causality is beyond ordinary understanding (*nanv aprasiddhe kāryakāraṇabhāve na hetūpadeśaḥ*).

To this argument the *pūrvapakṣin* replies: Although it is true in ordinary experience (*loke*) that a reason is stated when the causal relation is established, in the present context the reason will be directly settled in the Veda (*satyam evaṃ loke*, *vidhāyiṣyate tu vacanena vede*). Śabara explicates the causal relation in this case as follows: When the *homa* is to be performed by means of a winnowing basket, the reason is that it (i.e., a winnowing basket) is one of the instruments used for preparing food (*śūrpeṇa home kartavye 'nnakaraṇaṃ hetuḥ*). As the performance of the *homa* is the action to be achieved, it is appropriate to understand the compound *kāryakāraṇabhāva* as referring to the relation of an action to be achieved (*kārya*) and its motivation (*kāraṇa*).

(2) The *pūrvapakṣin* is questioned about the purpose (*prayojana*) of the Veda's stating a reason for some action to be performed. The *pūrvapakṣin* replies to this from his own point of view: By pointing out a reason for (i.e., cause of) the *śūrpahoma* the Veda teaches that the *homa* can also be performed by means of other implements, e.g., a ladle (*darvī*), a pan (*piṭhara*), etc., which are equally instruments for preparing food (*anyad api darvīpiṭharādy annakaraṇaṃ yat*, *tenāpi nāma kathaṃ homaḥ kriyata iti*). In other words, the *pūrvapakṣin* contends that the latter phrase of the illustrative sentence is a prescription (*vidhi*) that makes the performer of the *homa* procure an instrument in general for the *homa*, meaning that the *homa* is to be performed by means of whatever implements may be useful for preparing food. As regards this interpretation of the illustrative sentence, the *pūrvapakṣin* points out that the possibility of preparing food in general is indicated by the present tense of the verb *kriyate* ("is prepared"), because at the time the *homa* is performed by means of some implement, such as a winnowing basket, etc., food is not observed to be prepared by this instrument.[4]

The *pūrvapakṣin* further contends that although according to the above explication the particle *hi* is to be understood in its direct, primary sense (*śruti*), it naturally follows that the particle would function indirectly (*lakṣaṇā*) should it be explained as denoting a eulogy (*stuti*) of the *śūrpahoma*. Śabara refers to this with the statement *hetau ca śrutiḥ śabdaḥ*, *stutau lakṣaṇā*. An indirect function could be understood if the particle *hi* first expresses its affirmative sense "verily" (i.e., *avadhāraṇa*) and then causes us to understand a eulogy by way of this affirmation. However, in the exegetical system of the Mīmāṃsā it is preferred that a word in the Veda be explained as being used in its primary sense, rather than in an indirect function. Because of this exegetical criterion the *pūrvapakṣin* maintains that his interpretation is preferable to that of the *siddhāntin*.

(3) It is objected that a ladle (*darvī*), a pan (*piṭhara*), etc., should not be called implements for preparing food (*annakaraṇa*) because they do not prepare food directly. To this the *pūr-*

[4] *ŚBh* p. 139,4-6: *tasyāpy annakriyāyām arthavattā*, *śakyate ca tenāpy annaṃ kartum*. *etad dhi kriyata ity ucyate*. *na hi vartamānakālaḥ kaścid asti yasyāyaṃ pratinirdeśaḥ*.

vapakṣin replies: If it, i.e., the ladle, the pot, etc., would be of no use, the praise of the winnowing basket would be useless because it would be just as useless as the ladle, the pan, etc., inasmuch as it does not prepare food directly, and consequently it would be useless to eulogize the winnowing basket.[5]

The *siddhānta* of the *Hetuvannigada Adhikaraṇa* consists of four *sūtra*s (*MS* 1.2.27-30), with the second *sūtra* formulated as a question of the *pūrvapakṣin* directed at the *siddhāntin*. The first *sūtra* of the *siddhāntin* unambiguously asserts the meaning of the particle *hi* as expressing a eulogy (*stuti*): "(It is not a declaration of a reason) but a eulogy (of the *śūrpahoma*), because [in this case] it is based on Vedic words. In addition, there is no prescription of it" (*MS* 1.2.27: *stutis tu śabdapūrvatvād acodanā ca tasya*). Śabara does not positively assert the standpoint of the *siddhāntin* under this *sūtra*, but just refers to *śabdapūrvatvāt* and *acodanā ca tasya* in this *sūtra*. According to him, these two phrases show that the Veda teaches the reason not of a *homa* performed by means of a ladle, a pan, etc., but just of the *śūrpahoma* (*śabdaś cānnakaraṇaṃ śūrpahome hetur ity āha na ca darvīpiṭharahome*).

Under *sūtra* 29 (*arthas tu vidhiśeṣatvād yathā loke*) Śabara maintains that the passage including the particle *hi* is an *arthavāda* expressing a eulogy (*stuti*) of the *śūrpahoma* and that thereby the passage becomes subservient to the injunction *śūrpeṇa juhoti* (*vidhiśeṣa*), a situation which is similar to situations in ordinary experience (*yathā loke*). The question of how we are able to understand the sentence at issue as a eulogy is answered by Śabara as follows:

> Conformity with Vedic words expressing a eulogy is [to be understood] as follows: Just as we know (*jānīmaḥ*) [in ordinary experience] that food is prepared by means of a winnowing basket, it is certainly understood (*gamyate*) [by the Vedic words] that food is prepared by means of a winnowing basket.[6]

In interpreting the passage as an *arthavāda*, there arises no problem regarding the present tense of the verbal form *kriyate* because the present tense is usually employed in *arthavāda*s. Śabara thus explains *siddhāntasūtra* 1.3.29 as follows:

> Furthermore, in this case the Veda teaches something which is not present as being present, with the intention to eulogize it. In the case of your (i.e., the *pūrvapakṣin*'s) viewpoint a fault would ensue for you [who claims] the prescription of a reason because in the prescription a different word-meaning cannot be understood. And the Veda would not teach something which is possible by referring to it as being present.[7]

The third *siddhāntasūtra* reads: *yadi hetur avatiṣṭheta nirdeśāt*, *sāmānyād iti ced avyavasthā vidhīnāṃ syāt* (*MS* 1.2.30). Śabara explains this *sūtra*: Even if the reason, namely being an implement for the preparation of food, also belongs to a ladle, a pan, etc., (which therefore would have the same capacity as a winnowing basket), only a winnowing basket would remain, i.e., there would result the restriction that only a winnowing basket is to be used in the *homa*. Although we certainly understand from the Vedic words that the reason (for the performance of the *homa*) is the preparation of food, the Vedic words prescribe the preparation

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[5] *ŚBh* pp. 139,6-140,3: *yadi ca darvīpiṭharādi na sākṣād annaṃ karotīti nānnakaraṇam ity ucyate*, *vyarthe tasmiñ śūrpastutir anarthikā syāt*. *śūrpam api hi na sākṣād annaṃ karotīti tena vinārthena śūrpasya stutir nopapadyate*.

[6] *ŚBh* p. 141,1-3: *saṃvādaś ca stutivacanatvena yathā vayaṃ śūrpeṇānnaṃ kriyamāṇaṃ jānīmas tathā śūrpeṇānnaṃ kriyata ity eva gamyate*.

[7] *ŚBh* p. 141,3-5: *tadā cāvartamānaṃ stotuṃ vartamānam ity upadiśati*. *tvatpakṣa eṣa doṣaḥ*, *yasya te hetuvidhiḥ*. *vidhau hi na paraḥ śabdārthaḥ pratīyate*. *na ca vartamānam upadiśan vedaḥ śakyam arthaṃ vidadhyāt*.

of food only by means of a winnowing basket and not by means of a ladle, a pan, etc.[8] Thus the Vedic words convey to us that one should offer the oblation by means of a winnowing basket because food is prepared by means of it. Śabara paraphrases the *sūtra* passage *sāmānyād iti ced avyavasthā vidhīnāṃ syāt* as follows:

> If it be held that "what is meant is that by whatever thing – even other than the Winnowing Basket – food is prepared, even indirectly, – with that the *Homa* should be offered," – then, in that case there would be an indefiniteness in the Injunction; for there is nothing which, either directly or indirectly, does not help in the preparation of food.[9] (tr. Jha 1974: 72)

The term *sāmānyāt* (because of commonness or universality) in the *sūtra* should be understood to mean that a ladle, a pan, etc., have the same capacity as a winnowing basket inasmuch as food can equally be prepared by means of them. In other words, under these circumstances there arises an option (*vikalpa*), which is a serious fault in the exegetical system of the Mīmāṃsā, between the following injunctions: *śūrpeṇa juhoti*, *darvyā juhoti*, *piṭhareṇa juhoti*, etc. The injunctive passage of the illustrative sentence *śūrpeṇa juhoti* would thus lose its direct denotation and significance as a *vidhi*.

Although it may seem that, from the point of view of the *siddhāntin*, the passage including the particle *hi* is just a description of the fact (*vṛttāntānvākhyāna*) that a winnowing basket is an implement for preparing food, the true purport of the passage is not to provide this information about the winnowing basket, but to induce (*pra-√ruc*) the wife of the sacrificer to offer an oblation with a winnowing basket. As established in the *Arthavāda Adhikaraṇa* (*MS* 1.2, *Adhikaraṇa* 1), inducement (*prarocanā*) of the sacrificer to perform the sacrifice is the main function of an *arthavāda* passage which is preceded by a prescriptive sentence (*vidhi*). When it is preceded by a prohibitive sentence (*pratiṣedha* or *niṣedha*), an *arthavāda* expresses blame (*nindā*) concerning the prohibited action and thus causes a person to abstain from performing this act.

2. In contrast to the treatment by Śabara or even Prabhākara, the special feature of Kumārila's interpretation of this topical section in his *Tantravārttika* is its explication by means of technical terms of inference (*anumāna*) which had become established by his time. This is not surprising because the discussion, particularly from the *pūrvapakṣin*'s point of view, mainly involves an assertion and its grounds. In the following I shall focus my argument on the logical questions discussed by Kumārila in the *Hetuvannigada Adhikaraṇa*, although he refers to many other problems concerning Mīmāṃsā exegesis in this context.

Summarizing the *pūrvapakṣin*'s view, which is based on the interpretation of the particle *hi* as indicating a reason for the *śūrpahoma*, Kumārila offers the following interpretation: One should offer an oblation by means of any implement suitable for the preparation of food (*yad yad annakaraṇaṃ tena tena juhoti*).[10] Referring to this universal proposition implied in the

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[8] *ŚBh* p. 142,5-7: *yady api ca bhaved annakaraṇaṃ hetur darvīpiṭharaprakārāṇāṃ tathāpi śūrpa evāvatiṣṭheta. śabdād annakaraṇaṃ hetur iti vijñāyate. śabdaś ca śūrpasyāha na darvīpiṭharādīnām.*

[9] *ŚBh* p. 143,2-4: *atha matam, yena yenānnaṃ kriyate praṇāḍyā śūrpād anyenāpi, tena tenāpi homaḥ kriyata iti, avyavasthā vidhīnāṃ syāt.* (*na kenacit praṇādyā nānnaṃ kriyate.*) On the last Sanskrit passage see Jha's comments and his translation in Jha 1974: 72.

[10] *TV* p. 139,13-18: *atha vodāhṛtaviṣayahetulakṣaṇam eva* (acc. to *TV* [*IO*]) *etat. avinābhāvo hy anekakāryakāraṇasvasvāmisahacarabhāvādiprabhedabhinnaḥ, tatrānnakaraṇatā home* (*TV* [*OX*]: *homa-*) *hetutvenocyamānā* (*TV* [*OX*]: *-ocyamāna-*) *saṃbandhāntarābhāvāt kāraṇatvena syāt. tac cāprasiddham. tasmān na hetvapadeśaḥ* (*TV* [*IO*], *TV* [*OX*]: *hetutvavyapadeśaḥ*). *satyaṃ loke hetuvyavahārakālāt prathamaṃ pramāṇāntareṇa saṃbandhaprasiddhir apekṣyate. vede tu hiśabdapratipāditahetutvānyathānupapattyā saṃbandhābhi-*

Vedic injunction, Kumārila seems to intend to establish a logical concomitance or pervasion (*vyāpti*) between the *homa* to be performed and implements for the preparation of food. In other words, the formula which Kumārila puts forth suggests that the *homa* should be performed by means of any utensil for preparing food. In the terminology of an inference, the *hetu*, *liṅga* or *sādhana* is *annakaraṇatva* (being an implement for the preparation of food), which is pervaded (*vyāpta*) by "performing the *homa* by means of it," the *sādhya*. According to this interpretation of the *pūrvapakṣin*'s view by Kumārila, the following syllogistic formulation may be assumed:

[Major premise] One should offer an oblation with any implement suitable for the preparation of food (*yad yad annakaraṇaṃ tena tena juhoti*).

[Minor premise] A ladle, a pan, etc., are implements suitable for the preparation of food.

[Conclusion] Therefore one should offer an oblation with a ladle, a pan, etc.

According to the *pūrvapakṣa*, on the basis of the illustrative phrase (*udāharaṇavākya*) which allows such an inference the *homa* could thus be performed not only with a winnowing basket, but also with implements such as a ladle, a pan, etc., that are equally suitable for preparing food.

Under the first *siddhāntasūtra* (*MS* 1.2.27: *stutis tu śabdapūrvatvād acodanā ca tasya*) Kumārila maintains that the particle *hi* should be understood as denoting praise of the *śūrpahoma* prescribed in the *vidhi* passage and denies its ability to make people assume a universal proposition, as proposed by the *pūrvapakṣin*.[11] From this assertion it naturally follows that Kumārila insists that a winnowing basket, which the Veda directly enjoins by employing the instrumental case form *śūrpeṇa* referring to the means of the *homa*, is not just any implement and comparable to a ladle, a pan, etc. Consequently, ambiguous hermeneutical situations, such as sublation (*bādha*), option (*vikalpa*) or conjunction (*samuccaya*), involving a winnowing basket, a ladle, a pan, etc., do not ensue.

Kumārila points out two possibilities with respect to how the particle *hi* may express praise: (1) The denotation of *hi* is "because it (i.e., the winnowing basket) is a utensil for preparing food" (*annakaraṇatvāt*). (2) Furthermore, because the *vidhi* sentence *eṣa kartavyaḥ* ("This [*śūrpahoma*] is to be performed") stands in need of praise, the phrase *annakaraṇatvāt* indirectly (*lakṣaṇayā*) means *praśastatvāt*, i.e., "because it is praised."[12] The second possibility is explained as follows: The reason *annakaraṇatvāt* denoted by the particle *hi* is not a reason for the *vidhi* per se, but proves to be a reason for the praise of the object of the *vidhi* (= the *śūrpahoma*). Thus the meaning of the particle *hi* turns out to be *annakaraṇatvāt praśastaḥ*, i.e., it (the winnowing basket) is praised because it is a utensil for preparing food.[13] Regard-

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dhāyi dṛṣṭāntavacanaṃ kalpyeta (*TV* [*OX*]: *-ate*) *yad yad annakaraṇaṃ tena tena juhotīti*, *tena copapannaṃ hetutvam*. It is noteworthy that in his *Bhāṣya* on *MS* 1.2.30 Śabara already referred to a similar proposition establishing the *vyāpti* based upon the opinion of the *pūrvapakṣin*; cf. *ŚBh* p. 143,2-3: *atha mataṃ yena yenānnaṃ kriyate praṇāḍyā śūrpād anyenāpi*, *tena tenāpi homaḥ kriyata iti*.

[11] *TV* p. 140,19-21, ed. in Harikai 1990: 525 (section 215): *hetvapadeśaś ca stutyaivopapadyamānaḥ san nāśrutadṛṣṭāntakalpanāyai* (*TV* [*IO*], *TV* [*OX*], *TV* [*BI*], against the printed text: *sannaśrutadṛṣṭāntakalpanāyai*) *prabhavati*. *śūrpaśrutiś ca vidhyuddeśapātiny ananyaprayojanā ca* (acc. to *TV* [*IO*]) *vispaṣṭārthatā* (*TV* [*OX*]: *vispaṣṭā*) *ca* (om. in *TV* [*IO*]) *satī parityaktuṃ na yujyate*.

[12] *TV* p. 140,21-22: *tasmād yad vānnakaraṇatvād ity eṣa kartavya ity anenāpekṣitatvāl lakṣaṇayaitat pratipādayati – praśastatvād iti*.

[13] *TV* p. 140,22-24, ed. in Harikai 1990: 525 (section 216): *atha* (*TV* [*OX*]: *yad*) *vānnakaraṇatvād iti śrutivṛttam eva*. *tac ca* (*TV* [*OX*], *TV* [*BI*]; *TV* [*IO*]: *tat tu*) *yathāśrutaṃ vidhyuddeśe* (*TV* [*OX*]: *-a-*) *hetutām*

ing this double interpretation Kumārila points out two general grounds for praise: (1) The *vidhi* sentence stands in need (*apekṣā*) of praise of itself. (2) People can easily find examples in ordinary experience that would confirm such an interpretation (*lokaprasiddhadṛṣṭāntalābhāt*). It is well established that a praiseworthy act is to be performed and utensils for preparing food are praised.[14]

In his commentary on the last *siddhāntasūtra* (*MS* 1.2.30: *yadi ca hetur avatiṣṭheta nirdeśāt, sāmānyād iti ced avyavasthā vidhīnāṃ syāt*), Kumārila goes into more detail concerning the inference implied in the Vedic sentence. He states that even if we admitted the *pūrvapakṣin*'s view it would be necessary to regard *hi* as a particle referring only to a reason for the *śūrpahoma*. In this case, however, can the formulation of inference as pointed out by the *pūrvapakṣin* be obtained? Kumārila replies to this question:

> Even if the passage including the particle *hi* enjoined a reason for the *homa*, it does not follow that a ladle, a pan, etc., are also prescribed as instruments of the *homa* in the passage. Why? Because the Veda states that the instrument for preparing food is a cause (of the *homa*) only after it has prescribed (in the *vidhi* passage) a winnowing basket as an implement for the *homa*.[15] The reason (i.e., a winnowing basket's being an instrument for preparing food), however, is not generally accepted or established in ordinary parlance. Such being the case, we must infer that the Vedic words or phrases state an example and have to understand through these Vedic words that the (mentioned) reason proves to be appropriate.[16]

The most crucial question in this context concerns the means of valid cognition (*pramāṇa*) employed in the inference of Vedic words or phrases stating an example. Kumārila claims that "otherwise-inapplicability" or "otherwise-inexplicability" (*anyathānupapatti*), which ensues from a Vedic statement of a reason, is the only means of valid cognition in this case. That is, we should draw an inference from the latter passage of the illustrative sentence (*tena hy annaṃ kriyate*) where a winnowing basket is stated to be an instrument for preparing food. From this, Kumārila argues, it is proved that a winnowing basket, being a utensil for preparing food, is stated to be a cause of the *śūrpahoma*. According to Kumārila, the range of the resulting inference brought about by means of "otherwise-inapplicability" (*anyathānupapatti*) must be limited to (inferred) statements which justify that just a winnowing basket becomes a cause of the *śūrpahoma*.[17] Kumārila explicates:

> Furthermore, when a winnowing basket is stated (in the *vidhi* passage) to have a relation with the *homa*, it must necessarily be understood that the fact of being a utensil for preparing food belongs just to it because other things (*dharma*) (i.e., other implements, such as a ladle, a pan, etc.) cannot

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apratipadyamānaṃ tadanantarākāṅkṣitārthopaplutahetvapekṣaprāśastyahetur avadhāryate, annakaraṇatvāt praśasta iti.

[14] *TV* p. 140,24-26, ed. in Harikai 1990: 525 (section 216): *kalpanādvaye 'pi ca lokaprasiddhadṛṣṭāntalābhān nāśrutatadvākyānumānaprasaṅgo bhaviṣyati. siddhaṃ hi praśastānāṃ kartavyatvam annakaraṇānāṃ ca praśastatvam iti*.

[15] Cf. *NS* p. 91,14: *śūrpagatasyaivānnakaraṇatvasya hetutvaṃ śabdenoktam*.

[16] *TV* p. 142,17-19, ed. in Harikai 1990: 527 (section 225): *yady api hetuvidhānaṃ tathāpi na darvīpiṭharādeḥ prasaṅgaḥ. kutaḥ. śūrpaṃ hi* (om. *TV* [*OX*]) *vidhāyānnakaraṇaṃ hetur ucyate. so 'pi ca na loke* (*TV* [*IO*], *TV* [*OX*]: *loka-*) *prasiddhaḥ, śabdam eva dṛṣṭāntavācinam anumāya sādhayitavyaḥ*.

[17] *TV* p. 142,19-20, ed. in Harikai 1990: 527 (section 225): *tadanumāne ca śrutahetutvānyathānupapattiḥ* (*TV* [*OX*]: *-hetvanyathā-*) *pramāṇaṃ, sā ca yāvaty eva hetutvam upapannaṃ tato vidhikalpanāyai* (*TV* [*OX*]; *TV* [*IO*], *TV* [*BI*] and printed edition: *adhikakalpanāyai*) *na prabhavati*. Bhavadeva refers to this *pramāṇa* as *śrutārthāpatti*; cf. *TMT* p. 37ff.

> be proved to be causes of the *homa*. And because of the proximity it is understood that it (i.e., being a utensil for preparing food) is restricted by that (i.e., being a winnowing basket).[18]

Kumārila elaborates: (1) In this illustrative statement the Veda directly mentions a particular instrument (i.e., the winnowing basket) (*viśeṣasyopādānāt*). (2) A universal (i.e., being a utensil for preparing food) is not established in the statement (*sāmānyāprasiddheś ca*). (3) There exists no adequate ground for repudiating the direct declaration made by these Vedic words (*tatparityāganimittasyāsaṃbhavāt*). For these three reasons the fact of not being applicable/explicable otherwise (*anyathānupapatti*), which is brought about by a mere particular being mentioned, i.e., the winnowing basket as a particular utensil for preparing food, makes us suppose Vedic words which state an example (*dṛṣṭāntavacana*).[19] Kumārila formulates the words or phrases thus inferred in two manners:

(1) *yad yac chūrpam annakaraṇaṃ tena tena juhoti* (*TV* p. 143,12, Harikai 1990 : 528 [section 228]). ("She offers [i.e., should offer] the oblation by means of any winnowing basket which is a utensil for preparing food.")

(2) *yad yad annakaraṇasamarthaṃ śūrpaṃ tena tena hotavyam* (*TV* p. 143,16, Harikai 1990: 528 [section 229]). ("She should offer the oblation by means of any winnowing basket that is suitable for preparing food.")

Kumārila refers to this inference as a *viśeṣatodṛṣṭam anumānam* (thus *TV* [*IO*] and *TV* [*BI*], against *viśeṣadṛṣṭam anumānam* in the printed editions), i.e., an inference seen from a particular.[20] He employs this logical term because in the *vidhi* sentence *śūrpeṇa juhoti* only a winnowing basket is referred to and prescribed as the instrument for the *homa*, and its being a cause of the *homa* is stated in the following passage (*tena hy annaṃ kriyate*). If the *vidhi* sentence would refer to any instrument used in the *homa*, the phrase assumed by the *pūrvapakṣin*, i.e., *yad yad annakaraṇaṃ tena tena juhoti*, would ensue. That is, the Vedic words or phrases to be inferred must be restricted to the scope provided by the word *śūrpa* inasmuch as it is manifestly employed in the *vidhi* sentence. Kumārila illustrates this inference comparable to a *viśeṣatodṛṣṭam anumānam* with the inference from ordinary experience of a straw fire from its smoke.[21] Pointing out typical differences concerning the relationship between

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[18] *TV* p. 142,20-22, ed. Harikai 1990: 527 (section 225): *śūrpe ca homasaṃbandhitvena pratijñāte 'nyadharmasyāhetutvād avaśyaṃ tadgatam evānnakaraṇatvaṃ vaktavyam. sannidheś ca tadavacchinnam eva tad gamyate*; cf. *NS* p. 91,17-19: *prakṛtaśūrpanirdeśakasarvanāmaparayā tṛtīyayā tadgatasyaivānnakaraṇatvasyābhidhānāt tasyaivaṃ hiśabdena hetutvam ucyata ity evaṃ ca tadbhāṣyaṃ vyākhyeyam iti darśayitum āha – sannidheś ceti. ekapadopādānalakṣaṇā śrutiḥ sannidhiśabdenābhipretā.*

[19] *TV* p. 142,26-27, ed. Harikai 1990: 528 (section 228): *tatra viśeṣasyopādānāt sāmānyāprasiddheś ca tatparityāganimittasyāsaṃbhavād upāttaviśeṣamātropasaṃhṛtānyathānupapattis tadgatam eva dṛṣṭāntavacanaṃ kalpayati*; cf. the general statements on *anyathānupapatti* in the *TV* on *MS* 1.2.7: *anyathānupapattilakṣaṇārthāpatti* (*TV* p. 113,23; Harikai 1990, section 55), and *sarvapramāṇapratyastamaye cānyathānupapattir bhavati*, *pramāṇābhāvaś ca yaḥ sarvaprakāraṃ prayatamānasya sa pramāṇam* (*TV* p. 115,7-8; Harikai 1990, section 69).

[20] Someśvara remarks on *viśeṣatodṛṣṭam anumānam* as follows: *śūrpatvaikārthasamavāyino 'nnakaraṇatvasyaiva hetutvavidhāyakavidhivacanadvārānnakaraṇatvāvāntarasāmānyopalakṣaṇārthaṃ śūrpagrahaṇam*, *viśeṣadṛṣṭasaṃjñakaṃ caitad anumānaṃ loke 'pi prasiddham* (*NS* p. 91,26-28). In *Ślokavārttika* (*ŚV*), *Anumānapariccheda* v. 143, Kumārila identifies the propounder of *viśeṣatodṛṣṭānumāna* with the Sāṃkhya teacher Vindhyavāsin; however, there is historical evidence to the effect that already Vṛṣagaṇa, in his *Ṣaṣṭitantra* (ca. AD 300), classified *anumāna* into two types, i.e., *viśeṣato dṛṣṭa* and *sāmānyato dṛṣṭa*. At any rate, the *viśeṣatodṛṣṭānumāna* is of Sāṃkhya origin; see Frauwallner 1958: 84-139 (= Frauwallner 1982: 263): *rjes su dpag pa ni rnam pa gñis te | bye brag mthoṅ ba daṅ spyi mthoṅ ba'o ||*.

[21] *TV* p. 143, 12-13, ed. in Harikai 1990: 528 (section 228): *loke 'pi ca* (following *TV* [*IO*] and *TV* [*OX*]) *tṛṇadhūmadarśanāt tṛṇāgnir evānumīyate nāgnimātram*.

reason (*hetu*) and probandum (*sādhya*) in ordinary experience (*loka*) and in the Veda, Kumārila specifies the logical ground for the assumption of Vedic words expressing causality as follows:

> In ordinary experience, too, a reason (*hetu*) (e.g., smoke) is presented as referring to a property-possessor (*dharmin*) (e.g., a mountain which possesses smoke) and this [property] first of all understood as being a particular belonging to it (e.g., the mountain). But when an illustration (*dṛṣṭānta*) (e.g., a kitchen) is employed it is determined that the mere universal is intended, because a thing that is a particular by nature does not follow (i.e., go together with) the probandum (*sādhya*) (e.g., fire). In the case of reasons [adduced] in the Veda, however, we understand neither a relationship of the probandum with something that is a universal by nature nor with something which is a particular by nature. Therefore the relationship must be supposed by means of an inference from circumstance (*arthāpatti*).[22]

In this context Someśvara remarks on the inference from circumstance that a reason expressed in the Veda does not have the form of a universal because it is impossible that the illustrative sentence which is to be supposed because the stated reason would otherwise not be applicable/explicable (*anyathānupapatti*) refers to a universal concomitance (*vyāpti*).[23] This is why the universal proposition assumed by the *pūrvapakṣin* cannot be derived and a ladle, a pan, etc., under the assumption that the particle *hi* should be interpreted as expressing a reason, are not to be established as implements for the *śūrpahoma*.

The logical application (*prayoga*) with regard to the *śūrpahoma* could be formulated in the following manner; the illustrative sentence would be that of the *viśeṣatodṛṣṭam anumānam*:

[*pratijñā*]	*śūrpeṇa juhoti*.
[*hetu*]	*śūrpasyānnakaraṇatvāt*.
[*dṛṣṭānta*]	*yad yac chūrpam annakaraṇaṃ tena tena juhoti*.

What is the significance, though, of the universal proposition obtained by means of the inference seen from a particular? The proposition can only be achieved by means of an analytical judgement (analytisches Urteil) in Kantian terminology, based on the injunctive phrase (*śūrpeṇa juhoti*) and the passage stating the reason (*śūrpasyānnakaraṇatvāt*). In other words, a meaningful propositional passage does not result when one understands the particle *hi* as expressing a reason. Thus, the interpretation that the particle *hi* states a cause of the *śūrpahoma* is just a provisional admission of the opponent's position.[24] Someśvara further explains that the passage which includes *hi* does not express a reason for the *śūrpahoma* because a winnowing basket is not a utensil for preparing food in the primary sense, and because in injunctive sentences metaphorical expression is not acceptable.[25]

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[22] *TV* p. 142, 22-25, ed. in Harikai 1990: 527 (section 226): *loke 'pi ca yaṃ dharmiṇaṃ pratijñāya yo hetur upadiśyate sa prathamaṃ tāvat tad*(om. *TV* [*IO*])*gataviśeṣātmanaiva pratīyate. tadātmakasya tu sādhyāṃśānugamābhāvāt sāmānyamātraṃ vivakṣitam iti dṛṣṭāntaprayogavelāyām* (*TV* [*OX*]: *dṛṣṭāntavelāyām*) *evāvadhāryate. vedahetūnāṃ punar na sāmānyātmanā sādhyāṃśasaṃbandho* (*TV* [*OX*]: *sādhyasaṃbandho*) *'vagataḥ, na viśeṣātmanā, so 'dhunaivārthāpattyā kalpanīyaḥ*.

[23] *NS* p. 91, 23-25: *vede tu hetvanyathānupapattikalpyasya dṛṣṭāntavākyasya sāmānyavyāptiviṣayatvāyogān na tadanurodhena hetoḥ sāmānyarūpatāpattiḥ*.

[24] *TV* p. 142,17, ed. in Harikai 1990: 527 (section 225): *abhyupetyavādo 'yam*.

[25] *NS* p. 92, 9-11: *abhyupetyavādamātram etat. vastugatyā śūrpasyāpi mukhyānnakaraṇatvābhāvād vidhau ca lakṣaṇāyogād dhetutvānupapattir iti bhāvaḥ*.

Therefore the position of the Siddhāntin is that *hi* expresses praise and the *nigada* passage which includes the particle *hi* is thus interpreted as an *arthavāda* eulogizing the performance of the *śūrpahoma* prescribed in the preceding *vidhi* sentence.[26]

Conclusion

From the orthodox Mīmāṃsā point of view, the Vṛttikāra's assumption that the particle *hi* in the passage *śūrpeṇa juhoti*, *tena hy annaṃ kriyate* indicates a reason and his statement that the passage falls into the *brāhmaṇa*-category "stating a reason" can only be admitted with reservation. The term *hetu* cannot be understood here in accordance with the terminology of inference, i.e., in the sense of *liṅga* or *sādhana*, because in the Vedic context the basis for the establishment of logical pervasion (*vyāpti*) and inference (*anumāna*) therefrom is beyond our reach. Consequently, from the viewpoint of Mīmāṃsā it would be appropriate to render the passage *śūrpeṇa juhoti*, *tena hy annaṃ kriyate* as "By means of the winnowing basket she offers; *verily* food is prepared by means of the winnowing basket."

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TV [IO]	*Tantravārttika*. Ms. of the India Office Library, Eggeling No. 2150.
TV [OX]	*Tantravārttika*. Ms. No. 520 of the Bodleian Library (= Wilson No. 325).
NS	*Nyāyasudhā*, in *Nyāyasudhā*: *A Commentary on Tantravārttika by Paṇḍit Someśwara Bhaṭṭa*. Ed. Pandit Mukunda Shastri. Benares 2000. (Chowkhambā Sanskrit Series 14)
MaiS	*Maitrayāṇī Saṃhitā*. Ed. Leopold von Schröder. 4 vols. Wiesbaden 1970 (repr.).
MS	*Mīmāṃsāsūtra*, see *ŚBh*.
ŚBr	*Śatapathabrāhmaṇa in the Mādhyandina-Śākhā with Extracts from the Commentaries of Sāyaṇa*, *Harisvāmin and Dvivedagaṅga*. Ed. A. Weber. 2nd ed. Varanasi 1964.
ŚBh	*Śābarabhāṣya*, in *Mīmāṃsādarśanam*, ed. Vaidyanath Shastri, Vol. 1, Varanasi 1929. (Anandashrama Sanskrit Series 97)
ŚV	*Ślokavārttika of Śrī Kumārila Bhaṭṭa with the Commentary Nyāyaratnākara of Śrī Pārthasārathi Miśra.* Ed. and rev. Svami Dvarikadas Shastri. Varanasi 1978. (Prācyabhāratī Series 10)

[26] There are other cases in which a phrase containing the particle *hi* is interpreted as a *hetuvannigada*; cf., e.g., *TV* on *MS* 2.3.17, where the passage *vatsanikāntā hi paśavaḥ* after a *vidhi* "*vatsam ālabheta*" (*Maitrāyaṇī Saṃhitā* [*MaiS*] 1.5.9) is referred to by Kumārila as a *hetuvannigada arthavāda*. For the Dharmaśāstra literature, see Kane 1973: 676, n. 1277, and Kane 1962: 1239-1240, n. 2015.

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Kiyotaka Yoshimizu

Kumārila's Propositional Derivation (*Arthāpatti*) without Pervasion (*Vyāpti*)*

I.

The *Vṛttikāra*, whose definitions of valid means of knowledge (*pramāṇa*) were quoted by Śabarasvāmin and generally acknowledged in the Mīmāṃsā school, explains *arthāpatti* as follows: Through a reasoning called *arthāpatti*, one concludes that a statement "A" is true because otherwise, namely, if "A" is not true, it would contradict another statement "B" that has already been accepted as true. For example: As long as Devadatta is alive, we understand that he is outside his house since we do not find him in his house (type 1).[1] In addition to this example of *arthāpatti*, Kumārila (ca. AD 600) introduced another type of *arthāpatti*, whereby one concludes that fire has the power (*śakti*) to burn because we see combustibles burn when they are put into a fire (type 2).[2] In both cases, the conclusion is drawn from a reduction to absurdity (*anyathānupapatti*, "not being possible otherwise"): "If Devadatta were not outside his house although he is alive, it would not be possible that he is actually not in his house; therefore he must be outside" (type 1) and "If fire had no burning power, it would not be possible that combustibles actually burn when put into a fire; therefore fire must have burning power" (type 2).

Although Kumārila considers *arthāpatti* as a valid means of knowledge different from *anumāna*, Uddyotakara's idea of the definition of "the reason established on the basis of mere negative concomitance" (*kevalavyatirekihetu*) is certainly applicable to the second example cited above, because the reason therein, i.e., combustion, meets all the three conditions necessary for a *kevalavyatirekihetu*:[3] All subject-terms, viz., all fires in this world, are pervaded by combustion; there is no similar instance (*sapakṣa*), since nothing but fire has burning power; all things that have no burning power, i.e., the dissimilar instances (*vipakṣa*), cannot cause combustion.

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I render the Sanskrit word *arthāpatti* with "derivation" instead of "presumption," although the latter has been adopted by many scholars such as Bhatt (1989), Kajiyama (1999: 11), Staal (1962: 645), and Tillemans (1999), because in a conditional P ⊃ Q what is to be known (*prameya*) by means of *arthāpatti* is the consequent Q which is derived or follows (*ā-√pad*) from the antecedent P presumed in advance. E.J. Lemmon (1972: 8) uses the verb "to derive" synonymously with "to deduce." To distinguish *arthāpatti* from the grammatical derivation of a word from a verbal root (*vyutpatti*), I render it by "propositional derivation." The following symbols are utilized in the following: negation: ¬ ; and: ∧ ; or: ∨ ; if, then: ⊃ ; universal quantifier: ∀.

[1] *Śābarabhāṣya* (*ŚBh* [*F*]) p. 32,6-8: *arthāpattir api* dṛṣṭaḥ śruto vārtho 'nyathā nopapadyata ity arthakalpanā*, *yathā jīvato devadattasya gṛhābhāvadarśanena bahirbhāvasyādṛṣṭasya kalpanā*. * *api* refers to the statement in *ŚBh* (*F*) p. 24,18: *na parīkṣitavyaṃ nimittam*.

[2] Cf. *Ślokavārttika* (*ŚV*), *Arthāpatti*, v. 3a-c. The verses 1-9 of the *Arthāpattipariccheda* present some examples of *arthāpatti* together with the kind of *pramāṇa* by which the premises of *arthāpatti* are confirmed. In the examples based on perception, on inference (*anumāna*) and on analogy, the object of derivation is a *śakti*.

[3] *Nyāyavārttika* (*NV*) p. 145,1-2: *vyatirekī vivakṣitavyāpitve sati sapakṣābhāve sati vipakṣāvṛttiḥ*.

Karin Preisendanz (ed.), *Expanding and Merging Horizons*: *Contributions to South Asian and Cross-Cultural Studies in Commemoration of Wilhelm Halbfass*, Wien: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 2007, pp. 315-335.

The *arthāpatti* of type 2 is thus to be confirmed by a *kevalavyatirekihetu.* The reason why Kumārila nevertheless does not regard this *arthāpatti* as an *anumāna* is given in the *Anumānapariccheda* of his *Ślokavārttika* where he restricts *anumāna* to inferences that are established on the basis of both positive concomitance (*anvaya*) and negative concomitance to be ascertained by means of frequent observation. Kumārila accepts neither an inference which has no similar instance nor an inference based only on the absence of the reason in all dissimilar instances.[4] In other words, according to the classification of later times, Kumārila stands by the theory of extrinsic pervasion (*bahirvyāpti*).

II.

If, in contrast to Kumārila, one recognizes a *kevalavatirekihetu* as a valid reason for inference (*anumāna*), or if one stands by the theory of intrinsic pervasion (*antarvyāpti*), according to which no similar instance is required, can both types of *arthāpatti* be reduced to an *anumāna*?

At first glance, the *arthāpatti* of type 1 seems to be easily reduced to an *anumāna*. Suppose the class of all human beings to be the domain of discourse. Let us take the predicate "being in one's house" as P, "being outside" as Q, "being alive" as R, and the subject-term "Caitra" as c.

Proof 1: Tentative reduction of *arthāpatti* to *anumāna*

Thesis	"Caitra is outside." Qc
Reason	"Because he is not in his house, although being alive." $Rc \wedge \neg Pc$
Pervasion	"Whoever, although being alive, is not in their house, is outside." $\forall x((Rx \wedge \neg Px) \supset Qx)$

In this *anumāna*-formula, what is to be proved (*sādhya*) is "being outside" and the reason (*hetu*) is "not being in their house, although being alive." Because at any time there must be many people other than Caitra outside their own house, these people function as similar instances. The dissimilar instances consist of two groups, namely, all people who are in their own house and all people who are not alive. Under this circumstance, there certainly is negative concomitance between the negation of "being outside" and the negation of "not being in their house, although being alive," since any person who is not outside their house is either in their house or not alive. However, the reason of this *anumāna* cannot be a *kevalavyatirekihetu* because there certainly exist similar instances.

Although Kumārila himself takes this kind of *anumāna* into account in *Arthāpattipariccheda* vv. 10-47, he does not discuss whether the reason "not being in their house, although being alive" in this *arthāpatti* is a *kevalavyatirekihetu* or not. At any rate, it is evident for him that the *arthāpatti* of Caitra's being outside cannot be reduced to an *anumāna*. In order to demonstrate this position, Kumārila indicates that the reason has none of the three characteristics of

[4] According to Kumārila, one can ascertain the positive concomitance of a *hetu* with its *sādhya* through frequent observation (*bhūyodarśana*) (*ŚV*, *Anumāna*, v.12a-c). Even if it is ascertained that a reason is absent from all dissimilar instances, the reason is specifically indeterminate (*asādhāraṇa*) as long as its presence in similar instances is not observed (ibid., v. 86 cd). If there is no substrate (*dharmin*) which can be regarded as a similar instance, positive concomitance is not realized (ibid., v. 116b-d). Cf. Yamakami et al. 1983; 1985a; 1985b; Katsura 1982: 45; Katsura 1986: 93-95. Kumārila asserts that an *āvītahetu*, which is the same as *kevalavyatirekihetu* in Nyāya terminology, is inconclusive (*anaikāntika*). Cf. *ŚV*, *Apoha*, v. 166; Hattori 1975: 48-49.

a valid reason. It is impossible to ascertain the first characteristic (*pakṣadharmatā*), namely, that the reason inheres in the subject-term (vv. 11-28), since in the *arthāpatti* of Caitra's being outside the reason consists not only in Caitra's absence from his house but also in his existence. In order to confirm that Caitra is alive, we must find him somewhere outside his house because we do not find him alive in his house. If, however, we succeed in finding him alive outside, nothing remains to be proved (v. 19cd). Thus, one has some difficulty to establish *pakṣadharmatā* in this *arthāpatti*, whereas it is easily established in the inference (*anumāna*) of fire from smoke through the seeing of smoke on the mountain from a distance (v. 20). With regard to the second and the third characteristics of *anvaya* and *vyatireka*, one cannot find a way to practically ascertain them either. Nobody can observe at the same time that Caitra is absent from his house and present somewhere else because no observer can simultaneously be in Caitra's house and outside it (vv. 31-32ab).

Kumārila then adduces a third example of *arthāpatti* to ascertain this impracticability. Let us posit all places in this world as the domain of discourse and suppose that we seek Caitra outside and find him in a place P. From this fact we can conclude that Caitra is absent from a distant place Q or that Q lacks Caitra. In this case it is easy for us to watch a place R which is next to P and to ascertain that Caitra is absent from R. If we take this reasoning as an *anumāna* in which the *pakṣa* is place Q and what is to be proved is "lacking Caitra," we can take the neighbouring place R as a similar instance. But the fact that Caitra is absent from R cannot guarantee the validity of the reason of this *anumāna*, be it "presence of Caitra in P" or "Q's difference from P," because it is practically impossible to ascertain the third characteristic of the reason, namely, absence in all dissimilar instances. Nobody can exhaustively visit all places in this world apart from place P in order to ascertain the absence of the reason (vv. 34-45).[5]

III.

Thus we can say that Kumārila disproves the attempt to reduce his *arthāpatti* to an *anumāna* by demonstrating that it is impracticable for us to empirically confirm the three characteristics of a valid reason. He does not, however, analyze the process of *arthāpatti*-reasoning in

[5] With regard to the ascertainment of negative concomitance, an opponent argues that even the inference for inferring the existence of fire on the ground of perception of smoke is not established for Kumārila inasmuch as he maintains that it is impracticable to ascertain negative concomitance in those cases where the number of dissimilar instances is infinite (*ŚV*, *Arthāpatti*, v. 39). Refuting this objection, Kumārila says (v. 40):

yasya vastvantarābhāvaḥ prameyas tasya duṣyati |
mama tv adṛṣṭamātreṇa gamakaḥ sahacāriṇaḥ ||.

"For those who maintain that one should comprehend that [the reason is] absent from other entities (i.e., everything that lacks the *sādhya*), this may be fallacious. In my position, however, [there is no fault, since a reason] has its concomitant known by mere non-perception." He explains the reason as follows: "Because the concomitance of fire and smoke is well established owing to their limited domain" (v. 42ab: *sāhitye mitadeśatvāt prasiddhe cāgnidhūmayoḥ |*). Cf. Steinkellner 1997: 640-641. In the *Anumānapariccheda*, Kumārila considers that a pervasion (*vyāpti*) is the relation between two universal properties within a limited space and time (vv. 10-11: *deśe yāvati kāle vā ... tāvati*); cf. Katsura 1982: 42. Therefore it is sufficient for Kumārila to examine as many instances as practicably possible to ascertain both positive and negative concomitance. Kumārila expects nothing more than probability from an *anumāna*. He does not expect that the human intellect can empirically discover the universal regularity in nature (cf. section VI of the present article). As discussed by Steinkellner (1997), Dharmakīrti criticizes Kumārila's view on the negative concomitance required for an inference in *Pramāṇavārttika* (*PV*) 1.31f. Between these two scholars, a brahmin and a Buddhist monk, there is a sharp and essential disagreement on the ability of the human intellect.

order to prove it to be a valid means of knowledge (*pramāṇa*). He just declares that one should accept the conclusion of an *arthāpatti* because otherwise there would occur a contradiction to a fact one has already accepted as true. From the viewpoint of propositional logic, however, we can elucidate what is implied in the *arthāpatti* of Caitra's being outside by setting forth an axiomatic proof. In the axiomatic proofs I will present below, I use the ten rules of natural deduction listed in the primer of elementary logic by E.J. Lemmon.[6]

Let us predicate the same subject-term "Caitra" with the three terms P, Q and R used in proof 1, and take the proposition Pc "Caitra is in his house" as A, Qc "Caitra is outside" as B, and Rc "Caitra is alive" as C respectively. Note that Kumārila frequently uses "existing" (*vidyamānatva*, etc.) synonymously with "being alive."[7] He asserts that from the premise "Caitra exists" one can draw a conclusion "Caitra is necessarily outside (*bahir eva*) inasmuch as he is shut out (*utkālita*) from his house."[8] The latter sentence, in turn, implies "It is impossible for Caitra to be neither in his house nor outside." We may therefore assume that Kumārila would admit as a presupposition that Caitra is either in his house or outside as long as he is alive. This presupposition is reduced into the formula $C \supset (A \vee B)$.[9]

Now, the conditional proposition "If Caitra, although being alive, is not in his house, then he is outside" is reduced to the formula $(C \wedge \neg A) \supset B$. We can logically deduce this formula from $C \supset (A \vee B)$, in other words, we can prove theorem β, namely, $(C \supset (A \vee B)) \supset ((C \wedge$

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[6] The ten following rules are listed in Lemmon 1972: 39-40:
1. *Rule of Assumptions*: "Any proposition may be introduced at any stage of a proof."
2. *Modus Ponendo Ponens*: "Given A and $A \supset B$, we may derive B as conclusion."
3. *Modus Tollendo Tollens*: "Given $\neg B$ and $A \supset B$, we may derive $\neg A$ as conclusion." Cf. Lemmon 1972: 62; Noya 1997: 217; Maehara 1998: 46.
4. *Double Negation*: "Given A, we may derive $\neg \neg A$ as conclusion, and vice versa."
5. *Conditional Proof*: "Given a proof of B from A as assumption, we may derive $A \supset B$ as conclusion on the remaining assumptions (if any)."
6. $\wedge$-*Introduction*: "Given A and B, we may derive $A \wedge B$ as conclusion."
7. $\wedge$-*Elimination*: "Given $A \wedge B$, we may derive either A or B separately."
8. $\vee$-*Introduction*: "Given either A or B separately, we may derive $A \vee B$ as conclusion."
9. $\vee$-*Elimination*: "Given $A \vee B$, together with a proof of C from A as assumption and a proof of C from B as assumption, we may derive C as conclusion."
10. *Reductio ad Absurdum*: "Given a proof of $B \wedge \neg B$ from A as assumption, we may derive $\neg A$ as conclusion on the remaining assumptions (if any)."

[7] *ŚV*, *Arthāpatti*, vv. 21b and 22a: *vidyamānatva*; v. 24a: *sadbhāva*; v. 24c: *sattā*; v. 26c: *sattva*. In this chapter, Kumārila neglects the possibility of existence beyond this world.

[8] *ŚV*, *Arthāpatti*, v. 24:

siddhe sadbhāvavijñāne gehābhāvadhiyātra tu |
gehād utkālitā sattā bahir evāvatiṣṭhate ||.

"Under the condition that the knowledge of the existence [of a person] is established, [we can conclude] that [their] existence shut out from their house necessarily remains outside, when we know that this (person) is absent from their house."

[9] From $\neg A \supset B$, i.e., "Caitra is necessarily outside inasmuch as he is shut out from his house," $\neg (\neg A \wedge \neg B)$ is derived on the basis of the interderivability between $P \supset Q$ and $\neg (P \wedge \neg Q)$. Cf. Lemmon 1972: 37. Further, $A \vee B$ is derived from $\neg (\neg A \wedge \neg B)$ on the basis of the laws of de Morgan. Cf. Lemmon 1972: 37-38. From the conditional $C \supset (\neg A \supset B)$ stated in v. 24 we can thus derive $C \supset (A \vee B)$ on the basis of the theorem $((P \supset Q) \wedge (Q \supset R)) \supset (P \supset R)$ which is proved in Lemmon 1972: 10 in the style of a sequence. $C \supset (A \vee B)$ is explicitly asserted by Pārthasārathimiśra: "There is no doubt that a person is necessarily either in his house or outside as long as he is alive" (*Śāstradīpikā* [*ŚD*] p. 118,9-10: *jīvatā hy avaśyaṃ gṛhe vā bahir vā sthātavyam ity asaṃdigdham*).

$\neg$ A) $\supset$ B), as follows, if we presuppose and use theorem α, namely, ((A $\vee$ B) $\wedge \neg$ A) $\supset$ B, in the proof. Following the primer by Noya (1997), I give the line numbers of the assumptions required on each line of a proof in square brackets.

Proof 2: (C $\supset$ (A $\vee$ B)) $\supset$ ((C $\wedge \neg$ A) $\supset$ B)

(1) C $\supset$ (A $\vee$ B)	[1]	assumption
(2) C $\wedge \neg$ A	[2]	assumption
(3) C	[2]	(2) and $\wedge$-*Elimination*
(4) $\neg$ A	[2]	(2) and $\wedge$-*Elimination*
(5) A $\vee$ B	[1, 2]	(1) (3) and *Modus Ponendo Ponens*
(6) (A $\vee$ B) $\wedge \neg$ A	[1, 2]	(4) (5) and $\wedge$-*Introduction*
(7) ((A $\vee$ B) $\wedge \neg$ A) $\supset$ B		theorem α
(8) B	[1, 2]	(6) (7) and *Modus Ponendo Ponens*
(9) (C $\wedge \neg$ A) $\supset$ B	[1]	(2) (8) and *Conditional Proof*
(10) (C $\supset$ (A $\vee$ B)) $\supset$ ((C $\wedge \neg$ A) $\supset$ B)		(1) (9) and *Conditional Proof*.[10]

Theorem α, ((A $\vee$ B) $\wedge \neg$ A) $\supset$ B, is called a "disjunctive syllogism."[11] If we carry forward the proof as faithfully as possible to Kumārila, we can reconstruct the process with the help of a *Reductio ad Absurdum* as follows:[12]

Proof 3: ((A $\vee$ B) $\wedge \neg$ A) $\supset$ B

(1) (A $\vee$ B) $\wedge \neg$ A	[1]	assumption
(2) A $\vee$ B	[1]	(1) and $\wedge$-*Elimination*: "Caitra is in his house or outside."
(3) $\neg$ A	[1]	(1) and $\wedge$-*Elimination*: "Caitra is not in his house."
(4) $\neg$ B	[4]	Assumption for *Reductio ad Absurdum*: "If Caitra were not outside" (*anyathā*).
(5) A $\supset$ A		law of identity[13]
(6) B	[6]	assumption
(7) B $\wedge \neg$ B	[4, 6]	(4) (6) and $\wedge$-*Introduction*
(8) (B $\wedge \neg$ B) $\supset$ A		theorem of arbitrary derivation from a contradiction[14]

[10] The conclusion (C $\wedge \neg$ A) $\supset$ B is logically equivalent to the premise C $\supset$ (A $\vee$ B) because the converted conditional of β, i.e., ((C $\wedge \neg$ A) $\supset$ B) $\supset$ (C $\supset$ (A $\vee$ B)), is also proved to be a theorem as follows: If we assume (C $\wedge \neg$ A) $\supset$ B, C and $\neg$ (A $\vee$ B), we can derive the contradiction B $\wedge \neg$ B. In this proof it is necessary to apply $\neg$ A $\wedge \neg$ B, which is derived from $\neg$ (A $\vee$ B) on the basis of laws of de Morgan. Cf. Lemmon 1972: 41f.

[11] This kind of disjunctive syllogism is called *modus tollendo ponens* in contrast to the other kind, i.e., *modus ponendo tollens*. Cf. n. 53 below.

[12] Lemmon 1972: 59 and Noya 1997: 217 demonstrate the proof of this theorem in a more concise way without applying *Reductio ad Absurdum*. Cf. n. 51 below.

[13] A $\supset$ A can be proved by means of *Reductio ad Absurdum* as suggested in Noya 1977: 63:

(1) A	[1]	assumption
(2) $\neg$ A	[2]	assumption for *Reductio ad Absurdum*
(3) A $\wedge \neg$ A	[1, 2]	(1) (2) and $\wedge$-*Introduction*
(4) $\neg \neg$ A	[1]	(2) (3) and *Reductio ad Absurdum*
(5) A	[1]	(4) and *Double Negation*
(6) A $\supset$ A		(1) (5) and *Conditional Proof*.

[14] This theorem warns us that we cannot but allow arbitrary derivation of any proposition if we premise a contradiction. According to Maehara 1996: 58-59, we can prove it as follows:

(1) B $\wedge \neg$ B	[1]	assumption
(2) $\neg$ A	[2]	assumption for *Reductio ad Absurdum*

(9) A	[4, 6]	(7) (8) and *Modus Ponendo Ponens*
(10) B ⊃ A	[4]	(6) (9) and *Conditional Proof*
(11) A	[1, 4]	(2) (5) (10) and ∨-*Elimination*: "Caitra would be in his house."
(12) A ∧ ¬ A	[1, 4]	(3) (11) and ∧-*Introduction* (*anupapatti*)
(13) ¬ ¬ B	[1]	(4) (12) and *Reductio ad Absurdum*
(14) B	[1]	(13) and *Double Negation*:[15] "Caitra is outside."
(15) ((A ∨ B) ∧ ¬ A) ⊃ B		(1) (14) and *Conditional Proof*.

The conditional sentence ((A ∨ B) ∧ ¬ A) ⊃ B is thus proved to be a theorem which is inevitably valid according to its syntax, that is, it is a tautology. No matter what its constituent propositions, A and B, may semantically state, its validity does not change. The conditional C ⊃ (A ∨ B), however, is invalid because we cannot prove it to be a theorem since it is not a tautology. Nevertheless, this formula holds true in our world if we use A, B and C for "Caitra is in his house," "Caitra is outside," and "Caitra is alive" respectively and keep observing Caitra's everyday life. This conditional becomes false if both A and B are false although C is true. However, such a situation does not occur in the life of Caitra. Furthermore, regardless of whether A or B or C are true or false, the conditional (C ⊃ (A ∨ B)) ⊃ ((C ∧ ¬ A) ⊃ B) is inevitably valid because this formula is proved to be a theorem in proof 2. Therefore it is logical to say: As long as C ⊃ (A ∨ B) is true in the life of Caitra, (C ∧ ¬ A) ⊃ B is always true.[16]

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(3) (B ∧ ¬ B) ⊃ (¬ A ⊃ (B ∧ ¬ B))		replacement of P of the theorem P ⊃ (Q ⊃ P) (Lemmon 1972: 59) by B ∧ ¬ B and Q by ¬ A
(4) ¬ A ⊃ (B ∧ ¬ B)	[1]	(1) (3) and *Modus Ponendo Ponens*
(5) B ∧ ¬ B	[1, 2]	(2) (4) and *Modus Ponendo Ponens*
(6) ¬ ¬ A	[1]	(2) (5) and *Reductio ad Absurdum*
(7) A	[1]	(6) and *Double Negation*
(8) (B ∧ ¬ B) ⊃ A		(1) (7) and *Conditional Proof*.

[15] Because Kumārila declares that the negation of "non-cow" is nothing but the real cow-ness (*gotva*) (*ŚV*, *Apoha*, v. 1), he admits the rule of elimination of a double negation. As for the double negation added to a verb, he maintains that there remains the action indicated by the verb as its *svarūpa* while the particle *na* which negates the verb is negated (*niṣedhasya niṣedhanam*) by another particle *na* (ibid., v. 140). Cf. Hattori 1975: 36.

[16] In the same way, we can prove another example of *arthāpatti*, namely, "Caitra does not eat by day although he is stout; therefore he eats at night." Let us take "Caitra eats by day" as A, "Caitra eats at night" as B, and "Caitra is stout" as C. Because the content of this *arthāpatti* is rendered into the formula (C ∧ ¬ A) ⊃ B, we can say on the basis of proof 2 and 3 that this formula is always true as long as the conditional C ⊃ (A ∨ B), namely, "If Caitra is stout, he eats either by day or at night," is true. However, one difference should be noted between these two examples of *arthāpatti*. In the case of the *arthāpatti* of Caitra's eating at night, we confirm that Caitra is stout when we meet him in the daytime, not knowing that he eats at night. If we reduce this *arthāpatti* to an *anumāna* as demonstrated in proof 1, we can confirm the *pakṣadharmatā* with regard to the reason "not eating by day, although being stout." Kumārila himself may have noticed that *pakṣadharmatā* is possible in this case. Therefore, he most presumably preferred the first example of *arthāpatti* of Caitra's being outside to this example of deriving Caitra's eating at night when he demonstrated his thesis that the validity of *arthāpatti* cannot be confirmed through the three characteristics of a valid reason. Nevertheless, nowadays or in the future it may be possible for us to know, while staying in Caitra's house, whether he is alive or dead regardless of where he is, if someone implants a small but powerful wireless pulsimeter which never breaks down into Caitra's heart. Thus, the reason why one cannot confirm Caitra's existence when he is outside should not be ascribed to the logical structure of this *arthāpatti*, but to the level of technology of the time.

IV.

Proofs 2 and 3 in the previous section may have left the impression that things have moved away from Kumārila's thinking. But if we are allowed to use theorem β, $(C \supset (A \vee B)) \supset ((C \wedge \neg A) \supset B)$, we can prove formula γ, $((C \supset (A \vee B)) \wedge (C \wedge \neg A)) \supset B$, which has only B "Caitra is outside" as its conclusion:[17]

Proof 4: $((C \supset (A \vee B)) \wedge (C \wedge \neg A)) \supset B$

(1) $(C \supset (A \vee B)) \wedge (C \wedge \neg A)$	[1]	assumption
(2) $C \supset (A \vee B)$	[1]	(1) and ∧-*Elimination*
(3) $C \wedge \neg A$	[1]	(1) and ∧-*Elimination*
(4) $(C \supset (A \vee B)) \supset ((C \wedge \neg A) \supset B)$		theorem β
(5) $(C \wedge \neg A) \supset B$	[1]	(2) (4) and *Modus Ponendo Ponens*
(6) B	[1]	(3) (5) and *Modus Ponendo Ponens*
(7) $((C \supset (A \vee B)) \wedge (C \wedge \neg A)) \supset B$		(1) (6) and *Conditional Proof*.[18]

Because formula γ, $((C \supset (A \vee B)) \wedge (C \wedge \neg A)) \supset B$, is thus proved to be a theorem, the following statement is logically tenable: If the three propositions, namely, "Caitra is either in his house or outside as long as he is alive," "Caitra is alive," and "Caitra is not in his house now," are equally true, it is inevitably true that Caitra is outside now. We do not need any further observation in order to draw this conclusion. What proof 4 aims at through the process from (1) to (6) is to reveal that B is implied in formula (1). Applying this formula γ to Kumārila's argumentation, we can specify three essential characteristics of *arthāpatti*: (i) propositional derivation, (ii) deductive reasoning (or a vague idea of it) and (iii) no use of an inseparable connection (*avinābhāva*), in other words, pervasion (*vyāpti*) between properties in a specific domain of discourse.[19]

(i) It should be noted that the constituent elements of *arthāpatti*-reasoning are exclusively given in the form of sentences. What is to be established by an *arthāpatti* is the relation between two sentences presenting a premise and a conclusion;[20] it is not the relation between two predicates, one appearing in a premise and the other in a conclusion. It is a function of *anumāna* to make clear the relation between two predicates which indicate two properties (*dharma*). One can examine how the two properties are distributed among substrates (*dharmin*) within the context of a specific discourse by means of a gradual process, beginning with ascertaining *pakṣadharmatā*, then proceeding to *anvaya*, and finally determining *vyatireka*. In the case of an *arthāpatti*, however, such a procedure is impossible since an *ar-*

[17] This formula has already been suggested by Staal (1962: 645): "$A \rightarrow (B \vee C), A, \sim B \vdash C$." Even without β, we can prove γ by integrating the process from (3) C to (8) B of proof 2 into proof 4 after its (3), i.e., after $C \wedge \neg A$.

[18] Proof 4 follows the process of propositional derivation of R from $P \wedge Q$ under the assumption of $P \supset (Q \supset R)$. Contrasted with $((((A \wedge B) \supset C) \wedge A) \wedge \neg C) \supset \neg B$ (cf. n. 54 below), formula γ can be reduced to $(((C \supset (A \vee B)) \wedge \neg A) \wedge C) \supset B$.

[19] Summarizing vv. 30-33 of the *Arthāpattipariccheda*, Bhatt (1989: 323-324) refers to this point, but he does not clarify how it is possible to establish this *arthāpatti* without having recourse to pervasion. Also Randle (1976: 325) briefly remarks: "*Arthāpatti* is not inference from examples."

[20] In his commentary on *Nyāyasūtra* 2.2.2-6, Vātsyāyana (*Nyāyabhāṣya* [*NBh*] p. 579) adduces a propositional *arthāpatti* whereby "If there are clouds, then rain occurs" ($P \supset Q$) is derived from "If there are no clouds, then no rain occurs" ($\neg P \supset \neg Q$). Dismissing the charge of a "violation of the law of contraposition," Claus Oetke construes this *arthāpatti* as presupposing that P and Q are equivalent, and he completes the conditional "If P, then Q" by adding "but otherwise not" (= "if not P, not Q"). Cf. Oetke 1992: 196-203.

thāpatti in fact requires neither the analysis of a sentence into a subject–predicate structure nor the comparison between two predicates within a specific domain of discourse. The following verse suggests this difference between *arthāpatti* and *anumāna*:

> *pūrvasiddhaḥ svatantro 'rthaḥ svatantreṇa viśeṣitaḥ |*
> *dharmī dharmaviśiṣṭo*[21] *'tra nānumeyaḥ pratīyate ||.*

> [Through *anumāna* it should be proved that] an object (e.g., a mountain[22]) of which independent existence is established beforehand is qualified by another object (e.g., a fire[23]) [which has also been] independently [established]. Here [in the case of an *arthāpatti*] one recognizes nothing to be inferred that would be a substrate qualified by a property.[24] (*ŚV*, *Arthāpatti*, v. 64)

Kumārila emphasizes that both the premise and conclusion of an *arthāpatti* are given in the form of sentences (*vākya*).[25] We may therefore say that an *arthāpatti* deals with the propositional derivation of a sentence from another sentence, even though Kumārila himself does not suggest this, except for mentioning the fact of "not being possible otherwise" (*anyathānupapatti*) to answer the question of how a conclusion should be derived.

(ii) In order to clarify that in the *arthāpatti* of Caitra's being outside the first characteristic of a valid reason, viz., *pakṣadharmatā*, is not ascertained, Kumārila argues that there is a spatio-temporal interval between the confirmation of the two elements of the reason. That is to say, only after having confirmed one element, namely, that Caitra is absent in his house, can one confirm the other element, i.e., that he is alive.[26] In this procedure, however, one may be faced with the problem that when Caitra's being alive is established, the conclusion that he is outside is as a consequence established as well, because one has to go out of Caitra's house to find him alive. In this respect, Kumārila faults his opponent who tries to prove Caitra's existence outside by means of an inference, indicating that he falls into mutual dependence (*anyonyāśraya*) of premise and conclusion (vv. 27-28). Kumārila then contrasts *arthāpatti* with *anumāna*, focusing upon the relation between premise and conclusion:

> *anyathānupapattau tu prameyānupraveśitā |*
> *tādrūpyeṇaiva vijñānān na doṣaḥ pratibhāti naḥ*[27] *||.*

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[21] *ŚV* as printed in the *Kāśikā* (*ŚVK*); in the *Tātparyaṭīkā* (*ŚVT*) and the *Nyāyaratnākara* (*NR*): *dharma-dharma-*.

[22] *ŚVK* p. 180,14: *parvatādir iva*.

[23] *ŚVK* p. 180,15: *agnyādineva*.

[24] Although it is *śrutārthāpatti* that is discussed in the last half of the *Arthāpattipariccheda* (vv. 51-88), the examples of both *dṛṣṭa-* and *śrutārthāpatti* quoted here have the same syntax. Cf. n. 16 above.

[25] Regarding the premise as a sentence, he says in *ŚV*, *Arthāpatti*, v. 76:

> *ataḥ śrutasya vākyasya yad arthapratipādanam |*
> *tadātmalābha eva syād vinā nety etad iṣyate ||.*

"Therefore, this (i.e., the derivation of a sentence as the conclusion) is acknowledged for the reason that it would be impossible for a given (*śruta*) sentence to bear its meaning unless [the conclusion is true]." Regarding the conclusion as a sentence, he says, ibid., v. 63:

> *na ca sattānumānena viśeṣo vānumīyate |*
> *iha vākyaviśeṣasya sattaiva tv avagamyate ||.*

"And neither existence nor a particular is inferred [by means of an inference], whereas here (i.e., by means of an *arthāpatti*) indeed the existence of a particular sentence is recognized."

[26] *ŚV*, *Arthāpatti*, v. 26:

> *tasmāt pratyakṣato gehe caitrābhāve hy abhāvataḥ |*
> *jñāte yat sattvavijñānaṃ tad evedaṃ bahiḥ sthitam ||.*

"Therefore, when the house is cognized by means of perception [and] Caitra's absence, of course, by means of knowing absence, [Caitra's] existence, which has been taken for granted, is established outside [his house]."

[27] *ŚV* as printed in *ŚVK* and *NR*; in *ŚVT*: *pratighātinaḥ*.

> In the case of [an *arthāpatti* which is ascertained by means of reduction to absurdity formulated as] "not being possible otherwise", however, it does not seem to be a fault in our [system] that what is to be known (i.e., Caitra's existence outside[28]) is implied (*anupraveśin*) [in its premise], because [what is to be known is] comprehended [by means of *arthāpatti*] only in this manner. (*ŚV*, *Arthāpatti*, v. 29)

In the case of an *arthāpatti*, it does not matter how one confirms its premise because its truth is taken for granted. What is important in an *arthāpatti* is that the conclusion is logically implied (*anupraveśin*) in its premise.[29] Hence Kumārila includes Caitra's existence in the premise of the *arthāpatti* without discussing how it should be confirmed.[30] Although his explanation is not sufficient to establish a deductive proof – for he does not explicitly assert that not only C but also $C \supset (A \vee B)$ must be counted in the premise – it is appropriate to say that he attempted to make *arthāpatti* a form of deductive reasoning which remains partly implicit.

(iii) All propositions appearing in proof 4 are combinations of the propositions A, B and C. These three have only one and the same person, namely, Caitra, as their subject-term. Because the conditional $((C \supset (A \vee B)) \wedge (C \wedge \neg A)) \supset B$ has been proved to be a theorem, it is consistently valid, no matter who or what becomes the subject-term of A, B and C. In our proof 1 (cf. above p. 316), it was demonstrated that Caitra's being outside is comprehended on the basis of the universal conditional $\forall x ((Rx \wedge \neg Px) \supset Qx)$, namely: "Whoever, although being alive, is not in their house, is outside." The fact is, however, that the process of comprehension proceeds conversely. Paying attention solely to Caitra, we are led through the proof of *arthāpatti* to the conclusion that Caitra is outside. If we wish, we can further postulate the universal conditional $\forall x ((Rx \wedge \neg Px) \supset Qx)$ on the basis of this *arthāpatti*, for there is no restriction as to who or what may become the subject-term of the propositions forming a theorem.[31]

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[28] *NR* p. 324,30-31: *prameyasya bahirbhāvasyānupraveśaḥ*; *ŚVT* p. 394,16: *bahirbhāvākhyaprameyānupraveśa iti*; *ŚV*, *Arthāpatti*, v. 27b: *bahirbhāvaḥ praveśitaḥ*.

[29] Cf. Lemmon 1972: 9 on the *Rule of Assumption*: "The logician's concern is with the soundness of argument rather than the truth or falsity of any assumptions made."

[30] In verse 24 (cf. n. 8 above), the existence of Caitra is not considered as something to be confirmed but only presupposed: "Under the condition that the knowledge of the existence [of a person] is established …" (*siddhe sadbhāvavijñāne* …). We should remember that the Mīmāṃsakās employed *arthāpatti* mainly in their vedic exegesis. The premises of such *arthāpatti*s are given in passages of the Veda, which is established by itself (*svataḥprāmāṇya*), not by any external factors. Whereas later Mīmāṃsakās argued how to confirm Caitra's existence in this world by taking recourse to astrology or other devices, Kumārila did not deal with this question at all and seems to have neglected it deliberately.

[31] If we replace A of theorem β by Pt, B by Qt and C by Rt, and then introduce a universal quantifier into β, we can derive a universal affirmative $\forall x ((Rx \supset (Px \vee Qx)) \supset ((Rx \wedge \neg Px) \supset Qx))$. In order to avoid unjustified universalization of some particular instances, a restriction is imposed: "Before we apply UI (= introduction of a universal quantifier), we should make sure that "*a*" (= an arbitrarily selected object) does not appear in any of the assumptions on which the conclusion rests" (Lemmon 1972: 109). Because β is a theorem and therefore has no assumptions on which it rests, we do not break this restriction when we introduce a universal quantifier here. Following Maehara 1998: 95 or Lemmon 1972: 108, we can derive $\forall x (Fx) \supset \forall x (Gx)$ from $\forall x (Fx \supset Gx)$:

(1) $\forall x (Fx \supset Gx)$	[1]	assumption
(2) $\forall x (Fx)$	[2]	assumption
(3) $Fa \supset Ga$	[1]	(1) and the rule of universal quantifier elimination (cf. Lemmon 1972: 104)
(4) Fa	[2]	(2) and the rule of universal quantifier elimination
(5) Ga	[1, 2]	(3) (4) and *Modus Ponendo Ponens*

Kumārila is aware of this process of comprehension. At the beginning of his discussion of the impracticability of confirming the second and the third characteristics of the reason, he mentions the "inseparable connection" (*avinābhāvitā*) of the reason with what is to be proved (*sādhya*). According to him, the comprehension of the conclusion "Caitra is outside" is not caused by this inseparable connection. Such a connection is, conversely, presumed (*parikalpyate*) on the basis of the *arthāpatti* itself which pertains to a particular person:

> *avinābhāvitā cātra tadaiva parikalpyate |*
> *na prāg avagatety evaṃ saty apy eṣā*[32] *na kāraṇam ||.*
>
> And the inseparable connection [of "not being in their house" with "being outside"] in this (domain of discourse which consists of all existent persons[33]) is presumed (*parikalpyate*) only at this time [of deriving Caitra's being outside]; it was not comprehended beforehand. In this way, this (inseparable connection) is not the cause [of comprehending the conclusion of an *arthāpatti*], although it is already given.[34] (*ŚV*, *Arthāpatti*, v. 30)

Kumārila does not deny that the inseparable connection of "not being in their house" with "being outside" is already established for all existent persons before one employs the *arthāpatti* to derive that Caitra is outside. If we dare to reduce this *arthāpatti* into an *anumāna* as demonstrated in proof 1, we can find similar instances as well as dissimilar instances in this world. In order to confirm Caitra's being outside, we have to visit his house in the conviction that he is alive and nevertheless witness his absence there. However, we do not have to examine whether others are in their houses or outside. All we need to do is to observe the Caitra's everyday life and make sure that he is either in his house or outside it.

V.

In the history of Indian logic, and up to the present, it has generally been overlooked that in some examples of *arthāpatti* Kumārila discovered the possibility of an alternative way of reasoning in which one does not have recourse to a universal conditional.[35] Śāntarakṣita and Jayantabhaṭṭa, for instance, did not at all understand why Kumārila distinguished *arthāpatti* from *anumāna*. They erroneously believed that they could refute Kumārila's position by reducing his Caitra-*arthāpatti* to an *anumāna* like our proof 1, something Kumārila himself had anticipated.[36]

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(6) $\forall$ x (Gx) [1, 2] (5) and the rule of universal quantifier introduction
(7) $\forall$ x (Fx) $\supset$ $\forall$ x (Gx) [1] (2) (6) and *Conditional Proof*
(8) $\forall$ x (Fx $\supset$ Gx) $\supset$ ($\forall$ x (Fx) $\supset$ $\forall$ x (Gx)) (1) (7) and *Conditional Proof*.

On the basis of this proof, we can derive $\forall$ x (Rx $\supset$ (Px $\vee$ Qx)) $\supset$ $\forall$ x ((Rx $\wedge$ $\neg$ Px) $\supset$ Qx) from the universal affirmative $\forall$ x ((Rx $\supset$ (Px $\vee$ Qx)) $\supset$ ((Rx $\wedge$ $\neg$ Px) $\supset$ Qx)) if we replace Fx by Rx $\supset$ (Px $\vee$ Qx) and Gx by (Rx $\wedge$ $\neg$ Px) $\supset$ Qx. Starting from the conditional proposition (C $\supset$ (A $\vee$ B)) $\supset$ ((C $\wedge$ $\neg$ A) $\supset$ B) which concerns a particular person, we can consequently presume the following: $\forall$ x ((Rx $\wedge$ $\neg$ Px) $\supset$ Qx) is always true as long as $\forall$ x (Rx $\supset$ (Px $\vee$ Qx)), i.e., "All living persons are either in their house or outside," is true in this world.

[32] *ŚV* as printed in *ŚVT* and *NR*; in *ŚVK*: *anyathaiṣā*.

[33] Because in the next verse (v. 31a) Kumārila takes the reason and what is to be proved as "absence from their house" and "presence outside" (*gṛhābhāvabahirbhāvau*) without qualifying the reason by "although being alive," he confines the domain of discourse to the class of all persons who are alive.

[34] Cf. *ŚVT* p. 394,20: *saty apy atrāvinābhāvitve*; *ŚVK* p. 170,19-20: *sā svarūpasaty api na pūrvam avagateti*; *NR* p. 325,7: *prāg arthāpatteḥ sann api*.

[35] The neglect of *arthāpatti* in the history of Indian logic may be comparable to the destiny of the propositional logic which was developed in the Megarian and Stoic schools, but remained misunderstood with the bias of Aristotelian term logic in the history of traditional western logic. Cf. Bochenski 1962: 123-124.

[36] *Tattvasaṃgraha* (*TS*) vv. 1645-1646; *Nyāyamañjarī* (*NM*) pp. 114,13-115,4.

What then is Dharmakīrti's position with regard to *arthāpatti*? Dignāga had already asserted in his *Pramāṇasamuccaya* that what the Mīmāṃsākas of his times called *abhāva*, i.e., a means of knowing on the basis of absence, could not be regarded as a valid means of knowledge. This *abhāva*, he claimed, is nothing other than a primitive form of the *arthāpatti* used to derive Caitra's being outside, although it does not yet require the qualification of "his being alive."[37] Thus, we can hardly imagine that Dharmakīrti did not take note of this controversy between the Buddhists and Mīmāṃsākas. Moreover, it has already been pointed out that Dharmakīrti was acquainted with Kumārila's views on several topics.[38] Indeed, he uses the term *arthāpatti* several times in its proper meaning.[39] Nevertheless, in his works he is silent on the nature of *arthāpatti*.

Among the eleven types of inference for confirming a negative judgment enumerated in the second chapter of the *Nyāyabindu* (*NB*), seven types[40] have their reason in an affirmative judgment based on the perception of something present. Among these seven are the following two types: "inference from the perception of a property incompatible with the [property to be negated] itself" (*NB* 2.34: *svabhāvaviruddhopalabdhi*) and "inference from the perception of a property pervaded by an incompatible property" (*viruddhavyāptopalabdhi*). The other five types are applied forms of *svabhāvaviruddhopalabdhi*.[41] As an example of *svabhāvaviruddhopalabdhi*, Dharmakīrti states: "There is no cold temperature here, because there is a fire" (*nātra śītasparśo vahner iti*).[42] In the process of *svabhāvaviruddhopalabdhi* there occurs a reasoning based on one of the two kinds of incompatibility (*virodha*),[43] namely, "impossibility of co-existence" (*sahānavasthānavirodha*),[44] which corresponds to

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[37] *Pramāṇasamuccaya* (*PS*) vv. 2.51cd-52ab. In his *Vṛtti*, Dignāga cites two sentences, "Caitra is absent from [his] house" (*nag pa khyim na med*) and "Caitra is present outside" (*nag pa phyi rol na yod*), and states that the derivation of the latter from the former is an *arthāpatti* (*don gyi go ba*). Cf. Frauwallner 1968: 90-92. Kellner (1997a: 46-50) terms this type of *abhāvapramāṇa* "the proto-*abhāvapramāṇa*."

[38] For the meaning of a word, cf. Hattori 1996; for the refutation of the existence of God, cf. Krasser 1999; with regard to the repeated observance (*bhūyodarśana*) as the means to establish a pervasion, cf. Steinkellner 1997, and for the limit of the Buddha's compassion (*karuṇā*), cf. Inami 1986.

[39] Cf. Ono et al. 1996: 183; Steinkellner 1973: 34 (*don gyis go ba*). Dignāga remarks that if one of the two aspects of pervasion, i.e., *anvaya* and *vyatireka*, is established, the other is understood by means of *arthāpatti* (cf. *Nyāyamukha* [*NMu*] f. 3a3; Katsura 1981: 71-73). Dharmakīrti takes over this view (cf. *Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti* [*PVSV*] p. 18,17; *Pramāṇaviniścaya* [*PVin*] II pp. 34,9, 34,31 and 72,11; cf. Steinkellner 1979: 39, n. 92 and Kajiyama 1999: 11) and additionally remarks that the thesis of a *parārthānumāna* is understood by means of *arthāpatti* from the two syllogistic members presenting reason and pervasion (cf. Tillemans 1999: 72-73). Tillemans points out Dharmakīrti's synonymous usage of *sāmarthyāt*, *arthāt* and *arthāpattyā*. We frequently find this usage in Mīmāṃsā literature. Dharmottara glosses *arthāpatti* with *sāmarthya* (*NBṬ* p. 253,9 on *NB* 3.136).

[40] These are the types besides *svabhāvānupalabdhi* (2.31), *kāryānupalabdhi* (2.32), *vyāpakānupalabdhi* (2.33; cf. Steinkellner 1991) and *kāraṇānupalabdhi* (2.39). As for the various classifications of negative inferences in the works of Dharmakīrti and later logicians, see Kajiyama 1966: 151-154 and Steinkellner 1981.

[41] These applied forms are *viruddhakāryopalabdhi* (2.35), *kāryaviruddhopalabdhi* (2.37), *vyāpakaviruddhopalabdhi* (2.38), *kāraṇaviruddhopalabdhi* (2.40) and *kāraṇaviruddhakāryopalabdhi* (2.41). In fact, even *svabhāvānupalabdhi* is impossible without *svabhāvaviruddhopalabdhi*. Cf. n. 54 below.

[42] With regard to the translation of *sparśa* not as "sensation" but "temperature," which is the special object of touch, see Preisendanz 1994: 503-504.

[43] Cf. *NB* 3.72-75.

[44] This term is used by Dharmottara; cf. *NBṬ* pp. 199,3 and 207,6. Dharmakīrti uses the term *sahabhāvavirodha* (*PVSV* p. 5,11; *PVin* II pp. 12,35-13,1: *lhan cig yod par 'gal*) and defines it in *NB* 3.73: "If one relatum, which is existing as long as the totality of its causes remains unimpaired, vanishes when another relatum appears, then one realizes incompatibility [between them]" (*avikalakāraṇasya bhavato 'nyabhāve 'bhāvād virodhagatiḥ*). Cf. Steinkellner 1991: n. 32. Because *anyabhāve 'bhavaḥ* in this definition can be rendered into

"contrariety," $\neg (A \wedge B)$ in traditional western logic.[45] The other kind of incompatibility, namely, "mutually exhaustive exclusion," is presented as an incompatibility applied in the example of the *viruddhavyāptopalabdhi* in *NB* 2.36.[46]

That which is, in the sense of contrariety, incompatible with cold temperature (*śītasparśa*) is hot temperature (*uṣṇasparśa*).[47] Dharmakīrti, however, accepts that fire is incompatible with cold temperature because "fire" and "hot temperature" are designations for one and the same real entity that is capable of keeping out the cold.[48] Suppose that from the outside we see Caitra sit in front of a kindled stove in his house.[49] Let us take the proposition "Caitra is sitting in front of a fire" as A, and "Caitra feels cold" as B. We then can render the conditional proposition "If it is impossible for Caitra to sit in front of a fire and to feel cold simultaneously, and in addition, if Caitra is sitting in front of a fire, then it is impossible for him to feel cold there" into the formula $(\neg (A \wedge B) \wedge A) \supset \neg B$. We can prove this formula as follows:

Proof 5: $(\neg (A \wedge B) \wedge A) \supset \neg B$

(1) $\neg (A \wedge B) \wedge A$	[1]	assumption
(2) $\neg (A \wedge B)$	[1]	(1) and $\wedge$-*Elimination* (*sahānavasthānavirodha*)
(3) A	[1]	(1) and $\wedge$-*Elimination*
(4) $\neg (A \wedge B) \supset (\neg A \vee \neg B)$		laws of de Morgan (cf. Lemmon 1972: 41 [g])
(5) $\neg A \vee \neg B$	[1]	(2) (4) and *Modus Ponendo Ponens*[50]
(6) $\neg A$	[6]	assumption

$A \supset \neg B$, we can prove that $\neg (A \wedge B)$ is implied in this definition as follows:

(1) $A \supset \neg B$	[1]	assumption
(2) $A \wedge B$	[2]	assumption for *Reductio ad Absurdum*
(3) A	[2]	(2) and $\wedge$-*Elimination*
(4) B	[2]	(2) and $\wedge$-*Elimination*
(5) $\neg B$	[1, 2]	(1) (3) and *Modus Ponendo Ponens*
(6) $B \wedge \neg B$	[1, 2]	(4) (5) and $\wedge$-*Introduction*
(7) $\neg (A \wedge B)$	[1]	(2) (6) and *Reductio ad Absurdum*
(8) $(A \supset \neg B) \supset \neg (A \wedge B)$		(1) (7) and *Conditional Proof*.

[45] Lemmon (1972: 69): "Two propositions A and B are traditionally called *contrary* if they are never both true (though they may both be false); that is, if whenever one is true the other is false."

[46] This incompatibility, "whose characteristic is constantly established by mutual exclusion" (*NB* 3.75: *parasparaparihārasthitalakṣaṇatā*), forms the Indian version of the law of excluded middle ($A \vee \neg A$). In *NB* 2.36 the following inference is introduced: "Destruction (*vināśa*) of something present or past is uncertain (*na dhruvabhāvin*) because it depends on extraneous causes (*hetvantarāpekṣaṇāt*)." The *hetu* "dependence on extraneous causes" is pervaded (*vyāpta*) by the *sādhya* "uncertainty" which is incompatible (*viruddha*) with "certainty." Here the property to be proved which pervades the *hetu* and the property with which the former is incompatible pervade the whole domain of discourse, in other words, they exclude each other without leaving room for the third alternative. It is Birgit Kellner (1997b: 503-504; 507) who discovered this exceptional usage of the term *viruddha* in *NB* 2.

[47] Dharmakīrti illustrates *sahānavasthāna* in *NB* 3.74: *śītoṣṇasparśavat*. Cf. *PVSV* p. 6,1-2: *viruddhasiddhyā yathā na śītasparśo 'trāgneḥ*.

[48] Cf. the example of *vyāpakaviruddhopalabdhi* cited in *NB* 2.38: "There is no frigid temperature here because there is a fire" (*nātra tuṣārasparśo vahner iti*). The reason incompatible (*viruddha*) with the cold temperature which pervades (*vyāpaka*) the frigid temperature (*tuṣārasparśa*) is not something pervading fire, but fire itself.

[49] Commenting on *NB* 2.34, Dharmottara asserts that one (= the observer) draws this inference for the case in which one cannot feel the cold in question (*NBṬ* p. 129,12-13: *yatra śītasparśo 'dṛśyaḥ*).

[50] Applying $\wedge$-*Introduction*, we can derive a formula $(\neg A \vee \neg B) \wedge A$ from (3) and (5). If we replace $\neg A$ with P and $\neg B$ with Q, then this formula becomes $(P \vee Q) \wedge \neg P$ and thus results in Q, namely, $\neg B$, having followed proof 3.

(7) $A \wedge \neg A$	[1, 6]	(3) (6) and $\wedge$-*Introduction*
(8) $(A \wedge \neg A) \supset \neg B$		theorem of arbitrary derivation from a contradiction
(9) $\neg B$	[1, 6]	(7) (8) and *Modus Ponendo Ponens*
(10) $\neg A \supset \neg B$	[1]	(6) (9) and *Conditional Proof*
(11) $\neg B \supset \neg B$		law of identity
(12) $\neg B$	[1]	(5) (10) (11) and $\vee$-*Elimination*
(13) $(\neg (A \wedge B) \wedge A) \supset \neg B$		(1) (12) and *Conditional Proof*.[51]

It may, therefore, be reasonable to conclude that the inference based on *svabhāvaviruddhopalabdhi* is accomplished by way of deduction within the scope of propositional logic, and without recourse to a universal quantifier, in the same way as the *arthāpatti* used to derive Caitra's being outside.[52] What is demonstrated in proof 3 is a *modus tollendo ponens*: "If a disjunction holds and also the negation of one of its disjuncts, the other disjunct holds." That which is, on the other hand, demonstrated in proof 5 is a *modus ponendo tollens*: "If the negation of a conjunction holds and also one of its conjuncts, the negation of the other conjunct holds."[53]

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[51] The process from (5) to (12) follows the proof of a disjunctive syllogism $((P \vee Q) \wedge \neg P) \supset Q$ demonstrated in Noya 1997: 217. If we take "A mongoose (*nakula*) defeated a serpent" as A, and "A serpent defeated a mongoose" as B, we can render the relation between killer and killed (*vadhyaghātakabhāva*), i.e., the last of the seven possible relations (*saṃbandha*) enumerated in the *Ṣaṣṭitantra* (cf. Frauwallner 1958: 38; 42,19-20; 45-46), into the formula $\neg (A \wedge B)$. If we know that a mongoose and a serpent are fighting in a hidden place and see the mongoose come back alive, we can conjecture that the serpent did not win. We can render this reasoning too into the formula $(\neg (A \wedge B) \wedge A) \supset \neg B$. Although the reasoning consists of a series of deductions in the scope of propositional logic, Kumārila includes it in the realm of *anumāna* in his answer to the question why the Vṛttikāra did not adduce it as an example of *arthāpatti* (*ŚV*, *Arthāpatti*, v. 50).

Kumārila must have been aware of such a Sāṃkhya theory as explained by the author of the *Yuktidīpikā* with regard to the battle between boar and lion, instead of mongoose and serpent: "If the knower has apprehended the whole which consists of both relata and, perceiving either of the relata, knows the other relatum, this is an inference" (*YD* p. 73,15-17: *adhigatobhayasaṃbandhisamudāyasya hi pratipattuḥ pratyakṣībhūtānyatarasaṃbandhino yā saṃbandhyantarapratipattis tad anumānam*). The genitive adjective "has apprehended the whole which consists of both relata" seems to correspond to the major premise, and "perceiving either of the relata" to the minor premise in a categorical syllogism. Nevertheless, "the whole" (*samudāya*) in the premise does not mean a universal conditional established in a specific domain of discourse, but the contrariety between two incompatible relata. The author of the *Yuktidīpikā* does not designate a domain of discourse in this context. This syllogism is, therefore, not a categorical syllogism, but a kind of disjunctive syllogism called *modus ponendo tollens*. Although Kumārila concedes a point to the Sāṃkhya school in v. 50, this form of reasoning is not an *anumāna* as long as a pervasion is indispensable for *anumāna*.

[52] It is true that we can presume a universal proposition "Hot temperature and cold temperature do not co-exist at all in any entities in this world". If we take the predicate "causing hot temperature" as H, and "causing cold temperature" as C, this universal proposition is rendered into $\forall x (\neg (Hx \wedge Cx))$. But once $\neg (A \wedge B)$ is taken for granted, $\forall x (\neg (Hx \wedge Cx))$ does not contribute to the process of inference from A to $\neg B$ in proof 5 (lines [3] to [12]). Kumārila would advise us to concentrate on the change of temperature in Caitra's house.

[53] Lemmon 1972: 61. Strictly speaking, both *modus tollendo ponens* and *modus ponendo tollens* have an exclusive disjunction $(A \vee B) \wedge \neg (A \wedge B)$ in their premise, and they are therefore both called disjunctive syllogism (cf. Craig 1998, Glossary). Because $A \vee B$ and $\neg (A \wedge B)$ are connected with a conjunction in this premise, we can separate them applying the rule of $\wedge$-*Elimination,* and use either only $A \vee B$ or only $\neg (A \wedge B)$ in the proofs of both syllogisms. Exclusive disjunction, however, is assumed neither in the example of *arthāpatti* nor in that of *sahānavasthānavirodha*. Because it is possible for Caitra to lie sprawled over the threshold of his house or to eat by day as well as at night, $\neg (A \wedge B)$ is not assumed in our proof 3. $A \vee B$ is not assumed in our proof 5 either, since it is possible that Caitra feels neither heat nor cold in his house.

Consequently, I propose (not derive) as a "working hypothesis" the following interpretation for why Dharmakīrti kept silent on the nature of *arthāpatti*: Following Dignāga, Dharmakīrti established the thesis that besides perception there is only one kind of *pramāṇa*, viz., *anumāna*, based on pervasion. He thus had to admit any logical reasoning, inasmuch as it is a valid reasoning, as an *anumāna*. He regarded even *svabhāvaviruddhopalabdhi*, which is based on propositional deduction, as a kind of reason for an *anumāna* by including it into the types of inference for confirming a negative judgment.[54] It is interesting to note that in his discussion he carefully avoids suggesting that the process of *svabhāvaviruddhopalabdhi* is

[54] By means of an axiomatic proof, we can analyze the validity of the stock example of the most basic inference as a means for a negative judgment, namely, *svabhāvānupalabdhi* (*NB* 2.32): "In this particular place, a pot is absent because it is not perceived, although the definition of perceptibility is applied to it" (*NB* 2.12: *na pradeśaviśeṣe kvacid ghaṭaḥ, upalabdhilakṣaṇaprāptasyānupalabdheḥ*; cf. also *NB* 2.45; Katsura 1992: 228-229). In *NB* 2.13, Dharmakīrti reduces the definition of perceptibility to the conjunction of the entirety of conditions of perception except for the presence of the particular object in question (*upalambhapratyayāntarasākalya*) and its specific property (*svabhāvaviśeṣa*). This "specific property" is defined in *NB* 2.14: "The specific property is that property [of a particular object] which, being present in the presence of [the entirety of] other conditions of [its] perception is necessarily perceived" (*yaḥ svabhāvaḥ satsv anyeṣūpalambhapratyayeṣu san pratyakṣa eva bhavati sa svabhāvaviśeṣaḥ*). Not only the expression *satsv anyeṣūpalambhapratyayeṣu* in locative absolute but also *san*, the nominative singular of the present participle, refers to the condition of *pratyakṣa*. Cf. *sat* in *PVSV* p. 101,19 (Kellner 1997: n. 163) and *bhāvo hi yadi bhavet* in *PVSV* p. 104,8. Accordingly we can render Dharmakīrti's idea of the "specific property" of a pot which stands in a particular place into the formula $(A \wedge B) \supset C$, taking the proposition "the entirety of other conditions of perception of the pot is present" as A, "the pot is present" as B, and "the pot is perceived" as C. This stock example of a negative inference taught in *NB* 2.12-14 is, in its totality, to be rendered into the formula $((((A \wedge B) \supset C) \wedge A) \wedge \neg C) \supset \neg B$ and proved as follows:

Proof 6: $((((A \wedge B) \supset C) \wedge A) \wedge \neg C) \supset \neg B$

(1) $((((A \wedge B) \supset C) \wedge A) \wedge \neg C)$	[1]	assumption
(2) $((A \wedge B) \supset C) \wedge A$	[1]	(1) and $\wedge$-*Elimination*
(3) $(A \wedge B) \supset C$	[1]	(2) and $\wedge$-*Elimination*
(4) $\neg C$	[1]	(1) and $\wedge$-*Elimination*
(5) $\neg (A \wedge B)$	[1]	(3) (4) and *Modus Tollendo Tollens*
(6) A	[1]	(2) and $\wedge$-*Elimination*
(7) $\neg (A \wedge B) \supset (\neg A \vee \neg B)$		laws of de Morgan
(8) $\neg A \vee \neg B$	[1]	(5) (7) and *Modus Ponendo Ponens*
(9) $\neg A$	[9]	assumption for $\wedge$-*Elimination*
(10) $A \wedge \neg A$	[1, 9]	(6) (9) and $\wedge$-*Introduction*
(11) $(A \wedge \neg A) \supset \neg B$		theorem of arbitrary derivation from a contradiction
(12) $\neg B$	[1, 9]	(10) (11) and *Modus Ponendo Ponens*
(13) $\neg A \supset \neg B$	[1]	(9) (12) and *Conditional Proof*
(14) $\neg B \supset \neg B$		law of identity
(15) $\neg B$	[1]	(8) (13) (14) and $\vee$-*Elimination*
(16) $((((A \wedge B) \supset C) \wedge A) \wedge \neg C) \supset \neg B$		(1) (15) and *Conditional Proof*.

From (5) to (15), this proof follows the same process as steps (2) to (12) of proof 5 of the *svabhāvaviruddhopalabdhi*: $(\neg (A \wedge B) \wedge A) \supset \neg B$. In (5) of proof 6, we find the starting point of a reasoning with the help of incompatibility in the sense of *sahānavasthāna*: If a pot is not perceived ($\neg C$), the presence of the pot (B) becomes incompatible with the fact that the entirety of conditions for its perception is present (A). Both A and B pertain to a particular pot, not to the universal notion of pot. Therefore, this inference based on "non-perception" contains a series of deductive reasoning within propositional logic. An additional remark: Although Dharmakīrti declares that all ten varieties are included (*saṃgraham upayanti*) in the *svabhāvānupalabdhi* (*NB* 2.42; cf. Kellner 1999: 204), *svabhāvaviruddhopalabdhi* must be theoretically implied in *svabhāvānupalabdhi*. Dharmakīrti, in fact, refers to this implication in *PV* 1.204 with the expression *tadviruddhopalabdhau*.

based on pervasion.[55] Most presumably this is so because Dharmakīrti noticed that such a reasoning without pervasion is possible. Nevertheless, he did not mention the Caitra-*arthāpatti*, another example of reasoning based on propositional deduction, at all. Why did Dharmakīrti neglect this type of *arthāpatti*? For him, any inference for confirming an affirmative judgment must be based on one of the two kinds of inseparable connection (*avinābhāva*), i.e., *tādātmya* and *tadutpatti*.[56] Caitra's presence outside his house is, however, neither an essential property (*svabhāva*) nor the cause of his absence from his house, although the former is necessarily derived from the latter under the condition that Caitra is alive and either in his house or outside as long as he is alive.[57] I presume that for this reason Dharmakīrti did not accept the Caitra-*arthāpatti* as a proper reasoning in his own logical system.

VI.

A detailed discussion on the reason why Kumārila became aware of the possibility of propositional derivation without having recourse to a universal conditional is beyond the scope of this paper. Yet we can explain the background: Kumārila, a conservative rationalist of orthodox brahmanism, was very cautious about accepting universal laws in nature and opposed to the laying down of universal norms in society solely in accordance with the human intellect because human beings are only capable of learning a few things from their limited experience. It is Prof. Wilhelm Halbfass who paid much attention to Kumārila's criticism of the

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[55] In *NB* 2.46, Dharmakīrti enumerates three kinds of basic relation to be examined when deriving a negative judgment about "something perceptible" (*NB* 2.45: *upalabdhilakṣaṇaprāpta*) and distinguishes incompatibility (*virodha*) from causality (*kāryakāraṇabhāva*) and "absence" (*abhāva*). The "absence" (*abhāva*) mentioned in *NB* 2.46 concerns the relation between an entity and its essential property (*svabhāva*). Dharmottara explains this "absence" referring to the stock example of a *śiṃśapā* tree (*NBṬ* p. 146,1-2). In the case of "absence" and causality (*NBṬ* p. 145,10-11) as the basis of a negative judgment from non-perception (*anupalabdhi*), the negative pervasion of the complement of the originally pervading class by the complement of the originally pervaded class becomes an issue.

Dharmottara comments on the incompatibility (*virodha*) mentioned in *NB* 2.46 as follows: "When we know that in case one is present, the other is absent, we understand that there is incompatibility [between them]" (*NBṬ* p. 145,10: *ekasaṃnidhāv aparābhāvapratītau jñāto virodhaḥ*). We should not suppose that here Dharmottara is thinking of pervasion, because in this context he neither uses the term *vyāpti* or related terms, nor designates a specific domain of discourse. It is true that we can suppose a domain of discourse in which two classes, e.g., the class of entities (A) which cause hot temperature and the class of entities (B) which cause cold temperature, exclude each other. And we can even presume that the class of (A) is pervaded by the complement of the class of (B), namely, the complement which consists of heated entities and entities neither heated nor cold. If, however, it were based on this pervasion that we infer that something causes no cold temperature because it is heated, then, just as in the case of *viruddhavyāptopalabdhi* (*NB* 2.36, cf. n. 46 above), the incompatibility which contributes to this inference would be established only between the class of (B) and its complement, not between the class of (A) and the class of (B). In other words, no room would be left for contrariety (*sahānavasthāna*) to be distinguished as a kind of incompatibility that is applicable in a negative inference, since the inference by means of *svabhāvaviruddhopalabdhi* would then be established in dependence on the mutually exhaustive exclusion (*parasparaparihārasthitalakṣaṇatā*) between a class and its complement and on a pervasion (*vyāpti*) within the complement.

[56] Cf. *NB* 2.18-24.

[57] It is probably inappropriate to assume that Dharmakīrti devised a new type of inference by means of *svabhāvaviruddhopalabdhi* in order to counter Kumārila's propositional derivation by means of *arthāpatti*. Praśastapāda already uses the term *virodha* in the sense of contrariety (*Padārthadharmasaṃgraha* [*PDhS*] p. 24, 11-12: *sahānavasthānalakṣaṇe tu virodhe*) and asserts that *arthāpatti* is an *anumāna* in which the notion of a certain incompatibility is used (*PDhS* p. 48,16: *darśanārthād arthāpattir virodhy eva*).

theory of a universal retribution of *karman*,[58] his theodicy of animal killing (*hiṃsā*) in sacrifices[59] and his reply to the vehement rejection of Vedic sacrifice as something bringing about no result at all.[60] In the course of these polemics, Kumārila is confronted by anti-brahmanical contemporaries who, along with developing their own logico-epistemological theories, devoted themselves to establishing universal morals to be accepted by all human beings irrespective of social status.[61]

Kumārila and his predecessors not only refused to apply the human intellect to criticism of Vedic authority, but also refused to ascribe the origin of the authority of Vedic passages to their agreement with inferences based on some universal regularity. In the *Tantravārttika*, Kumārila tells us that some Mīmāṃsākas criticize the use of the following inferences referring to the process of farming and the resulting harvest in order to illustrate the effectivity of Vedic sacrifices:[62] "Whatever is an action causes its result, because it is an action, just like farming" and "This result is accomplished by an action because it is a result, just like rice."[63] The Mīmāṃsākas assert that in these inferences the pervasion of the reason by what is to be proved is not at all established. In their view, these inferences rely on an analogy (*upamāna*) alone; consequently, the reason deviates (*anaikāntika*) from what is to be proved.[64] The effectivity of sacrifices is accessible only through the revelation of the Veda. Based on the reasoning of the human intellect, one can neither deny nor prove it.

It may sound paradoxical that it was Kumārila and not scholars of philosophical traditions orientated to logic who became aware of the difference between propositional derivation and

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[58] Kumārila says: If one sticks to the criteria of giving pleasure or pain in determining whether an act is good or bad, one cannot condemn illicit drinking (*surāpāna*) or sexual intercourse with the wife of one's teacher as bad deeds (*ŚV*, *Codanā*, vv. 236cd-237ab; cf. Halbfass 1991: 90, nn. 13-14). Kumārila also rejects "habitual familiarity" (*lokaprasiddhi*) as a criterium for good and bad because in this way one would fall into an ethical relativism (*ŚV*, *Autpattika*, vv. 1-8; cf. Halbfass 1991: 97-98 and 111; nn. 51-52 and 111).

[59] Kumārila distinguishes "internal" (*aṅga*) killing which forms an inevitable part of sacrifices from "external" (*anaṅga*) non-sacrificial killing which is sinful (*ŚV*, *Codanā*, v. 258cd), and even regards sacrifices involved in curses as neutral, comparing them to a sword which is different from the injury caused by means of it (*ŚV*, *Codanā*, v. 205). Cf. Halbfass 1991: 91; nn. 18 and 20.

[60] In answer to this criticism, Kumārila points out that concerning the *citrā* ceremony for attainment of cattle nothing is stated in the Veda about when the result occurs after the performance of the ceremony (*ŚV*, *Citrākṣepaparihāra*, v. 21). In the case of the *kārīrī* ceremony, when rain fails to fall immediately there must be some obstacle which results from a previous act related to a Vedic injunction (*ŚV*, *Citrākṣepaparihāra*, v. 26cd). Cf. Halbfass 1991: 305, nn. 60-61.

[61] Kumārila calls them "self-conceited with logic" (*tarkamānin*) and accuses them of not accepting the Vedic origin of *ahiṃsā*. Cf. *Tantravārttika* (*TV*) Vol. 2, p. 162,24; Halbfass 1991: 96, n. 40. For Kumārila's theory developed to defend the Varṇa system, see chapter 10 of Halbfass 1991.

[62] Although this criticism appears in the opponent's assertion (*TV* Vol. 3, pp. 106,8-110,23) on the *Indriyakāmādhikaraṇa* (*Mīmāṃsāsūtra* [*MS*] 2.2.25-26), we can safely assume that Kumārila supports it because he does not mention it at all in the *siddhānta* (*TV* on *MS* 2.2.26).

[63] *TV* Vol. 3, p. 109,13-14: *yat karma tat phalavat karmatvāt kṛṣyādivat. karmasādhyaṃ vedaṃ phalaṃ phalatvād vrīhyādivat*.

[64] If it were allowed to infer what is to be proved based on analogy, one could infer Yajñadatta's dark complexion if Devadatta has such a complexion because both are human (*TV* Vol. 3, p. 108,13). However, analogy is based only on partial resemblance. A *gavaya* does not have a dewlap although it is similar to a cow. In the same way, the result of a basic sacrifice (*prakṛti*) cannot be brought about by means of its applied form (*vikṛti*) (*TV* Vol. 3, p. 108,15-16). And if the inferences in question are based on close analogy, one may prove that the sacrifice is an action that brings about a perceptible (*dṛṣṭa*) result, such as the harvest of rice (*TV* Vol. 3, p. 109,20-21).

inference (*anumāna*). Kumārila indeed frequently employs the tool of logical derivation from given information (*śrutārthāpatti*) in order to clarify what is implied in Vedic sentences.[65]

Conclusion

The typical example of an *arthāpatti* used in Mīmāṃsā treatises, i.e., the *arthāpatti* of Caitra's being outside, can be explained in accordance with the rules of propositional logic. In the *Arthāpattipariccheda*, Kumārila demonstrates the impracticability of confirming the three characteristics of a valid reason with regard to this example. He thereby posed an essential problem in logic to his contemporary logicians, although he himself did not elaborate his method of derivation in order to establish a particular style of formal logic. He maintained that in an *arthāpatti* the conclusion is derived from a premise that implies the conclusion. He further noticed that in an *arthāpatti* it is not necessary to have recourse to a universal conditional which should be given in the form of a pervasion between two classes in a specific domain of discourse. It may be supposed that this is why Kumārila refused to reduce such an *arthāpatti* to an *anumāna*, which is necessarily based on pervasion.[66]

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TS	*Tattvasaṃgraha*, in *The Tattvasaṅgraha of Ācārya Śāntarakṣita with the* "*Pañjikā*" *Commentary of Ācārya Kamalaśīla*, Vol. 1, ed. Swami Dwarikadas Shastri, 3rd ed. Varanasi 1997.
NB	*Nyāyabindu*, in *Paṇḍita Durveka Miśra's Dharmottarapradīpa*, ed. Dalsukhbai Malvania, rev. 2nd ed. Patna 1971.
NBṬ	*Nyayabinduṭīkā*, see *NB*.
NBh	*Nyāyabhāṣya*, see *NV*.
NM	*Nyāyamañjarī*, in *Nyāyamañjarī of Jayantabhaṭṭa with Ṭippaṇi*, Vol. 1, ed. K.S. Varadacharya, Mysore 1969.
NMu	*Nyāyamukha*, Taisho ed., Vol. 32.
NR	*Nyāyaratnākara*, see *ŚV*.
NV	*Nyāyavārttika*, in *Nyāyadarśanam*, *with Vātsyāyana's Bhāṣya*, *Uddyotakara's Vārttika*, *Vācaspati Miśra's Tātparyaṭīkā*, *and Viśvanātha's Vṛtti*, ed. Taranatha Tarkatirtha and Amarendramohan Tarkatirtha, Calcutta 1936.
PDhS	*Praśastapādabhāṣya*, in Bronkhorst and Ramseier 1994.

[65] Cf. *ŚV*, *Arthāpatti*, v. 87 and the *Hetuvannigadādhikaraṇa* in *TV* Vol. 2, pp. 47,18-48,13; Harikai 1990: 158-160 and 399-400. See also Harikai's article in the present volume, pp. 303-313.

[66] Because a propositional derivation is concerned with the structure of a set of propositions alone, without revealing the inner structure of individual propositions (cf. Lemmon 1972: 93), it does not matter at all whether the pertinent propositions have the same subject-term. The conclusion of the present article would therefore be established in a more convincing way if we could find other examples of *arthāpatti* in Kumārila's works in which a valid derivation is carried out with regard to propositions containing various subject-terms.

PV 1 *Pramāṇavārttika*, chapter 1, see *PVSV*.
PVin II *Pramāṇaviniścaya*, chapter 2, ed. in Steinkellner 1973.
PVSV *Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti*, in *The Pramāṇavārttikam of Dharmakīrti, the First Chapter with the Auto-Commentary*, ed. R. Gnoli, Roma 1960.
PS *Pramāṇasamuccaya*, ed. in Frauwallner 1968.
MS *Mīmāṃsāsutra*, see *TV*.
YD *Yuktidīpikā*: *The Most Significant Commentary on the Sāṃkhyakārikā*. Ed. A. Wezler and Sh. Motegi. Vol. 1. Stuttgart 1998.
ŚBh(F) *Śābarabhāṣya* on *MS* 1.1.1-5, ed. in Frauwallner 1968.
ŚV *Ślokavārttika*, in *Ślokavārttika of Śrī Kumārila Bhaṭṭa with the Commentary Nyāyaratnākara of Śrī Pārthasārathi Miśra*, ed. Svami Dvarikadas Shastri, Varanasi 1978.
ŚVK *Kāśikā*, in *The Mīmāṃsāślokavārttika with the Commentary Kāśikā of Sucaritamiśra*, Vol. 3, ed. V.A. Ramaswami Shastri, Trivandrum 1943.
ŚVT *Tātparyaṭīkā*, in *Ślokavārtikavyākhyā* (*Tātparyaṭīkā*) *of Bhaṭṭombeka*, ed. S.K. Ramanatha Shastri, rev. ed., Madras 1971.

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Jean-Marie Verpoorten

La théorie optique au chapitre VI de la *Prakaraṇapañcikā* de Śalikanātha

1. Ouvrage de référence pour la Mīmāṃsā de tendance prābhākara, la *Prakaraṇapañcikā* (*Pp*) de Śalikanātha (Ś) (entre 800 et 950) est d'autant plus prisée que l'oeuvre du maître de Ś – Prabhākara – est difficile et encore peu étudiée. La *Pp* est un ouvrage assez long de quatorze chapitres alternativement en prose et en vers, introduits le cas échéant par une stance où apparaissent tantôt le nom de Prabhākara, tantôt son surnom de Guru. Ces chapitres ont des thèmes variés, depuis le rituel jusqu'à la théorie de la connaissance, en passant par la philosophie grammaticale. Bref la *Pp* est une encyclopédie des thèmes spéculatifs de son époque.

Au centre de l'ouvrage, figure l'exposé des moyens de connaissance droite ou *pramāṇa*, qui avaient été recensés sommairement par Śabara, le fondateur de la Mīmāṃsā, dans sa paraphrase des *sūtra*s 1.1.4-5 de Jaimini,[1] avant d'être commentés par Prabhākara dans sa *Bṛhatī*.[2]

2. Les chapitres que la *Pp* consacre aux *pramāṇa*s portent le nom de *-pariccheda*, sauf le premier – c'est-à-dire le sixième de l'oeuvre – qui s'intitule *Pramāṇapārāyaṇa* "Investigation approfondie des moyens de connaissance droite", et qui rassemble les réflexions de Ś sur la notion de *pramāṇa* et sur le premier et le principal d'entre eux, le *pratyakṣa* ou "perception".

Quelle est la méthode suivie par Ś? Il recueille diverses définitions, les discute puis les rejette et propose à leur place celles de son école. Comme beaucoup de penseurs de son temps et d'après, Ś est un doxographe. Et comme la philosophie bouddhiste semble marquer les esprits, c'est sur elle que Ś pose en premier son regard critique. Il part de la définition du *pramāṇa* par Dharmakīrti pour la contester. Il passe alors à celles du Nyāya–Vaiśeṣika et à celles de son collègue en Mīmāṃsā, Kumārila. Il en arrive enfin aux positions de Prabhākara. Mais ici, double paradoxe, il s'appuie d'abord sur des citations qu'on ne localise pas jusqu'à présent dans l'oeuvre conservée du Guru[3] et, ensuite, il semble bien mieux connaître le Bouddhisme que sa propre doctrine.

L'extrait traduit et commenté ci-après[4] relève de la deuxième partie du chapitre VI qui traite de la perception sensible. Avant d'en fournir la définition bouddhique qu'il tire du *Nyāyabindu* de Dharmakīrti, Ś nous propose au préalable celle élaborée dans les cercles de "logique" (Nyāya) et de "physique philosophique" (Vaiśeṣika), témoignant du reste pour cette dernière d'un incontestable penchant.

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[1] En *Śābarabhāṣya*, la perception est l'objet du *Mīmāṃsāsūtra* (*MS*) 1.1.4. Au sein de la glose du *sūtra* 5, entre les sections désignées traditionnellement comme *Śūnyavāda* et *Citravāda*, se glisse la liste des cinq autres *pramāṇa*s reconnus par la Mīmāṃsā: l'*anumāna*, le *śāstra*, l'*upamāna*, l'*arthāpatti* et l'*abhāva*. Cf. Frauwallner 1968: 30 et 32. Ajoutons que la glose n'est pas de Śabara seul mais aussi d'un prédécesseur connu comme le "Glossateur" (*vṛttikāra*).

[2] Il existe à ce jour deux éditions du commentaire de Prabhākara au *Śābarabhāṣya* intitulé *Bṛhatī* ou "Grande [paraphrase]": celle par C. Sastri (incomplète); celle par S.K.R. Sastri et al. (complète). C'est le texte de la première qui est reproduit, sectionné sous diverses rubriques, par Kevalananda Sarasvati 1952-1976. Les deux éditions contiennent aussi le sous-commentaire de Ś sur la *Bṛhatī* intitulé *Ṛjuvimalapañcikā.*

[3] Les problèmes posés par la définition attribuée par Ś à Prabhākara du *pramāṇa* comme *anubhūti* ou "expérience" (*Pp* pp. 124-125) sont trop complexes pour être abordés ici.

[4] Soit les pages 129,2-131,9 de l'édition standard de la *Pp* par A. Subrahmanya Sastri.

Karin Preisendanz (ed.), *Expanding and Merging Horizons*: *Contributions to South Asian and Cross-Cultural Studies in Commemoration of Wilhelm Halbfass*, Wien: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 2007, pp. 337-346.

3. A travers l'exposé de Ś, on reconnaît le plan suivi par les très longs commentaires élaborés autour de *Nyāyasūtra* (*NS*) 1.1.4 par (Pakṣilasvāmin) Vātsyāyana dans son *Nyāyabhāṣya* (*NBh*), Uddyotakara dans le *Nyāyavārttika* (*NV*), tous deux antérieurs à Ś, ainsi que par Vācaspatimiśra dans la *Nyāyavārttikatātparyaṭīkā* (*NVTṬ*), qui lui est sans doute postérieur (entre 950 et 1000).

Puisque selon *NS* 1.1.4, la connaissance perceptive consiste en un *saṃnikarṣa*, un "rapprochement", entre sens et objet, Ś entame son exposé par un relevé des divers contacts ou rapports mis en jeu par l'acte sensoriel de base et par les étapes postérieures du procès cognitif.

Le premier d'entre eux est le *saṃyoga*, contact mécanique et contingent entre faculté sensorielle et objet concret et impliquant un mouvement (*karman*, *Pp* p. 90,9-10).

Puis vient celui entre la faculté sensorielle et les qualités de l'objet individuel, ce qui postule un rapport de présence indissociable de ces qualités dans leur support.[5] La notion générale de qualité[6] apparaît au terme d'une série de contacts englobés les uns dans les autres.

Même si la terminologie en question se rencontre dans les traités de Nyāya (*NV*, *NVTṬ* etc.) ou de Vaiśeṣika (*Daśapadārthī*, *Praśastapādabhāṣya* etc.), la présentation exhaustive et condensée qui en est faite ici par Ś ne laisse pas d'impressionner, et l'on comprend qu'un ouvrage postérieur, comme le *Mānameyodaya* (17e s.), qualifie ces contacts de "prabhakariens".[7]

Cette liste, dressée une première fois par Ś (*Pp* p. 128,11-129,12), semble lui avoir plu, puisqu'il la reproduit (*Pp* p. 132,1-6) après avoir expliqué comment l'oeil contacte le monde extramental.

4. On n'oubliera pas non plus que, sousjacente aux considérations de Ś, se laisse apercevoir la polémique contre les Bouddhistes et leur "idéalisme".[8] Pour ces adversaires, surtout s'ils sont d'obédience *vijñānavādin–yogācāra*, comme Dignāga ou Dharmakīrti, les objets concrets et les contacts avec eux n'ont qu'un rôle subalterne. En revanche, les Mīmāṃsakas, qui sont des réalistes, les placent à la base de la connaissance et se demandent comment les facultés sensorielles – par exemple la vue ou l'ouie – peuvent entrer en communication avec eux. C'est à ce point du texte que commence la traduction ci-dessous.[9]

5. Premier développement. Le toucher est un sens qui opère par contact matériel immédiat. La peau ressent contre elle une chose et fournit à son sujet des informations, par ex. la température (*sparśa*) dont le sujet connaissant va tirer parti. C'est sur ce modèle que Ś et d'autres penseurs du Nyāya–Vaiśeṣika voudraient voir fonctionner la vue. Une différence pourtant

[5] Cette "présence indissociable", connue habituellement sous le nom d'"inhérence" se dit *samavāya* et peut être qualifiée de non-matérielle et de nécessaire. Elle règne donc entre les accidents et la substance. Cf. n. 14.

[6] Ainsi la blancheur est indissociablement présente dans les divers "blancs", qui sont eux-mêmes des propriétés indissociablement présentes dans certains objets en contact physique avec l'oeil. Elle est donc dotée de *samyuktasamavetasamavāya*, cf. *Pp* p. 128,1.

[7] Cf. *Mānameyodaya* (*MMU*) p. 18,13: *prābhākarās tu saṃyogaḥ saṃyuktasamavāyaḥ samavāya iti tredhā saṃnikarṣam āhuḥ.*

[8] C'est-à-dire la priorité donnée aux entités conceptuelles sur les entités extramentales jugées imparfaites ou marginales.

[9] Les passages traduits sont précédés d'un "T" et d'un numéro d'ordre. Ils sont annotés et introduits par quelques lignes qui délimitent et éclairent leur contenu.

saute aux yeux: ici pas d'attouchement constatable.[10] Pourtant il existe car l'oeil en a besoin pour voir son objet. Si celui-ci est à une certaine distance ou à une distance certaine, comment alors imaginer ce contact? En disant de la faculté visuelle qu'elle est *prāpyakārin*, qu'elle est dotée de *prāpyakāritva*, c'est-à-dire qu'elle se porte vers l'objet physique même lointain pour le contacter sous la forme d'un/de rayon(s) matériel(s) (*bhautika*)[11] mais invisible(s). Ś parle aussi de rayons "larges à leur extrémité" qui peuvent saisir plus grand qu'eux.

> **T 1** (*Pp* p. 129,2-5):[12] Dans cette [liste],[13] c'est par [simple] contact[14] que l'on saisit via la vue et le toucher les choses qui sont faites de terre, d'eau, de feu et d'air.
>
> L'oeil, du fait qu'il est, comme la peau,[15] une faculté sensorielle [tournée] vers l'extérieur,[16] contacte ce qui est à contacter.[17] Il est de nature lumineuse,[18] puisque, comme une lampe, il fait connaître la forme–couleur etc.
>
> Les rayons de l'[oeil] se diffusent et entrent en contact avec la chose. Comme ils sont larges à leur extrémité,[19] ils atteignent des choses même [plus] larges [qu'eux].[20]

6. Une objection est ici avancée par le bouddhiste sur la question de l'intervalle entre l'organe sensoriel et la chose perceptible. C'est que nous voyons non seulement des objets, mais également l'intervalle (*sāntarāla*) qui nous sépare d'eux. Ce n'est pas compatible avec le *prāpyakāritva* qui est censé annuler toute distance entre les deux. En effet, nous dit-on en *NV*

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[10] D'ailleurs en cas d'attouchement entre l'oeil et tel ou tel objet, la vision est bloquée, comme l'atteste le cas du collyre ou de l'écharde qui sont à la fois contre ou dans l'oeil et invisibles par lui. Cf. *AKBh* I 43c-d (tr. La Vallée Poussin 1923: Vol. I, p. 87); cf. aussi Preisendanz 1994: Vol. II, p. 446.

[11] Cf. Preisendanz 1994: Vol. II, pp. 569-570.

[12] *tatra saṃyogāt pārthivāpyataijasavāyavīyānāṃ dravyāṇāṃ cakṣuḥsparśanābhyāṃ grahaṇam. prāpyakāri cakṣur bahirindriyatvāt tvagindriyavat. taijasaṃ tad rūpapratītihetutvād dīpavat. tasya raśmayaḥ prasaranto dravyeṇa saṃyujyante. te ca pṛthvagrā iti pṛthūny api dravyāṇi prāpnuvanti*.

[13] *tatra* renvoie sans doute à la liste des divers contacts et relations qui le précède immédiatement.

[14] *saṃyoga*, le plus simple et le plus banal des contacts, est celui qui s'établit entre l'oiseau et le piquet sur lequel il est perché ou entre deux lutteurs qui s'empoignent. Les déplacements physiques qui l'accompagnent sont nommés et classés chez nos auteurs. Le *samavāya*, traduit ici par "présence indissociable" (plutôt que par "inhérence", cf. n. 5) est un contact plus abstrait, comme celui des fils en tant que parties et du tissu qu'ils forment, conçu comme un tout.

[15] *tvagindriya* "faculté/sens dermique".

[16] Par opposition au *manas* qui, dans les systèmes classiques, est le sens interne, récepteur des états/impressions comme le bien être, le désir etc.

[17] Traduction de *prāpyakārin*, mot essentiel ici qui dénote le mouvement de l'*indriya* vers l'objet. Voir aussi sur ce mot, *Nyāyamañjarī* (*NM*) VIII (Vol. II, pp. 271sv.) ou *Yuktidīpikā* (*YD*) pp. 203 et 217 ad *Sāṃkhyakārikā* 28; cf. aussi Preisendanz 1989: 182sv. et 1994: Vol. II, pp. 446, 453, 455, 490, 569, 574 etc., et Bhatt 1962: 177.

[18] C'est la "faculté sensorielle" (*indriya*) qui est lumineuse et représentable comme des rayons (*raśmi*), et non son siège (*adhiṣṭhāna*) organique ou physique, c'est-à-dire (la pupille de) l'oeil. La distinction est faite en *NV* ad *NS* 3.1.51 (ou 50) (*Nyāyadarśana* [*ND*] p. 780,17sv.; tr. Jha 1984: Vol. III, p. 1217).

[19] Le mot *pṛthvagra* ici usité est-il emprunté à Kumārila, *Ślokavārttika* (*ŚV*), *Pratyakṣa* 47? On trouve *pṛthvagratā* en *NV* ad NS I 1 4 (*ND* p. 104,19). Cf. Preisendanz 1989: 182-183.

[20] Un des arguments contre le *prāpyakāritva* est de dire que si déplacement il y a pour la faculté visuelle, elle se retrouve bredouille devant un objet plus grand qu'elle. L'idée des rayons à bouts élargis est là pour se tirer d'affaire.

ad *NS* 1.1.4 (*ND* p. 102,2), "c'est donc parce qu'on appréhende un intervalle que [la faculté sensorielle] n'est pas *prāpyakārin*".[21]

> **T 2** (*Pp* p. 129,5-7):[22] Pardon mais ainsi (= s'il y a contact) on ne devrait pas remarquer d'intervalle[23] au cas où – à ce qu'on dit[24] – l'objet est à distance. Car, quand il y a contact,[25] il n'y a pas de distance possible, puisqu'il y a contact avec ce qu'on peut contacter, comme pour le toucher.

7. L'adversaire bouddhiste objecte ensuite que des distances variables – celles de deux objets par rapport au même oeil – peuvent passer inaperçues alors même que la faculté se déplace pour toucher ses cibles. Or, sous peine d'erreur, il conviendrait d'évaluer cette différence. Il y a ici référence implicite à l'exemple plus d'une fois attesté[26] où lune et branche d'arbre sont apparemment vues à la même distance, alors qu'elles sont en réalité très éloignées l'une de l'autre. Le *prāpyakāritva* serait erronné et à réfuter parce qu'il nous autorise à penser que le rayon oculaire ne se déplace pas de l'objet le plus proche vers le plus lointain.

> **T 3** (*Pp* p. 129,7-8):[27] En outre puisque le contact [physique] repose sur un mouvement et que les mobiles se déplacent progressivement du proche au lointain, il est impossible d'appréhender en même temps des objets proches et d'autres lointains.[28]

8. Réponses de Ś aux objections précitées. La première réponse envisage l'intervalle organe–objet; la seconde, la fausse proximité de deux objets.

> **T 4** (*Pp* pp. 129,9 et 130,1-3):[29] On répond: la prise de conscience de l'intervalle est possible d'abord en fonction du lieu de l'expérience.[30]
>
> Mais à propos de la connaissance au même instant, certains avancent le contre-argument suivant: après avoir touché tous les objets et fusionné avec la lumière

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[21] *tasmāt sāntaragrahaṇād aprāpyakāri*.

[22] *nanv evaṃ dūre 'rtha iti sāntarālagrahaṇaṃ na syāt prāptau satyāṃ dūratvāsambhavāt prāpyakāritvāt sparśanavat*.

[23] *sāntarāla*; on trouve aussi *sāntara*, par ex. en *NV* ad *NS* 1.1.4 (*ND* p. 101,8).

[24] Les mots *dūre 'rtha iti* sont-ils une citation?

[25] *prāpti*, terme venu peut-être du bouddhisme et qui signifie "atteinte, accession, obtention". Il peut convenir comme synonyme de *saṃyoga* ou de *samavāya*; cf. *Pp* p. 325,2-3 (ch. 8, *Tattvāloka*).

[26] Par ex. *NV* et *NVṬ* ad *NS* 1.1.4 (*ND* pp. 102,7-108,1, 105,5 et 105,19) et, dans un contexte différent, *NV* ad *NS* 2.1.16 (*ND* p. 437,12-13).

[27] *kiñ ca saṃyogasya gatinibandhanatvād gatimatāṃ ca krameṇāsannadūragamanāt samakālam āseduṣāṃ davīyasāṃ cārthānāṃ grahaṇaṃ nopapadyate*.

[28] C'est pourtant ce qui a l'air de se passer pour la branche et la lune.

[29] *ucyate – bhogāyatanāpekṣayā sāntarālagrahaṇaṃ tāvad upapannam. samasamayasaṃvedane tu kecit parihāram evaṃ varṇayanti*: *sakalānarthān prāpya yugapad upasthitena bāhyena tejasā sahaikībhūtās te cākṣuṣā raśmayo yugapadgrahaṇahetava iti*.

[30] *bhogāyatana* glosé *śarīradeśa* "emplacement du corps" par le commentateur de la *Pp*, Nārāyaṇa (*Nyāyasiddhi* [*NSi*], p. 130,16). Commentant *NS* 3.1.6 dans son *Nyāyatattvāloka*, Vācaspati Miśra II fait du corps (*śarīra*) le siège (*āśraya*) de l'"expérience", de la "jouissance" (*bhoga*) des actes karmiques, en raison de sa "qualité résidentelle" (*āyatanatā*) pour ceux-ci; cf. Preisendanz 1994: Vol. I, p. 46.

extérieure omniprésente, les rayons oculaires [deviennent] causes d'une perception simultanée.[31]

9. Invalidation des théories précédentes. L'idée que la vision simultanée de la branche toute proche et de la lune lointaine provient de la fusion des rayons oculaires dans la lumière extérieure omniprésente et illimitée suscite à son tour des difficultés. En effet, si l'oeil fonctionne grâce à celle-ci, il devrait tout voir. Or il n'en est évidemment rien. Un raisonnement du même genre servira à rejeter la thèse que l'agent de la vision est la connaissance.

T 5 (*Pp* p. 130,4-5):[32] Cela, d'autres le réfutent en disant: si l'on admet un contact de cette sorte,[33] il est difficile d'exclure la perception d'objets extrêmement lointains ou occultés.[34]

10. Considération du facteur temps. Deux opinions sur la simultanéité (*yaugapadya*) sont mentionnées sans autre précision sur les éléments entre lesquels elle règne. Pour Ś on ne peut mettre sur le même pied objet proche et objet lointain en raison de la différence des temps pour les atteindre par la vue.

T 6 (*Pp* p. 130,6-10):[35] Mais d'autres affirment: la simultanéité est une impression fausse[36] due à ce qu'on n'appréhende pas les différences de temps à cause de la très grande vitesse des rayons [oculaires].

D'aucuns en revanche désapprouvent [la vue ci-dessus] et disent: [Soit!] Quand les choses sont extrêmement proches, que ne soit pas posée de différence dans le temps de passage [de l'une à l'autre] pas plus [qu'on n'en pose] pour cent feuilles de lotus.[37] Mais, à propos d'objets situés à plusieurs milliers de kilomètres[38] à la surface de la terre, et à propos de l'étoile polaire, ne pas tenir compte d'une différence en temps[39] n'effleure jamais la pensée.

11. Reprise de parole par des interlocuteurs qui disent "nous" et qui sont peut-être Ś en personne.[40] Le passage formule l'adhésion de celui-ci à la théorie d'une vision illimitée via la

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[31] Sur la question du rôle de la lumière extérieure, cf. Preisendanz 1989: 188 où cette doctrine est donnée comme mīmāṃsiste; voir aussi Preisendanz 1994: Vol. II, p. 260.

[32] *tad anye dūṣayanti – itthaṃ prāptāv abhyupagamyamānāyām atidūravyavahitānām apy arthānāṃ grahaṇaṃ durnivāram*.

[33] C'est-à-dire par le truchement de la lumière extérieure.

[34] C'est-à-dire dissimulés par un écran. Sur les difficultés logiques provoquées par la transparence ou non de ce dernier, cf. Preisendanz 1989: 191sv.

[35] *anye tv āhuḥ – kṣepīyas tayā teṣāṃ raśmīnāṃ kālabhedān avagrahād yaugapadyābhimāna iti. tad apare nānumanyante. atisannikṛṣṭeṣu vastuṣu gatikālabhedaḥ padmapatraśatabhedavan mā nāma avasāyi. anekayojanasahasrāntariteṣu bhumiṣṭheṣv artheṣu dhruve ca sadaiva kālabhedānavasāyo na buddhim anurañjayati*.

[36] *abhimāna*. Le composé *yaugapadyābhimāna* apparaît en *NVṬ* ad *NS* 1.1.4 (*ND* p. 105,15 et 19). Cf. aussi Schmithausen 1965: 206-207 et 264, et Van Buitenen 1956: 185.

[37] Les cent feuilles sont transpercées d'un coup et il n'y a pas de différence dans le temps de percement de chacune d'elles. Cf. *ŚV*, *Śūnyavāda* 157; *NV* et *NVṬ* ad *NS* 1.1.4 (*ND* p. 105,6).

[38] *yojana*, qui est une distance effectivement plus longue: sept à neuf kilomètres.

[39] Et donc aussi en distance entre eux et d'autres objets à proximité. Cette formule tortueuse équivaut, semble-t-il, à dire que la vision d'objets proches et lointains n'est pas simultanée. Sur l'étoile polaire, cf. encore T 7.

[40] Selon Preisendanz 1989: 188, la théorie qui suit serait d'origine prabhakarienne. Cf. supra, n. 31.

lumière extérieure. Pour celui qui se montrerait sceptique, reste la solution de l'*adṛṣṭa*, du "facteur invisible", deus ex machina de la spéculation en panne d'explication devant tel ou tel phénomène.[41]

> **T 7** (*Pp* p. 130,11-13):[42] Pour notre part nous disons: il n'y a pas de problème à ce que [cela][43] dépende du facteur invisible. Dès que la lumière extérieure s'est fondue aux rayons oculaires, aussi grande soit la partie de celle-ci atteinte grâce à l'*adṛṣṭa* comme cause de perception, aussi grande elle opère pour la perception.[44] [Mais la lumière extérieure] n'[opère] pas toute entière. Il n'y a ni perception totale ni atteinte simultanée de [tout] ce qui est sur terre et de l'étoile polaire etc.[45]

12. Réflexions sur les problèmes qui surgissent pour une vision fondée sur un contact matériel et physique si un obstacle sous la forme d'un écran s'interpose entre le rayon lumineux et l'objet.[46] Pour Ś, obstacle et écran démontrent a contrario que la vision postule un déplacement, puisque c'est l'arrêt de celui-ci à cause de l'écran qui suspend la vision.

> **T 8** (*Pp* p. 131,1-2):[47] Pardon mais quand, face à la lumière oculaire chargée de contacter ce qui peut l'être, s'interposent une vitre, un nuage, un voile, des ténèbres,[48] comment y aurait-il perception puisque le rayon oculaire ne se répercute pas[49] sur les [objets]?

13. Pour défendre l'idée de contact physique sens–objet, on tient le raisonnement par l'absurde suivant: si l'on n'accepte pas le *prāpyakāritva*, il devient possible de voir des objets offusqués ou éloignés, puisqu'on n'est plus limité par des conditions physiques de rencontre, et que la vision s'opère directement par l'esprit, sans l'aide d'une faculté sensorielle. Or tout cela se heurte à l'expérience.

> **T 9** (*Pp* p. 131,2-4):[50] Pour tous ceux qui disent que ce n'est pas la vue[51] qui contacte ce qui peut l'être, il est difficile d'exclure la saisie d'objets séparés [de

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[41] *adṛṣṭa* dénote toutes sortes de puissances mystérieuses, par ex. le résultat invisible des actes, rituels ou non; la source du souvenir etc. Sur ce mot, voir le recueil de Halbfass 1980, ainsi que Bronkhorst 1993 qui traitent de *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* (*VS*) 5.2.19 et *Vākyapadīya* (*VP*) III, *Sambandha*, st. 18.

[42] *vayaṃ tu vadāmaḥ – adṛṣṭasāpekṣatvād adoṣaḥ. nayanaraśmibhir ekībhūte 'pi bāhye tejasi yāvān eva tasya bhāgo 'dṛṣṭavaśenopalabdhihetutayopāttas tāvān evopalabdhaye prabhavati na sarva iti na sarvopalambho yugapadbhaumadhruvādisiddhiś ca*.

[43] Le mot "cela" n'est pas dans le texte. On l'introduit ici comme une référence à l'action limitatrice invisible de l'*adṛṣṭa* qui s'exerce pour que la vision, en principe illimitée à cause de et comme son vecteur, la lumière extérieure, n'amène pas à tout voir en même temps.

[44] Ces énoncés touffus cherchent sans doute à éclairer le rôle de l'*adṛṣṭa*, tel qu'il est décrit en n. 43.

[45] Même idée que plus haut en T 6. L'impression que deux objets sont contactés au même endroit et en même temps ne vaut pas quand ils sont très éloignés.

[46] Sur tout cela, voir *Abhidharmakośa* (*AK*) I 42 (tr. La Vallée Poussin 1923: Vol. I, pp. 141-142); *NS* 3.1.39 et commentaires (*ND* p. 767sv.). Cf. Preisendanz 1994: Vol. II, p. 595 (n. 150).

[47] *nanu prāpyakāriṇi nāyane tejasi kācābhrapaṭalatimirāntariteṣu katham upalabdhis tair nayanaraśmer apratighātāt*.

[48] Le composé *kāca* + *abhra* + *paṭala* + *timira* se retrouve en *NS* 3.1.45 (ou 43), mais le dernier terme est ici remplacé par *sphaṭika* "cristal". En *NVTṬ* ad *NS* 1.1.4 (*ND* p. 101,22), le dernier terme est absent. On pourrait aussi donner à *abhra* le sens plus technique de "mica" et le réunir à *paṭala* dans le composé "écran en mica".

[49] *apratīghāta* figure encore en *NS* 3.1.47 (ou 45) (*ND* p. 775).

[50] *ye punar aprāpyakāri cakṣur āhus teṣāṃ vyavahitaviprakṛṣṭārthagrahaṇam. sannidhāna iva viprakarṣe 'pi sphuṭitaram aṇīyāṃso 'py arthā gṛhyeran*.

l'oeil par un écran] ou éloignés.[52] Des objets, même distants, même microscopiques, pourraient être appréhendés très distinctement comme s'ils étaient tout près.[53]

14. Explication inverse: grâce à la transmission matérielle de la vision, on explique bien la visibilité relativement faible d'objets lointains ou petits, due à la puissance décroissante ou insuffisante du rayon oculaire.[54]

T 10 (*Pp* p. 131,4-5):[55] Mais s'il n'y a saisie [que par le rayon oculaire] de ce qui peut l'être, il est normal que les [objets] les plus éloignés soient vus moins distinctement et que les plus minuscules échappent à la vue, et cela à cause de la rareté des particules lumineuses.

15. Ce qui suit est la conclusion de l'exposé de Ś sur le théorie optique. Il nous rappelle que certaines réalités sont invisibles et explique pourquoi.

T 11 (*Pp* p. 131,5-9):[56] Mais d'où vient que ni l'atome − celui de terre par exemple[57] −, ni l'éther, ni le temps, ni l'espace, ni le soi ne sont perceptibles?

On répond:[58] Sont causes de perception la grandeur, la multiplicité des parties substantielles, une couleur spécifique ainsi que le rapprochement [avec la faculté sensorielle].[59]

Il faut savoir que l'atome subtil[60] ne se voit pas faute de multiplicité de parties substantielles et faute de grandeur, tandisque ni la dyade[61] ni l'éther [ne se voient], parce qu'ils manquent de forme–couleur et qu'ils ne sont pas substances de substances.[62]

16. Conclusion. Après cette série de mises au point à propos du *prāpyakāritva*, Ś reprend la liste des contacts qu'il avait déjà donnée avant ce développement, puis il poursuit avec d'autres problèmes. Ainsi

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[51] Ou l'"oeil", en skr. *cakṣus*.

[52] En effet, le vecteur de la vision est alors illimité puisqu'il s'agit de l'esprit.

[53] Traduction du texte chez Preisendanz 1989: 188.

[54] Cf. *NVTṬ ad NS* 1.1.4 (*ND* p. 105,28) où *prakṣīṇa* "épuisé" qualifie la vision (*cakṣus*).

[55] *prāpyagrahaṇe tu tejovayavānām apracuratayā yuktam asphuṭadarśanaṃ davīyasāṃ kṣodiṣṭhānām adarśanam*.

[56] *atha kasmād aṇu pārthivādy ākāśakāladigātmānaś ca na pratyakṣeṇa gṛhyante. ucyate – mahatvam anekadravyatvaṃ rūpaviśeṣaś ca sannikarṣa iva pratyakṣahetuḥ. anekadravyābhāvāt paramāṇor adarśanam, amahattvād dvyaṇukasya, ākāśādīnāṃ tv arūpatvād adravyadravyatvāc ceti veditavyam*.

[57] Les autres atomes sont ceux de feu, d'eau et d'air.

[58] C'est-à-dire Ś, faisant sienne la doctrine de *VS* 4.1.6.

[59] Cette doctrine est celle de plusieurs autres traités. "Multiplicité des parties substantielles" = *anekadravyatva* ou *anekadravyabhāva*; "rapprochement" = *saṃnikarṣa*, synonyme virtuel de *saṃyoga*, présent en *NS* 1.1.4, en *Praśastapādabhāṣya* (*PBh*) 235sv. (éd. Bronkhorst–Ramseier 1994: 44-45) et en *Daśapadārthī* 145 etc. (éd., tr. Miyamoto 1996: 191, 235 etc.)

[60] *paramāṇu*, synonyme virtuel d'*aṇu* "atome".

[61] Dans le Vaiśeṣika, l'atome est sans parties, invisible, éternel; la combinaison de deux atomes (*dvyaṇuka*, "dyade") ne manque pas de parties, mais de grandeur (Türstig 1982: 30). Pour l'atomisme bouddhique, cf. par ex. *Abhidharmakośa* (*AKBh*) II 22sv. (tr. La Vallée Poussin 1923: Vol. I, pp. 144-150).

[62] Le mot *adravyadravyatva* reparaît en *Pp* p. 148,11.

▪ la perception du vent / de l'air. En effet *vāyu* ne remplit aucune des conditions pour être saisi par *prāpyakāritva* visuel. N'importe. Il le sera par *prāpyakāritva* de la peau puisque, à défaut de visibilité, il possède la température, laquelle est accessible au tact.

▪ la perception du mouvement. Selon notre auteur, le *karman* comme tel ne relève pas de la perception, mais de l'inférence. On le déduit en effet du changement constaté dans les conjonctions et disjonctions d'un objet par rapport à un autre.

▪ la perception du son pose des problèmes sui generis et ce qu'en dit le ch. VI (= *Pp* p. 133,6sv.) est à compléter par *Pp* pp. 324,16sv. (ch. 8 *Tattvāloka*) et 423,7sv. (ch. 11 *Vākyārthamātṛkā*, section 2) où il est question du *prāpyakāritva* sonore.

▪ la perception d'une notion abstraite, comme l'inexistence réciproque de la vache et du cheval. Ici nous passons à une autre dimension. Nous ne sommes plus au niveau de la sensation, mais du concept.

Quel que soit le thème abordé, Ś procède par de brefs éclairages plus ou moins polémiques sur les problèmes. Cette méthode a ses inconvénients: elle suppose entre autres chez le lecteur une connaissance quasi-encyclopédique des données en jeu. Elle a aussi un avantage: la relative clarté d'un exposé qui va à l'essentiel.

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1) Textes

AK(Bh)	*Abhidharmakośa*(*bhāṣya*) de Vasubandhu, dans La Vallée Poussin 1923.
Daśapadārthī	de Candramati, cf. Miyamoto 1996.
ND	*Nyāyadarśana*, cf. *NS*.
NBh	*Nyāyabhāṣya* de Vātsyāyana, cf. *NS*.
NM	*Nyāyamañjarī*, dans *Nyāyamañjarī of Jayantabhaṭṭa with the Commentary of Granthibhaṅga by Cakradhara*, éd. Gaurinath Sastri, 3 vols., Varanasi 1982.
NV	*Nyāyavārttika* de Uddyotakara, cf. *NS*.
NVTṬ	*Nyāyavārttikatātparyaṭīkā* de Vācaspatimiśra, cf. *NS*.
NS	*Nyāyasūtra*s, dans *Nyāyadarśanam with Vātsyāyana's Bhāṣya*, *Uddyotakara's Vārttika*, *Vācaspati Miśra's Tātparyaṭīkā and Viśvanātha's Vṛtti*, éd. Taranatha Nyaya-Tarkatirtha et Amarendramohan Tarkatirtha, New Delhi 1985 (réimpr.). (Calcutta Oriental Series 18-19)
NSi	*Nyāyasiddhi* of Jaipuri Nārāyaṇa Bhaṭṭa, cf. *Pp*.
Pp	*Prakaraṇa Pañcikā of Śalikanātha Miśra with the Nyāya-Siddhi of Jaipuri Nārāyaṇa Bhatta*. Éd A. Subrahmanya Sastri. Banaras 1961. (Banaras Hindu University Darśana Series 4)
PBh	*Praśastapādabhāṣya*, éd. dans Bronkhorst et Ramseier 1994.
Bṛhatī	de Prabhākara, a) éd. C. Sastri, Benares 1929 (Kashi Sanskrit Series 391); b) éd. S.K. Ramanatha Sastri, Madras 1934 (Madras University Sanskrit Series 24-25).
MMU	*Mānameyodaya* de Nārāyaṇa, éd. et tr. dans Raja et Suryanarayana 1933.
MS	*Mīmāṃsāsūtra*s de Jaimini, dans Frauwallner 1968.

YD *Yuktidīpikā*, dans *Yuktidīpikā*: *The Most Significant Commentary on the Sāṃkhyakārikā*, éd. A. Wezler et S. Motegi, Vol. 1, Stuttgart 1998. (Alt- und Neu-Indische Studien 44)

VP *Vākyapadīya*, dans *Bhartṛharis Vākyapadīya*: *Die Mūlakārikās nach den Handschriften herausgegeben und mit einem Pāda-Index versehen*, éd. W. Rau, Wiesbaden 1977. (Abhandlungen für die Kunde des Morgenlandes 42/4)

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Śābarabhāṣya de Śabarasvāmin, éd. et tr. dans Frauwallner 1968.

ŚV *Ślokavārttika*, dans *Ślokavārttika of Śrī Kumārila Bhaṭṭa with the Commentary Nyāyaratnākara of Śrī Pārthasārathi Miśra*, éd. Svami Dvarikadasa Sastri, Varanasi 1978. (Prāchyabhāratī Series10)

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Yogipratyakṣa in Vācaspati Miśra's *Nyāyakaṇikā*

1. Vācaspati Miśra was a renowned tenth-century Hindu logician. He possessed a detailed knowledge of the teachings of both Hindu and Buddhist philosophers, and his mastery of all facets of classical Indian scholarship induced Indian historians to describe him as one of the four pillars of the Hindu religious tradition. Vācaspati composed commentaries on the main texts of the Hindu philosophical systems. He often quoted from previous Buddhist scholars, such as Dharmakīrti (ca. 600–660) and Dharmottara (ca. 750–810), and was himself frequently quoted by later Buddhist opponents like Jñānaśrīmitra (ca. 980–1030) and Ratnakīrti (ca. 1000–1050). His works present a picture of lively scholarly antagonism between Hindu and Buddhist philosophers.

The *Nyāyakaṇikā* is one of the most significant works of Vācaspati Miśra. As a commentary on the *Vidhiviveka* by the seventh-century philosopher Maṇḍana Miśra, it expounds the Mīmāṃsā view on many issues in the Indian religious tradition. This work of Vācaspati's is not only an intellectual masterpiece summarizing the Mīmāṃsā ideas, but also testifies to the blossoming of scholarly debate in ancient India. Further, it reflects discussions that took place within the Hindu schools as well as controversies the Mīmāṃsā philosophers had with their Buddhist counterparts, especially with the philosophers of the Pramāṇa school.

In the *Nyāyakaṇikā*, one of the crucial subjects that Vācaspati Miśra argues about with Buddhist philosophers is the omniscience (*sarvajñatā*) attributed to the Buddha. Central to his argument that a human being cannot be a god is the concept of *yogipratyakṣa*, which functions as the basis of the Buddha's omniscience. The purpose of the present paper is to investigate *yogipratyakṣa*, which has been accepted as a type of perception (*pratyakṣa*) ever since Dignāga (ca. 480–540), the founder of the Buddhist Pramāṇa school. I shall focus on examining the issues that were debated with regard to this concept around the tenth century and how Vācaspati Miśra dealt with the notion from the Mīmāṃsā perspective.

2. First, I would like to briefly introduce the discussion on the concept of *yogipratyakṣa* which predates Vācaspati Miśra. Although Dignāga mentioned *yogipratyakṣa* as perception in his *Pramāṇasamuccaya* (*PS*),[1] it is Dharmakīrti who elaborated upon this concept in the Buddhist epistemological context. His ideas on it exerted a strong influence upon later Indian and Tibetan Buddhist philosophers.[2] In the *Nyāyabindu* (*NB*), Dharmakīrti places *yogipratyakṣa* in the category of perception. He defines it as follows:

> *yogipratyakṣa* is [the cognition] which is produced at the termination (*paryanta*) of the intensification (*prakarṣa*) of meditation on a true object.[3]

Dharmakīrti here implies that *yogipratyakṣa* arises through the practice of meditation (*bhāvanā*) upon true objects, such as the Four Noble Truths. The process of this practice has three stages: intensification (*prakarṣa*), termination (*paryanta*), and yogic intuition (*yogipratyakṣa*).[4]

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[1] See *PS* I.6cd: *yogināṃ gurunirdeśāvyatibhinnārthamātradṛk*.
[2] For details, see Dreyfus 1997: 331ff.
[3] *NB* I.11: *bhūtārthabhāvanāprakarṣaparyantajaṃ yogijñānam*.
[4] See Kajiyama 1989: 53, n. 119.

Karin Preisendanz (ed.), *Expanding and Merging Horizons*: *Contributions to South Asian and Cross-Cultural Studies in Commemoration of Wilhelm Halbfass*, Wien: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 2007, pp. 347-353.

The stage of intensification (*prakarṣa*) is characterized by the *yogin*'s repeatedly interiorizing the object of meditation. At this stage, the contemplated object begins and continues to reach a state of clarity in the *yogin*'s mind.[5] The stage of termination (*paryanta*), on the other hand, is a moment at the end of intensification. According to Dharmottara, the author of the *Nyāyabinduṭīkā*, it is a state in which the object of meditation is almost clear, as if it were covered by mica.[6] This stage is the direct cause of *yogipratyakṣa*. The following stage of yogic intuition is the moment when the clarity of the object is complete. At this stage, the object is apprehended with absolute vividness, like something perceived by sense-perception (*indriyajñāna*); the *yogin* grasps it just as clearly as if he would be looking at a grain on the palm of his hand. Dharmakīrti maintains that since *yogipratyakṣa* is free from conceptual construction (*nirvikalpaka*) throughout these stages, it is a sort of perception.

The problem with which the commentators on Dharmakīrti's works, for instance Dharmottara and Prajñākaragupta, were confronted was how to prove that *yogipratyakṣa* is perception. The practice of meditation (*bhāvanā*) is concerned with concepts. For this reason, *yogipratyakṣa* has no contact with real things; it does not even have a direct connection with the mental image that follows upon the sensory cognition of an external object. Thus, although Dharmakīrti subsumes *yogipratyakṣa* under the category of perception, this aspect contradicts his definition that perception is devoid of judgement (*kalpanāpoḍha*). Further, *yogipratyakṣa*, whose object is based on conceptual construction, does not enable the *yogin* to reach an actual thing. Yogic intuition manifests an object in the form of some non-X being X and thus is not trustworthy, that is, it cannot fulfil the *yogin*'s purpose of activity. This is incompatible with the second component of Dharmakīrti's definition, namely, that perception is non-erroneous (*abhrānta*).[7]

In order to solve the first problem, the followers of Dharmakīrti examine the difference between determinate (*savikalpaka*) cognition and indeterminate (*nirvikalpaka*) cognition. They try to demonstrate that a criterion for distinguishing these two kinds of cognition can be found here and to prove that *yogipratyakṣa* belongs to the realm of the indeterminate cognition. In their view, the criterion consists in having a vivid manifestation (*sphuṭābhatva*).[8] Mīmāṃsā philosophers, such as Vācaspati Miśra, do not object to this.[9] An indeterminate cognition is vivid because it is directly produced by its object, whereas a determinate cognition is unclear because it is experienced at a time when words are formed. It is established through the *yogin*'s experience of meditation that *yogipratyakṣa* appears as something quite vivid. By including it for this reason in the realm of indeterminate cognition, the followers of Dharmakīrti prove that it is free from conceptual construction.

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[5] See *Dharmottarapradīpa* (*DhPr*) p. 68,12: *sa ca yatsphuṭatvatadadhikasphuṭatvādinā rūpeṇa tajjñānasyodaya eva*.

[6] *NBṬ* pp. 68,4-69,1: *abhrakavyavahitam iva yadā bhāvyamānaṃ vastu paśyati sā prakarṣaparyantāvasthā*.

[7] Non-erroneousness (*abhrāntatva*) consists in not being reverse to the nature of reality, which is causal effectiveness (*arthakriyākāritva*). See *NBṬ* pp. 41,5-42,1: *abhrāntam arthakriyākṣame vasturūpe 'viparyayas tam ucyate*.

[8] See *PV* III.283ab: *na vikalpānubaddhasyāsti sphuṭārthāvabhāsitā*; *PVin* f. 259b.7: *gaṅ gi phyir | rnam rtog rjes su 'brel ba la | don gsal snaṅ ba yod ma yin | rnam par bslad pa'i blo yaṅ ruṅ ste brjod pa daṅ 'dres pa'i śes pa thams cad la ni don gsal ba ñid ldog pa'i phyir ro*. It becomes clear in the light of Prajñākaragupta's *Pramāṇavārttikabhāṣya* (*PVBh*) that the criterion for determinateness and indeterminateness rests on the notion of vividness and its incompatibility with conceptual construction; see *PVBh* p. 326,24: *spaṣṭābhatvād evāvikalpakaṃ tataḥ pratyakṣam*.

[9] For instance, see *NK*$_2$ p. 104,26-27: *satyam, śrutānumānagocaracāriṇī bhāvanā viśadābhavijñānahetuḥ*.

As for the second problem, the Buddhist philosophers clarify what it means to exist at the present moment. With this they attempt to undermine the position that it is impossible for a past or a future thing to be the object of *yogipratyakṣa*.[10] The foundation of the Mīmāṃsakas' argument is that since past and future things are unreal, they cannot fulfil the purpose of the one who cognizes them.[11] According to Prajñākaragupta, however, something's existing at the present moment does not refer to the fact that the thing is connected with the present moment, but to the fact that it is directly experienced.[12] This reiterates Dharmakīrti's definition of existence (*sattva*) as causal effectiveness (*arthakriyākāritva*). In the case of *yogipratyakṣa*, this amounts to producing the image (*ākāra*) of a contemplated object in the cognition of the *yogin*. Even though a concept is not limited to the present moment, it becomes the object of the *yogin*'s direct experience (*sākṣātkaraṇa*) through his intensive practice of meditation. In other words, the *yogin* is capable of going beyond the realm of time, and his cognition manifests even a past or future thing at the present moment. In this way, the commentators on Dharmakīrti's works establish that *yogipratyakṣa* is non-erroneous (*abhrānta*).

3. Regarding the Buddhist view which Vācaspati Miśra introduces in his *Nyāyakaṇikā*, it is certain that in his time the above two issues were still important topics in the context of understanding *yogipratyakṣa*. However, Vācaspati approaches yogic intuition from a different angle. He raises the more fundamental question of whether it is really possible to gain *yogipratyakṣa*. In doing so he pays attention to the doctrine that everything is without Self (*samastavastunairātmya*). In order to argue his point, Vācaspati introduces a logical formula (*prayoga*) brought forth by Kamalaśīla (ca. 740–795).[13]

> *vyāpti*: Whatever practices of meditation are done with attention, without interruption and for a long time, have as their effect a cognition which makes its object appear like an *āmalaka* fruit on the palm of the hand, just like for a lovesick man the love for [his] beloved endowed with these three qualifications is the cause for the fact that [his] cognition which has [his] beloved as object has a clear appearance.
>
> *pakṣadharmatā*: And in the same way the meditational practice upon [the doctrine] that everything is without Self has these three qualifications.[14]

The conclusion derived from this formula is that when the practice of meditation upon the selflessness of all things reaches completion, it produces a cognition which vividly manifests selflessness. In other words, the *yogin*'s cognition is perception.

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[10] See *PVBh* p. 112,5ff. See also Iwata 1976: 359.

[11] According to the Mīmāṃsā position the object of perception is only a present thing. Kumārila argues that if the cognition of past and future objects were to be admitted as perception, cognitions such as remembrance (*smṛti*) and the like would also have to be recognized as perceptions. See Hattori 1968: 162, n. 6.2.

[12] See *PVBh* p. 112,1-2: *sākṣātkaraṇam evāsya bhāvasyāstitvam ucyate*, *sarvatra sākṣātkaraṇāt sattvaṃ bhāvasya gamyate*. *vartamānābhimatasyāpi padārthātmani stambhādau sākṣātkaraṇād eva gamyate tadastitvaṃ nānyataḥ*. See also Iwata 1976 and Steinkellner 1978.

[13] With reference to the concept of *yogipratyakṣa*, Vācaspati Miśra's *pūrvapakṣin* is Kamalaśīla. In his *Nyāyakaṇikā*, he refers, directly or indirectly, to a number of passages from *Tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā*. See Pemwieser 1991: 109-147.

[14] *NK*$_1$ p. 114,1-5: *yā sādaranairantaryadīrghakālāsevitā bhāvanā sā sarvā karatalāmalakāyamānālambananirbhāsajñānaphalā*, *tadyathā kāmāturasya kāminībhāvanā viśeṣaṇatrayavatī kāminīviṣayavijñānaviśadābhatāhetuḥ*. *tathā ca samastavastunairātmyabhāvanā viśeṣaṇatrayaśālinīti*. Despite the slight changes it is clear that this passage is a direct reference to Kamalaśīla's *Tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā* (*TSP*$_2$ pp. 1060,22-1061,3): *yā sādaranairantaryadīrghakālaviśeṣaṇā bhāvanā sā karatalāyamānagrāhyāvabhāsamānajñānaphalā*, *tadyathā kāmāturasya kāminībhāvanā*. *yathoktaviśeṣaṇatrayayuktā ca sarvākārasarvagatanairātmyabhāvanā kāruṇikasyeti*.

Now, let us turn to the question Vācaspati asked and see how the Buddhists prove that the practice of meditation upon selflessness is possible. This is done by demonstrating that the logical reason (*hetu*) in the above formula is not non-established (*asiddha*). For this, Vācaspati Miśra states the following Buddhist view:

> For, the practice of meditation endowed with the three qualifications is possible for people who, fearing the cause of suffering in the world of *saṃsāra*, are firm in the cognition of *śrāvakas*, and for people who have overcome inner obstacles through performing *pāramitā*s, such as giving, who have compassion which removes the causes of all sufferings, and who consider all sufferers as equal to themselves.[15]

Here, the Buddhists present the view that because of the whole world's suffering, people try to practice meditation either out of fear of suffering or owing to the compassion they feel toward those who suffer. In Buddhist thought it is possible to become free from suffering because suffering is not eternal, but has causes.

Yet a question arises regarding the above Buddhist view. Why does the *yogin* seek to remove suffering by means of the practice of meditation upon selflessness and to attain *yogipratyakṣa*? If this question is not properly answered, the conclusion in the logical formula cannot be established. Vācaspati shows how the Buddhists attempted to solve this problem in the next logical formula:

> *vyāpti*: If a thing [X] which is incompatible (*viruddha*) with another thing [Y] exists at a certain place, the other thing [Y] never exists there. For instance, coldness does not exist where fire exists.
>
> *pakṣadharmatā*: And the realization of [the doctrine/fact] that everything is without Self, which is incompatible with the view of an eternal Self, is possible in the mind.[16]

Ever since the time of the Buddha, Buddhists have understood that the cause of suffering consists in unwholesome qualities (*doṣa*), such as greed and passion. These unwholesome qualities, which produce suffering and themselves become part of suffering, are based on the view of a Self (*ātmadarśana*). Hence, suffering disappears when its basis, the view of a Self, disappears, just as fever goes down when its cause, a cold, goes away. Now, how can one abandon the view of a Self? For this, Buddhist philosophers turn to the notion of *virodha*, the relationship of incompatibility, which is crucial to their logic. The views of Self and non-Self are incompatible with each other. They cannot belong to the same person. For this reason, the *yogin*'s abandonment of the view of a Self is nothing other than his maintaining the view of non-Self. The meditation upon selflessness is a powerful antidote to both the view of a Self and the suffering that arises from it.[17] Accordingly, Buddhists maintain that by means of the practice of meditation it is possible for a *yogin* to achieve *yogipratyakṣa*.

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[15] *NK*$_1$ p. 115,5-8: *sambhavati hi bhāvanā viśeṣaṇatrayavatī sāṃsārikaduḥkhanimittād bibhyatāṃ śrāvakabodhipratiniyatānāṃ nikhiladuḥkhanimittaśamanīkāruṇikānāṃ ca sakalān eva duḥkhina ātmatayābhyupagacchatāṃ dānādipāramitābhyāsatanūkṛtāntarmalānām*. See also *TSP*$_1$ pp. 57,18-58,3: *tatra na tāvad anarthitvaṃ siddham. tathā hi ye tāvaj jātyādiduḥkhotpīḍitamanasāḥ saṃsārād uttrastamanasas tadupaśamam ātmanaḥ prārthayante, teṣāṃ śrāvakādibodhaniyatānāṃ saṃsārād bhayam eva nairātmyabhāvanārthitvanimittam*; *NK*$_1$ p. 110,4-6: *na caite svasya pareṣāṃ vā nāpaninīṣitāḥ, śrāvakabodhipratiniyatena vā naisargikakaruṇāparādhīnacetasā vā puruṣadhaureyakeṇa paraduḥkhaduḥkhinā pratikūlavedanīyatvāt*.

[16] *NK*$_1$ pp. 110,15-111,3: *yatra yadviruddhasamavadhānaṃ tatrāvaśyaṃ taditaranivṛttiḥ, yathā viruddhavahnisannidhāne śītanivṛttiḥ. sambhavati ca citte sthirātmadarśanaviruddhasarvadharmanairātmyasātmībhāva iti*. This passage is from *TSP*$_1$ p. 55,5-9: *yatra yadviruddhavastusamavadhānam na tatra tad aparam avasthitim āsādayati, yathā dīpraprad̄īpaprabhāprasarasaṃsargiṇi dharaṇītale timiram. asti ca doṣagaṇaviruddhanairātmyadarśanasamavadhānaṃ pratyakṣīkṛtanairātmyadarśane puṃsīti*.

[17] See *TSP*$_1$ p. 55,2-3: *tena sarvadoṣavirodhinairātmyadarśane pratyakṣīkṛte sati na tadviruddho rāgādidoṣagaṇo 'vasthānaṃ labhate*.

4. Vācaspati Miśra does not object to the claim that the *yogin* experiences the contemplated object.[18] He rather directs his criticism at *yogipratyakṣa*, from the point of view that its object is not an actual thing. The problem to which Vācaspati turns his attention is this object's difference from the object in the actual world. For instance, the *yogin* may continue to meditate upon the image of fire and clearly manifest it in his mind. Vācaspati argues that this image of fire is not the same as an actual fire which burns or cooks. He presents the reason as follows:

> Therefore it is not the case that this [result of the intensive practice of meditation] does not deviate [from a real thing] because of a relationship of identity with [it], nor [does it not deviate] because of a causal relationship with it.[19]

The object of *yogipratyakṣa* is not identical with a real thing because it is an act of mental consciousness; the thing is obviously distinct from the cognition. Nor is it produced from a real thing because it originates from a concept that the *yogin* acquires from the Buddha's teaching (*āgama*) and upon whose meaning he reflects by means of reasoning (*yukti*). Hence, the object of *yogipratyakṣa* has no relation with a real thing. On this basis Vācaspati insists that it deviates from the thing.

Another issue Vācaspati Miśra raises regarding *yogipratyakṣa* is related to the Buddhist proof of the omniscience (*sarvajñatā*) of the Buddha. Buddhist philosophers claim that the object of *yogipratyakṣa* is the fact that everything is without Self (*samastavastunairātmya*). Because "cognizing everything" is the condition for "being aware of everything as selfless," the object of this cognition is concerned with all things. Thus a question arises: How can the *yogin* know everything and manifest it in his consciousness? The following is the Buddhist reply which Vācaspati Miśra uses for his argument:

> Sentient beings, who are [now] being seen but exist extending to the limit of the threefold world, are of the nature of a main cause or effect which is a multitude of aggregates in the past or the future obtained during the recurrence of other lives. Hence, the cognition of them [by the *yogin*s] has even past and future things as its object, as something specified by them (i.e., these past and future things) inasmuch as they are identical with the [present] things being perceived.[20]

This reply reminds one of the concept of *ālayavijñāna* in Yogācāra Buddhism which provides the ultimate metaphysical foundation of the Pramāṇa school. This *ālayavijñāna* is the storehouse of all seeds of *dharma*s.[21] Sentient beings, transmigrating from beginningless time, have been accumulating *dharma*s in this storehouse by way of experience throughout their lives. Their cognitions are the place where all *dharma*s are located. Being produced from the continuum (*santāna*) of the *yogin*'s mind, *dharma*s themselves are the object-condition (*ālambanapratyaya*) for *yogipratyakṣa*.

Vācaspati argues against this Buddhist view, making two points. First, he does not agree that, like the present thing, past and future things are the object of *yogipratyakṣa*. Vācaspati's position is that "the fact that a thing is the object-condition for a cognition" is pervaded by "the fact that it depends on senses."[22] In other words, the object of perception is what is present

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[18] See NK_2 p. 104,26-27: *satyam*, *śrutānumānagocaracāriṇī bhāvanā viśadābhavijñānahetur iti nāvajānīmahe*; NK_2 p. 105,16-17: *satyam*, *sambhavaty anubhavaḥ*.

[19] NK_2 p. 105,22-23: *tan na tādātmyād asyāvyabhicāraḥ*, *nāpi tatkāryatvāt*.

[20] NK_2 p. 106,18-21: *atha dṛśyamānā dhātutrayaparyantāpannāḥ prāṇabhṛto janmāntaraparivartopāttātītānāgataskandhakadambakopādānopādeyātmāna iti taddarśanaṃ dṛśyamānatādātmyena tadviśeṣaṇatayātītānāgatāny api gocarayati*.

[21] See *TV* 2cd: *tatrālayākhyaṃ vijñānaṃ vipākaḥ sarvabījakam*.

[22] NK_2 p. 106,10: *arthasya ālambanapratyayatvaṃ vijñānaṃ pratīndriyāpekṣatvena vyāptam*. From the time of Jaimini, the author of the *Mīmāṃsāsūtra* (*MS*), the contact of sense and object has been one of the essential factors for perception according to the Mīmāṃsā. See *MS* I.1.4: *satsaṃprayoge puruṣasyendriyāṇāṃ buddhijanma tat pratyakṣam animittaṃ vidyamānopalambhanatvāt*.

(*vidyamāna*).[23] Vācaspati refers to the idea that although a certain fuel is the cause of smoke, it cannot produce smoke without a fire even after hundred attempts. Past and future things do not depend on the senses. They are included in the realm of concepts. Thus it is not proper to claim that all *dharma*s are the object of *yogipratyakṣa*.

Further criticizing the Buddhist view, Vācaspati asks: If all *dharma*s are the object-condition for the cognition of *yogin*s, why do they not function thus for the cognition of ordinary people? Buddhists may answer that the difference lies in the presence or the absence of *kleśa*s. Although all *dharma*s are potentially the object-condition for the cognition of both *yogin*s and ordinary people, they do not become the object of ordinary people's cognitions because these are covered by the impurity of *kleśa*s.[24] Arguing against this Buddhist view, Vācaspati rejects the idea that the absence of *kleśa*s allows for the perception of real things. He argues that if the *yogin* gets rid of *kleśa*s, he may indeed see all *dharma*s. However, this does not mean that he is capable of turning something unreal into something real.

> But it is not proper [to maintain] that the [*yogin*] has the skill to turn unreal things [into something real] owing to this [removal of *kleśa*s, etc.]. For it is suitable [to claim that] *kleśa*s, etc., cover the truth. However, they do not have any relation to changing concepts [into real things].[25]

What the Buddhists are confused about is the difference between perceiving something clearly and perceiving a real thing. The removal of *kleśa*s is related to the purity of mind, but it is not concerned with the true character of reality. The *yogin* may continue to practice and purify his mind of all *kleśa*s. This results in the vivid manifestation of all *dharma*s. However, they remain fictional concepts (*vikalpa*). Vācaspati concludes that it is therefore impossible for Buddhists to establish the validity of *yogipratyakṣa*.

5. The concept of *yogipratyakṣa* occupied a special position in Indian philosophy because as the link between theory and practice it was an object of proof for logicians as well as an object of experience for *yogin*s. The approach to this concept changed over the course of time. While Dharmakīrti tried to define *yogipratyakṣa* and demonstrate its epistemological structure, his commentators, such as Dharmottara and Prajñākaragupta, attempted to justify how it fulfils the two conditions of perception, namely freedom from conceptual construction and non-erroneousness. Vācaspati Miśra, on the other hand, taking the Mīmāṃsā perspective, discussed *yogipratyakṣa* quite differently. His argument is based on the position that perception is the apprehension of a present object (*vidyamānopalambhana*). He doubted the possibility of meditation on the selflessness of all things for two reasons: 1) the object of *yogipratyakṣa* deviates from the actual thing and 2) the *yogin* cannot perceive all *dharma*s. These reasons made Vācaspati negate the *yogin*'s attainment of *yogipratyakṣa*. Subsequently, his ideas with respect to this cognition became a crucial target of criticism for Buddhist philosophers such as Jñānaśrīmitra and Ratnakīrti.

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[23] See *Ślokavārttika* (*ŚV*) IV.20:

> *yato 'sti tatra dharmo 'yaṃ vidyamānopalambhanam |*
> *tasmāt tena prasiddhena gamyatām animittatā ||.*

[24] See TSP_1 p. 53,3-4: *kleśajñeyāvaraṇaprahāṇato hi sarvajñatvam. tatra kleśā eva rāgādayo bhūtadarśanapratibandhābhāvāt kleśāvaraṇam ucyante*; NK_2 p. 106,21-24: *na ca asmadādidarśanasyāpi tathātvaprasaṅgaḥ, rāgādimalāvṛtatvāt. tasya ca bhagavato nirmṛṣṭanikhilakleśopakleśamalaṃ vijñānam anāvaraṇaṃ paritaḥ pradyotamānam ālambanapratyayaṃ sarvākāraṃ gocarayat.*

[25] NK_2 p. 107,5-7: *na punar asmād asadarthanirmāṇakauśalam asya yujyate. tattvāvarakatā hi sulabhā kleśādīnām, na punar vikalpanirmāṇapratibandhatā.*

Bibliography and Abbreviations

1) Primary sources

TV	*Triṃśikā Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi of Vasubandhu*, ed. in A.K. Chatterjee, *Readings on Yogācāra Buddhism*, Varanasi 1971, pp. 44-62.
TSP_1	*Tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā of Kamalaśīla*, ed. in Pemwieser 1991.
TSP_2	*Tattvasaṃgrahapañjikā of Kamalaśīla with Tattvasaṃgraha of Śāntarakṣita*. Ed. D. Shastri. Varanasi 1968.
DhPr	*Dharmottarapradīpa of Paṇḍita Durveka Miśra with Dharmakīrti's Nyāyabindu and Dharmottara's Ṭīkā*. Ed. D. Malvania. Patna 1971.
NK_1	*Nyāyakaṇikā of Vācaspatimiśra*, ed. in Pemwieser 1991.
NK_2	*Nyāyakaṇikā of Vācaspatimiśra*. Ed. M. Goswami. Varanasi 1978.
NBṬ	*Nyāyabinduṭīkā of Dharmottara*. Ed. Pandita Dalsukhbhai Malvania. Patna 1971.
PV	*Pramāṇavārttika of Dharmakīrti with Manorathanandin's Pramāṇavārttikavṛtti*. Ed. R. Samkrtyayana. Patna 1953.
PVin	*Pramāṇaviniścaya of Dharmakīrti*. Derge edition No. 4211; Peking edition No. 5710.
PVBh	*Pramāṇavārttikabhāṣya of Prajñākaragupta*. Ed. R. Samkrtyayana. Patna 1953.
PS	*Pramāṇasamuccaya of Dignāga*, ed. in Hattori 1968.
MS	*Mīmāṃsāsūtra of Jaimini*. Tr. and ed. M.L. Sandal. Delhi 1980.
ŚV	*Ślokavārtika of Kumārila Bhaṭṭa with Commentary Nyāyaratnākara of Pārthasārathi Miśra*. Ed. D. Shastri. Varanasi 1978.

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4.3

SĀṂKHYA

Shujun Motegi

Asita Devala, a Sāṃkhya Teacher

(1) It is well known that before Īśvarakṛṣṇa, the author of the *Sāṃkhyakārikā* (*SK*), there were other Sāṃkhya teachers who transmitted Sāṃkhya ideas, said to have been originally propounded by Kapila, the mythological founder of the school. In the present paper I shall focus upon Asita Devala (AD) and discuss his teachings in order to infer earlier stages of Sāṃkhya thought.

(2) Before examining AD's teachings, let us pay some attention to his name, which appears in different forms in the *Mahābhārata* (*MBh*). The most frequently used form is the combination *asito devalaś caiva*,[1] which implies the existence of two different persons. However, the combined forms *asitasya devalasya* and *asito devalaḥ* often appear as the name of one and the same person.[2] The sequence of the two words, that is, *asita* and *devala*, is not fixed. We can also observe the reverse word order, that is, *devalas tv asito* (*'bravīt*).[3] Thus the name AD does not have a single constant form. As the word *asita* may be used as an adjective, the original meaning seems to be "black Devala." Owing to the familiarity of the name either of the two components could have been used to denote AD. This would explain the occurrence of the forms *asita* or *devala*.[4] For the present I presume the existence of one and the same person with a variety of names.[5]

(3) In *SK* 71 it is stated that Sāṃkhya thought came down to Īśvarakṛṣṇa through *śiṣya-paraṃparā* (a succession of disciples). Māṭhara explains this succession of disciples as follows: *tasmād bhārgavolukavālmīkihāritadevalaprabhṛtīnām āgatam*.[6] Though other commentaries on the *SK* do not refer to his name, AD is listed in the Epic as a Sāṃkhya teacher together with another well-known Sāṃkhya teacher, Vārṣagaṇya. In *MBh* XII.306, Yājñavalkya, in response to a question posed by Viśvāvasu, refers to a theory which has "the twenty-fifth" as its highest principle, that is, the Sāṃkhya theory. He then lists certain teachers as sources of Sāṃkhya knowledge:

> *jaigīṣavyasyāsitasya devalasya ca me śrutam* |
> *parāśarasya viprarṣer vārṣagaṇyasya dhīmataḥ* ||57||
> *bhikṣoḥ pañcaśikhasyātha kapilasya śukasya ca* |
> *gautamasyārṣṭiṣeṇasya gargasya ca mahātmanaḥ* ||58||
> *nāradasyāsureś caiva pulastyasya ca dhīmataḥ* |
> *sanatkumārasya tataḥ śukrasya ca mahātmanaḥ* ||59||.

It is far from certain that all the teachers mentioned here really were Sāṃkhya teachers, but it should be noted that this list contains the name of Vārṣagaṇya, who is the most important teacher in the history of the Sāṃkhya school, and the names of the first three teachers men-

[1] *MBh* I.48.8, III.83.103, VII.69.45, XII.281.15, XIII.18.14, XIII.65.22 and XIII.18.14.
[2] *MBh* II.53.6, III.13.43, VI.32.13, XII.200.4, XII.222.4 and XII.306.57.
[3] *MBh* VI.64.6, II.49.10 (*devalaṃ cāsitam*) and XIII.153.13 (*devalenāsitena ca*).
[4] *MBh* I.60.25, I.174.2, II.64.5, XII.1.4, XII.222.3, XII.222.8, XIII.154.16 and XIV.94.32.
[5] However, in view of the large number of places where the name Devala appears, and which are discussed below, there remains the possibility that there may have been a person or persons called Devala who was/were different from AD.
[6] Cf. *Māṭh* p. 62,22.

Karin Preisendanz (ed.), *Expanding and Merging Horizons*: *Contributions to South Asian and Cross-Cultural Studies in Commemoration of Wilhelm Halbfass*, Wien: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 2007, pp. 357-371.

tioned in the *SK*, that is, Kapila, Āsuri, and Pañcaśikha. It is clear that the purpose of this list is to identify these well-known teachers as Sāṃkhya teachers. It is thus safe to say that AD was also regarded as a Sāṃkhya teacher at an early stage of the school.

(4) The teachings of AD are recorded in Chapter 267 of the *Mokṣadharma* section of the *MBh*'s *Śāntiparvan*. In this chapter we find a rather long speech by AD directed at Nārada, who sometimes appears together with AD in the *MBh*. I shall first summarize the teachings of AD,[7] and then discuss some important topics or terms in relation to Sāṃkhya thought.

In the beginning of the chapter Nārada asks AD what the universe was created from and where living beings go at the dissolution of the world. In answer to this question, AD begins his teachings with a cosmological description. Citing the ideas of a/the *adhibhūtacintaka* he states that Time (*kāla*), compelled by its own nature (*bhāvapracodita*), creates beings from the five material elements, and emphasizes that it is wrong to assume a different creative principle. AD describes the five material elements as being eternal, immovable and unchanging, and as being aggregates of great energetic power (*mahat tejas*); they have Time as their sixth (v. 6). Subsequently, AD declares that eight elements, consisting of the five material elements, Time, life and death (*bhāva-abhāva*), make up the creation and dissolution of existing beings (v. 9).

AD then analyses the human being in relation to the five material elements (vv. 10ff.). The human body is made of the five material elements. A human being has five sense organs, three organs of knowledge, six organs of action, and an individual soul. The sense organs themselves do not cognize external objects; it is the field-knower (*kṣetrajña*, individual soul) who cognizes them. The process of cognition is explained as follows: man perceives an external object by means of the sense organs; the object is then made an object of awareness by *citta*, is examined by *manas* and is finally decided upon by *buddhi*.

The next topic is sleep and dreams. Man dreams when his sense organs have become weary[8] and *manas* is active and directed at external objects. Human beings have three kinds of condition (*bhāva*) called *sāttvika*, *rājasa* and *tāmasa*. They are characterized by these conditions which are connected with their actions, and the memory in dreams is also characterized by them.

Furthermore, human beings are said to consist of seventeen elements, that is, eight organs of knowledge, six organs of action, and the three conditions. The eighteenth component is the soul which is eternal in the human body. It is further explained that human beings consist of twenty elements, including bodily heat.

Next, the life and death of a human being are explained. The human body is kept alive by *mahān* with the help of wind: wind, connected with *bhāva*, is the force that binds together the bodily elements. It is not clear here to what the term *mahān* refers. When the effects caused by actions of merit and demerit cease, man dies. Subsequently, his bodily elements are dissolved into "the five." The soul (*kṣetrin*), impelled by Time (*kālasaṃcodita*), transmigrates from the original body to another body, like a man moves to a new house. It takes some time to be born again after the soul has reached the new body. As the soul itself is neither born nor dies, we should not lament death. The soul is described as independent, not

[7] This chapter is summarized by Hopkins (1901a: 155-157) and translated into English by Edgerton (1965: 287-290).

[8] The term *indriyasannyāya* is found only here in the *MBh*.

belonging to anyone. It experiences pain and pleasure in the body and at some later time will proceed to the highest stage which is Brahman. It attains this state by abandoning the body, which is made of merit and demerit. The method by which the soul may abandon merit and demerit is Sāṃkhya knowledge.

(5) I shall now examine some terms and concepts to be found in the teachings of AD. The first of them is Time (*kāla*), which plays an important role in the cosmology of this chapter. The principal role of Time goes back to the *Atharvaveda* where it is the principle that sets the whole world revolving.[9] However, the idea that Time has a creative function did not survive in later systematized philosophical thought. In the *MBh*, Time is often seen as the principle of destiny[10] or as something connected with destiny, for example, Death. In the *Mokṣadharma* Nahuṣa and Bali, two demons defeated by Indra, respectively tell Indra that everything, including their defeat, has been determined by Time. Human efforts have no influence on the course of life.[11] A sort of pessimism that everything is predetermined is expressed rather frequently at the beginning of the *Mokṣadharma* section in which renouncement of the world is strongly recommended for keeping the mind in a state of steady tranquility. It could be said that in the Epic it is the pessimistic view of ascetics that tends to lend emphasis to the function of Time as destiny.[12]

In the teachings of AD, Time is not the ultimate cause or creator of the world. However, even though it does not create the five material elements, it creates all existent beings from the five material elements which are eternal.[13] It is therefore supposed that Time is the principle that causes motion and change in things which do not move and change by themselves; it is said to be one of the eight basic elements which cause the creation and dissolution of living beings.

Nevertheless, we should not assume that Time is the principle of destiny in the teachings of AD. Although some verses seem to explain transmigration in a pessimistic manner,[14] AD does not seem to accept destiny as the ultimate principle inasmuch as Brahman is said to be the final goal attainable by certain efforts. Time thus plays the role of a basic principle which causes change in things, but is not the ultimate principle. The idea that Time is accepted as one among several principles is also seen in the teachings of Pañcaśikha in Chapter 212 where, however, the precise role or function of Time is not stated.[15]

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[9] Cf. *AV* IX.53 and 54; Edgerton 1965: 130-132; Bedekar 1961.

[10] The idea of Time as the creator of the world is still seen, for example, in *MBh* I.1.187-190 and I.3.151 (*kālacakra*) where destiny is also implicitly indicated. In *Maitrāyaṇī-Upaniṣad* (*MaiUp*) 6, Time is not the ultimate principle of creation although it occupies a very high position; it is regarded as the source of food, and the sun as the source of Time (6.14). Further, Time is considered to be an aspect of Brahman (6.15-16).

[11] *MBh* XII.217 and 219. Cf. Hopkins 1901a: 103 and Bedekar 1961: 1-6.

[12] In the *Śvetāśvatara-Upaniṣad* (*ŚvetUp*), Time, together with other principles such as *svabhāva*, *niyati* and *yadṛcchā* (*ŚvetUp* 1.2 and 6.1), is denied as cause of the world. In *MaiUp* 4.5, it is treated as one of the forms of formless Brahman, next to other entities such as *agni*, *vāyu*, *āditya*, *prāṇa* and *anna*.

[13] Hopkins (1901: 155) takes the function of Time here to be the creation of the five material elements.

[14] The thirty-third verse of this chapter runs as follows:

hitvāhitvā hy ayaṃ praiti dehād dehaṃ kṛtāśrayaḥ |
kālasaṃcoditaḥ kṣetrī viśīrṇād vā gṛhād gṛham ||. (*MBh* XII.267.33)

The expression *kāla*(*saṃ*)*codita* is frequently used to emphasize the capability of destiny to influence human life.

[15] Bedekar (1961) tries to explain the appearance of the concept of Time in these chapters as a reaction of orthodox thinkers to heterodox thinkers who maintain the notion of destiny (pp. 14-15).

Time cannot be considered a Sāṃkhya concept. The *Yuktidīpikā*, a later commentary on the *SK*, in the context of proving the existence of *prakṛti* clearly denies Time as the world's cause.[16] On the basis of the *Ahirbudhnyasaṃhitā*'s (*AS*) testimony, Chakravarti maintains that Time may possibly have been one of the sixty topics of the *Ṣaṣṭitantra*.[17] The *Ahirbudhnyasaṃhitā* lists six topics which are quite different from those referred to in commentaries on the *SK*, with Time appearing together with *śakti* and *niyati*. Inasmuch as it is listed alongside *niyati*, the concept of *kāla* must here be related to destiny, unlike in Chapter 267 of the *Mokṣadharma*.[18]

The *Ahirbudhnyasaṃhitā* has another verse that refers to Sāṃkhya. In it, Time is said to be one of four principles, together with *vyakta*, *avyakta* and *pum*. The verse runs as follows:

> *vyaktāvyaktapumākhyābhis tathā kālākhyayā mune |*
> *uktā catasṛbhiḥ saiva śaktir vai sāṃkhyayogayoḥ ||*.[19]

Although the role of Time is not clear here,[20] the testimony of the *Ahirbudhnyasaṃhitā* suggests the possibility that in the earlier period there was a certain Sāṃkhya or Yoga school which regarded Time as a basic principle. As for the role of Time, it seems possible to assume that, like in Chapter 267, it is a principle that causes modification in immovable things. Time may have been adopted to explain the manifold phenomena of the primary matter before the appearance of *pariṇāmavāda*, or the notion of time may have been introduced as an alternative to it. The existence of such a school may be assumed on the basis of the evidence provided by the *Ahirbudhnyasaṃhitā*. But even if a similar function of Time were presupposed, there would be a difference between this assumed school and the teachings of AD that never refer to basic Sāṃkhya terms such as *vyakta*, *avyakta* and *pum* (*puruṣa*) which are found in the above verse.

Regarding material principles, we note only the five material elements in AD's teaching in Chapter 267 of the *Mokṣadharma* which are supposed to be eternal. Later on in the *SK* they are treated as one of the evolutes of the ultimate material principle (*prakṛti*). There is no reference in the teachings of AD to this higher principle which contains the five material elements in latent form.

The term *guṇa* deserves examination. The *SK* maintains *pariṇāmavāda* which explains the manifold phenomena as the combination of three constituents (*guṇa*s), that is, *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas* of the ultimate material principle (*prakṛti*). The same term *guṇa* is used here in Chapter 267 of the *Mokṣadharma*, but it has various meanings. First, *guṇa* is used to refer to the functions of the sense organs, that is, seeing, hearing, smelling, touching and tasting (v. 12). The function of the organs of knowledge and action is also called *guṇa* (v. 22).[21] Second,

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[16] *Yuktidīpikā* (*YD*) pp. 161,24-26 and 247,12. In addition, Varāhamihira in *Bṛhatsaṃhitā* (*BS*) I.7 refers to the *kālavādin*s as thinkers distinct from the *pradhānavādin* Kapila.

[17] Chakravarti 1951: 117-118; cf. *AS* 12.21.

[18] Cf. *AS* 12.21ab: *trīṇi tantrāṇy athānyāni śakter niyatikālayoḥ*. As Chakravarti (1951: 120) clarifies, this list is coloured by Bhāgavata speculation where the three concepts, that is, *śakti*, *niyati* and *kāla*, play an important role. The extent to which Sāṃkhya thought is properly reproduced here is therefore questionable.

[19] *AS* 51.42; cf. Chakravarti 1951: 257.

[20] The four principles are regarded as forms of the supreme God Viṣṇu in the literature of Pāñcarātra; cf. *Viṣṇupurāṇa* (*ViP*) 1.2.14-18ab (pp. 5-6), specifically *vyaktaṃ viṣṇus tathāvyaktaṃ puruṣaḥ kāla eva ca* (1.2.18ab).

[21] Cf. *MBh* 267.22cd: *jñānaceṣṭendriyaguṇāḥ sarve saṃśabditā mayā*. Edgerton (1965: 289, n. 1) takes *guṇa* used in verse 12 to refer to the characteristics of material elements. However, even if this interpretation is accepted, the usage in verse 22 still supports the assumption that the function of organs is also called *guṇa*.

the characteristics of the five material elements, that is, color, odour, taste, contact and sound, are called *guṇa* (vv. 13-15); the sense organs perceive these five characteristics. This usage is very frequent in the *Mokṣadharma*. Thirdly, three dispositions (discussed below) and fourteen organs are referred to as the seventeen elements (*guṇa*) which constitute a human being (v. 28). Although it seems unreasonable to combine mental dispositions with organs, perhaps this is necessary for justifying that a human being consists of a certain number of elements.[22] Alternatively, AD refers to the idea that there are twenty constituent elements (v. 30).[23] In this case, too, he seems to use *guṇa* in the meaning of constituent elements of a human being.

Thus the term *guṇa* is applied in various senses. However, upon closer observation of the usages of the term it becomes apparent that AD uses this term whenever he refers to the nature or function of something substantial. This usage is very common in the *Mokṣadharma* but differs from that of the *SK*.

One should also examine the term *bhāva* in relation to *guṇa*. *bhāva* is used in the *SK* to refer to the dispositions of *buddhi* which determine the next birth. They are of three natures: *sāṃsiddhika*, *prākṛtika* and *vaikṛtika*. The specific appearances of *bhāva* are eight in number, *dharma*, *jñāna*, *vairāgya*, *aiśvarya* and their opposites (*SK* 43-45), and are considered to explain transmigration.

In Chapter 267 of the *Mokṣadharma*, the term *bhāva* is used in different meanings. First, it is used in a compound to qualify Time (v. 4): *kālo bhāvapracoditaḥ*. In the next verse, Time is qualified by another compound: *kāla ātmapracoditaḥ*. The two expressions must have the same meaning. Thus *bhāva* here means "own nature," comparable to *svabhāva*.[24] Second, the term *bhāva* is used together with its negation in the compound *bhāvābhāvau* (v. 9). Because the relevant verse explains the death and rebirth of living beings made of the five material elements, the meaning of *bhāva* is "birth" or "life."[25] Third, *bhāva* refers to the mental dispositions or conditions of a human being which are closely connected with his activities (v. 25). There are three dispositions of *bhāva*, namely, the clear (*sāttvika*), the dark (*tāmasa*) and the active (*rājasa*), among which only the *sāttvikabhāva* is explained. The three kinds of dispositions are discussed in detail in Chapter 187, with duplicates in Chapters 239-241. Frauwallner (1925) regards these chapters as Sāṃkhya chapters. In Chapter 187, the dispositions are specified as modified forms of the psychic organ *buddhi*: when *buddhi* changes into the three

[22] That the human being is made of seventeen or sixteen elements is often stated in the *Mokṣadharma*. Cf. Hopkins 1901a: 167-170.

[23] The verse runs as follows:

atha vā saṃnipāto 'yaṃ śarīraṃ pāñcabhautikam |
ekaś ca daśa cāṣṭau ca guṇāḥ saha śarīriṇām |
ūṣmaṇā saha viṃśo vā saṃghātaḥ pāñcabhautikaḥ ||. (*MBh* XII.267.30)

The meaning of the verse is not clear. The body is made of five material elements, and for the soul there are one, ten and eight elements. By adding bodily heat to the list, a human being possesses twenty elements. Referring to Deussen's suggestion (1906: 481) that *eka* is *kṣetrajña*, Edgerton (1965: 290, n. 1) comments that he cannot make sense of these enumerations.

[24] Cf. Edgerton 1965: 287.

[25] Regarding this usage, it has already been pointed out that there is a parallel passage in *MBh* XII.244.2 which reads (cf. Edgerton 1965: 287, n. 1):

ākāśaṃ māruto jyotir āpaḥ pṛthvī ca pañcamī |
bhāvābhāvau ca kālaś ca sarvabhūteṣu pañcasu ||.

Here, Time is conceived as the innate nature of the five material elements, rather than as an independent principle. Frauwallner (1925: 192) points out that this verse is influenced by another sphere of ideas.

dispositions, it becomes another psychic organ, the *manas*.[26] Here, in Chapter 267, though not explicitly stated, *bhāva* seems to refer to the dispositions of *buddhi*.[27]

Taking all these occurrences of the term *bhāva* into consideration, I am compelled to conclude that the chapter is not well systematized as regards its terminology because in its mere thirty-eight verses the same important term has several different meanings. However, we can see that *bhāva* is predominantly used to refer to mental dispositions, which is similar to the usage in Chapter 187.[28]

The purpose of referring to mental dispositions seems to be to prepare for an explanation of emancipation which relies on the simile of a dream. Although the verses 23-27 are obscure to me, it can be assumed that AD tries to explain emancipation with the simile of a dream, the latter being interpreted by the three dispositions of mind.[29] A human being in general experiences waking, sleep with dreams, and deep sleep without dreams. In the first two states the mind is still active and confused, which would refer to the dispositions of *rajas* and *tamas*. However, in deep sleep worldly affairs mean nothing, which is the very state of emancipation comparable to the disposition of *sattva*. Emancipation is described in terms of the unconscious condition of deep sleep, a simile which is also found in the Middle Upaniṣads.[30]

The process of perception of an external object also needs examination. In *SK* 30-35 it is said that several psychic organs work successively to cognize an external object, which presupposes a certain hierarchical order among them. This successive hierarchically ordered functioning of the senses and psychic organs is a characteristic feature of perception in Sāṃkhya. In Chapter 267 of the *Mokṣadharma*, as in the *SK*, several psychic organs function successively to cognize an external object. Hierarchically ordered psychic organs are first mentioned in the *Kaṭha-Upaniṣad* (*KaṭhUp*).[31] Here the hierarchy is part of a sequence which

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[26] The relevant verses in Chapter 187 read:

puruṣādhiṣṭhitā buddhis triṣu bhāveṣu vartate |
kadācil labhate prītiṃ kadācid anuśocati ||21||
na sukhena na duḥkhena kadācid api vartate |
evaṃ narāṇāṃ manasi triṣu bhāveṣv avasthitā ||22||.

"*buddhi* governed by *puruṣa* exists in the three conditions. Sometimes it experiences pleasure, sometimes it grieves. And sometimes it exists with neither pleasure nor pain. Thus [*buddhi*] remains in three conditions in the mind of human beings."

[27] Edgerton (1965: 289, n. 1) assumes that the meaning of *bhāva* is the same as that of *guṇa* in Sāṃkhya usage.

[28] The abstract meaning of the term *bhāva* must have opened the way for a wide application of its triple classification. In Chapter 187, the concept of three dispositions is used to interpret a Buddhist concept of three kinds of *vedanā*, called *sāttvikī*, *rājasī* and *tāmasī* (v. 28). This explanation of *vedanā* using the notion of three dispositions is again found in the teachings of Pañcaśikha. Moreover, Pañcaśikha uses this notion to explain conditions of the mind (*citta*) or body (*MBh* XII.212.21ff.). In Chapter 302, this classification is applied to the kinds of individual selves (*pratyagātman*) by persons called *adhyātmacintāḥ* (302.3), and in Chapter 313 it is used by King Janaka when describing human faults and the proper way to be followed (313.28). In *Bhagavadgītā* (*BhG*) 7.12-13 the three dispositions are said to be born from Bhagavat and to put the whole world in a state of confusion.

[29] The twenty-seventh verse is especially unclear:

jantuṣv ekatameṣv evaṃ bhāvā ye vidhim āsthitāḥ |
bhāvayor īpsitaṃ nityaṃ pratyakṣagamanaṃ dvayoḥ ||. (*MBh* XII.267.27)

[30] Cf. *Praśna-Upaniṣad* (*PraUp*) 4.5-6 and *MaiUp* 6.25 and 7.11. In *MBh* XII.187, dreaming is determined to be the consequence of the workings of *tamas* as well as of laziness (v. 35).

[31] The verses in *KathUp* 3 run as follows:

indriyebhyaḥ parā hy arthā arthebhyaś ca paraṃ manaḥ |
manasas tu parā buddhir buddher ātmā mahān paraḥ ||10||

leads to the highest principle as the final goal to be known or to be identified with one's own Self. Again, in Chapter 187 of the *Mokṣadharma*, the psychic organs and the soul, called the field-knower, are hierarchically listed in order to indicate the highest principle in a human being. Subsequently, with the concept of the hierarchically ordered psychic organs and the soul presupposed, the process of perception is explained as follows:

> *cakṣur ālokanāyaiva saṃśayaṃ kurute manaḥ |*
> *buddhir adhyavasāyāya kṣetrajñaḥ sākṣivat sthitaḥ* ||12||.
>
> Eyes are for seeing (an external object), *manas* doubts, *buddhi* determines, and the field-knower stands like an on-looker.

If one compares the process of perception as described in Chapters 187 and 267, it can be stated that both descriptions basically follow a similar scheme, though they differ in some details. The differences are that in Chapter 187 *citta* is not known as a psychic organ, and in Chapter 187 the field-knower is included in the process of perception.[32] It is peculiar that the field-knower has no function in the process of perception described in Chapter 267 because it is included in the hierarchical order of psychic organs and because in the preceding verse it is emphasized that it is not the sense organs but the field-knower who perceives objects.[33] Some confusion or interpolation in the course of textual transmission may have occurred. In this respect the scheme of perception presented in Chapter 267 may be said to be inconsistent. However, Chapter 267 at least testifies to the concept of perception by hierarchically ordered psychic organs, which is also found in Chapter 187 and later in the *SK*.

The term *karmendriya* is found in *SK* 26 and *Yogabhāṣya* (*YBh*) *ad YS* 2.19,[34] and not in any other system of philosophical thought. It is thus possibly a Sāṃkhya or Yoga concept. The term itself does not appear in the literature of the Upaniṣads, but the functions of parts of the human body are noted there, and the terms referring to individual *karmendriya*s can already be found in the Old Upaniṣads.[35] In the *Praśna-Upaniṣad*, one of the Middle Upaniṣads, all the organs of action are listed together with the material elements, sense organs and psychic organs:

> *mahataḥ param avyaktam avyaktāt puruṣaḥ paraḥ |*
> *puruṣān na paraṃ kiñcit sā kāṣṭhā sā parā gatiḥ* ||11||.

Cp. *KaṭhUp* 6.7-8.

[32] The verse in question runs:

> *pūrvaṃ cetayate jantur indriyair viṣayān pṛthak |*
> *vicārya manasā paścād atha buddhyā vyavasyati |*
> *indriyair upalabdhārthān sarvān yas tv adhyavasyati* ||17||.

The same process of perception is described in *MBh* III.201.18, VI.25.42 (*BhG* III.42), XII.244.10 *et passim*. Incidentally, when comparing these descriptions of the process, one has to note that the function of *buddhi* is almost fixed, while *manas* has different functions in each of them. This reflects the wide range of meanings associated with *manas*.

[33] The relevant verses run:

> *indriyāṇi na budhyante kṣetrajñas tais tu budhyate* ||15cd||
> *cittam indriyasaṃghātāt paraṃ tasmāt paraṃ manaḥ |*
> *manasas tu parā buddhiḥ kṣetrajño buddhitaḥ paraḥ* ||16||.

The term *citta* is used in the teachings of Pañcaśikha in Chapter 212 in which the process of perception is not treated.

[34] *YBh* p. 199,15.

[35] The *Bṛhadāraṇyaka-Upaniṣad* (*BĀUp*) 2.4.11 (= 4.5.12) reads: ... *evaṃ sarveṣāṃ karmaṇāṃ hastāv ekāyanam | evaṃ sarveṣām ānandānām upastha ekāyanam | evaṃ sarveṣāṃ visargāṇāṃ pāyur ekāyanam | evaṃ sarveṣām adhvanāṃ pādāv ekāyanam | evaṃ sarveṣāṃ vedānāṃ vāg ekāyanam |*. In the *Taittīriya-Upaniṣad* (*TaiUp*) 3.10 Brahman as food is said to appear in the acts of parts of the human body: ... | *kṣema iti vāci | yogakṣema iti prāṇāpānayoḥ | karmeti hastayoḥ | gatir iti pādayoḥ | vimuktir iti pāyau | iti mānuṣīḥ samājñāḥ |*.

> *... | vāk ca vaktavyaṃ ca | hastau cādātavyaṃ ca | upasthaś cānandayitavyaṃ ca | pāyuś ca visarjayitavyaṃ ca | pādau ca gantavyaṃ ca | manaś ca mantavyaṃ ca | buddhiś ca boddhavyaṃ ca | ahaṃkāraś cāhaṃkartavyaṃ ca | cittaṃ ca cetayitavyaṃ ca | tejaś ca vidyotayitavyaṃ ca | prāṇaś ca vidhārayitavyaṃ ca |*. (*PraUp* 4.8)[36]

It is only a small step from this to the point where organs of actions are placed in a category named *karmendriya*. In the *MBh* the term *karmendriya* occurs in eight chapters, six of which are apparently Sāṃkhya chapters, so to speak.[37] The remaining two chapters are Chapters 212 and 267 of the *Mokṣadharma*, both of which lack typical Sāṃkhya concepts, such as *puruṣa*, *prakṛti*, *triguṇa* and so on. Unlike in Chapter 212 where the names of *karmendriya*s are only listed, in Chapter 267 they are given a detailed treatment. Chapter 267 therefore places a certain emphasis upon the *karmendriya*s, without providing an explanation of other specific Sāṃkhya concepts.

The term *bala* is used to refer to the power which results from the activities of the organs of action. This way of thinking is very similar to the notion of the *sāmānyakaraṇavṛtti* of the three kinds of organs mentioned in *SK* 29, which explains the five bodily winds as the result of the common activity of the three kinds of organs.[38] In the *YBh* on *YS* 39, the activity of the five bodily winds is identified with life (*jīvana*), which is also considered to be the result of the common activity of the organs (*samastendriyavṛttiḥ*).[39]

With regard to the elements forming a human being, AD introduces several explanations in the context of treating transmigration. According to the first, living beings consist of eight elements: five material elements, birth, death and Time. This explanation only relates to the birth and death of living beings (v. 9), that is, it presupposes a rather mechanical kind of transmigration without the assumption of any psychic principles. According to the second explanation a human being consists of eighteen elements (*guṇa*) (v. 22), of which the eighteenth is the eternal soul (*dehin*). The soul is called *kṣetrajña*, perhaps in the context of cognition. With the third explanation AD introduces the idea of a human being made up of twenty elements, but it is unclear which elements are meant (v. 30). Here, the embodied soul is called *śarīrin*. According to this explanation, the principle called "the large one" (*mahān*), together with wind (breath), keeps the body alive.[40] Wind further dissolves the physical body into the material elements at the time of death. Among these three alternative explanations of the human being, the third seems conclusive. It assumes an eternal soul which has nothing to do with birth and death, but nevertheless transmigrates, as an embodied soul, from body to body with its experience of pleasure and pain intact.[41] The concept of soul here is that – while

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[36] The same type of list is seen again in the *Kauṣītaki-Upaniṣad* (*KauUp*) 3.5.

[37] They are *MBh* XII.203.6, 287.9, 291.27, 292.44, 295.4 and XIV.42.15.

[38] Nīlakaṇṭha expresses a similar view in his comments on *MBh* XII.267.22: *tena sāmānyakaraṇavṛttiḥ prāṇādyāvāyavaḥ pañceti sāṃkhyānāṃ saṃmataḥ prāṇasyendriyānatirekapakṣaḥ parāstaḥ* (cf. *BhD* p. 156,5f.). Frauwallner (1925: 191) offers a suggestion as to why the term *bala* is used.

[39] As to the sense organs, they seem to be composed of the material elements, though this is not explicitly stated. In v. 267.11, it is said that the body is born from earth, the ears from space, the eyes from fire (*sūrya*), the breath from wind, and blood from water. This idea is different from that of the *SK*, according to which sense organs, organs of actions and *manas* are born from a psychic organ, that is, *ahaṃkāra* (*SK* 25) (cf. Frauwallner 1925: 188-192).

[40] It is not clear what is meant by *mahān* here. This term is often used for *buddhi* or *ātman*. It would therefore be natural to take it to refer to an embodied soul responsible for life.

[41] Regarding the terms used to refer to the soul, four are used in different contexts, that is, *dehin*, *śarīrin*, *kṣetrin* and *kṣetrajña*. This may partially be due to the fact that various sources have been cited. A number of expressions are used in this chapter to refer to other sources: *āhur bhūtacintakāḥ* (v. 4), *kavayo viduḥ* (v. 12),

being essentially eternal and pure – it transmigrates until emancipation is reached. This is somewhat analogous to the notion of the soul according to the *SK*. However, there is nothing equivalent here to the *SK*'s concept of a subtle body (*sūkṣmaśarīra*), within which an eternal soul transmigrates without contact with the material world.

Emancipation is attained after death by reaching Brahman. To reach Brahman, it is necessary to leave the body which is made of merit and demerit (*puṇyapāpamaya*). In order to destroy the merit and demerit of the body, the knowledge of Sāṃkhya is taught (vv. 36-38). In the last verse the term *sāṃkhya* appears, referring to the means by which the merit and demerit in the body accumulated over a lifetime can be destroyed. According to the *SK*, on the other hand, emancipation is attained by means of the knowledge by which one distinguishes *puruṣa* from *prakṛti*, as a result of which the three kinds of pain, irremovable by other means, may be expunged. Thus these concepts of emancipation differ markedly from each other. The term *puṇyapāpa* is rather rare in the literature of the Upaniṣads.[42] It occurs often in the Epic, especially in the *Mokṣadharma* section. Chapter 267 is unique because in it merit and demerit are said to belong to the body, not to the mind.[43] As a result, the eternal nature or purity of the soul seems to be maintained even during the process of transmigration. Even though according to this system of thought the eternal soul remains in a pure state, which is similar to that of the *SK*, it has to be pointed out that the terms and the frame of thought are quite different.

(6) The close relationship between AD and Jaigīṣavya (Jai.), who is also regarded as a Sāṃkhya teacher, necessitates the examination of Jai.'s teachings. The teachings of Jai. can be found in two chapters of the *MBh*. First he lectures to AD in *MBh* IX.49.

The story of *MBh* IX.49 provides us with a description of AD. AD is said to be an ideal householder (cf. *gārhasthya*) who lives in a hermitage (*āśrama*) at a *tīrtha*. He is rich in ascetic merit (*tapas*) and practises *dharma*, is religiously pure and without anger, and treats all living beings equally. He considers censure and praise to be the same, and gold to be equal in value to clay. He always worships gods, guests and *brāhmaṇa*s. Satisfied with *brahmacarya*, he is constantly engaged in his duties (vv. 1-4). He is called *muni*, *mahāmuni* and *bhikṣuka*. Although absorbed in austerities, he cannot reach the world of Brahman where Jai. can easily go.

Jai. visits AD's hermitage, engages in *yoga* practice and attains perfection (*siddhi*). He is also called *muni* or *mahāmuni*, but not *yogin*; nonetheless he possesses great power born of *yoga* by means of which he can fly up to the highest world of Brahman. The main feature of Jai.'s *yoga* is, therefore, his miraculous power (*prabhāva*) (vv. 22, 43 and 51), which enables him to fly through the skies with tremendous speed.[44]

Because AD's miraculous powers are not as perfect as those of Jai., AD makes up his mind to follow Jai. and pursues the *mokṣadharma*, leaving *gārhapatya*. His decision is described in terms of a contradiction between the duties of a householder and the quest for emancipation.

āhur etāny adhyātmacintakāḥ (v. 18), *iti saṃśabdyamānāni* (v. 19), *praśaṃsanti* (v. 25) and *atha vā* (vv. 29 and 30).

[42] It only occurs in the *Muṇḍaka-Upaniṣad* (*MuUp*) 3.1.3, which is parallel to *MaiUp* 6.18.

[43] Other usages are rather standard general expressions such, as *puṇyapāpavivarjitāḥ* (*MBh* XII.327.6, 332.13 and 336.2) and *puṇyapāpena mānuṣena* (XII.291.47 and 302.4).

[44] Hopkins (1901b: 337) discusses the ability of certain persons to fly. It has already been pointed out by Chakravarti (1951: 127-128) that later literature sees Jai. as a *yoga* teacher who teaches concentration of mind. Cf. also Johnston 1937: 9.

The decision causes fear of a food shortage among living beings because of the renouncement of the householder's duties. AD therefore changes his mind and decides to renounce emancipation, but now some fruits, flowers and herbs fear that they will be plucked or cut for the householder's sacrifice. Undecided about whether he should seek emancipation or remain a householder, AD finally chooses emancipation and attains perfection (*siddhi*) and the highest *yoga*. At the end of the story Nārada appears and tells the divine beings that Jai. no longer possesses *tapas* because it has been transmitted to AD.

The term *mokṣadharma* must here refer to the method by which man attains Brahman, though this is not clearly stated; Jai.'s actual lesson is not specifically reported either. We know from the words of Nārada that Jai. transmitted his accumulated power of austerity (*tapas*) to AD. In the chapter under discussion *tapas* is most important, and *yoga* seems to be a method to obtain the majestic power of *tapas*; *yoga* is not the means of mental concentration as in the *YBh*. Even the power of *yoga* ascribed to Jai. can be regarded as a result of *tapas*.[45] In any case, Jai. is presented as having a connection with *yoga*.

The teachings of Jai. addressed to AD are again presented in Chapter 222 of the *Mokṣadharma*. In this chapter Jai. is described as a sage free from anger and desire who has a great liking for the power of *tapas*. In his teachings as a whole, he stresses indifference towards people and worldly affairs, which is emphasized by means of various maxim-like expressions. Jai.'s main points are that a person should be of equal mind towards everyone, and that one should be indifferent to praise and blame. If one adheres to these attitudes, Jai. states, one can sleep tranquilly even if one has been insulted, and reach the final goal, that is, Brahman. As this goal is beyond the realm of matter (*prakṛti*), it can only be attained by the strict suppression of anger and the senses (cf. *jitendriya*).

One frequently comes across the basic idea that indifference is to be praised in earlier chapters of the *Mokṣadharma* section.[46] From the above chapter emerges an image of Jai. as the teacher of AD who preaches indifference, perhaps attained by means of practising austerity and restraining the senses. Thus his image in these chapters is that of an austere sage or *yogin*, rather than that of a Sāṃkhya teacher.

(7) The name of AD is encountered not only in the *Mokṣadharma*, but also elsewhere in the Epic and in other literature. These occurrences need to be examined in order to obtain a more complete understanding of his personality.

First, let me examine the occurrences of the name in the Epic. AD is a son of Vasu Pratyūṣa (*MBh* I.60.25) and has a younger brother Dhaumya (*MBh* I.174.2).[47] Together with Vyāsa

[45] In *MBh* XII.312.8, Śuka, who is described as a *dharmātmā muniḥ*, is prohibited by his father from using the power to fly in the sky.

[46] For example, the idea that praise and blame should be treated as equal occurs in Chapters 213, 215, 237 and 313. The first two verses of Chapter 222 are the same as those of Chapter 269 in which Hārīta praises the sage (*muni*) who wanders about as a beggar. The two verses are:

kiṃśīlaḥ kiṃsamācāraḥ kiṃvidyaḥ kiṃparāyaṇaḥ |
prāpnoti brahmaṇaḥ sthānaṃ yat paraṃ prakṛter dhruvam ||222.1||
mokṣadharmeṣu niyato laghvāhāro jitendriyaḥ |
prāpnoti brahmaṇaḥ sthānaṃ yat paraṃ prakṛter dhruvam ||222.2||.

The first verse is referred to in Brough 1962: 282. The term *laghvāhāro jitendriyaḥ* of the second verse is repeatedly used in the *Mokṣadharma* (*MBh* XII.227.8, 232.12 and 267.17).

[47] According to the *Harivaṃśa* (*HV*), AD married Ekaparṇā, one of the three daughters of Himavat (12.22). Jai. married another daughter called Ekapāṭalā (13.23). Cf. Hopkins 1915: 11.

and other *brāhmaṇa*s, AD is invited to the snake sacrifice of Janamejaya as a priest (*sadasya*) (*MBh* I.48.8). In the same book of the *MBh* he is said to be a reciter of the *Mahābhārata* to the ancestors, while Nārada recites it to the gods (*MBh* I.1.64 and XVIII.5.42). He is one of many guests at the *pūjā* of Yudhiṣṭhira (*MBh* II.4.8), at the *abhiṣekha* ceremony of Yudhiṣṭhira (*MBh* II.49.10) and at the *aśvamedha* sacrifice (*MBh* XIV.94.32). He further appears as one of the *maharṣi*s (*MBh* III.83.103, VII.69.45 and XII.1.4), as one of the *ṛṣi*s who praise Viṣṇu (*MBh* XII.281.15), as one of the storytellers who narrate the wonder of Kṛṣṇa (*MBh* XII.200.4), and as one of the sages (*muni*s) in the sesame worship (*MBh* XIII.65.22). AD is also one of the members of the procession which sets out to meet the dying Bhīṣma (*MBh* XIII.153.13), and he participates in the funeral procession for Bhīṣma together with Vyāsa, Nārada and others (*MBh* XIII.154.16).

In the passages just mentioned, only AD's name appears, with qualifications such as *muni* and *ṛṣi*. As AD seems to be treated as a great seer (*ṛṣi*) in almost all of the above passages, it may be assumed that he was a seer highly esteemed in the orthodox Hindu religious tradition of the days of the Epic.

Furthermore, some fragmentary statements are ascribed to AD in the Epic, but they are too short and too general to allow for any conclusive interpretations. The words ascribed to AD are as follows:

(a) Yudhiṣṭhira, while gambling, quotes AD in order to justify gambling:

evam āhāyam asito devalo munisattamaḥ |
imāni lokadvārāṇi yo vai saṃcarate sadā ||
idaṃ vai devanaṃ pāpaṃ māyayā kitavaiḥ saha |
dharmeṇa tu jayo yuddhe tat paraṃ sādhu devanam ||. (*MBh* II.53.6-7)

The great *muni* Asita Devala, who always goes through these gates of the world, said: "Gaming deceitfully with gamblers is a sin. But winning in battle by a righteous act (*dharma*) is excellent, virtuous gaming."

(b) AD is quoted by Bhīmasena when the wife of the Pāṇḍu brothers has been insulted:

trīṇi jyotīṃṣi puruṣa iti vai devalo 'bravīt |
apatyaṃ karma vidyā ca yataḥ sṛṣṭāḥ prajās tataḥ ||. (*MBh* II.64.5)

"Man has three lights," said Devala, that is, offspring, action and learning, because living beings are created from them.

(c) Kṛṣṇā (Draupadī) quotes AD when she asks Kṛṣṇa for protection:

pūrve prajā nisarge tvām āhur ekaṃ prajāpatim |
sraṣṭāraṃ sarvabhūtānām asito devalo 'bravīt ||. (*MBh* III.13.43)[48]

You (Kṛṣṇa) are said to have been the single creator when living beings were formerly created. Asita Devala said that you were the creator of all living beings.

(d) *MBh* VI.32.13 quotes words of various sages including AD on the nature of Bhagavat:

paraṃ brahma paraṃ dhāma pavitraṃ paramaṃ bhavān |
puruṣaṃ śāśvataṃ divyam ādidevam ajaṃ vibhum ||12||
āhus tvām ṛṣayaḥ sarve devarṣir nāradas tathā |
asito devalo vyāsaḥ svayaṃ caiva bravīṣi me ||13||.

[48] This verse has a parallel in *MBh* VI.64.5:
pūrve prajānisargeṣu dakṣam āhuḥ prajāpatim |
sraṣṭāraṃ sarvabhūtānām (cf. *MBh* X.17.12c) *aṅgirās tvāṃ tato 'bravīt* ||.

> (Arjuna said:) You are the highest Brahman, the highest residence, the highest purifier, the eternal holy *puruṣa*, the first god [and] unborn Lord. All the sages as well as the divine sage Nārada, Asita Devala and Vyāsa called you thus. And you tell me thus yourself.

(e) *MBh* VI.64.6 is a verse in praise of Brahman sung by AD and other sages such as Nārada, Bhṛgu, Dvaipāyana and Aṅgiras:

> *avyaktaṃ te śarīrotthaṃ vyaktaṃ te manasi sthitam* |
> *devā vāksaṃbhavāś ceti devalas tv asito 'bravīt* ||.
>
> Asita Devala has said of you that the Unmanifest is in your body [and] the Manifest is in your mind, and that the divine beings were born from [your] speech.

(f) AD is quoted praising Śiva's power together with other sages including Viśvāmitra, Jai. and Parāśara:[49]

> *asito devalaś caiva prāha pāṇḍusutaṃ nṛpam* |
> *śāpāc chakrasya kaunteya cito dharmo 'naśan mama* |
> *tan me dharmaṃ yaśaś cāgryam āyuś caivādadad bhavaḥ* ||. (*MBh* XIII.18.14)
>
> And Asita Devala told the king, the son of Pāṇḍu (Yudhiṣṭhira), that Bhava gave him back the accumulated merit which had disappeared due to the curse of Śakra, o son of Kuntī, together with glory and long life.

It is impossible to postulate the existence of a systematic framework of thought from the fragments just quoted because they are drawn from different contexts. However, these quotations show that AD was accepted as an authority in mental instruction or in the belief in God – Viṣṇu and Śiva –, perhaps owing to his career as an ascetic. Additionally, the fact that he is often quoted together with other sages shows that he was accepted as one of the authoritative sages in the Hindu religious tradition.

(8) The name Asita often appears in Buddhist literature in an almost formulaic manner. In the episode of the Buddha's birth, Asita is the sage (*isi*, *ṛṣi*, *maharṣi*) who laments that he is too close to death to watch the newly born son of King Śuddhodana grow up and become a Buddha. Hence, he is supposed to possess the power to foresee the future.[50]

(9) Devala is given as the name of the author of a Dharmasūtra in the *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* (*BSBh*) *ad BS* I.4.28.[51] In the *Bṛhatsaṃhitā* (*Bs*), the name Devala appears twice. First, his opinion on the motions of Mercury is quoted. Second, he is mentioned, together with other sages, as being the source for Ṛṣabha's knowledge of omens based on the observation of birds and other animals.[52]

Taking into consideration the different, though not necessarily contradictory, characteristics ascribed to Devala, it seems inappropriate to assume that all these references to Devala are to

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[49] Hopkins (1901: 155) understands this verse to be connected with one of the many epithets of Śiva, *sāṃkhyaprasāda*, listed in *MBh* XIII.17.61a.

[50] The story and relevant literature are discussed in Windisch 1916: 1-13.

[51] The relevant portion (*BSBh* p. 139,9-11) reads: *devalaprabhṛtibhiś ca kaiścid dharmasūtrakāraiḥ svagrantheṣv āśritaḥ*, *tena tatpratiṣedhe yatno 'tīva kṛto nāṇvādikāraṇavādapratiṣedhe*. For Devala as the author of a Dharmasūtra, see Chakravarti 1951: 128 and Bhattacharyya 1964: 8-10.

[52] The relevant verses of the *Bṛhatsaṃhitā* are:

> *ṛjvy ativakrā vakrā vikalā ca matena devalasyaitāḥ* |
> *pañcacaturdvyekāhā ṛjvyādīnāṃ ṣaḍabhyastāḥ* ||7.15||
> *yac chakraśukravāgīśakapiṣṭhalagarutmatām* |
> *matebhyaḥ prāha ṛṣabho bhāgurer devalasya ca* ||86.1||.

one and the same person. However, rather than postulating the existence of several Devalas, I take the variety of appearances as an indication of the fact that AD's fame as a seer with supernatural powers had been officially accepted and had spread in the Hindu tradition.

(10) Let me conclude the present paper with the following assumptions:

1) The personal attributes of AD gleaned from the passages discussed above indicate that he was a well-known austere sage in the Hindu religious tradition. He appears as an excellent *brāhmaṇa* together with other mythological *ṛṣi*s. The sages close to AD are Jai. and Nārada. AD, like his teacher Jai., is characterized as a *ṛṣi* or a *muni* who is full of *tapas*. This is a basic characteristic which both of them have in common and around which legends were created. For example, AD is said to have abandoned the life of a householder (*gārhapatya*) in order to attain emancipation (*mokṣadharma*) by practising *yoga* as a disciple of Jai.[53]

2) The teachings ascribed to AD in Chapter 267 of the *Mokṣadharma* should be regarded as a form of pre-Sāṃkhya thought which is more advanced than the ideas found in the Middle Upaniṣads. It contains concepts which are partly analogous to those of classical Sāṃkhya, albeit rudimentary or fragmentary, but lacks the basic concepts that form the basis of Sāṃkhya thought.

3) The analysis of the episodes which feature AD throughout the Epic provides no evidence which conclusively shows that he was a Sāṃkhya teacher. The teaching in Chapter 267 of the *Mokṣadharma* is isolated from other passages referring to AD; and even in this chapter he does not expound a theory by which he could be regarded as a Sāṃkhya teacher. Moreover, as both AD and Jai. are excellent practitioners of austerities, which are considered as *yoga* in *MBh* IX., it appears that they have a greater affinity to an early Yoga school than to Sāṃkhya teachings.[54] The reason why AD was considered a Sāṃkhya teacher in the days of the Epic should not be sought in his specific theory, but in his role as one of the well-known ascetics, whose name was used to lend authority to the newly born Sāṃkhya school of thought.

[53] In this episode, the stage of the householder is the only one that is specifically named a life-stage (*āśrama*); the other three are ignored. It seems that in the story of Jai. and AD only the life of a householder is regarded as an *āśrama*. Cf. Hara 1997: 221-235.

[54] The name of Jai. occurs in the *YBh* (*ad* 2.55 and 3.18) as that of an authoritative person. Vācaspatimiśra (*Nyāyavārttikatātparyaṭīkā* [*NVTṬ*] *ad NS* 3.2.41) refers to him as the author of a *dhāraṇāśāstra* (cf. Chakravarti 1951: 128). AD is not referred to in the literature of the classical Yoga school. Nārada is also a great sage, but he appears in too wide a range of contexts to allow for a connection with a particular school of philosophy. Hopkins maintains that there was an independent sect, Sāṃkhya–Yoga, so to speak, which was distinct from both Sāṃkhya and Yoga and which pronounced a theistic monism with an ultimate principle as the twenty-sixth. But as "this doctrine belongs only to the later part of the pseudo-epic," this sect cannot be connected with the teachings of *MBh* XII.267 which must belong to an earlier stage of thought (cf. Hopkins 1901a: 133-138 and 1901c: 380-389).

References

1) Primary sources

AV	*Atharva Veda Saṃhitā*. Ed. R. Roth and W.D. Whitney. Stuttgart 1966 (reprint).
AS	*Ahirbudhnya Saṃhitā of the Pāñcarātrāgama*. Ed. M.D. Ramanujacharya. Madras 1916. (The Adyar Library Series 4)
KaṭhUp	*Kaṭha-Upaniṣad*, ed. in V.P. Limaye and R.D. Vadekar, *Eighteen Principal Upaniṣads*, Vol. 1, Poona 1958.
KauUp	*Kauṣītaki-Upaniṣad*, ed. in Limaye and Vadekar 1958 (cf. *KaṭhUp*).
TaiUp	*Taittirīya-Upaniṣad*, ed. in Limaye and Vadekar 1958 (cf. *KaṭhUp*).
NVTṬ	*Nyāyavārttikatātparyaṭīkā*, in Taranatha Nyaya-Tarkatirtha, Amarendramohan Tarkatirtha and Hemanta-Kumar Tarkatirtha (eds.), *Nyāyadarśanam*, 2 vols., Calcutta 1936-1944. (Calcutta Sanskrit Series 18, 29)
NS	*Nyāyasūtra*, in *NVTṬ*.
PraUp	*Praśna-Upaniṣad*, ed. in Limaye and Vadekar 1958 (cf. *KaṭhUp*).
BĀUp	*Bṛhadāraṇyaka-Upaniṣad*, ed. in Limaye and Vadekar 1958 (cf. *KaṭhUp*).
Bs	*Bṛhatsaṃhitā*. Ed M.R. Bhat. Delhi 1982.
BS	*Brahmasūtra*, in *BSBh*.
BSBh	*Brahmasūtrabhāṣya*, in *Brahmasūtra with Śaṅkarabhāṣya*, Delhi/Varanasi/Patna 1964. (Works of Śaṅkarācārya in Original Sanskrit 3)
BhG	*Bhagavadgītā*, in *MBh.*
BhD	*Bhāratabhāvadīpikā*, in *The Śrīman Mahābhāratam*, Vol. 6: *Mokṣadharma*, Delhi 1988.
Māṭh	*Māṭharavṛtti*, in *SK*.
MuUp	*Muṇḍaka-Upaniṣad*, ed. in Limaye and Vadekar 1958 (cf. *KaṭhUp*).
MaiUp	*Maitrayaṇī-Upaniṣad*, ed. in Limaye and Vadekar 1958 (cf. *KaṭhUp*).
MBh	*The Mahābhārata*. Critically ed. by V.S. Sukthankar and others. 19 vols. Poona 1933-1966.
YD	*Yuktidīpikā*: *The Most Significant Commentary on the Sāṃkhyakārikā*. Ed. A. Wezler and S. Motegi. Stuttgart 1998. (Alt- und Neu-Indische Studien 44)
YBh	*Yogabhāṣya*, in *Pātañjala Yogadarśanam*, ed. Narayana Mishra, Varanasi 1971.
YS	*Yogasūtra*, in *YBh*.
ViP	*Viṣṇumahāpurāṇam*. Ed. R.N. Sarma. Delhi 1985.
ŚvetUp	*Śvetāśvatara-Upaniṣad*, ed. in Limaye and Vadekar 1958 (cf. *KaṭhUp*).
SK	*Sāṃkhyakārikā*, in *Sāṃkhya-Kārikā of Īśvarakṛṣṇa*, ed. V.P. Sarma, Varanasi 1970. (Chaukhambā Saṃskṛta Granthamālā 296)
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Johannes Bronkhorst

On the Nature of *Pradhāna*

In the middle of his refutation of the Sāṃkhya philosophy which he presents in his *Brahmasūtra Bhāṣya* on *sūtra* 2.2.1, Śaṅkara attacks one aspect of his opponents' view in the following words:[1]

> *tathā parimitānāṃ bhedānāṃ mūlāṅkurādīnāṃ saṃsargapūrvakatvaṃ dṛṣṭvā bāhyādhyātmikānāṃ bhedānāṃ parimitatvāt saṃsargapūrvakatvam anumimānasya sattvarajastamasām api saṃsargapūrvakatvaprasaṅgaḥ, parimitatvāviśeṣāt.*

Deussen (1887: 318-319) translated this passage as follows:

> Ferner: wenn man aus der Wahrnehmung, dass die begrenzten Unterschiede, z.B. die Wurzel und die Pflanze, ein gemeinschaftliches Erschaffensein zur Voraussetzung haben, darauf schliesst, dass die äusseren und inneren Unterschiede der Dinge, weil sie sich gegenseitig einschränken, ein gemeinschaftliches Erschaffensein zur Voraussetzung haben (vgl. Sâṅkhyakârikâ 15), nun dann folgt, dass auch die drei Guṇa's *Sattvam*, *Rajas* und *Tamas* [nicht wie die Sâṅkhya's meinen, die ursprünglichen Bestimmungen der Urmaterie sind, sondern] ein solches gemeinschaftliches Erschaffensein zur Voraussetzung haben, weil sie ebenso gut sich gegenseitig einschränken.

This translation is problematic for various reasons. To begin with, it is not clear why things that limit each other (*sich gegenseitig einschränken*) should for that reason have been created together (*gemeinschaftliches Erschaffensein*). Moreover, the Sanskrit term translated as *gemeinschaftliches Erschaffensein* is *saṃsarga*, which does not normally have that meaning according to the dictionaries. The translation *Pflanze* ("plants") for *aṅkura*, finally, which really means "sprout," is incorrect; we will see below that this is more than a minor point.

Other translators propose different interpretations. George Thibaut (1904: 366-367) translates:

> (Turning to the next Sāṃkhya argument which infers the existence of the *pradhāna* from the limitation of all effects), we remark that he who concludes that all inward and outward effects depend on a conjunction of several things, because they are limited (a conclusion based on the observation that some limited effects such as root and sprout, etc., depend on the conjunction of several things), is driven to the conclusion that the three constituents of the *pradhāna*, viz. Goodness, Passion, and Darkness, likewise depend on the conjunction of several antecedents; for they also are limited.

Swami Gambhirananda (1972: 370) translates, similarly:

> Similarly if somebody infers that "since limited products like roots, sprouts, etc. are born out of a combination of many materials, therefore all external and corporeal modifications too must have been similarly formed out of the combination of many materials; for they too are limited," then one will be faced with the predicament of *sattva*, *rajas*, and *tamas* also spring-ing out of a combination of many materials, they too being equally limited.

A.J. Alston, finally, translates (1989: 179):

> A further point is that if from observation of the fact that all limited effects involve a composite cause (*saṃsarga*), as in the case of the seed and the sprout, one infers that the cause of the whole world and of external objects and mental phenomena (i.e. Nature and all its evolutes) must also be composite (composed of the three constituents, *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*), because it is also lim-

[1] Perhaps because the Sāṃkhya argument and its rejection by Śaṅkara cover no more than a few lines, it does not figure in the summary of the *Brahmasūtra Bhāṣya* by Karl H. Potter in *EIP*, Vol. III, Delhi 1981, p. 153.

Karin Preisendanz (ed.), *Expanding and Merging Horizons*: *Contributions to South Asian and Cross-Cultural Studies in Commemoration of Wilhelm Halbfass*, Wien: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 2007, pp. 373-381.

> ited, then it would follow that the constituents *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas* themselves must also have a composite cause, since they, too, are limited.

These translations are to be preferred to the one by Deussen. They agree, moreover, with some of the Sanskrit commentaries. Thibaut cites in a note (p. 367, n. 1) the following words from Ānandagiri's *Nyāyanirṇaya* (*NyāNir* p. 416,43):

> *saṃsargapūrvakatvaprasaṅga iti guṇānāṃ saṃsṛṣṭānekavastuprakṛtikatvaprasaktir ity arthaḥ.*
>
> The expression *saṃsargapūrvakatvaprasaṅgaḥ* means: the consequence that the [three] constituents (*guṇa*,) (i.e., *sattva*, *rajas*, and *tamas*) are [, each of them,] by nature composite and plural.

Govindānanda's *Bhāṣyaratnaprabhā* states, similarly (*BhRaPra* p. 416,11):

> *buddhyādīnāṃ parimitatvena saṃsargapūrvakatvasiddhau saṃsṛṣṭāny anekāni sattvarajastamāṃsi sidhyanti.*
>
> If it is established that [divisions] like the *buddhi* etc., are *saṃsargapūrvaka* for being limited, then it is established that *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas* are [, each of them,] composite and plural.

And yet these interpretations are not fully satisfactory. They leave us with the question why roots and sprouts are given as examples of composite things,[2] rather than whole plants or mountains, not to speak of the among Indian thinkers favourite chariots and houses. More problematic is that Śaṅkara's passage presents a Sāṃkhya argument in order to refute it; it is open to doubt whether the specific argument that appears in these translations has ever been used by the Sāṃkhyas.

Deussen was no doubt right in drawing attention to *Sāṃkhyakārikā* 15, which enumerates a number of reasons from which the existence of the unmanifest (*avyakta*) can supposedly be deduced. The first of these two reasons are *parimāṇa* and *samanvaya*.[3] As a matter of fact, the above passage in Śaṅkara's commentary occurs immediately after another one which deals with, and rejects, *samanvaya* as a factor from which the Sāṃkhya believes to be able to infer the existence of *pradhāna* as ultimate cause of the world. It seems therefore likely that Śaṅkara criticises here the arguments that are presented in that verse of the *Sāṃkhyakārikā* (which does not necessarily imply that he took them from the *Sāṃkhyakārikā*; see below).

Sāṃkhyakārikā 15 gives no explanation of what exactly is meant by *parimāṇa* in this context. Its commentaries do, but most of these explanations are so different from Śaṅkara's passage that little help in understanding our passage can be derived from them (see the appendix). Note however that the *Yuktidīpikā*, which is known to sometimes preserve early interpretations,[4] provides in this context the following enumeration (*YD* p. 141,18-19): ... *mūlāṅkuraparṇanāladaṇḍabusatuṣaśūkapuṣpakṣīrataṇḍulakaṇānām* ... . "... of roots, sprouts, leaves, stalks, sticks, chaff, husk, awns, flowers, sap, rice-grains ... ." Whatever the reason why this enumeration is given,[5] it is clear that it can be looked upon as an extension of Śaṅkara's *mūlāṅkurādīnām*. And it is also clear that all the items of the enumeration designate parts of plants, or of a plant.

More help may be derived from the commentary called *Jayamaṅgalā* of a certain Śaṅkara, who is different from the author of the *Brahmasūtra Bhāṣya*. Here the words *bhedānāṃ parimāṇāt* of *kārikā* 15 are explained as follows (*JayMaṅ* p. 80,23-26):

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[2] Alston referring to Belvalkar, observes in a note: "Seed, soil, water, air, and light, etc., are involved" (Alston 1989: 326, n. 76).

[3] *SK* 15-16: *bhedānāṃ parimāṇāt samanvayāt ... kāraṇam asty avyaktam ...* .

[4] Cf. Bronkhorst 1999a: 46, n. 113.

[5] The immediate context in the *Yuktidīpikā* provides no clue; see the appendix below.

> *... | bhidyanta iti bhedāḥ, kāryaviśeṣās teṣām ekas saṃsargī dṛṣṭaḥ parimāṇāc ca | bhedānāṃ parimitatvād ity arthaḥ | yena ca parimitās teṣām ekaḥ saṃsargī dṛṣṭaḥ | yathā mūlāṅkurapatrakāṇḍaprasavapuṣpa(tu)ṣataṇḍulakaṇānāṃ bhedānāṃ vrīhiḥ ... .*
>
> Divisions (*bheda*) [are so called] because they are divided (*bhidyante*); [they are] special products. Of those [special products] it is observed that one thing combines them (*saṃsargin*), because of their measure (*parimāṇa*). This means: because the divisions are limited (*parimita*). And that by which they are limited, [that] is the one thing that combines them; this much has been observed. An example is the rice plant [which is a combination] of roots, sprouts, leaves, stem, blossoms, flowers, husk and rice-grains.

The explanation in the *Jayamaṅgalā* of the argument *parimāṇāt* is exceptional among the commentaries on the *Sāṃkhyakārikā*, so much so that Solomon's study of these commentaries (1974: 39-40) does not even mention it. For our present purposes it is however important, for the author of the *Jayamaṅgalā*, like his namesake the author of the *Brahmasūtra Bhāṣya* and like the *Yuktidīpikā*, gives an enumeration of the parts of a plant; moreover, the first two of these authors use the term *saṃsarga*. This is not likely to be mere coincidence, and we are entitled to ask whether the *Brahmasūtra Bhāṣya* borrowed from the *Jayamaṅgalā* or vice versa, or whether perhaps both borrowed from an earlier text.

Unfortunately little is known about the date of the *Jayamaṅgalā*. The volume on Sāṃkhya of the *Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies* says the following about it (*EIP* IV, p. 272):

> The date and authorship of Jayamaṅgalā is simply an open question, although Chakravarti's [(1951: 164-168)] claim that it precedes Vācaspati and comes after Yuktidīpikā appears to be the most likely avenue for further research.

If Chakravarti's claim is correct, the author of the *Brahmasūtra Bhāṣya* may not have borrowed from the *Jayamaṅgalā*. However, borrowing in the opposite direction is highly improbable, given that the *Brahmasūtra Bhāṣya* presents the argument under consideration only in order to reject it. It seems much more likely that both these texts drew upon an earlier text that may no longer exist today.

About the earlier history of Sāṃkhya we owe a great deal to the work of Erich Frauwallner. His article "Die Erkenntnislehre des klassischen Sāṃkhya-Systems" (1958) in particular is of considerable importance. In this article Frauwallner draws attention to passages in Jinendrabuddhi's commentary on Dignāga's *Pramāṇasamuccaya* and in Siṃhasūri's commentary on Mallavādin's *Dvādaśāranayacakra* (*DNC*) which are cited or summarized from a Sāṃkhya work which no longer exists. This work may have been the *Ṣaṣṭitantra* of Vārṣagaṇya.[6] For our present purpose it is particularly important that some of the passages from this text preserved in Siṃhasūri's *Nyāyāgamānusāriṇī* deal with proofs of the existence of *pradhāna*. Unfortunately Siṃhasūri's presentation of the Sāṃkhya arguments is corrupt and condensed, sometimes beyond comprehension.[7] It is however clear that there are five direct (*vīta*) proofs, which are dealt with in the following order: (i) *bhedānām anvayadarśanāt* (*NĀgAnu* I, p. 314,7), (ii) *bhedānāṃ parimāṇāt* (*NĀgAnu* I, p. 314,15), (iii) *bhedānāṃ kāryakāraṇabhāvāt* (*NĀgAnu* I, p. 318,7), (iv) *śaktimadavasthāmātratvāc chaktīnām* (*NĀgAnu* I, p. 319,7), (v) *vaiśvarūpyasyāvibhāgaprāpter deśakālapramāṇabalarūpapratyāsatter avaśyambhāvyucchedānucchedābhyāṃ ca nivṛtteḥ* (*NĀgAnu* I, p. 320,1-2). *Sāṃkhyakārikā* 15 has what would seem to be the same enumeration, but in a different order: *bhedānāṃ parimāṇāt* (= [ii]), *samanvayāt* (= [i]), *śaktitaḥ pravṛtteś ca* (= [iv]), *kāraṇakāryavibhāgāt* (= [iii]), *avibhāgād vaiśvarūpyasya* (= [v]) [*kāraṇam asty avyaktam* 16a]. Śaṅkara's commentary on *Brahmasū-*

[6] On the name of this author, see Chakravarti 1951: 135ff.; Wezler 1985: 14, n. 6.

[7] Frauwallner 1958: 92-93 (= *Kleine Schriften*, pp. 231-232): "Der Text dieses ganzen Abschnittes ist vielfach entstellt und schwer verständlich. Siṃhasūri hat nämlich stark gekürzt. Besonders die direkten und indirekten Beweisführungen sind teilweise bis zur Unkenntlichkeit zusammengestrichen."

tra 2.2.1 deals with the first three of these arguments in the following order: *anvaya*, *parimāṇa*, *kāryakāraṇabhāva*; argument (iv) is dealt with under *Brahmasūtra* 2.2.2. This is the order which we also find in Siṃhasūri's *Nyāyāgamānusāriṇī*, but not in the *Sāṃkhyakārikā*.[8] It suggests that Śaṅkara followed the same text that is criticised by Siṃhasūri and, presumably, Mallavādin, probably the *Ṣaṣṭitantra*.[9]

This impression is confirmed by the presence, in Siṃhasūri's *Nyāyāgamānusāriṇī*, of the following specification of the proof *bhedānāṃ parimāṇāt* (*NĀgAnu* I p. 318,4-6):

> *tasmāt parimitatvāt saṃsargapūrvakā bhedāḥ, vrīhāv iva saṃsṛṣṭā mūlāṅkuraparṇanālakāṇḍaprasavatuṣaśūkapuṣpakṣīrataṇḍulakaṇabhāvāḥ, yathā vā śukraśoṇitasaṃsṛṣṭāḥ kalalārbudamāṃsapeśiśarīravyūhabālyakaumārayauvanasthāvirā bhāvā iti.*
>
> Therefore, because they are limited (*parimita*), the divisions presuppose their combination (*saṃsarga*), just like the states of root, sprout, leaf, stalk, stem, blossom, husk, awn, flower, sap and rice grain that are combined in a rice plant, or like the states of [embryonic] bodily disposition called *kalala*, *arbuda*, and *māṃsapeśi*, as well as the states of infancy, childhood, youth and old age, which are combinations of sperm and blood.

This passage is close both to what we find in the *Jayamaṅgalā* and to the position ascribed to his Sāṃkhya opponent by the author of the *Brahmasūtra Bhāṣya*. It can therefore no longer be denied that Śaṅkara the author of the *Brahmasūtra Bhāṣya*, and the author of the *Jayamaṅgalā*, as well as the author of the *Yuktidīpikā* to at least some extent, drew upon an earlier Sāṃkhya text which may well have been the *Ṣaṣṭitantra* of Vārṣagaṇya. It is now further possible to translate the passage from the *Brahmasūtra Bhāṣya* cited above in the light of the passages from the *Jayamaṅgalā* and the *Dvādaśāranayacakra*, as follows:[10]

> *tathā parimitānāṃ bhedānāṃ mūlāṅkurādīnāṃ saṃsargapūrvakatvaṃ dṛṣṭvā bāhyādhyātmikānāṃ bhedānāṃ parimitatvāt saṃsargapūrvakatvam anumimānasya sattvarajastamasām api saṃsargapūrvakatvaprasaṅgaḥ, parimitatvāviśeṣāt.*
>
> For someone who infers – having seen that divisions, such as roots, sprouts, etc. (which are divisions of a plant), being limited, presuppose their combination (*saṃsarga*) – that external and internal divisions, because they are limited, presuppose their combination, it would follow that *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*, too, presuppose their combination, for they are equally limited.

* * *

The different passages presented above present us with a Sāṃkhya doctrine in which *pradhāna* is apparently conceived of as the combination, perhaps we can say the totality, of all that exists. This is again confirmed in a passage of Siṃhasūri's *Nyāyāgamānusāriṇī* which gives the following résumé of the five proofs (*NĀgAnu* I p. 320,7-8): *tasmād asti pradhānam ity ebhiḥ pañcabhir vītaiḥ samanvaya-**parimāṇa**-upakāra-śaktipravṛtti-vaiśvarūpyagatyākhyaiḥ sāmānya-**saṃsarga**-ekakartṛ-śaktimacchakty-avibhāgasaṃjñaṃ pradhānaṃ siddham*. This doctrine appears to have been held by Sāṃkhya thinkers at some time but has been all

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[8] One should not conclude from this that Śaṅkara did not know the *Sāṃkhyakārikā*. On *Brahmasūtra* 1.4.11, for example, he cites the whole of *Sāṃkhyakārikā* 3 (without however mentioning the name "*Sāṃkhyakārikā*").

[9] Note in this connection that Bhāskara's commentary on *Brahmasūtra Bhāṣya* 2.2.1 attributes the following words to the Sāṃkhyas, without specifying their source (*BSūBhā*/*Bhā* p. 109,17-18): *anvayāt parimāṇāc chaktitaḥ pravṛtteś ca | kāraṇakāryavibhāgād avibhāgād vaiśvarūpyasya ||*. This quotation has the first two items in the order used by Śaṅkara, to be sure, but is otherwise so close to *Sāṃkhyakārikā* 15 that one is entitled to wonder whether it is an alternative version of that verse. It is clear from Bhāskara's subsequent discussion that he did indeed read the first two items in this order.

[10] One is here reminded of *Mahā-bh* I p. 321,2-3 (on P. 1.4.21): *bahuṣu bahuvacanam ity ucyate | keṣu bahuṣu | artheṣu | yady evaṃ vṛkṣaḥ plakṣo 'trāpi prāpnoti | bahavas te 'rthā mūlaṃ skandhaḥ phalaṃ palāśam iti |*.

but lost in the surviving texts.[11] According to this doctrine, the things that derive from *pradhāna* are its divisions. Śaṅkara's criticism of this position is not that *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas* would be composite and plural, as several commentators have proposed, but the opposite: there would be no place for these three constituents in a single *pradhāna*.

It will be of interest to cite here another passage from Śaṅkara's *Brahmasūtra Bhāṣya*, this one on *sūtra* 2.1.29. Here too Śaṅkara criticises the Sāṃkhya:

> *pradhānavādino 'pi hi niravayavam aparicchinnaṃ śabdādihīnaṃ pradhānaṃ sāvayavasya paricchinnasya śabdādimataḥ kāryasya kāraṇam iti svapakṣaḥ.*
>
> The own position of the Sāṃkhya (*pradhānavādin*), too, is that *pradhāna* – which has no parts, is undivided and without [qualities] such as sound – is the cause of an effect which does have parts, which is divided and which does possess [qualities] such as sound.

We know from *Sāṃkhyakārikā* 10 that the non-manifest (*avyakta* = *pradhāna*) is the opposite of the manifest (*vyakta*) and that the latter has parts (*sāvayava*); this confirms that *pradhāna* has no parts. Śaṅkara's passage adds to this that *pradhāna* is undivided (*aparicchinna*), its effect divided (*paricchinna*). This strongly suggests, once again, that the creation of the world out of *pradhāna* consists in the division of *pradhāna*.

Consider now the following remark in the *Yuktidīpikā* (*YD* p. 155,17-18):[12] *svakāryād dhi prathīyasī prakṛtir bhavatīti ca naḥ samayaḥ*. "For it is our doctrine that a *prakṛti* is larger than its effect." In the derivational scheme of things adhered to by Sāṃkhya all but the final evolutes are *prakṛti*s. The present sentence states that each *prakṛti* is larger than its evolutes. *pradhāna*, being the *mūlaprakṛti*, must as a result be larger than all its evolutes, and therefore presumably larger than all other existing things. Indeed, we also learn from *Sāṃkhyakārikā* 10 that the non-manifest (which is *pradhāna*) is omnipresent (*vyāpin*).[13] These statements fit in well with the idea that *pradhāna* is the totality of all there is, even though they do not prove it.

The associated idea that all that is limited in size is therefore non-original and therefore created finds expression in the following line of the *Yuktidīpikā* (*YD* p. 155,32): *iha yat paricchinnadeśaṃ tat kṛtakaṃ dṛṣṭaṃ tad yathā ghaṭaḥ.* "In this world it is observed that what occupies limited[14] space has been made/created, as for example a jar." This observation, which is far from evident to impartial outsiders, clearly reflects a fundamental attitude of the Sāṃkhya school of philosophy, at least of the branch represented in the *Yuktidīpikā*.

This same statement, in combination with the idea that *pradhāna* is the totality of all there is, suggests that each *prakṛti* is – or was at an earlier time, perhaps at the time of the *Ṣaṣṭitantra* – thought of as the combination of its evolutes. This in its turn would imply that the process of evolution out of *pradhāna* is – or was in the *Ṣaṣṭitantra* – an ongoing division, in which the final evolutes are the final parts. This last conclusion finds an interesting confirmation in the writings of a number of classical authors, who ascribed a position to the Sāṃkhyas which is no longer part of its classical doctrine. According to these authors, Sāṃkhya held the opinion that material objects − and therefore the material elements themselves − are collections of qualities. Other texts teach us, moreover, that the qualities (sound, colour, etc.)

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[11] The only modern full-length study dedicated to *prakṛti* (Jacobsen 1999) is not aware of it either. Larson (1987: 69), on the other hand, observes: "Analytically, each manifest component is a 'part' of the 'whole' that is primordial materiality." See further Bhāskara on *Brahmasūtra* 2.1.10: *niravayavam ... pradhāna*[*m*], and note 13 below.

[12] Cp. Bronkhorst 1999: 685ff.

[13] Śaṅkara's *Brahmasūtra Bhāṣya* on *sūtra* 2.2.38, speaking of "Sāṃkhya with God," confirms this: *pradhānapuruṣeśvarāṇāṃ sarvagatatvān niravayavatvāc ca*.

[14] Note the use of *paricchinna*-, lit. "divided."

were at one time thought of as the final evolutes.[15] It goes without saying that the idea of qualities as final evolutes and at the same time as "parts" of elements fits in well with a vision of evolution as an ongoing division.

Appendix: Other Explanations of *Parimāṇāt* in *SK* 15

As stated above, the commentaries on the *Sāṃkhyakārikā* different from the *Jayamaṅgalā* do not offer any help in understanding Śaṅkara's statement in the *Brahmasūtra Bhāṣya*. The *Yuktidīpikā*, usually the most detailed and in general most important surviving commentary, explains the words *bhedānāṃ parimāṇāt* of the *kārikā* as follows (*YD* p. 141,18-21):

> *yat parimitaṃ tasya sata utpattir dṛṣṭā | tad yathā mūlāṅkuraparṇanāladaṇḍabusatuṣaśūkapuṣpakṣīrataṇḍulakaṇānām | parimitāś ca mahadahaṃkārendriyatanmātramahābhūtalakṣaṇabhedāḥ | tasmāt satkāraṇapūrvakāḥ | yad eṣāṃ kāraṇaṃ tad avyaktam |.*

The problematic nature of the enumeration in the second sentence has been mentioned in note 5. If one insists on interpreting this enumeration in the context provided by the *Yuktidīpikā*, all the parts of plants here enumerated must then illustrate the fact that limited things arise out of existing things, or out of an existing thing, which is strange. In the light of our preceding reflections we may now assume that this enumeration is what is left of an argument that has somehow disappeared in the *Yuktidīpikā* but has survived in the *Jayamaṅgalā*, in Śaṅkara's commentary on the *Brahmasūtra*, and of course in Siṃhasūri's *Nyāyāgamānusāriṇī*.

The *Māṭharavṛtti* comments as follows (*MāṭhVṛ* pp. 25-26):

> *asti pradhānam | kutaḥ | **bhedānāṃ parimāṇāt** | loke yatra kartāsti tasya parimāṇaṃ dṛṣṭam | yathā kulālaḥ parimitān mṛtpiṇḍāt parimitam eva ghaṭaṃ kurute prasthagrāhakam āḍhakagrāhakaṃ vā | evaṃ vyaktaṃ parimitam | ekā buddhir eko 'haṅkāraḥ pañca tanmātrāṇy ekādaśendriyāṇi pañca mahābhūtānīti trayoviṃśatikam | evam etat parimitaṃ vyaktaṃ dṛṣṭvānumānena sādhayāmo 'sty asya kāraṇaṃ pradhānaṃ yad vyaktaṃ parimitam utpādayati | yadi ca pradhānaṃ kāraṇaṃ na syān niṣparimāṇam idaṃ vyaktaṃ syāt | asti cāsya parimāṇaṃ tasmād asti pradhānam |.*

The *Gauḍapādabhāṣya* (*GauḍBhā*) repeats this passage in almost exactly the same words, as do the *Sāṃkhya-saptati-vṛtti* (V1) and the *Sāṃkhya-vṛtti* (V2). The commentary preserved in Chinese translation and translated into French by J. Takakusu seems to have been close to the above (Takakusu 1904: 999):

> "Parce que les classes spécifiques sont finies." Dans ce monde une chose produite a une mesure, une dimension, un nombre; ainsi avec une quantité d'argile donnée, le potier fabrique des vases, d'un nombre limité. Supprimez la matière originelle (argile), et il n'y aura plus de mesure numérique ni de vase. Voyant que les vases ont une mesure numérique, nous savons qu'ils ont une matière originelle. La comparaison des fils constituant un vêtement est également applicable. Parmi les (vingt-cinq) principes, les principes évolués, le Mahat et les autres, possèdent également une mesure numérique. Quelle est cette mesure numérique? Le Mahat est un, le Sentiment du moi est un, les éléments subtils sont cinq, les organes sont onze et les grands éléments sont cinq. Quant à ces principes évolués, nous voyons qu'ils ont une mesure numérique. En raisonnant par analogie, nous savons qu'il y a une Nature (origine). S'il n'y avait pas une Nature, les principes évolués n'auraient pas de mesure numérique et ces principes eux-mêmes n'existeraient pas.

The *Tattvakaumudī* of Vācaspati Miśra (*TatKaum*) has, in Ganganatha Jha's edition (for important variants cf. Srinivasan's edition):

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[15] See Bronkhorst 1994: 311, with references to Aśvaghoṣa's *Buddhacarita*, the *Mahābhārata*, as well as to Strauss 1913 and Frauwallner 1927. A passage from the *Ṣaṣṭitantra* regained by Steinkellner (1999: 670-671; 675, n. 8) confirms the view that these qualities were thought of as evolutes: *śabdasparśarūparasagandhāḥ pañca trayāṇāṃ sukhaduḥkhamohānāṃ sanniveśaviśeṣāḥ*.

parimāṇād iti | parimitatvāt, avyāpitvād iti yāvat | vivādādhyāsitā mahadādibhedā avyaktakāraṇavantaḥ, parimitatvāt, ghaṭādivat | ghaṭādayo hi parimitā mṛdādyavyaktakāraṇakā dṛṣṭāḥ |.

The *Candrikā* of Nārāyaṇa Tīrtha (*Can*) explains:

parimāṇāt parimitatvād avyāpitvāt, anekatvarūpabhedavattvād vā, yad yad anekam avyāpi ca tat tat kāryam, bhavati ca mahadādikaṃ pratipuruṣaniyatatvād anekam avyāpi ca, atas tatkāraṇaṃ yogyatayā nityam ekaṃ pradhānam eveti bhāvaḥ.

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Can	*Candrikā* of Nārāyaṇa Tīrtha, in *Sāṃkhya Kārikā by Īśvarakṛṣṇa with Chandrikā commentary by Śrī Nārāyaṇa Tīrtha*, ed. Pt. Dhundhirāja Śāstrī, Benares 1941.
JayMaṅ	*Jayamaṅgalā* of Śaṅkara, in *Sāṃkhya-Kārikā of Śrīmad Īśvarakṛṣṇa with the Māṭharavṛtti of Māṭharācārya ... and the Jayamaṅgalā of Śrī Śaṅkara*, ed. Satkāriśarmā Vaṅgīya, Varanasi 1970. (Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series 296 [Work No. 56])
TatKaum	*Tattvakaumudī* of Vācaspati Miśra. 1) Ed. and tr. Ganganatha Jha, Har Dutt Sharma, M.M. Patkar, Poona 1965. 2) *Vācaspatimiśras Tattvakaumudī*: *Ein Beitrag zur Textkritik bei kontaminierter Überlieferung*. Ed. Srinivasa Ayya Srinivasan. Hamburg 1967. (Alt- und Neu-Indische Studien 12)
DNC	*Dvādaśāra Nayacakra*, in *Dvādaśāra Nayacakra of Ācārya Śrī Mallavādi Kṣamāśramaṇa with the commentary Nyāyāgamānusāriṇī of Siṃhasūri Gaṇi Vādi Kṣamāśramaṇa*, 3 parts, ed. Muni Jambūvijayajī, Bhavnagar 1966, 1976, 1988.
NĀgAnu	*Nyāyāgamānusāriṇī* of Siṃhasūri. For the edition see *DNC*.
NyāNir	*Nyāyanirṇaya* of Ānandagiri. For the edition see *BSūBhā* 1).
BSūBhā	*Brahmasūtra Bhāṣya* of Śaṅkara. 1) In *Brahmasūtra-Śāṅkarabhāṣyam*, *with the Commentaries Bhāṣyaratnaprabhā of Govindānanda*, *Bhāmatī of Vācaspati*, *Nyāyanirṇaya of Ānandagiri*, ed. J.L. Shastri, reprint Delhi 1996. 2) In *Brahmasūtra with Śāṅkarabhāṣya*, Delhi 1964. (Works of Śaṅkarācārya in original Sanskrit, Vol. 3)
BSūBhā/Bhā	*Brahmasūtrabhāṣyaṃ Bhāskarācāryaviracitam*. *Brahmasūtra with a Commentary by Bhāskarāchārya*. Ed. Vindhyeshvari Prasāda Dvivedin. Benares 1915 (Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series 70, 185, 209). Reprint: Varanasi 1991. (Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series 20)
BhRaPra	*Bhāṣyaratnaprabhā* of Govindānanda. For the edition see *BSūBhā* 1).
Mahā-bh	Patañjali, (*Vyākaraṇa*-)*Mahābhāṣya*. Ed. F. Kielhorn. Bombay 1880-1885.
MāṭhVṛ	*Māṭharavṛtti*, in *Sāṃkhyakārikā by Īśvara Kṛṣṇa*, *with a Commentary of Mathara Charya*, ed. P. Vishnu Prasad Sarma, Benares 1922. (Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series 296)
YD	*Yuktidīpikā*, ed. in Albrecht Wezler and Shujun Motegi, *Yuktidīpikā*: *The Most Significant Commentary on the Sāṃkhyakārikā*, Vol. 1, Stuttgart 1998. (Alt- und Neu-Indische Studien 44)

V1 *Sāṃkhya-saptati-vṛtti*. Ed. Esther A. Solomon. Ahmedabad 1973.
V2 *Sāṃkhya-vṛtti*. Ed. Esther A. Solomon. Ahmedabad 1973.
SK *Sāṃkhya Kārikā*. For the editions used see *GauḍBhā*, *Can*, *JayMaṅ*, *TatKaum*, *MāṭhVṛ*, *V1*, *V2*, *YD*.

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4.4

NYĀYA AND VAIŚEṢIKA

Masanobu Nozawa

On the Vaiśeṣika Definition of *Mokṣa*

1. *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* (*VS*) 5.2.20 gives the following definition of emancipation (*mokṣa*): *tadabhāve saṃyogābhāvo 'prādurbhāvaḥ sa mokṣaḥ*, while the Vaiśeṣikas of the post-Praśastapāda period set forth a different one, which is found in the following sentence of the *Nyāyakandalī* (*NK*) (p. 273,17): *mokṣo navānām ātmaviśeṣaguṇānām atyantocchedaḥ*.[1] It is generally accepted that the Vaiśeṣika system underwent a remarkable change sometime between the second half of the fifth and the first half of the sixth centuries, which constitutes the period of transition from the early stage to the classical period of the system, and that this change was mainly due to Praśastapāda's reform of the system. Thus it would be natural to suppose that the new definition of *mokṣa* first occurs in the *Padārthadharmasaṃgraha* (*PDhS*). However, this is not the case. The present paper aims to shed some light on the question of the time of the appearance of the new definition and on the relation between the two definitions.

2.1 *VS* 5.2.20 occurs in the context of *VS* 5.2.18-20[2] which originally formed the section on the "activity of *ātman*."[3] The Vaiśeṣikas abandoned this concept before the formation of *Nyāyasūtra* (*NS*) 3.2.59-71 in the fifth century at the latest.[4] *VS* 5.2.19 is interpreted as discussing the "activity of *manas*" in *NS* 3.2.67-68.[5] This corroborates the dating of *VS* 5.2.20 to the pre-classical period.

2.2 *VS* 5.2.20 is alluded to with a Sāṃkhyistic modification in Śārīrasthāna 1.142 of the *Carakasaṃhitā* (*CS*),[6] which most probably belongs to the so-called "dark period" of Vaiśeṣika,[7] although we cannot say anything definite about the date of this part of the *CS* which is supposed to have undergone a very complicated process of composition. The preceding verses of Śārīrasthāna 1.138-139 correspond to *VS* 5.2.16-17,[8] and thus the assumption that the former passage is based on the latter is corroborated, even though the expression in 1.142 is rather different from that of *VS* 5.2.20.

2.3.1 The Buddhist literature preserved in Chinese translation contains several pieces of information about the Vaiśeṣika theory of emancipation. I would first like to discuss the reference in chapter 70 of the *Dài zhì dù lùn* (*DL*).[9] The *DL* is ascribed to Nāgārjuna by tradition, but its authenticity is doubtful. It has been pointed out by Lamotte that the original Sanskrit text was written in India and its title was **Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa*; Lamotte further determined that since the work contains citations from Nāgārjuna's disciple Āryadeva and the

[1] In this paper I will term this definition the "classical definition."

[2] *VS* 5.2.18: *kāyakarmaṇātmakarma vyākhyātam*; *VS* 5.2.19: *apasarpaṇam upasarpaṇam aśitapītasaṃyogaḥ kāryāntarasaṃyogāś cety adṛṣṭakāritāni*; *VS* 5.2.20: *tadabhāve saṃyogābhāvo 'prādurbhāvaḥ sa mokṣaḥ*.

[3] Nozawa 1981: 460f.

[4] Ruben 1928: 209, n. 237; Bronkhorst 1993: 90. For the date of the *Nyāyasūtra* and *Nyāyabhāṣya* see Franco and Preisendanz 1995: 86.

[5] Bronkhorst 1993: 89; Nozawa 2000: 116.

[6] *CS* Śārīrasthāna 1.142: *mokṣo rajastamo'bhāvād balavatkarmasaṃkṣayāt. viyogaḥ sarvasaṃyogair apunarbhava ucyate.*

[7] Matilal 1977: 59.

[8] Nozawa 1996: (17).

[9] This passage is not included in Lamotte's translation which covers only chapters 1 to 34.

Karin Preisendanz (ed.), *Expanding and Merging Horizons*: *Contributions to South Asian and Cross-Cultural Studies in Commemoration of Wilhelm Halbfass*, Wien: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 2007, pp. 385-399.

latter's disciple Rāhulabhadra, its author could not have lived before the beginning of the fourth century.[10] The *DL* was translated into Chinese by Kumārajīva in AD 405, which means that the *DL* predates the *PDhS* and that its testimony belongs to the dark period of Vaiśeṣika.

Cf. *DL* pp. 546c29-547a4:

> Next, some say that in the beginning the world is what is called atoms. Atoms are eternal, indestructible, incombustible, non-inflammable and imperishable because of their being subtle. However, having a relation to the causes **dharma* and **adharma* they produce bodies in heaven or hell, etc. They are dissociated into pieces when the causes **dharma* and **adharma* are exhausted because they are lacking father and mother.[11]

2.3.2 It is interesting to note that an explanation of the Lokāyata theory of *svabhāva* follows this passage.[12] A similar concurrence of the Lokāyata theory with that of the Vaiśeṣika is found several times in the *NS*, i.e., 3.1.17f., 3.2.59f., and 4.1.59f. It should also be noted that *dharmādharma* are referred to as the cause of connection with a body in the next birth. This role is allotted to *adṛṣṭa* in the *VS*, but there is no *sūtra* identifying *adṛṣṭa* with *dharmādharma*.[13] *adṛṣṭa* characterized as *dharmādharma* is critically referred to as a cause of the body in the *Nyāyabhāṣya* (*NBh*).[14] A similar mention of *dharmādharma* as a cause of retribution is found in the *Abhidharmakośa* (*AK*).[15]

2.4.1 The *Wài dào xiǎo chéng niè pán lùn* (*WXNL*) is another Buddhist work preserving a reference to an early Vaiśeṣika theory of emancipation. Tradition ascribes the *WXNL* to Āryadeva; it is also adorned with the name of the alleged author and called *Dī pó pú sà shì léng jiā jīng zhōng wài dào xiǎo chéng niè pán lùn*, but few scholars believe in its authenticity.[16] The translator of this treatise was Bodhiruci, who arrived at Loyang in AD 508,[17] which places the original text in the fifth century at the latest. The *WXNL* contains introductory remarks on the theories of *mokṣa* adopted by twenty Hīnayāna Buddhist and Hindu sects, one of which is the Vaiśeṣika theory.

Cf. *WXNL* p. 157a28-b5:

> Question: Which heretic is the one who says that emancipation is to see everything according to specific features as well as common features? Answer: The seventh heretic, a proponent of the Vaiśeṣika philosophy, makes the following assertion, namely that the ten principles, that is, earth, water, fire, wind, ether, atoms, substance (*dravya*), quality (*guṇa*), action (*karman*), particularity (*viśeṣa*) and so on, are eternal, in order to unite with each another to produce the whole world with both sentient and non-sentient entities included. Everything arises in sequence from two atoms. Without them no construct exists, and when there is no construct, they are dissociated. Dissociation is nothing but emancipation. Therefore the proponent of Vaiśeṣika asserts that atoms, which are eternal, are capable of producing everything and are the cause of emancipation.[18]

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[10] Lamotte 1970: xl; Nakamura 1980: 239 and 240, n. 28.

[11] Cp. Ui 1917: 48.

[12] *DL* p. 547a4: "Some say that nature is the primary cause of the world and that being poor and rich is not the result of wishes and actions."

[13] Halbfass 1991: 313; Bronkhorst 1993: 90; Nozawa 2000: 124.

[14] According to *NBh* p. 173,3f., the Naiyāyikas conceived the cause of the body to be *saṃkalpa*. Cf. Oberhammer 1987: 18; Nozawa 2000: 121.

[15] *AK* p. 477,7: *katham asaty ātmani vinaṣṭāt karmaṇa āyatyāṃ phalotpattiḥ. ātmany api sati kathaṃ vinaṣṭāt karmaṇa āyatyāṃ phalotpattiḥ. tadāśritād dharmādharmāt.*

[16] Hirakawa 1979: Vol. 2, p. 53.

[17] Mochizuki 1936-1963: 4671; Nakamura 1980: 245; Tillemans 1990: Vol. 1, p. 7.

[18] Cp. *NBh* pp. 237 and 238.

2.4.2 The testimony of the *WXNL* presents three interesting problems. The first one is the expression in the first sentence, that is, "seeing everything according to specific features as well as common features," which is equivalent to a phrase in the opening sentence of the *PDhS*, that is, *sādharmyavaidharmyatattvajñāna*.[19] This sentence seems to be a Vaiśeṣika adaptation of *NS* 1.1.1, but the relevant expression *sādharmyavaidharmya* does not appear in the *NS*.[20] As the *WXNL* antedates the *PDhS*, this suggests that the concept of *sādharmyavaidharmyatattvajñāna* as a cause of emancipation also predates the *PDhS*. We know that the idea that true knowledge of six categories is a cause of bliss (*śarman*) is mentioned in Sūtrasthāna 1.28-29 of the *CS*;[21] this part seems older than *CS* Vimānasthāna 8.29 because the latter refers to it.[22] Furthermore, the logical theory contained in Vimānasthāna 8.26f. is said to be older than that of *NS*.[23] If therefore Sūtrasthāna 1.28-29 predates *NS* 1.1.1, we may assume that the origin of *sūtra* 1.1.4 according to the *Upaskāra* (*VSU*) is very old.[24]

2.4.3 Next, it is unclear what is denoted by "ten principles." This may possibly refer to ten *padārtha*s like Candramati's. The items which are enumerated happen to be ten: earth, water, fire, wind, ether, atoms, substance (*dravya*), quality (*guṇa*), action (*karman*), and particularity (*viśeṣa*). However, it is highly improbable that the enumeration ended with *viśeṣa*; the following word *dìng*, which means "and so on," indicates some further principles not mentioned here.

2.4.4 The third problem is the understanding of emancipation as the dissociation of atoms. This idea seems to be based on an atomistic interpretation of *VS* 5.2.20 and is conceptually similar to the idea referred to in the *DL*, cited above. From this one can infer that some time before the fifth century there were certain Vaiśeṣikas who interpreted *VS* 5.2.20 in a very peculiar atomistic way.

2.5 A similar Vaiśeṣika view of *mokṣa* with an atomistic tendency is criticized in the *NBh*.[25]

Cf. *NBh* pp. 237-238 on *NS* (*POS*) 3.2.68 (= *NS* 3.2.67):

> *tad adṛṣṭakāritam iti cet kasyacid darśanam. adṛṣṭaṃ nāma paramāṇūnāṃ guṇaviśeṣaḥ kriyāhetuḥ. tena preritāḥ paramāṇavaḥ sammūrcchitāḥ śarīram utpādayantīti. tan manaḥ samāviśati svaguṇenādṛṣṭena preritam. samanaske śarīre draṣṭur upalabdhir bhavatīti. etasmin vai darśane guṇānucchedāt punas tatprasaṅgo 'pavarge. apavarge śarīrotpattiḥ, paramāṇuguṇasyādṛṣṭasyānucchedyatvād iti.*
>
> Someone may think that it (i.e., the body) is produced by *adṛṣṭa*. In his opinion *adṛṣṭa* is a specific quality of atoms and the cause for their motion. Being stimulated by it, atoms are united and produce the body. The mind enters it, being stimulated by its own quality *adṛṣṭa*. When the body is

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[19] *PDhS* p. 6,14.

[20] *NS* 1.1.1: *pramāṇaprameyasaṃśayaprayojanadṛṣṭāntasiddhāntāvayavatarkanirṇayavādajalpavitaṇḍāhetvābhāsacchalajātinigrahasthānānāṃ tattvajñānān niḥśreyasādhigamaḥ.*

[21] *CS* Sūtrasthāna 1.28-29:

> *maharṣayas te dadṛśur yathāvaj jñānacakṣuṣā |*
> *sāmānyaṃ ca viśeṣaṃ ca guṇān dravyāṇi karma ca ||*
> *samavāyaṃ ca taj jñātvā tantroktaṃ vidhim āsthitāḥ |*
> *lebhire paramaṃ śarma jīvitaṃ cāpy anitvaram ||.*

[22] *CS* Vimānasthāna 8.29: *dravyaguṇakarmasāmānyaviśeṣasamavāyāḥ svalakṣaṇaiḥ ślokasthāne pūrvam uktāḥ. ślokasthāna* is another name of Sūtrasthāna.

[23] Ui 1924-1930: Vol. 2, p. 430 ("Caraka Honju ni okeru Ronrisetu [Logical Theory of *Carakasaṃhitā*]").

[24] *VSU* 1.1.4: *dharmaviśeṣaprasūtād dravyaguṇakarmasāmānyaviśeṣasamavāyānāṃ padārthānāṃ sādharmyavaidharmyābhyāṃ tattvajñānān niḥśreyasam*. Bronkhorst (1993b: 164) argues for the antiquity of this *sūtra*. See Potter 1977: 32.

[25] Halbfass 1991: 313; *ŚBh* on *BS* 2.2.12; *Vyo* II, p. 230,15.

endowed with mind, perception arises for the knower. Since in this view [that adopts the rule that qualities of eternal substances are eternal] the quality (i.e., *adṛṣṭa*) is never destroyed, it (i.e., a body) results again in liberation: [in other words] in liberation the body is produced [again] because *adṛṣṭa*, a quality of the atoms, is indestructible.

2.6 An atomic theory of *mokṣa* is also preserved in the *PDhS*; it is presented in the chapter on "creation and destruction of the world."

Cf. *PDhS* p. 48,8:

brāhmaṇe mānena varṣaśatānte vartamānasya brahmaṇo 'pavargakāle saṃsārakhinnānāṃ sarvaprāṇināṃ niśi viśrāmārthaṃ sakalabhuvanapater maheśvarasya saṃjihīrṣāsamakālaṃ śarīrendriyamahābhūtopanibandhakānāṃ sarvātmagatānām adṛṣṭānāṃ vṛttinirodhe sati maheśvarecchātmāṇusaṃyogajakarmabhyaḥ śarīrendriyakāraṇāṇuvibhāgebhyas tatsaṃyoganivṛttau teṣām āparamāṇvanto vināśaḥ. tathā pṛthivyudakajvalanapavanānām api mahābhūtānām anenaiva krameṇottarasminn uttarasmin sati pūrvasya pūrvasya vināśaḥ, tataḥ pravibhaktāḥ paramāṇavo 'vatiṣṭhante dharmādharmasaṃskārānuviddhā ātmānas tāvantam eva kālam.

At the end of a century by the measure of Brahmā there occurs the time of emancipation for the Brahmā existing at that time, when Maheśvara, the Lord of the whole world, wishes for destruction in order to give a rest at night to all living beings fatigued from their transmigration. At the same time, there occurs a cessation of the operation of the unseen forces (*adṛṣṭa*) of all Selves that are the constituting causes of [their] bodies, sense organs and the gross elements. And then the actions caused by Maheśvara's wish and the conjunction of Selves and atoms bring about disjunction among the atoms that are the causes of their bodies and sense organs, which are all destroyed down to the atoms due to the disappearance of conjunction. Moreover, the gross elements, i.e., earth, water, fire and wind, are also destroyed one after the other in this very manner, each preceding one being destroyed after the destruction of each succeeding one. After this, the atoms remain in an isolated condition, as do the Selves pervaded by *dharma*, *adharma* and the faculty to reproduce previous acts of cognition, for exactly this time (i.e., a century by the measure of Brahmā).

2.7 Akalaṅkadeva's *Tattvārthavārttika* (*TAV*) presents some literal quotations from the *VS*; one of them is of *VS* 5.2.20 with a fairly detailed elucidation in accordance with Candrānanda's annotation.[26] However, Akalaṅka provides a more detailed explanation than Candrānanda's which he must have taken from some unknown Vaiśeṣika work. The citation shows that the definition of *mokṣa* in the *VS* had not yet been completely discarded and was still maintained by some Vaiśeṣikas around the time of Akalaṅka, who seems to have flourished in the seventh century.[27] The *sūtra* text cited by Akalaṅkadeva is slightly different from that read by Candrānanda; it has *ca* before *sa*, which is the same reading as that of Vādīndra (cf. *VSV*).[28]

Cf. *TAV* p. 11,20:

icchādveṣābhyām apareṣām |44| ***icchādveṣapūrvikā dharmādharmayoḥ pravṛttis*** (*VS* 6.2.17) *tābhyāṃ sukhaduḥkhaṃ tata icchādveṣau. na ca vimohasya tau mithyādarśanābhāvāt. mohaś cājñānam. vimohasya yateḥ ṣaṭpadārthatattvajñasya vairāgyavataḥ sukhaduḥkhecchādveṣābhāvaḥ, icchādveṣābhāvād dharmādharmābhāvaḥ,*[29] ***tadabhāve saṃyogābhāvo 'prādurbhāvaś ca sa mokṣaḥ*** (*VS* 5.2.20), *tayor dharmādharmayor abhāve bhavaty apavargaḥ. katham*? *pradīpoparame prakāśābhāvavat.*[30] *yad dhi yadbhāvaṃ pratityātmānaṃ pratilabhate tat tasyoparamāt tirobhāvaṃ*

[26] *VSC* p. 43,12: *evaṃrūpasyānādyapasarpaṇādinimittasyādṛṣṭasyābhāve jīvanākhyasya ātmamanaḥsaṃyogasyābhāvo 'nyasya ca śarīrasyāprādurbhāvo yaḥ sa mokṣaḥ.*

[27] The editor of the *TAV* discusses Akalaṅkadeva's date on p. 5 of the introduction and places him around 700 of the Vikrama era, which is equivalent to AD 643. Akalaṅka lived during the reign of the Rāṣṭrakūṭa king Sāhasatuṅga Dantidurga; cf. Winternitz 1985-1993: Vol. 2, p. 478, n. 4, and p. 581.

[28] The *sūtra* text in *VSU* has only *ca* and omits *sa*. See Rasāyana (*VSR*) on *VS* 5.2.19 (p. 180,1).

[29] Cf. *PDhS* p. 281,21.

[30] Cf. *PDhS* p. 282,4; *Vyo* I, p. 2,6; *NK* p. 4,12; *Kir* p. 7,6. Cf. also *MBh* 12.180.1-18 and Frauwallner 1956: Vol. 1, p. 130.

yāti, *tad yathā pradīpoparamāt prakāśābhāvaḥ*. *bandhaś cādṛṣṭād bhavati*. *katham*? *adharmasañjñād adṛṣṭād ajñānaṃ bhavati*, *ajñānāc ca mohaḥ*, *mohavata icchādveṣau jāyete*, *icchādveṣābhyāṃ dharmādharmau*, *sa eṣa bandhaḥ*, *ataḥ saṃsārasya prasūtiḥ*. *tasmād bhavaty adṛṣṭābhāve saṃyogābhāvaḥ*. *katarasya saṃyogasyābhāvaḥ*? *jīvanasañjñakasya*. *dharmādharmāpekṣaḥ sadehasyātmano manasā saṃyogo jīvanam*,[31] *tasya dharmādharmayor abhāvād abhāvo 'prādurbhāvaś ca pratyagraśarīrasyātyantam abhāvaḥ sa mokṣaḥ*. *katham abhāvo dharmādharmayoḥ*? *anāgatānutpattisañcitanirodhābhyām*. (1) *anāgatānutpattiḥ* (2) *sañcitanirodhaś ca dvividho 'bhāvaḥ*.[32] (1) *tatrānāgatānutpattis tāvad dharmādharmayoḥ – śarīrendriyamanovyatiriktātmadarśanād akuśalasyādharmasyānutpattis*, *tatsādhanānāṃ pāravarjanāt*; *dharmasyāpi tatsādhanānām anabhisambandhāt*; *nānabhisaṃhitaṃ karma badhnātīti*. (2) *sañcitanirodho 'pi – tadudvegaparikhedaphalād adharmanāśaḥ*, *tasmāt saṃsārād udvegaḥ*. *śarīratattvāvalokanāc chītoṣṇaśokādinimittaṃ śarīraparikhedaṃ pradāyādharmo 'tiricyate*. *bhogadoṣadarśanāt ṣaṇṇāṃ ca padārthānāṃ tattvavinirṇayāt prītim ārabhya dharmasya vināśaḥ*,[33] *ato mokṣa ity apareṣāṃ darśanam*.

[Activity] towards the others (i.e., *dharma* and *adharma*) [is preceded] by desire and aversion (44). Activity towards *dharma* and *adharma* is preceded by desire and aversion; from these [arise] pleasure and pain, [and] from them desire and aversion. And these two do not belong to a person who has got rid of delusion because he does not have false views. And delusion is ignorance. An ascetic who has got rid of delusion, inasmuch as he possesses true knowledge of the six categories [and] indifference towards worldly desires, is free from pleasure, pain, desire and aversion. Since [he] has no desire and aversion, [he] is free from *dharma* and *adharma*. Emancipation is this: absence of conjunction and appearance when these (i.e., *dharma* and *adharma*) are absent (*VS* 5.2.20). When these two, i.e., *dharma* and *adharma*, are absent, emancipation arises. How? It is like the disappearance of brightness when a lamp is put out. For when something arises dependent on the existence of some other thing, it disappears because of the latter's disappearance, just as the absence of brightness follows the extinction of a lamp. And bondage occurs because of *adṛṣṭa*. How? From *adṛṣṭa*, which is technically termed *adharma*, arises ignorance, and from ignorance delusion. For a person who is deluded, desire and aversion arise, [and] from desire and aversion *dharma* and *adharma* [arise]. This is bondage, and because of it transmigration comes about. Therefore, when *adṛṣṭa* is absent, the absence of conjunction [results]. What kind of conjunction is absent? [The conjunction] technically termed "life." Life is the conjunction between the Self possessed of a body and the mind that depends on *dharma* and *adharma* as its requirement. Because *dharma* and *adharma* are absent, this [conjunction] (i.e., life) is absent and does not appear, that is, perfect absence of a new body [results], which is emancipation. How does the absence of *dharma* and *adharma* [come about]? It results from the non-occurrence of what is future and the destruction of what has been accumulated. Absence is of two kinds, i.e., (1) the non-occurrence of what is future and (2) the destruction of what has been accumulated. (1) First, the non-occurrence of what is future is [of two kinds] relating to *dharma* and *adharma* – [one is] the non-occurrence of evil, i.e., *adharma*, due to the view of the Self as different from the body, sense organs and mind, which is dependent on abstaining from the means for bringing it about, and [the other is the non-occurrence] of *dharma* due to [one's having] no relation to the means for bringing it about; *karma* does not bind anyone who has no relation to it. (2) Next, the destruction of what has been accumulated is the vanishing of *adharma* on account of [the enjoyment of] its fruit, such as fear and weariness. Therefore there is fear of transmigration. Because one views the true/real nature of the body, *adharma*, after it has discharged weariness of the body caused by cold, heat, anxiety and so on, is overcome. Because one sees the defects of enjoyment and ascertains the true/real nature of the six categories, *dharma* causes bliss and then perishes; from this emancipation results. This is the view of others.

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[31] Cf. *NBh* on *NS* 3.2.26, p. 208,1: *sadehasyātmano manasā saṃyogo vipacyamānakarmāśayasahito jīvanam iṣyate*; *VSC* p. 43,12: … *jīvanākhyasyātmamanaḥsaṃyogasya* …; *TJ*(*P*) f. 274a8-274b1: *lus daṅ bcas pa'i bdag yid da | ldan par gyur pa ni 'tsho ba yin la*; *NK* p. 263,12: *sadehasyātmano vipacyamānakarmāśayasahitasya manasā saha saṃyogaḥ sambandho jīvanam*. Cf. further Preisendanz 1994: 238-239.

[32] Cf. *PDhS* p. 281,22.

[33] Cf. *PDhS* p. 282,2.

2.8.1 It may seem strange to propose that the theory of *mokṣa* in the *PDhS* is mainly based on the *VS* and has the appearance of a pre-classical theory, but this becomes clear when one compares it with the quotation in the *TAV* given above.

Cf. *PDhS* pp. 281,19-282,5:

> *jñānapūrvakāt tu kṛtād asaṅkalpitaphalād viśuddhe kule jātasya duḥkhavigamopāyajijñāsor ācāryam upasaṅgamyotpannaṣaṭpadārthatattvajñānasyājñānanivṛttau viraktasya* (A) *rāgadveṣādyabhāvāt tajjayor dharmādharmayor anutpattau pūrvasañcitayoś copabhogān nirodhe santoṣasukhaṃ śarīrapariccheda cotpādya rāgādinivṛttau nivṛttilakṣaṇaḥ kevalo dharmaḥ paramārthadarśanajaṃ sukhaṃ kṛtvā nivartate*. (B) *tadā nirodhān nirbījasyātmanaḥ śarīrādinivṛttiḥ. punaḥ śarīrādyanutpattau dagdhendhanānalavad*[34] *upaśamo mokṣa iti*.
>
> Someone who is born in a family of pure lineage because of his acting with due knowledge and without intention of its fruit approaches a teacher with the wish to know the means for the cessation of pain. When the true knowledge of the six categories occurs to him, he becomes free from worldly desires because of the disappearing of ignorance. And then, because greed, anger and so on disappear, *dharma* and *adharma* originating from them stop arising and [those] accumulated in the past are destroyed by virtue of their enjoyment, when the pure *dharma* with the specific feature of the suppression of activity brings forth the bliss of satisfaction and detachment from the body, [and] then, because of the cessation of greed and so on, [the pure *dharma*] ceases after having produced the pleasure from insight into the truth. At the same time, the body and so on disappear for the Self that has become seedless due to the complete annihilation [of the senses]. When the body and so on occur no more, being calm like an [extinguished] fire whose fuel has been burnt up is emancipation.

2.8.2 The underlined sentence (A) might be the logical starting point for the classical definition of *mokṣa*, namely that *mokṣa* is the annihilation of the nine specific qualities of *ātman*, i.e., cognition, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, volition, *dharma*, *adharma*, and latent impression (*bhāvanā*). However, when one compares it with the underlined sentence from the *TAV* (cf. 2.7), it becomes clear that it is an inversion of *VS* 6.2.17: *icchādveṣapūrvikā dharmādharmayoḥ pravṛttiḥ.* Sentence (B) explains *mokṣa* as the annihilation of the body, a statement which has the same connotation as *VS* 5.2.20 (*tadabhāve saṃyogābhāvo 'prādurbhāvaḥ sa mokṣaḥ*). As a whole, Praśastapāda's theory of *mokṣa* is closely related to that of the *VS*.

2.8.3 However, there is the problem that *VS* 6.2.17 (*icchādveṣapūrvikā dharmādharmayoḥ pravṛttiḥ*) may be a later addition. In the present edition of the *sūtra*-text, *VS* 6.2.12-19 form a section treating "causes of transmigration and liberation from it." First, *sūtra*s 12-16 enumerate various causes of desire. The two following *sūtra*s explain that activities which come about due to desire and aversion are conducive to *dharmādharma* (17) and produce conjunction and disjunction with bodies (18). The last *sūtra* concludes that liberation has been explained in the section concerning the "activity of *ātman*" (19). As has been pointed out by Hattori (1989: 49), this explanation of transmigration is almost in accordance with that of the Naiyāyikas.

2.8.4 *VS* 5.2.19-20 (*apasarpaṇam upasarpaṇam aśitapītasaṃyogaḥ kāryāntarasaṃyogaś cety adṛṣṭakāritāni* [19]; *tadabhāve saṃyogābhāvo 'prādurbhāvaḥ sa mokṣaḥ* [20]) explain transmigration and emancipation in a way which is criticized in *NS* 3.2.67-68 (*tad adṛṣṭakāritam iti cet punas tatprasaṅgo 'pavarge* [67]; *manasaḥ karmanimittatvāc ca saṃyogānucchedaḥ* [68]), whereas *VS* 6.2.12-19 explain transmigration and emancipation in accordance with the Naiyāyika theory. The former *sūtra*s state that transmigration is caused by *adṛṣṭa*; according to the latter passage it is caused by desire, activities and *dharmādharma*. *adṛṣṭa* and *dharmādharma* are not identical in the *VS* unless one presupposes that these two theories of transmigration are actually only one, or were interpreted to be the same. What makes the theory of transmigration

[34] See n. 31 above.

in *VS* 6.2.12-19 look like that of the Naiyāyikas are the sentences *VS* 6.2.17 and 18 (*icchā-dveṣapūrvikā dharmādharmayoḥ pravṛttiḥ* [17]; *tataḥ saṃyogo vibhāgaś ca* [18]). Without them, the *sūtra*s would stand in a completely different context.

2.8.5 In the *NBh* on *NS* 3.1.25, Vātsyāyana criticizes the Vaiśeṣika theory of desire and refers to *VS* 6.2.13, 15 and 16.[35] *VS* 6.2.12-16 treat various causes of desire such as pleasure (12), indulgence (13), satisfaction (14), *adṛṣṭa* (15) and particularity of birth (16), while in the Naiyāyikas' view desire is solely produced by *saṅkalpa*, i.e., imaginary representation conditioned by what was experienced in a previous life.[36] Vātsyāyana criticizes *VS* 6.2.13, 15 and 16 as if they had no relation with transmigration, i.e., as if he did not know *VS* 6.2.17-18. In the present edition of the *VS*, they are clearly related to transmigration. If *VS* 6.2.12-19 would have had its present form with *sūtra*s 17 and 18 included, Vātsyāyana would not have voiced his criticism in this way. At the time he criticized the Vaiśeṣika theory of desire, *VS* most probably lacked *sūtra*s 6.2.17 and 18. These two *sūtra*s seem to have been added soon after the composition of the *NBh*, with the aim of changing the context of 6.2.12-19 and thus making the sequence fit the Naiyāyika theory of emancipation. Influenced by Buddhism, the Naiyāyikas preferred to describe the attainment of emancipation by tracing the causes of transmigration in reverse.[37] The classical Vaiśeṣika definition of *mokṣa* may have been produced in the same manner by reversing and expanding the chain of causes of transmigration, as explained in *VS* 6.2.17 and 18. Had these *sūtra*s been added after the composition of the *PDhS*, they would have, influenced by the classical definition of *mokṣa*, taken a fairly different shape.

3.1 The classical definition of *mokṣa* seems to have been widely accepted and is found numerous times in the literature of the post-Praśastapāda period.[38] The nine specific qualities of *ātman* are not clearly stated in the *VS*. Only Candramati and Praśastapāda make the categorical statement that cognition, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, volition, *dharma*, *adharma* and latent impression are the specific qualities of the Self.[39] However, they do not explicitly mention in their works that annihilation of these qualities means emancipation.

3.2 What is the oldest evidence for the classical Vaiśeṣika definition of *mokṣa*? It may occur in the *Suí xiāng lùn* (*SXL*) (**Lakṣaṇānusāraśāstra*) of Dé hui (Guṇamati), translated by Paramārtha (499–569). The *SXL* is a commentary on part of the seventh chapter of the *Abhi-*

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[35] Nozawa 2000: 121. Cf. *NBh* p. 173,3: *athāpi saṅkalpād anyad rāgakāraṇaṃ dharmādharmalakṣaṇam adṛṣṭam upadīyate*, (cf. *VS* 6.2.15: *adṛṣṭāt*) *tathāpi pūrvaśarīrayogo 'pratyākhyaḥ. tatra hi tasya nirvṛttiḥ*, *nāsmin janmani. tanmayatvād rāga iti* (cf. *VS* 6.2.13: *tanmayatvāt*) *viṣayābhyāsaḥ khalv ayaṃ bhāvanāhetus tanmayatvam ucyata iti. jātiviśeṣāc ca rāgaviśeṣa iti* (cf. *VS* 6.2.16: *jātiviśeṣāc ca rāgaviśeṣaḥ*) *karma khalv idaṃ jātiviśeṣanirvartakaṃ tādātmyāt tacchabdyaṃ vijñāyate. tasmād anupapannam – saṅkalpād anyad rāgakāraṇam iti*.

[36] Oberhammer 1987: 18. On *saṅkalpa* cf. also Preisendanz 1994: 389-392.

[37] Cf. *NS* 1.1.2 and Halbfass 1991: 246.

[38] Cf. *ŚBh* on *BS* 2.3.50 (p. 561): *tatrātmadravyāṇāṃ manodravyāṇāṃ ca saṃyogān navecchādayo vaiśeṣikā ātmaguṇā utpadyante. te cāvyatikareṇa pratyekam ātmasu samavayanti. sa saṃsāraḥ. teṣāṃ navānām ātmaguṇānām atyantānutpādo mokṣa iti kāṇādāḥ*; *NM* III, p. 1,11: *navānām ātmaguṇānāṃ buddhisukhaduḥkhecchādveṣaprayatnadharmādharmasaṃskārāṇāṃ nirmūlocchedo 'pavarga ity uktaṃ bhavati*; *NBhūṣ* p. 594,1f.: *kaḥ punar ayaṃ mokṣa iti. eke tāvad varṇayanti – samastātmaviśeṣaguṇocchede saṃhārāvasthāyām ākāśavad ātmano 'tyantāvasthānaṃ mokṣa iti*; *VSC* p. 2,3: *niḥśreyasam apy ātmano* (see Isaacson 1995: 159) *vaiśeṣikaguṇābhāvarūpo mokṣaḥ*; *Vyo* I, p. 4,26: *navānām ātmaviśeṣaguṇānām atyantocchittir niḥśreyasam*, see also *Vyo* I, p. 2,6; *NK* p. 273,17: *mokṣo navānām ātmaviśeṣaguṇānām atyantocchedaḥ*, see also p. 4,11 and p. 287,15. As to the definition in Navya-Nyāya literature, see Wada 2000: 112.

[39] Miyamoto 1996: 255; Ui 1917: 253; *PDhS* pp. 281-282. See also *PDhS* p. 95,24 and *VSC* on *VS* 3.2.17.

dharmakośabhāṣya.[40] Ui doubts Guṇamati's authorship of the extant *SXL* and regards the work as Paramārtha's commentary on Guṇamati's **Lakṣaṇānusāraśāstra*.[41] Mochizuki criticizes this opinion and affirms that the *SXL* is a translation of Guṇamati's work.[42] Ui dates him to 420–500,[43] but Mochizuki considers the time of his activity to be "from the latter half of the fifth to the first half of the sixth century,"[44] while Frauwallner makes Guṇamati "a little older than Sthiramati (c. 510–570)."[45] Hattori regards Dignāga (c. 480–540) and Guṇamati as contemporaries.[46] Ejima follows Frauwallner's dating for Sthiramati and gives the date of c. 460–540 for his preceptor Guṇamati.[47] Paramārtha arrived in Kwang Tung in southern China in 546 at the age of 47 or 48;[48] at that time he must have been in possession of the original Sanskrit text of Guṇamati's *SXL*.

Guṇamati mentions *zì zài tiān* (*īśvara*) and describes the Vaiśeṣika cosmology in fair detail; because a precise equivalent to his description is not found in any extant Vaiśeṣika work he must have taken his information from some unknown Vaiśeṣika work. If this source would have been a commentary on the *PDhS*, we could fix the date of *PDhS* and *SXL* rather decisively. The logical theory of the *PDhS* has been influenced by the *Pramāṇasamuccaya*,[49] Dignāga's last work,[50] and thus the *PDhS* must have been composed sometime around 540 and the original text of *SXL* written between 540 and 546. If this is the case, we have to place the end of Guṇamati's life some five years later and assign the earliest reference to the classical definition of *mokṣa* to the early 540's. However, given that we know of several lost Vaiśeṣika works which existed in the days of Praśastapāda, such as the *Vākya*, the *Ṭīkā*, the *Kaṭandī*, etc.,[51] there is an equally strong possibility that Guṇamati used one of them as his source. In this case a much earlier date must be assigned to both his treatise and the classical definition of *mokṣa*, and we will be confronted with the question of why Praśastapāda kept silent on the classical definition.

Cf. *SXL* p. 165a5-b26:

> (Question): What is the use of the Self of the heretics? If it had any use, it should be known by means of inference. (Answer): They say that the Self has five external features and nine internal features (as inferential marks of its existence).[52] Ulūka and others adhere to this opinion.

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[40] *AK* p. 400,1-401,11. This section corresponds to the nineteenth chapter of Paramārtha's translation (*Ā pí dá mó jū shè shì lùn*, Taisho No. 1559), p. 288b1-288c7.

[41] Ui 1924-1930: Vol. 5, pp. 137-138, and Vol. 6, p. 96.

[42] Mochizuki 1936-1963: Vol. 3, p. 2872; see also Hirakawa 1979: Vol. 2, p. 248, n. 5. Nakamura (1980: 280) assigns the approximate date of 557-569 to the *SXL*.

[43] Ui 1924-1930: Vol. 5, p. 136.

[44] Mochizuki 1936-1963: 3929b.

[45] Frauwallner 1961: 137.

[46] Hattori 1968: 6.

[47] Ejima 1980: 195.

[48] Ui 1924-1930: Vol. 5, p. 130, and Vol. 6, p. 13; Hirakawa 1979: Vol. 2, p. 229. According to the *Dài táng xī yù jì* (Taisho No. 2087, Vol. 51, f. 913c.), Guṇamati came from South India and stayed in Nālandā as well as in Valabhī, a prosperous city in Gujarat, during the reign of the Maitraka dynasty. His disciple Sthiramati is said to have built a temple named Śrī Bappapādīya Vihāra. See also Hirakawa 1979: Vol. 2, p. 13, and Ui 1924-1930: Vol. 6, p. 9. Paramārtha is said to have been a native of Ujjain, which is not far from Valabhī. A Chinese tradition regards Paramārtha as a disciple of Sthiramati, but Hirakawa denies this; cf. Hirakawa 1979: Vol. 2, pp. 229-230.

[49] Hattori 1968: 136-138; Nozawa 1982: 76.

[50] Hattori 1968: 3.

[51] *VS*, introduction p. 10.

[52] The nine "internal features" or qualities are *buddhisukhaduḥkhecchādveṣaprayatnadharmādharmabhāvanā*, which are included in the list of specific qualities (*vaiśeṣikaguṇa*) of the Self in *PDhS* p. 95,24.

[165a7] The external features are five, i.e., 1) exhalation, 2) inhalation, 3) the shutting of the eyes, 4) the opening of the eyes, and 5) life.[53] From these five features we know that the Self is real. The five features are five functions (of living things). Now we refute this. If the reality of the Self were known from the first four features, how could eggs, inasmuch as they do not have the first four features, be said to have a Self? In order to protect their tenet they may say that although the first four features are lacking, possession of the fifth feature (i.e., life) makes it known that they have a Self. Again we refute this. Life is always connected to a body. When the Self as you expound it attains emancipation, the Self leaves the body. When the Self leaves the body, it has no life either. How could it be proved from life that the Self is real?

[165a14] The internal features are [as follows]. They say that the Self is eternal. The mind is atomic in size. The mind is also eternal. Moreover, there are **dharma* and **adharma*. **dharma* is good, **adharma* is evil. **dharma* and **adharma* urge the Self and the mind to be connected. The connection of Self and mind produces nine qualities. From Self and mind arises 1) cognition, since they are capable of cognizing. From cognition arise 2) pain and 3) pleasure. From pain and pleasure arise 4) desire and 5) aversion. Desire arises in pleasure, aversion arises in pain. From desire and aversion arises 6) volition. Exercising volition [one] wants to remove pain and to gain pleasure. When one thinks of the body's being eternal, one takes into account existence in the future and performs various austerities. This is named 7) **dharma*. When one thinks of the body as perishing, one does not take into account existence in the future and becomes willful and does evil. This is named 8) **adharma*. From **dharma* and **adharma* arises 9) latent impression (*bhāvanā*).[54] When latent impression has already ripened, it works very quickly. Quick latent impression is a causal power. Because of its being quick, latent impression reminds one of one's own past affairs in an instant. From the connection to this (latent impression) there arise further **dharma* and **adharma*. Thus **dharma* and **adharma* are included in the nine qualities. Sometimes one concerns oneself with good and sometimes with evil.

[165a25] There are other kinds of **dharma* and **adharma*. They are five in all.[55] The first one makes fire flame upwards. The second one makes wind blow horizontally. The third one makes earth and water fall down. The fourth one makes atoms connect with and disconnect from each other. The fifth one makes the Self and the mind connect firmly.

[165a28] The heretic asserts that there are two destructions (of the cosmos). One is the intermediate destruction[56] and the other is the fire-destruction.[57] The intermediate destruction continues for three hundred thousand **koṭi*s. The three hundred thousand **koṭi*s consist of one hundred thousand **koṭi*s of the fire (world) and one hundred thousand **koṭi*s of the water (world) and one hundred thousand **koṭi*s of the wind world. During the time of the fire (world) the world disappears for one **koṭi* and appears for one **koṭi*. It is the same with the time of water and wind. When the world disappears, large matter disappears. Basic atoms[58] remain apart from each other. When the world appears, **dharma* and **adharma* make them unite. Conjunction by **dharma* leads to virtue and conjunction by **adharma* leads to evil.

[165b5] When the basic atoms have been united, they promote growth and various elements appear and construct the world. The Self and the mind also enter into conjunction with and disjunction from the outer elements. After three hundred thousand **koṭi*s have passed, the intermediate destruction is completed and the period of fire(-destruction) arrives. And after a further three hundred [thousand] **koṭi*s have passed, the world disappears completely. **The basic atoms remain apart**

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[53] Cf. *VS* 3.2.4: *prāṇāpānanimeṣonmeṣajīvanamanogatīndriyāntaravikārāḥ sukhaduḥkhe icchādveṣau prayatnaś cety ātmaliṅgāni*.

[54] Paramārtha translates *bhāvanā* as *xiū xí*, "meditation," in accordance with Buddhist terminology.

[55] This is a rare and remarkable statement in that it restricts *dharmādharma* or *adṛṣṭa* to five varieties. It seems to be based on *VS* 5.2.14: *agner ūrdhvajvalanaṃ vāyoś ca tiryakpavanam aṇumanasoś cādyaḥ karmety adṛṣṭakāritāni*.

[56] Cf. *AK* p. 179,23: *antaḥkalpa.*

[57] Cf. *AK* p. 189,1: *tejaḥsaṃvartanī*. Here Vasubandhu enters into criticism of the atomic holism of the Vaiśeṣika, according to which something must remain even at the time of complete destruction of the cosmos.

[58] *běn lín xū* = *paramāṇu*? Paramārtha usually translates *aṇu* as *lín xū*. The meaning of *běn* is "stem, root, origin, source, basis, foundation," which is equivalent to *mūla* in Sanskrit.

> **from each other, and the Self and the mind also remain apart from each other: that is, the Self is temporally emancipated.** After three hundred thousand **koṭi*s have passed, the fire-destruction is completed, and **dharma* and **adharma* make them (i.e., the Self and the mind) united again.
>
> [165b10] Question: Why does fire move upward? Why does wind blow horizontally? Why does earth move downwards?
>
> [165b11] Answer: Fire heats and ripens things. If fire did not move upwards, people could not cook food and drink. And because of having brightness and being dominant in wisdom fire stays above.[59] The omnipotent lord (**īśvara*) is in possession of six realms of existence in the body: that is, the part above the heart is [the realm of] human beings (**manuṣya*) and gods (**deva*), the part between heart and navel [that of] demons (**asura*) and ghosts (**preta*), and the lower part from the navel to the feet [that of] animals (**tiryañc*) and hell creatures (**nāraka*).[60] The human beings, gods and brightness stay above because they possess wisdom. Fire has brightness and is dominant in wisdom and in this way stays above. If wind did not blow horizontally, people could not come and go, like ships on the sea. If wind would go downwards or upwards, ships could not sail. Because wind blows horizontally, coming and going are possible. If earth and water did not stay below, people could not take up their abode. Earth, water and darkness cause delusion, and delusion belongs to the hell creatures and to animals; therefore it stays below. Hells, animals and darkness cause delusion; therefore they stay below. Earth, water and darkness cause delusion; therefore they stay below.
>
> [165b22] Because of seeking emancipation for a long time one observes the four [kinds of] prescribed conduct,[61] that is, moral conduct, donation, asceticism, and meditation. From the four [kinds of] prescribed conduct arises virtue (**dharma*). The man of virtue attains the way to that (i.e., emancipation). From virtue arise pleasure and wisdom. One who has pleasure and wisdom enjoys the pleasant fruits [of his conduct] in heaven. If wisdom later on destroys **dharma* and **adharma*, **the Self eternally separates from the mind and the nine qualities [of the Self] do not arise again. This is eternal emancipation.**[62] If we destroy the view of **ātman* and atoms, this tenet will collapse by itself.

3.3 The *Tarkajvālā* (*TJ*) refers to the classical Vaiśeṣika definition of *mokṣa*. Ejima (1980: 34), in support of Ui's dating,[63] places Bhāvaviveka c. 490–570, Hattori (1994: 706) 510–570. However, because Bhāvaviveka's authorship of the *TJ* is doubted by Ejima it may be a much later work. In any case, Bhāvaviveka quotes from Guṇamati's commentary on the *Madhyamakakārikā* in his *Prajñāpradīpa*.[64]

Cf. *TJ*(*P*) f. 274b7-275a1:[65]

> *blo sogs bdag gi yon tan bcad druṅs nas phyuṅ ba'i rnal 'byor pa yid la bdag ces gnas pa ni bye brag pa yis thar par źes gsuṅs te. blo daṅ bde ba daṅ sdug bsṅal ba daṅ 'dod* [274b8] *ba daṅ źe sdaṅ daṅ 'bad pa daṅ chos daṅ chos ma yin pa daṅ śes pa daṅ 'dus byas śes bya ba ni bdag gi yon tan dgu'o. de dag gi bcad pa ni ma 'oṅs pa na ma 'byuṅ ba daṅ bsags* [275a1] *pa 'gog pa'o.*

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[59] Punctuation marks inserted by the editor should be disregarded here.

[60] This corresponds to the Buddhist theory of "six realms of existence" (*ṣaḍgati*). There is a reference to *devamanuṣyatiryañc* in the *NBh* on *NS* 1.1.7 (p. 21). *PDhS* pp. 280,20-281,3 mentions *brahmendraprajāpati-pitṛmanuṣyaloka*, *pretatiryagyonisthāna* and *devamanuṣyatiryaṅnāraka*. Furthermore, *PDhS* p. 49,14 refers to Prajāpati whose body is the origin of the four *varṇa*s and various beings.

[61] There is no mention of these four types of religious conduct in the *PDhS*. Instead, *PDhS* p. 272,17 mentions sacrifice (*ijya*), studying (*adhyayana*) and donation (*dāna*).

[62] Note that the absence of *ātmamanaḥsaṃyoga* is given as the cause of disappearance of the nine qualities of *ātman*.

[63] Ui 1924-1930: Vol. 5, pp. 148-149.

[64] Kajiyama 1963: 37 and 1964: 106, n. 5; Ejima 1980: 160.

[65] This passage follows upon the section discussed in Hattori 1994. Because elements not found in the *PDhS* are referred to, the author's source may not have been the *PDhS*, but rather some commentary on it.

> The **yogin*, who has completely extirpated the qualities of the Self, such as cognition, etc., firmly fixes the Self on the mind,[66] which is called emancipation by the Vaiśeṣikas. Cognition, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, volition **dharma*, **adharma*, and what is produced together with knowledge (**bhāvanā = śes pa daṅ 'dus byas*) are the nine qualities of the Self. Extirpation of these [qualities] means [their] non-occurrence in the future and the consumption of what has been accumulated.

4.1 Is emancipation in terms of Vaiśeṣika blissful? According to the widely accepted view the answer is definitely "no." However, in the *Guăng băi lùn shì lùn* (*GBLShL*), Dharmapāla mentions some Vaiśeṣikas who maintained emancipation accompanied by eternal bliss. Although there is no extant Vaiśeṣika work that contains an explicit statement about blissful emancipation, this reference assures us of the existence of such a tenet in the sixth century.

Cf. *GBLShL* p. 193b6:

> Next the Vaiśeṣikas make the following assertion: If the causes [of transmigration, such as] pleasure, pain and so on, are uprooted forever, [the Self], abandoning everything, exists in complete solitude (**kaivalya*), and being calm and almighty does nothing and remains in eternal pleasure, which is called emancipation. This kind of emancipation should definitely be admitted, because if [emancipation] were nothing but the extirpation of pain and if the Self did not exist, it would be total annihilation. How could it [then] be called emancipation? And for us emancipation is characterized by freedom from all bondage and by almightiness, and is therefore welcomed with joy by the man of wisdom.

4.2 We know that in the *NBh* on *NS* 1.1.22[67] criticism is voiced against a theory of emancipation accompanied by eternal bliss. This part of the *NBh* has generally been understood as a criticism against the Vedāntic view, probably because of a similar argument found in *NK* pp. 286-287; however, as has been pointed out by Marui (1989: 42), this understanding is doubtful. Several expressions in Vātsyāyana's argument seem to be Vaiśeṣika terms, such as *dharmādharma*, *ātmamanaḥsaṃyoga* and *yogasamādhijadharma*. Further, as will be shown in the next section, the *Nyāyavārttika* (*NV*) on this passage rejects a Vaiśeṣika theory. Dharmapāla's testimony may indicate that the proponents of blissful emancipation criticized by Vātsyāyana belong to a group of the Vaiśeṣika.

4.3 When Uddyotakara criticizes the theory of blissful emancipation, he obviously denounces the Vaiśeṣika because he refers to the peculiar Vaiśeṣika term *samavāya* and the theory of *saṃyoga* as conveyed in *VS* 1.1.15: *dravyāśrayy aguṇavān saṃyogavibhāgeṣv akāraṇam anapekṣa iti guṇalakṣaṇam*.[68] It is noteworthy that he presents *kaivalyavirodha* as a decisive reason for the denial of eternal pleasure.

4.4 We cannot know for certain whether the classical Vaiśeṣika definition of *mokṣa* was formulated in order to reject emancipation with eternal bliss, but it appears certain that once the classical definition had been established *kaivalya*[69] was understood in line with this definition and it became difficult to reconcile *kaivalya* and eternal bliss, as attempted by the opponents mentioned by Dharmapāla (cf. 4.1). In this respect it is interesting to note that *santoṣasukha* and *paramārthadarśanajaṃ sukham* are mentioned in the *PDhS*[70]: they are produced just

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[66] The relation of Self and mind is inverted; see *VS* 5.2.17.

[67] *NBh* pp. 33-37.

[68] *NV* p. 81,11: *yadi manyase – ātmamanaḥsaṃyogo jñānasya kāraṇam iti, tasya tarhy apekṣākāraṇaṃ vaktavyam. na hi dravyaguṇakarmasv ārabdhavyeṣu saṃyogo nirapekṣaṃ kāraṇam iti. ātmamanaḥsaṃyogaḥ sukhāpekṣo jñānakāraṇam iti cet, na, kaivalyavirodhāt.*

[69] *NBhūṣ* p. 594; *NK* pp. 286,3-287,15.

[70] *PDhS* pp. 281,23 and 282,2.

before emancipation is attained, but it is not clearly stated when they disappear. We also find a reference to *prīti* in the last sentence of Akalaṅka's citation given above (cf. 2.7), and here also the problem of the time at which it fades away remains unaddressed. Is it possible that these are rare cases of statements on blissful emancipation? At any rate, Dharmapāla's testimony assures us that there existed such a theory among the Vaiśeṣikas in the sixth century. It probably survived for some time in the classical period and exerted some influence, as observable in the case of Bhāsarvajña, but went out of use with the prevalence of the notion of stone-like *kaivalya*,[71] which is compatible with the classical definition of *mokṣa*.

Postscript

Without Prof. Preisendanz's correction of my English expression and illuminating remarks on my argument, this article would not have been completed in the present form. I wish to express my deep appreciation for her kindness.

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CS *Carakasaṃhitā*. Ed Vaidya Jadavaji Trikamji Acarya. Bombay 1941.
TAV *Tattvārthavārttikam of Śrī Akalaṅkadeva*. Ed. Mahendra Kumar Jain. Delhi 1993.
TJ(D) *Tarkajvālā* of Bhāvaviveka. Tibetan Tripiṭaka, sDe-dge ed. Dbu ma Vol. 3 (Dsa). Tokyo 1977.
TJ(P) *Tarkajvālā* of Bhāvaviveka. Tibetan Tripiṭaka, Peking ed. Vol. 96. Tokyo/ Kyoto 1957.
NK *Nyāyakandalī*. See *PDhS*.
NBh *Nyāyabhāṣya*. See *NS* (*POS*).
NBhūṣ *Nyāyabhūṣaṇa*. Ed. Svami Yogindrananda. Varanasi 1968. (Ṣaḍdarśanaprakāśānagranthamālā 1)
NM *Nyāyamañjarī*. Ed. Gaurinath Shastri. 3 vols. Varanasi 1982-1984.
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PDhS *Padārthadharmasaṃgrahaḥ* (*Praśastapādabhāṣyam*). Ed. Vindhyeshvari Prasad Dvivedin. Benares 1895 (reprint Delhi 1984). (Vizianagram Sanskrit Series 4)
MBh *Mahābhārata*. Ed. V.S. Sukthankar et al. 19 vols. Poona 1933-1966.
Vyo *Vyomavatī*. Ed. Gaurinath Shastri. 2 vols. Varanasi 1983-1984.

[71] *NM* Vol. 3, p. 2,12; *NK* p. 287,1; *Naiṣadhīyacarita* 17.74-75.

VS *Vaiśeṣikasūtra of Kaṇāda with the Commentary of Candrānanda*. Ed. Jambuvijaya Muni. Baroda 1961. (Gaekwad's Oriental Series 136)
VSU *Vaiśeṣikasūtra-Upaskāra*. Ed. Dhundhiraj Shastri. Varanasi 1923. (Kashi Sanskrit Series 3)
VSC Candrānanda's commentary on the *VS*. See *VS*.
VSR *Vaiśeṣikasūtrarasāyana*, in *Kaṇāda's Vaiśeṣika Darśana with Rasāyana-Commentary*, ed. T. Viraraghavacarya, Madras 1958.
VSV *Vaiśeṣikasūtra-Vyākhyā*, in *Vaiśeṣikadarśana of Kaṇāda with an Anonymous Commentary*, ed. Anantalal Thakur, Darbhanga 1957.
ŚBh *Śāṅkarabhāṣya on the Brahmasūtra*. Ed J.L. Shastri. Delhi 1980.

2) Chinese primary sources

DL *Dài zhì dù lùn* (**Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśa* attributed to Nāgārjuna). Taisho No. 1509.
GBLShL *Guǎng bǎi lùn shì lùn* (Dharmapāla's commentary on the *Catuḥśataka*). Taisho No. 1571.
SXL *Suí xiāng lùn* (Guṇamati's **Lakṣaṇānusāraśāstra*). Taisho No. 1641.
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Elliot M. Stern

Padārthasaṅgrahaṭīkā of Vyomaśiva: A Partial Reconstruction of Folia 2-3a*

While visiting the library at the Oriental Research Institute, Mysore, early in 1982, I had the good fortune to see the ancient manuscript of *Padārthasaṅgrahaṭīkā* (*PASṬ*). A copy of this manuscript made early in the twentieth century and now kept in the collection of Sarasvati Bhavan in Varanasi, served as the source for the first edition, and was also consulted for the second edition. Notice of the Mysore manuscript was published on page 395 in the *Catalogue of Sanskrit Manuscripts in the Government Oriental Library*, *Mysore* (Mysore: printed at the Government Branch Press, 1922). The manuscript is number C1575 in the collection. The material is thick handmade paper that has been colored yellow. The extant folios are 2-9, 11-59, and 61-257. Folios 1, 10, and 60 are missing. The folios are, except for folio 2, about 8.5 cm long by 28 cm wide. Folio 2, now about 8 cm long and 25.3 cm wide, was probably the same size as the others, when in its original condition. There are nine lines on each side. Full lines (lines 1-3 and 7-9) are generally 68-70 characters. Lines 4-6 have a *phullikā* somewhat left of center. The center of the *phullikā* is colored with red powder on both sides of each folio; a black ink design appears on the b side of each folio. No hole was ever pierced to run a cord through. The left and right margins are marked by thin double black lines. Similar lines mark the margins for the *phullikā*; these lines often extend down to line 7. The b sides of the folios are numbered at line 5 both on the left and right. Pratīkas are underlined by red wax pencil or marked with red powder. The colophon on folio 257a states that the manuscript was completed in Varanasi on Wednesday, the fourth day in the bright fortnight of Māgha, Saṃvat 1445. This date corresponds to 1 January 1389 CE.

At some time before the manuscript was copied in the early twentieth century, black ink was spilled on the manuscript. The ink spill caused considerable damage to the text of folio 2 (especially side a), and folio 3. A partly unsuccessful attempt was made to remove or erase spilled ink. Writing and the prepared surface of the paper on which it lay have been lifted off, especially on folio 2a. There is a hole in the paper on the left side of folio 2 at lines 4 and 5 on either side. The reduced size of folio 2 is probably in some way a consequence of the accidental spilling. It seems likely, as well, that the total loss of folio 1 may be attributed to this event. While there is some evidence of the ink spill elsewhere in the manuscript, it seems unlikely that the ink spill is a significant factor in the loss of folios 10 and 60.

The text presented below falls into two sections. In the first section, Vyomaśiva, while arguing for the purposefulness of the Vaiśeṣika, and so on, gives an account of circumstances leading to the composition of the *Vaiśeṣikasūtrāṇi*, and then those leading to Praśastapāda's composing *Padārthadharmasaṅgraha* (*PADhS*). The text of this section is very much disturbed, as many characters are lost both at the beginning and end of most lines on folio 2a. I have included this section, because it is now possible to make a few improvements in the readable portions, and to estimate the number of characters lost in each of the gaps. I have

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brought attention to comparable material found elsewhere, and, in one instance, have found a cited passage that may have been drawn from Vyomaśiva's work.

The second section is the beginning of Vyomaśiva's exposition of *mokṣa*. A careful examination of the manuscript, considerably aided by comparison with freely rendered versions of the text found in Abhayadevasūri's *Tattvabodhavidhāyinī* (*TBV*), and Prabhācandra's *Prameyakamalamārṭāṇḍa* (*PKM*) and *Nyāyakumudacandra* (*NKC*), allows a nearly complete restoration of this section. The passages from *TBV*, a collation of substantially identical *PKM* and *NKC* passages, and passages from *PKM* appear on the odd pages facing the source text, together with other testimonia, such as the *Nyāyakandalī* (*NK*), the *Nyāyavārttika* (*NV*), the *Nyāyasudhā* (*NSu*), the above mentioned *PADhS* and *PASṬ*, and the *Vākyapadīyapaddhati* (*VPP*). I have frequently noted readings from *TBV* in the variants of the text, as it reads, in general, as an abridged near quotation of *PASṬ*. I have presented the text up to the end of the argument at folio 3b4, even though folio 3b is fully readable.

Curled brackets {} indicate damaged portions of the manuscript. Within the curled brackets, I have indicated an estimate of the number of characters that would fit, or suggested a partial reconstruction plus an estimate of the additional characters that would fit, or a full reconstruction. Square brackets [] supply missing characters. Angle brackets < > enclose folio and line numbers.

The manuscript generally has no punctuation, aside from the *daṇḍa* used at the end of recognized half-verses. Punctuation in the reconstruction is, accordingly, an editorial addition.

The use of spaces in the roman transcription of the reconstruction follows the conventions for spacing in a printed *devanāgarī* text. These conventions avoid the visual isolation of the effects of *sandhi* and the creation of unpronounceable visual units, that are characteristics of the prevalent styles of roman transcription. The absence of *avagraha* reflects its absence in this and most other manuscripts, and an understanding that the *avagraha* in Sanskrit texts is merely a prevalent editorial convention.

Abbreviations and Bibliography

ChU — *Chāndogyopaniṣat*, in *Chāndogyopaniṣat Ānandagirikṛtaṭīkāsaṃvalitaśāṅkarabhāṣyasametā*, ed. Kashinath Shastri Agashe, Poona 1934.

TVB — *Tattvabodhavidhāyinī*, in *Ācāryasiddhasenadivākarapraṇītaṃ Sanmatitarkaprakaraṇam Jainaśvetāmbararājagacchīyapradyumnasūriśiṣyatarkapañcānanaśrīmadabhayadevasūrinirmitayā Tattvabodhavidhāyinyā Vyākhyayā Vibhūṣitam*, ed. Sukhlal Sanghavi and Becardas Dosi, Vol. 1, Ahmedabad 1980.

DBhP — *Devībhāgavatapurāṇam*. Ed. Pushpendra Kumar. Delhi 1986.

NK — *Nyāyakandalī*, in *Prasaśastapādabhāṣya* (*Padārthadharmasaṅgraha*) *with Commentary Nyāyakandalī by Srīdhara Bhatta along with Hindi Translation*, ed. Durgadhara Jha, Varanasi 1977.

NKC — *Nyāya Kumud Chandra of Śrīmat Prabhāchandrāchārya*. Ed. Mahendra Kumar. Vol. 2. Bombay 1941.

NBh — *Nyāyabhāṣya*, see *NSū*.

NV	*Nyāyavārttika*, see *NSū*.
NSu	*Nyāyasudhā*: *A Commentary on Tantravārtika by Paṇḍit Someśwara Bhaṭṭa*. Ed. Mukunda Sastri. Benares 1901-1909.
NSū	*Nyāyasūtra*, in *Nyāyadarśanam*, ed. Taranatha Nyaya-Tarkatirtha and Amarendramohan Tarkatirtha, 2 vols., Kyoto 1982 (repr. of the Calcutta Sanskrit Series edition).
PADhS	*Padārthadharmasaṅgraha*, see *PASṬ*.
PASṬ	*Padārthasaṅgrahaṭīkā* or *Vyomavatī of Vyomaśivācārya*. Ed. Gaurinath Sastri. 2 vols. Varanasi 1983, 1984.
PKM	*Prameyakamal Martand by Shri Prabha Chandra*. Ed. Mahendra Kumar Shastri. Bombay 1941.
Bṛ	*Bṛhatī*, in *Bṛhatī of Prabhākara Miśra ... with the Ṛjuvimalā Pañcikā of Śālikanātha*, ed. S. Subrahmanya Sastri, Part 3, Madras 1962.
BhG	*Bhagavadgītā*, in *The Mahābhārata*, critically ed. by V.S. Sukthankar and others, Vol. 7, ed. Shripad Krishna Belvalkar, Poona 1947.
VPP	*Vākyapadīyapaddhati*, in *Vākyapadīya of Bhartṛhari with the Vṛtti and Paddhati of Vṛṣabhadeva*, ed. K.A. Subramania Iyer, Poona 1966.
ŚV	*Ślokavārttika of Śrī Kumārila Bhaṭṭa with the Commentary Nyāyaratnākara of Śrī Pārthasārathi Miśra*. Ed. Svami Dvarikadas Shastri, Varanasi 1978.

(This space has been left blank to avoid awkward page turns.)

Reconstruction

<2a1> {3-4 characters}*stamiti viśiṣṭānantaryapratipādanācca tadabhāvanirāsaḥ | ataḥśabdopi*[1] *hetau vartamāno viśiṣṭadeśakulaprasūtamaviplutena brāhmaṇenāvi*{*plutabrāhmaṇyāṃ* plus 4-5 characters} <2a2> {about 8 characters plus *pade*}*śāvasitādupajāta*[2]*śuśrūṣāśravaṇagrahaṇadhāraṇohāpohatattvābhiniveśa*[*ṃ*] *tadantevāsinamāheti | tathā ca sāṅgāṃścaturo vedānāva*[*r*]*ta*{*yataḥ krameṇedaṃ*}[3] <2a3> {*brāhmaṇakhaṇḍa*}[4]*lakamājagāma*[5] "*na ha vai saśarīrasya priyāpriyayorapahatirasti aśarīraṃ vāva santaṃ na priyāpriye spṛśataḥ*"[6] *iti | vākyādaśarīrāvasthāṃ sukha*{7 characters} <2a4> {10 characters[7] plus *tas*}*ya kaṇādadarśanamabhavat | taṃ ca yathopapannaṃ bhagavānadhikāriṇaṃ dṛṣṭvā samādhibalādekasminnaṇāvutpannaṣaṭ*[8]*padārthata*{*ttvajñānaḥ* plus 3 characters} <2a5> {10-11 characters}*tsūtrakaraṇe pravṛttaḥ | tadarthasiddhaye sūtrasandarbhasyaivātisaṅkṣiptatvā*[*d*]*durbodhatayā cāsmadādestattvajñānaṃ na syāditi praśastapāda*{7 characters} <2a6> {10-11 characters plus *brāhma*[9]}*ṇatvādivadapratibhāsanādadhikāryabhāvaḥ | tadasat upadeśavyaṅgyatvāt dravyādiṣviva kṛta*{*samaya* plus 12 characters} <2a7> {10-11 characters plus *brāhmaṇoyaṃ*[10]} *brāhmaṇoyamiti jñāne paścādbhāvibādhakānupapatteḥ pramāṇatayā śiṣṭapadārthādhikārisiddhe nirviṣayatvena* {13 characters} <2a8> {7 characters}*ṇa*{5 characters}*bhāvaśca nirasta eva tadabhidhānāt* {2 characters} *prayojanopanyāsāttadabhāvaśceti | atha kiṃ punastattvajñānaṃ kiṃ vā niḥśreyasamiti |* {11 characters} <2a9> {11-12 characters} *navānāmātmaviśeṣaguṇānāmatyantocchittirna dharmārthakāmāḥ teṣāmanyasādhanasādhyatvāt atha niḥśreyasāstitve kiṃ pramāṇa*{*mastī* plus 9 characters} <2b1> {3-4 characters}*vi | tathā hi navānāmātmaviśeṣaguṇānāṃ santānotyantamucchidyate santānatvādyo*[11] *yaḥ*[12] *santānaḥ sa sotyantamucchidyamāno dṛṣṭaḥ*[13] *yathā pradīpasantānastathā cāyaṃ santānastasmā*<2b2>{*datyanta*}*mucchidyata iti | santānatvasya ca vyāptyā buddhyādiṣu*[14] *sambhavāt pakṣadharmatayāsiddhatvābhāvaḥ*[15] *tatsamānadharmaṇi dharmiṇi*[16] *pradīpādāvupalambhādaviruddhatvam | na ca vipakṣe paramāṇvādāvasti san*<2b3>{*tānatva*}*mityanaikāntikatvābhāvaḥ*[17] *| viparītārthopasthāpakayoḥ pratyakṣāgamayoranupalambhānna kālātyayāpadiṣṭaḥ | na cāyaṃ satpratipakṣa*[18] *iti pañcarūpatvātpramāṇam |*

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[1] Ms.: *tadabhāvaḥ nirāsaḥ satachabdopi*.

[2] Ms.: *śāvasitāyādupajātaṃ*.

[3] The blank space appears long enough for 9 characters; the conjecture is 6.

[4] The blank space appears long enough for 7 characters; the conjecture is 5.

[5] Ms.: *tvaṃlakamājagāma*. The word *khaṇḍalaka*, signifying a small text unit, is attested twice in *VPP* 1.2 (p. 15.10-11): *khaṇḍalakadvayena*; also attested in *Bṛ* 1.4.1 (Vol. 3, p. 204.8): *bhāṣyakhaṇḍalakam*, and *VPP* 1.8 (p. 30.22): *granthakhaṇḍalakāḥ*.

[6] Ms.: *santarna priyāpriye na sāśate*. The quotation is a variant reading of *ChU* 8.12.1 (p. 491.11-13).

[7] For *vākyādaśarīrāvasthāṃ sukha*{7 characters} <2a4> {10 characters}, the edition reads *vākyād aśarīrāvasthā*[*yā*]*ṃ sukhaduḥkham aniśaṃ pratipadyate …* . I am unable to confirm any reading beyond *sukha* in the manuscript microfilm.

[8] Ms.: *vutpaṇavaṣaḍa*.

[9] *h* portion of *hma* barely visible.

[10] Ms.: *ṇoyaṃ* faintly visible.

[11] Ms.: *sa* X X *tvādyo*. Xs represent space for two characters lost to spilled ink.

[12] Ms.: *śvaḥ* (?).

[13] *TaBoVi*: *so 'tyantam ucchidyate*.

[14] *ṣu* is almost entirely hidden under spilled ink.

[15] For *siddhatvābhāvaḥ*; *TaBoVi*: *siddhatābhāvaḥ*.

[16] *PASṬ*: *tatsamānadharmaṇi*; *TaBoVi*: *tatsamānadharmiṇi dharmiṇi*. Conjecture.

[17] *TaBoVi*: *paramāṇvādāv astīty anaikāntikatvābhāvaḥ*.

[18] Ms.: *sapratipakṣa*.

Testimonia

(*PASṬ* Vol. 1, pp. 13.26-14.4) <9a9> *tad evaṃ parāparagurunamaskārād yato 'ntarāyapradhvaṃso yato vāntevāsī yathoktalakṣaṇasampannaḥ | ato 'nantaram eva pratipakṣakriyānantaritaḥ padārthadharmasaṅ*<9b1>*grahaḥ pravakṣyata iti | na ca* [*k*]*tvāpratyayād eva viśiṣṭānantaryapratipattiḥ | tasya hi samānakartṛkatve sati pūrvakālabhāvitvamātre bhāvāt | tathā hi bhojanānantaraṃ śayanādikriyāvya*<9b2>*vadhāne 'pi bhuktvā vrajatīti prayogo bhavaty eva | atra ceśvarapraṇāmānantaram eva muner namaskāras tadanantaram eva pravacanakriyeti | na ca*[1] *pratipakṣakriyāvyudāso*[2] *'vayavacalanāder bhāvād iti*.

(*NKC* pp. 768.9-10 and 772.1) *aviplutena brāhmaṇenāviplutāyāṃ brāhmaṇyām utpanno brāhmaṇaḥ*.

(*VPP* 1.124, p. 203.23-27) *evaṃ hy āha tasya sāṅgāṃś caturo vedān āvartayataḥ krameṇedaṃ brāhmaṇam ājagāma* "*na ha vā aśarīrasyātmanopahatir asti*[3] *| aśarīraṃ vāva santaṃ na priyāpriye spṛśataḥ*" *| iti*.

(*PASṬ* Vol. 1, p. 48.4-13) *atha nāli*<31b7>*keradvīpavāsinaḥ kasmād ekākāratāpratibhāso na bhavatīti | vyañjakānupalabdheḥ | yathā hi guṇatvādisāmānyaṃ nālikeradvīpavāsināṃ vyañjakānupalambhā*<31b8>*d vidyamānam api nopalabhyate tathā bhūtatvam apīti | kim asya tarhi vyañjakam iti | brāhmaṇatvasyevopadeśaḥ*[4] *| yathā hi brāhmaṇatvam upadeśād vijñāyate tadva*<31b9>*d bhūtatvam apīti | athopadeśa evāstv alaṃ sāmānyakalpanayā*[5] *yathānyair uktaṃ bhūtatvaṃ bhūtaśabdavācyatvam ity abhidhānābhidheyaniyamaniyogapratipattiḥ*[6] *sā ca* <32a1> *śabdād vyavahārato*[7] *vānvayavyatirekābhyāṃ bhavatīti | etac cāsat | abādhyamānānugatajñānasya durnimittāntarakalpanāyāṃ dravyatvāder apy a*<32a2>*sattvaṃ syāt | asti ca kṛtasamayasya bhūtaṃ bhūtam iti jñānaṃ brāhmaṇo brāhmaṇa iti ca dravyaṃ dravyam iti ca jñānavat tato 'sti bhūtatvaṃ sāmānyam iti*.

(*TBV* p. 150.8-13) *navānām ātmaviśeṣaguṇānāṃ santāno 'tyantam ucchidyate santānatvād yo yaḥ santānaḥ sa so 'tyantam ucchidyate yathā pradīpasantānas tathā cāyaṃ santānas tasmād atyantam ucchidyata iti | santānatvasya ca vyāptyā buddhyādiṣu sambhavāt pakṣadharmatayāsiddhatābhāvaḥ | tatsamānadharmiṇi dharmiṇi pradīpādāv upalambhād aviruddhatvam | na ca vipakṣe paramāṇvādāv astīty anaikāntikatvābhāvaḥ | viparītārthopasthāpakayoḥ pratyakṣāgamayor anupalambhān na kālātyayāpadiṣṭaḥ | na cāyaṃ satpratipakṣa iti pañcarūpatvāt pramāṇam*.

(*PKM* p. 307.21-27 = *NKC* p. 824.1-5) *navānām ātmaviśeṣaguṇānāṃ santāno 'tyantam ucchidyate santānatvāt pradīpasantānavat | na cāyam asiddho hetuḥ pakṣe vartamānatvāt*[8] *| nāpi viruddhaḥ sapakṣe pradīpādau sattvāt | nāpy anaikāntikaḥ pakṣasapakṣavad vipakṣe paramāṇvādāv apravṛtteḥ | nāpi kālātyayāpadiṣṭo viparītārthopasthāpakayoḥ pratyakṣāgamayor atrāsambhavāt | nāpi satpratipakṣaḥ pratipakṣasādhakānumānāsambhavāt*[9].

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[1] Ms.: *cā*.

[2] Ms.: *vyudāvo-*.

[3] The unique attestation *aśarīrasyātmanopahatir asti* is a problem. In the editions, and other testimonia, only two readings seem to be known: *saśarīrasya priyāpriyayor apahatir asti*, Vyomaśiva's reading, which appears to be the reading favored by Naiyāyika and Vaiśeṣika authors and reported as their reading by their critics and *saśarīrasya sataḥ priyāpriyayor apahatir asti*, which is the reading favored by Śaṅkara, his followers, and the editions. The only other well attested variant in the text extract is the frequent reading in manuscript and edition of *na vai* for *na ha vai*. I intend to discuss the relationship between the *VPP* testimonium and *Padārthasaṅgrahaṭīkā* in a future publication.

[4] Ms.: *brāhmaṇatvasyaivāpadeśaḥ*.

[5] Ms.: *kalpanāyā*.

[6] See *NBh* 1.2.12 (Vol. 1, p. 393.11-12): *prasiddhaś ca loke śabdārthasambandho 'bhidhānābhidheyaniyamaniyogaḥ | asyābhidhānasyāyam artho 'bhidheya iti samānaḥ sāmānyaśabdasya viśeṣo viśeṣaśabdasya*.

[7] Ms.: *śabdādvyavahārāto*.

[8] *PKM: pravartamānatvāt*.

[9] *PKM: pratipakṣasādhanāsambhavāt*.

(Reconstruction)

atha[1] *nirhetukavinā*<2b4>{*śapra*}*ti*{*ṣe*}*dhāt santānocchede heturvācyaḥ yataḥ samucchidyata iti | sa tūkta eva tattvajñānaṃ niḥśreyasaheturiti nirdeśāt | tacca*[2] *tattvajñānamaśakyatvānna prativyaktyapekṣaṃ kiṃ tu* <2b5> {*dravyādipadārthala*}[3]*kṣaṇā*{*pekṣam*} | *tathā hi dravyādilakṣaṇalakṣiteṣūtpadyate tattvajñānamiti | atha tattvajñānasya niḥśreyasakāraṇatvamastu upajāta*[4][*ta*]*ttvajñānāstvanantaramevāpavṛjye*<2b6>{*ran tadanuśā*}[5]*sanasyāsambhave asmadādīnāṃ tattvajñānānupapattiḥ | atha yogajadharmā*[*d*]*upajāta*[*tat*]*tvajñānosmadādestattvajñānasampādanāya kaṇāda*[*ḥ*] *sūtrāṇi karotītyavadhā*<2b7>{*raṇamabhi*}*pretaṃ | na tarhi tattvajñānaṃ niḥśreyasakāraṇaṃ satyapyabhāvāt | naiṣa doṣaḥ | viśiṣṭatattvajñānasya niḥśreyasakāraṇatvābhyupagamāt | tathā hi upajātepi*[6] *śraute tattvajñānesmadādīnāṃ* <2b8> {*na niḥ*}*śreyasaṃ yogābhyāsajanitatattvajñānasyāsambhavāt | śraute hi tattvajñāne samutpanne yogābhyāse pravartamānasyābhyāsavaśādātmanyaśeṣaviśeṣāliṅgite*[7] *tattvajñānamupajātaṃ niḥ*<2b9>{*śreya*} *sakāraṇamiti | tathā hyupalabdhaṃ*[8] *samyagjñānasya mithyājñānanivṛttau sāmarthyaṃ śuktikādāviti | na ca*[9] *jñānasya jñānāntaravirodhitvāduttarakālabhāvinā mithyājñānenāpi samyagjñā*<3a1>*nasya virodhaḥ sambhavatyeva yadi nāma santānocchittirvivakṣiteti*[10] *| yathā hi samya*[*g*]*jñānānmithyājñānasya*[11] *santānocchedo naivaṃ*[12] *mithyājñānāt samyagjñānasyeti*[13] *nivṛtte ca mithyājñāne tanmūlatvā*<3a2>*drāgādayo naśyanti*[14] *kāraṇābhāve*[15] *kāryasyānutpādāditi*[16] *| rāgādyabhāve ca tatkāryā pravṛttirvyāvarttate | tadabhāve*[17] *dharmādharmayoranutpattiḥ | ārabdhakāryayoścopabhogātprakṣaya iti |*

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[1] Ms: *atha*; *TBV*: *na ca*.

[2] Ms.: *nirdeśāstacca*; correction.

[3] No significant trace is left of the characters. The prepared surface and writing on it have been removed. Space for 6-7 characters.

[4] Ms.: *niḥśreyasakāraṇatvestamupajāta-*; there is a mark above *sta*.

[5] Ms: *evāpapramṛdya*<2b6>{5 characters}. The actual ms. reading may be taken to have counted as five characters, if *anusvāraḥ* was used for final *-n* of *apavṛjyeran*.

[6] Ms.: *vi upajātevipi*.

[7] Ms.: *aśeṣaviśeṣāliṅgitetyaṃ*.

[8] Ms.: *tathā hyupalabdhaṃ*; *TBV*: *upalabdhaṃ ca*.

[9] For *na ca*, ms. originally reads *saya*; this is altered in margin to *samyak*; *TBV*: *na ca*.

[10] Ms.: *yadi sāmanasana santānocchittirvivakṣiteti*. Conjectural reading. Alternatively, *sāmanasana* is perhaps to be explained as a false start for *santāno-*. *TBV* and *PKM* appear to support ignoring these syllables. *NKC* lacks testimonial to this line.

[11] *TBV* omits *mithyājñāna*.

[12] *TBV*, *PKM*: *naivaṃ*; ms.: *naiva*.

[13] Ms.: *samyagjñānasyeti*; *TBV*: *samyagjñānasantānasya tasya satyārthatvena balīyastvāt*; *PKM*: *samyagjñānasantānasya asya satyārthatvena balīyastvāt*.

[14] Ms.: *naśyanti*; *TBV*: *na bhavanti*.

[15] Ms.: *kāraṇābhāvena*.

[16] *TBV* omits *iti*.

[17] *TBV*: *tadabhāve ca*.

(Testimonia)

(*TBV* p. 150.14-15) *na ca nirhetukavināśapratiṣedhāt santānocchede hetur vācyaḥ yataḥ samucchidyata iti tattvajñānasya viparyayajñānavyavacchedakrameṇa niḥśreyasahetutvena pratipādanāt.*

(*PKM* p. 308.1-3 = *NKC* p. 824.6-8) *nanu santānocchedarūpe 'pi mokṣe hetur vācyo*[1] *nirhetukavināśānabhyupagamād ity apy acodyaṃ tattvajñānasya viparyayajñānavyavacchedakrameṇa niḥśreyasahetutvopapatteḥ*[2].

(*NV* 1.1.1 [p. 67.7-8]) *yadi tattvajñānād apavargaḥ syāt śāstrasampradāyo vicchidyeta yasya yadā tattvajñānaṃ vṛttaṃ sa tadaivāpavṛkta iti.*

(*TBV* p. 150.15-20) *upalabdhaṃ ca samyagjñānasya mithyājñānanivṛttau sāmarthyaṃ śuktikādau | na ca mithyājñānenāpy uttarakālabhāvinā samyagjñānasya virodhaḥ sambhavati santānocchitter vivakṣitatvāt | yathā hi samyagjñānān mithyājñānasantānocchedo naivaṃ mithyājñānāt samyagjñānasantānasya tasya satyārthatvena balīyastvāt | nivṛtte ca mithyājñāne tanmūlatvād rāgādayo na bhavanti kāraṇābhāve kāryasyānutpādād rāgādyabhāve ca tatkāryā pravṛttir vyāvartate tadabhāve ca dharmādharmayor anutpattiḥ | ārabdhakāryayoś copabhogāt prakṣaya iti.*

(*PKM* p. 308.3-13 = *NKC* p. 824.8-11) *dṛṣṭaṃ ca samyagjñānasya mithyājñānocchede śuktikādau sāmarthyam | nanu*[3] *cātattvajñānasyāpi tattvajñānocchede sāmarthyaṃ dṛśyate jñānasya jñānāntaravirodhitvena mithyājñānotpattau samyagjñānocchedapratīter ity apy ayuktaṃ yato nānayor ucchedamātram abhipretam | kiṃ tarhi santānocchedaḥ | yathā ca samyagjñānān mithyājñānasantānocchedo naivaṃ mithyājñānāt samyagjñānasantānasyāsya satyārthatvena balīyastvāt | nivṛtte ca mithyājñāne tanmūlā rāgādayo na sambhavanti kāraṇābhāve kāryānutpādāt | rāgādyabhāve tatkāryā manovākkāyapravṛttir vyāvartate | tadabhāve ca*[4] *dharmādharmayor anutpattiḥ | ārabdhaśarīrendriyaviṣayakāryayos tu sukhaduḥkha*[5] *phalopabhogāt prakṣayaḥ.*

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[1] *NKC*: *kaścid dhetur vaktavyaḥ.*

[2] *PKM*: *ity apy acodyaṃ tattvajñānasya viparyayajñānavyavacchedakrameṇa niḥśreyasahetutvopapatteḥ*; *NKC*: *iti ca na śaṅkanīyaṃ tattvajñānasyaiva taddhetutvāt | tat khalu viparyayajñānavyavacchedakrameṇa niḥśreyasahetuḥ.*

[3] *NKC* omits *nanu ... balīyastvāt.*

[4] *NKC*: *tadvyāvṛttau.*

[5] *PKM*: *sukhaduḥkha*; *NKC*: *sukhādi.*

(Reconstruction)

atha sañ<3a3>*citayornirodhaḥ*[1] *katham | tattvajñānādeveti | tathoktam*

yathaidhāṃsi samiddhognirbhasmasātkurute kṣaṇāt |
jñānāgniḥ sarvakarmāṇi bhasmasātkurute tathā ||[2]

iti | nanūpabhogādeva[3] *prakṣaya ityapyāga*<3a4>*mosti yathoktam*

nābhuktaṃ kṣīyate karma kalpakoṭiśatairapi |
avaśyamanubhoktavyaṃ kṛtaṃ karma śubhāśubham ||[4]

tathā ca viruddhārthatvādubhayoḥ kathaṃ prāmāṇyamiti | bhogācca prakṣayenu<3a5>*mānamapyasti*[5] *| pūrvakarmāṇyupabhogādeva kṣīyante karmatvāt | yadyatkarma tattadupabhogādeva kṣīyate yathārabdhaśarīraṃ karma tathā cāmūni karmāṇi tasmādupabhogādeva kṣīyante iti | u*<3a6>*pabhogena ca prakṣaye karmāntarasyāvaśyambhāvātsaṃsārānucchedaḥ | tadasat | samādhibalādutpannatattvajñāno hi karmaṇāṃ sāmarthyamayaṃ*[6] *viditvā yugapaccharīrāṇi nirmāya*[7] *bhogā*<3a7>*{nupabhuṅ}kta iti | na tu karmāntarotpattiḥ | mithyājñānajanitānusandhānasya*[8] *sahakāriṇobhāvāt |*

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[1] The *rni* is partly effaced here, and unclear. But comparison with *PADhS* Vol. 2, p. 236.1 and *PASṬ* Vol. 2, p. 236.25 assures the reading.

[2] *BhG* 4.37 with variant *kṣaṇāt* for *'rjuna*.

[3] For *nanūpabhogādeva ... śubhāśubham*, *TBV* reads: *athopabhogādapi prakṣaye nābhuktaṃ kṣīyate karma kalpakoṭiśatairapītyāgamosti*.

[4] Identified as *Devībhāgavata* (*DBhP*) 9.29.69cd-70ab and 9.40.73bc-74ab; v.l. *eva* for *anu-*.

[5] Ms.: *ubhayoḥ kathaṃ prāmāṇyamiti | bhogācca prakṣayenu*<3a5>*mānamapyasti*; *TBV*: *ubhayor ekatrārthe kathaṃ prāmāṇyam | upabhogāc ca prakṣaye 'numānopanyāsam api kurvanti*.

[6] Ms. (not clear): *svasādhyatvamayaṃ*.

[7] Ms.: *nirmāṇaya*. The *ṇa* is possibly marked for deletion.

[8] Ms.: *-sandhānasvasya*; *sva* is an error that appears not to have been stricken.

(Testimonia)

(*TBV* p. 150.21-30) *sañcitayoś ca tayoḥ prakṣayas tattvajñānād eva tad uktam*

yathaidhāṃsi samiddho 'gnir bhasmasātkurute kṣaṇāt |
jñānāgniḥ sarvakarmāṇi bhasmasātkurute tathā ||

athopabhogād api prakṣaye

nābhuktaṃ kṣīyate karma kalpakoṭiśatair api |

ity āgamo 'sti | tathā ca viruddhārthatvād ubhayor ekatrārthe kathaṃ prāmāṇyam | upabhogāc ca prakṣaye 'numānopanyāsam api kurvanti | pūrvakarmāṇy upabhogād eva kṣīyante karmatvād yad yat karma tat tad upabhogād eva kṣīyate yathārabdhaśarīraṃ karma tathā caitat karma tasmād upabhogād eva kṣīyata iti | na copabhogāt prakṣaye karmāntarasyāvaśyaṃ bhāvāt saṃsārānucchedaḥ samādhibalād utpannatattvajñānasyāvagatakarmasāmarthyotpāditayugapadaśeṣaśarīradvārāvāptāśeṣopabhogasya karmāntarotpattinimittamithyājñānajanitānusandhānavikalasya karmāntarotpattyanupapatteḥ.

(*PADhS* Vol. 2, p. 236.1) *sañcitayoś copabhogān nirodhe.*

(*PASṬ* Vol. 2, p. 236.25) *sañcitayoś ca nirodhaḥ.*

(*PKM* p. 308.13-22 = *NKC* pp. 824.11-825.5) *anārabdhatatkāryayor apy avasthitayos tatphalopabhogād eva prakṣayaḥ | tathā cāgamaḥ*

nābhuktaṃ kṣīyate karma kalpakoṭiśatair api |

iti | anumānaṃ ca[1] *pūrvakarmāṇy upabhogād eva kṣīyante karmatvāt prārabdhaśarīrakarmavat*[2] *| na copabhogāt prakṣaye*[3] *karmāntarasyāvaśyaṃ bhāvāt saṃsārānucchedaḥ samādhibalād utpannatattvajñānasyāvagatakarmasāmarthyotpāditayugapadaśeṣaśarīradvārāvāptāśeṣabhogasyopāttakarmaprakṣayāt | bhāvikarmotpattinimittamithyājñānajanitānusandhānavikalatvāc ca saṃsārocchedopapatteḥ | anusandhānaṃ hi rāgadveṣāv anusandhīyate gataṃ cittam ābhyām iti vyutpatteḥ.*

(*PKM* p. 309.1-9) *nanu tattvajñāninām tattvajñānād eva sañcitakarmaprakṣaya ity apy āgamo 'sti*

yathaidhāṃsi samiddho 'gnir bhasmasātkurute kṣaṇāt |
jñānāgniḥ sarvakarmāṇi bhasmasātkurute tathā ||

iti | tathā ca viruddhārthatvād ubhayor ekatrārthe kathaṃ prāmāṇyam ity ayuktaṃ tattvajñānasya sākṣāt tadvināśe vyāpārābhāvāt | tad dhi karmasāmarthyāvagamato 'śeṣaśarīrotpattidvāreṇopabhogāt karmaṇām vināśe vyāpriyata ity agnir ivopacaryate jñānam ity āgamavyākhyānād avirodhaḥ.

(*PASṬ* Vol. 1, p. 156.1-2) <99a6> *yogī khalv ṛddhau prādurbhūtāyāṃ sendriyāṇi śarīrāṇi nirmāya yugapad bhogān upabhuṅkte.*

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[1] *PKM*: *anumānaṃ ca*; *NKC*: *atraivārthe 'numānam.*
[2] *PKM*: *prārabdhaśarīrakarmavat*; *NKC*: *prārabdhaśarīrādikarmavat.*
[3] *PKM*: *prakṣaye*; *NKC*: *tatprakṣaye.*

(Reconstruction)

atha mithyājñānābhāvebhilāṣasyābhāvāt bhogānupapattiḥ | tanna | upabhogaṃ vinā hi karma<3a8> *{ṇāṃ prakṣa}*[1]*yānupapatteḥ | jānannapi tadarthitayā pravartata eva vaidyopadeśādāturavadauṣadhācaraṇe | jñānamapyevamaśeṣa*[2]*śarīrotpattidvāreṇopabhogāt karmaṇāṃ vināśe vyāpārādagniri* <3a9>*vo{pacarya}*[3]*ta iti vyākhyeyaṃ na tu sākṣāt | na caitadvācyaṃ tattvajñāninām karmavināśastattvajñānāditareṣāṃ tūpabhogāditi jñānena karmavināśe prasiddhodāharaṇābhāvāt |*

[1] Space for three syllables: written surface of paper rubbed off.

[2] Ms.: *jñānamapyevaśarīramaśeṣa*; *śarīra* marked for deletion.

[3] Space for three syllables: upper portions of syllables *vopa* barely recognizable; the rest of the written surface of paper rubbed off.

(Testimonia)

(*TBV* p. 150.30-34) *na ca mithyājñānābhāve 'bhilāṣasyaivāsambhavād bhogānupapattis tadupabhogaṃ vinā karmaṇāṃ prakṣayānupapatter jñānato 'pi tadarthitayā pravṛtter vaidyopadeśād āturasyevauṣadhācaraṇe jñānam apy evam aśeṣaśarīrotpattidvāreṇopabhogāt karmaṇāṃ vināśe vyāpārād agnir ivopacaryata iti vyākhyeyaṃ na tu sākṣāt | na caitad vācyaṃ tattvajñāninām karmavināśas tattvajñānād itareṣāṃ tūpabhogād iti jñānena karmavināśe prasiddhodāharaṇābhāvāt.*

(*PKM* p. 308.22-27 = *NKC* p. 825.6-10) *na ca mithyājñānābhāve*[1] *'bhilāṣasyaivāsambhavād bhogānupapattis tadupabhogaṃ vinā hi*[2] *karmaṇāṃ prakṣayānupapattes*[3] *tattvajñānino 'pi karmakṣayārthitayā pravṛtter vaidyopadeśenāturavad auṣadhācaraṇe | yathaiva hy āturasyānabhilaṣite 'py auṣadhācaraṇe vyādhiprakṣayārthaṃ pravṛttis tadvyatirekeṇa tatprakṣayānupapattes tathātrāpi*[4].

(*PKM* p. 309.10-12) *na caitad vācyaṃ tattvajñāninām karmavināśas tattvajñānād itareṣāṃ tūpabhogād iti jñānena karmavināśe prasiddhodāharaṇābhāvāt phalopabhogāt tu tatprakṣaye tatsadbhāvāt.*

[1] *NKC*: *atha mithyājñānabhāve.*
[2] *NKC*: *tan na tadupabhogaṃ vinā.*
[3] *NKC*: *prakṣayānupapattitaḥ.*
[4] *NKC*: *evam atrāpi.*

(Reconstruction)

anye tu mithyājñā<3b1>*najanitasaṃskārasya sahakāriṇobhāvāt vidyamānānyapi karmāṇi na janmāntare śarīrārambhakāṇīti manyante | atra ca kāryavastuno nityatvaṃ syāditi dūṣaṇam | athānāgatayordharmādharmayorutpatti*<3b2>*pratiṣedhe tattvajñānino nityanaimittikānuṣṭhānaṃ tarhi kathaṃ | pratyavāya*[1]*parihārārtham | tathā hi*

nityanaimittikaireva kurvāṇo duritakṣayaṃ |
jñānaṃ ca vimalīkurvannabhyāsena tu pācayet |
abhyāsātpa<3b3>*kvavijñānaḥ kaivalyaṃ labhate naraḥ |*

iti kevalaṃ tu kāmye niṣiddhe ca pravṛttipratiṣedha iti | yadi vā tattvajñāno nityanaimittikānuṣṭhāne na nivartate dharmotpattistathaivābhisandhānāt tatphalasa[*n*]*nyāso* <3b4> *vā | tathā hi sarvakarmaṇāṃ paramagurāvarpaṇamiti śrūyate* "*na vā pravṛttiḥ pratisandhānāya*[2] *hīnakleśasya*"[3] *ityalaṃ |*

[1] Ms.: *pratyavādhaya*, with *dha* marked for deletion.
[2] Ms.: *pratisandhānāhaya*, with *ha* marked for deletion.
[3] *NSū* 4.1.63.

(Testimonia)

(*TBV* pp. 150.34-151.5) *na ca mithyājñānajanitasaṃskārasya sahakāriṇo 'bhāvād vidyamānāny api karmāṇi na janmāntaraśarīrāṇy ārabhanta ity abhyupagamaḥ śreyān anutpāditakāryasya karmalakṣaṇasya kāryavastuno 'prakṣayān nityatvaprasakteḥ | athānāgatayor dharmādharmayor utpattipratiṣedhe tajjñānino nityanaimittikānuṣṭhānaṃ katham | pratyavāyaparihārārtham | tad uktam*

nityanaimittikair eva kurvāṇo duritakṣayam |
jñānaṃ ca vimalīkurvann abhyāsena tu pācayet ||
abhyāsāt pakvavijñānaḥ kaivalyaṃ labhate naraḥ |

kevalaṃ kāmye niṣiddhe ca pravṛttipratiṣedhataḥ | tad uktam

nityanaimittike kuryāt pratyavāyajihāsayā |
mokṣārthī na pravarteta tatra kāmyaniṣiddhayoḥ ||.[1]

(*PKM* pp. 309.13-310.4) *anye tu mithyājñānajanitasaṃskārasya sahakārinobhāvād vidyamānāny api karmāṇi na janmāntare śarīrādyārambhakāṇīti manyante teṣām anutpāditakāryasyādṛṣṭasyāprakṣayān nityatvasaṅgaḥ | anāgatayor dharmādharmayor utpattipratiṣedhe tattvajñānino nityanaimittikānuṣṭhānaṃ kimartham iti cet pratyavāyaparihārārtham | na ca mithyājñānābhāve duṣkarmaṇobhāvāt kasya parihārārthaṃ tad ity abhidhātavyaṃ yato mithyājñānābhāve niṣiddhācaraṇanimittasyaiva pratyavāyasyābhāvo na vihitānanuṣṭhānanimittasya akurvan vihitaṃ karma pratyavāyena lipyate ity āgamāt | tatas tadanuṣṭhānaṃ tatparihārārthaṃ yuktam | tad uktam*

nityanaimittike kuryāt pratyavāyajihāsayā |
mokṣārthī na pravarteta tatra kāmyaniṣiddhayoḥ ||
nityanaimittikair eva kurvāṇo duritakṣayam |
jñānaṃ ca vimalīkurvann abhyāsena tu pācayet ||
abhyāsāt pakvavijñānaḥ kaivalyaṃ labhate naraḥ |
kāmye niṣiddhe ca paraṃ pravṛttipratiṣedhataḥ ||.

(*NK* p. 689.9-12) *yathoktam*

nityanaimittikair eva kurvāṇo duritakṣayam |
jñānaṃ ca vimalīkurvann abhyāsena tu pācayet ||
abhyāsāt pakvavijñānaḥ kaivalyaṃ labhate naraḥ || iti.

(*NSu* pp. 329.33-330.5) *etad evābhipretya bṛhaṭṭīkāyām uktam*

nityanaimittikair eva kurvāṇo duritakṣayam |
jñānaṃ ca vimalīkurvann abhyāsena ca pācayan ||
vairāgyāt pakvavijñānaḥ kaivalyaṃ bhajate naraḥ | iti.

[1] *ŚV*, *Sambandhākṣepaparihāra* 110cd, 110ab.

Toshihiro Wada

Gaṅgeśa on the Meaning of Verbal Suffixes (1)

Introduction

Navya-Nyāya contributed a great deal not only to Indian epistemology and logic, but also to Sanskrit semantics. Gaṅgeśa, who consolidated the system of Navya-Nyāya in the fourteenth century, influenced the semantic arguments made by later scholars in the Mīmāṃsā and Vyākaraṇa schools. We do not yet have a translation of the whole "Chapter on Language" (*Śabdakhaṇḍa*) of his *Tattvacintāmaṇi* (*TC*).[1] However, we have translations of later Navya-Nyāya expositions on language analysis, such as the *Ākhyātaśaktivāda* of Raghunātha,[2] the *Śabdaśaktiprakāśikā* of Jagadīśa,[3] the "Chapter on Language" (*Śabdakhaṇḍa*) of Viśvanātha's *Nyāyasiddhāntamuktāvalī*,[4] and Gadādhara's *Vyutpattivāda*[5] and *Śaktivāda*.[6]

In spite of the importance of the *TC*'s "Chapter on Language", modern scholars have paid more attention to later works. In the present paper, I would like to provide an annotated translation of the "Section on Verbal Suffixes" (*Ākhyātavāda*), which represents only a small part of that chapter.

Text, Commentary and Contents

I have used the Sanskrit text included in *Tattvacintāmaṇi of Gaṅgeśa Upādhyāya*, 4 vols., ed. with the *Āloka* of Jayadeva Miśra and the *Rahasya* of Mathurānātha by Kāmākhyānātha Tarkavāgīśa, Delhi 1990 (Chaukhamba Sanskrit Pratishthan). In this book, the "Section on Verbal Suffixes", which covers the second part of the fourth volume (pp. 819-859), is only accompanied by the *Āloka* of Jayadeva (ca. 1470), and not by the *Rahasya*. I have exhaustively consulted the *Āloka*.

The arguments presented in the "Section on Verbal Suffixes" can be divided as follows:[7]

A. Introduction: Presentation of the Nyāya View (pp. 819,1-820,1)
B. The Mīmāṃsā View (pp. 820,1-826,13)
C. The Nyāya Refutation (pp. 826,13-830,8)
D. The View of the Author of the *Ratnakośa* (pp. 830,9-831,13)
E. The Refutation of the View of the Author of the *Ratnakośa* (pp. 831,143-834,4)
F. The Nyāya View Presented in Detail (pp. 834,4-846,4).

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[1] Potter and Bhattacharyya (1993: 239-312) give a summary of the "Chapter on Language." Of its sections, the *Apūrvavāda* and *Vidhivāda* have been translated by Jha (1986 and 1988), and the *Śabdaprāmāṇyavāda* by Mukhopadhyay (1992).

[2] Translated by Chatterjee (1981).

[3] Explained by Chatterjee (1980) and partly translated by K. Bhattacharya (1979).

[4] Translated by Vattanky (1995). English commentaries are provided by Goswami (1991) and Jha (1993). Since 1990 I have been preparing an annotated translation of this chapter into Japanese; see Wada 1995: 103.

[5] Translated by Bhatta (1990 and 2001).

[6] Translated by Bhatta (1994-1995) and partly by Gerschheimer (1996). Ganeri (1999) explicates the position presented in this small work.

[7] Numbers in brackets refer to page and line numbers in the edition indicated above.

Karin Preisendanz (ed.), *Expanding and Merging Horizons*: *Contributions to South Asian and Cross-Cultural Studies in Commemoration of Wilhelm Halbfass*, Wien: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 2007, pp. 415-429.

Part F includes the views of traditional[8] and new Nyāya as well as Gaṅgeśa's conclusion. The present paper deals with Parts A and B.

In the "Section on Verbal Suffixes", Gaṅgeśa sometimes presents discussions similar to those found in the fifth chapter of Udayana's *Nyāyakusumāñjali* (*NKu*). In the corresponding portions, Gaṅgeśa's discussions are shorter than Udayana's, but his argument is more elaborate. Following my translation, I supply page and line numbers of passages in the *NKu* which correspond to Gaṅgeśa's discussion. It has to be noted, though, that the indicated portions of the *NKu* do not necessarily correspond to divisions of the Sanskrit text of the *NKu*.

Basic Concepts

In order to understand the present annotated translation, it is necessary to have a clear understanding of the concept of *ākhyāta* (verbal suffix), effort (*yatna*, *prayatna*), the signifying function of a word (*vṛtti*), verbal understanding (*śābdabodha*, *śābdajñāna*), and meaning (*artha*). For lack of space, I will give only a brief explanation of these concepts here.

(a) *ākhyāta*

The word *ākhyāta* has two meanings: the finite verb and the personal ending of the finite verb (*tiṄ* suffix).[9] Gaṅgeśa's argument with the Mīmāṃsā and Grammar schools is confined to the analysis of the second of these two meanings. Unless otherwise specified, the suffixes he discusses are those used in the active voice and the present tense. He discusses the meaning of verbal suffixes used in the passive voice in Part F of the "Section on Verbal Suffixes".

Navya-Naiyāyikas including Gaṅgeśa hold that a verbal suffix denotes effort, while Mīmāṃsakas of the Bhāṭṭa School[10] hold that it denotes a productive operation (*bhāvanā*), whether internal or external.[11] Internal productive operation, which Navya-Naiyāyikas regard as effort, occurs in the soul (*ātman*). External productive operation, which occurs in the body and things, is perceived by the senses. Navya-Naiyāyikas generally call this operation "action" (*kriyā*). Grammarians (*pāṇinīya*s) argue that a verbal suffix denotes an agent.[12] Navya-Nai-

[8] It is not clear whether the "traditional Nyāya" dealt with in Part F is the Prācīna-Nyāya or not. It may present the Nyāya view upheld in the period between Udayana and Gaṅgeśa. On the founder of Navya-Nyāya, see Wada 1999. The revised English version of Wada 1999 appeared in 2004.

[9] On these two meanings, see Joshi 1993: 22. He reports that the *Mīmāṃsānyāyaprakāśa* (*MNP*), which was written in the seventeenth century, uses the word in the second sense given above. But the *TC* shows an earlier use of the word in this sense. On *tiṄ* suffixes, see Pāṇini's *Aṣṭādhyāyī* (*P*) 3.4.78 and Abhyankar and Shukla 1977: 197.

[10] The view of the Prābhākara School is briefly referred to and refuted at the end of Part C.

[11] The operation of Vedic injunctions is not discussed here. However, since the Mīmāṃsakas' method of interpreting sentences in common usage is based on their exegesis of Vedic sentences, we have to consider this exegesis in order to follow their arguments as presented in the "Section on Verbal Suffixes". On their exegesis, see Edgerton 1929. The verbal suffixes of Vedic injunctions denote the "word-efficient-force", i.e., productive operation relying on the word itself (*śābdībhāvanā*), which resides in the injunctions themselves. On the "word-efficient-force", see *MNP* No. 4 and Edgerton 1929: 40.

[12] To be precise, in Pāṇini's grammar a verbal suffix denotes the agent, the object, or – in the case of intransitive roots – the action itself. See *P* 3.4.69: *laḥ karmaṇi ca bhāve cākarmakebhyaḥ*. Vasu (1977: 584) translates this *sūtra* as follows: "The tense-affixes called *la* are used in denoting the object and the agent; and after intransitive verbs, they denote the action as well as the agent." This means: When transitive verbs are used in the active voice, the suffixes denote the agent; when these verbs are used in the passive, the suffixes denote the object. On this issue, see also Cardona 1975: 266.

yāyikas and Mīmāṃsakas accept Pāṇini's grammar in general, but when they disagree with the grammarians and with each other, they attempt to prove their own views by analyzing common linguistic usage, in this case the usage of the finite verb.

(b) Effort (*yatna*, *prayatna*)

Effort, which is regarded as the meaning of a finite verbal suffix by Navya-Naiyāyikas, is one of twenty-four qualities (*guṇa*), and we know of its existence in the soul through inference. Nyāya holds that knowledge or cognition (*jñāna*) causes desire (*icchā*), which produces effort, which in turn brings about action.[13] To understand the relation among cognition, desire, and effort, let us consider the case in which we quench our thirst with water. First, we must know that water can remove our thirst and recognize that there is some water within our reach. Second, we must have the desire to take and drink some water. If we have no desire, action does not take place. However, due to certain reasons we do not always take action immediately after we have such a desire. For instance, there may be dead insects in the water and so on. Hence, we can infer that there must be an intervening factor which is produced by the preceding desire and which brings about the action of drinking. That factor is effort.

Note that effort can be designated as resolution (*kṛti*) in the Navya-Nyāya discussion on the meaning of a verbal suffix. Udayana states in his *NKu* that resolution is nothing but effort, a statement quoted by Gaṅgeśa in Part B2 of his "Section on Verbal Suffixes".

(c) The signifying function (*vṛtti*)

Any meaningful linguistic unit, or morpheme, as well as any word, possesses a signifying function and thus can mean something. Navya-Nyāya accepts only two kinds of signifying function: the denotative function (*śakti*) and the indicative function (*lakṣaṇā*).[14] For instance, when we hear the word *śaśin* ("moon") at night, this word first reminds us of the moon in the sky; furthermore, it reminds us of a rabbit (*śaśa*). In this case, "moon" is the direct meaning of the word, and the function pointing to this meaning is called denotative. A rabbit is the indirect object of the word, and the function pointing to it is called indicative.

(d) Verbal understanding (*śābdabodha*, *śābdajñāna*)

The concept of verbal understanding is quite often utilized in analyzing the meaning of language units, e.g., a root (*dhātu*), a suffix (*pratyaya*), a nominal base (*prātipadika*), a case-ending (*sUP*), and so on. Since we cannot determine the meaning of an isolated verbal suffix

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[13] For the causal relationship among these four, Marui (1987: 145-146 and nn. 24 and 26) gives two Sanskrit references and their explanation. One is from the *NKu* (k. 7): *pravṛttiḥ kṛtir evātra sā cecchāto yataś ca sā | taj jñānam … ||*, the other from the *NSD* (p. 74,1-4): *pravṛttiparavākyaśravaṇānantaraṃ prayojyasya tattadarthasambandhavyāpārānukūlāṃ ceṣṭāṃ paśyaṃs taṭasthaḥ svaceṣṭāyāṃ kṛteḥ kṛtau ca cikīrṣāyāś cikīrṣāyāṃ samānādhikaraṇasamānaviṣayakajñānasyaivāvadhṛtakāraṇabhāva iti prayojyasyāpi tatkāraṇībhūtaṃ jñānam anumāya tasya jñānasya vākyajanyatāpravṛttau janayitavyāyāṃ śabdavyāpāratvaṃ cāvadhārayati*. For a translation of the former passage, see Cowell 1980: 71 and Dravid 1996: 433.

[14] Cf. *NSM* p. 292,3: *vṛttiś ca śaktilakṣaṇānyataraḥ sambandhaḥ*; see also Matilal 1968: 25. The indicative function is defined as the relation of some meaning with the denoted object/meaning (*NSM* k. 82ab: *lakṣaṇā śakyasambandhaḥ … |*). To explain this definition: When word *A* denotes meaning *B* and further indicates meaning *C*, the indicative function of *A* reaches *C* through *B*. This function also represents the relation between *A* and *C*. The relation between *A* and *B* is expressed by "the denoted object" (*śakya*) in the definition, the relation between *B* and *C* by "the relation" (*sambandha*).

such as *-ti*, we have to deal with a complete word, such as *pacati* ([he] cooks). From *pacati* we obtain a verbal understanding which has some content or structure. Gaṅgeśa and his opponents presuppose that all of this understanding is generated only by the word *pacati*; they attempt to determine the correspondence between the constituents of the understanding we gain on hearing the word *pacati* and the linguistic constituents, such as the verbal suffix, which make up this word.

There are three competing views of verbal understanding which identify different elements in a sentence as being prominent. The proponents of these views claim that in verbal understanding (1) the meaning of the noun in the nominative case is predominant (*prathamāntārthamukhyaviśeṣyakaśābdabodha*), (2) the meaning of the verbal suffix is predominant (*ākhyātārthamukhyaviśeṣyakaśābdabodha*), and (3) the meaning of the root is predominant (*dhātvarthamukhyaviśeṣyakaśābdabodha*).[15] The Nyāya school upholds the first view; the Mīmāṃsā school the second; and the Grammar school the third.

Take the sentence *caitraḥ pacati* as an example. Let us see what Navya-Nyāya regards as the verbal understanding brought about through hearing this sentence. The word *caitra* denotes a person called Caitra; the case-ending *-ḥ* (*sU*) denotes the number of Caitra; the root *pac* denotes the action of cooking (*pāka*); the suffix *-ti* denotes effort. Effort generates the action of cooking. This relation between effort and cooking is not denoted by any meaningful unit of the sentence, but it is understood from the juxtaposition of the two units *pac* and *-ti*. Similarly, the relation of the effort and Caitra is understood; he (i.e., his *ātman*) possesses effort. Finally, the sentence generates the understanding "Caitra is the possessor of an instance of effort conducive to cooking" (*pākānukūlakṛtimān caitraḥ*).

The Mīmāṃsakas, on the other hand, present the following verbal understanding as generated from the same sentence: "There is productive operation conducive to cooking and residing in Caitra" (*caitraniṣṭhā pākānukūlā bhāvanā*). Grammarians give the following analysis: "There is operation conducive to the softening of the cooked substance which occurs in Caitra" (*caitrāśrayako viklittyanukūlo vyāpāraḥ*). This is only a brief illustration of how the three schools analyze verbal understanding.[16]

(e) Meaning (*artha*)

Finally, I would like to call the reader's attention to the word "meaning", which appears throughout my translation. This word does not always stand for mental representation in the Indian context. Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika and Mīmāṃsā hold the view that knowledge or cognition (*jñāna*) has no content in itself (*nirākāravāda*) and that recognizing an object means that a cognitive relation occurs between the cognition and the object (*grāhyagrāhakabhāva*). For example, when for these three schools the "meaning" of the root *pac* is said to be the action of cooking, this does not refer to the understanding of cooking or the concept of cooking; it

[15] Cf. Rao 1969: 4-34. The expression of verbal understanding may appear to represent its structure, but this is not accepted by some schools of Indian philosophy, i.e., those of so-called Indian realism such as Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, and Mīmāṃsā. This point will be referred to later on under (e).

[16] For example, it has not been illustrated how tense and mood are expressed, what the suffix *a* inserted between the root *pac* and *-ti* denotes, and so forth. For a general illustration of verbal understanding, see Rao 1969: 4-34 and Joshi 1993: 29-36. Cardona 1975 discusses whether or not the paraphrase and analysis of verbal understanding decisively serve to assign partial meanings to the constituents of a sentence or word, such as a root and a suffix. He remarks (p. 272) that the different schools assign meanings in different ways, based on their particular background, premises, and aims.

rather refers to the physical action of cooking which takes place in the outer world. Even the expression of verbal understanding (*śābdabodha*) does not represent the structure of understanding or cognition itself, but the structure of part of the outer world.

By contrast, the Grammar school maintains that knowledge has a content.[17] For this school the expression of verbal understanding represents the structure of the understanding. This expression also represents the structure of a phenomenon in the outer world as long as the understanding corresponds to this phenomenon. When I refer readers to this position on "meaning" in the course of my translation, I provide a footnote.

An Annotated Translation of the Ākhyātavāda of the *Tattvacintāmaṇi*

A. Introduction: Presentation of the Nyāya View[18]

A verbal suffix (*ākhyāta*) denotes an instance of effort (*yatna*), and hence, when [the agent of action is] insentient in the case of [sentences such as] *ratho gacchati* ("The chariot goes") and so on, a verbal suffix possesses indicative function (*lakṣaṇā*) with reference to operation (*vyāpāra*). To explain, an instance of effort is denoted by the verbal suffix in the case of *pacati* ("[He] cooks") and so on, because all verbal suffixes are paraphrased with [the expression] *karoti* which denotes effort, as in the case where *pacati* is [paraphrased with] *pākaṃ karoti* ("[He] does cooking") and so on; [a paraphrase can be the grounds for the assignment of meaning to meaningful linguistic units] because in the absence of an impediment [the relation between a verbal suffix and its meaning] is also understood from paraphrase (*vivaraṇa*), as in the case of the verbal usage of elder people. [However] in the case of the paraphrase, for its part (*api*),[19] of a *dvandva* compound and so on by means of analysis (*vigraha*) [the whole compound] does not possess denotative function (*śakti*) towards the [complete] meaning [obtained] by analysis because [some meaning is] obtained from something else.[20] The teacher[21] says that when [you] ask about the effort (or intention) [of someone

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[17] The Vijñānavāda school of Buddhism also takes this position. Gaṅgeśa does not debate with the followers of this school and other *sākāravādin*s in the "Section on Verbal Suffixes".

[18] *TC* Vol. 4/2, pp. 819,1-820,1: *ākhyātasya yatnavācakatvād acetane ratho gacchatīty ādāv ākhyāte vyāpāralakṣaṇā. tathā hi – pacatīty ādāv ākhyātasya yatno vācyaḥ, pacati pākaṃ karotīty ādiyatnārthakakarotinā sarvākhyātavivaraṇād vṛddhavyavahārādivad bādhakābhāve vivaraṇād api vyutpatteḥ. dvandvādisamāsasya vigraheṇa vivaraṇe 'pi vigrahārthe na śaktir anyalabhyatvāt. kiṃ karotīti yatnapraśne pacatīty uttarasya yatnārthatvaṃ vinānupapatter ity ācāryāḥ.*

[19] Paraphrase by means of analysis is basically the account of the derivation of a compound using Pāṇini's rules. For instance, since *rājapuruṣaḥ* derives from *rājñaḥ puruṣaḥ* by the application of the respective rules, the latter expression is the paraphrase of the former. On the classification of *vigraha*, see Abhyankar and Shukla 1977: 353. Navya-Nyāya does not admit that a whole compound or sentence possesses denotative function. It assigns all the component meanings of a compound obtained by means of analysis to its components. On how Navya-Nyāya performs this task, see the next note.

[20] Navya-Nyāya takes the view that in the case of a *samāhāradvandva* compound the meaning of a collection is not obtained through the denotative function of any component of the compound. Take as an example *ahinakulam*. This compound refers to a collective consisting of a snake and a mongoose. The word *nakula* denotes a mongoose and further refers to a collective consisting of a snake and a mongoose through its indicative function (*lakṣaṇā*). The word *ahi* is interpreted as indicating the speaker's intention (*tātparyagrāhaka*) to make the hearer understand the collective consisting of a snake and a mongoose, not the collective consisting of something else and a mongoose. On this issue, see *NSM* p. 334,1-2 and Jha 1992: 29-30.

[21] The teacher appears to be Udayana. A similar statement is found in *NKu* (p. 528,6-7): *asti ca tad iha – kiṃ karoti*? *pacati*, *pākaṃ karotīty artha ityādidarśanāt*. D. Bhattacharya (1958: 40) remarks that Gaṅgeśa dis-

with the words] *kiṃ karoti* ("What does [that man] do?"), it is impossible to answer that [the man] cooks (*pacati*) unless [you assign] the meaning of effort [to the suffix *-ti*].

B. The Mīmāṃsā View

B 1:[22] On this point [Mīmāṃsakas of the Bhaṭṭa school] say the following. Neither the verbal suffix nor the verb *karoti* denotes effort, because a verbal suffix is used even when it is impossible [to understand] effort[23] conducive to the "meaning"[24] denoted by the root in the case of *ratho gacchati* ("The chariot goes"), *jānāti* ("[He] knows"), *nidrāti* ("[He] sleeps"),[25] and so forth, and because a verbal suffix is paraphrased with [the expression] *karoti* in the case where [*gacchati*] is paraphrased with *gamanaṃ karoti* ("[He] does going"). In that case, if operation (*vyāpāra*) is the meaning of *karoti* [used in the paraphrase], [this "meaning"[26] can] similarly [occur] in sentient [agents]. But (*ca*) in that case, the usage of the verbal suffix [*-ti* or *-te* in the above four expressions] and *karoti* [in the paraphrase] is not figurative (*gauṇa*), for there is no impediment to [interpreting *gamanaṃ karoti* as] a primary [usage] (*mukhya*).[27] Therefore, [the verbal suffixes used] in the question and [its] answer do not denote effort, but rather just denote the action of (i.e., referred to by) [the root] *kṛ*. Hence, when [one] asks about action in general [with the words] *kiṃ karoti* ("What does [he] do?"), it is also proper to answer in terms of the particular action denoted by [the verb] *pacati* or *gacchati*.

B 2:[28] [The Naiyāyika will object to this claim by the Mīmāṃsakas:] The root *kṛ* denotes effort because a pot and a sprout are said to have been made (*kṛta*) on account of [a pot] being produced by effort, and not to have been made (*akṛta*) on account of [a sprout] not being produced [by effort, respectively] in spite of there being no difference in [their] being pro-

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played his utmost veneration for Udayana, and that in the *Prāmāṇyavāda* of the *TC* there are three references to *ācāryāḥ*. Ingalls (1951: 104) remarks that in Navya-Nyāya Udayana is regularly referred to as *ācāryāḥ* and points out that Mathurānātha refers to him so.

[22] *TC* Vol. 4/2, p. 820,1-9: *atra vadanti – ākhyātasya karoteś ca na yatnārthatvaṃ ratho gacchati jānāti yatate nidrātītyādau dhātvarthānukūlayatnābhāve 'py ākhyātaprayogād gamanaṃ karotīti karotinā tatrākhyātavivaraṇāc ca tatra vyāpārasya karotyarthatve cetane 'pi tathā. na ca tatrākhātakarotyor gauṇatvaṃ mukhye bādhakābhāvāt. ata eva praśnottarayor na yatnārthatvaṃ kiṃ tu kṛñaḥ kriyāvācitvam eva. tena kiṃ karotītikriyāmātrapraśne pacati gacchatītikriyāviśeṣeṇottaram api samañjasaṃ bhavati.*

[23] This view presupposes the Nyāya view that effort brings about the action which is denoted by a root.

[24] On the specific sense of "meaning", see the introduction to the present paper (Basic Concepts [e]).

[25] In the case of *ratho gacchati*, the literal understanding is "The chariot possesses effort conducive to going" (*gamanānukūlayatnavān rathaḥ*). This understanding is awkward because an insentient being cannot possess effort. In the case of *jānāti*, the literal understanding is "[Someone] possesses effort conducive to cognition" (*jñānānukūlayatnavān*). This understanding is not proper because it contradicts the Nyāya view on the causal relationship between cognition and effort. On this relationship, see Basic Concepts (b). In the case of *nidrāti*, the literal understanding is "[Someone] possesses effort conducive to sleep" (*nidrānukūlayatnavān*). This understanding is not supported by experience, for sleep does not necessitate effort.

[26] Cf. Basic Concepts (e).

[27] A primary usage is one in which all linguistic elements possess only denotative function.

[28] *TC* Vol. 4/2, pp. 820,10-821,2: *atha kriyājanyatvāviśeṣe 'pi yatnajanyatvājanyatvābhyāṃ ghaṭāṅkurayoḥ kṛtākṛtavyavahārāt tṛjantakṛñdhātuvyutpannakartṛpadasya kṛtyāśrayavācakatvāc ca kṛjo yatnārthatvaṃ kriyāmātrārthatve kṛjaḥ kriyāśrayaḥ kartṛpadārthaḥ syāt. tathā ca kārakamātre 'tiprasaṅgaḥ. evaṃ ca kṛjo yatnārthatve tena cākhyātavivaraṇāt tasyāpi yatno 'rthaḥ. tad ucyate –*

kṛtākṛtavibhāgena kartṛrūpavyavasthayā |
yatna eva kṛtiḥ pūrvā parasmin saiva bhāvanā ||

saivākhyātārtho bhāvanocyata iti cet; cf. *NKu* pp. 530,1-7 and 531,8-532,4.

duced by [some] action, and because the word (*pada*)[29] *kartṛ* ("agent") derived from the root *kṛ* ending with the *tṛC* [suffix][30] denotes the support (*āśraya*) of resolution. If action in general is the meaning of [the root] *kṛ*, the support of action would be the meaning of the word *kartṛ*, and as a result [this word would have the defect of] over-application [extending] to action generators (*kāraka*) in general.[31] And thus, given that [the root] *kṛ* denotes effort and because the verbal suffix [*-ti*] is paraphrased with it (i.e., the verb *karoti*), it too denotes effort. The following is said [by Udayana]: Owing to the determination of the nature of an agent on the basis of the difference of [the usage of] "made" and "not made", resolution (*kṛti*) is nothing but effort (*yatna*); this [resolution] which is precedent to [some] subsequent [thing] is nothing but productive operation (*bhāvanā*).[32] This [effort] is the meaning of a verbal suffix [and is] called "productive operation".

B 3:[33] [The Mīmāṃsaka will answer: This view is] not correct, because [people use] expressions such as *bījenāṅkuraḥ kṛtaḥ* ("A sprout is produced by a seed"), *sragādinā sukhaṃ kṛtam* ("Pleasure is produced by a garland and so on"), *bījam aṅkuraṃ karoti* ("A seed produces a sprout") and so on in spite of the absence of effort. Moreover, the word *kartṛ* is not derivative (*yaugika*).[34] To explain, if [the root] *kṛ* denotes effort and *tṛC* denotes resolution

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[29] Later Navya-Nyāya works, such as the *Tarkasaṃgraha* (*TS*) (p. 50,9) and the *Maṇikaṇa* (*MK*) (p. 80,12), define *pada* as the minimum meaningful unit (*śakta*), i.e., a morpheme. Udayana employs *pada* in this sense: *tena ca sarvam ākhyātapadaṃ vivriyate* (*NKu* p. 530,6-7). On the concept of *pada*, see Jha 1980: 85-87. On the other hand, Pāṇini defines *pada* as that which ends with a *sUP* suffix (case ending) or *tiṄ* suffix (personal ending) (*P* 1.4.14: *suptiṅantaṃ padam*). In other words, according to the Vyākaraṇa school, *pada* is a declined noun or adjective, or a conjugated verb. Indeclinables are thus regarded as declined. Note that in their works Vyākaraṇa and Navya-Nyāya authors do not always employ their own concepts of *pada* consistently.

[30] *P* 3.1.133 teaches the meaning and employment of this suffix.

[31] There are six action generators: agent (*kartṛ*), object (*karman*), instrument (*karaṇa*), receiver (*sampradāya*), point of departure (*apādāna*), and locus (*adhikaraṇa*). On action generators and the research on them by modern scholars, and for a historical sketch, see Deshpande 1992: 46-53.

[32] Cf. *NKu* k. 5.9:

kṛtākṛtavibhāgena kartṛrūpavyavasthayā |
yatna eva kṛtiḥ pūrvā parasmin saiva bhāvanā ||.

For a translation of this *kārikā*, see Cowell 1980: 74 and Dravid 1996: 439.

[33] *TC* Vol. 4/2, pp. 821,2-823,5: *na, bījenāṅkuraḥ kṛtaḥ sragādinā sukhaṃ kṛtaṃ bījam aṅkuraṃ karotīti yatnaṃ vināpi vyavahārāt. kartṛpadaṃ ca na yaugikam. tathā hi – kṛjo yatnārthatve tṛcaś ca kṛtyarthatve kartrarthatve vā dhātupratyayārthayoḥ kṛtyoḥ kṛtikartror vā parasparam ananvayaḥ kṛtau kṛtijanyatvasya tadviṣayatvasya cābhāvāt kṛtiviśiṣtasya kṛtinirākāṅkṣatvāc ca. evaṃ kṛjaḥ kriyārthatve tṛcaś ca kriyāśrayavācakatve tayoḥ parasparam ananvaya evety ubhayadarśane kartṛpadaṃ karmādipadavad rūḍham eva. rūḍhiś ca kṛtyāśraye kriyāśraye vety anyad etat. tasmāt kṛtākṛtavibhāgena kartṛrūpavyavasthayā ca na kṛjo yatnārthatvam iti. kiṃ cākhyātasya karoteś ca na yatnārthatvaṃ pākāya yatate pākaṃ karotītyādau yatnadvayasya yatnaviṣayakayatnasya vā pratīteḥ prakṛtipratyayārthayoḥ sāmyenānvayānupapatteḥ paunaruktyād ekatraiva vidhyanuvādadoṣāc ca.*

[34] A derivative word is one whose meaning is explained from the meanings of its constituents. Later on in B 3, the Mīmāṃsaka proposes to interpret *kartṛ* as a conventional word (*rūḍha*) and argues that this word does not imply effort. We can understand from Dash 1992: 121-122 that Gaṅgeśa accepts at least a threefold classification of words: derivative, conventional, and derivatively conventional (*yogarūḍha*). However, Dash does not mention whether Gaṅgeśa deals with a fourth classification, derivative and conventional (*yaugikarūḍha*), or not. The *MK* (p. 80,13), which briefly presents the principal points of Gaṅgeśa's *TC*, does not include this fourth one. The *TD* (p. 51,17), a later Navya-Nyāya manual, does not include it either, while the *NSM* (p. 315,1-2), also a later Navya-Nyāya manual, adopts the fourth classification. On the later Navya-Naiyāyikas who accepted this classification, see Dash 1992: 80-81.

or an agent,[35] the two resolutions which are denoted by the root [*kṛ*] and the suffix [*tṛC*] are not related to each other; nor are the resolution and the agent [related to each other]. The reason [for the former case] is that resolution is neither produced by [another] resolution nor the object [of another resolution],[36] and [the reason for the latter case is] that what is qualified by resolution does not need [another] resolution. Similarly, if [the root] *kṛ* denotes an action and [the suffix] *tṛC* denotes the support (*āśraya*) of an action, they cannot be related to each other.[37] Hence, in both views (i.e., those of Mīmāṃsā and Nyāya) the word *kartṛ* is conventional (*rūḍha*), like the word *karman* ("object") and so on. And the conventional meaning [of the word *kartṛ*] is the support of resolution or the support of an action, [but] this is a matter which is different [from our concern whether a verbal suffix denotes effort or not]. Therefore, on the basis of the difference of [the usage of] "made" and "not made" and owing to the determination of the nature of an agent, [the root] *kṛ* does not denote effort. Moreover, a verbal suffix and [the verb] *karoti* do not denote effort. The [first] reason [for this] is that because two [kinds of] effort or effort which has [another] effort for [its] object is understood in the case of [sentences such as] *pākāya yatate* ("[He] makes efforts to cook"), *pākaṃ karoti* ("[He] does cooking") and so on, the meanings of the base[38] (i.e., the root *yat* or *kṛ*) and the suffix [*-te* or *-ti*] cannot be related to each other with the same status, and the [second] reason is that because [the word denoting effort would] be repeated [in the expression of the literal understanding], there will be the fault of affirming something (*vidhi*)[39] (i.e., establishing an unknown matter) as well as repeating [it] (*anuvāda*) (i.e., referring to a known matter)[40] in just a single [linguistic] item.

B 4.1:[41] [The Naiyāyika will say:] Even though the base (*prakṛti*) (i.e., the root *yat* of *yatate* or the root *kṛ* of *karoti* in the above two examples) denotes this [effort], the verbal suffix [*-te* of *yatate* or *-ti* of *karoti* also] denotes it (i.e., this effort); [this view is] not defective. [This] is because [the Mīmāṃsaka's argument that a base and its suffix do not have one and the same meaning] does not hold good in the case [of the expressions] *ekaḥ* ("one"), *dvau* ("two"), *bahavaḥ* ("many") and *iṣiṣiṣati* ("[He] desires to desire")[42].

B 4.2:[43] [On this point, however, the Mīmāṃsaka may argue: We can] assume a second effort in these cases (i.e., *pākāya yatate* and *pākaṃ karoti*), just as [we can] assume a second number or desire [in the above expressions *ekaḥ*, *dvau*, *bahavaḥ* and *iṣiṣiṣati*].

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[35] The Naiyāyika in B 2 holds that an agent is the possessor of resolution, since he interprets the word *kartṛ* on the basis of its derivation. *P* 3.1.133 defines the meaning of the suffix *tṛC* as an agent.

[36] Resolution produces action, and not another resolution. See Basic Concepts (b).

[37] I.e., if the root *kṛ* and the suffix *tṛC* denote action and the support of action respectively, we would comprehend two actions when hearing the word *kartṛ*.

[38] The word *prakṛti* stands for a root (*dhātu*) and a nominal stem (*prātipadika*).

[39] On *vidhi* and *anuvāda*, see Edgerton 1929: 152, n. 193, and 278.

[40] If the suffix of the verb in the case of *pākāya yatate* denoted effort, the Mīmāṃsaka assumes that the Naiyāyika would present the following literal understanding: "[Someone is] possessor of effort to make effort to cook (*pākayatnayatnavān*)", which, of course, is not appropriate.

[41] *TC* Vol. 4/2, p. 823,5-7: *nanu prakṛtes tadarthatve 'pi pratyayasya tadarthatvaṃ na doṣāya*, *eko dvau bahava iṣiṣiṣatīty atra ca vyabhicārāt*.

[42] The base and the suffix in the first three expressions will respectively denote the same number. The fourth example is the desiderative of the root *iṣ*. The root denotes desire, and the desiderative suffix *saN* also denotes desire.

[43] *TC* Vol. 4/2, p. 823,8-9: *yat tu dvitīyasaṅkhyecchādikalpanavad ihāpi dvitīyayatnakalpanam iti*.

B 4.3:[44] [The Naiyāyika will answer:] This is not correct, because the second number, desire or effort does not exist at all [in the understanding obtained through hearing the above expressions; we thus do not need to connect a second number, etc., to the meaning of the base in these four expressions]. However, in reality [your argument is not correct] on the following grounds. When [we] judge each [meaningful linguistic unit] (i.e., a base or its suffix) as to [its possession of a] denotative function, it is not a defect that even when two [meanings of two given units] are necessarily recalled when [these two units] are [used] together, one [meaning] (i.e., that of the suffix) remains unrelated. When the suffix denotes resolution in the case of [expressions such as] *pākāya yatate* ("[He] makes efforts to cook") and *pākaṃ kuryāt* ("[He] should do cooking"), you (i.e., the Mīmāṃsaka) also accept [it] in this way (i.e., that the meaning of the suffix remains unrelated)[45].

B 5:[46] [The Mīmāṃsaka will answer: The Naiyāyika's argument[47] is] not correct, because it is possible to understand a relation (*anvaya*) between the meaning of the nominal stem (*nāma*) and the number recalled from the case ending (*vibhakti*) in the case of [the expressions] *ekaḥ*, *dvau* and *bahavaḥ*.[48] [Moreover, Pāṇini's rules also invalidate the Nyāya view that a verbal suffix denotes effort and warrant my view that an optative suffix denotes effort] on [the following respective] grounds: The verbal suffixes of the present tense (*laṭ*) and so forth are not judged to possess denotative function (*sāmarthya*) with regard to effort;[49] and the suffixes of the optative mood (*liṅ*) are judged to possess denotative function with regard to resolution (*kṛti*) in the case of *paceta* ("[He] should cook")[50].

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[44] *TC* Vol. 4/2, pp. 823,9-824,3: *tan na dvitīyasaṅkhyecchāyatnābhāvāt. vastutas tu pratyekaṃ sāmarthyāvadhṛtau sambhede tūbhayopasthiter āvaśyakatve 'py ekasyānanvaye 'py adoṣāt. pākāya yatate pākaṃ kuryād ity atra kṛtyarthakākhyāte tvayāpi tathaivāṅgīkārād iti cet.*

[45] In the former case the root *yat* denotes effort, and the suffix denotes another effort (i.e., resolution); thus there would be two kinds of effort denoted. In the latter case the root *kṛ* denotes effort, and the *liṅ* suffix denotes a productive operation (*bhāvanā*) or "end-productive-operation" (*ārthī bhāvanā*) which is nothing but effort; thus there would be two kinds of effort denoted here too. On the meaning of the *liṅ* suffix, see *MNP* Nos. 3-4 and 383-392, and Edgerton 1929: 39-40 and 185-188.

[46] *TC* Vol. 4/2, p. 824,3-6: *na, eko dvau bahava ity atra nāmārthasya vibhaktyupanītasaṅkhyānvayāvagamayogyatvāt. laḍāder yatne sāmarthyānavadhāraṇāl liṅaḥ pacetety atra kṛtau sāmarthyāvadhāraṇāc ca.*

[47] I.e., the argumentation presented in B 4.1-3.

[48] Mīmāṃsakas of the Bhāṭṭa school consider the meaning of a nominal stem to be the universal (*ākṛti*, *jāti*, *sāmānya*). Kumārila takes the view that a word denotes *ākṛti* (*Ślokavārttika* [*ŚV*], *Ākṛtivāda*, k. 1); he also says that *ākṛti* is nothing but *jāti* and *sāmānya* (*ŚV*, *Ākṛtivāda*, k. 3). In the case of *ekaḥ*, for example, the stem *eka* denotes the universal onenessness (*ekatvatva*), which resides in all oneness (*ekatva*); the number one, which is a quality, is in reality oneness (*MMU*, pp. 244, No. 2.4.1 and 246, No. 2.4.6) which is considered to differ according to its loci. The suffix *-s* denotes the number one, or oneness. Thus, we can assume that the Mīmāṃsaka succeeds in connecting the meaning of the stem (i.e., onenessness) with the number obtained from the suffix (i.e., the number one, or oneness).

[49] In Pāṇini's grammar, verbal suffixes denote the agent in the active construction. On this point, see n. 12.

[50] The employment of the *liṅ* suffixes is prescribed by *P* 3.3.161 (*vidhinimantraṇāmantraṇādhīṣṭasaṃpraśnaprārthaneṣu liṅ*) and *P* 3.3.173 (*āśiṣi liṅloṭau*). *P* 3.3.161 tells us that the *liṅ* suffixes mean a command (*vidhi*), a respectful command (*adhīṣṭa*), and so on. Later Pāṇinians comment on these two terms as follows. Kaiyaṭa (ca. twelfth century) states in his *Mahābhāṣyapradīpa* (*MBhP*) that both a command and a respectful command have a prompting function (*niyoga*) (*MBhP* Vol. 3, p. 247,b34-35: *vidhyadhīṣṭayor iti. ubhayor api niyogarūpatvād iti praśnaḥ*); Nāgeśa (ca. eighteenth century) explains in his *Mahābhāṣyapradīpoddyota* that this function is an operation which exists in the prompting person and is conducive to the activity of the prompted person (*MBhPU* Vol. 3, p. 247,b36-37: *niyogeti. niyogaḥ pravartanā pravartakaniṣṭhaḥ pravṛttyanukūlo vyāpāraḥ*). I infer that such a function corresponds to effort or resolution.

B 6:[51] [The Naiyāyika will argue:] The verbal suffix following a root which does not denote effort denotes effort. Hence, in the case of *yatate* ("[He] makes effort"), it is not [true that the meanings of the base and the suffix can] not be related. Moreover, in [the case of the agent of the action denoted by a root being] insentient, the usage of the suffix [in the sense of effort] is only figurative (*gauṇa*). And it does not stand to reason to assume a denotative function [of a verbal suffix] when the usage [of the suffix] is possible (i.e., accepted by us as valid) also by [having recourse to] another signifying function (i.e., by *lakṣaṇā*, the indicative function). [We will provide] another [interpretation of the meaning of a verbal suffix as follows.][52] [In the case of insentient agents] a meaningful linguistic unit (*pada*) (i.e., a verbal suffix) denoting a conducive effort (*anukūlayatna*) is used to denote just what is conducive (*anukūla*), which [may only be] a part of this [meaning of the linguistic unit], like the word *śrotriya*[53] [can denote] a *brāhmaṇa* with a focus only on [his] purity [in spite of his not being well-versed in the Vedas]. [We can] further [illustrate the difference between the cases of sentient and insentient agents as follows:] For insentient [agents], [verbal suffixes of] the second person and the first person can never be [used], because the adjoining words (*upapada*)[54] *yuṣmad* ("you") and *asmad* ("we") mean sentient [agents]. Or [the usage of the suffixes with insentient agents] may be figurative indeed, for [such a usage is] not objectionable for people.

B 7:[55] Mīmāṃsakas of the Bhāṭṭa school [will answer]: [The above view is] not correct. The reason [for this] is that [the usage of] a verbal suffix, in the case of an insentient agent, is not

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[51] *TC* Vol. 4/2, pp. 824,6-825,3: *athāyatnārthakadhātuparākhyātasya yatnārthatvam. tena yatata ity atra nānanvaya acetane cākhyātaprayogo gauṇa eva. na ca vṛttyantareṇāpi prayogasambhave śaktikalpanā yuktā. yad vānukūlayatne pravṛttaṃ padaṃ tadekadeśe 'nukūlamātre prayujyate viśuddhimātraṃ puraskṛtya brāhmaṇe śrotriyapadavat. acetane ca madhyamapuruṣottamapuruṣau na bhavata evopapadayor yuṣmadasmadoś cetanārthatvāt. bhavatu vā gauṇa eva lokasyāparyanuyojyatvād iti cet*. Cf. *NKu* pp. 530,7-531,2.

[52] The difference between the first interpretation and the second, which will be presented in the translation, is as follows. According to the first interpretation, if a root does not denote effort and the verb is used with a sentient agent, the suffix denotes effort, as in the case of *devadattaḥ pacati* ("Devadatta cooks"). This usage of the suffix is primary (*mukhya*). If a verb whose root does not denote effort is used with an insentient agent, the usage of the suffix is figurative (*gauṇa*). According to the second interpretation, if a root does not denote effort and the verb is used with a sentient agent, the suffix denotes a conducive effort. If a verb is used with an insentient agent, the suffix denotes something conducive. This conducive thing will then be regarded as an action, etc., according to context. The usage in either case, whether the agent is sentient or insentient, is primary.

[53] According to the *Āloka* (p. 824,11), this word means a *brāhmaṇa* who is born from *brāhmaṇa* parents and has learned the Vedas and their supplements.

[54] The term *upapada* applies either to a word that is used in the locative case in the section where Pāṇini teaches *kṛt* (primary) suffixes or to an adjoining word connected in sense. On this, see Abhyankar and Shukla 1977: 85. The employment of the verbal suffixes of the second person is prescribed by *P* 1.4.105 and 106, of the first person by *P* 1.4.107.

[55] *TC* Vol. 4/2, p. 825,4-7: *na, acetana ākhyātasya mukhyatve bādhakābhāvena gauṇatvābhāvāt. tasmād ākhyātasyānukūlatvena vyāpāro vācya iti bhaṭṭāḥ. tena cetanācetanayor dhātvarthānukūlavyāpārasya sattvād ākhyātaprayogo mukhya eva*. According to the Bhāṭṭa school, when the agent is sentient, the listener of the verb understands an action of the agent which is nothing but productive operation conducive to the meaning of the root. On the other hand, when the agent is insentient, the listener understands an external action conducive to the meaning of the root. For instance, when the listener hears the sentence *ratho gacchati*, he understands an action of the chariot which consists in separation from and union with earlier, later and intermediate places, and is conducive to going. Here we have taken into consideration a case in which the verbal suffix expresses "end-productive-operation," or "end-efficient-force" (*ārthī bhāvanā*). According to the *MNP* (No. 391), the lineage of Pārthasārathi Miśra, who lived from the eleventh to the twelfth century, regards *ratho gacchati* not as a figurative usage but as a primary one. Hence, the position of this school seems to be referred to in the text. On

figurative, because there is no impediment to [its] being primary. Therefore that which is denoted by the verbal suffix [in this case] is an operation as [something] conducive. Thus [the Mīmāṃsakas conclude that] since the operation conducive to the meaning[56] of the root occurs in [the agent], sentient or insentient, the usage of the verbal suffix [in the sense of action] is only primary.

B 8:[57] [The Mīmāṃsaka anticipates that the Naiyāyika will put forward the following argument:] If so (i.e., if the above is accepted), [we] would [apply] the word *pacati* to a man who sleeps off [his] fatigue due to a journey, because sleeping is an operation which is conducive to cooking by means of the removal of fatigue.[58] [However,] this argument should not be made, because a particular conducive operation is denoted [by a verbal suffix], like the particular effort [being denoted by it] in your (i.e., the Naiyāyika's) [theory]. Otherwise, also [in your position] that [the verbal suffix] denotes effort, the word *pacati* would [apply] to a man who possesses effort conducive to [producing] husked rice (*taṇḍula*) (e.g., a man who is removing the husks of rice). Similarly, since in the case of insentient [agents], too, the verbal suffix is paraphrased with [the expression] *karoti*, *karoti* also expresses just a particular operation.

B 9.1:[59] [The Naiyāyika will raise the following question:] How [can we] then [have] an understanding of the possessor of effort conducive to cooking in the case of [the sentence] *caitraḥ pacati* ("Caitra cooks")? If [the Mīmāṃsaka answers that we can have such an understanding] because of implication (*ākṣepa*), [this is] wrong. [This is] because neither operation nor number, both of which are denoted by a verbal suffix, implicates effort, since both [can] be [understood] even without effort [according to your Mīmāṃsā theory].[60] Neither does the agent [which may be denoted by the verbal suffix according to the Vyākaraṇa theory[61] imply effort], because any substance [can play the role of] agent.[62] And [another] reason [for this] is that since [only] a possessor of effort is an agent, a verbal suffix denoting the [agent] also denotes effort.[63] Nor does the meaning of a root (i.e., an action) in general [imply effort], because it (i.e., an action) [can] take place even without effort. Nor does a root denote effort,

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the view of Pārthasārathi Miśra, cf. Edgerton 1929: 186, n. 248, who gives reference to the *Śāstradīpikā* on *Mīmāṃsāsūtra* 2.1.1.

[56] Cf. Basic Concepts (a) and n. 23.

[57] *TC* Vol. 4/2, p. 825,7-13: *na caivaṃ pathiśramaśayāne pacatīti syāc chramaśāntidvārā śayanasya pākānukūlavyāpāratvād iti vācyam. tava prayatnaviśeṣasyevānukūlavyāpāraviśeṣasya vācyatvāt. anyathā yatnavācyatve 'pi taṇḍulānukūlayatnavati pacatīti syāt. evam acetane 'pi karotinākhyātavivaraṇāt karotyartho 'pi vyāpāraviśeṣa eva*. Cf. *NKu* p. 531,6-7.

[58] Suppose the following case: A man has come from a distant place to cook, but he cannot cook due to fatigue. He first takes a nap. Then, after he has awakened, he starts cooking. In this case, the Naiyāyika argues, his sleep enables him to cook.

[59] *TC* Vol. 4/2, pp. 825,13-826,5: *kathaṃ tarhi caitraḥ pacatīty atra pākānukūlayatnavatpratītiḥ. ākṣepād iti cet, na, ākhyātārthena vyāpāreṇa saṅkhyayā vā yatnānākṣepāt tayoḥ prayatnaṃ vināpi sattvāt. nāpi kartrā dravyamātrasya kartṛtvād yatnavataś ca kartṛtvenākhyātena tadabhidhāne yatnasyāpy abhidhānāt. nāpi yatno dhātvarthamātreṇa tasya prayatnaṃ vināpi sattvāt. nāpi yatno dhātvarthaḥ kriyāyās tatphalasya vā dhātuvācyatvāt. anyathā pāka ity atrāpi yatnānubhavaprasaṅgād iti cet*. Cf. *NKu* pp. 532,5-533,3.

[60] Take the example *ratho gacchati* ("The chariot goes"). The Mīmāṃsakas accept that the chariot does not possess effort but that the action of going takes place. It is apparent that number does not imply effort.

[61] On this theory, see n. 12.

[62] That is, insentient substances, which lack effort, can also be grammatical agents.

[63] The objection here is that if the verbal suffix denotes the agent, then, since the concept of agent involves that of effort, once the former concept is understood, there is no scope for an implication of the latter.

because a root denotes [only] action or its result (*phala*) since otherwise [we] would have an immediate understanding (*anubhava*) of effort even when [we only hear the word] *pākaḥ* ("cooking") [which is interpreted as expressing the meaning of the root *pac*].

B 9.2:[64] [The Mīmāṃsaka will answer: This view is] not correct. The reason [for this] is that effort is implied by cooking, etc., which are particular meanings of roots, because they (i.e., cooking, etc.) are impossible without effort.

B 10.1:[65] If [the Naiyāyika says that] since for [the expression] *pacati* ("[He] cooks") [we have] the paraphrase *pākayatnavān* ("[He is] the possessor of effort to cook"), [the verbal suffix] denotes effort, …

B 10.2:[66] … [the Mīmāṃsaka would] in this case [object] that [the verbal suffix] for its part would denote an agent.[67] For (*hi*) there is no paraphrase [such as] *pākayatnaḥ* ("[There is] effort to cook") [which would warrant the Naiyāyikas' view that the verbal suffix denotes effort]. This [paraphrase] (i.e., *pākayatna* "[There is] effort to cook"]) is a paraphrase of the [expression] *pacati* relating to the intention [of the speaker of the expression *pacati*], and this [paraphrase] is possible by [way of] implication (*ākṣepa*).

B 11.1:[68] [The Naiyāyika would object that] the same [manner of interpretation should apply] to effort too.[69] How then does an immediate understanding of productive operation (*bhāvanā*) take place in the case of [the sentences] *ratho gacchati* ("The chariot goes") and *vidyate vyoma* ("The sky exists")?

B 11.2:[70] [The Mīmāṃsaka will answer: Such an understanding] in no way [takes place in this case], because inasmuch as the productive operation cannot be related to the meaning of the root, in this case you (i.e., the Naiyāyika) also accept [these two expressions] as being figurative (*gauṇa*).[71]

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[64] *TC* Vol. 4/2, p. 826,5-6: *na*, *dhātvarthaviśeṣapākādinā yatnākṣepāt tasya prayatnaṃ vinānupapatteḥ*.

[65] *TC* Vol. 4/2, p. 826,6-7: *atha pacatīty asya pākayatnavān iti vivaraṇād yatnārthateti cet*.

[66] *TC* Vol. 4/2, p. 826,7-10: *tarhi kartrarthatāpi syāt*. *na hi pākayatna ity eva vivaraṇam*. *pacatīty asya tātparyavivaraṇaṃ tat tac cākṣepeṇa nirvahatīti cet*.

[67] The Mīmāṃsaka considers the following: If the paraphrase given in B 10.1 is accepted, the root *kṛ* and the verbal suffix must denote *pāka* (cooking) and *yatnavān* (possessor of effort) respectively. The possessor of effort is nothing but an agent, and thus it follows that the verbal suffix also denotes the agent.

[68] *TC* Vol. 4/2, p. 826,10-11: *tulyaṃ yatne 'pi*. *kathaṃ tarhi ratho gacchati vidyate vyometi bhāvanānubhava iti cet*.

[69] In other words, we can obtain the meaning *yatnavān* ("possessor of effort") by having recourse to the indicative function of the word *yatna* ("effort") in the paraphrase *pākayatna*.

[70] *TC* Vol. 4/2, p. 826,11-13: *na kathaṃcit*, *bhāvanāyā dhātvarthānvayāyogyatvena tvayāpi tatra gauṇatvābhyupagamād iti*.

[71] Based on Gaṅgeśa's "Section on Verbal Suffixes", Wada 2006 further discusses the Navya-Nyāya principle of determining the meaning of words.

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TD	*Tarkadīpikā*, in *Tarka-Saṃgraha of Annambhaṭṭa*, ed. Yashwant Vasudev Athalye and Mahadev Rajaram Bodas, 2nd ed., Poona 1974.
TS	*Tarkasaṃgraha*. Ed. Yashwant Vasudev Athalye and Mahadev Rajaram Bodas. Poona 1974.
NKu	*The Nyāyakusumāñjali of Śrī Udayanāchārya with Four Commentaries*: *the Bodhanī of Varadarāja*, *the Prakāśa of Vardhamāna*, *the Prakāśikā of Mecha Thakkura*, *and the Makaranda of Rucidatta*. Ed. Padmaprasada Upadhyaya and Dhundhiraja Shastri. Varanasi 1957.
NSD	*Nyāyasiddhāntadīpa* of Śaśadhara. Ed. Bimal K. Matilal. Ahmedabad 1976.
NSM	*Nyāyasiddhāntamuktāvalī* of Viśvanātha Pañcānana. Ed. Narayancharan Shastri and Swetvaikuntha Shastri. Varanasi 1972.
P	*Pāṇinisūtra*, ed. in Śrīśa Chandra Vasu, *The Aṣṭādhyāyī of Pāṇini*, 2 vols., Delhi/Varanasi/Patna 1977 (repr.).
MK	*Maṇikaṇa*, ed. in Sarma 1977.
MNP	*Mīmāṃsānyāyaprakāśa*, ed. in Edgerton 1929.
MBhP	*Mahābhāṣyapradīpa* of Kaiyaṭa, in *Vyākaraṇamahābhāṣya*, 5 vols., ed. Shivdatta Sharma and Raghunath Kashinath Shastri, Delhi 1988 (repr.).
MBhPU	*Mahābhāṣyapradīpoddyota* of Nāgeśa, in *Vyākaraṇamahābhāṣya* (cf. *MBhP*).
MMU	*Mānameyodaya* of Nārāyaṇa. Ed. C.K. Raja and S.S. Sastri. Madras 1975.
ŚV	*Ślokavārttika* of Kumārila Bhaṭṭa. Ed. Dvarikadasa Shastri. Varanasi 1978.

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4.5

VEDĀNTA

Roque Mesquita

Die Idee der Erlösung bei Lebzeiten im System Madhvas*

Die Idee der Erlösung bei Lebzeiten wird von vielen brāhmaṇischen Systemen geteilt – möglicherweise unter dem Einfluß der buddhistischen Unterscheidung zwischen der Erleuchtung (*nirvāṇa*) des Buddha und seinem späteren vollkommenen Erlöschen (*parinirvāṇa*).[1] Wir finden diese Lehre nicht nur im Advaita-Vedānta, sondern auch bei Autoren des Nyāya–Vaiśeṣika[2] und sogar bei Kumārila.[3]

Die Vorstellung der *jīvanmukti* bei Madhva war bislang Ausgangspunkt für verschiedene widersprüchliche Meinungen. Der Grund dafür war die Annahme, Madhva habe diesen *terminus technicus* in keinem seiner Werke ausdrücklich verwendet. Einige Indologen glaubten daher, daß er die Erlösung bei Lebzeiten abgelehnt habe. So z.B. Hiriyanna, wenn er sagt: "Like Rāmānuja, Madhva also rejects the ideal of *jīvanmukti*."[4] Auch Sheridan geht in seiner Arbeit über die *jīvanmukti* bei Madhva davon aus, daß Madhva diesen Ausdruck nicht kennt: "It is true that the term *jīvanmukti* is not found in the writings [of Madhva]."[5] Im Gegensatz zu den genannten Gelehrten ist er aber der Meinung, daß "the concept of 'liberation while

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* Dieser Beitrag stützt sich auf das Material, das ich anfangs der neunziger Jahre im Zusammenhang mit meiner Beschäftigung mit der Thematik der *jīvanmukti* zusammengetragen hatte. Aus dieser Zeit stammen zwei Arbeiten zum Thema, "Die Idee der Erlösung bei Kumārilabhaṭṭa" (Mesquita 1994) und "Der *Apavarga*-Begriff bei Śrīdhara. Eine vedāntische Erlösungslehre?" (Mesquita 1995). Für den letzten Beitrag erhielt ich viele Anregungen von Prof. Dr. Wilhelm Halbfass, der im Sommersemester 1994 am Institut für Indologie an der Universität Wien als Gastprofessor weilte. Ich hatte die Ehre, ihn nicht nur als Wissenschaftler, sondern auch als Freund kennenzulernen. Es ist mir daher eine Genugtuung, einen Beitrag über die gleiche Thematik diesmal bei Madhva zur Gedenkschrift Wilhelm Halbfass zu leisten.

[1] Vgl. Sprockhoff 1962, Vetter 1995: 213ff., 219f. und 225f. und Slaje 2000: 184, n. 8. Diese weit verbreitete Vorstellung, die als "allgemein-indische Idee" bezeichnet wurde (Garbe 1894: 181), wird nun bezeugt durch zahlreiche Einzelstudien und vor allem durch zwei kürzlich erschienene Publikationen, nämlich Fort und Mumme 1996 sowie Fort 1998.

[2] Vgl. Slaje 1986 und Mesquita 1995. So wird *jīvanmukti* auch im *Yogavāsiṣṭha* (vgl. Slaje 1994: 94f.) vertreten, ebenso im Sāṃkhya, Yoga und in den śivaitischen Schulen (vgl. Fort und Mumme 1996 sowie Oberhammer 1994: 75ff.)

[3] Vgl. Mesquita 1994.

[4] Hiriyanna 1951: 199. Ähnlich Puthiadam 1985: 293: "It is true that Madhva does not accept the doctrine of jīvanmukti. But something equivalent is to be found in his teaching." In diesem Sinne auch Radhakrishnan 1929: Vol. I, p. 748; vgl. auch Sinha 1952: Vol. II, p. 699. Siauve, die uns einige vorzügliche Arbeiten über Madhva hinterlassen hat, geht auf die Problematik der *jīvanmukti* nicht explizit ein. Sie scheint diese – mit Verweis auf Jayatīrtha – eher in Abrede zu stellen (vgl. Siauve 1957: 51): "… l'illumination précède la délivrance et il est dit qu' entre ces deux moments la vie du *jīvanmukta*, du délivré vivant, continue sous l'effet de l'impulsion du *karman*, de la force des actes passés, jusqu'au moment où le stock du *prārabdhakarman* est épuisé. Cette assertion est absurde, réplique Jayatīrtha: *acetanānāṃ karmaṇāṃ svatantrabhagavatprasādapratibandhakatvāyogāt* (N.S. 68a, 1-2) 'parce qu'il ne se peut que de [résidus] inconscients d'actes aient capacité de faire obstacle à la grâce du Bienheureux qui est libre' … Pourtant les dvaitin reconnaissent bien eux-mêmes un délai entre la vision, (*aparokṣa-jñāna*) et la délivrance finale, mais cela ne tient pas au *prārabdha-karman* et cela ne met pas en cause l'unique causalité du Seigneur: *vastutas tu bhagavān evānāder api bandhasya nivartaka iti sādhūktam* | (N.S. 68a, 4) 'mais en réalité il est exact de dire que c'est le Bienheureux qui peut supprimer ce lien, bien qu'il soit sans commencement'"; vgl. dazu auch Siauve 1968: 269.

[5] Sheridan 1996: 91. Er gibt auch den Grund an, warum Madhva diesen Ausdruck vermieden haben könnte, wenn er behauptet (p. 94): "In the fourteenth century Madhva would not have used the term without seeming to agree with the Advaitin concept of liberation … ."

Karin Preisendanz (ed.), *Expanding and Merging Horizons*: *Contributions to South Asian and Cross-Cultural Studies in Commemoration of Wilhelm Halbfass*, Wien: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 2007, pp. 433-454.

living' ... is quite compatible with Madhva's teaching",[6] und er versucht außerdem zu zeigen, daß "Madhva's teaching of *aparokṣajñāna*, the direct and immediate knowledge of God, is functionally equivalent to Advaita Vedānta's teaching of *jīvanmukti*".[7] Diese eher zurückhaltende Auffassung Sheridans[8] steht jedoch im Gegensatz zu entscheidenden Aussagen Madhvas, die bisher bei der Ausarbeitung der Lehre zur *jīvanmukti* nicht herangezogen wurden. Im Folgenden wird daher neues, zu diesem Themenkreis gehörendes Material vorgelegt und unter besonderer Berücksichtigung der unbekannten Quellen Madhvas, die er als Belege für seine Lehre anführt, interpretiert.[9]

Als Ausgangspunkt dient hier ein unbekanntes, einer bekannten Quelle zugeschriebenes Textstück, das Madhva für die Auslegung der Strophe IV 4,20 des *Bhāgavatapurāṇa* heranzieht,[10] wo nicht nur der *terminus technicus* für die Erlösung bei Lebzeiten vorkommt,[11] sondern auch seine engere Definition. Die genannte Strophe lautet:

> *karma pravṛttaṃ ca nivṛttam apy uta vede vivicyobhayaliṅgam āśritam |*
> *virodhi tad yaugapadaikakartari dvayaṃ tathābrahmaṇi karma na ṛcchati ||.*

In Entsprechung zu den textlichen Veränderungen, die Madhva hier vornimmt (er liest *uta* statt *ṛtam* bzw. *tathā ābrahmaṇi* statt *tathā brahmaṇi*), könnte man diese Strophe folgendermaßen wiedergeben:

> Da im Veda die [rituelle] Handlung entweder [als mit diesseitiger bzw. jenseitiger] Belohnung [verbunden] oder auch [damit] nicht [verbunden] unterschieden wird,[12] wird [dort eine Handlung] mit zweifachem Merkmal angenommen. Kommt diese Handlung mit zweifachem [Merkmal] gleichzeitig bei einem einzigen Täter vor, so ist es widersprüchlich. Gewiß kommt [diese] Handlung [mit zweifachem Merkmal] bei [einem, der eine richtige bzw. unmittelbare Erkenntnis hat,] die das Brahman beinhaltet, nicht vor.

Aus der im Kommentar Madhvas darauf folgenden Paraphrase *ābrahmaṇi samyagjñānini* folgt, daß er die Strophe im Sinne einer Erlösung bei Lebzeiten versteht. Er untermauert diese Auslegung durch ein Zitat aus dem *Bhaviṣyatpurāṇa*:

> *ābrahmā sthitadhīr jīvanmuktaś cety abhidhīyate |*
> *yas tasya na nivṛttaṃ ca pravṛttaṃ karma ceṣyate |*
> *yat tu devāḥ prakurvanti sa mahāniyamaḥ smṛtaḥ |*
> *svargādyarthaṃ pravṛttaṃ syān nivṛttaṃ muktaye tu yat |*
> *sa mahāniyamo nāma karma yat tv ādhikārikam |*

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[6] Ibidem.

[7] Ibidem.

[8] Sheridan spricht immer wieder bloß von einer "functional similarity" bzw. davon, daß "the term *jīvanmukti* … was later equated with his teaching of *aparokṣa-jñāna* by his commentator Vyāsatīrtha (1460–1539)" (vgl. Sheridan 1996: 94; 107). Zurückhaltung übt auch Dasgupta 1975: Vol. IV, p. 88: "... Thus Madhva favours the doctrine of *jīvanmukti*."

[9] Die Problematik der unbekannten literarischen Quellen Madhvas habe ich anderswo ausführlich behandelt; vgl. Mesquita 1997 und Mesquita 2000.

[10] *BhāgTN* p. 280,10f. (vgl. dazu auch *BhāgP* IV 29,13 und VII 15,47); vgl. auch *MS* XII 89-90 und *KūrmaP* I 2,63f., unten n. 28.

[11] Auch anderswo ist dieser Terminus belegt, z.B. im *AiUBh* (p. 209,8f.) zusammen mit *videhamukti*; vgl. dazu auch *BSūBh* p. 198,25f. In manchen anderen fiktiven Zitaten gibt Madhva diese Lehre in äquivalenten Formulierungen wieder, wie in *Anuv* p. 187,13-15: *... iti paiṅgiśruter*, *BhāgTN* p. 51,10-11: *... iti brahmavaivarte*, ibid. p. 266,8-9: *... iti skānde*, ibid. p. 272,3-5: *... iti harivaṃśeṣu*, ibid. p. 352,1-2: *... iti harivaṃśeṣu*, ibid. p. 602,7-8: *... iti vārāhe*, und *GīBh* p. 4,29-30: *... iti skānde*; vgl. dazu auch unten nn. 15, 57, 65, 66, 67, 75, 86 und 88.

[12] Diese Auffassung von *pravṛtta* und *nivṛtta* wird auch im *MBh* (XII 327,61f.) als Meinung Kapilas überliefert, vgl. Bronkhorst 1998: 75f.; vgl. dazu auch *GīBh* p. 27,3f. *ad Gī* II 47 und *GīBhŚ*, unten n. 17.

mahato niyamād viṣṇoḥ prītyā muktau sukhonnatiḥ |
kecin nivṛttam ity āhur mahāniyamam apy uta |
iti bhaviṣyatpurāṇe (nicht überliefert).

"Für den [Weisen], dessen feste Erkenntnis Brahman beinhaltet und der Lebenderlöster genannt wird, wird nicht eine Handlung angenommen, die [mit diesseitiger bzw. jenseitiger] Belohnung [verbunden ist und zugleich auch] eine Handlung, die [damit] nicht [verbunden ist]. Was aber die Götter ausführen, das wird als großes Gelübde überliefert. [Die Handlung,] welche um des Himmels usw. willen [ausgeführt wird], die wäre [eine Handlung,] die [mit jenseitiger] Belohnung [verbunden ist], während aber jene [Handlung,] die zum Zweck der Erlösung [ausgeführt wird, eine Handlung wäre,] die [mit diesseitiger bzw. jenseitiger] Belohnung nicht [verbunden ist]. Dieses große Gelübde ist nämlich eine Handlung, welche vorrangig ist. Wegen [dieses] großen Gelübdes [und] auf Grund der Liebe zu Viṣṇu ergibt sich eine Vermehrung der Freude in der Erlösung. Auch nennen einige [die Handlung,] die nicht [mit diesseitiger bzw. jenseitiger] Belohnung [verbunden ist], eben das große Gelübde." So [heißt es] im *Bhaviṣyatpurāṇa*.

Analysiert man den Sachverhalt dieses Zitates, so fällt zunächst auf, daß es Züge einer fiktiven Quelle zeigt, die ich anderswo bereits beschrieben habe.[13] Denn das Zitat folgt der diesbezüglichen Eigenaussage Madhvas. Außerdem ist es nicht lokalisierbar, obwohl es einem bekannten Purāṇa-Werk zugewiesen wird. Darüber hinaus wird im Zitat ein Thema angesprochen, das in der Strophe aus *BhāgP* bzw. in der knappen Paraphrase Madhvas nicht enthalten ist, nämlich das Wirken der Götter als Vorbild für die Menschen. Denn die Götter handeln nicht um der Frucht willen. Deshalb wird darin ihr Wirken als "großes Gelübde" gepriesen, ein Ausdruck, mit dem einige Gelehrte auch das selbstlose Handeln der Menschen bezeichnen (= Zitat im Zitat!). Interessant ist nun, daß Madhva dabei einen weiteren unidentifizierten Beleg, den er ebenfalls einem Purāṇa-Werk zuschreibt, anschließt:

yadi devāś ca ṛṣyādyā nindyante yatra kutracit |
na tāvatā guṇair hīnāḥ sthitaprajñā hi te matāḥ |
yathāyogyaṃ tu tātparyaṃ nindāyām anyad eva tu |
iti gāruḍe.

"Wenn Götter, Ṛṣis und andere [Wesen] manchmal getadelt werden, sind sie somit nicht [ihrer] Eigenschaften/Tugenden [, die ihnen je nach ihrer inneren seinsmäßigen Fähigkeit zukommen][14] beraubt. Denn sie werden für [erlöste Wesen] mit fester Erkenntnis gehalten. Im Tadel kommt aber eben ein anderer geeigneter Sinn zum Ausdruck [dem weder Haß noch Neid zugrundeliegt]." So [heißt es] im *Garuḍapurāṇa*.[15]

Damit beendet Madhva seinen Kommentar der genannten Strophe. Auch hier kommen Aspekte der Erlösung zur Sprache, die zu dem Grundtext des *BhāgP* keinen Bezug haben. Madhva geht darauf aber in seinem *Anuvyākhyāna*[16] in selbständiger Form ein, sodaß man sagen kann, daß auch hier Madhva selber spricht:

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[13] Vgl. Mesquita 1997: 17f.; 72f.; 101f.

[14] Vgl. Mesquita 2000: 506, n. 663.

[15] In *BSūBh* pp. 226,19-227,9 führt Madhva ein weiteres fiktives Zitat an, das er ebenfalls diesem Purāṇa zuschreibt. Darin werden alle Erlösungsarten beschrieben, beginnend mit der Lebenderlösung (ohne den *terminus technicus*: *... kecid atraiva mucyante notkrāmanti kadācana*) gefolgt von der Stufen-Erlösung (*kramamukti*) und der *videhamukti*: *gāruḍe ca –*

ātmety eva paraṃ devam upāsya harim avyayam |
kecid atraiva mucyante notkrāmanti kadācana |
atraiva ca sthitis teṣām …

Ähnlich ebenfalls in *GīT* p. 160,20-23: … *aparokṣadṛśo viṣṇoḥ śarīre 'pi sataḥ purā ... iti mahāvarāhe*; vgl. dazu auch ein anderes unechtes Zitat zum Thema aus dem genannten *Garuḍapurāṇa* in *GīBh* pp. 35,12-14 und 29,17-18 bzw. aus dem *Vāyupurāṇa* in *BSūBh* p. 158,12-14 und ibid. p. 221,12-14: *bhaviṣyatpurāṇe ca ...* bzw. auch aus dem *Brahmāṇḍapurāṇa* im *AiUBh* p. 220,19-22, vgl. unten n. 18.

[16] *Anuv* p. 173,15, vgl. unten n. 86; *SŚS* 19cd. S. auch *GīBhŚ ad* XIII 13: *uttarapakṣa*.

vikarmalepo naivāsti samyagdṛṣṭimatāṃ kvacit |
guṇahāniś ca naivāsti brahmaṇas tv avikarmataḥ ||.

Die unterschiedliche Zielrichtung der obigen beiden fiktiven Zitate ist nur scheinbar. Denn beide Zitate bekräftigen die Kernaussage, daß die Überwindung des Wesenskreislaufes nur durch Handlungen möglich ist, die nicht zweckorientiert sind (*nivṛttaṃ karma*). Handlungen, die von einem Zweck geleitet sind (*pravṛttaṃ karma*), erzeugen neues Karman, das die Menschen an den Wesenskreislauf bindet (*abandhakatvaṃ tv akāmenaiva bhavati*).[17] Und das Stadium der Begierdelosigkeit, in dem das *pravṛttaṃ karma* keinen Platz hat, erreicht man auf dem Weg der yogischen Übungen, welche die Zügelung der Sinne bewirken und schließlich zur Versenkung (*samādhi*) führen. Die beiden Zitate aus den Purāṇen weisen auf diesen Weg hin, wenn sie vom Lebenderlösten als dem *sthitadhī* bzw. *sthitaprajña* sprechen.[18] Somit wird in diesen Belegen eine direkte Verbindung mit dem Yoga-Weg in der *Gī* (II 51f.) hergestellt:

karmajaṃ buddhiyuktā hi phalaṃ tyaktvā manīṣiṇaḥ |
janmabandhavinirmuktāḥ padaṃ gacchanty anāmayam ||.

Es ist daher nicht zufällig, daß Madhva im *GīBh* das Pratīka *buddhiyuktāḥ* mit *samyagjñāninaḥ* wiedergibt,[19] mit dem er oben in seiner Paraphrase zu *BhāgP ad* IV 4,20 den Lebenderlösten beschrieben hat. In Übereinstimmung damit werden in *Gī* II 54-56[20] weitere Merkmale eines Lebenderlösten aufgezählt: *sthitadhī*, *sthitaprajña*, *samādhisthita*. Dazu bemerkt Madhva im *GīBh*:

na hi samādhiṃ kurvatas tasya śubhāśubhaprāptir asti | asaṃprajñātasamādheḥ | saṃprajñāte tv avirodhaḥ | tathāpi na tatraiveti niyamaḥ |

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[17] Vgl. *GīBh* p. 39,13. Es handelt sich dabei um einen wichtigen Topos der Erlösungslehre, den wir auch bei anderen Autoren finden; vgl. z.B. Śrīdhara (= Mesquita 1995: 235f.: *lābhapūjādiprayojanam anabhisandhāya* ...), Kumārila (= Mesquita 1994: 458f.) und Śaṅkara: *pravṛttiḥ pravartanaṃ bandhahetuḥ karmamārgaḥ śāstravihitaviṣayaḥ … nivṛttir mokṣahetuḥ saṃnyāsamārgaḥ ... pravṛttinivṛttī karmasaṃnyāsamārgāv iti avagamyate* (*GīBhŚ ad* XVIII 30; vgl. auch Bos 1983: 170f. und Oberhammer 1994: 18f.). In diesem Sinne auch im *Yogavāsiṣṭha* (Slaje 2000: 174f.), jedoch mit dem Unterschied, daß *vairāgya* nicht als Erlösungsmittel aufgefaßt wird, sondern als Ziel (Slaje 2000: 180).

[18] Vgl. *BSūBh* p.158,12-14: *vāyuprokte ca* – (nicht überliefert)
sthitaprajñatvam āptā ye jñānena paramātmanaḥ |
brahmalokaṃ gatāḥ sarve brahmaṇā ca paraṃ gatāḥ |
tīrṇatartavyabhāgāś ca svecchayopāsate param | iti.
Der Ausdruck *sthitaprajña* erscheint auch bei den Advaita-Autoren als Wesensmerkmal eines *jīvanmukta*. So z.B. bei Śaṅkara: *sthitaprajñalakṣaṇāni* (Bos 1983: 168f.), Vimuktātman: ... *ityādīni jīvanmuktivacanāni sthitaprajñāguṇātītalakṣaṇavacanāni copapannārthāni bhavanti* (*IS* p. 77,13-15) und Citsukha in seiner *Citsukhī* (*CS* p. 609,6f.) (so auch der spätere Advaitin Vidyāraṇya [vgl. Sprockhoff 1970: 137]). Maṇḍanamiśra dürfte der einzige Advaita-Autor sein, der unter *sthitaprajña* nicht einen *siddha* (= *jīvanmukta*) versteht, sondern einen *sādhaka* (*BS* p. 130,19-21). Citsukha widerlegt die Ansicht Maṇḍanas (o.c.). Und Sarvajñātman – zuerst selber Anhänger der These von *jīvanmukti* – gibt sie dann zugunsten der sofortigen Erlösung (*sadyomukti*) gänzlich auf (vgl. Mesquita 2000: 181, n. 375).

[19] *GīBh* p. 29,31-32: *buddhiyuktāḥ samyagjñānino bhūtvā padaṃ gacchanti | sayogakarma jñānasādhanam | tan mokṣasādhanam iti bhāvaḥ.*

[20] *Gī* II 54-56: *arjuna uvāca –*
sthitaprajñasya kā bhāṣā samādhisthitasya keśava |
sthitadhīḥ kiṃ prabhāṣeta kim āsīta vrajeta kim ||54||
śrībhagavān uvāca –
prajahāti yadā kāmān sarvān pārtha manogatān |
ātmany evātmanā tuṣṭaḥ sthitaprajñas tadocyate ||55||
duḥkheṣv anudvignamanā sukheṣu vigataspṛhaḥ |
vītarāgabhayakrodhaḥ sthitadhīr munir ucyate ||56||.

kāmādayo na jāyante hy api vikṣiptacetasām |
jñāninām jñānanirdhūtamalānāṃ devasaṃśrayāt |
iti smṛteḥ.[21]

Denn einer, der Versenkung übt, erfährt, sofern er sich in einer nichterkenntnishaften Versenkung befindet, weder [weltliches] Glück noch Unglück. [Das] steht aber nicht in Konflikt zu erkenntnishafter [Versenkung]. [Aber] selbst [wenn sie erkenntnishafte Versenkung ist,] gibt es da auch [weder weltliches Glück noch Unglück]. So ist die Regel, weil die Überlieferung [nicht identifiziert!] lehrt: "Den Erkennenden, deren Bewußtsein geschwunden ist [und] deren Makel durch das [erlösende] Wissen vernichtet sind, entstehen, da sie zu Gott [Viṣṇu] Zuflucht [nehmen], doch keine [Befleckungen] wie Begierde."

In seinem Kommentar zur *Gī* (*ad* III 17) finden wir die gleichen Gedanken, die Madhva in ein fiktives Zitat verpackt:

ātmaratir evety (= *Gī* III 17a) *avadhāraṇād asaṃprajñātasamādhisthasyaiva kāryaṃ na vidyate |*
sthitaprajñasyāpi kāryo dehādir dṛśyate yadā |
svadharmo[22] *mama tuṣṭyarthaḥ sā hi sarvair apekṣitā |*
iti vacanāc ca pañcarātre.

Auf Grund der Feststellung *ātmaratir eva* gibt es eben für einen, der sich in einer nichterkenntnishaften Versenkung befindet, keine [Handlung], die er auszuführen hat, wegen der [folgenden] Aussage in der *Pañcarātra*[*-Saṃhitā*]: "Auch von einem, der die feste Erkenntnis hat (d.h. lebenderlöst ist), ist [eigene Dharma-Pflicht] auszuführen, wenn der Körper usw. gesehen wird (= *saṃprajñātasamādhi*). [Der Vollzug] der eigenen Dharma[-Pflicht] erfolgt zum Zwecke meiner [= Viṣṇus] Zufriedenheit. Diese wird nämlich von allen erwünscht."

In Einklang damit stehen auch Madhvas Ausführungen zur *Gī* (*ad* VI 3), wenn er die Frage bespricht, wie lange man die Yoga-Übungen ausführen soll (*kiyatkālaṃ karma kartavyam*). Die Antwort: bis man die unmittelbare Erkenntnis und damit die *jīvanmukti* erlangt hat und sogar noch darüber hinaus.[23] In diesem Sinne paraphrasiert Madhva das Pratīka *yogārūḍhasya* als *aparokṣajñāninaḥ*. Dieser Zustand im Leben eines *jīvanmukta* umfaßt sowohl die nichterkenntnishafte als auch die erkenntnishafte Versenkung.[24] Während in der nichterkenntnishaften Versenkung alle weltlichen Tätigkeiten zur Ruhe kommen, da der Lebenderlöste sein individuelles Bewußtsein verliert,[25] verweilt der Lebenderlöste in der erkenntnishaften Versenkung in der Ausführung der Bhakti-Werke, selbst wenn er in eine Notsituation gerät.[26] Auch hier unterstreicht Madhva seine Deutung durch ein fiktives Zitat:

aparokṣajñānino 'pi samādhyādiphalam uktam | tasya sarvopaśamena samādhir eva kāraṇaṃ prādhānyenety arthaḥ | tathāpi yadā bhoktavyoparamas tadaiva samyag asaṃprajñātasamādhir jāyate | anyadā tu bhagavaccaritādau sthitiḥ | tac coktam –

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[21] *GīBh* p. 31,21-24.

[22] Vgl. *GīT* p. 1,20: *bhaktyā bhagavadārādhanam eva paramadharmas tadviruddhaḥ sarvo 'py adharmaḥ*; ibid. p. 2,13: *... ityādinā svadharmeṇa bhagavadārādhanasyaiva kartavyatvaṃ tadanyasya tyājyatvaṃ ca*.

[23] Vgl. *BSūBh* p. 197,24-26: *iti brahmāṇḍe* (nicht überliefert); Mesquita 1994: 469, n. 89; Mesquita 1995: 226 und 242, n. 104.

[24] Vgl. *NyāV* p. 220,22-23: *svena rūpeṇābhiniṣpadyata iti muktasya spaṣṭaṃ pratibhātatvāc chrutam* (= *ChU* VIII 3,4) und *BSūBh* p. 220,4-6. So auch Śrīdhara (vgl. Mesquita 1995: 241f.) und Kumārila (Mesquita 1994: 471f.).

[25] Vgl. *Anuv* p. 153,18:

śravaṇādi vinā naiva kṣaṇaṃ tiṣṭhed api kvacit |
atyaśakye tu nidrādau punar eva samācaret |;

vgl. auch *GīBh* p. 4,29-30: *... iti skānde* und *NK* p. 687,15f.: *... ātmatattvajñānam eva kevalaṃ tadānīṃ saṃjāyate na bahiḥsaṃvedanam | bāhyendriyavyāpāroparamāt*; vgl. oben n. 24.

[26] Vgl. *SŚS* 21: *... nityam upāsanaṃ kāryam āpady api brahma tena yāty aparokṣatām.*

ye tvāṃ paśyanti bhagavaṃs ta eva sukhinaḥ param |
teṣām eva ca samyak tu samādhir jāyate nṛṇām |
bhoktavyakarmaṇy akṣīṇe japena kathayāpi vā |
vartayanti mahātmānas tvadbhāktās tvatparāyaṇāḥ | iti.

Die Yoga-Übung bewirkt also eine feste Erkenntnis (*sthitadhī*, *sthitaprajñā*) und diese ermöglicht ihrerseits die rechte Ausführung der rituellen Handlungen im Sinne des *nivṛttaṃ karma*. Aus verschiedenen Redewendungen Madhvas geht hervor, daß er damit in erster Linie die frommen Werke der Bhakti meint.[27] Madhva führt dies später im *GīBh* mit Hilfe einer teilweise fiktiven Quelle näher aus:

tasmāj jñāninām karmāpy anuṣṭheyam | karmiṇām api gṛhasthānāṃ jñātavyo bhagavān | na hi jñānaṃ vinā karmaṇaḥ samyaganuṣṭhānaṃ bhavati |
niṣkāmaṃ jñānapūrvaṃ ca nivṛttam iha cocyate |
nivṛttaṃ sevamānas tu brahmābhyeti sanātanam |
buddhyāvihiṃsan puṣpair vā praṇavena samarcayet |
vāsudevātmakaṃ brahma mūlamantreṇa vā yatiḥ |
muktir astīti niyamo brahmadṛg yasya vidyate |
tasyāpy ānandavṛddhiḥ syād vaiṣṇavaṃ karma kurvataḥ |
karma brahmadṛśā hīnaṃ na mukhyam iti kīrtitam |
tasmāt karmeti tat prāhur yat kṛtaṃ brahmadarśinā |
etasmān nyāsināṃ lokaṃ saṃyānti gṛhiṇo 'pi hi |
jñānamārgaḥ karmamārga iti bhedas tato na hi |
tasmād āśramabhedo 'yaṃ karmasaṃkocasaṃbhavaḥ |
iti vyāsasmṛteḥ |
mokṣopāyo yoga iti tadrūpo nyāsa eva tu |
viṣṇvarpitatayā bhadro nānyo nyāsaḥ kathaṃcana |
ity āgneye.[28]

Daher müssen die Wissenden [auch rituelle] Handlung[en] ausführen. Ebenso müssen die Hausväter, die [rituelle] Handlungen vollziehen, den erhabenen [Viṣṇu] erkennen. Denn ohne die Erkenntnis [des Viṣṇu] ist die richtige Ausführung der [rituellen] Handlung[en] nicht möglich, weil in der *Vyāsasmṛti* [gelehrt wird]: "Eine begierdelose [Handlung], die das [wahre] Wissen voraussetzt, wird hier [eine Handlung] genannt, die [weder mit diesseitiger noch jenseitiger] Belohnung [verbunden ist]. Einer aber, der [eine Handlung] ausführt, die [mit einer] Belohnung nicht [verbunden ist], der geht in das ewige Brahman ein. Ein Asket möge Brahman mit dem Selbst des Vāsudeva verehren[29] entweder mit dem inneren Sinn oder mit Blumen, ohne [diese] zu verletzen,

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[27] Vgl. auch *BhāgTN* p. 4,16: *dharma iti | projjhitakaitavo 'phalāpekṣayā | īśvarārpeṇa paramaḥ*; vgl. oben n. 22. So auch Śaṅkara, *GīBhŚ* (*Upodghāta*): *... īśvarāspaṇabuddhyānuṣṭhīyamānaḥ sattvaśuddhaye bhavati phalābhisandhivarjitaḥ*; ibid. *ad* V 11.

[28] *GīT* p. 59,20-29; vgl. auch *MuUBh* p. 492,22-23 und *GīBh* p. 27,12 sowie p. 39,15f. (die erste Strophe wird hier als *Manusmṛti* [!] zitiert, in *BhāgTN* p. 660,5-6 jedoch wird sie dem *Mahābhārata* zugeordnet). Vgl. *MS* XII 89-90:

iha cāmutra vā kāmyaṃ pravṛttaṃ karma kīrtyate |
niṣkāmaṃ jñānapūrvaṃ tu nivṛttam upadiśyate ||
pravṛttaṃ karma saṃsevya devānām eti sāmyatām |
nivṛttaṃ sevamānas tu bhūtāny eti pañca vai ||;

vgl. dazu auch *KūrmaP* I 2,63f.:

tasmāj jñānena sahitaṃ karmayogaṃ samāśrayet |
pravṛttaṃ ca nivṛttaṃ dvividhaṃ karma vaidikam ||
jñānapūrvaṃ nivṛttaṃ syāt pravṛttaṃ yad ato 'nyathā |
nivṛttaṃ sevamānas tu yāti tat paramaṃ padam ||
tasmān nivṛttaṃ saṃsevyam anyathā saṃsaret punaḥ | ... .

[29] Madhva dürfte hier der Pañcarātra-Lehre folgen, nach der Gott Viṣṇu sich vierfach differenziert (*vyūhabheda*) als Vāsudeva, Saṃkarṣaṇa, Pradyumna und Aniruddha, um im Ritual zum Objekt der Verehrung zu werden; vgl. Oberhammer 1971: 49.

> oder mit der Keimsilbe Oṃ. Demjenigen, dem die Brahma-Schau [und] die Gewißheit, daß [er] erlöst ist, zukommt, diesem käme auch eine Zunahme an Wonne zu, sofern er das viṣṇuitische Ritual ausführt. Man nennt eine [rituelle] Handlung ohne Brahma-Schau nicht das Vorrangige. Deshalb lehren [die Weisen], daß jene Handlung, welche von einem Brahma-Seher ausgeführt wird, eine [vorrangige rituelle d.h. *mahāniyama*][30] Handlung ist. Deshalb gehen nämlich auch die Hausväter in die Welt der Entsager ein [d.h. sie sind diesen gleich]. Daher gibt es ja keinen Unterschied zwischen *jñānamārga* und *karmamārga*. Aus diesem Grund bewirkt der Unterschied zwischen den [verschiedenen] Lebensstadien eine Einengung [des Begriffes] *karman* [, da das *nivṛttaṃ karma* kein unterscheidendes Merkmal der Entsager ist]."[31]
> Im *Agnipurāṇa* [heißt es]: "Der Yoga ist das Mittel zur Erlösung. Die Entsagung ist eben seine Form. Es gibt niemals eine andere erfreuliche Entsagung, da sie Viṣṇu gewährt."

Die beiden hier angeführten Quellen sind ebenfalls fiktiv. Nur der erste Śloka, den Madhva je verschiedenen Werken zuschreibt, gleicht am ehesten einer im *KūrmaP* überlieferten Strophe. Auffallenderweise wird dieses Purāṇa von Madhva in diesem Zusammenhang nirgends erwähnt.[32]

Der Inhalt des ersten Zitates aus der *Vyāsasmṛti* fügt sich genau in die Thematik des fiktiven Zitates aus dem *Bhaviṣyatpurāṇa* in *BhāgT*, nämlich *nivṛttaṃ karma* ein. Wie in *BhāgTN* (*viṣṇoḥ prītyā muktau sukhonnatiḥ*) werden auch hier die vedischen rituellen Handlungen mit dem viṣṇuitischen Ritual bzw. der Bhakti gekoppelt und zum Grund für die Zunahme der Wonne erklärt (*ānandavṛddhiḥ syād vaiṣṇavam karma kurvataḥ*). *ābrahmā sthitadhīḥ* bzw. *ābrahman samyagjñānin* in *BhāgTN* wird hier durch *brahmadṛk* ersetzt. Eine Entsprechung findet dies auch in der Beschreibung des *nivṛttaṃ karma* im *Bhaviṣyatpurāṇa* als *mahāniyama*, die als Meinung von einigen Weisen *kecin nivṛttam ity āhur mahāniyamam* wiedergegeben wurde. Denn auch hier wird diese Handlung als *karman* im eigentlichen Sinne charakterisiert und diese Auslegung in den Mund der Weisen gelegt: *tasmāt karmeti tat prāhur yat kṛtaṃ brahmadarśinā*. Neu ist hingegen, daß das Ideal der Lebensstadien als vier verschiedene Ziele stark relativiert wird.[33] Relativiert wird auch die Rolle der rituellen Handlungen als selbständiger Erlösungsweg, da sie vom *jñānamārga* abhängig sind bzw. darunter subsumiert werden.

In Ergänzung dieser Gedanken unterscheidet Madhva in *GīBh ad* III 32 zwischen den nicht zweckorientierten rituellen Handlungen und der unmittelbaren Erkenntnis (*aparokṣajñāna*). Dabei sind erstere der unmittelbaren Erkenntnis untergeordnet, da sie bloß zur Reinigung des inneren Sinnes dienen:

> *akāmakarmaṇām antaḥkaraṇaśuddhidvārā jñānān mokṣo bhavati* | *tac coktam –*
> *karmabhiḥ śuddhasattvasya vairāgyaṃ jāyate hṛdi* |
> *iti bhāgavate* (nicht überliefert!) | *viraktānām eva ca jñānam ity uktam*.[34]

Madhva untermauert diese Gliederung wiederum durch ein fiktives Quellenzitat, indem er die Rolle des *aparokṣajñāna* als des einzigen Erlösungsmittels unterstreicht:

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[30] Vgl. oben p. 435.

[31] Vgl. dazu auch *GīBh* p. 39,17f.: *saṃnyāsaḥ kāmyakarmaparityāgaḥ ... viraktānām eva ca jñānam uktam ... ato na karmatyāga eva mokṣasādhanam* | *yatyāśramas tu prāyatyārtho bhagavattoṣārthaś ca* | *aprayatatvam eva hi prāyo gṛhasthādīnām* | *itarakarmodyogāt* | *aprayatānāṃ ca na jñānam* (vgl. unten n. 42); Śaṅkara: *nivṛttir mokṣahetuḥ saṃnyāsamārgaḥ* (vgl. oben n. 17).

[32] Vgl. oben nn. 17 und 28.

[33] Vgl. oben Madhvas Kritik an der herkömmlichen Auffassung von einem Saṃnyāsin. Ähnliche Einschränkungen wurden auch im *Yogavāsiṣṭha* und ebenfalls von Abhinavagupta vertreten (vgl. Slaje 2000: 180, n. 87).

[34] *GīBh* p. 39,18-19, vgl. oben n. 31; *SŚS* 15cd, vgl. oben n. 27.

ye tv evaṃ nivṛttakarmiṇas te 'pi mucyante jñānadvārā | kimv aparokṣajñāninaḥ | na tu sādhanāntaram ucyate –

nivṛttādīni karmāṇi hy aparokṣeśadṛṣṭaye |
aparokṣeśadṛṣṭis tu muktau kiṃcin na mārgate |
sarvaṃ tad antarādhāya muktaye sādhanaṃ bhavet |
na kiṃcid antarādhāya nirvāṇāyāparokṣadṛk |

iti hy uktaṃ nārāyaṇāṣṭākṣarakalpe.

Jene aber, die auf diese Weise Handlungen vollziehen, die nicht [mit einer] Belohnung [verbunden] sind, auch diese werden mittels der Erkenntnis erlöst. Wieviel mehr diejenigen, die eine unmittelbare Erkenntnis besitzen? Es wird aber kein anderes Mittel [dazu] genannt. Das wurde nämlich im *Nārāyaṇāṣṭākṣarakalpa* verkündet: "Handlungen nämlich ohne [Verbindung mit] einer Belohnung dienen zur unmittelbaren Schau des Herrn. Die unmittelbare Schau [des Herrn] aber sucht um der Erlösung willen nach nichts [anderem, d.h. sie ist mit der Erlösung identisch]. Alle Mittel, insofern sie diese [unmittelbare Schau des Herrn] enthalten, richten sich auf die Erlösung. Die unmittelbare Schau dient, da sie gar nichts enthält, dem Nirvāṇa."

Die letzte Konsequenz dieses Standpunktes ist, daß Madhva die von Vedānta-Autoren und auch von Kumārila, Śrīdhara usw.[35] vertretene These vom *jñānakarmasamuccayavāda* entschieden ablehnt: *ata eva samuccayaniyamo 'pi nirākṛtaḥ*. Damit dürfte auch feststehen, daß nicht erst Vyāsatīrtha im 16. Jahrhundert es war, der die Auffassung von *aparokṣajñāna* mit *jīvanmukti* verbunden hat,[36] sondern Madhva selbst.

Interessanterweise stimmt Madhvas Beschreibung des Phänomens der Erlösung als "die unmittelbare Schau des Herrn" mit der diesbezüglichen Auffassung der theistischen Autoren, wie etwa Śrīdhara und Bhāsarvajña, überein.[37] So gibt es hier auch keine Notwendigkeit zu der Annahme, daß Madhva bei seiner Lehre von *jīvanmukti* eine Anleihe bei Śaṅkara gemacht hätte.[38]

Eine Ähnlichkeit mit der Auffassung Śrīdharas ist auch in einem anderen Punkt gegeben, wenn es darum geht, die Rolle der nicht zweckorientierten rituellen Handlungen im Erlösungsprozeß zu bestimmen. Śrīdhara legt besonderen Wert darauf, daß die Ausführung der rituellen Handlungen dazu dient, die Sünden zu tilgen (*pratyavāyanirodhārthaṃ vihitāni anuṣṭheyāni*).[39] Madhva bezieht dazu in *GīBh ad* III 20 folgendermaßen Stellung:

yatra ca tīrthādy eva muktisādhanam ucyate –

brahmajñānena vā muktiḥ prayāgamaraṇena vā |
athavā snānamātreṇa gomatyāḥ kṛṣṇasannidhau |

ityādau tatra pāpādimuktiḥ | stutiparatā ca | tatrāpi hi kutracid brahmajñānasādhanatvam evocyate 'nyathā muktiṃ niṣidhya –

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[35] Vgl. *NK* p. 683,11f.: *kiṃ jñānamātrān muktiḥ | uta jñānakarmasamuccayāt | jñānakarmasamuccayād iti vadāmaḥ*. Im Gegensatz dazu relativieren diese beiden Autoren diese Aussage, indem sie dem *karmamārga* eher eine vorbereitende Rolle zuschreiben; vgl. Mesquita 1994: 463f. und 469 sowie Mesquita 1995: 220, n. 23.

[36] Vgl. oben n. 8.

[37] Vgl. *NK*, *maṅgala*-Vers:

dhyānaikatānamanaso vigatapracārāḥ paśyanti yaṃ kam api nirmalam advitīyam |
jñānātmane vighaṭitākhilabandhanāya tasmai namo bhagavate puruṣottamāya ||

und *NyāBh* p. 590,7-8: *tataḥ samādhiprakarṣātiśayaprāptāv acireṇaiva kālena bhagavantam anaupamyasvabhāvaṃ śivam avithataṃ pratyakṣataḥ paśyati*; vgl. dazu auch Mesquita 1995: 217f.

[38] Vgl. Sheridan 1996: 94.

[39] Vgl. Mesquita 1995: 226, n. 42. So auch Kumārila; vgl. Mesquita 1994: 469, n. 91. Diese Meinung ist in der purāṇischen und epischen Literatur weit verbreitet; vgl. z.B. *MatsyaP* XXII 8, 13 und 31f. sowie *MBh* XIII, Appendix 15, 3091f.

brahmajñānaṃ vinā muktir na kathaṃcid apīṣyate |
prayāgādes tu yā muktir jñānopāyatvam eva hi |
ityādau ... yathāha bhagavān –
yāni tīrthādivākyāni karmādiviṣayāṇi ca |
stāvakāny eva tāni syur ajñānāṃ mohakāni vā |
bhaven mokṣas tu maddṛṣṭer nānyatas tu kathaṃcana |
iti nāradīye | ato 'parokṣajñānād eva mokṣaḥ | karma tu tatsādhanam eva.

Und dort, wo [z.B. mit Aussagen] wie "Die Erlösung [kommt zustande] entweder auf Grund der Brahma-Erkenntnis, oder durch den Tod in Prayāga, oder bloß durch das Baden [im Fluß] von Gomatī in der Gegenwart des Kṛṣṇa", [festgestellt wird], daß nur die Wallfahrtsorte usw. das Mittel für die Erlösung sind, [so] ist das Loswerden von Sünden usw. [gemeint]. Auch haben sie den Zweck, [die Wallfahrtsorte] zu loben. Denn auch in jeder beliebigen [von diesen Aussagen] wird gelehrt, daß nur die Brahma-Erkenntnis das Mittel [für die Erlösung] ist, nachdem man [mit Aussagen] wie "Niemals wird eine Erlösung ohne die Brahma-Erkenntnis vorgeschrieben. Die Erlösung [an den Wallfahrtsorten wird] doch [empfohlen, weil] Prayāga usw. bloß Mittel zur Erkenntnis [des Brahman] sind", eine Erlösung auf eine andere Weise verworfen hat. ... Wie [z.B.] der Erhabene [selber] im *Nāradīyapurāṇa* gelehrt hat: "Die Aussagen über die Wallfahrtsorte und [die Aussagen], die die rituellen Handlungen zum Gegenstand haben, können nur [die Wallfahrtsorte] loben oder sie können die Unwissenden verwirren. Die Erlösung aber kommt zustande, [nur] weil man mich schaut, und auf keine andere Weise." Daher geht die Erlösung nur aus der unmittelbaren Erkenntnis hervor. Die rituelle Handlung ist eben ein Mittel dazu.

Analysiert man diese Aussagen, so wird klar, daß auch Madhva wie Śrīdhara den Vollzug der rituellen Handlungen als ein Mittel auffasst, das zur Tilgung der Sünden führt (*pāpādimukti*). Im Gegensatz zu Śrīdhara lehrt Madhva, daß dieser Vollzug auch zur Erkenntnis führt (*karma tu tatsādhanam eva = nivṛttādīni karmāṇi hy aparokṣeśadṛṣṭaye*).[40] Somit ist die Erkenntnis einerseits eine Voraussetzung für die richtige Ausführung der rituellen Handlungen, und andererseits bewirken die richtig ausgeführten Handlungen ihrerseits eine Vermehrung der Erkenntnis,[41] die dann zur Erlösung führt. Dies belegt Madhva mit Hilfe einer fiktiven Quelle in *GīT ad* III 3:

jñānino mokṣaniyamas tathāpi śubhakarmaṇā |
ānandavṛddhir anyena hrāso jñānaṃ tu karmaṇā |
iti paramaśruteḥ.

Denn in der *Paramaśruti* [heißt es]: Dem Wissenden kommt die Gewißheit der Erlösung zu. Dennoch entsteht [bei ihm] auf Grund der reinen Handlung (d.h. der viṣṇuitischen Bhakti-Werke bzw. der dem göttlichen Wohlgefallen gewidmeten Handlungen) eine Zunahme an Wonne, auf Grund der anderen [Handlungen aber] ein Schwund [an Wonne]. Aus Handlung[en] aber entsteht die Erkenntnis.

Damit betont Madhva, daß man nur dann die erlösende Erkenntnis erlangen kann, wenn man tätig ist. Wäre die Erlösung auch einem möglich, der nicht tätig wird, so würden auch die ungeistigen Dinge Erlösung erlangen: *jñānam eva tatsādhanaṃ na tu karmākaraṇam ... yadi karmākareṇa muktiḥ syāt sthāvarāṇām*.[42] Tätigsein heißt auch die Anwendung der Erlösungsmittel. Darunter versteht Madhva auch die im Vedānta und im Anschluß an diesen auch die in anderen theistischen Schulen[43] anerkannten Schritte, wie die Rezeption des Wissens

[40] Vgl. oben *GīBh ad* III 32.
[41] Vgl. oben n. 28:
niṣkāmaṃ jñānapūrvaṃ ca nivṛttam iha cocyate |
nivṛttaṃ sevamānas tu brahmābhyeti sanātanam |.
Vgl. *BSūBh* (*ad BSū* IV 1,16): *agnihotrādy api mokṣe 'nubhavāyaiva tuśabdād brahmadarśanavataḥ.*
[42] *GīBh* p. 39,4f. und 17f.; vgl. oben n. 31.
[43] Vgl. Mesquita 1995: 233, n. 71 und Mesquita 1994: 462; Oberhammer 1984: 86f.

aus dem Munde eines Lehrers (*anuśravaṇa*),[44] das intellektuelle Erforschen (*manana*) und die meditative Vertiefung (*nididhyāsanā*). Auch diese Mittel führen zur unmittelbaren Erkenntnis, wie Madhva in seinem Kommentar zur *Gī* (*ad* VI 8) unter anderem folgenderweise erläutert:

> *na tasya manaḥ prāyo viṣayeṣu gacchati | tadā ca paramātmā samyag hṛdy āhitaḥ sannihito bhavati | aparokṣajñānī sa bhavatīty arthaḥ | ... tac coktam –*
> *śravaṇān mananāc caiva yaj jñānam upajāyate |*
> *taj jñānaṃ darśanaṃ viṣṇor vijñānaṃ śaṃbhur abravīt | ...*
> *ityādi* (nicht identifiziert).[45]

Auffallend ist, daß Madhva in vielen fiktiven Zitaten den Bhakti-Werken einen höheren Stellenwert als den vedischen Vorschriften einräumt, wie oben im Falle der Belegstelle aus der *Paramaśruti*. So lautet die Antwort auf eine Frage eines zum Veda-Studium Berufenen, daß er unaufhörlich und eifrig Viṣṇu meditative Verehrung entgegenbringen soll: *kiṃ mayā kāryam ity eva syād buddhir adhikārinaḥ ... upāsanā nityaṃ kartavyety ādareṇa hi*.[46] Bemerkenswert ist auch, daß er in diesem Zusammenhang angesprochene Erlösungsmittel bzw. die Yoga-Wege zur Erlangung des *aparokṣajñāna* unter *upāsanā* subsumiert:[47]

> *sopāsanā ca dvividhā śāstrābhyāsasvarūpiṇī |*
> *dhyānarūpā parā caiva tadaṅgaṃ dhāraṇādikam |.* [48]

Da die Erlösung eine Wirkung ist und jede Wirkung von Viṣṇu als *mūlakāraṇa* abhängt,[49] so ist die meditative Verehrung nicht das Ergebnis einer menschlichen Bemühung,[50] sondern letztlich eine Gnade, ein Geschenk Viṣṇus. So schreibt Madhva diese Gedanken seinem fiktiven Werk *Brahmatarka* zu:

> *nāhaṃ kartā hariḥ kartā tatpujā karma cākhilam |*
> *tathāpi matkṛtā pūjā tatprasādena nānyathā |*
> *tadbhaktis tatphalaṃ mahyaṃ tatprasādaḥ punaḥ punaḥ |*

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[44] Vgl. *BSūBh* p. 161,22-24 (*... iti vārāhe*) und *Anuv* p. 167,27f.:
samyag guruprasādaś ca mukhyato dṛṣṭikāraṇam |
śravaṇādi ca kartavyaṃ nānyathā darśanaṃ kvacit |
guṇādikaṃ guruṃ prāpya taddhīnaṃ nāpnuyāt kvacit | ... .

[45] Vgl. *BSūBh* p. 161,5f.: *... brahmatarke ca –*
śrutvā matvā tathā dhyātvā tadajñānaviparyayau |
saṃśayaṃ ca parāṇudya labhate brahmadarśanam | iti;
vgl. auch *Anuv* p. 153,14f.:
śravaṇaṃ mananaṃ caiva kartavyaṃ sarvathaiva hi |
matiśrutidhyānakālaviśeṣaṃ gurur uttamaḥ |
vetti tasyoktimārgeṇa kurvataḥ syād dhi darśanam | ... .

[46] *Anuv* p. 146,27-28; auch *NyāV* p. 207,10-11: *na cānyasyāpi sādhanasya kartuṃ śakyatvān na yāvan muktir dhyānaṃ kāryam iti vācyam | dhyānaṃ vināparokṣajñānākhyaviśeṣakāryānupapatteḥ*; vgl. auch oben n. 26.

[47] Auch Bhāsarvajña entfaltet seinen *upāsana*-Begriff in engem Zusammenhang mit *dhāraṇā* und ordnet den *upāsana*-Begriff dem Yoga über (vgl. Oberhammer 1984: 117ff.). Da Madhva in seiner Schlußlehre Bhāsarvajña zu folgen scheint (vgl. Mesquita 2000: 348f., n. 291 und 357, n. 314), wäre auch in diesem Fall eine Beeinflussung durch Bhāsarvajña denkbar; vgl. auch die diesbezügliche Lehre bei Maṇḍanamiśra (*BS* p. 134,1-12) und Śaṅkara (Bos 1983: 171).

[48] *Anuv* p. 146,29f. Ausführlich darüber Siauve 1968: 262ff.

[49] Vgl. dazu Mesquita 2000: 470ff. und 497ff.

[50] Vgl. *BSūBh* pp. 5,5 und 138,19: *paramātmāparokṣyaṃ ca tatprasādād eva na jīvaśaktyeti vaktum ucyate*; *NyāV* p. 127,21-24; *Anuv* p. 140,30: *avyakto 'pi svaśaktyaiva bhaktānāṃ dṛśyate hariḥ*; *GīBh* p. 18,19f.; vgl. dazu auch Mesquita 2000: 511ff., besonders p. 516. Dies dürfte auch der Grund gewesen sein, warum einige Anhänger Madhvas die Erlösung bei Lebzeiten abgelehnt haben; vgl. oben n. 4.

karmanyāso harāv evaṃ viṣṇos tṛptikaraḥ sadā |
yasmāt svatantrakartṛtvaṃ viṣṇor eva na cānyagam | ...
iti brahmatarkavacanāt ... .

Nicht ich bin der Täter, [vielmehr] der Täter ist Hari. Und alle [meine] Handlung[en] sind als [Bhakti-]Verehrung für ihn [zu verstehen]. Auch wenn [ihm diese] [Bhakti-]Verehrung von mir [entgegengebracht wird, ist sie nur] auf Grund [seiner] Gnade möglich, nicht anders. Bhakti zu ihm, ihre Frucht [wird] mir immer wieder als seine Gnade [zuteil]. Die vertrauensvolle Übergabe [meiner] Handlungen in die Obhut Haris bereitet in dieser Weise Viṣṇu immer eine Freude, weil Viṣṇu allein und kein anderer der unabhängige Urheber [von allem] ist.[51]

Nicht nur die meditative Verehrung ist von Viṣṇu abhängig, sondern auch die "Schau Viṣṇus" als deren Folge. Denn die unmittelbare Erkenntnis allein bewirkt von sich aus keine Erlösung. Dies führt Madhva folgenderweise aus:

narte tvat kriyate kiṃcid ityāder na hariṃ vinā |
jñānasvabhāvato 'pi syān muktiḥ kasyāpi hi kvacit |
ajñānāṃ jñānado viṣṇur jñānināṃ mokṣadaś ca saḥ |
ānandadaś ca muktānāṃ sa evaiko janārdanaḥ |.[52]

Eine sehr ambivalente Rolle spielt in diesem Zusammenhang die Bhakti.[53] Sehr wahrscheinlich faßt Madhva diese als *upāsanā* auf, wie z.B. Rāmānuja.[54] Aber es gibt auch Stellen,[55] die sie als Folge der Erkenntnis beschreiben:

jñānapūrvaḥ paraḥ sneho nityo bhaktir itīryate |
ityādivedavacanaṃ sādhanapravidhāyakam ||.

Anderswo wird die Erkenntnis als ein Teil der Bhakti bzw. diese als eine besondere Erkenntnis vorgestellt:

jñānasya bhaktibhāgatvād bhaktir jñānam itīryate |
jñānasyaiva viśeṣo yad bhaktir ity abhidhīyate ||.

Im Gegensatz dazu wird im *GīT* erklärt, daß Bhakti das vorzüglichste Mittel der Erlösung sei:

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[51] *GīT* p. 44,28f. Auch die Erlösten bringen Verehrung dar (*BSūBh* p. 158,6-8): *brahmatarke ca –*
muktā api hi kurvanti svecchayopāsanaṃ hareḥ |
niyamāntaram viprāḥ kuśādyair apy adhīyate |;
vgl. auch ibid. p. 143,5-8.

[52] *Anuv* p. 2,30f.; ibid. p. 4,21-23:
ato yathārthabandhasya vinā viṣṇuprasādataḥ |
anivṛttes tadarthaṃ hi jijñāsātra vidhīyate |
yathā dṛṣṭyā prasannaḥ san rājā bandhāpanodakṛt |
evaṃ dṛṣṭaḥ sa bhagavān kuryād bandhavibhedanam |.

[53] Auch Śrīdhara, der in seine Auffassung der Erlösung bei Lebzeiten viele Lehrelemente des Yoga aufgenommen hat (Mesquita 1995: 226ff.), zieht den Bhakti-Begriff, möglicherweise in Anlehnung an das *Yogabhāṣya* (zu I 23) heran, um zu erklären, daß das *ātmajñāna* bzw. der *dharma*, der aus der intensiven Meditation über die Vaiśeṣika-Kategorien hervorgeht, die Erlösung nicht bewirken kann, wenn er nicht durch den Wunsch Īśvaras unterstützt wird (vgl. Mesquita 1995: 239). Yoga in Verbindung mit Bhakti im Prozeß der Erlösung wird auch von Bhāsarvajña vertreten (vgl. Oberhammer 1984: 312ff.).

[54] *ŚBh* I, p. 61,1: *dhruvānusmṛtir eva bhaktiśabdenābhidhīyata upāsanaparyāyatvād bhaktiśabdasya | ata eva śrutismṛtibhir evam abhidhīyate ...* . Rāmānuja belegt diese Aussage mit *Gī* XI 53-54. Beide Strophen werden auch von Madhva herangezogen mit dem Vermerk: *ityādinā viṣṇubhakter eva sarvasādhanottamatvam*; vgl. *GīT* p. 2,14-16 = *Anuv* p. 187,29-32.

[55] Vgl. Mesquita 2000: 54, n. 19.

viṣṇubhakter eva sarvasādhanottamatvaṃ parokṣāparokṣajñānayor jñānino 'pi mokṣasya tadadhīnatvaṃ ca sneho bhaktir iti proktaḥ sarvopāyottamottamaḥ | tenaiva mokṣo nānyena dṛṣṭyādis tasya sādhanam |.[56]

Andererseits wird die Erlösung als ein Zustand beschrieben, in dem ein dynamisches Zusammenspiel der Erkenntnis und Bhakti stattfindet. Die beiden bedingen und ergänzen einander gegenseitig. In diesem Sinne lautet auch eine Selbstaussage Madhvas in *Anuv*:

bhaktyā jñānaṃ tato bhaktis tato dṛṣṭis tataś ca sā |
tato muktis tato bhaktiḥ saiva syāt sukharūpiṇī |
bhaktyā prasanno bhagavān dadyāj jñānam anākulam |
tayaiva darśanaṃ yātaḥ pradadyān muktim etayā |.

Aus der Bhakti geht die Erkenntnis hervor, aus dieser die Bhakti, aus dieser die Schau [des Viṣṇu] und aus dieser [wieder] die [Bhakti]. Aus dieser entsteht die Erlösung, daraus die Bhakti. [Und] eben diese besteht aus Wonne. Der durch Bhakti günstig gestimmte Erhabene möge [dem Erlösten] eine sichere Erkenntnis verleihen. Eben durch diese [Bhakti] wird [der Herr] sichtbar. Wegen dieser möge er die Erlösung verleihen.[57]

Ist nun die Erlösung ein Zustand, in dem die Bhakti aus Wonne besteht (*anuvartate ca sā bhaktir muktāv ānandarūpiṇī*), so ist die Bhakti, als Mittel dazu, das Erkennen der Größe bzw. der Macht des Viṣṇu und setze als solche die Liebe zu ihm voraus: *mahattvabuddhir bhaktis tu snehapūrvābhidhīyate*.[58]

Je stärker die Bhakti desto größer ist die Wonne in der Erlösung. So liegt hier der Gedanke einer Abstufung vor. Madhva schreibt diese Lehre im *GīT* einer anonymen Quelle[59] (*vacanāc ca*) zu:

yathā bhaktiviśeṣo 'tra dṛśyate puruṣottame |
tathā muktiviśeṣo 'pi jñāninām liṅgabhedane |
yogināṃ bhinnaliṅgānām āvirbhūtasvarūpiṇām |
prāptānāṃ paramānandaṃ tāratamyaṃ sadaiva hi | iti.

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[56] Vgl. *MBhTN* I 105; *Anuv* p. 187,9f.; *GīT* pp. 2,16-17 und 4,12-13; ferner *Anuv* p. 168,25f. In der Rāmānuja-Schule wird Bhakti als die besondere Form der Erkenntnis definiert: *bhaktiś ca jñānaviśeṣa eveti*. Auch Śaṅkara versteht *upāsanā* als *smṛtisantati* und identifiziert sie mit *jñāna* (vgl. Bos 1983: 171).

[57] *Anuv* p. 187,28-30; *GīT* p. 4,8-10 (anonyme Quelle):

bhaktyā prasannaḥ paramo dadyāj jñānam anākulam |
bhaktiṃ ca bhūyasīṃ tābhyāṃ prasanno darśanaṃ vrajet |
tato 'pi bhūyasīṃ bhaktiṃ dadyāt tābhyāṃ vimocayet |
mukto 'pi tadvaśo nityaṃ bhūyo bhaktisamanvitaḥ |
sādhyānandasvarūpaiva bhaktir naivātra sādhanam |;

NyāV p. 150,21-23: *bhaktyaivainaṃ jānāti bhaktyaivainaṃ paśyati bhaktyaiva bandhād vimucyate bhaktyaivānandībhavati ... bhinatti karmasaṅghātaṃ prasanno bhagavān hariḥ | ityādyāgamāt* (nicht identifiziert); *BhāgTN* p. 272,3-5: *... iti harivaṃśeṣu* (nicht überliefert); in einem weiteren fiktiven Zitat unterscheidet Madhva drei Gruppen von Bhaktas:

kecid unmādavad bhaktā bāhyaliṅgapradarśakāḥ |
kecid āntarabhaktāḥ syuḥ kecic caivobhayātmakāḥ |
mukhaprasādād dārḍhyāc ca bhaktir jñeyā na cānyataḥ |

iti vārāhe.

[58] *BSūBh* p. 137,6-7 = *iti pādme* (nicht überliefert); so auch *BSūBh* p. 168,1-4 = *māyāvaibhave ca* (nicht überliefert); ibid. p. 168,2-5: *... snehānubandho yas tasmin bahumānapuraḥsaraḥ | bhaktir ity ucyate ...*; *MBhTN* I 85: *māhātmyajñānapūrvas tu suhṛdaḥ sarvato 'dhikaḥ | sneho bhaktir iti proktaḥ ... = iti bhaviṣyatparvavacana* (fiktive Quelle); ibid. I 105: *jñānapūrvaḥ paraḥ sneho nityo bhaktir itīryate = iti vedavacana* (nicht identifiziert).

[59] *GīT* p. 30,14-16. In *BSūBh* p. 138,7-9 wird die Quelle ohne nähere Angaben als Smṛti identifiziert! Vgl. unten n. 81; s. auch Mesquita 2000: 241, n. 7 und 519f.

Der Grund dafür, daß bei den Menschen, die um der Erlösung willen den Yoga-Weg beschreiten, eine je abgestufte Erkenntnis bzw. Bhakti entsteht, dürfte im je verschiedenen Karma-Potential der Seelen liegen und nicht in ihrer inneren Eignung bzw. Fähigkeit.[60] So spielt das karmische Potential eine wichtige Rolle im Erlösungsprozeß, sofern es die Dauer der restlosen Tilgung bestimmt.[61] In den Vedānta-Sūtren IV 1,15 und 19 wird zwischen den karmischen Ablagerungen unterschieden, die nicht wirksam sind (*anārabdhakarma*), und Ablagerungen, die begonnen haben zu wirken (*ārabdhakarma*). Die letzteren sollen erklären, warum der Lebenderlöste seine irdische Existenz, trotz der Schau des Brahman eine Zeit lang (*kaṃcit kālam*), nicht verliert. Sind diese Ablagerungen restlos getilgt, so ergibt sich eine *videhamukti*, andernfalls folgt die Wiederverkörperung (*evam eva prārabdhakarmābhāve śarīrapātānantaram eva mokṣas tadbhāve janmāntarāṇity aniyamaḥ*).[62]

Für die Erklärung der *jīvanmukti* in Verbindung mit den karmischen Ablagerungen standen für Madhva grundsätzlich zwei Modelle zur Verfügung: eines von Śaṅkara/Maṇḍana und ein anderes von Kumārila/Śrīdhara. Während Śaṅkara und Maṇḍana der Meinung sind, daß die erlösende Erkenntnis (*samyagjñāna/darśana*) nur die *anārabdhakarmāṇi* vernichtet, nicht aber die *ārabdhakarmāṇi*, die durch Aufzehren abgebaut werden,[63] üben Kumārila und Śrīdhara Kritik an diesem vedāntischen Standpunkt, der von ihnen als *pūrvapakṣa* referiert und widerlegt wird. Für diese beiden Autoren zerstört die erlösende Erkenntnis das Nichtwissen und verhindert die Entstehung von neuem Karma. Das angehäufte karmische Potential, sowohl aus den früheren Leben als auch das neu hinzugekommene, wird allmählich (*krameṇa*) durch Vergeltung (*bhogāt*) und durch Ausführung der Ritualwerke (*karmabhiś ca*) abgebaut.

Ihre Kritik stützt sich vor allem auf die Überlegung, daß die erlösende Erkenntnis plötzlich, d. h. sofort und unmittelbar mit dem Eintritt des Wissens, aufleuchtet und es keinen Grund gibt, warum diese Erkenntnis nicht das gesamte karmische Potential unterschiedlos (*aviśeṣāt*) zerstören kann. In diesem Fall müßte sich auch der Körper, der als Produkt des Karman gilt, auflösen und somit wäre eine Erlösung bei Lebzeiten unmöglich.[64]

Madhvas diesbezügliche Haltung ist etwas differenzierter. Grundsätzlich vertritt er den vedāntischen Standpunkt (*ad* Sūtra IV 1,15) *anārabdhakārye eva pūrve puṇyapāpe vinaśyataḥ* | ..., ergänzt ihn aber durch den Beleg aus einer fiktiven Smṛti-Quelle, die nach seiner Auslegung durch die Partikel *tu* bereits im Sūtra angezeigt wird:

tuśabdaḥ smṛtidyotakaḥ –
yad anārabdhapāpaṃ syāt tad vinaśyati niścayāt |
paśyato brahma nirdvandvaṃ hīnaṃ ca brahma paśyataḥ |
dviṣato vā bhavet puṇyanāśo nāsty atra saṃśayaḥ |
tasyāpy ārabdhakāryasya na vināśo 'sti kutracit |
ārabdhayoś ca nāśaḥ syād alpayoḥ puṇyapāpayoḥ |
iti ca nārāyaṇatantre.

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[60] Vgl. Mesquita 2000: 506ff.

[61] Interessant ist, daß im *Yogavāsiṣṭha* die Lehre der *jīvanmukti* in keinster Weise von den karmischen Vorstellungen Gebrauch macht (vgl. Slaje 2000: 177).

[62] *BSūBh* p. 191,7.

[63] Vgl. Bos 1983: 167; *BS* p. 129,18f.

[64] Vgl. Mesquita 1994: 459 und 469f. sowie Mesquita 1995: 226f. Interessanterweise wird diese Lehre wiederum von Maṇḍana und Śaṅkara (vgl. *BSūBh ad* IV 1,15) referiert und zurückgewiesen (vgl. *BS* p. 130,6f.); vgl. dazu auch die etwas anderslautende Ansicht Vyomaśivas (Mesquita 1995: 225, n. 38). Möglicherweise war die von Kumārila/Śrīdhara geäußerte Kritik der Grund, warum Jayatīrtha die Vorstellung von *jīvanmukti* abgelehnt hat; vgl. oben n. 4.

> Die Partikel "aber" weist auf die Smṛti hin: "Das schlechte [Karma], welches nicht begonnen hat [zu wirken], dieses wird für einen, der die Schau des unabhängigen Brahman erlangt hat, sicherlich vernichtet. Und für jemanden, der Brahman als mangelhaft/unterlegen ansieht oder es haßt, dem wird [auch] das gute [Karma] vernichtet. Darüber gibt es keinen Zweifel. Auch gibt es in keinem [der beiden Fälle] eine Tilgung des Karma, das begonnen hat zu wirken. Und eine Tilgung eines geringfügig guten oder schlechten [Karma] wäre möglich, [auch wenn] es begonnen hat zu wirken." So [heißt es] auch im *Nārāyaṇatantra*.

Daß Madhva die im Zitat zum Ausdruck gekommene kleine Abweichung von der vedāntischen Lehre, wonach auch *ārabdhakarman*, sofern es geringfügig ist, von der erlösenden Erkenntnis erfaßt und vernichtet werden kann,[65] als Zugeständnis an die von Śrīdhara geäusserte Kritik versteht, ist nicht anzunehmen.[66] Auf jeden Fall kann die genannte Abweichung die Bedenken Śrīdharas sachlich nicht beseitigen.

Eigenartig ist, daß Madhva im obigen Zitat nicht nur von einem *jīvanmukta* spricht, sondern auch von einem, der zur Hölle verdammt ist.[67] Diese Thematik verfolgt er ebenfalls in seinem Kommentar *ad* IV 1,19, wo er nochmals dieselbe fiktive Quelle heranzieht:

> *ārabdhapuṇyapāpe bhogena kṣapayitvā brahma saṃpatsyate | atheti niyamasūcakaḥ –*
> *ārabdhapuṇyapāpasya bhogena kṣapaṇād anu |*
> *prāpnoty eva tamo ghoraṃ brahma vā nātra saṃśayaḥ |*
> *brahmaṇāṃ śatakālāt tu pūrvam ārabdhasaṃkṣayaḥ |*
> *niyamena bhaven nātra kāryā kācid vicāraṇā |*
> *iti ca nārāyaṇatantre*.
>
> Nachdem man das gute und schlechte Karman, das zu wirken begonnen hat, durch das Aufzehren getilgt hat, wird man Brahman erlangen. [Das Pratīka] *atha* weist auf die Gewißheit hin. Und so [heißt es] im *Nārāyaṇatantra*: "Aufgrund der Tilgung durch das Aufzehren des guten und schlechten Karman, das zu wirken begonnen hat, erlangt man entweder die tiefe Finsternis oder Brahman. Darüber gibt es keinen Zweifel. Die [restlose] Tilgung [des Karman], das begonnen hat zu wirken, könnte gewiß vor einem Zeitraum von hundert Brahmā[-Jahren] erfolgen. Darüber darf man gar keine Bedenken äußern."

Bemerkenswert ist in diesem Zitat eine Facette der Erlösungslehre, die auch von Śrīdhara und Kumārila besonders betont wird, wonach nämlich für die restlose Tilgung des karmischen Potentials, das sich im Laufe mehrerer Geburten angehäuft hat (*anekajanmasahasrasaṃcitānāṃ karmaṇām*), keine Zeitgrenze (*kālāniyama*) festgesetzt ist.[68] In diesem Sinne lautet eine Strophe aus der verlorenen *Bṛhaṭṭīkā* Kumārilas:

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[65] Überraschend ist eine anonym angeführte Aussage im *NyāV* (p. 207,13-14) Madhvas *ad* Sūtra IV 1, die ebenfalls auf ihn zurückgehen dürfte, denn sie hat Merkmale einer fiktiven Quelle (vgl. oben n. 13). Die Aussage trägt die ursprüngliche Vedānta-Lehre ohne Abstriche vor:

karmāṇi kṣapayed viṣṇur aprārabdhāni vidyayā |
prārabdhāni tu bhogena kṣapayan svapadaṃ nayet |
iti vacanāc ca. Genauso lautet auch eine Selbstaussage Madhvas im *SŚS* (v. 22):
prārabdhakarmaṇo 'nyasya jñānena syāt parikṣayaḥ |
aniṣṭasyobhayasyāpi sarvasyānyasya bhogataḥ |.

[66] In *BhāgTN* p. 51,1-3 schreibt Madhva diese Vernichtung einer großen Ursache (= Bhakti) zu: *jñānināṃ prārabdhasyaiva nirmathanam | yogyasyaiva –*
mahatā kāraṇenaiva prārabdhāny api kānicit |
karmāṇi kṣayam āyānti brahmadṛṣṭimataḥ kvacit |
iti bhaviṣyatparvaṇi (fiktive Quelle).

[67] Vgl. auch *Anuv* pp. 198,28-200,7: ... *iti sattattvavacanaṃ svayaṃ bhagavatoditam*; Mesquita 2000: 527f.

[68] Eine Lehre, die auch in der Purāṇa-Literatur vorkommt; vgl. z.B. *BrahVP* II 26,69f.

kurvann ātmasvarūpajño bhogāt karmaparikṣayam |
yugakoṭisahasreṇa kaścid eko vimucyate ||.

Irgendeiner wird in tausend unzähligen Zeitaltern erlöst, indem er als Kenner des wahren Wesens des Selbst das Karman infolge der Aufzehrung zunichte macht.[69]

Madhva hat diese Vorstellung voll in seine Lehre von *jīvanmukti* aufgenommen. Wie Kumārila nimmt auch er an, daß es keinen *mahāpralaya* gibt, in dem das gesamte Karman vernichtet wird.[70] So kann Madhva zwischen Menschen unterscheiden, die in ihrer letzten körperlichen Existenz (*caramadeha*) die *jīvanmukti* erlangt haben, und Menschen, die sich auf dem langen und beschwerlichen Weg der *jīvanmukti* befinden[71] und diese erst nach zahlreichen Wiedergeburten erreichen können. Eine innere und unerschütterliche Gewißheit (*mokṣaniyama*)[72] über die Erlösung ist den Seelen gegeben, sofern sie von Ewigkeit her zur Erlösung bestimmt sind (*muktiyogya*), da Viṣṇu ihnen eine innere Fähigkeit (*yogyatājātikṛta*) dazu verliehen hat.[73] Die Erstgenannten haben ihr karmisches Potential restlos durch Aufzehren und durch das Erlangen der vollkommenen Erkenntnis, d.h. der Schau des Brahman, getilgt, während die Letzteren auf ihre endgültige Erlösung warten müssen, bis die karmischen Ablagerungen restlos abgebaut sind und sie in den Besitz der vollkommenen Erkenntnis kommen. Diese Unterscheidung basiert auf konkreten Aussagen Madhvas selbst. So spricht er z.B. in seinem Kommentar zur *Gī* (*ad* II 72) von einem *jñānin*, der die Erlösung erlangt (*ato jñāninām bhavaty eva muktiḥ*) und einem *jñānin*, der wiedergeboren wird und erst nach mehreren Wiedergeburten zur erlösenden Erkenntnis kommt: *jñāninām api sati prārabdhakarmaṇi śarīrāntaraṃ yuktam | bhogena tv itara iti hy uktam* (= *BSū* IV 1,19) | *santi hi bahuśarīraphalāni karmāṇi kānicit | saptajanmani vipraḥ syād ityādeḥ* (*Ṛgveda* IX 67,190?) | *dṛṣṭeś ca jñāninām api bahuśarīraprāpteḥ*. Den gleichen Gedanken finden wir in vielen Variationen vor. So z.B. in Anlehnung an *Gī* VI 45:[74]

jijñāsur jñātvā prayatnaṃ karoti | evam anekajanmabhiḥ saṃsiddho 'parokṣajñānī bhūtvā parāṃ gatiṃ yāti | āha ca –

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[69] Vgl. Mesquita 1994: 467f.; vgl. dazu *Gī* VI 45, vgl. unten n. 74.

[70] Vgl. Mesquita 2000: 469.

[71] Madhva unterstreicht diese Beschwerlichkeit mit Hilfe eines fiktiven Zitates in *GīBh* p. 46,22-24: *tathā hy uktam –*

saṃskāro balavān eva brahmādyā api tadvaśāḥ |
tathāpi so 'nyathākartuṃ śakyate 'tiprayatnataḥ | iti.

Anuv p. 163,10-12:

doṣā anādisaṃbadhās te muktiparipanthinaḥ |
santy eva prāyaśaḥ puṃsu tena mokṣo na jāyate |
sarve ta ete jīveṣu dṛśyante tāratamyataḥ |;

vgl. dazu *NK* p. 676,7: *anādivāsanāvāsita iti prabalo nisargabaddhaḥ sarvaḥ sāṃvyavahārikaḥ pratyakṣeṇa pratyayaḥ* (Mesquita 1995: 222).

[72] Vgl. oben nn. 28 und 41 und p. 449 (*ad Gī* VI 31; *BhāgTN* p. 278,1-3: ... *iti vārāhe*).

[73] Nach Madhva hat Viṣṇu in seinem unerforschlichen Ratschluß die Seelen als *muktiyogya*, *nityabadha* und *tamoyogya* eingeteilt, vgl. Mesquita 2000: 510ff.

[74] *Gī* VI 45:

prayatnād yatamānas tu yogī saṃśuddhakilbiṣaḥ |
anekajanmasaṃsiddhis tato yāti parāṃ gatim ||.

Interessanterweise vertritt auch Śaṅkara in seinem *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* (*ad* III 4,51) diese Auffassung mit dem Hinweis auf die genannte *Gītā*-Stelle: *śravaṇādidvāreṇāpi vidyotpadyamānā pratibandhakṣayāpekṣayaivotpadyate | tathā ca śrutir durbodhatvam ātmano darśayati* (= *KaU* II 7) *garbhastha eva ca vāmadevaḥ pratipede brahmabhāvam iti* (= *BĀU* I 4,10) *vadantī janmāntarasaṃcitāt sādhanāj janmāntare vidyotpattiṃ darśayati | na hi garbhasthasyaivaihikaṃ kiṃcit sādhanaṃ saṃbhavyate | smṛtāv api* (= *Gī* VI 37cd/40cd/43ab und VI 45cd) *ity antenaitad darśayati | tasmād aihikam ānuṣmikaṃ vā vidyājanma pratibandhakṣayāpekṣayati sthitam*.

atīva śraddhayā yukto jijñāsur viṣṇutatparaḥ |
jñātvā dhyātvā tathā dṛṣṭvā janmabhir bahubhiḥ pumān |
viśen nārāyaṇaṃ devaṃ nānyathā tu kathaṃcana |
iti nāradīye (nicht überliefert) |
bahujanmavipākena bhaktijñānena ye harim |
bhajanti tatsmṛtiṃ tv ante devo yāti na cānyathā |
ity ukter brahmavaivarte (nicht überliefert).[75]

Dies impliziert nun, daß das Merkmal eines *jīvanmukta* in der festen Erkenntnis besteht, die im Brahman tief verankert (*ābrahma*) und daher *aparokṣajñāna* bzw. Brahma-Schau selbst ist.[76] Die Erkenntnis eines noch nicht Erlösten hingegen hat diese Festigkeit nicht, weil das noch wirksame *karman* mächtig ist.[77] Deshalb wird er wiedergeboren (*brāhmī sthitiḥ* [= *Gī* II 72] *brahmaviṣayā sthitir lakṣaṇam | antakāle 'py asyāṃ sthitvaiva brahma gacchati | anyathā janmāntaraṃ prāpnoti*).[78] Somit besteht das Merkmal (*liṅga*) eines noch nicht Erlösten darin, daß er die unmittelbare Erkenntnis erst zu einem späteren Zeitpunkt bzw. in einer zukünftigen Geburt haben wird. Das dürfte der Grund sein, warum Madhva diese Personen als *aparokṣajñānarahitajñāninaḥ* bezeichnet.[79] Das bedeutet, daß sie erst dann der Erlösung teilhaftig werden, wenn ihre Bhakti-Erkenntnis mehrere Geburten hindurch gereift ist (*bahujanmavipākena bhaktijñānena*).[80] Somit entspricht dies dem Grundsatz Madhvas, daß die Art und Weise (*liṅgabhedana*) der Erlösung von der Art und Weise der Bhakti abhängt. D.h. während die Bhakti-Erkenntnis beim Lebenderlösten sofort die Erlösung bewirkt, erfolgt diese beim noch nicht Erlösten erst nach vielen Geburten:

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[75] *GīBh* p. 72,3-6 und 36, 8-9; ibid. p. 72,14-16:
ajñātvā dhyāyino dhyānāj jñānam eva viśiṣyate |
jñātvā dhyānaṃ jñānamātrād dhyānād api tu darśanam |
darśanāc caiva bhakteś ca na kiṃcit sādhanādhikam |
iti nāradīye (nicht überliefert); ibid. p. 39,6-12: ... *iti brāhme* (nicht überliefert); *BSūBh* p. 191,9-11: ... *iti nārāyaṇādhyātme* (nicht überliefert).

[76] Vgl. *GīBh* p. 66,17f.

[77] Vgl. z.B. *BhāgTN* p. 51,10-11:
jñānādivyaktir avyaktiḥ sukhaduḥkhādikaṃ tathā |
sudṛṣṭabrahmatattvānāṃ bhavaty ārabdhakarmaṇā |
iti brahmavaivarte (nicht überliefert). Damit wird hier angedeutet, daß auch ein Erkenner des Brahman nicht in vollem Besitz der Erkenntnis ist, weil er unter dem Einfluß des noch wirksamen *karman* steht. Im darauf folgenden ebenfalls fiktiven Zitat räumt Madhva sogar ein, daß der Erkenner des Brahman, sofern er Viṣṇu nicht zugeneigt ist, manchmal sogar Zweifel über die Wirklichkeit der Sinneswelt haben kann:
bhagavantaṃ vinānyatra pravṛttyādiprakāśanam |
prārabdhakarmaṇaiva syāt kadācij jñāninām api |
tāṃ dvaitadṛṣṭiṃ me deva cchindhi jñānavarāsinā |
iti brāhme. Gemeint wären hier die Advaitins! Anderswo insinuiert Madhva, daß auch die Vertreter anderer gegnerischer Schulen wie des Nyāya etc. erst nach mehreren Geburten die erlösende Erkenntnis erlangen können (Mesquita 2000: 521, n. 688). Die Lehre von zweierlei *jñānin*s wurde später auch von Advaitins wie Vidyāraṇya vorgetragen, der "zwischen dem, der nur weiß oder bloß Erkenntnis besitzt (*jñānimātra*), und dem, der sich durch Beständigkeit (in) der Erkenntnis auszeichnet (*sthitaprajña*)" unterscheidet; vgl. Sprockhoff 1970: 137.

[78] *GīBh* p. 35,8-9.

[79] Vgl. oben n. 19; *GīBh* p. 32,27f.

[80] Vgl. *GīBh* p. 72,3f., oben n. 75. Madhva dürfte sich hier an den Gedanken Kumārilas/Śrīdharas anschließen, daß die gegenwärtige Existenz, in der die Vollendung erlangt wird, durch frühere Geburten vorbereitet wurde oder daß eine schrittweise Steigerung der Versenkung durch Übung einen *dharma* hervorruft, der seinerseits wiederum eine noch vorzüglichere Versenkung entstehen läßt. Der durch Übung des *yoga* entstandene *dharma* wirkt auch in einem anderen Leben weiter (*janmāntare 'py anuvartate*); vgl. Mesquita 1995: 238. So auch Śaṅkara, vgl. oben n. 74.

yathā bhaktiviśeṣo 'tra dṛśyate puruṣottame |
tathā muktiviśeṣo 'pi jñāninām liṅgabhedane |.[81]

Ein zweites unterscheidendes Merkmal eines Lebenderlösten ist, daß für ihn *per definitionem* ein böses Handeln nicht möglich ist, da er von jeder Art von Begehren frei ist (*vairāgya*) – *viraktānām eva ca jñānam* – und das Begehren der Keim des Wesenskreislaufes (*saṃsāra-bīja*) ist: *abandhakatvaṃ tv akāmenaiva bhavati*.[82] Die noch nicht Lebenderlösten hingegen sind nicht von diesem Keim befreit, da ihr innerer Sinn sich meistens nicht von den Sinnesgegenständen abwendet: *na tasya manaḥ prāyo viṣayeṣu gacchati*.[83] Deshalb unterliegen sie manchmal einem *adharma*. Darauf verweist Madhva im Kommentar zu *Gī* (*ad* VI 31):

evam aparokṣaṃ paśyato jñānaphalaṃ niyatam ity arthaḥ | tathāpi prāyo nādharmaṃ karoti | kurvatas tu mahac ced duḥkhasūcakaṃ bhavatīty uktaṃ purastāt | āha ca –
kadācid api nādharme buddhir viṣṇudṛśāṃ bhavet |
pramādāt tu kṛtaṃ pāpaṃ svalpaṃ bhasmībhaviṣyati |
ādirājais tathā devair ṛṣibhiḥ kriyate kiyat |
bāhulyāt karmaṇas teṣāṃ duḥkhasūcakam eva tat | iti.

Wenn man so [Brahman] unmittelbar schaut, ist einem die Frucht der Erkenntnis gewiß. So ist der Sinn. Auch so begeht ein [*jñānin*] normalerweise nichts Unrechtes. Begeht er [es] aber in großem Maße, so wird ihm Leid angekündigt. So wurde früher erklärt. Außerdem wurde [dazu anderswo] gelehrt: "Niemals kann sich der innere Sinn derjenigen, die die Schau Viṣṇus erlangt haben, auf etwas Unrechtes richten. Eine geringe Sünde aber, die aus Unachtsamkeit begangen wird, wird [durch die Schau Viṣṇus] eingeäschert werden. So haben die früheren Rāja- [und] Devarṣis geringe [Sünden] begangen [, die durch die Schau Viṣṇus eingeäschert wurden]. Wegen Häufigkeit [solcher] Taten wird ihnen daher eben Leid angekündigt."

Offenkundig wird in diesem anonymen Beleg eine klare Trennung gezogen zwischen einem *jñānin*, der nicht sündigen kann (*kadācid api na* ...), bzw. der wegen der kleinen Fehler, die er aus Unachtsamkeit begangen hat, kein Leid erfährt, da sie eingeäschert werden,[84] und einem *jñānin*, der auch große Sünden begehen kann, die Leid und infolgedessen die Wiedergeburt nach sich ziehen. Im letzten Fall haben die Sünden eine bleibende Existenz, die in Form von *ārabdhakarman*, das sowohl *pāpa* als auch *puṇya* bzw. *jñāna/bhakti* miteinschließt, über zahllose Leben hinweg wirksam sein und Grundlage für eine spätere *jīvanmukti* bilden kann. Auf diesen Unterschied zwischen den beiden *jnāñin*s macht ein anderes ebenfalls anonymes Zitat aufmerksam, auf das möglicherweise oben mit *ity uktaṃ purastāt* (*ad* VI 4) hingewiesen wurde. Es lautet:

uktaṃ ca –
svato doṣalayo dṛṣṭyā tv itareṣāṃ prayatnataḥ | iti.

Das heißt, daß die kleinen Fehler aus Unachtsamkeit durch die Schau Viṣṇus von selbst (*svataḥ*) gelöscht werden, während die Tilgung anderer, großer Sünden nur mit Mühe (*prayatnataḥ*) auf dem Wege mehrerer Geburten erfolgt .[85]

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[81] Vgl. oben nn. 59f.; s. auch *BhāgTN* p. 602,7-8: ... *iti vārāhe*.
[82] Vgl. oben nn. 17 und 28; s. auch Mesquita 1995: 246f.
[83] *GīBh* p. 66,16-17.
[84] Vgl. auch *Anuv* p. 198,28-29:
tasmād yathoktamārgeṇa brahmopāsyaṃ mumukṣibhiḥ |
tathopāsyāñjasā dṛṣṭaṃ brahma pāpaṃ ca bhasmasāt |
karoti nikhilaṃ pūrvaṃ pāścātyasyāpy asaṅgatām |
karoti ... .
[85] Vgl. dazu auch *BSūBh* p. 199,7-9:
anabhīṣṭam anārabdhaṃ puṇyam apy asya naśyati |

In diesem Sinne heißt es auch im *BSūBh* (*ad* IV 1,13): *brahmadarśana uttarāghasyāśleṣaḥ pūrvasya vināśaś ca* (= *ChU* IV 4,3 und V 24,3) *iti tadvyapadeśāt*. Madhva schließt daran (*ad BSū* IV 1,14) einen weiteren, diesmal fiktiven Beleg aus einem Purāṇa an:

> *yathāśleṣo vināśaś ca muktasya tu vikarmaṇaḥ |*
> *evaṃ sukarmaṇaś cāpi patatas tamasi dhruvaḥ |*
> *iti cāgneye*.

So kann Madhva den Lebenderlösten als einen beschreiben, dem nicht einmal ein Hauch von Sünde anhaftet, bzw. der die erworbene unmittelbare Erkenntnis nicht einbüßt (*hāni*), der aber dennoch, solange er als *jīvanmukta* im Geburtenkreislauf weilt, die leidvollen Folgen der früheren Sünden zu tragen hat:

> *vikarmalepo naivāsti samyagdṛṣṭimatāṃ kvacit |*
> *guṇahāniś ca naivāsti brahmaṇas tv avikarmataḥ |*
> *...*
> *apāpatvaṃ ca naivāsti yāvat saṃsāram asya hi |*
> *ārabdhapāpam asty eva duḥkhaṃ ca jñānino 'pi hi |*.[86]

Betrachtet man nun am Ende dieser Untersuchung die Lehre der Erlösung bei Lebzeiten in ihrer Gesamtheit, so wird klar, daß Madhva den technischen Ausdruck dafür nicht nur kennt, sondern ihn auch genau erklärt. Unter der Erlösung bei Lebzeiten versteht Madhva den unwiderruflichen Zustand der höchsten Wonne (*ānandarūpa*) bzw. die endgültige Vollendung der Einzelseele, die durch die unmittelbare Erkenntnis des Brahman (*aparokṣajñāna/brahmadarśana*) erreicht wird. Das *aparokṣajñāna* besiegt restlos das Nichtwissen und das nichtwirksame Karman (*anārabdha*). Darüber hinaus verhindert es das Entstehen des neuen Karman. Die Überreste des *prārabdhakarman*, die das Weiterbestehen des Körpers begründen, werden durch das Aufzehren (*bhogena*) bzw. durch die Bhakti-Werke abgebaut,[87] bis der Augenblick des Todes eintritt. Da zu diesem Zeitpunkt das gesamte Karman-Potential restlos getilgt ist, schließt sich daran die *videhamukti* an.[88]

Das *aparokṣajñāna* als Synonym von *jīvanmukti*, das Madhva manchmal auch durch *brahmadarśana* und durch *samādhyādiphala* wiedergibt,[89] könnte man als mystische Schau auffassen, in der die Individualität der Einzelseele unberührt bleibt. Somit nimmt Madhva Abstand von der Meinung des Advaita. Ein wichtiger Unterschied liegt auch darin, daß für Madhva das *aparokṣajñāna* eines Lebenderlösten nicht einmal eine Spur von Nichtwissen

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> *kiṃ tu pāpaṃ parabrahmajñānino nāsti saṃsayaḥ |*

iti pādme (nicht überliefert); vgl. auch oben n. 74. Vgl. *BhāgTN* p. 266,8-9: *... iti skānde*.

[86] *Anuv* pp. 173,15 und 174,18-19; *MBhTN* I 127-129:

> *yadā muktipradānasya svayogyaṃ paśyati dhruvam |*
> *rūpaṃ hares tadā tasya sarvapāpāni bhasmasāt |*
> *yānti pūrvāṇy uttarāni na śleṣaṃ yānti kānicit |*
> *mokṣaś ca niyatas tasmāt svayogyaharidarśane |*

bhaviṣyatparvavacanam ity etat sūtragaṃ (IV 1,13) *tathā*.

[87] Vgl. oben, nn. 22, 27, 39, 46 und 48.

[88] Auch hier zieht Madhva fiktive Zitate bzw. Quellen heran; vgl. z.B. *AiUBh* p. 220,19-22: *... iti brahmāṇḍe*; *BSūBh* p. 191,7-11: *... iti nārāyaṇādhyātme*; *BhāgTN* p. 52,3-5: *... iti brahmatarke*; vgl. dazu auch die Selbstaussage Madhvas im *SŚS* (v. 23f.); auch Mesquita 2000: 520, n. 688.

[89] Vgl. z.B. oben pp. 437f.

(*ajñānaleśa*) zuläßt. Advaita-Autoren wie z.B. Vimuktātman hatten das für den *jīvanmukta* postuliert: *ato 'jñānaleśād eva tadvidaḥ śarīrādyābhāsa eṣṭavyaḥ*.[90]

Wir können mit gutem Grund davon ausgehen, daß Madhva bei der Entfaltung seiner Lehre eher von den Vertretern der realistischen Schulen, wie z. B. Kumārila oder Śrīdhara, ausgeht und nicht von den advaitischen Autoren, wie vielfach behauptet wurde.[91] Daß Madhva in diesem Zusammenhang auch geringfügig abweichende Standpunkte einnimmt, steht in enger Verbindung mit seinen fiktiven literarischen Quellen.[92] Es ist daher nicht überraschend, daß Madhva für die Begründung seiner Lehrmeinung ausschließlich fiktive Zitate bzw. Quellen heranzieht, obwohl diese Meinung vor ihm von mehreren Autoren vorgetragen wurde. Auch das ist ein weiteres Merkmal seiner fiktiven Quellen.[93] So erweist sich Madhva auch bei der Entfaltung der *jīvanmukti*-Lehre zwar nicht originell, aber sehr einfallsreich. Daß er selber im festen Glauben eines *jīvanmukta* gelebt hat, bezeugen die von ihm gewählten Ausdrücke wie *pūrṇaprajña* (= *sthitaprajña/aparokṣajñāna*!), *sarvajñamuni* und *sarvajñasūrya*.[94]

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1) Primärliteratur

Anuv	*Anuvyākhyāna* des Madhva, in *Sarvamūlagranthāḥ – Prasthānatrayī*, Vol. 1, ed. B. Govindacharya, Udipi 1969. (Works of Sri Madhwacharya)
IS	Vimuktātman, *Iṣṭasiddhi with Extracts from the Vivaraṇa of Jñānottama*. Ed. M. Hiriyanna. Baroda 1933.
AiUBh	*Aitareyopaniṣadbhāṣya* des Madhva, s. *Anuv*.
KaU	*Kaṭhopaniṣad*, s. *BĀU*.
KūrmaP	*Kūrmapurāṇa*. Ed. Nag Sharan Singh. Delhi 1983.
Gī	*Bhagavadgītā*, s. *MBh*.
GīT	*Bhagavadgītātātparya* des Madhva, s. *Anuv*.
GīBh	*Bhagavadgītābhāṣya* des Madhva, s. *Anuv*.
GīBhŚ	*Gītābhāṣya* des Śaṅkara. Ed. D.V. Gokhale. Poona 1950.
CS	*Citsukhī* [=] *Tattvapradīpikā* des Citsukha mit *Nayaprasādinī* des Pratyak-svarūpa. Ed. Svamin Yogindrananda. Kashi 1956.
ChU	*Chāndogyopaniṣad*, s. *BĀU*.

[90] Vgl. *IS* p. 76,9-13; vgl. dazu Mesquita 2000: 181, n. 375. Prakāśātman vertrat die Meinung, daß diese Ansicht auch von Śaṅkara und Padmapāda geteilt wurde (vgl. Cammann 1965: 163; vgl. dazu auch Bos 1983: 172f.). Das Gleiche dürfte auch für Maṇḍanamiśra gelten (vgl. Oberhammer 1994: 58-61).

[91] Sheridan 1996: 91f. und 94ff.

[92] Vgl. oben n. 13.

[93] Vgl. Mesquita 1997: 17f. und 37, n. 53. Auffallend sind bei den obigen fiktiven Zitaten die immer wiederkehrenden Redewendungen, wie *nānyathā tu kathaṃcana* und dergleichen, mit dem Zweck, die Ausschließlichkeit seiner Lehre hervorzuheben, Dies kann man auch in Zusammenhang mit Madhvas anderen Lehren beobachten (vgl. Mesquita 1997: 139). So gilt auch hier meine Feststellung, daß Madhva die fiktiven Textstücke dem Anlaß entsprechend entweder frei erdichtet oder die überkommenen literarischen Vorlagen im Sinne seiner Lehren textlich neu gestaltet hat, die er dann einmal unbekannten, von ihm frei erfundenen Werken und ein anderes Mal bekannten bzw. überlieferten Werken zuweist.

[94] Vgl. *BhāgTN* p. 584,13-14: *samyagjñānavadācāryān mucyate puruṣo bhavāt | ... iti vāmane* (nicht überliefert); s. oben n. 18 und Mesquita 1997: 143, n. 360.

ChUBh *Chāndogyopaniṣadbhāṣya* des Madhva, s. *Anuv*.
NK *Nyāyakandalī* des Śrīdhara, in *Praśastapādabhāṣya with the Commentary Nyāyakandalī by Śrīdharabhaṭṭa along with Hindi Translation by D. Jha*, Varanasi 1963.
NyāBh *Nyāyabhūṣaṇa* des Bhāsarvajña. Ed. Svamin Yogindrananda. Varanasi 1968. (Ṣaḍdarśanagranthamālā 1)
NyāV *Nyāyavivaraṇa* des Madhva, s. *Anuv*.
BĀU *Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad*, in *Eighteen Principal Upaniṣads*, Vol. 1, ed. V.P. Limaye and R.D. Vadekar, Poona 1958.
BrahVP *Brahmavaivartapurāṇa* Parts 1-2. Ed. J.L. Shastri. Delhi 1983-1985.
BS *Maṇḍanamiśra*, *Brahmasiddhi with Commentary by Śaṅkhapāṇi*. Ed. K. Sastri. Madras 1937.
BSū *Brahmasūtra*, s. *BSūBh*.
BSūBh *Brahmasūtrabhāsya* des Madhva, s. *Anuv*.
BSūBhŚ *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* des Śaṅkara. Ed. J.L. Shastri. Delhi 1980.
BhāgTN *Bhāgavatatātparyanirṇaya* des Madhva, in *Sarvamūlagranthāḥ – Purāṇaprasthāna*, Vol. 3, ed. B. Govindacharya, Udipi 1980. (Works of Sri Madhwacharya)
BhāgP *Bhāgavatapurāṇa with Sanskrit Commentary Bhāvārthabodhinī of Śrīdhara*. Ed. J.L. Shastri. Delhi 1983.
MatsyaP *Matsyapurāṇa*. 2 vols. Ed. Nag Sharan Singh. Delhi 1983.
MuUBh *Muṇḍakopaniṣadbhāṣya* des Madhva, s. *Anuv*.
MBh *Mahābhārata*. *Text as Constituted in its Critical Edition*. 4 vols. Poona 1971-1975.
MBhTN *Mahābhāratatātparyanirṇaya* des Madhva, in *Sarvamūlagranthāḥ – Itihāsaprasthāna*, Vol. 2, ed. B. Govindacharya, Udipi 1971.
MS *Manusmṛti*. Ed. J.L. Shastri. Delhi 1990.
ŚBh *Śrībhāṣya*. 2 vols. Ed. U.T. Viraraghavacharya. Madras 1967.
SŚS *Sarvaśāstrārthasaṅgraha* des Madhva, s. *Anuv*.

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Andrew O. Fort

Bad (and Good) Tendencies: *Vāsanā*s in the *Jīvanmuktiviveka*

The nature of the mind, its qualities, tendencies, and transformations are repeatedly addressed in Vidyāraṇya's *Jīvanmuktiviveka* (*JMV*, "Discerning Liberation while Living"), a syncretic (but largely Advaita Vedānta) fourteenth century work which outlines the nature of embodied liberation and teaches the path to liberation via a combination of knowledge of non-duality, yogic practice, and renunciation. This essay will focus on the character of latent mental tendencies, or *vāsanā*s, according to Vidyāraṇya. The topic is addressed in a number of places in the text, though, naturally enough, at greatest length in the second chapter, called *vāsanākṣaya*, or the elimination of mental tendencies.

This essay is part of my ongoing interest in the nature of mind according to thinkers who are part of the Advaita Vedānta tradition, and specifically in Vidyāraṇya's ideas.[1] Below I will attempt to make clear what Vidyāraṇya thinks a *vāsanā* is, and how it is distinct from *saṃskāra* and *vṛtti*. Briefly, a *vāsanā* is a latent tendency of the mind, a habitual pattern which "seizes" one's mind and orients a person toward some virtue or vice. The power of *vāsanā*s is one of the reasons Vidyāraṇya emphasizes the importance of ongoing yogic practice to reinforce or redirect one's tendencies. (A liberated person would seem to be able to be both more present to *and* detached from current experience, rather than stuck in or reacting to past habits.) A *saṃskāra* is more broadly any subtle "subliminal" mental impression, and a *vṛtti* is a kind of mental activity or process influenced by (and reciprocally influencing) *vāsanā*s and *saṃskāra*s.

The term *vāsanā* is used by Śaṅkara and later Advaita schoolmen, but not in much detail, and it is generally not clear how, if at all, these figures distinguish between *vāsanā* and *saṃskāra*.[2] It is also used by, and is more important to, writers in the Pātañjala-Yoga school; while also there meaning latent or subliminal impression, the primary sense of the term is often more of "memory trace" or "karmic residue" than of mental pattern or tendency evident in the *JMV*.[3] It would be a valuable exercise to examine exactly how authors in Yoga, Advaita,

[1] See my essay "On Destroying the Mind: The *Yogasūtras* in Vidyāraṇya's *Jīvanmuktiviveka*," in *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 27 (1999): 377-395, which focused on Vidyāraṇya's *yoga*-influenced understanding of destroying the mind, or *manonāśa*.

[2] The best text for quick reference on *vāsanā*s in Advaita is Karl Potter's volume on Advaita Vedānta in the *Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies* series, Delhi 1981. See especially pp. 23-34. Advaita schoolmen sometimes use *vāsanā* to refer to impressions or images seen in dreams, a concept not utilized by Vidyāraṇya.

[3] On Pātañjala-Yoga, the interested reader can turn to Barbara Stoler Miller's *Yoga*: *Discipline of Freedom*, Berkeley 1996, a translation of and commentary on the *Yogasūtra*. Miller defines *vāsanā* as "memory trace" (p. 96), and links it with *saṃskāra* ("subliminal impression") and *āśaya* ("subliminal intention") (p. 100), all lying in memory. Swami Hariharananda Aranya makes numerous remarks about *vāsanā*s in his *Yoga Philosophy of Patanjali* (translated by P.N. Mukerji, Albany 1983). While there is no consistent definition in the text, the primary sense is that a *vāsanā* is a latent impression (*saṃskāra*) rising from feelings (from birth, lifespan, or experience of pleasure or pain) making a memory, with the focus on its status being within memory alone (pp. 133, 148, 357, 364). It does not produce action itself, but it is the mold or receptacle of *saṃskāra*s of action (pp. 133, 148). For a similar view, see Mircea Eliade's *Yoga*: *Immortality and Freedom*, Princeton 1969, pp. 42ff. Eliade says *vāsanā*s are subconscious or subliminal latencies in memory which are driven to actualize; they feed and manifest in mental processes (*vṛtti*) which then cause karmic action.

Karin Preisendanz (ed.), *Expanding and Merging Horizons*: *Contributions to South Asian and Cross-Cultural Studies in Commemoration of Wilhelm Halbfass*, Wien: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 2007, pp. 455-466.

and other schools understand *vāsanā* and related terms. My more focused study can in part be a resource for such a contribution.

I might also note that the three editions and translations I consulted[4] treat *vāsanā* rather differently: one (Sastri and Ayyangar) simply – and unhelpfully – leaves the word untranslated, another (Moksadananda) renders *vāsanā* as "desire," which certainly does not capture central aspects of the term, while the third (Goodding) also uses "latent tendency" as most clearly indicating the principal sense of the term.

Finally, while *vāsanā* is used regularly in the *JMV*, we shall see that it is not central to or interwoven with many other ideas which are fundamental to Vidyāraṇya, including his description of one liberated while living (*jīvanmukta*); there is surprisingly little overlap between mentions of *vāsanā*s and the oft-discussed already commenced (*prārabdha*) *karma*. A number of the usages are in response to the term's appearance in the *Laghu Yogavāsiṣṭha* (*LYV*), one of the main scriptural resources for Vidyāraṇya. In fact, Vidyāraṇya uses definitions from the *Yogavāsiṣṭha* (*YV*) or *LYV* as jumping off points for his first and later longest discussions of the term.[5] As we shall see, there are also a number of relevant quotations from the *Bhagavad Gītā*, particularly on impure tendencies relating to demonic nature (*āsura saṃpad*) and from a wide variety of Upaniṣads ("major" and "minor").

Defining *Vāsanā*s

While references to *vāsanā*s are predominantly in the second chapter, the first significant reference to the term appears in the first chapter, on establishing the basis for living liberation (pp. 25, 198). In *YV* II.9.23[6], Rāma tells Vasiṣṭha that he acts as the web of previous latent tendencies compels him to, and asks what he should do. Vidyāraṇya states that a *vāsanā* is a *saṃskāra* (subtle mental impression) in an individual embodied self (*jīva*) which has the form of religious virtue or vice (*dharmādharma*). Following *YV* II.9.24, Vidyāraṇya adds that since one is subject to prior latent tendencies, one must oppose this domination by personal exertion accomplished by resolution generated in mind, speech, and body. Vasiṣṭha says that there are two kinds of *vāsanā*s: good (*śubha*) and evil (*aśubha*) (Vidyāraṇya parallels these with *dharmādharma*), and asks which one – or both – impels Rāma (II.9.25). If swept away by a flood of pure (*śuddha*) tendencies, he will attain the highest goal (liberation) by this alone (without resolute effort), but if a bad disposition (*bhāva*) leads him to dire straits (*saṃkaṭa*), then the prior (bad tendencies) must be vanquished by his own effort (II.9.26-27).[7] Thus, Vasiṣṭha concludes, the stream of *vāsanā*s flows through both good and bad channels, and one should direct it along the good path by resolute personal effort (II.9.30). Vidyāraṇya

[4] The first, which has the Sanskrit text interspersed with English translation, is *Jīvan-mukti-viveka of Swami Vidyāraṇya*, tr. by Swami Moksadananda, Calcutta 1996. The second, which presents the Sanskrit text and English translation in separate sections, is *Jīvanmuktiviveka of Vidyāraṇya*, ed. and tr. by S. Subrahmanya Sastri and T.R. Srinivasa Ayyangar, Madras 1978. The third was the University of Texas Ph.D. dissertation, in manuscript form, of Robert Goodding. Each was helpful, but all translations given are mine. Page references which follow paragraphs indicate pages on which the material can be found in the Advaita Ashrama and Adyar Library editions respectively, i.e. "(pp. 186-187, 305-306)".

[5] The *LYV* itself emphasizes that there are two kinds of *vāsanā*s, pure and impure, and they flow, calming or impelling the mind, in different channels. One must practice hard to guide the flow of good tendencies until one knows the real (Self), then one must abandon all (even the pure consciousness) *vāsanā*s. A major *LYV* theme is reiterated in this context: having abandoned all, one may act or be at rest, but will always be utterly detached. Unlike Vidyāraṇya, the *LYV* does not accentuate either *saṃnyāsa* or sacred texts.

[6] References to the *YV* are taken from Moksadananda 1966 (cf. n. 4).

[7] Vidyāraṇya adds that effort (*yatna*) means observing śāstric rites opposed to evil.

again suggests that good tendencies do not need effort, but the evil ones should be removed by efforts prescribed by sacred texts and replaced by the good. From the beginning, then, the focus is on mental tendencies being habitual patterns needing disciplined direction by yogic exertion.[8]

On Eliminating *Vāsanā*s

While there are a number of other, relatively brief, references to *vāsanā*s in the rest of the first chapter, the next important passage considering latent tendencies appears in the second chapter, which is dedicated to describing the elimination of *vāsanā*s (pp. 75ff., 232ff.). Such elimination is part of the threefold means (*sādhana*) to living liberation via extinguishing latent impressions (*vāsanākṣāya*), destroying the mind (*manonāśa*), and the highest goal, knowing the (non-dual) truth (*tattvajñāna*). Following *LYV* 28.115ff.[9], Vidyāraṇya holds that these three, if practiced simultaneously, and for a long time, will bear fruit, but if not practiced repeatedly together at length, liberation while living will not arise; this is similar to the necessity of reciting various Vedic *mantra*s together, or utilizing a variety of foods to make a full meal. Vidyāraṇya then proceeds to divide these means into three pairs, and describe how they can support or inhibit each other via the process of *anvaya–vyatireka*, positive and negative concomitance.

First addressing destroying the mind, Vidyāraṇya defines the mind (*manas*) as a component (*dravya*) of the internal organ (*antaḥkaraṇa*), transforming as a continuous stream of mental activity (*vṛttisaṃtāna*) like the ongoing flame of a lamp (pp. 78, 234). So "destroying the mind" is transformation (*pariṇāma*) in the form of cessation (or restraint, *niruddha*), having abandoned transformation in the form of mental activity. Explaining *Yogasūtra* 3.9, he states that subliminal impressions (*saṃskāra*) of agitation (*vyutthāna*) are overcome, and those of cessation appear, so a moment of cessation is reached by the mind, and this is "*manonāśa*." This again suggests that mental patterns get set in a particular flow, which needs reinforcement (if pure) or redirection (if agitated).

Then turning to eliminating latent tendencies, Vidyāraṇya defines a *vāsanā* as a subliminal impression based in the mind which causes particular mental activities (*vṛtti*) like anger, which rises suddenly without considering past or future (pp. 79, 235). It is called a *vāsanā* (from √*vas*, to perfume) since it dwells in – or "perfumes" – the mind by previous repetitive experience. One sees here that a *vāsanā* seems to be a particular kind of *saṃskāra* which is associated with emotions or feelings and creates or represents a habitual orientation in the mind toward certain feelings and actions, for good or ill.

Vidyāraṇya continues that the elimination of latent tendencies (*vāsanākṣaya*) is the non-arising of anger, etc., even when there is (appropriate) external cause, due to pure tendencies

[8] Vasiṣṭha then continues to urge resolute effort to lead the mind toward the good. In *YV* II.9.35 and 38, he says that when (good) tendencies rise quickly through the power of yogic practice, know it to be the fruit of such practice (despite its rapidity) (pp. 30, 201). Even if one has doubts, keep on intently accumulating good *vāsanā*s – there is no fault in amassing them. Vidyāraṇya concurs: if one doubts one has completed the practice (of collecting good tendencies), then keep going. For example, if one commits to thousand *mantra* recitations, and, near the end, becomes unsure whether one has completed a thousand, or just nine hundred, doing another hundred will have no fault – you will either complete the thousand or add the merit of an additional hundred recitations. Vasiṣṭha concludes here that one should continue to practice until the highest goal has been realized, and when all impurity is burnt off and one knows the real, one should abandon the flood of *vāsanā*s, even the good ones (II.9.41-42).

[9] References to the *LYV* are taken from Moksadananda 1966 (cf. n. 4).

such as self-control and tranquility which are firm and generated by right discernment (*viveka*). But if the mind is not destroyed (*manonāśa*) and mental activities arise, *vāsanā*s will not be eliminated because at some point anger, etc., would arise due to some external cause. Likewise, if there is no elimination of latent tendencies, the mind will not be destroyed because mental activity will continue to arise.

Vidyāraṇya then goes over the mutual causation of knowing the (non-dual) truth (*tattvajñāna*) and destroying the mind by negative concomitance (*vyatireka*); lack of either breeds illusory perception and mental activity. Finally, he discusses mutual causation of knowing the truth and eliminating *vāsanā*s by negative concomitance: if latent tendencies of anger, etc., are not destroyed, knowledge of the real cannot rise since means like self-control and tranquility (*śamadama*) are absent. And when the truth of non-dual *brahman* is not known, confusion about the truth of the cause of anger, etc., is not halted, so tendencies are not eliminated (pp. 81, 236).

Vidyāraṇya then turns to mutual causation through positive concomitance (*anvaya*): when the mind is destroyed, there is no apprehension (*pratīti*) of an external cause which awakens subtle impressions (*saṃskāra*), so latent tendencies are eliminated, and when tendencies are eliminated, mental transformations like anger, etc., do not arise since their cause is absent, so the mind is destroyed.[10] He continues that knowing the truth is the cause of eliminating *vāsanā*s like anger according to Sureśvara, who writes "seeing the same Self in an enemy, friend, or one's own body, how can the discerning person (*vivekin*) be angry?" (*Naiṣkarmyasiddhi* 2.18). Reciprocally, it is well-known that tranquility, etc., in the form of eliminating tendencies like anger are the cause of knowledge. *LYV* 4.114 describes the means to attain these three: the discerning person, with resolute personal effort, abandons and keeps distant any desire to enjoy by resorting to the three means. Vidyāraṇya elaborates that discrimination (*viveka*) is the analytic discernment that hearing sacred texts (*śravaṇa*), etc., is the means to knowing the truth, *yoga* is the means to destroying the mind, and the means to eliminating latent tendencies is the production of countervailing tendencies (pp. 83, 238). Or, one not counteracting the flow is supporting it!

At this point, there are a series of objections (*pūrvapakṣa*) and responses offered by Vidyāraṇya clarifying the relationship (and ultimate primacy) of knowing the truth over destroying the mind and eliminating latent tendencies (pp. 84, 239). Vidyāraṇya argues that knowing the truth is principal (*pradhāna*) for the renunciation of the seeker (*vividiṣāsaṃnyāsa*, i.e. one who has not yet fully realized the truth), and destroying the mind and eliminating latent tendencies are subordinate (*upasarjana*). But for the renunciation of the knower (*vidvatsaṃnyāsa*), the latter two are primary (since one is in this case already a knower). And it is always fruitful to continually practice them together in either case.

When discussing discrimination of principal and subordinate further, Vidyāraṇya takes up the idea of divine (*daiva*) and demonic (*āsura*) nature (*saṃpad*)[11] from the *Bhagavad Gītā*. The text lists divine and demonic characteristics, and Vidyāraṇya states that liberation while living occurs when bad tendencies of innate and non-scriptural (*aśāstrīya*) demonic *saṃpad* are eliminated by good tendencies of *śāstra*-based divine nature achieved by personal effort (pp. 89, 242). Vidyāraṇya then discusses whether both destroying the mind and eliminating *vā-*

[10] And stopping mental transformations causes knowing the truth and knowing the truth stills the mind, since there is no "kindling" and the Self is seen.

[11] The term also suggests (good) fortune or accomplishment, but here I think is best translated "nature" or "condition."

*sanā*s are necessary to remove intense (*tīvra*) bondage, which is of demonic nature and constituted by dull (tāmasic) mental activity; he concludes both are necessary. Further, they are the direct or principal means to living liberation, as knowing the real is their cause, thus *tattvajñāna* is once removed as *jīvanmukti* cause; knowing the real is the direct or principal means to final, bodiless liberation,*videhamukti* or *kaivalya*. Vidyāraṇya here concludes that one who practices destroying the mind and eliminating latent tendencies, but does not study the knowledge texts (amply quoted in the text), will not attain *kaivalya* since the subtle body (*liṅgadeha*) is not destroyed.[12]

Defining *Vāsanā*s Again

Vidyāraṇya finally turns to asking the basic question, "what is the nature of *vāsanā*s which one must make great effort to eliminate?" approximately one-third of the way into the chapter (pp. 109, 256). In response, he quotes *LYV* 28.48-51, which state that a latent tendency is seizing (*ādāna*) a thing (or "it seizing us") with intense thought (*dṛḍhabhāvanā*), abandoning inquiry (*vicāraṇa*) into its antecedent or consequent. One instantly becomes what one conceives oneself with great intensity, forgetting everything else. Whatever object the person overcome (*vivaśīkṛ*) by a *vāsanā* sees, he imagines[13] it is a real thing. The object loses its true form (*svarūpa*) due to the overwhelming power of the tendency; one sees all poorly and is deluded as if drunk. This suggests that the person overcome by an impure *vāsanā* is "single-minded," but not in a positive, purifying sense; it also emphasizes the intense (affective) attachment, rather than the utter falsity of what is seen. Showing an uncommon awareness of cultural conditioning, Vidyāraṇya adds that a general example of such a tendency is the attachment (*abhiniveśa*) of people to the customs and traditions of their own country and family, and to their form of language and its proper usage. He also gives a more traditional addendum, a *śruti* passage (*Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* IV.4.5) which says that what one desires becomes one's resolve, which then turns into one's action, and one turns out in accord with that.

Vidyāraṇya then returns to the *LYV* (1.10-12) to describe two types of *vāsanā*s: pure (*śuddha*) and impure (*malina*); the latter causes birth and the former ends it (pp. 111, 257). The impure tendency also has the form of very dense ignorance (like congealed *ghī*) and possesses thick egoism (*ahaṃkāra*), while the pure tendency has known what is to be known (the Self), and remains just for the sake of the body, like a roasted seed without the sprout of rebirth. He quotes *Gītā* 16.7-12, which gives a long list of base qualities relating to the demonic nature (*āsura saṃpad*) to illustrate impure tendencies. These demonic folk do not know right conduct, purity, or truth; they are atheists with little understanding and they do savage deeds; and they are filled with desire, deceit, arrogance, anger, and lust. Vidyāraṇya emphasizes that those of demonic nature and impure tendencies do not accept the authority of the Veda and reject a lord over the universe, saying lust is the cause of all. He continues quoting and commenting on *Gītā* 16.13-16, describing dense egoism which leads to lust, arrogance, delusion, and ultimately falling into a foul hell, and *Gītā* 16.17-20, which state that the evil *vāsanā*-impelled egoism causes rebirth in a low state for the proud, obstinate, hateful

[12] The relationship of the three means is further discussed when Vidyāraṇya considers two types of *vidyādhikārin*s, those fit for knowledge (pp. 107, 254). Latent tendencies are not a major or separate topic here; meditation (*upāsti*) and repeated practice are endorsed.

[13] *vi-√muh*: emphasizing "supposes" or "believes," that is, what one sees is not necessarily a mere delusion, but is simply (and inaccurately) assumed real as it is.

and vile. Possessing such dense and affect-laden tendencies would certainly make it difficult to perceive clearly (or "see straight").

The pure tendencies are covered with far more brevity, following *Gītā* 13.12-17, which describe the highest *brahman*: that which is to be known and brings immortality, being detached, uniting opposites, with and without qualities (*guṇa*) and adjuncts (*upādhi*), light of lights, etc. (pp. 115, 259). An opponent points out that it was said that *vāsanā*s are characterized by disregarding inquiry into antecedent and consequent, but knowing what is to be known rises from inquiry, so this definition does not include pure tendencies. Vidyāraṇya responds that the term "intense thought" (*dṛḍhabhāvanā*) in the definition covers this (need for inquiry). As impure tendencies like anger, desire, and egoism arise in this life without any instruction from others due to intense thought (i.e. attachment) over many births, so, although first awareness of the real rises from inquiry, only when one concentrates on the truth by long, continuous, and careful attention, does reality (*tattva*) spring forth immediately before one's eyes, like a jar, without help of words, reasoning, or reflection.[14] This suggests inquiry (*vicāraṇa*) is needed at the beginning (to clarify consciousness and promote the flow of good *vāsanā*s), but after practice, reality appears immediately, without inquiry. A pure tendency, Vidyāraṇya continues, is the activity of the senses connected with continuing awareness of the real. It operates just to keep the body alive, not to produce a demonic nature consisting of deceit and pride, nor to produce merit or demerit (*dharmādharma*) causing rebirth (thus being like a burnt, fruitless grain).[15]

Types of (Impure) *Vāsanā*s

Vidyāraṇya then begins a long discussion of three types of impure *vāsanā*s: those relating to the world or society (*loka*), to learning (*śāstra*), and to the body (*deha*) (pp. 118, 261).[16] These are habitual patterns of attachments to approval, study, ritual, bodily appearance, and so on. A worldly tendency is a profound determination (*abhiniveśa*) to gain everyone's praise and no one's blame. This is impure because it is impossible to achieve – after all, even Rāma and Sītā were criticized. (Again below with learning, Vidyāraṇya will say that something is impure because unrealistic – so a fantasy or exaggerated attachment.) He points out that people insult one another over differing local customs, and Brahmins criticize each other about food or marriage regulations, as well as proper recensions of the Veda. It is well-known that everywhere all people – the learned, women, herdsmen – praise their own family, relatives, and goods, while belittling others. Since you cannot please everyone, he writes, perform your own good. Given the impurity of worldly tendencies, then, the texts of liberation (*mokṣa*) properly describe a master *yogin* as the same whether praised or censured.

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[14] Similar language appears in chapter three (pp. 264, 359) when an opponent asks how modest and recently begun yogic practice can overcome beginningless tendencies to agitation (*vyutthāna*). *Yogasūtra* 1.14 answers that such practice is firmly grounded when attended to constantly with great care for a long time. Vidyāraṇya reiterates the importance of long constant effort, avoiding all distraction, to firmly ground oneself in *samādhi*, thus being immovable by the *vāsanā*s of suffering or enjoyment of objects.

[15] The lack of any mention of commenced (*prārabdha*) *karma*, which also keeps the body alive until fruits are used up, is surprising here.

[16] A passing mention to these types of tendencies is made in chapter one (pp. 61, 223). Vidyāraṇya writes that since people desire different things, the worldly *vāsanā* of the agitated mind increases by seeking out what is desired, and it is opposed to knowledge. *Muktika Upaniṣad* 2.2 states that knowledge in its proper form does not arise by tendencies relating to the world, learning, or body.

*vāsanā*s of learning are themselves of three kinds: attachment (*vyasana*) to study (*pāṭha*), to many disciplines (*śāstra*), and to ritual performance (*anuṣṭhāna*) (pp. 120, 262). (This is an interesting criticism for one so learned himself!) Bharadvāja, for example, spent three lifetimes and began a fourth addicted to studying the Veda. Completing this study is impossible, Vidyāraṇya says, so it is an impure tendency. Finally, Indra taught him the knowledge of *saguṇa brahman* to reach a higher goal. Similarly, Mahādeva taught Durvāsā the study of Self-knowledge (*ātmavidyā*) alone (not many disciplines), as well as to turn inward and gain the grace of the *guru*. Mere textual study, Vidyāraṇya repeats, does not bring knowledge of *brahman*. Lastly, one sees the useless addiction to ritual performance in Nidāgha (in the *Viṣṇu Purāṇa*) and Dāśūra (in the *LYV*). This impure tendency causes rebirth. Vidyāraṇya offers an effective supporting quotation from the *Muṇḍaka Upaniṣad* (I.2.7-10) criticizing foolish blind faith in performing rites. *Gītā* 2.42-46 add that rites-doers seek heaven and pleasure, so get rebirth, while wise Brahmins go beyond the Vedas. In addition, the tendency relating to learning is impure since it causes arrogance, as when Śvetaketu, proud of his Vedic learning, disrespected his father (*Chāndogya Upaniṣad* VI), or when Bālāki audaciously even tried to teach *brahman*-knowing Ajātaśatru.

Vidyāraṇya also states that there are three types of tendencies relating to the body: the illusion of the body's Selfhood, of it acquiring (good) qualities, and of it removing defects (*doṣa*) (pp. 126, 266). Ordinary people wrongly think the self is the body, as did Virocana in *ChU* VIII. Acquiring (auspicious) qualities (*guṇādhāna*) is of two kinds: worldly (*laukika*) and scriptural (*śāstrīya*). Gaining a good voice, fragrance, or beauty is the first kind; bathing in the Gaṅgā or making pilgrimage is the second. Finally, one removes worldly defects by taking prescribed medicines or rinsing the mouth; the Vedic way of defect removal is by purification or sipping holy water.

Vidyāraṇya then expands on the impurity of each of these tendencies relating to the body. Identifying the self with the body is without foundation (*aprāmāṇika*) and the source of all misery; all teachers attacked this notion (pp. 127, 267). And we generally do not see people acquiring pleasant qualities (versus having them "naturally"): singers and teachers often try, but fail, to gain an attractive voice or beauty, and a good fragrance depends on one's clothes or garlands, not on the body. Vidyāraṇya reinforces this with one of his regular paeans to disgust at the body – the fool delighting in this mass of flesh, blood, pus, feces, etc., will love hell itself, and there is no better argument for detachment than the foul stench of one's own body. Acquiring certain qualities according to scripture is invalidated by other, more important, scriptures, like "do not harm any living being" is set aside by an injunction to sacrifice.

Vidyāraṇya again points out that powerful defects inherent in the body (thus impossible to remove, as some tend to imagine) also obstruct gaining (good) qualities, and he continues to vividly denigrate the body, which is filled with urine, phlegm, bile, muscle, fat, and other bodily elements (*Maitrī Upaniṣad* 1.2, 3.4) (pp. 130, 269). The body is covered with sweat, constantly open to disease and has filth continually discharging from various orifices, so it can never be truly purified. As the *LYV* says, the notion that "I am the body" is false and leads to hell. It must be avoided at all costs like an outcaste woman carrying dog flesh.

Vidyāraṇya here concludes that the wise should shun these three latent tendencies relating to society, learning, and the body. They obstruct the rise of knowledge in seekers and its stability in knowers. He here mentions in passing a fourth impure *vāsanā* of the mind (*manas*) in the form of demonic nature like deceit or pride, which all know leads to hell. The mind and all these tendencies should be eliminated (pp. 132, 270).

Mind, *Guṇa*s and *Vāsanā*s

Vidyāraṇya then turns to the nature of the mind whose tendencies are to be eliminated. The mind is a thing composed of parts (*sāvayava*), not an eternal substance, and is able to constantly change like lac or gold[17] (pp. 133, 271). Mental activities (*vṛtti*) like desire, etc., arising serially, are directly and clearly perceived by the witness (*sākṣipratyakṣa*) like a pot is directly perceived by the eye, and the mind is the basis (*upādāna*) of this. He adds, following *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* I.5.3, that when one's mind is absorbed elsewhere, one does not see or hear. For example, a pot, nearby and in broad daylight, is not seen when one is not attending to (*avadhāna*) it, but when attentive, one perceives it; the case is similar with a loud and nearby Vedic chant. An attentive mind is the common factor in all perception.[18] Here Vidyāraṇya seems to be reiterating that the eternally "clear-minded" observer is not overcome by or absorbed in clouded attachments due to impure tendencies.

Vidyāraṇya continues by discussing the *guṇa*s, of which the intellect (*citta*) consists (pp. 135, 272). The *guṇa*s are said to be constantly in flux (like waves on an ocean), and each is able to overpower the others (*Gītā* 14.10). When *tamas* (called *moha* or delusion) predominates, demonic nature rises. When *rajas* (called *pravṛtti* or activity) governs, the three latent tendencies relating to society appear, and when *sattva* (called *prakāśa* or radiance) dominates, divine nature is produced. *sattva* is the primary basis of the internal organ (*antaḥkaraṇa*) and is the nature of a knower's mind.

When *tamas* prevails (swelling the mind with the demonic nature of egoism, lust, and delusion), the mind is to be destroyed and latent tendencies eliminated. Vidyāraṇya here quotes *LYV* 18.20-23 on eliminating *vāsanā*s: bondage is bondage to tendencies and liberation their elimination (pp. 140, 275). Having abandoned *vāsanā*s, one should abandon desire for liberation. Abandoning tendencies concerning the mind and objects (a twofold distinction explained below), acquire pure *vāsanā*s manifesting friendliness, etc. While still producing them, abandon them internally, and be attached to the highest serenity within, having the latent tendency of consciousness alone (*cinmātra*). Intently abandoning even that which is connected with mind and intellect, resting firmly on what remains, abandon that by which you abandon.

Vidyāraṇya then explains some of the points above at some length, interspersed with replies to opponent's objections: "mental (*mānasa*) *vāsanā*s" means the latent tendencies relating to the world, learning, and body, which have been described in the prior section of the paper. Tendencies concerning objects refer to demonic nature, like deceit and pride, and are described as mild or sharp. Alternatively, "objects" refer to sound, touch, taste, and smell, and a mental *vāsanā* is an impression (*saṃskāra*) rising from *desiring* them while a *vāsanā* relating to objects is an impression rising from *enjoying* them. In this case, the four kinds of tendencies mentioned earlier (world, learning, body, and mind) are included in these two, since no other kind of *vāsanā* is possible other than internal (mental) and external (object).

An objection is then raised: how can we "abandon" *vāsanā*s (pp. 141, 276)? They have no form by which we could pick them up and throw them out like a dust ball! Vidyāraṇya an-

[17] He quotes *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* I.5.3 that the mind is desire, conceptualization, doubt, faith and lack thereof, resolve and lack thereof, shame, intelligence, and fear.

[18] Vidyāraṇya then makes an interesting distinction between a simple feeling (such as being touched on the back) and the awareness of the touch being specifically by hand or finger. The mind (*manas*) alone is the cause of the specific knowledge (*viśeṣajñāna*). It is called *manas* for the (discriminative) thinking (*manana*) and *citta* for the cognizing awareness (*cetana*).

swers that abandoning (formless things) is possible as in the case of fasting or a vigil. Eating and sleeping are natural, yet "formless," activities, and people observe fasts and vigils by giving them up.

Vidyāraṇya continues by emphasizing disciplining the mind, and here advocates the virtues (commonly mentioned in Buddhist texts) of friendliness (*maitrī*) and compassion (*karuṇā*), overcoming the ideas that happiness and suffering are solely individual (pp. 144, 278). One sees the suggestion here that group, as well as individual, tendencies or habitual patterns exist. Vidyāraṇya writes that if one practices sympathetic joy (*muditā*) towards virtuous (*puṇya*) people, then by that tendency, one turns toward virtuous acts oneself. In comparable fashion, being unmoved by evil doers, one would cease evil acts. Similarly, by practicing friendliness toward the happy, one removes desire *and* envy of the virtue of others; making another's happiness one's own by *maitrī* removes jealousy.[19]

An objector notes that there are limitless good *vāsanā*s, so one cannot practice them all, and such an attempt is futile (pp. 148, 282). Vidyāraṇya disputes its futility, since a single mind cannot possess limitless impure tendencies (so does not need to practice *all* good ones), as one person cannot get all diseases or take all the medicines prescribed in the Āyurveda. One should first examine one's mind and, on discovering which impure *vāsanā*s reside there, practice the opposing good tendencies. He offers an unsurprisingly ascetic parallel: as one oppressed by children, friends, and wife gets disgusted and renounces to get away from them, so one oppressed by impure tendencies like arrogance from knowledge, wealth, or family status should practice discernment (*viveka*) opposed to them.[20]

A short time later, when discussing the relation of discernment to liberating knowledge, the opponent states that since *viveka* immediately follows the rise of knowledge, impure *vāsanā*s do not continue, thus the practice of pure tendencies is not required (pp. 151, 284). Vidyāraṇya disagrees, because while impure tendencies do not continue in figures like Janaka (who had vast accumulated virtue), they do with others. For example, Yājñavalkya, who, despite being a *brahman*-knower, retained pride in learning and wealth, and Bhagīratha, who while a knower still lacked a peaceful mind due to impure tendencies while ruling his kingdom (but eventually abandoned all and then found peace). Thus, Vidyāraṇya concludes, one should observe one's own flaws from impure *vāsanā*s as clearly as those of others, and practice counteracting them. As usual, Vidyāraṇya insists on ongoing practice to safeguard knowledge.

The text continues discussing the remedies for pride, anger, and lust. Vidyāraṇya mentions *vāsanā*s when advocating discernment to remove desire for wife and children (pp. 163, 291). His misogyny (following *LYV* 2.90-100) is in full flower here: women are the fuel of hellfire, snares for trapping fools, masses of flesh, blood, and bone, and the baited hook attached to the line of the evil tendencies of men, who fish in the pond of rebirth, wallowing in the mind's muck. As impure *vāsanā*s concerning learning, women, etc., are remedied by discernment, so other tendencies should be counteracted by examining own's flaws through the *śāstra*s or one's own reasoning. When this is done, one obtains the highest state, liberation

[19] And when hatred of one's enemies ceases by practicing compassion toward the suffering, pride (like the demonic egoism described in *Gītā* 16.14-15) caused by happiness opposed to their suffering ceases. *yogin*s, being detached, can and do purify their minds by practicing these virtuous qualities, which suggest analogous virtues like the divine endowments of fearlessness and purity, means to knowledge like humility and honesty, and various positive qualities mentioned of the *jīvanmukta* and *sthitaprajña*. All these, being in the form of good (*śubha*) *vāsanā*s, remove impure tendencies.

[20] He adds *LYV* 19.39-41 here for support. The verses emphasize the transience of greatness, wealth, and worlds and heavens themselves.

while living. As *Yogavāsiṣṭha Upaśama* 92.9 states, if you make enough effort to abandon *vāsanā*s, all your ills will dissolve in a moment (pp. 166, 293).

Pure Consciousness (*Cinmātra*) *Vāsanā*s

Still explicating *LYV* 18.20-23, Vidyāraṇya next turns to advocating practice to gain the pure consciousness (*cinmātra*) *vāsanā* (pp. 171, 296). By control of the senses and discernment through long, continuous, and careful effort, the practice of friendliness (*maitrī*) is firmly established, and impure tendencies having a demonic nature are eliminated. Tendencies like friendliness now continually flow without personal effort, like breathing and blinking. While acting in the world, one should abandon contemplating whether these virtuous tendencies are complete or insufficient. And calming with effort all activities such as sleep, lassitude, or daydreaming, one should practice the *vāsanā* of pure consciousness. One then sees that consciousness (*cit*) is the fundamental basis of all. One must intently pursue the pure consciousness tendency until awareness of consciousness alone is as natural as breathing (and inquiry is no longer needed).

An opponent says that if from the start this *vāsanā* alone is enough to remove impure tendencies, why practice "superfluous" friendliness, etc. (pp. 173, 297)? This gives Vidyāraṇya another opportunity to reinforce the importance of constant practice to support knowing the real: he responds that without such practice the pure consciousness *vāsanā* would lack a firm basis, as any well-built house must have a firm foundation. To the objection that the *YV* improperly says "one should renounce even this (pure consciousness tendency)," since then nothing further remains, Vidyāraṇya argues that this is no problem since there are two types of pure consciousness *vāsanā*: one with mind and intellect, and one without. Mind is the instrument and intellect is the agent adjunct. Therefore, one should abandon the first type of *cinmātra* tendency, called meditation (*dhyāna*), associated with the idea of instrument and agent such as "I will cultivate pure consciousness with a focused and concentrated mind." But one should appropriate (*upā-√dā*) the pure consciousness tendency called enstasis (*samādhi*), which is free from the obstructing idea of agent and instrument, by intense practice.[21] Having firmly attained this enstasis by long and careful effort (taken from *YS* 1.14), one should then abandon even the effort to abandon the idea of agent and instrument.

The opponent (unsurprisingly) points out that an effort to abandon effort must be abandoned, thus leading to infinite regress. Vidyāraṇya responds that somehow this effort at abandonment removes both itself and other efforts (like that to abandon the idea of agent and instrument) like a powder in dirty water which removes itself along with the other impurities (by precipitation). And when this (effort to abandon) ceases, the mind remains completely without *vāsanā*s, since both pure and impure tendencies are eliminated.

Vidyāraṇya ends the chapter listing and explaining verses from the *LYV* which support eliminating tendencies (pp. 175ff., 299ff.): the mind is bound by *vāsanā*s and freed without them; they dissolve due to right insight, and the mind is then like an oilless lamp (*LYV* 16.45-46). The awakened one without tendencies is called a *jīvanmukta* (*LYV* 5.92). One whose mind is without *vāsanā* has no concern for performing *or* refraining from action, nor for enstasis or muttered prayers (*japa*). Having studied *śāstra* and debated at length, the highest state is the silence due to abandoned tendencies (*LYV* 18.28-29). Vidyāraṇya adds that one should not

[21] He then offers Patañjali's definitions of *dhyāna* (continual fixedness on a concentrated thought) and *samādhi* (illumination of the object [of meditation] alone) from *Yogasūtra* 3.2-3.

think that ordinary activities supporting life will disappear for one whose mind is devoid of *vāsanā*s. Neither sense nor mental activity will completely cease (they just will not be overcome by any flaw) – one continues to see without tendencies and the eye effortlessly perceives without attachment, so the wise person continues to act (and experience already commenced [*prārabdha*] *karma*).

Still, even when enjoying *karma*, those with and without *vāsanā*s can be distinguished. As *LYV* 18.42-43 say, the latter (without tendencies) bear up in adversity, accept what is, remain cool and umoved (pp. 179, 301).[22] Thus, the importance of extinguishing tendencies is shown by Vidyāraṇya's conclusion here that it is well-established that living liberation (discernment of which is the reason for this text) will arise by the elimination of *vāsanā*s.

Later References to *Vāsanā*s in the *JMV*

*vāsanā*s are discussed on occasion in chapter three, on destroying the mind (*manonāśa*), but they are generally not linked with the main topic in this chapter, the limbs of *yoga*, nor with Sāṃkhya evolutes, though there are a few interesting remarks tying eliminating latent tendencies with breath control (*prāṇāyāma*). Vidyāraṇya reiterates that these two means to *jīvanmukti* (*manonāśa* and *vāsanākṣaya*) support one another: when tendencies are eliminated, the mind is certainly destroyed as well, and the proper practice of destroying the mind brings about and protects the elimination of tendencies.

In the section most relevant here, *LYV* 28.128-129 hold that one conquers the mind by gaining knowledge of the Self, associating with the good, and by completely abandoning all *vāsanā*s and regulating the breath (pp. 186, 305). Vidyāraṇya adds that one afflicted by the evil tendency of pride in knowledge (*vidyāmada*) will lack the urge to associate with the good and must use the means of discernment (*viveka*) discussed earlier to abandon tendencies. If the *vāsanā*s prove still too powerful to abandon, one should use the means of breath control (*prāṇāyāma*). Since tendencies and the rhythm of breathing impel the mind, when they are controlled, the mind becomes tranquil. Vidyāraṇya then insightfully expands on how the very nature of breathing kindles mental activity, and from the "flaring up of consciousness" (*saṃvijjvāla*), e.g. mental activity, suffering arises. According to *YV* V.91.28, the other way the mind is produced is through generation by tendencies, manifestation in consciousness states (*bhāvasaṃvit*), and then experience (pp. 189, 308). Vidyāraṇya adds that not only do the breath and *vāsanā*s impel the mind, they stimulate each other, thus by destroying one, you destroy both (also found in *LYV* 28.64-65).[23] In chapter four, on the purpose of attaining living liberation, *vāsanā*s are addressed only at the very end (pp. 313, 392), when Vidyāraṇya deals with the objection that enstasis has been belittled and everyday action (*vyavahāra*) praised in *LYV* 25.10-11. The verses state that if the mind of one in *samādhi* is full of mental activity, then his enstasis is like a wild dance, but if one wildly dancing has eliminated all tendencies, then the dance is equal to *brahman*-enstasis. Vidyāraṇya responds that the passage accepts the excellence of *samādhi* and belittles (evil) *vāsanā*s: while enstasis is better

[22] *LYV* 19.60-64 add that Janaka, after rising from enstasis, was said to act this way: arising after a long silence, he reflected, with an utterly calm mind, on people's lives: "What is there to accomplish or to imagine while having a self-established and pure consciousness? I do not desire what I don't have or abandon what I have. Content, I abide in the self." Having thus reflected, Janaka rose, detached, to act however was appropriate, not thinking about past or future, but just happily following the present.

[23] *LYV* 28.121-123 (and 54-57) detail the means to and result of destroying them: breathing is controlled by *prāṇāyāma*, *āsana,* etc., and *vāsanā*s by acting daily without attachment and with awareness of the body's mortality. One will reach "mindlessness" (*acittatā*) by practicing either route.

than everyday activity, if the former has latent tendencies, then it is inferior to everyday activity without tendencies, so it is not really enstasis. When one in *samādhi* and one acting in the world both have *vāsanā*s (and are not truth-knowers), then enstasis is superior because it produces virtue, which causes one to attain the highest realm. And when both are established in knowledge and without tendencies, then *samādhi* in the form of destroying the mind (which safeguards living liberation in the form of eliminating *vāsanā*s) is certainly superior.

There is also only one significant reference to latent tendencies in the final chapter, on the renunciation of the knower (pp. 336, 411). In commenting on *Paramahaṃsa Upaniṣad* 2, which asserts that the *yogin* always turns away from the cause of doubt, error, or false knowledge, Vidyāraṇya holds that the cause of doubt, etc., is ignorance and its *vāsanā*s, which conceal the reality of non-dual *brahman*. The ignorance of the *paramahaṃsa yogin* is removed by realizing the meaning of the Upaniṣadic great statements (*mahāvākya*) and tendencies are removed by yogic practice, as one realizes the right compass points upon sunrise (giving light), but the presence of *vāsanā*s (like the habit "but it must be *that* way") might still cause some confusion. However, after realization, a *yogin* always turns away from doubt, etc., and their cause, ignorance and its attendant tendencies, so this cessation is considered permanent.

To conclude, concerning *vāsanā*s, Vidyāraṇya emphasizes the profound influence of subtle, latent mental patterns or habits, flowing along either good or evil channels. The evil ("demonic") tendencies cause affect-laden convictions which overwhelm our ability to think or reflect clearly. We are bound to (or "become") what we think (or project). The nature of *vāsanā*s is further evidence for the need for renunciation and yogic practice to safeguard liberating non-dual knowledge, one of Vidyāraṇya's major themes. Vidyāraṇya was keenly aware that, despite the power of knowing the real, the continuing force of mental tendencies was hard to resist.

Stuart Elkman (Swami Atmajnanananda)

What to Do with the World

During the years between 1974 and 1976, Wilhelm Halbfass found himself in the rather unusual position (enviable or lamentable, depending upon your point of view) of conducting a series of Indian philosophy seminars attended by three staunch devotees of Sri Ramakrishna, one a Mathematics professor who had once been a monk at one of the Vedanta Societies in California, and two destined to become *sādhu*s of Sri Sarada Math and Sri Ramakrishna Math respectively. The seminars were always interesting, usually centered on textual questions related to the precise meaning of the original Sanskrit sources, and rarely contentious. The one issue that I seem to remember creating a bit of a lively debate was the question of the universe in relation to Brahman. In the *Gospel of Sri Ramakrishna*, we run across the statement many times that "Brahman has become the world," and one of us had evidently repeated this phrase in the seminar. Wilhelm took exception to this position as not representing the advaitic point of view, while the three of us naturally tried to defend Sri Ramakrishna's assertion.

Wilhelm's point of view was certainly well taken. Brahman, of course, never actually *becomes* anything, in the sense of Brahman undergoing change, since changelessness is, according to the *advaitin*s, one of the essential features of Brahman. When we speak of Brahman becoming the universe, it is certainly not in the sense of milk turning into curd. And yet, what is it that becomes the universe if not Brahman, since Brahman alone exists and has reality? This is the dilemma for the *advaitin.* And this is why the universe represents such an enormous problem. It is a kind of embarrassment for the *advaitin*. It is the elephant in the living room that no one wants to acknowledge, and yet no one can ignore. And it is this question that I would like to look at in the space of a few short pages, and in a rather uncritical and unscholarly fashion that my status as a non-academic (I hope) will allow me.

The Problem of the Universe

The *advaitin* has, to a certain extent, painted himself in a corner with his assertion that Brahman alone is real, and is inactive, unchanging, without parts, free from attributes, etc. If *nirguṇa* Brahman is all we have to work with, then any attempt to explain the existence of the universe is doomed at the very outset. Heidegger believed that the ultimate philosophical question was, "Why is there anything at all?" But for the *advaitin*, the more pressing question seems to be, "*Is* there anything at all?" *ajātavāda*, the belief that there is/was no creation, is not very satisfying. Even the most orthodox *advaitin*s grudgingly admit that there is something that seems to be a universe, but is ultimately not what it seems. We may accept the unreality of the universe in the sense of its transitory and insubstantial nature, but we are still left in the dark as to why even an unreal universe should appear. The dilemma, to state it rather oddly, is: If Brahman alone exists, then why doesn't Brahman alone exist?

Ultimately, of course, we have to add a small footnote to our statement. When we say that Brahman alone exists, we really mean that Brahman alone exists as a real entity (*vastu*). There is, however, an ominous cloud hovering above the sun of Brahman that is neither completely real nor completely unreal (*sadasadvilakṣaṇa*), which we call Māyā. Whether this cloud belongs to Brahman (an unhappy conclusion) or is distinct from Brahman (equally un-

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happy) or is somehow sitting on the fence (*taṭastha* – a nice compromise, but somehow philosophically tenuous) is anyone's guess, and the different schools of Vedānta make much of this question. But regardless of our position, this small and unfortunate footnote of Māyā has immense consequences, both philosophical and existential, as we all know.

Vivartavāda

Short of denying completely the reality of the universe, the most commonly accepted theory regarding the apparent existence of the universe is just that: that the universe is an appearance. This theory has many positive features. It relieves Brahman of the onerous task of becoming anything, and yet explains, in some sense, how the universe becomes an object of experience. The classic example is that of the snake and the rope, and it is used so often that we wonder why the snake has not long ago refused to be a part of it. As the story goes, we are strolling along the country path at twilight and see what appears to be a snake by the side of the road. We approach and shine a flashlight on the supposed snake, and discover to our relief that the snake was actually a rope. We had simply mistaken it for a snake in the darkness of dusk. As I said earlier, this theory has several very appealing features. We know that the rope never became a snake, that it is foolish to enquire when the snake came into being, how it evolved, why it took birth, what possible harm it can cause us, etc. It is unreal, the product of ignorance. The false appearance of the snake did nothing to compromise the integrity of the rope. *The rope has not become a snake*; *therefore Brahman has not become the universe.*

So, Wilhelm was right after all, or so it would seem. But let us examine this illustration a little more closely. The rope represents Brahman (which alone exists) and the snake represents the universe (which is merely an appearance of Brahman). So far, so good. But where did the road come from, and who is this gentleman walking down it? To put the question a little more philosophically, "If the universe is a false appearance of Brahman, to whom is it appearing?" The *jīva* cannot be the source of this illusion, since the *jīva* is itself a product of illusion – our friend Māyā. In fact, we find that the standard illustration used to support *vivartavāda* serves to raise more questions than it answers.

Here I would like to bring Wilhelm back into the picture. For my comprehensive exam he had me to translate Śaṅkarācārya's introduction to the *Bhagavadgītā*, and then gave me an essay topic to write on. I have always been grateful to him for the final question because I found it so interesting. I was also impressed that he would choose something so suited to my bent of mind. The question was, "What is the locus of *avidyā*, or ignorance? Is it Brahman or the *jīva*?" The question is of special relevance here, since it helps explain the mysterious gentleman walking down the unmarked road, seeing the Brahman–rope lying on the ground and thinking it to be a universe–snake.

As much as we hate to admit it, since it goes against everything we know or would like to know about Brahman, there can be no ultimate locus for ignorance, in the cosmic sense, other than Brahman. This conclusion is easily reached when we realize that both the long and short lists of options contains only one entry, namely Brahman, the sole existent reality. This cosmic ignorance, Māyā, cannot be outside of Brahman, since it would then represent a second reality. It cannot lie at the heart of Brahman as an essential characteristic (*svarūpa*), for it would then compromise its nature as pure knowledge and light. It seems to somehow reside at the very point where the real and the unreal meet, something like the fictitious line that separates the sky from the land, which we call the horizon. The example is often given of the

venom in the throat of a poisonous snake. It lies within the throat region; yet the snake is protected from it by an enclosing sac. The poison is deadly to others, but harmless to the snake. In short, ignorance resides within Brahman, but does not affect Brahman. At least we hope not. (I should note, on the other hand, that Sri Ramakrishna was fond of quoting the Bengali verse, *pañcabhūter phānde*, *brahma paṛe kānde* – "Brahman weeps, having fallen in the snares of the five elements.")

But this is not the only sense of *avidyā* that we find in Vedānta, for the *jīva*, though itself a product of cosmic illusion, or Māyā, nevertheless is a proud possessor of ignorance as well. And in his case, it is an essential feature, or *svarūpa*. This is of great significance when we go back to our friend and his mistaken snake. If he represents the *jīva* in a state of ignorance and the snake represents the entire universe, including his own person, then the illustration starts to make some sense. Unfortunately, though, we find that the very *vivartavāda* that is so often used to explain the appearance of the universe is in reality not a model for illusory creation at all, but rather an explanation of individual, *post-Māyā* ignorance. That is to say, it tells us nothing about how or why the apparent universe comes into being. This does not mean it is not a helpful model. It is very helpful, especially if we understand the significance of the symbolism. What we learn from the model of the snake and the rope is, not how the universe comes into being, but how something can appear to change without really changing. It is, in this sense, not so different from the Upanishadic example of gold jewelry. As gold, the underlying substance does not change when bracelets, earrings, rings, etc., are made. The gold remains the same, only changed externally in terms of name and form. Unfortunately, we are no wiser when it comes to the question as to how and why and by whom the gold was turned into golden ornaments.

There is, of course, a second deep meaning to the snake and rope example, perhaps of more interest to the spiritual seeker than to the philosopher. I mention it here because it is often overlooked, though of great importance. It is the fact that the first glimpse of the snake brings to us great fear, and the recognition that it is a rope, equally great relief. When we see the universe as real, it has a great power to affect us. When we know it to be a false appearance of Brahman, it loses both its sting and its attraction.

So, for the *advaitin*, the theory of *vivartavāda* is of the utmost importance, though it may not be the creation model many think it is. Ultimately the *advaitin* is forced back into the old explanation that the apparent creation/projection/illusion is due to Māyā. This is at once the best answer and no answer, since we really cannot say with any certainty what Māyā is. There is a beautiful verse which sums up the truth about Māyā: It is by its very essence inexplicable. If it could be understood, then it would have to be considered real:

> *āvidyāyā avidyātvam idam eva tu lakṣaṇam |*
> *yat pramāṇāsahiṣṇutvam anyathā vastu sā bhavet ||.*
>
> The characteristic of *avidyā* is its unintelligibility. It cannot bear the light of any standard of knowledge. If it could, it would be something real. (*Bṛhadāraṇyakavārttika* v. 181)[1]

Nevertheless, Māyā *is* something; it is not a mere negation, as we often think of ignorance. The *Vedāntasāra* (v. 34)[2] speaks of it as *bhāvarūpa*, something existent, if not altogether real in the sense that Brahman is real. It is this Māyā that inexplicably changes *nirguṇa* Brahman into *saguṇa* Brahman. And in this sense, we are almost forced to think of Māyā in terms of

[1] See *Vedāntasāra*, translated by Swami Nikhilananda, Calcutta 1974, p. 23.
[2] Op. cit., p. 21.

śakti, or power: the power, first of all, to conceal the true nature of Brahman, *āvaraṇaśakti*, and then to cover it with an apparent reality that is in every respect contrary to Brahman, *vikṣepaśakti*.

Understood this way, the advaitic doctrine of creation is far more realistic than it appears when we try to use the snake–rope model as a creation theory tool. When we turn to the Upanishads to try to find explanations for this apparent universe, we often find highly allegorical stories and anthropomorphic conceptions of Brahman. A well-known passage from the *Taittirīya Upaniṣad* (VI.1) speaks of Brahman almost in the sense of being lonely, wanting a little companionship, or being bored with its vaunted oneness and seeking "to be many." Though allegory, it points to the idea that Brahman is not merely a mass of pure consciousness, but somehow cosmic mind as well. That is to say, it possesses the power of projection as an adjunct to its power of thought, *cicchakti*. By thinking the universe, or, to use another common metaphor, dreaming the universe, it creates the universe. Out of what? Out of itself. It is a case of Brahman *becoming* the universe, while remaining itself the same time. It is Brahman, through Māyā, dreaming the universe, and again, Brahman, as the *jīva*, acting in the dreamed universe. It is the actor who sees the rope and thinks it to be a snake. And the rope, or substance of all that it sees, is nothing but undifferentiated consciousness having become differentiated. It is Māyā that creates both the *jīva* and the apparent universe, both out of the same Brahman and both at the same time. It is not the *jīva* mistaking Brahman as the universe that explains creation, as the snake and rope scenario seems to imply. As Sri Ramakrishna used to say, it is Brahman that has become all this, not through actual transformation, but through Māyā. And here, we cannot help but explain Māyā in terms of the power of consciousness, *cicchakti*.

There is another very helpful verse from the *Vivekacūḍāmaṇi*, attributed to Śaṅkarācārya. It reads:

> *mayy akhaṇḍasukhāmbhodhau bahudhā viśvavīcayaḥ |*
> *utpadyante vilīyante māyāmārutavibhramāt ||.*
>
> In me, the ocean of unbroken bliss, the waves of the universe rise and fall again and again, churned up by the winds of Māyā. (v. 496)

Does any actual transformation of the ocean take place when the waves rise and fall? Only from the point of view of name and form, not from the point of view of water. The water remains completely unchanged, regardless of the waves on the surface. And yet, it is also undeniable that the placid ocean becomes a choppy ocean when the winds of Māyā blow. How it happens and why it happens is inexplicable. That is why we use the term Māyā. It explains it by leaving it unexplained. So, in the final analysis, Wilhelm was right: there is no *becoming* in Brahman. It ever remains what it is. But it is equally true that there is a mysterious power at the heart of Brahman (or, if not the heart, then the throat) that allows it to *become* the universe, and not simply to *appear* as the universe, without ever undergoing any change itself.

During my years of graduate work under Wilhelm, many such topics were discussed. They were happy days and my memories of them are very fond, as are my memories of Dr. Halbfass. I am one of many students who owe him a great debt of gratitude and remember him with much affection. These musings certainly do not do justice to the memory of such a brilliant thinker, but I hope they will be a small tribute to Wilhelm Halbfass – the person, and not just the scholar.

4.6

ŚAIVISM

Raffaele Torella

Studies on Utpaladeva's *Īśvarapratyabhijñāvivṛti*
Part I: *Anupalabdhi* and *Apoha* in a Śaiva Garb*

At the outset of an article published in 1988, I noted that the *Īśvarapratyabhijñāvivṛti* or *-ṭīkā* (henceforth *Vivṛti*) would deserve a prominent place in any imaginary catalogue of the lost works of Indian philosophical literature (Torella 1988: 137). Thirteen years later, in which the Pratyabhijñā school of the Kashmirian Śaivādvaita has continued to be one of my preferred fields of research, I would still fully subscribe to that earlier statement. The role of Utpaladeva's long commentary on his *Īśvarapratyabhijñākārikā* (*ĪPK*) as the real centre of gravity of Pratyabhijñā philosophy has become, in fact, clearer and clearer, though the later Śaiva philosophical tradition chose instead Abhinavagupta's *Īśvarapratyabhijñāvimarśinī* (*ĪPV*) as the standard text. This brilliant and more compact and accessible text was copied again and again over the centuries and became popular in South India too, where a number of manuscripts in the principal southern scripts are still available. The success of a particular commentary is very often the indirect cause of the decline of others, which are less and less read and, consequently, copied, until they are completely or almost completely lost. One could mention, among others, the particularly exemplary case of the *Yuktidīpikā* on the *Sāṃkhyakārikā* that has come down to us in a very few copies.

I need not repeat here what I have already said elsewhere on the nature of the *Vivṛti* and its relation to the other commentaries.[1] Suffice it to recall that Utpaladeva is said to have composed the *ĪPK* and the concise *Vṛtti* at the same time, and later on to have devoted an analytic commentary to the complex of *Kārikā–Vṛtti*, i.e., our *Vivṛti* (or *Ṭīkā*), in which he discussed possible alternative views and rejected them, also indulging in occasionally quite long digressions on particular subjects.

The only mention of an extant fragmentary manuscript of the *Vivṛti* occurred in K.Ch. Pandey's pioneering book on Abhinavagupta and the so-called Kashmir Shaivism (Pandey 1963: 69-70; see also Torella 1988: 141). Though the original manuscript was apparently lost, a transcript of it, by Prof. Pandey's own hand, was found among the papers left by the learned scholar upon his demise and kept by his widow on behalf of the Abhinavagupta Institute, University of Lucknow. During my visit to Lucknow in 1987, Mrs. Lila Pandey and the Trustees of the Institute were so kind as to show me the notebook with the transcript, but did not allow me to copy or photograph it, except for a small portion (10 pages out of 49), which I edited and translated in the above-mentioned article. My efforts in later years to secure the entire transcript were, despite the good offices of Professors N. Rastogi and J.P. Sinha, totally unsuccessful. By now, Pandey's transcript is to be considered definitively lost.

The good fortune that sometimes helps scholars in their research, counteracting the obstacles set up by human unhelpfulness, took me in 1998 to the India National Archives in Delhi in search of the manuscripts used by the Pandits of the Srinagar Research Department for the editions of the Kashmir Series. I was interested in those manuscripts because of the important marginal notes that some of them contained, where I assumed to find quotations from lost

* I wish to thank Prof. Karin Preisendanz for her useful comments and keen editorial care.

[1] Cf. Torella 1994: xl-xliv.

Karin Preisendanz (ed.), *Expanding and Merging Horizons*: *Contributions to South Asian and Cross-Cultural Studies in Commemoration of Wilhelm Halbfass*, Wien: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 2007, pp. 473-490.

Kashmiri works. When I chanced upon a Śāradā manuscript, entitled *Pratyabhijñāvivṛti* (Skt. ms. No. 30), belonging to a small fund of manuscripts that the Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir had transmitted to the National Archives in 1948, I began looking through it with the same skepticism with which I had in the past looked through manuscripts with the same title all over India (in all cases, the title had simply been the outcome of careless cataloguing). Very soon, however, I realized that what I had in front of me was precisely the original of Pandey's transcript, as described by him on the very first page of his notebook.[2] Once the transcript had become irretrievably lost to us, the original came to light again.

The thirty-three folios of the manuscript cover the full text of *ĪPK* I.3.6 through I.5.3 along with Utpaladeva's *Vṛtti* and *Vivṛti*, plus Abhinavagupta's *Vimarśinī.* The manuscript begins with the *Vimarśinī's bhūmikā* to *ĪPK* I.3.6 (*saṃskāre saty api smṛtiḥ* […], Vol. 1, p. 103,6) and ends abruptly with *iha bodhas tāvad abhinnaḥ prakāśamātram eva hy asya paramā-<rthaḥ>*, that is, the first line of the *Vimarśinī* on *ĪPK* I.5.4-5 (Vol. 1, p. 135,5-6). Although the portion of the recovered text is comparatively short, it proves to be particularly important for the study of Pratyabhijñā philosophy since some very crucial points are dealt with there at great length. Among them, we find the nature of cognition, its being self-aware, the impossibility of a cognition's becoming the object of another cognition, the necessity for the various cognitions to rest on a single substratum for a connection between cognitions to be possible, and the necessity for cognition and its object to share the same essential nature, that is, "light". Utpaladeva, and after him Abhinavagupta, progressively attain their final position by means of a very interesting dialogue, mainly with the Buddhist *pramāṇa* tradition and the Vijñānavāda, with the participation of the Mīmāṃsakas (Bhāṭṭas and Prābhākaras) on specific points.

In this contribution I am continuing, after an interval of thirteen years, my above-mentioned article, which contained the edition and translation of the full text of the *Vivṛti* on *ĪPK* I.3.6 up to the beginning of the *Vivṛti* on *ĪPK* I.3.7. The present article is devoted to the edition and translation of the full text of the *Vivṛti* on *ĪPK* I.3.7.

The third Āhnika of *ĪPK* deals with the untenability of the opponent's theses as regards the unification of cognitions, which alone renders all human experiences (*vyavahāra*) possible (cf. the relevant colophon of the *Vimarśinī* [*ĪPV* I, p. 112]: *paradarśanānupapattir nāma tṛtīyam āhnikam*). The theses of the opponents were presented in the previous Āhnika (ibid., p. 89: *pūrvapakṣavivṛtir nāma dvitīyam āhnikam*). In order to better understand the content of v. I.3.6 of the *ĪPK*, we must read it together with the previous verse, to which it is closely connected (tr. Torella 1994: 102-103):

> Thus, the functioning of the human world – which stems precisely from the unification (*anusaṃdhāna*) of cognitions, in themselves separate from each other and incapable of knowing one another – would be destroyed … (I.3.6). … if there were no Maheśvara who contains within himself

[2] "Leaf 33. Size 7 $^{1}/_{2}$" x 9 $^{1}/_{2}$". Lines per page 19 approximately. Syll. per line 21. Handwriting almost recent. Written on local paper which does not seem to be old. 31st leaf worm eaten, it is clear from the note book pages 44, 45 and 46. The ms. begins line no. 1, top: *śrīgaṇeśāya namaḥ*; line two: *saṃskāre saty api* etc. Ends abruptly as can be seen at page 49. Character sharada." This description perfectly suits the National Archives manuscript, except for the mention of the worm-eaten thirty-first leaf, which, at least as far as I can see from a rather faint xerox-copy, would seem more or less intact. According to Prof. Prakash Pandey (personal communication), the manuscript belongs to the latter half of the eighteenth century.

> all the infinite forms, who is one, whose essence is consciousness, possessing the powers of knowledge, memory and exclusion (I.3.7).

Utpaladeva's final aim is to establish a single cosmic consciousness, i.e., Śiva, as the common background of all reality and, particularly, of all human experiences. He pursues this intention not by apodictically stating the Śaiva truth – for example, by resorting to the authority of revealed texts – but by critically examining diametrically opposed doctrines, i.e., those of the Buddhist *pramāṇa* philosophers. In doing so, he recognizes the leading position of the Buddhist philosophy in the Kashmir of his day and at the same time shows that he is not afraid of challenging the great cultural prestige of the Buddhist doctrines. Moreover, in many cases he makes use, as far as possible, of their arguments to preliminarily build up and then refine his own position. This way of carrying out the "duel" with the *pramāṇa* philosophers reminds one of the attitude often found in oriental martial arts. Instead of directly attacking his adversary, Utpaladeva seeks to exploit the adversary's intellectual ability to finally turn it back upon him. The main technique on which Utpaladeva's argumentation is based is the one well known in śāstric debate as *prasaṅgaviparyaya*. The Buddhist ideas are not rejected at the outset but are rather apparently accepted and then pushed to their extreme consequences. As a result, the Buddhist opponent is finally confronted with two alternatives: either to abandon his own specific theses or, if he is still convinced of them (and, interestingly, this is the case not only for the Buddhist but for the Śaiva philosopher himself), to change the perspective from which they are to be viewed. In other words, he should accept the overall theoretical Śaiva framework precisely to safeguard his own Buddhist ideas.[3]

The main part of the *Vivṛti* passage edited here is devoted to the discussion of the Buddhist concepts of "non-perception" (*anupalabdhi*) and, less extensively, of "exclusion" (*apoha*) as the very core of conceptual thought. If one accepts the self-contained nature of cognition (as the Buddhist does), it becomes impossible to account for either of them. On seeing an empty surface we would not be allowed to say that there is no jar there because the cognition of a certain object would not be able to give rise to, at the same time, alternative cognitions later to be rejected. Yet the world of human knowledge, language and practical activity has among its pillars precisely the possibility of taking something for "absent", or of building mental images by way of exclusion. Furthermore, granted that the Buddhist description of how an individual cognition works in isolation is considered as basically correct, the capability of the individual cognitions to communicate with each other, to enter into a network, is required. Such a "network" cannot be provided but by the single and unitary consciousness in which all of them are rooted, in a word: by the Śiva-nature which permeates reality, constituting its ultimate ground.

Both the topics of *anupalabdhi* and *apoha* will receive a separate and extensive treatment later on in the *ĪPK* (see I.7.7-11 for *anupalabdhi* and I.6.1-5 for *apoha*). Here they are preliminarily discussed from a particular viewpoint, that is, as examplary grounds for the necessity to postulate a single consciousness-principle (in the case of *anupalabdhi*) and a basic "universal" stuff in everything (in the case of *apoha*). The Buddhists account for the establishment of the absence of a jar in a certain place by saying that the cognition of the empty place, being aware of itself as opposed to the cognition of the place together with a jar, is also aware of the place as "devoid of a jar". In fact, if a jar were present in a certain place, the jar would also be manifested in the cognition of the place since both the jar and the place share the same capacity [of being perceptable] (*tulyayogyatārūpatvāt*). This can be maintained, the

[3] The technique of *prasaṅgaviparyaya* is also well known to Buddhists (cf. Iwata 1993).

Buddhists go on, because particulars belonging to the same class (that is, "visible" particulars) are grasped by one and the same cognition (here a "visual" cognition), and, consequently, in the case of a jar being there, the cognition of the place should also contain a manifestation of the jar; but in the case at issue, this is not so. Utpaladeva points out that we are dealing here with two distinct and separate cognitions, which are bound to remain so: the one can by no means include or exclude the other, unless one intends to explain the establishment of the absence of a jar in terms of inference, which is not assumed by the Buddhists (see Torella 1994: 143, n. 17). These and other arguments are taken into account in the text (see below). To summarize: Each cognition sheds light on itself alone; or, in other words, each cognition has its own self-awareness (*svasaṃvedana*), which can by no means act as a common basis where two distinct cognitions may meet. No single cognition, Utpaladeva concludes, not even perceptual cognition, can by itself establish the absence of something. The only way to fill the gap between cognitions and in this way give a reasonable explanation of the establishment of "absences" which is so common in everyday life is to accept their resting on a single consciousness. Instead of a multiplicity of unrelated *svasaṃvedana*s each corresponding to a single cognition, Utpaladeva posits the one supreme consciousness-principle as the common *svasaṃvedana* of all cognitions, which in this way derive from it the capacity to enter into relation with each other.

The starting point for the discussion of the *apoha* issue is clearly stated in Abhinavagupta's *Īśvarapratyabhijñāvivṛtivimarśinī* (*ĪPVV* I, p. 292,9ff.): Why, on the appearance of a particular object, should one figure out something different destined to be excluded later (*nanu svalakṣaṇe 'vabhāte kuto 'tadrūpam āśaṅkyate yad apohyate*)? Abhinavagupta is not satisfied with Dharmakīrti's answer, elaborated at length in the *Svārthānumānapariccheda* chapter of his *Pramāṇavārttika* and *Svavṛtti*: the correct knowledge of the particular (*svalakṣaṇa*) is continually threatened by erroneous superimpositions (*samāropa*), caused, e.g., by misleading similarities – such as the brightness equally found in mother-of-pearl and in silver –, which make the knower mistake one thing for another. The doubt which projects alternative objective forms to be negated would arise precisely because the knower is aware of the fact that in principle many superimpositions are possible; thus a definite ascertainment becomes possible only after hypothetical mistaken forms are preliminarily rejected. Subsequently, Abhinavagupta takes into account the position of Śaṅkaranandana (lines 18ff.), who in his *Apohasiddhi* recognizes *prasaṅga*, i.e., the mere possibility that a thing be different from itself (?) (*anyathāprasaṅga*), as the cause of doubt.[4] Both *samāropa* and *prasaṅga* are untenable for Abhinavagupta because, no matter whether they derive from beginningless nescience or from other causes, they ultimately lead to a *regressus ad infinitum*.

Utpaladeva puts forward his own version of how *apoha* works, taking for granted that *apoha* is indeed the pivot of all conceptual thought. His view, evidently nourished by Buddhist ideas, is centred on the plurality of causal efficiencies found in any object, an idea he substi-

[4] The *ĪPVV* seems to be the only work to quote from the *Apohasiddhi*; among the five quotations (pp. 272,14; 292,19, 21, 23; 293,12) the second one is certainly in prose, thus showing that the *Apohasiddhi*, just like other works by Śaṅkaranandana, consisted of *kārikā*s mixed with prose passages. Only three out of the five quotations could be traced either in its single extant Sanskrit manuscript (Bühnemann 1980: 193-194) or in the Tibetan translation (see Gnoli 1960: xxiii-xxiv); on Śaṅkaranandana, see Steinkellner and Much 1995 and Krasser 2001. In a separate study under preparation I propose to examine the context of the *Apohasiddhi* from which the above passages have been drawn. I cordially thank Professor Dr. Ernst Steinkellner and Dr. Helmut Krasser for very kindly and generously putting at my disposal all the available material on Śaṅkaranandana's *Apohasiddhi*, including a copy of the only available Sanskrit manuscript (produced from Rahula Sankrityayana's negatives) and a transcript of the Tibetan translation.

tutes for that of the plurality of wrong assumptions (*vikalpa*, *samāropa*), with respect to which Abhinavagupta will clearly explicate the fault of infinite regress (*anavasthā*) (cf. below, n. 68) already implicit in Utpaladeva's argument. But, more importantly, he makes an additional remark. On the level of *māyā*, on which alone discursive thought (*vikalpa*) is at work, the objects should be at their highest level of differentiation; then, how can their cognition also evoke "other" objects? Utpaladeva's answer is rooted in Śaiva theology. The *īśvara-tattva*-level on which the whole manifested world is still enclosed in the I (*sarvam idam aham*) remains so to speak in the background even in the world of *māyā*, which is marked by full-fledged differentiation. This is especially true for the process of cognition, in which even the fully differentiated object ends up flowing into consciousness and being absorbed into it; moreover, as is often repeated by the Śaiva philosophers, if the object were not essentially light, it could not at all shine in cognition (cf. *ĪPVV* I, p. 294,18-20: *sa hy eko 'pi bhāvo vastuto 'nyaiḥ saha tadātmaiva yadyapi māyāśaktyā pṛthakkṛtaḥ*, *tathāpi bhātatvād eva anyonyātmatām unmīlayati*; see also p. 296,5-8). This latent basic non-differentiation of the object (from other objects and from the Self) is, according to Utpaladeva, what finally renders the process of *apoha* possible, the potential "openness" of the object (and the subject) being the very ground for the "doubt" about it. On this premise alone, the Buddhist *apoha* is accepted by the Śaivas, who take it as a particular *śakti* figuring side by side with *jñānaśakti*.

Text[5]

[f. 4v,16] *vivṛtau – yujyeta*[6] *punar etādṛśo vyavahāro yady eṣām anubhavasmṛtyādīnāṃ cinmātrasāratvenaika evātmā syāt*, *yasyaitā viśvātmanaḥ parameśvarasya jñānādikā vicitrāḥ śaktayaḥ*[7], *anyathā tu na syād iti* ||

na ced antaḥkṛtānanta[f. 5r]***viśvarūpo maheśvaraḥ*** |
syād ekaś cidvapur jñānasmṛtyapohanaśaktimān || [I.3.7] ||

[Vimarśinī follows] [f. 6r,4] *atra* ***vṛttiḥ –*** *cittattvam eva viśvarūpam ato 'tiriktasyānupapatter aśeṣapadārthajñānānām anyonyānusandhānam asyaiva jñānādiśaktayaḥ*, *mattaḥ smṛtir jñānam apohanaṃ ceti hy uktam* ||

vivṛtiḥ – *prakāśarūpaṃ*[8] *hi cittattvaṃ kartṛtāmayam ādisiddham eva tadatiriktatvaṃ ca nīlasukhāder jaḍābhimatasya bhāva*[9]*jātasya svayam aprakāśarūpatvaṃ syād atadrūpatve ca prakāśamānatānupapattiḥ*, *na hy aśvetarūpaḥ prakāśaḥ śveta iti bhavaty etac copapādayiṣyate*[10] | *tad āha cittattvam evety ato 'tiriktasyeti ca* | *bhinnāvabhāsināṃ api cārthānāṃ cidekarūpatve tadviṣayāṇāṃ jñānānām avivādasiddham eva tadātmakatvam*, *na hi tāni tato*

[5] The words underlined in the text are those literally cited in the *ĪPVV*. Punctuation is mine (that found in the ms. is often misleading). The *sandhi* has been "normalized".

[6] Ms. *yujyate*. I follow Abhinavagupta's reading (*ĪPVV* I, p. 273,6-7): *tad etat tātparyam avatāraṇikāyām āha* "*yujyeta*" *iti*.

[7] At this point the *ĪPVV* seems to refer to other parts of the *Vivṛti* which are not found in the ms. (*ĪPVV* I, p. 273,15-16: *śaktiyogalakṣaṇaṃ ceti*).

[8] *prakāśarūpaṃ*, my emendation (ms. *viśvarūpaṃ*), following Abhinavagupta's reading (cited and commented upon in *ĪPVV* I, p. 273,18-21) which seems more appropriate to the context.

[9] *-sya bhāva-*, my emendation (ms. *-svabhāva-*); cf. *ĪPVV* I, p. 273,25.

[10] *upapādayiṣyate*, my emendation (ms. *pratipādayiṣyatāṃ*); cf. *ĪPVV* I, p. 274,17-18: *upapādayiṣyata iti prakāśātmā prakāśyo 'rtha ityādisthāneṣu*.

bhedena prathante, *tathāpi*[11] *viṣayabhedāvakalpita*[12]*bhedānām api teṣāṃ vibhinnadeśakālāvacchede 'py ekacinmayasvabhāvaviśrāntir eva | anyathā sarveṣām eva jñānānām ekasvasaṃvedanarūpāntarmukhacittattvamayasvabhāvābhāve kevalapradeśajñānaprakāśasamaye saghaṭapradeśajnānaṃ nāstīti kathaṃ ni*[f. 6v]*ścīyate*, *jñānānāṃ svaprakāśarūpatayā ghaṭādiviṣayavadekajñānasaṃsargitvābhāvāt |*

kevalapradeśe hi ghaṭo yadi syāt, *tat tatra pradeśajñāne tulyayogyatārūpatvāt so 'pi prakāśeta tathā ca saghaṭapradeśajñānam etat syāt*, *na kevalapradeśajñānam*; *ataḥ kevalapradeśajñānaṃ svātmānaṃ saghaṭapradeśajñānaviparītaṃ saṃvedayamānaṃ pradeśam api ghaṭarahitaṃ saṃvedayate iti ghaṭābhāvasiddhiḥ pradeśe syāt |*

yāvatā kevalapradeśajñānena yadi nāma svātmā saghaṭapradeśajñānaviparītaḥ saṃviditas tato dvitīyam arthāntarabhūtaṃ saghaṭa[13]*pradeśajñānaṃ svaprakāśarūpaṃ nāstīti kathaṃ sidhyet |*

ghaṭo nāstīti kāmaṃ sidhyet, *anyathā ghaṭāsadbhāve tasyaiva pradeśajñānasya saghaṭapradeśajñānatāpattiprasaṅgāt | na ca tat saghaṭapradeśajñānam*, *api tu tadviparītam*,[14] *atas tajjñānasaṃvedyo nāsti ghaṭa iti bhavet |*

dvitīyaṃ tu saghaṭapradeśajñānaṃ nāstīti kena jñātaṃ yatas[15] *tajjñānasaṃvedyaḥ syād api tatra ghaṭaḥ*, *na ca tatra dvitīyaṃ saghaṭapradeśajñānaṃ yadi syāt tan*[16] *na prakāśeta*, *na ca prakāśate 'to nāstīti vaktuṃ yujyate. tad eva hi paryanuyuktam |*

katham etaj jñānam aghaṭapradeśajñā[f. 7r]*ne*[17] *prakāśata iti tu tenaiva svaprakāśena svātmā tathā jñāyeta*, *ghaṭe yadvad aghaṭābhāvarūpatā |*

dvitīyaṃ tu saghaṭapradeśajñānam arthāntarabhūtam aghaṭa[18]*pradeśajñānābhāvam api na na*[19] *vyabhicarati yena tatprakāśād eva saghaṭapradeśajñānābhāvo 'pi jñāyeta*, *dvitīyārthāntarabhūtasaghaṭapradeśajñānabhāvābhāvayor api tasyāghaṭa*[20] *pradeśajñānaprakāśasyopapatter ekatarā*[21]*navyabhicārāt |*

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[11] *tathāpi*, my emendation (ms. *tathā hi*); I follow the reading cited and commented upon in *ĪPVV* I, p. 275,5-6 (s. n. 47 to the translation).

[12] *-avakalpita-*, my emendation (ms. *-vikalpita-*). Cf. *ĪPVV* I, p. 275,7-8: *bhedas tenāvakalpito 'vajñayāprarohayogena kalpitaḥ*.

[13] *saghaṭa-*, my emendation (ms. *ghaṭa-*).

[14] *ĪPVV* I, p. 277,17 seems to have one more quotation from the *Vivṛti* (*ghaṭam api*) which is not found in the ms.

[15] Ms. *jñātam atas* is to be corrected to *jñātaṃ yatas*. This was probably the reading of the exemplar, as we can surmise from the *anusvāra* above *-ta-* (subsequently deleted); the following *ya-* must have been misread as *ma-*, thus suggesting the deletion of the *anusvāra*.

[16] I correct ms. *tat* to *tan na*, as meaning strictly requires.

[17] *aghaṭapradeśajñāne*, my emendation (ms. *tatsaghaṭapradeśajñānaṃ*). This seems to be the reading required by the context. This would also tally with Abhinavagupta's remark (*ĪPVV* I, p. 278,2-3): *nanv aghaṭapradeśajñānaṃ prakāśata ity atredam eva tattvaṃ saghaṭapradeśajñānaṃ na prakāśata iti.*

[18] *aghaṭa-*, my emendation (ms. *ghaṭa-*), supported by Abhinavagupta's quotation and comments (*ĪPVV* I, p. 278,3-5: *naitad ity āha* "*aghaṭa*" *iti paryudāsavṛttyā hy atra vastvantaraprakāśo bhāti*, *na tu prasajyapratiṣedhātmā saghaṭapradeśajñānaprakāśābhavaḥ*).

[19] *na na*, my emendation (ms. *na*).

[20] *tasyāghaṭa-*, my emendation (ms. *tasya ghaṭa-*), supported by Abhinavagupta's paraphrase (*ĪPVV* I, p. 278,13-14): *kevalapradeśapratyayasyobhayathāpy upapatteḥ*.

[21] *-anavyabhicārāt*, my emendation. This (or also *-vyabhicārāt*) is in fact the reading one would expect, instead of ms. *-avyabhicārāt* (*ekatarāvyabhicārāt*); see also Abhinavagupta's comments *ĪPVV* I, p. 278,13: *avyabhicāro 'vināvo nāsti*.

atha saghaṭapradeśajñānaṃ ghaṭamātrajñānaṃ vā na pradeśajñānād bhinnaṃ sambhavaty ekajātīyarūpaviśeṣaviṣayasyāpi cākṣuṣasyaikatvaniyamāt, *anyathā ghaṭe 'pi pratiparamāṇujñānabhedāpatter ghaṭābhāsa eva na syād ityādiyuktibhis tat kevalapradeśajñānam evedaṃ ghaṭe sati ghaṭapratibhāsam api syāt*, *na ca tatheti tata eva kathaṃ na ghaṭajñānābhāvasiddhiḥ* |

tad evam iyannyāyānusaraṇād ānumāniky eva ghaṭābhāvasiddhiḥ syāt, *na prātyakṣī. yadi vā samandhakāre*[22] *rūpajñānaṃ nāstīti kathaṃ jñāyeta*, *tarhy atraitad api vaktuṃ yujyeta*[23] [+]*yadi rūpajñānaṃ syāt tad etat sparśādijñānābhinnam eva syād*[+] [my tentative restoration: *yadi rūpajñānaṃ tattatsparśādijñānābhinnam eva syād*] *iti rūpasparśajñānānāṃ bhinnendriyajanyānām anekatvenaivopagamāt* |

nāpy uttarakālotpannavikalpaḥ[24] *smṛtir vā sparśajñānamātrābhāsā rūpajñānābhāvāvyabhicāriṇī*[25] *tam api sādhayati*, *yato*[26] *rūpasyāpi tadā sadbhāve yathā*[f. 7v]*sau sparśajñānābhāsā tathā rūpajñānābhāsā caiva*[27] *syāt*, *na caivaṃ tadātmānaṃ sparśajñānamātrābhāsaṃ saṃvedayamānāpi rūpajñānābhāsavivekaṃ sādhayatīti* | *tato yady api svātmani rūpajñānābhāsaṃ vyavacchindyāt saṃvedyamānākāraviparītatvāt tathāpi pūrvaṃ sparśajñānamātraprakāśakāle rūpajñānaṃ nābhūd iti kathaṃ jānīyāt*, *sparśamātrajñānasya tatra parisphurataḥ pūrvoktanyāyena dvitīyarūpajñānābhāvāvyabhicārābhāvāt*[28] | *smārtaṃ hi vijñānaṃ pūrvānubhavasaṃskārajaṃ pūrvānubhavānusāreṇaiva vyavasthāpakaṃ bhavati*, *na tu svātantryeṇa pūrvapravṛttānubhavabhedasākṣātkāri sad yena svātmany*[29] *ābhāsamānākāraviparītaṃ rūpajñānaṃ pūrvasmin kāle vyavacchindan viṣayam api pūrvabhāvinaṃ vyavacchindyāt*, *yathā pradeśamātrajñānaṃ svātmani saghaṭa*[30] *pradeśābhāsatāvyavacchedena bahir ghaṭam api vyavacchinattīty āhuḥ* | *tato vikalpajñānaṃ pūrvānubhavasaṃskārāt tadanusāri jāyamānam*, *yathā tatpūrvānubhavadvayaṃ pṛthakpṛthakprakāśam ekaprakāśasaṃsargarahitam āsīt*, *tathānubhūtam*[31] *anubhavāmīti ca tat parāmṛśati* |

tataś cobhayaparāmarśe 'pi tatsvaprakāśasparśarūpajñānadvayamātravyavasthānaṃ syāt[32], *na tv ekakālikatvena yena tad andhakārakālagatasparśajñānamātraṃ tātkālikarūpajñānavimuktaṃ svābhāsopārūḍhaṃ* [f. 8r] *parāmṛśad api tadandhakārakāle rūpajñānaṃ nirākuryāt* | *yāvatā jñānānām anyonyaprakāśarahitānāṃ svātmamātrapratiṣṭhānāṃ yathā na svayaṃ tulyakālatāvyavasthāpanaṃ tathā vikalpenāpi tatsaṃskārajanmanā svarūpamātra-*

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[22] The original reading of the ms. was *sambandhakāre*, then transformed into *samandhakāre*, which is in fact the correct reading (cf. *ĪPVV* I, p. 280,23: *santate 'ndhakāre*).

[23] *yujyeta*, my emendation (ms. *yujyate*).

[24] In the ms. *-vikalpa-* has been later corrected to the correct *-vikalpaḥ*.

[25] *-avyabhicāriṇī*, my emendation (ms. *-vyabhicāriṇī*); cf. *ĪPVV* I, p. 281,18-19: […] *rūpajñānasyābhāvam avyabhicāreṇa bhavantaṃ sādhayet*.

[26] *yato*, absent in the ms. but cited by Abhinavagupta, apparently has to be added here. The following phrases up to *sādhayatīti* are taken by him as a quotation (from an unknown source). Cf. *ĪPVV* I, p. 281,20-21: *tatra hetutvaṃ granthāntarasyāha* "*yataḥ*" *iti*.

[27] *caiva*, my emendation (the ms. has *cai-*, corrected to *nai-* above the line).

[28] *-abhāvāt*, my emendation (ms. *-bhāvāt*). Utpaladeva is here stating the Śaiva position on the matter which in fact excludes any correlation between the two cognitions.

[29] The expected meaning (with the further support of Abhinavagupta's comments in *ĪPVV* I, p. 282,10-15) has induced me to modify at some places the transmitted text which is evidently corrupt. In fact, the ms. reads: *ābhāsamānākāraviparītaṃ paricchindan pūrvasmin kāle viṣayam api rūpajñānaṃ pūrvabhāvi vyavacchindyāt*. In particular, Abhinavagupta's *tādātmyena asahamānā* (ibid., line 12) can by no means refer to the transmitted *paricchindan*.

[30] *saghaṭa-*, my emendation (ms. *ghaṭa-*).

[31] The ms. has an *anusvāra* deleted above *-ta-*.

[32] *-vyavasthānaṃ syāt*, my emendation (ms. *-vyavasthā na syān*).

prakāśakānekajñāna[33]*parāmarśakena naikakālavyavasthāpanaṃ śakyaṃ pūrvānubhūtātiriktavastusaṃsparśisaṃvedanatvābhāvāt tasya*, *na cāpi pūrvānubhūtavastusaṃsparśitvam api vikalpānāṃ ghaṭata ity uktam | tad evam ekāntarmukhasvasaṃvedanarūpacittattvātmatāviśrāntiṃ vinā jñānānām aindriyakāṇām apy anyonyaṃ sahabhāvapṛthagbhāvaprakāśo na syād ity arthānām api sadasattāniyamaniścayo na syāt*, *tataś ca sarvavyavahārocchedaprasaṅgaḥ | tasmād eṣām ekacittattvaviśrāntirūpam anusandhānam avaśyābhyupagantavyam | tad āha aśeṣapadārthajñānānām iti jñānānāṃ bahūnām anusandhānam eva cittattvam ity anena ekaśabdo 'pi vivṛtaḥ |*

smṛtyādau[34] *cānekānubhavānām anusandhānam ekacittattvaviśrāntir evāta evābhedenātra cittattvam anusandhānam iti tasya caivam avibhedena vakṣyamāṇanayenāśeṣabhāvanirbharasya*[35] *tattadvicitrabhāvāvabhāsanāmayaṃ jñānaṃ nāma śaktir eva | phalabhedāropitabhedo*[36] *hi padārthātmaiva śaktir ucyate sā ca śaktiḥ svecchā*[f. 8v]*vaśenaiva na punar anyakāraṇasāmarthyasācivyena yasya phalati*[37] *sa maheśvara iti sūtre tathā nirdiṣṭaḥ | cittattvasya caikarūpatvam agre pratipādayiṣyate |*[38] *smṛtir api pūrvāvabhāsitavastunaḥ pūrvāvabhāsitatvena vartamānakāle prakhyāpanaśaktiḥ | deśakālaviśeṣāvacchedaśūnyatvena vicitrecchābodhitā*[39]*vabhāsabhedavāsanāmātropapāditavikalparūpavijñānāpohanaśaktiḥ śaṅkitapratipakṣapratikṣepaparatvād vikalpānām | padārthāntarasamparkarahite 'py arthe pratiniyataprakṛtāv avabhāte*[40] *vividhārthakriyākāriṇy api viśiṣṭaikārthakriyārthina īśvarāṅgabhūta ivānyonyātmatayā śaṅkyamānatattadarthakriyākāritattatpratipakṣanirākriyāṃ vinā na tena vyavahartum alaṃ pratipattāra iti svabhāva evaiteṣāṃ* [41] *padārthānām anyonyabhedamayatvāt |*

tad viśvavyavahāraprajanaiṣā vikalpavyāpārāpohanaśaktir iti gītāsu bhagavatāviṣṭamaheśvarabhāvena parigaṇitā | tad āha mattaḥ smṛtir iti | etac ca jñānaśaktibhedāt ||

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[33] By reading *-prakāśakānekajñāna-*, I restore what seems to have been the original reading of ms., which was corrected to *-prakāśakāle jñāna-* (by changing *-ne-* to *-le-* and deleting *-ka-* by means of a horizontal stroke).

[34] *smṛtyādau*, my emendation (ms. *smṛtyātmā*); cf. *ĪPVV* I, p. 285,6.

[35] The ms. has *nirbharasya*, corrected to *nirbhara-*. The correct reading is the original *nirbharasya* (cf. the paraphrase *ĪPVV* I, p. 285,21-25: *uktābhir yuktibhir ekasya* […] *ityādivakṣyamāṇābhiḥ samastabhāvapūrṇasya jñānaṃ nāma śaktiḥ*).

[36] *phalabhedāropitabhedo*, my emendation (ms. *phalabhedāropitadbhedo*). The passage is also quoted, with a slightly different, equally possible reading in Kṣemarāja's commentary on the *Vijñānabhairavatantra* (*VBh*) (p. 14,3-5): *uktaṃ ca pratyabhijñāyāṃ* "*phalabhedād āropitabhedaḥ padārthātmā śaktiḥ*".

[37] The ms. has *pratiphalati*, apparently corrected to *phalati*; the latter reading, which I have accepted, is also confirmed by *ĪPVV* I, p. 289,6-7: "*phalati*" *phalaparyantā saṃpadyate*, *na punaḥ pratihanyate yasya*.

[38] The following definitions of *smṛti* and *apohana* are incorporated in a marginal note found in one of the mss. of Abhinavagupta's *ĪPV* used for the Kashmir Series edition (Delhi National Archives, Sanskrit ms. No. 5, p. 131, right margin): *deśakālaviśeṣāvacchedaśūnyatvena vicitrecchāprabodhitāvabhāsabhedavāsanāmātropapāditavikalparūpavijñānāpohanaśaktiḥ | pūrvāvabhāsitavastunaḥ pūrvāvabhāsitatvena vartamānakāle prakhyāpanaśaktiḥ smṛtiśaktir ity anayor bhedaḥ*. Note 71 of the *ĪPV* edition (Vol. I, p. 117) is based on this marginal annotation.

[39] The text as quoted in the *ĪPV* manuscript (see above n. 38) has *-prabodhitā-*.

[40] *avabhāte*, my emendation (ms. *avabhāti*). The latter reading would not in itself be impossible; Abhinavagupta's paraphrase and comments, however, consistently have *avabhāte*).

[41] If we rely upon *ĪPVV* I, p. 295,25 (*atrāha* "*māyīyānām*" *iti*), we should add *māyīyānām* (omitted in the ms.) after *eteṣām*. However, this would involve a slight redundancy, which is not usual in Utpaladeva's style. I prefer to surmise that *eteṣām* was omitted in the edited text of *ĪPVV*, leaving merely *māyīyānām* which glossed it.

Translation

Vivṛti: On the contrary, such a world of practical experience (*vyavahāraḥ*) will become possible (*yujyeta*)[42] – if all the various cognitions – direct perception, memory, etc. – have only one intrinsic nature (*ātmā*),[43] being in essence consciousness only. Of this [*ātman*], namely the Supreme Lord, whose essence is all, these cognitions, etc., represent the various and multiform powers.[44] [The world of practical experience] would otherwise be impossible.

Kārikā: "… if there were no Maheśvara who contains within Himself all the infinite forms, who is one, whose essence is consciousness, possessing the powers of knowledge, memory and exclusion." [I.3.7]

Vṛtti: The mutual unification of all cognitions of things is [constituted by] the consciousness principle itself (*cittattvam*) whose form is all, since nothing distinct and separate (*atiriktasya*) from it is admissible. The powers of knowledge, etc., only pertain to this [consciousness-principle]. For it has been said: "From me derive memory, knowledge and exclusion."[45]

Vivṛti: For the consciousness-principle, whose form is light, constituted by agency, is established since the very beginning. If the world of objects, such as a patch of blue colour or pleasure, [erroneously] assumed as being insentient, were separate from it, this would [amount to saying] that its nature is not by itself light. But if [things] did not have light as their essence, their shining would be impossible, for, as we are going to demonstrate,[46] a light which is not white[47] cannot become white. This concept has been expressed [by the *Vṛtti*] with the phrases "the consciousness-principle itself" and "distinct and separate from it". If the objects, though appearing as differentiated [from consciousness], are to be recognized as constituted solely by consciousness, it is established beyond discussion that [also] the cognitions which refer to them are made of consciousness.[48] For cognitions never manifest themselves separately from it; all the same,[49] though they (i.e., the cognitions) may show [a certain level of] differentiation somehow induced (*avakalpita*)[50] by the differentiation of their contents, yet, despite this delimitation due to spatio-temporal differences, they ultimately do rest (*viśrāntir*

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[42] According to Abhinavagupta, here the meaning of the optative conforms to Pāṇini's *Aṣṭādhyāyī* (*P*) III.3.156: *hetuhetumator liṅ*, "Affix LIṄ optionally occurs after a verbal root when *hetu* 'cause' and *hetumat* 'effect' are denotated" (tr. Sharma 1995: 574). The fact that cognitions share the same essential nature is precisely what renders *vyavahāra* possible.

[43] Cf. *ĪPVV* I, p. 273,12: "*ātmā*" *iti svabhāvaḥ*.

[44] This means that they rest on the Lord, and are neither independent of Him nor exceeding His own form (*ĪPVV* I, p. 273,14-15).

[45] See below n. 91.

[46] See, e.g., *ĪPK* I.5.3.

[47] That is, a cognition in which the colour white does not appear.

[48] For Abhinavagupta (*ĪPVV* I, p. 274,25) this is a case of *daṇḍāpūpīyanyāya*, "the maxim of the stick and cakes". A stick and cakes are usually tied together so that if something happens to the stick (e.g., being eaten by rats) the same happens to the cakes.

[49] Despite any "superficial" differentiation deriving from their contents, cognitions too must have (at least) the same status of ultimate non-differentiation from consciousness as their objects (*ĪPVV* I, p. 275,5-7: "*tathāpi*" *iti tenāpy ahamaṃśāvyatirekeṇa vartamānānām ity arthaḥ*).

[50] The preverb *ava-* is given a derogatory meaning (*avajñayā*) by Abhinavagupta: the objects are only able to shed an imperfect, that is, not fully developed (*aprarohayogena*), appearance of differentiation onto their cognition (cf. n. 12 to the text).

eva)[51] on their own nature consisting of a single and unitary consciousness (*ekacit*).[52] If it were not so, and all the various cognitions did not have as their essential nature the consciousness-principle, introverted, in the form of a single and unitary self-awareness (*eka-svasaṃvedana*), how could one, at the moment when the cognition of an empty surface occurs, arrive at the statement "There is no jar here" [lit.: "This is not the cognition of a surface with a jar"]? For cognitions, being by their very nature conscious of themselves [alone], cannot combine to form a single [complex] cognition (*ekajñānasaṃsargitvābhāva*)[53] having as its object a jar, and so on.[54]

[Buddhist:] In fact, if a jar were in an empty place, then also the [jar] would be manifested in the cognition of the place since [both the jar and the place] share the same capacity [of being perceptable] (*tulyayogyatārūpatva*),[55] and in this way it would be the cognition of a place with a jar, not the cognition of an empty place. Therefore, the cognition of an empty place, being aware of itself as opposed to the cognition of a place with a jar, is also aware of the place as devoid of a jar. In this way the absence of a jar in the place can indeed be established.

[Śaiva:] But if the cognition of an empty place is aware [only] of itself as opposed to the cognition of the place with a jar, how would it be possible to establish that there is not a second[56] cognition – which is another fact-event (*arthāntarabhūta*) – having the place with a jar as its object and being manifest by itself?

[Buddhist:] It is nonetheless true that, some way or other, one should be able to affirm that a jar is absent, for otherwise it would ensue that when there is no jar that very cognition of the place [without a jar] would be the same as the cognition of the place with a jar. However, that

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[51] *eva* means here "restriction". As the *Vivṛti* sets out to show, this resting of the various cognitions on one unitary consciousness principle is the necessary condition for the worldy transactions to take place successfully (*ĪPVV* I, p. 275,14-17).

[52] In this context, *eka* (qualifying *cit*, *jñāna*, etc.) always oscillates between "one, single" and "unitary", usually expressing both meanings at the same time.

[53] The Buddhist position Utpaladeva is referring to is clearly formulated in Dharmottara's *Nyāyabinduṭīkā* (*NBṬ*) p. 101,13-14: *yadaikajñānasaṃsargivastvantaropalambhaḥ | ekendriyajñānagrāhyaṃ locanādi-praṇidhānābhimukhaṃ vastudvayam anyonyāpekṣam ekajñānasaṃsargi kathyate*.

[54] Utpaladeva's criticism is addressed to the Buddhists, who, just like the Śaivas, uphold the self-awareness of cognitions but, unlike the Śaivas, reject a common ground for them, represented by the unitary conscious subject. Interestingly, in order to present an exemplary statement on the self-awareness of cognition, Abhinavagupta resorts to Bhartṛhari's *Vākyapadīya*, by citing a well-known verse from the *Jātisamuddeśa* (*VP* III.1.104):

yathā jyotiḥ prakāśena nānyenābhiprakāśyate |
jñānarūpaṃ tathā jñāne nānyatrābhiprakāśyate ||.

(Incidentally, it is to be noted that *pāda*s c and d differ considerably from the text in Rau's and Iyer's editions, which both read: *jñānākāras tathānyena na jñānenopagṛhyate*.) The weakness of the Buddhist position on the matter appears quite clearly in their treatment of the crucial problem of *anupalabdhi* ("non-perception") and *abhāva* ("non-being, absence"), which therefore becomes the object of a sustained analysis in the subsequent portion of the *Vivṛti* (ĪPVV I, pp. 276,24-277,1: *anyavyavacchedair grahaṇavyavahāro 'pi svaparaviṣayo ya ucyate*, *so 'pi na nirvahed ityāśayena saugatīyam abhāvasiddhiprakāram eva vicārayati*).

[55] Cf. *Hetubindu* (*HB*), p. 22*,2-4 (Steinkellner 1967: I, p. 73): *yatra yasminn upalabhyamāne niyamena yasyopalabdhir bhavati yogyatāyā aviśeṣāt*, *sa tatsaṃsṛṣṭaḥ*, *ekajñānasaṃsargāt*. See also the sentences immediately following the *Nyāyabinduṭīkā* passage quoted above (n. 50): *tayor hi sator naikaniyatā bhavati pratipattiḥ | yogyatāyā dvayor apy aviśiṣṭatvāt* (*NBṬ*, pp. 101,14-102,1).

[56] As to the meaning of *dvitīya* (lit. "second"), see below n. 58.

cognition would not be the cognition of the place with a jar, but a cognition opposed to it;[57] hence we would have: "There is no jar being cognized by that cognition."

[Śaiva:] But by which cognitive act is a second (*dvitīyam*) (i.e., distinct and separate)[58] cognition of the place with a jar cognized as not being there, thanks to which [one could say that] the jar, being potentially cognized by that same cognition, should also have been there? If such a distinct and separate cognition were there, it could not but be manifested (*na ca … na prakāśeta*), whereas, on the contrary, it is not manifested. Therefore, one cannot reasonably say that it exists.[59] In fact, this is precisely what has been questioned.

[Buddhist:] But to him who might wonder how this cognition can be manifested when [only] the cognition of the place without a jar occurs, we would reply that it is cognized by that (i.e., the latter's) very self-awareness, just as when there is a jar, its being there has the form of the not-being-there of a non-jar.[60]

[Śaiva:] However, the distinct and separate cognition of the place with a jar, which is "another" fact-event, is not also invariably accompanied by the absence of the cognition of the place without a jar, so that simply from the manifesting of the latter[61] one could also cognize the absence of the cognition of the place with a jar.[62] For, even as regards the presence and the absence of a distinct and separate cognition of the place with a jar which is "another" fact/event, there is no invariable concomitance with either [the absence or the presence of the cognition of the place without the jar], since the cognition of the place without a jar is manifested [in both cases].[63]

[Buddhist:] But the cognition of the place with the jar or the cognition of the jar alone cannot occur separately from the cognition of the place, since a visual cognition having particulars belonging to the same class as its objects is by necessity unitary.[64] If it were not so, also with reference to a jar the manifestation "jar" itself would not take place because one would come to have a single and separate cognition for every single atom.[65] Therefore, from these arguments and others of this kind it ensues that this cognition of the place alone should, in the case of a jar being there, also contain the manifestation of the jar. But [in the case at issue] it

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[57] Cf. *ĪPVV* I, p. 277,18-19: *saghaṭapradeśajñānaṃ tad bhavet*, *na tv etadviparītāghaṭapradeśajñānam*.

[58] *ĪPVV* I, p. 277,19: "*dvitīyaṃ tv*" *iti vyatiriktam*. In other words, the perception of an empty surface cannot evoke the possible perception of a surface with a jar, to be subsequently negated. This is apparently what Abhinavagupta means to say with the laconic remark (ibid., lines 19-21): *na hy aghaṭapradeśajñānena jñānāntarasya bhāvo jñāyate*, *yena tadabhāvo 'pi jñāyeta*.

[59] Cf. *ĪPVV* I, p. 277,24-25: *iti ca vaktuṃ na yujyata iti saṃbandhaḥ.*

[60] According to the Buddhists, we do not need a separate cognition to account for the cognition of the absence of a non-jar when a jar is cognized: it is the self-awareness of the cognition "jar" which implicitly also cognizes the negation of its contrary. The jar itself has as its own form the not being a non-jar.

[61] That is, of the cognition of the place without the jar, i.e., an empty space.

[62] In other words, the negation of the cognition of an empty space in the Buddhist argument is not to be taken in terms of *prasajyapratiṣedha* but of *paryudāsa*: it does not confine itself to negating a thing but affirms the presence of another (see n. 18 to the text).

[63] That is, of the space taken in itself, independently of the jar's being or not being there; cf. Abhinavagupta's paraphrase (*ĪPVV* I, p. 278,13-14): *kevalapradeśapratyayasyobhayathāpy upapatteḥ*.

[64] Abhinavagupta develops the Buddhist's arguments outlined by Utpaladeva and casts them into full-fledged inferences based on various forms of *anupalabdhi* (cf. *ĪPVV* I, p. 278,14ff.).

[65] Cf. *ĪPVV* I, pp. 278,22-279,1: *kiṃ ca kevalapradeśo ghaṭo vānantarūpaparamāṇumayaḥ saṃnihitānantāvayavo vā | tatra yāvanti dravyāṇi*, *tāvanti cet pṛthag jñānāni*; *tarhi teṣāṃ pṛthak pṛthak svaprakāśatvenaikasamūharūpaprakāśābhāvāt pradeśajñānam eva na bhavet*, *bhāti ca tat pradeśajñānam iti*.

is not so.[66] Due to this very reason, the establishment of the absence of the cognition of a jar cannot be questioned.

[Śaiva:][67] Thus, if we accept your argument as following such a line of reasoning, the absence of a jar comes to be established by means of inference (*ānumāniky eva*), not by means of direct perception (*na prātyakṣī*).[68] If, on the other hand, someone [i.e., a Buddhist] objected that on these conditions one could not [even] say when one is in continuous darkness that there is no cognition of a visible form, [we would reply that] in this case this too[69] would be admissible, provided that such a cognition of a visible form were not distinct from the cognition of a tangible form and so on – whereas [on the contrary] the cognitions of tangible and visual forms, being produced by different senses, are to be admitted as [differentiated and therefore] not [reducible to] one.[70]

Nor can a conceptual elaboration, which takes place at a later time,[71] or memory, in which only the cognition of a tangible form is manifested and which is [consequently deemed as] invariably associated with the absence of the cognition of a visual form, also establish the absence of the cognition of a visual form. For if at that time a visual form had also been there, then, just as [now] in this [memory] the cognition of a tangible form is manifested, in the

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[66] That is, when one is perceiving an empty space.

[67] From this point onwards it is no longer feasible to present the larger structure of the argumentation by demarcating the Śaiva and the Buddhist positions, because the latter come to be too closely embedded in the former.

[68] The Buddhist explanation is seen as not conforming to common sense, which explains the matter under discussion in a much simpler way (*ĪPVV* I, p. 280,8: "*evam*" *iti svakalpanayā lokapratītyananugṛhītayā*). Moreover, the Buddhist argument would lead to a *regressus ad infinitum* (ibid.: *iyān ity anavasthāpādako nyāyaḥ*). Dharmakīrti himself was well aware of the risk involved in not accounting for *anupalambha* directly, that is, by explaining it within the inner dynamics of the self-awareness of a perceptive act: The absence of an object would be arrived at by means of its non-perception, but the absence of its perception would need another *anupalambha* to be established, which would lead to a *regressus ad infinitum* (*Pramāṇavārttika* [*PV*] IV.274-275:

tasmād anupalambho 'yaṃ svayaṃ pratyakṣato gataḥ |*
svamātravṛtter gamakas tadabhāvavyavasthiteḥ ||
anyathārthasya nāstitvaṃ gamyate 'nupalambhataḥ |
upalambhasya nāstitvam anyenety anavasthitiḥ ||).

*Manorathanandin reads *svasaṃvedanāt*.

Verses 270-275 are quoted by Abhinavagupta in *ĪPVV* I, pp. 279,24-280,5. The same kind of objection is put by Dharmakīrti into the mouth of an opponent in his *svavṛtti* on *Pramāṇavārttika* I.3 (*PVS* p. 4,15-17: *atrānupalabdher liṅgād asattāyām upalabdher abhāvo 'py anyayānupalabdhyā sādhya ity anavasthānād apratipattiḥ syāt*). The Buddhist explanation itself would become acceptable (instead of coming to a dead end) if it were placed in a Śaiva perspective (*ĪPVV* I, p. 280,13: *yad bhavadbhir uktam*, *tad upapadyate* …). For the Śaivas, in fact, a single introverted self-consciousness is the common ground which unifies all cognitions (ibid., line 10: *asmaddṛśā jñānānāṃ svasaṃvedanam antarmukham ekam eveti*).

[69] Cf. *ĪPVV* I, p. 280,24-25: "*etad api*" *ity aprātītikaṃ niṣphalaṃ ca sad apīty apiśabdārthaḥ.*

[70] If two things (e.g., a jar and a cloth) are the object of the same sense, they are cognized by the same cognitive act. But this is not the case with a visual and a tangible form. In the negative case it ensues that in the dark the absence of a tangible form cannot be understood as the absence of a visual form, since there is no single cognition in which both a visual and a tangible form are manifested. Cf. *ĪPVV* I, p. 281,1-4: *abhinnendriyajanyānāṃ hi ghaṭapaṭādīnām iva saṃnihitānām eṣa niyamaḥ – ekajñānagrāhyateti | na ca rūpasparśau rūparasau vā samānendriyagrāhyau*, *yena tadviṣayam ekam eva jñānaṃ rūpasparśābhāsaṃ saṃbhāvyeta rūparasābhāsaṃ vā*.

[71] If I understand correctly, this remark is meant to exclude the *vikalpa* which immediately follows direct perception and transforms it into a determinate cognition.

same way also the cognition of a visual form should be manifested in it.[72] In fact, although [memory], in the manner [outlined above], is aware of itself – referring to that time – as containing the manifestation of the mere cognition of a tangible form, it does not [contextually] establish a discrimination (i.e., the absence) of the manifestation of a cognition of a visual form. Therefore, although it may [be admitted to] exclude in itself the manifestation of a cognition of a visual form as being opposed to the form being currently cognized, nonetheless how could it (i.e., memory) know that previously, i.e., at the time when only the cognition of a tangible form was manifested, there was no cognition of a visual form? For on the basis of the already stated reason, there is no invariable concomitance of the cognition of a mere tangible form, which is taking place there, with the absence of a distinct and separate cognition of a visual form. In fact, that [particular kind of] cognition that is memory (*smārtaṃ vijñānam*) derives from the impressions left by a previous perception [and] performs the task of determining [its object] only by conforming to the previous perception, [that is,] not by autonomously (*svātantryeṇa*)[73] having access to the particular perception that occurred in the past, so that, while excluding in itself the cognition of a visual form in the past[74] as being opposed to the form currently being manifested, it might also exclude its object [equally] belonging to the past.[75] In the same vein, some [opponents] maintain that by excluding the manifestation in itself of the place with a jar the cognition of a mere [empty] place also externally excludes a jar. For the above-mentioned reason, just as two [distinct] former perceptions each shining by its own light were not associated into a single light, in the same way a discursive cognition (*vikalpajñāna*)[76] – which derives from the impressions left by a former cognition and [consequently] conforms to it –, is reflectively aware (*parāmṛśati*) of them in terms of "[This has been] perceived" and "I am perceiving".[77]

Therefore, although we have a reflective awarenesses of both [cognitions], [nonetheless we do have] the determination only of those two cognitions – that of a tangible form and that of the visible form –, taken in themselves (*-mātra-*), each being self-illuminating, but not the de-

[72] This inference would have as its *hetu* "the non-perception of the effect" (*kāryānupalabdhi*), whose validity is viewed by Abhinavagupta as highly questionable already in itself, that is, prior to his examination of the relevant arguments.

[73] Namely, through an illuminating power of its own (cf. *ĪPVV* I, p. 282,9: *svātantryeṇa svena prakāśabalena*). What memory can do is only to recall the illuminating power belonging to the original perception, or, in other words, it conforms to it or "imitates" it (ibid., lines 15-16: *smṛtir hi pūrvam anubhavam anukaroti*); however, this perception being "imitated", Abhinavagupta goes on, is to be related to the object of memory (ibid., line 16: *paraṃ smartavyasaṃbandhinam*).

[74] That is, a cognition which had been hypothesized and then negated in the past.

[75] This crucial passage has been carefully examined and explained by Abhinavagupta (*ĪPVV* I, p. 282,10-15). Memory, while cognizing the previous cognition of a tangible form, contextually realizes that in the range of its own cognitive act the cognition of a certain visual form, opposed to that of the tangible form, would not be admissible. In this way, memory would be allowed to establish now the previous absence of the cognition of a visual form (and, through it, also the previous absence of that visual form) on the basis of the fact that if the cognition of a visual form had taken place it would have entered the range of the memory cognition along with the cognition of the tangible form. This argument, however, is based on a presupposition that is altogether unacceptable to the Śaivas for whom a cognition cannot possibly become the object of another cognition. In the case at issue, the former cognition cannot become the "object" (*viṣaya*) of memory (ibid., lines 7-8: *na tu viṣayatvenābhāsayati jñānānāṃ parasaṃvedyatvasya vistarato nirākṛtatvāt*).

[76] According to Abhinavagupta, this is a general designation also including memory (*ĪPVV* I, p. 282,24-25: "*vikalpajñānam*" *iti sāmānyoktiḥ smṛtim api saṃgṛhṇīte*). Abhinavagupta (ibid., p. 283,1-4) also records a different interpretation by "others" who take *vikalpa* as a particular form of memory, the only difference being that memory proper refers to a perception which occurred in the past and is now extinct (apart from the impressions left by it).

[77] That is, memory and discursive cognition respectively.

termination of their occurring at the same time (*na tv ekakālikatvena*), by virtue of which it (i.e., the memory / discursive cognition) – being reflectively aware only of the cognition of the tangible form which occurred at the time of darkness, free from any cognition of a visual form occurring at the same time and resting in its own self-manifestation (*svābhāsopārūḍha*) – might [be able to] negate the cognition of a visual form at the time of that darkness.[78] On the contrary, [perceptual] cognitions, being unable to illuminate each other and each being grounded in itself only, cannot by themselves establish their occurrence at the same time. Similarly, the discursive cognition, too (*vikalpenāpi*), which originates from the impressions left by them and has a reflective awareness of several [distinct] cognitions each illuminating its own form alone, cannot establish their occurrence at the same time, for it is not in the nature of [discursive cognition] to be an awareness directly touching a distinct real entity which has formerly been perceived. Nor, on the other hand, has it ever been said that the discursive cognitions are admitted to directly touch (i.e., have direct access to) the real entity formerly perceived. On these premises, cognitions, even the perceptual ones (*aindriyakāṇām api*),[79] could not be manifested as mutually associated or separated, unless they rest on having as their essential nature the consciousness-principle in the form of a single and unitary introverted self-awareness. Consequently, one could not determine for things, too, a restriction of their being [mutually] present or absent, whence the destruction of the world of practical experience would ensue. Therefore, [we] are obliged to admit for cognitions [some] unification which has the form of [their] resting on a single consciousness-principle. This [is what is meant by the *Vṛtti*] with the phrase "of all cognitions of things". The consciousness-principle is that very unification (*anusandhāna*) of the many cognitions: in this way, also the word "one" in the *Kārikā* (cf. *ekacidvapuḥ*) has been explained.

Also the unification of many perceptual cognitions in memory, etc., is nothing but [their] resting on the single consciousness-principle; it is for this very reason that "consciousness-principle" and "unification" are put here [in the *Vṛtti*] in a relationship of non-difference. And thus, on the basis of the reasoning that will be stated below, to this consciousness-principle, full of all things, there belongs a power, in terms of non-differentiation [from it], named "knowledge", consisting in the manifestation (*-avabhāsanā*)[80] of the various multiform things. In fact, when something which is in itself a [unitary] substance (*padārthātmaiva*) is superimposed with a differentiation deriving from its different effects, we call it "power".[81]

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[78] Cf. the construction of the sentence by Abhinavagupta (*ĪPVV* I, p. 283,15-16): *rūpajñānaviviktasvābhāsopārūḍhasparśajñānaparāmarśi vikalpajñānam iti sambandhaḥ.*

[79] Utpaladeva is addressing again the Buddhist opponent: no single cognition, particularly not even the perceptual cognition, can establish the absence of something by itself alone. As a consequence, either the perception has to enter by itself into a net of relations to other cognitions (which goes against the Buddhist presuppositions) or the Buddhist has to admit that absence can only be established by means of inference (which the Buddhist intended to reserve for the establishment of the *abhāvavyavahāra* alone). But also the establishment of the *abhāvavyavahāra* by means of inference would entail a *regressus ad infinitum* (cf. *ĪPVV* I, pp. 284,25-285,1: *pradeśakaivalyavyavahāro 'py ānumānikatvād anavasthopahata iti*).

[80] The "causing things to appear [as 'this']" concerns the limited subject (*ĪPVV* I, p. 286,3: *idam ity avabhāsamānā* [read: *avabhāsanā*] *paśupramātṛvartinī*). The *samārthācaraṇa* component that Abhinavagupta singles out in the causative form ("to make somebody/something able to …") is referred to the freedom of the Lord. The manifestation of the object as external to consciousness ("this") does not entail a real separation from the absolute light of consciousness (ibid., lines 10-11: *na mahāprakāśāt pṛthakkaroti*), since it presupposes the contextual "creation" of a māyic subject, from whose limited light alone the object appears as separate.

[81] According to Abhinavagupta (cf. *ĪPVV* I, p. 287,3-9), a single thing or being, capable of producing various effects, does not lend itself to be indicated, or taught successfully, through a single word or concept. Practical reality and linguistic communication (*vyavahāra*) require the unitary thing to be expressed in manifold ways on the basis of its various efficiencies: one and the same fire can be indicated as "burner", "cooker" or "il-

And by the word "Great Lord" (*maheśvara iti*) the *sūtra* indicates him whose "power" yields fruit due to his will alone, that is, without the intermediation of the capacity of other causes. And the fact that the consciousness-principle is to be one and unitary in its nature will be explained later on.[82] Memory, for its part, is the power to make an entity, which has been manifested in the past, known in the present as formerly manifested. We have the power of exclusion (*apohanaśakti*) when a cognition in the form of conceptual elaboration is generated exclusively by the latent impression left by a particular manifestation, [a latent impression which is] awakened by the wonderful (*vicitra*)[83] will [of the Lord] as devoid of any specific spatio-temporal delimitation. For these (i.e., "this kind of") conceptual elaborations have as their [specific] function that of rejecting envisaged contrary options (*śaṅkitapratipakṣa*).[84] Also in respect to an object being manifested without commingling with other realities [and] having a well-defined nature of its own[85] – but at same time being capable of having a variety of possible causal efficiencies –, the knowing subjects aspiring to only one of these causal efficiencies – a specific one – will not succeed in making use of such an object in the various occurrences of practical life, unless we reject the various contrary options, endowed with various causal efficiencies, which they are figuring out.[86] For the object, which is not sepa-

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luminator". When the manifoldness of aspects is borne in mind, we speak of "power(s)"; when unity is borne in mind, we speak of "possessor of powers". However, none of these two approaches, Abhinavagupta continues, can be claimed to be ultimately true, because both of them are a creation of the Supreme Lord (ibid., lines 8-9: *parameśvareṇaiva tathā sṛṣṭatvāt*). In their conception of *śakti* Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta are reminiscent of what Bhartṛhari says about the many *śakti*s that any substance possesses, being the basis of the grammatical notion of *sādhana*; see particularly *Vākyapadīya* III.7.2:

śaktimātrasamūhasya viśvasyānekadharmaṇaḥ |
sarvadā sarvathā bhāvāt kvacit kiṃcid vivakṣyate ||.

Cf. Helarāja's commentary thereon (*VP* p. 232,4-5): *ghaṭādayo bhāvā viśvaśabdavācyāḥ | te ca tattadudakāharaṇādikāryasādhikānāṃ śaktīnāṃ samūharūpāḥ*); see also *kārikā* 6.

[82] According to Abhinavagupta, Utpaladeva here refers to *ĪPK* I.6.11.

[83] What puzzles a hypothetical opponent in the "exclusion" process (*apohana*) outlined here is the fact that the conceptual elaboration arises only from the impression left by the former perception of the object, and yet does not possess the same character of spatio-temporal definiteness that belonged to its source (in fact, the conceptual elaboration is in essence something general). The objection is made explicit in *ĪPVV* I, p. 291,8-9: *nanu deśādyavacchinne 'nubhūte tatkṛtā vāsanā kathaṃ tadanavacchinnaviṣayā* [my correction; the edited text is apparently corrupt: *tatkṛtayā vāsanā kathaṃ tadavacchinnaviṣayayā*] *prabudhyate*. According to Utpaladeva, this inexplicable fact is due to the unfathomable (ibid.: *vicitrāparyanuyojyā*) will of the Lord.

[84] According to Abhinavagupta (*ĪPVV* I, p. 291,13ff.), the peculiarity of *apohanaśakti* with respect to the mere *jñānaśakti* lies precisely in this figuring out of possible alternatives and then excluding them. In Dharmakīrti's formulation of the *apoha* theory, the alternatives to be rejected are in fact various erroneous superimpositions (*adhyāropa*). However, Abhinavagupta replies (ibid., p. 292,15-17), the object of the superimposition is already a mental construct, which in turn had to be established by way of the exclusion of other superimpositions, and so on; this entails that the simple ascertainment of a patch of blue colour could not be arrived at even in thousands of cosmic eras (*vikalpasamāropaparamparānavasthānād yugakoṭibhir api na nīlaniścayaḥ*). Next, Abhinavagupta takes into account the position of Śaṅkaranandana (ibid., lines 18ff.), who in the *Apohasiddhi* substitutes *anyathāprasaṅga* (the mere possibility that a thing be different from itself? Cf. lines 24-25: *tatrāpi viśiṣṭe 'rthe pratibhāte ko 'nyathāprasaṅgasyāvasara iti vaktavyam*) for Dharmakīrti's *adhyāropa* as the cause of doubt (see above n. 3). Both *samāropa* and *anyathāprasaṅga*, however, are seen by Abhinavagupta as inevitably leading to a *regressus ad infinitum*.

[85] The possibility that an object may be different from what it appears to be usually depends on its being mixed with something else (e.g., milk with water) or on its having the same features as something else. Utpaladeva's following explanation of the *apoha* process is intended to cover all possible cases, including the one most difficult to account for: the case of a distinctly characterized object which is not mixed with anything else.

[86] According to Abhinavagupta, this peculiar variation on the theme of *apoha*, which, though not being at all incompatible with the Buddhists' position, has, to the best of my knowledge, never been explicitly put forth by them, is to be traced back to some "*ācāryapāda*", presumably a Śaiva teacher (Utpaladeva himself?); cf.

rated from the level of Īśvara, as it were, has as its essence that of all other objects.[87] The above is the very essential nature of these[88] realities as they are characterized by mutual differentiation.[89]

Therefore, it is precisely this power of exclusion, whose sphere of activity is represented by conceptual elaboration, that opens the way to all transactions of practical life.[90] (Or: "produces the world of practical experience"; cf. the beginning of text.) On account of this, [the power of exclusion] has been mentioned separately in the Songs by the Blessed One, who possesses the status of the Great Lord. In fact, He said: "From me memory […]".[91] [All] these [powers derive] from a differentiation of the power of Knowledge.

ĪPVV I, p. 295,18-20: *tad uktam ācāryapādair eva yāvatyo 'rthakriyās tāvatsaṃkhyo 'tatkāriṇāṃ gaṇaḥ | tāvantas tatsamāropās tanniṣedhāś ca tatsamāḥ*, etc.

[87] The unexpressed question that Utpaladeva is answering is highlighted by Abhinavagupta (*ĪPVV* I, p. 294,6-7): How can a particular object be a strictly individualized entity and at the same time the occasion for a number of hypothetical alternatives?

[88] That is, the objects existing on the level of *māyā*. To sum up, they are primarily *anyonyabhedamaya*, and secondarily *anyonyātma*.

[89] In conclusion, the process of *apoha* can be successfully explained only in a Śaiva context. Particularly, it presupposes that both the knowing subject and the object are ultimately identified with Īśvara and are *viśvātma* – even at the level of *māyā*, although in a more virtual and concealed form. In the Buddhist explanation the defect of *anavasthā*, etc., is unescapable because *vikalpana*, *samāropaṇa*, etc., are separate and incapable of relating to each other by their own capacity alone (*ĪPVV* I, p. 296,22: *yena* [referring to the Śaiva position] *pṛthagvikalpanasamāropaṇānavasthādoṣāprasaṅgaḥ*). This potential "openness" of the object (and the subject) is at the root of the subject's "doubt" about it. Of this "openness", i.e., of the *viśvātma*-nature of the object, the subject maintains some kind of subliminal, inner awareness, even on the level of *māyā*. To sum up: unlike the Buddhists who view the "doubt" (i.e., the first step in the *apoha* process) as deriving from the object alone, the Śaivas have it arise from the "greatness" of the subject as well (ibid., p. 296,18-19: *māyāpade 'pi ca tatprakāśasaṃskārasyeśvarasyānativṛtter āśaṅkā pramātṛmāhātmyād evottiṣṭhati*). The solution of the problem of objective and subjective disparateness involved in the Buddhist theory as proposed by Dharmakīrti, who maintains that the objects, though being essentially differentiated, can be ascertained by the subject as unified owing to their production of a single effect, e.g., a single cognition (*PVS* p. 60,16-17: *bhāvāḥ prakṛtibhedino 'pi jñānādikam ekaṃ kāryaṃ kecit kurvanti nānya iti*), does not seem satisfactory to Abhinavagupta. In fact, after quoting *PV* I.119 he refers to his subsequent indication of its shortcomings (*ĪPVV* I, p. 297,1: *tatra sphuritam api vastu duḥsamartham ity agre* [to be added: *sphuṭaṃ*] *bhaviṣyati*).

[90] It is precisely for this reason, Abhinavagupta says (*ĪPVV* I, p. 297,2-8), that the power of exclusion has been given separate status, though exclusion is the very body of conceptual cognition and of the special case of conceptual cognition which is memory.

[91] *Bhagavadgītā* (*BhG*) XV.15b: "From me derive memory, knowledge and exclusion." This passage sounds somewhat cryptic. For Śaṅkara (*Gītābhāṣya* [*BhGŚ*] p. 627,4), *apohana* stands for "turning away from, departing from" (*apāyanam apagamanam*), that is, the loss of knowledge and memory due to evil karma (the objects of *apohana* are *jñāna* and *smṛti*: *tadapohanam*). According to Ānandagīri's *Vyākhyā* thereon (p. 626,14-15), "knowledge" is the supernatural power to perceive what is beyond the normal reach of the senses; "memory" is the capacity to recollect what has been experienced in past lives. The commentary of Rājanaka Rāmakaṇṭha (possibly identical with Utpaladeva's disciple) is the one that seems closer to the interpretation given by Utpaladeva. According to Rāmakaṇṭha (*Sarvatobhadra* [*BhGS*] p. 330,3ff.), memory, perceptual cognition and exclusion are the outcome of the outflowing of Power (*śaktiprasara*) in human beings. This Power, or more precisely this Consciousness-Power (*saṃvedanaśakti*) acts in two ways, in that it defines the being and the non-being of the various realities (*tattatpadārthabhāvābhāvaparicchedakatva*). While the "non-being" of realities is defined by means of *apohana* alone, their "being" is defined by means of perceptual cognition (which makes something which was not there before manifest) and by means of memory (which brings something that has already been perceived in the past again to the mind). In both processes *apohana* acts as *prakāśanābhāva* ("absence of manifestation"). Though these powers act in limited subjects, they ultimately flow from the one and absolutely real knowing subject (*paramārthasaṃveditur ekasmāt*). According to Abhinavagupta's *Bhagavadgītārthasaṃgraha* (*BhGA*) (p. 231,10-16), *jñāna* is the manifestation of something new and corresponds to the "great" creation (*mahāsṛṣṭi*) of the universe; *apohana*, which represents the creation of the limited soul, is con-

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1) Texts

ĪPK	*Īśvarapratyabhijñākārikā* and *-vṛtti* of Utpaladeva, ed. and tr. in Torella 1994.
ĪPV	*Īśvarapratyabhijñāvimarśinī* of Abhinavagupta. Ed. Mukund Ram Shastri. 2 vols. Bombay 1918-1921. (Kashmir Series of Texts and Studies 22 and 33)
ĪPVV	*Īśvarapratyabhijñāvivṛtivimarśinī* of Abhinavagupta. Ed. Madhusudan Kaul Shastri. 3 vols. Bombay 1938-1943. (Kashmir Series of Texts and Studies 60, 62 and 65)
DhP	*Dharmottarapradīpa* of Durveka Miśra, in *Dharmottarapradīpa* [*Being a Sub-commentary on Dharmottara's Nyāyabinduṭīkā, a Commentary on Dharmakīrti's Nyāyabindu*], ed. Pandita Dalsukhbhai Malvania, rev. 2nd ed., Patna 1971.
NBṬ	*Nyāyabinduṭīkā* of Dharmottara, in *DhP*.
P	Pāṇini's *Aṣṭādhyāyī*, ed. in Sharma 1995.
PV	*Pramāṇavārttika* of Dharmakīrti, in *Pramāṇavārttika with the Commentary "Vṛtti" of Acharya Manorathanandin*, critically ed. by Swami Dwarikadas Shastri, Varanasi 1968.
PVS	Dharmakīrti's *Svavṛtti* on the *Pramāṇavārttika*, ed. in Gnoli 1960.
BhG	*Bhagavadgītā*, in *BhGŚ*.
BhGA	*Bhagavadgītārthasaṃgraha* of Abhinavagupta, in *Śrīmadbhagavadgītā with Gītārthasaṃgraha*, Part One: *Text*, ed. S. Sankaranarayanan, Tirupati 1985.
BhGŚ	*Bhagavadgītābhāṣya*, in *Śrīmadbhagavadgītā with the Commentaries Śrimat-Śāṅkarabhāṣya* (*with Ānandagiri's Vyākhyā*), *Nīlakaṇṭhī*, *Bhāṣyotkarṣadīpikā of Dhanapati*, *Śrīdharī*, *Gītārthasaṅgraha of Abhinavaguptācārya*, *Gūḍhārthadīpikā of Madhusūdana* (*with Gūḍhārthatattvāloka of Śrīdharmadattaśarma*), ed. L.S. Panshikar, 2nd ed. Delhi 1978.
BhGS	*Sarvatobhadra*, in *The Bhagavadgītā with the Commentary Called Sarvatobhadra of Rāmakaṇṭha*, ed. M.K. Shastri, Bombay 1943. (Kashmir Series of Texts and Studies 64)
VP	*Vākyapadīya* of Bhartṛhari, in *Vākyapadīya with the Prakīrṇakaprakāśa of Helārāja*: *Kāṇḍa 3*, ed. K.A.S. Iyer, 2 vols., Poona 1963-1973.
VPM	*Vākyapadīya*, ed. in W. Rau, *Bhartṛhari's Vākyapadīya*: *Die Mūlakārikās nach den Handschriften*. Wiesbaden 1977. (Abhandlungen für die Kunde des Morgenlandes 42)
VBh	*Vijñānabhairavatantra with the Commentary Partly by Kṣemarāja and Partly by Śivopādhyāya*. Ed. Mukunda Ram Shastri. Bombay 1918 (Kashi Sanskrit Text Series 8)
HB	Dharmakīrti, *Hetubindu*, ed. in Steinkellner 1967.

ceptual thought, which acts by fragmenting all-inclusive reality; *smṛti* has the function to make manifest again what, subsequent to the original cognition, has been reduced to the status of a latent impression.

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Loriliai Biernacki

Possession, Absorption and the Transformation of *Samāveśa*

This article purports to be something like a piece of detective work, tracing the history of meanings of the word *samāveśa*. In larger terms it addresses the problems of interpretation, particularly, how an interpretation can often serve a political end. In a specific sense, I hope this helps us to understand that the political aspects of interpretation, interpretation as the production of knowledge, to borrow a phrase, does not commence with the advent of the British into the farther reaches of the globe in the beginning of the eighteenth century.

In specific terms, I address in this paper the transformations of the notion of *samāveśa*.[1] A number of modern, twentieth-century translations of this word, notably, and representative for our purposes here, K.C. Pandey's, whose book on Abhinavagupta was published in 1963, present *samāveśa* as having a sense of absorption into divinity. Drawing from *Tantrāloka* (*TĀ*) 1.173, he describes *samāveśa* as the merging of the limited individual into the highest reality.[2] With this understanding of *samāveśa* as "absorption" into divinity, one detects the implied model of transcendence, along with the image of merging, as a key. Here we find what we might construe as a Vedāntic metaphor of merging, reminiscent of the salt in the pan of water in the celebrated sixth chapter of the *Chandogya-Upaniṣad*.

Sanderson, on the other hand, writing in the 1980's, proposes another sense of *samāveśa*. Rather than translating it as "absorption" or "immersion", he translates it as "possession".[3] In an insightful article[4] he relates it especially to a ritual context, linking this "possession" to the *upāya*s, the methods for spiritual attainment; here he notes that the different formulations of these methods indicate the different degrees of possession by deity.

I hope to show here that the strain influencing Pandey's version represents a subtle shift in interpretation influenced in large measure by Kṣemarāja's writings in the eleventh century.

Literally[5] meaning the "complete entrance, immersion" Utpala felt the term *samāveśa* was important enough to devote a *sūtra* of his fairly condensed *Kārikā* to it. Based on what we find in scriptural sources like the *Mālinīvijayottaratantra* (*MVT*) or the *Kubjikāmatatantra* (*KMT*), one might conjecture that this term evidently referred to some sort of visceral meditative experience. In the course of commentarial writing, however, both in the works of Abhinavagupta and Kṣemarāja, it appears that the meaning of the word slowly shifted, and to a certain extent this occurred as the result of a conscious effort on the part of these writers.

How does *samāveśa* appear in Tantric scriptural sources? Abhinavagupta and Kṣemarāja both frequently cite the *Mālinīvijayottaratantra* when they address the issue of *samāveśa*. Most often cited from *Mālinīvijayottaratantra* is the following verse:

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[1] Ideally a study of this sort would be more comprehensive and include a wide variety of Tantras. I hope to do this in the future. This study serves as a preliminary venture.

[2] Pandey 1963: 312.

[3] Sanderson 1986: 176.

[4] Sanderson 1986: 176-177.

[5] Of course, giving a "literal" meaning is also a species of interpretation, and one quite subject to "misreading".

Karin Preisendanz (ed.), *Expanding and Merging Horizons*: *Contributions to South Asian and Cross-Cultural Studies in Commemoration of Wilhelm Halbfass*, Wien: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 2007, pp. 491-504.

akiñcic cintakasyaiva guruṇā pratibodhataḥ |
jāyate yaḥ samāveśaḥ śāmbhavo 'sāv udāhṛtaḥ ||.

The possession/immersion that arises from an awakening by the *guru*, for one who is free from thought or contemplation, that is the designated as *śāmbhava* [the possession relating to Śiva].[6]

This is the verse that Abhinavagupta paraphrases in *TĀ* 1.168, where he describes the *śāmbhava samāveśa*:

akiñcic cintakasyaiva guruṇā pratibodhataḥ |
utpadyate ya āveśaḥ śāmbhavo 'sāv udīritaḥ ||.

The immersion/possession (*āveśa*) produced from an intense awakening (by the teacher) for one who is without thought or contemplation, that is called the *śāmbhava* type.[7]

Here the *Mālinīvijayottaratantra* states three types of *samāveśa*, in a descending order. The first we just noted. The second is the Energy (*śakti*) *samāveśa*, which occurs without any spoken words or outward muttering of *mantra*s, but which does involve thought and a subtle transmission of energy:

uccārarahitaṃ vastu cetasaiva vicintayan |
yaṃ samāveśam āpnoti śāktaḥ so 'trābhidhīyata ||.[8]

The third, the Small, i.e., limited, *samāveśa* (*āṇava*), involves all manner of methods – reciting *mantra*s, yogic trance, meditation and thought:

uccārakaraṇadhyānavarṇasthānaprakalpanaiḥ |
yo bhavet sa samāveśaḥ samyag āṇava ucyate ||.[9]

The *Mālinīvijayottaratantra* then goes on to expand this list into fifty by ascribing *āveśa* separately to the thirty-six *tattva*s (with some *tattva*s being again subdivided), a scheme which again Abhinavagupta addresses in his *TĀ*.

Here we get a sense of *samāveśa* as some sort of spiritual experience, a sudden awakening, or one brought on through contemplation or else through standard yogic disciplines.

We know that *samāveśa* has occurred, the *Mālinīvijayottaratantra* tells us, if we see five signs in a person; here the type of *samāveśa* is possession in or by the *śakti* of Rudra, and this *rudraśaktisamāveśa* stands as paradigmatic in this text as the "highest" form of *samāveśa* which I think is figured in general with the addition of the prefix "*sam*-" despite the synonymity in several texts, including Abhinavagupta's, of *āveśa* and *samāveśa*. The five signs are:

1. Firm devotion to Rudra.
2. One becomes accomplished in *mantra*s.
3. One gains control over beings.

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[6] *MVT* 2.23.

[7] Although neither Silburn nor Padoux draws attention to this in the translation and introduction to the *TĀ* (Silburn and Padoux 1998), it seems likely that Abhinavagupta specifically notes that *guruṇā* in verse 1.172 means "intense" rather than "by the *guru*" because he wishes to undermine the Śaiva Siddhānta elevation of the role of the teacher and initiation (*dīkṣā*). That this is evidenced in a number of other places elsewhere as well indicates that it may be construed in connection with a systematic attempt on Abhinava's part, though for lack of space it will not be treated here.

[8] *MVT* 2.22.

[9] *MVT* 2.21.

4. Those works which have already been started ripen [quickly]. (This may refer to an idea that the *karman*, effects of deeds which were destined to be experienced in this life, ripen quickly.)
5. One acquires skill in poetry, a refined aesthetic appreciation or enjoyment and a sudden, spontaneous knowledge of all scriptures.[10]

These five signs appear to reference a type of yogic accomplishment. However they do not seem to correspond exactly to the vague notion of "supreme immersion" or "absorption" proposed by a number of twentieth-century scholars. In some sense this may be perhaps because the signs this *rudraśaktisamāveśa* describes are especially precise. They appear very little connected with the general transcendent vagueness that comes to mind when we think of absolute immersion into a highest state. On the other hand, neither do these five signs appear to connect with the idea of "possession" (*āveśa*) as a possession by fierce deities in the Kāpālika rites.[11]

Another interesting feature to note about *samāveśa* in the *Mālinīvijayottaratantra* is that in some instances the cultivation of *samāveśa* entails a profound preoccupation with the physical body. For instance in the twelfth chapter we find instructions on how to "practice" *āveśa*, according to a procedure given by the *guru*,[12] and it involves the body to a large extent. The practitioner's own body becomes shining like gold for instance (*svadehaṃ hemasaṃkāśam*)[13] and the text specifically mentions that the body should be properly immersed or possessed (*samyag āviṣṭadehaḥ syāt*).[14] The procedures employed also involve *nyāsa*, a practice of placing *mantra*s in the different limbs of the body.[15] Although these passages here are somewhat opaque, incorporating what appears to be some type of obscure secret or encoded teaching, as in *tatas tālaśatād yogī samāveśam avāpnuyāt*,[16] ("following this the *yogin* gets *samāveśa* because of *tālaśata*"), nevertheless the emphasis on the body reinforces a sense of bodily phisical experience and an experience very much grounded in this world – not transcendence – just as the five signs noted above reference the body and are useful in this world.

In the context of the *Mālinīvijayottaratantra*'s precise description of and prescriptions for *samāveśa*, we still do not get either a sense of transcendence or a sense of some sort of ecstatic or out-of-control state of "possession" by wild or demure deities. In any case, whatever the state of *samāveśa* may be, it does not appear to neglect the body or this world.

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[10] This last would certainly be useful! The passage quoted is *MVT* 2.13-16:
rudraśaktisamāveśas tatra nityaṃ pratiṣṭhataḥ |
sati tasmiṃś ca cihnāni tasyaitāni vilakṣayet ||13||
tatraitat prathamaṃ cihnaṃ rudre bhaktiḥ suniścalā |
dvitīyaṃ mantrasiddhiḥ syāt sadyaḥ pratyayakārikā ||14||
sarvasattvavaśitvaṃ ca tṛtīyaṃ lakṣaṇaṃ smṛtam |
prārabdhakāryanispattiś cihnam āhuś caturthakam ||15||
kavitvaṃ pañcamaṃ jñeyaṃ sālaṅkāraṃ manoharam |
sarvaśāstrārthavettṛtvam akasmāc cāsya jāyate ||16||.

[11] Torella 1994: xxxiii.

[12] *MVT* 12.20b: *yaḥ punar guruṇaivādau kṛtāveśavidhikramaḥ*.

[13] *MVT* 12.22b.

[14] *MVT* 12.22a.

[15] *MVT* 12.16.

[16] *MVT* 12.19a.

In the *Kubjikāmatatantra*, the word *āveśa* is favored over *samāveśa*. In contrast to the *Mālinīvijayottaratantra* with its three basic types of *samāveśa*, the *Kubjikāmatatantra* presents six types of *āveśa* corresponding to the six paths (*adhvan*). The six types of *āveśa* are *bhūta*, *bhāva*, *śākta*, *māntra*, *raudra*, and *śāmbhava*.[17] Here in the *Kubjikāmatatantra*'s description of these types of *āveśa*, a more pronounced sense of "possession" appears. Although still presented in the context of *yoga*, with its consequent implications of conscious control of psychic processes, we do find a greater emphasis on a lack of control, which we associate with the word possession. For instance, in the *Kubjikāmatatantra* the signs of *bhūtāveśa* are trembling, weeping, moving unsteadily, jumping up, and falling down, speaking incoherently and crying out like an insane person,[18] and so on, with similar types of non-normative and non-conforming behavior occurring with the other *āveśa*s. The person experiencing *āveśa* would appear to others as though perhaps mad. In this text's presentation, glossing *āveśa* as "possession" appears to be appropriate.

Again, however, as in the *Mālinīvijayottaratantra* regarding the *āveśa*, the "possession" relating to Rudra, the person becomes able to understand the scriptures and other books without studying them. So it appears that the mad "possession" of the earlier stages (and the text here does assume a hierarchical ordering[19]) gives way to a sane comprehension of normative culture. This expresses itself as a spontaneous knowledge of the tradition's scriptures and books and superknowledge of past and future. Now this knowledge may be surprising with regard to its spontaneity and depth, but the person displaying this "possession" could no doubt appear quite sane, not at all like someone possessed, to those around him or her. And following this, not surprisingly, the *āveśa* in Rudra progresses to culminate in (the usual) omniscience with the *śāmbhavāveśa*.

Here, however, the situation is more complicated. This person does not tremble or roar[20] in an obviously mad way like someone in the earlier stages, but he does whirl just a little bit (*īśadghūrmi*),[21] and among other signs his body becomes stiff, comatose.[22] While the person in *śāmbhavāveśa* does not appear patently mad or possessed as in the earlier stages, he or she certainly does not appear quite normal. The text goes on to tell us that these different *āveśa*s progress in stages from the lower to the higher. We see that the possession here culminates with a person who is both omniscient (*sarvajñaguṇabhūṣita*)[23] and constantly[24] intoxicated with bliss (*sadānandamadonmatta*).[25] This characterization seems to include both the image of the transcendent *yogin* possessing omniscience *and* the mad divine reveller intoxicated (*unmatta*) in the transgressive rituals involving sex and wine.

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[17] *KMT* 10.68. A thorough comparison of the two systems might prove very interesting, though this will not be attempted in this paper.

[18] *KMT* 10.83a-c: *kampate bhramate rodec cotpaten nipated vadet | anibaddharavonmādī …||*. See *KMT* 10.83-98 for a description of the different signs of the six types.

[19] *KMT* 10.99.

[20] *KMT* 10.96.

[21] Ibid.

[22] Ibid.

[23] *KMT* 10.98.

[24] *sadānandamadonmatta* could be read as "always, constantly intoxicated with bliss" or also as "intoxicated with the bliss of being" or "the true bliss", depending upon how one reads the compound. My reading here emphasizes a fleshiness over transcendence, which the "bliss of being" might otherwise suggest. In any case, *madonmatta* tends to connotatively bring back the body and intoxication.

[25] Ibid.

These signs of trembling and whirling do also occur in the *Mālinīvijayottaratantra* in the context of initiation, in forms ranging from mild to intense (*mandatīvrādibhedena*).[26] And here the degree of intensity is dependent on the extent to which the person is entered or possessed by the Energy (*śakti*).[27] The description of the signs here in the *Mālinīvijayottaratantra* is not nearly presented with such an in-depth fervor or minutely and comprehensively adumbrated as in the *Kubjikāmatatantra*. However, in one place where trembling is described, notably unaccompanied by either whirling or *āveśa*, it is associated with a teaching of the highest non-dualism (*paramādvaita*).[28] It may be possible to see in this overt espousal of a non-dualism both a later interpolation and also inchoate beginnings of a transformation from a boisterous overtly expressive "possession" to the more demure "absorption" which comes to be promoted especially by Kṣemarāja, as we will see later. And in fact where we might normally find *āveśa* the word used here is *līna*, denoting a more benign and transcendent expression of absorption. It may be that part of the reason why Abhinavagupta[29] favored the *Mālinīvijayottaratantra* so much is precisely that it represented a middle ground, one which was capable of incorporating aspects of both a transcendent sense of immersion associated with a non-dual philosophy and a sense of immanence, an incorporation of divinity in the world here and now, exemplified especially in its focus on the physical body.

For the sake of comparison we may look at the use of the word *āveśa* in a classical text like Patañjali's *Yogasūtra*s (*YS*). Here *āveśa* has no connection with a highest state of liberation (*mokṣa*) or "absorption" or the like. Rather it belongs to the realm of obstacles on the path, the magic powers which must be ultimately rejected by a seeker of liberation. However, it should be added that even though magic powers must be ultimately rejected, they do function as a type of signpost indicating that the seeker is making progress. The relevant *sūtra* describes how a *yogin* with his mind may enter (*āveśa*) the body of another person, by perceiving the flow of its currents.[30] This does seem to be in keeping with a tone of *āveśa* which we have seen above, connecting it with magic powers and yogic trance, and here also there is the sense of possession, though not in the passive sense and not by a spiritual power or deity.

Contrasting the very human manipulation involved in *āveśa* for Patañjali, in a patently dualistic Tantra like the *Mṛgendratantra* (*MT*) the Lord enters/possesses (*āveśa*) the beings Ananta, etc., who are cosmologically the overlords of the world here; having entered them (*āviśya*) he gives these not entirely pure beings authority over the worlds.[31] Here possession is divorced from the context of individual experience and transposed entirely into a mythic cosmological realm. And neither does Rāmakaṇṭha in his commentary try to reconstruct cosmology as a psychological map for the individual, as Abhinava so often does with the cosmological. Rather cosmology remains a story of the Gods and beings above humans, and

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[26] *MVT* 11.27 and 11.35.

[27] *MVT* 11.36: *evam āviṣṭyā śaktyā mandatīvrādibhedataḥ*.

[28] *MVT* 18.4; here the text also enjoins one to worship the spiritual *liṅga*, not the one made of clay, stone, etc. (*MVT* 18.2-3).

[29] This may also be a reason why it was a popular text for a majority of Kashmirian householders as well.

[30] *YS* 3.39: *bandhakāraṇaśaithilyāt pracārasaṃvedanāc ca cittasya paraśarīrāveśaḥ*.

[31] *MT* 1.4.9-10:

tato 'nantādyabhivyaktaḥ patīnāṃ granthitattvataḥ |
kalādyārabdhadehānāṃ karoty aṣṭādaśaṃ śatam ||
tān apy āviśya bhagavān sāñjanān bhuvanādhipān |
yebhyaḥ sarvam idaṃ yeṣāṃ śaktiḥ karmanibandhanā ||.

āveśa is not part of the human experience. So, even if we cannot say that *āveśa* represents immersion into the highest reality here, we can say that it nevertheless speaks to something transcending this world.

Somānanda on *Samāveśa*

Now to get a clearer sense of how *samāveśa* comes to be transformed in non-dual Kashmir Śaiva philosophy we will take a look at some important medieval writers. In Somānanda's ninth-century *Śivadṛṣṭi* (*ŚD*), *samāveśa* carries the sense of an undifferentiated unity in which Somānanda is nevertheless able to maintain a poignant expression of devotion to a personal God. Somānanda uses the word *samāveśa* in the first eloquent verse of his *Śivadṛṣṭi*, which at once sets the tone of an indivisible monism and at the same time maintains the diverse elements which make up what we know as the disunified world. Though Utpala does not draw attention to the weaving of *nara*, the limited self (third person), Śakti (second person) and Śiva (first person) in his commentary on the verse, one would not be surprised if Abhinavagupta, in his lost *Śivadṛṣṭyālocana*, would have elaborated on this in a manner similar to his expositions in the *Parātriṃśikāvivaraṇa* (*PV*).[32]

Somānanda describes his relationship with Śiva as *samāviṣṭa*, completely merged:

> *asmadrūpasamāviṣṭaḥ svātmanātmanivāraṇe |*
> *śivaḥ karotu nijayā namaḥ śaktyā tadātmane ||.*
>
> May Śiva by means of his own Energy bow to his own Self. He has completely merged into and possessed my form in having covered up his Self with [what is really] his own form.[33]

Śiva, who would traditionally be accorded the grammatical first person, especially according to the scheme Abhinavagupta gives in the *PV* mentioned above, is here in the third person performing the action of the verse. Further, Śiva would traditionally in the opening verse be honored or bowed to – here Somānanda has Śiva himself performing the bowing with a third person verbal form. And the *nara* who is Somānanda, the traditional third person, here speaks in the first person, saying "my" (*asmad-*). All this occurs by the agency of Śakti, the traditional second person. At the same time a unity prevails everywhere, as Utpaladeva tells us, the I (i.e., Somānanda) who is bowing is simply Śiva having attained oneness with my form.[34] Śiva who is the entire world enters into his own Self, covering his own resplendent nature, and by his own energy bows to himself.

Where is Somānanda really in all this? In the *samāveśa* he has attained, there seems to be no Somānanda, but rather all is only Śiva. No doubt it is his form, his body and his words reciting the praise and bowing to Śiva, yet here, perhaps trying to convey a non-discursive experience of union in language, a medium eminently suited to highlighting differentiation, Somānanda at every corner lands only on the Self (though perhaps we may say not his own Self, rather Śiva's Self).

In any case, whatever Somānanda meant in this verse, it is possible to see how Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta are able, in the profuse pervasiveness of Śiva expressed in this verse with the past passive participle that Somānanda uses for his merger, to begin to move into a unity beyond the violent ruptures of identity punctuated by powers and reassertions of the world of

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[32] *PV* pp. 25-28; cf. Singh 1989: 70-75.
[33] *ŚD* 1.1, p. 2.
[34] *ŚD* p. 2,8: *yo 'haṃ namaskaromi sa śivo 'smadrūpeṇaikyaṃ prāptaḥ*.

the possessed Kāpālikas. The intrusions of the deity as the wholly other do not figure in Somānanda's conception where all is Śiva.

And while Utpaladeva in his commentary mentions a certain mutuality in this *samāveśa*, where both Śiva and Devadatta here, for instance, are mutually "merged" and "possessed",[35] still in the final analysis this mutuality is simply a part of the drama of Śiva, highlighted in a verse which three times resorts to the word Self (*ātman*). For, Utpala tells us, "everything consists of Śiva – speech, mind, etc.".[36]

But what is quite remarkable is that Somānanda is in fact able to maintain the tension between the necessary duality essential to the devotion he wishes to convey *and* a fluid sense of union. And we might add, on an aesthetic level it is this very tension which gives the verse its power and prevents it from lapsing into an inaccessible transcendence divorced from the exigencies of living.

Utpaladeva on *Samāveśa*

At the same time, another point we should not lose sight of is that Utpala also, contrasting the modern scholarly interpretation we looked at earlier, does not ultimately rely on a notion of *samāveśa* which transcends the world, as he writes in one of his songs:

> *bhavadāveśataḥ paśyan bhāvaṃ bhāvaṃ bhavanmayam* |
> *vicareyaṃ nirākāṅkṣaḥ praharṣaparipūritaḥ* ||.
>
> From this merger in you,
> let me, seeing all existence,
> consider this existence to consist of you,
> remaining free of desires
> filled full with excited, raptured joy.[37]

For Utpaladeva the world does not disappear. He wishes not to transcend the world but rather to imbue it with divinity, or rather to rediscover its actual divinity. Somewhat thematically typical of much of Utpaladeva's poetry, the movement is towards an all-encompassing experience of Śiva, encompassing the world as well. The verse here plays upon oppositions, contradictions, upon seeing existence, this life here, yet not seeing it in its usual worldly sense, rather seeing it as part of Śiva. Similarly, Utpala is free of desires and yet at the same time *praharṣapūrita*, filled with the joy accompanying sexual excitement. The force of opposition is delicately conveyed in the sensuous connotations of the word *praharṣa*, which carries a sense of sexual excitement. It can mean a joyous excitement where the hair on the skin becomes erect and also a sexual erection. Embedded in the root *vi-√car* is a further punning contradiction. It carries connotations of wandering and of straying from the right path and of using the mind to discern. And this discernment as well is something that happens in the world, using the dangerous and worldly instrument of the mind. In this case the world is not transcended, and the mind also is not transcended, but as in many of Utpaladeva's poems they are seen in a new and intimate relationship to Śiva.

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[35] *ŚD* p. 3,8: *samāviṣṭaś ca śivo 'pīty ucyate devadattādir api ca*, *ubhayor aikyagamanāviśeṣāt*.
[36] *ŚD* p. 3,14: *sarvaṃ ca śivamayam iti namaskāre vāṅmanasādi karaṇam api śiva eva*.
[37] *Śivastotrāvalī* (*ŚSĀ*), song 6.5.

In this way, we can see in Utpaladeva's rendition of the word *āveśa,* this merger, this possession is both full of the world and with hints of an ecstatic experience, and at the same time beyond the desires attendant on living in the world.

Utpaladeva in his *Īśvarapratyabhijñākārikā* (*IPK*) and *Vṛtti* stresses again the idea that *samāveśa* is allowing one aspect to be made prominent while another is subordinated:

> *mukhyatvaṃ kartṛtāyāś ca bodhasya ca cidātmanaḥ |*
> *śūnyādau tadguṇe jñānaṃ tat samāveśalakṣaṇam* ||12||.
>
> When both agency and awareness, which is essentially pure consciousness, become predominant, and when the Void, etc., become subordinate to them,[38] then that knowledge [which arises in this state] is defined as complete absorption.

In his gloss to this verse Utpala emphasizes that the knowledge attained here is characterized as immersion into the (feminine) Energy. Equating the two and facilitating a knowledge-based – and hence more abstract and transcended – form of *samāveśa*, he starts to move away from a notion of "possession". Also, we may note here, we encounter the metaphor of prominence versus subordination.

Abhinavagupta on *Samāveśa*

Now when we look at the uses of *samāveśa* in Abhinavagupta we find that he uses the word in multiple senses extending in a variety of directions which are not all mutually compatible. On the one hand he still does retain a sense of *samāveśa* connected with yogic praxis and orgiastic ritual which tends towards a notion of *samāveśa* as possession. On the other hand he also prioritizes *samāveśa* as immersion, moving away from a sense of *samāveśa* as possession towards a sense conveying a more abstract transcendent beatitude. And moving in another direction again, he also construes *samāveśa* as something not ultimate but instead as a lower state.

In all of this one does not get a sense of contradiction as much as a sense that Abhinavagupta shifts registers on us, so to speak, and at different places views *samāveśa* from a different perspective. While in one context *samāveśa* is the highest absorption, this is highest only relatively speaking. And probably to some degree certain perspectives were necessitated by the social climate and expectations of those people he was trying to woo to his version of non-dual Kashmir Śaivism. For instance to appeal to the more staid liberation-seeking householder not so keen on wild cremation ground possessions, Abhinavagupta may emphasize the sense of *samāveśa* as an absorption, immersion, somewhat divorced from the flailing whirling *āveśa* of the *Kubjikāmatatantra*.

To take a closer look, in his *TĀ* 3.167 Abhinavagupta places *samāveśa* in the context of yogic and ritual praxis. Arising out of mantric utterance, *samāveśa* is associated with the *sītkāra*, an ecstatic expulsion of breath connected with the sexual ritual, a state of bliss and a deep meditative state:

> *kṣobhādyantavirāmeṣu tad eva ca parāmṛtam* ||166||
> *sītkārasukhasadbhāvasamāveśasamādhiṣu | …*

[38] Here I take *śūnyādau tadguṇe* as locative absolute, where the void is subordinated, and knowledge is predominant.

Here Abhinavagupta ascribes *samāveśa* a meaning very much connected with ritual and yogic practice. Here Jayaratha notes the connection with the *ādiyāga*, a secret sexual ritual, which suggests that a possession oriented experience might not be too far off the mark.

At the same time, elsewhere, Abhinavagupta explicitly construes *samāveśa* as immersion into the supreme:

> *āveśaś cāsvatantrasya svatadrūpanimajjanāt* ||
> *paratadrūpatā śambhor ādyāc chaktyavibhāginaḥ* | ...
>
> *āveśa* occurs from submerging one's limited form which lacks freedom, so that one identifies with the supreme form which comes from the primordial Śiva, inseparable from his Energy.[39]

With this articulation of *samāveśa*, we can see why a number of twentieth-century scholars have drifted towards an abstract transcendent notion of *samāveśa*. And in the section where this definition of *samāveśa* occurs in the *TĀ*, Abhinavagupta also takes great pains to cultivate a notion of *samāveśa* as a unified ultimate and non-specific state in order to reconcile into a unity the fifty types of *āveśa* that the *Mālinīvijayottaratantra* puts forth. To this end Abhinavagupta provides us with a long discussion on why, despite that there are so many "ways" (here we see *samāveśa* also assimilated to the meaning of *upāya*), so many forms of *āveśa*, there is nevertheless one unified result, a total immersion in the supreme.[40] As the song goes, "there must be fifty ways", but the end result is the same. Abhinavagupta accomplishes his end by appealing to a gestalt-like notion, the idea that a conceptual unity underlies the actual external variety. We see the whole and that is the form of its unity; even though this unity is inevitably made up of a myriad of diverse parts, still it is the unity as its ground and source which we initially pre-linguistically apprehend. Here Abhinavagupta takes what is a spatial duality and reconfigures it by analogy with a temporal duality to show us how the variety is dependent on a unified substratum. This hinges on our accepting an unarticulated component of the metaphor, that the temporal is in fact commensurable with the spatial.

Now the *Īśvarapratyabhijñāvivṛtivimarśinī* (*IPVV*) reveals another aspect of *samāveśa*. In his exposition of Utpala's verse treated above, Abhinavagupta makes a point of undermining the notion of *samāveśa*. Having described two types of *samāveśa*, one connected with knowledge and one connected with yogic practice, he equates the two and then goes on to say, "Other schools point out the way to that state". He then quotes from the *Bhagavadgītā* (*BhG*): *mayy āveśya mano ye* ... "Those who merge their minds in me ..."[41] and continues by elaborating on the practices enjoined, which he notes are forms of dualism.[42] That they are essentially dualistic in his view gives the clue that he does not see this state as an ultimate attainment. This is also reinforced by the fact that he notes that latent traces (*saṃskāra*s) are not erased in this state.[43] And then in a telling conclusion to his exposition, Abhinavagupta writes:

> However, when the body goes, then the essence of Śiva becomes one dense full mass. Then one can no longer speak of *samāveśa*, absorption, etc.[44]

Here Abhinavagupta highlights a dualism endemic to the notion of *samāveśa*, and we may note that this dualism likely arises as a concomitant component of *samāveśa*, inherent in the

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[39] *TĀ* 1.173c-174b.
[40] *TĀ* 1.196ff, especially 1.197 and 1.201.
[41] *BhG* 12.2
[42] *IPVV* p. 328,8: *sā iyaṃ* (sic!) *dvayy api daśā samāveśo yallābhāya anyad upadiśyate*.
[43] *IPVV* p. 328,1-2: *tadā turyātītā*; *tadāpi ca śūnyādisaṃskāro 'py asti*.
[44] *IPVV* p. 328,18: *dehapāte tv ekaghanā eva śivateti tadā samāveśādivyavahāro na kaścit*.

dual use of the verb √*viś*, in both an active sense of "possessing" or "immersing", and in the passive sense of "being possessed". It may be fair to say that Abhinava is ambivalent about *samāveśa*, particularly in its dual capacity, in its ability to function, to use a paraphrase of his, like a "crow's eye",[45] alternatively with one meaning or the other. Likely Abhinavagupta sees in it some aspects that are essential to his vision of non-dualism and at the same time he feels it necessary to redefine it to incorporate *also* an element of transcendent pervasiveness.

Kṣemarāja on *Samāveśa*

Thus far we have seen how Abhinavagupta along with Utpaladeva sets out to subtlely reconstitute the meaning of the word *samāveśa*. Now what Kṣemarāja adds to this process is a heightening of it and extending it in new directions with a result that places more stress on a notion of *samāveśa* as a transcendent immersion. Abhinavagupta, Utpaladeva and Somānanda articulate *samāveśa* both in terms of a transcendent immersion and in terms evocative of possession. And they tend to try to balance both these aspects, but Kṣemarāja tips the scale in favor of transcendence for *samāveśa*.

In general Kṣemarāja effects this reconstitution of the notion of *samāveśa* in what might be construed as a covert method, relying more on contextual positioning and a pervasive assimilation of *samāveśa* to a notion of knowledge. We saw hints of this latter in Utpala's *Kārikā* verse above; however, in Kṣemarāja this trend becomes more pronounced. For instance, in Kṣemarāja's *Parāpraveśikā* he introduces a new element into the classic formula for immersion. Here, we discover that *samāveśa* alone is not enough by itself. One needs knowledge as well, as Kṣemarāja says, in a style reminiscent of an upaniṣadic text: *yo veda samāviśati ca*, *saḥ ... jīvanmuktaḥ … .*[46] In his formulation here one must *know* as well as merge, and we might add that the passive usage of *samāveśa*, so typically associated with possession, is displaced by the active meaning with its sense of merging. Consequently, here it is not just a question of immersion into the highest state, but knowledge as well is important for salvation.

Again, in his introduction to the third section of the *Spandakārikā* (*SK*)[47] Kṣemarāja says that the eleventh verse refers to *samāveśa*.[48] However, when we look at the verse itself, the evidence is more ambiguous. The verse says:

> *didṛkṣayeva sarvārthān yadā vyāpyāvatiṣṭhate |*
> *tadā kiṃ bahunoktena svayam evāvabhotsyate* ||11||.

> When with the desire to see everything, as it were, one pervades [all this] then why speak much? One experiences this for oneself.[49]

This verse does not explicitly mention or refer to *samāveśa*. Neither does it match the descriptions of *samāveśa* that we saw for instance in the *Kubjikāmatatantra*, or in the *Mālinīvijayottaratantra*. If we were to redefine *samāveśa* to incorporate a sense of pervading immersion, like the upaniṣadic metaphor of salt merging in water that we looked at earlier, then

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[45] *IPVV* p. 312,7.

[46] *Parāpraveśikā* (*PP*) p. 12,1-3: *yo veda samāviśati ca*, *sa parāmārthato dīkṣitaḥ prāṇān dhārayan laukikavad vartamāno jīvanmukta eva bhavati*.

[47] *SK* p. 127.

[48] Ibid., line 15 (line 10 of the Sanskrit text): *ekena dvitīyaniḥṣyandanirṇītaviśvātmatāsvabhāvaḥ samāveśa uktaḥ*.

[49] *SK* p. 148.

one could *interpret* the verse as referring to *samāveśa*. However, in view of the text's preference for silence, we remain with nothing more solid than a simple conjecture to hang on to.

What is Kṣemarāja doing here? I suggest that ascribing *samāveśa* to this verse facilitates his reconstitution of the notion of *samāveśa* to a sense of immersion that avoids the more violent cultic sense of "possession". Further, his reformulation reconfigures the underlying metaphor to one that follows the upaniṣadic image of salt dissolving in water. But why should he choose such an ambiguous verse in the first place? No doubt influencing his decision to look to just this particular verse is the fact that the verse which follows it elevates knowledge to a position of central importance:

> *prabuddhaḥ sarvadā tiṣṭhej jñānenālokya gocaram |*
> *ekatrāropayet sarvaṃ tato 'nyena na pīṣyate* ||12||.
>
> After having surveyed the world visible to the senses by means of knowledge, one should always stay awake. He or she should put everything in one place, and consequently he or she won't be troubled by something which is other – separate or different.[50]

This is a far cry from any notion of "possession". With this it becomes possible for Kṣemarāja to insinuate a subtle hierarchy where *samāveśa* is "defined" as a transcendent immersion which is even then superseded by knowledge, the "staying awake" of verse twelve. Kṣemarāja wants to establish that higher than *samāveśa* is knowledge.

This is on a par with the different enunciation of the *yoga* system that non-dual Kashmir Śaivism takes in contrast to Patañjali's eight limbs of *yoga*,[51] namely, to reduce the number to six and put *tarka*, reasoning, on top, above *samādhi*, meditative absorption.[52] Both Abhinavagupta and Kṣemarāja are aware of Patañjali's *yoga* system, since both quote it, but we may see this as part of the same trend towards a valorisation of the cognitive over the experiential, to make a correct view more essential for liberation (*mokṣa*) than correct experience, or, perhaps in the case of the Śaiva Siddhānta, to make a correct view more important for liberation than correct ritual praxis (i.e., an attempt to de-emphasize the status of *dīkṣā*, which we see elsewhere, especially in Abhinavagupta[53]).

Why, we may ask, does Kṣemarāja do this? I suspect it forms part of a consistent and pervasive strategy especially on the part of Kṣemarāja to establish a nondualism which distances itself to some extent from the socially uncomfortable cultic possessions of the more transgressive left-oriented groups. And consequently it makes it possible for him to woo a broad-based householder constituency for his version of nondual Kashmir Śaivism. In any case, it serves to remind us that while a philosophical system may develop according to a logic internal to its system, it is also the case that neither does any philosophical system exist in a social vacuum.

We can see this process carried further when Kṣemarāja takes the notion of *samāveśa*, which in both its uses – in its sense of total immersion and in its sense of possession – carried a sense of presence and immediacy, and connects it to the notion of *saṃskāra*. With this he subtly relegates it to a second-order experience. Kṣemarāja writes: *yatsamāveśasaṃskāraba-*

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[50] *SK* p. 150.

[51] Wilhelm Halbfass pointed out to me (oral communication) that the sixfold system of *yoga* does not originate with Kashmir Śaivism, but can be found as early as the *Maitrī-Upaniṣad* (VI.18).

[52] *TĀ* 4.15-16.

[53] See *IPVV* p. 326,12ff., in the commentary on verse 10 as only one instance.

lāt, "because of the strength of the latent impression (*saṃskāra*) of immersion" [a person is able to make the oneness of consciousness firm and so to become liberated while alive].[54] Although the point I am making here hinges upon the connotative value of words, I think it is fair to say that for this system an ultimate state would not leave *saṃskāra*s, because the word *saṃskāra* is so consistently associated with the limiting, insentient overlays covering over and obscuring one's true nature. For the sake of contrast we can compare this with a verse of the *Spandakārikā* frequently quoted both by Abhinavagupta and Kṣemarāja: *ātmabalasparśāt* "from the contact with the strength of the Self".[55] The contact with the Self is touch – palpable and present. When something starts to leave traces, *saṃskāra*s, we tend to find ourselves back in the realm of *prakṛti*, in contact with the insentient – that which is not the Self, and not the highest state. And we may note that even here this "latent impression" of *samāveśa* is strengthened (*upabṛṃhita*) by reasoning (*yukti*).[56]

In a similar vein at one place in his commentary on the *Netratantra* (*NT*) Kṣemarāja presents *samāveśa* as something which one practices with great effort (*prayatnena*); this effort consists of removing one's negative traits, greed, pride, jealousy and the like.[57] We can see how the tone of *samāveśa* has changed. The text of the *Netratantra* itself is an exposition describing how one attains a state like Śiva's and the process involves removing these negative traits. In this context Kṣemarāja introduces the word *samāveśa* and quotes half a verse of the *Bhagavadgītā*: *mayy āveśya mano ye māṃ nityayuktā upāsate*,[58] "Those who merge the mind in me, and worship me, constantly joined [to me]", assimilating this verse to *samāveśa* (as we earlier saw his teacher Abhinava do, cf. p. 499 above) to *samāveśa*. But here, unlike in Abhinavagupta, the implications of *samāveśa* are more overtly mundane, dealing with what for Patañjali would reach only to the first limb of *yoga*. And, we may note here that the Śiva whom one attains according to Kṣemarāja's commentary is *lokottara śiva*, a "Śiva beyond this world", in a word, transcendent.

If we compare this to Rāmakaṇṭha's commentary on this verse in the *Bhagavadgītā* we find that the sense of *āveśa* as immersion or possession is entirely ignored,[59] where Kṣemarāja makes a point of explicitly bringing up the subject. What we gather from all this is that *āveśa* and *samāveśa* were most likely a phenomenon associated with non-dualist circles. (After all, vegetarian Vaiṣṇavas do not get possessed!) Kṣemarāja needs to keep the term as support for and association with non-dualism, but wishes to refine it out of the reach of transgressive praxis.

Consequently, we may say that the image of transcendent immersion so prevalent in a number of contemporary scholars may to some extent be a product of Kṣemarāja's influence. Now by the time we reach Jayaratha, the issue of possession has to a certain degree become

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[54] *Pratyabhijñāhṛdaya* (*PH*) p. 91,8: *yatsamāveśasaṃskārabalāt pratipādayiṣyamāṇayuktikramopabṛṃhitāc cidaikātmyapratipattidārḍhyam avicalā*, *cidekatvaprathā*, *saiva jīvanmuktiḥ*.

[55] *SK* 8cd: *api tv ātmabalasparśāt puruṣas tatsamo bhavet*, "but rather from the strength of the contact with the Self the limited Subject becomes equal to that [non-dual principle of the Self]".

[56] Cf. *PH* p. 91,8, quoted in n. 54.

[57] *NT* 8.8, p. 63,8-9: *satatasamāveśaprayatnena pareṇa vairāgyeṇa dṛṣṭāgamikadharādyanāśritāntasamastabhogavaitṛṣṇyena ata eva rāgadveṣādisarvadoṣapraśamāc ca labhyate*.

[58] *NT* 8.8, p. 63,7; text emended here from *mayy āveśva*.

[59] For Rāmakaṇṭha *āveśa* merely has the sense of "having made that one arrives at, or falls into that" (*tatsamāpannaṃ kṛtvā* …) (*BhG* p. 266,9).

resolved, with regard to the highest state in any case. In his commentary on the *TĀ* Jayaratha writes:

> *śivas tu samāveśya eva iti na tatrāveśo 'sti tasya paramādvayasvabhāvatvāt, tadapekṣayā samāveśyasamāveśakalakṣaṇabhedānupapatteḥ*.[60]
>
> Śiva is only to be "entered"; there is no *āveśa* there because his natural state is supreme non-duality. Therefore it does not make sense to have this distinction between the one who is being entered and the agent who is entering (possessing) with regard to him.

Looking at Jayaratha's commentary here one begins to form a picture of how the passive transcendent meaning of *samāveśa* may have come to attain a certain ascendancy. It may be said that the tradition itself contributed part of the impetus to whittle away at this distinction between the active and passive senses of the verb √*viś*, based on a philosophical and political "refitting" of the term.

Conclusion

Now all of this is not merely an exercise in semantics. In the course of surveying the interpretations of the term *samāveśa* I hope that what has also emerged is the notion that a theology can appropriate a specific praxis, here via the term denoting it, and transform its meaning and no doubt to a certain extent transform the praxis as well. The political ramifications of this are salient. Especially it illustrates the need to look for contextual motives for understanding how knowledge is represented, indeed manipulated. With the subtle shift seen in Kṣemarāja the scale tips towards the transcendent.

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[60] *TĀ* commentary on verse 1.191, p. 224,13.

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4.7

BUDDHIST PHILOSOPHY

Tom Tillemans

Trying to be Fair to Mādhyamika Buddhism*

Is that all there is?
(Peggy Lee)

I think it is fair to say that people by and large perk up when they hear talk about Mādhyamika Buddhism, Nāgārjuna, Candrakīrti, ultimate truth and voidness in a way in which they do not when they are treated to a talk about Vinaya, Abhidharma or the *parārthānumāna* chapters in Dharmakīrti. I will spare you the detailled history of the school and its Western interpreters, but in a word the point is this: Mādhyamika, whether in the East or in the West, has been revered for its depth and has stimulated the best minds in Buddhism and in Buddhist Studies.

My focus in this paper is on some interesting and well informed contemporary critics of Mādhyamika, ones who have seen deviousness and fraudulence where most others saw depth. The first article in this direction was that of Richard Robinson, published in 1972, and entitled "Did Nāgārjuna Really Refute all Philosophical Views?"[1] For Robinson, the principal complaint was that Nāgārjuna and the Mādhyamika school were attributing to their opponents notions and positions to which these opponents themselves would never agree. The second major article was a follow-up to Robinson by Richard P. Hayes, "Nāgārjuna's Appeal,"[2] in which the author argued that not only did the Mādhyamika regularly misrepresent his opponent's positions and thus refute a man of straw, but his key arguments only appear to work because of a systematic equivocation upon the key polysemic term "intrinsic nature" (*svabhāva*). While Robinson saw a strategy of deliberate misrepresentation, Hayes added equivocation to the would-be sins of Nāgārjuna.[3]

That there would some time or another be a strong negative turn like this is to quite a degree understandable. After all, what could be more irritating to a good, serious, scholar than a general idolatry of a philosophy that seemed to him to be a series of bad arguments, misrepresentations and sloppy or deliberate plays on words. The temptation is great to buck the tide of exaggerated claims. Nonetheless, the Robinson–Hayes type of reaction is short on charity,

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* An earlier and longer version of this article on Mādhyamika was presented as a Numata Lecture and published by the University of Calgary's Department of Religious Studies. Let me, straight off, consecrate a few lines to a troublesome quibble: should the term be *Madhyamaka*, or *Mādhyamika*? In fact, the attempt to see the former as the word for the school of thought and the latter as the word for the adherents to this thought is, as Jacques May pointed out quite some time ago, not grounded in rigorous data from Sanskrit texts. The situation in Sanskrit is *not* parallel to that in Tibetan where *dbu ma* and *dbu ma pa* do respectively designate the philosophical system and its adherents. In short, although there is now a type of pedantic convention amongst modern writers to make such a distinction between the two Sanskrit terms, it is doubtful that there is much to recommend it. Even if *Madhyamaka* might be more of a designation of the system, *Mādhyamika* is attested for both, viz. the system and its adherents. See p. 472 in J. May, "Chūgan," *Hōbōgirin* V, Paris/Tokyo 1979, pp. 470-493.

[1] R.H. Robinson, "Did Nāgārjuna Really Refute all Philosophical Views?," *Philosophy East and West* 22 (1972): 325-331.

[2] Richard P. Hayes, "Nāgārjuna's Appeal," *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 22 (1994): 299-378.

[3] Cf. ibid., p. 325: "To the various fallacies and tricks brought to light by Robinson in his articles, we can now add the informal fallacy of equivocation as outlined above. That is, not only did Nāgārjuna use the term 'svabhāva' in ways that none of his opponents did, but he himself used it in several different senses at key points in his argument."

Karin Preisendanz (ed.), *Expanding and Merging Horizons*: *Contributions to South Asian and Cross-Cultural Studies in Commemoration of Wilhelm Halbfass*, Wien: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 2007, pp. 507-523.

leading to more heat than light. Worse, it is sometimes short on some potentially relevant information on the complicated points it treats. Indeed, as we shall see, the later Indian and Tibetan Mādhyamika scholastic had taken up some of the accusations similar to those which Robinson and Hayes are leveling and had some solutions that involved considerable ingenuity, and in some cases, I would argue, significant insights. I think it is clear that at least the impatient tone of Robinson's and Hayes' articles is unfair: the Mādhyamika philosopher is much, much less of an amateur, or to put it more strongly, he is less of a trickster or fraud, than Robinson and Hayes make him out to be.

It would be too involved and technical in the present context to undertake a detailed blow by blow analysis of the passages that these modern critics of the Mādhyamika cite. Nor fortunately do I think we need to do this, as I think we can get our points across with a reconstruction of some general strategies in this school's argumentation. But before we delve into that, it is worthwhile to point out that the argumentation is not *just* what should make or break this philosophy or other philosophies for us. Even if certain of the different sorts of arguments that we find in these Mādhyamika texts seem unconvincing to us, as they perhaps often do, it would nonetheless be a mistake to thereby dismiss Mādhyamika thought. To take a parallel, I think that many people, other than perhaps certain die-hard analytic philosophers, would think it strangely narrow to dismiss the philosophies of St. Thomas Aquinas or Descartes because of the unconvincingness of the Five Ways, the cogito or the ontological argument – it would be seen as narrow because somehow these philosophies are more than just those arguments, and involve a certain systematic vision, approach and method of thinking that is of interest and can be developed further, even if many of the actual arguments that St. Thomas and Descartes themselves gave might often leave us less than converted. It may be that someone formulates other arguments to arrive at essentially Thomistic or Cartesian conclusions. So I think it could be with Nāgārjuna and the Mādhyamika: even if certain of the reasonings which he gave in the third century would leave us somewhat puzzled in the twenty-first, the philosophic vision may well be of interest and could conceivably find support in arguments quite different from those of Nāgārjuna himself. I am not going to elaborate or invent such types of arguments, but I can imagine other people doing so. In short, I think the Mādhyamika should be of interest to contemporary scholars, because the system and philosophic vision should be of interest. On the most general level the Mādhyamika is trenchantly asking the question "What is a thing?," and this question, as well as the Mādhyamika's attempted answers, should be of interest to philosophers, be they analytic philosophers concerned with issues of realism and anti-realism, or so-called "continental" philosophers, such as the Heideggerians meditating on *Die Frage nach dem Ding*.

I

Our task at hand, however, is to try to help re-open the debate on Mādhyamika in a fairer way, and for that we need to dispel, to some degree at least, the accusations of sleight of hand and amateurism.

Clearly, the key term at stake here is *svabhāva*, intrinsic nature. Broadly speaking, a recurrent semantic feature of the term, whether in Mādhyamika or in other philosophies, is that *svabhāva* is something or some property which exists objectively and genuinely occurs in, or qualifies, certain things; it is thus to be contrasted with a mind-dependent appearance that is absent from, or fails to correspond to, the things themselves. Thus, to take the stock Indian example: when a striped rope is seen as a snake, the pseudo-snake that appears has no intrin-

sic nature and is not present in, or corresponding to, the striped rope. In the Mādhyamika texts we find this fundamental sense expressed in terms of designations and their bases: to say that something has an intrinsic nature and is not just a mere appearance or a mere designation (*prajñaptimātra*) due to language and thought, means that it withstands logical analysis and that it is findable or obtainable by reason in the "basis of designation." The pseudo-snake is obviously not findable anywhere in the striped rope – a fact which any worldling can verify – but if we switch to a more sophisticated level, that of ultimate analysis of the mode of being of things, then, according to the Mādhyamika, nothing is fully findable in its bases, and in that sense nothing has intrinsic nature.

Note that the formulation I have adopted in terms of *x* having a *svabhāva* implying that *x* and its properties are findable when one searches logically, or equivalently, that *x* and its properties have the ability to withstand logical analysis (*rigs pas dpyad bzod pa*), is not literally what occurs in the texts of Nāgārjuna himself. That said, the locution "ability to withstand logical analysis" and variants upon this terminology are prominently used by most major Indian Mādhyamika writers, who say that customary things exist for us only insofar as they are not analyzed (*avicārataḥ*), or to take the striking formulation of Śrīgupta and Atīśa, they are "satisfying [only] when not analyzed" (*avicāraramāṇiya*).[4] "Findable/obtainable/perceptible as existent under analysis" figures in such texts as, for example, *Madhyamakāvatāra* VI.160 where Candrakīrti discusses the so-called "sevenfold reasoning" (*rnam bdun gyi rigs pa*) and says that when *yogin*s analyze things, the latter are not found (*rnyed pa*) to exist as having any of the seven possible relationships to parts.[5] Thus, it is argued that under analysis wholes are neither identical with nor different from their parts, meaning that when we look for, or analyze, what we take to be the intrinsic nature of something like a cart in terms of possible part–whole relations, we come up empty handed: we don't find (obtain/perceive) any coherent, unassailable, version of what this cart or its cartness could be. And in that sense, we do not find (obtain/perceive) any real thing: the customary cart only exists unanalyzed. In short, these ways of interpreting Nāgārjuna are probably present in one way or another in all the important currents of Indian Mādhyamika philosophy and especially so in the later Indian Mādhyamika works, such as those of Candrakīrti, Jñānagarbha, Śrīgupta, Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla. There is a quasi-consensus amongst commentators on this matter of Mādhyamika philosophy being about unfindability under analysis, and I see no reason to deny that, on this very broad characterization at least, they may well have gotten Nāgārjuna pretty much right.

As we shall discuss shortly, Richard Hayes also focused on something like this sense of *svabhāva*, but instead of speaking of it being a type of analytically findable identity or intrinsic nature, he spoke of it as being identity *simpliciter*. Thus, for him this usage of *svabhāva*

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[4] See e.g., *Prasannapadā* p. 67,7 (ed. Louis de La Vallée Poussin, Bibliotheca Buddhica IV): *naitad evam | laukike vyavahāra ithaṃvicārāpravṛtter avicārataś ca laukikapadārthānām astitvāt.* "No, it is not so, for in the world this type of analysis does not operate with regard to transactional usage, and entities for the world exist [only] from a non-analytic point of view." See also ibid., p. 71, n. 1a. On the term *avicāraramaṇiya* and Jñānagarbha's emphasis on non-analysis (*avicāra*), see pp. 42 and 138 in M.D. Eckel, *Jñānagarbha on the Two Truths*: *An Eighth Century Handbook of Madhyamaka Philosophy*, Delhi 1992.

[5] *Madhyamakāvatāra* VI.160ab (ed. L. de La Vallée Poussin, Petersburg 1912): *rnam bdun gyis med gang de ji lta bur | yod ces rnal 'byor pas 'di'i yod mi rnyed.* It is not clear what the Sanskrit corresponding to *rnyed pa* is here, but it is likely to be *labdha*, as it is in VI.23, or possibly *prāpta* / *upalabdha.* The basic idea of things being fundamentally unfindable (*na labdhaḥ* / *labdhāḥ*) is already present in the *Samādhirājasūtra* 32.96 (ed. P.L. Vaidya, Darbhanga 1961 [Buddhist Sanskrit Texts 2]): *dharmo na labdho buddhena yasya saṁjñā utpadyate* "The Buddha has not found any dharma of which a notion arises."

meant just what something is, its identity, as opposed to what it is not, its difference from other things.[6] This is not far from accurate as an account, but nonetheless lacks a very important feature in Mādhyamika contexts. The term *svabhāva* can indeed mean identity, what something is – as for example in Abhidharma texts or when Mādhyamikas themselves endorse the generally recognized verity that fire has the *svabhāva* of heat – but it is always more than that in the polemical contexts where it is being refuted by the Mādhyamika. In those contexts, it is an identity that withstands analysis, that is hence real and not just customary; it is consistent and does not dissolve into contradictions when subjected to logical analysis. This is why I prefer to speak of this sense of *svabhāva* as an "analytically findable intrinsic nature," or "analytically findable identity," thus bringing out the fact that the Mādhyamika is arguing against *real* identity, what something really is. In their polemical attributions of *svabhāva* to "realists," or advocates of "real entities" (*bhāva*), the Mādhyamikas always take this *svabhāva* as involving a reification, a misguided attempt to confer some sort of an ultimate status to things, a *bhāvasvabhāva.* As I shall try to show below, this idea that realists, and indeed we ourselves, are constantly engaged in reification, i.e., a type of distorting projection, is the thread which ties the would-be double use of the term *svabhāva* together. However, before we get to that, let us very briefly look at Nāgārjuna's own use of *svabhāva*.

In Chapter XV of his most important work, the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā*s, Nāgārjuna develops another use of "intrinsic nature," a use which, prima facie at least, might seem different from that which we have termed "analytically findable identity." In the first two verses he speaks instead of an intrinsic nature as something which "cannot arise due to causes and conditions" (*na saṃbhavaḥ svabhāvasya yuktaḥ pratyayahetubhiḥ*) and as that which is "not fabricated and is not dependent on anything else" (*akṛtrimaḥ svabhāvo hi nirapekṣaḥ paratra ca*).[7] It is then this sense that Robinson would take as the point of departure for his critique, arguing that Nāgārjuna foists upon his innocent opponent an acceptance of an absurd and self-contradictory *svabhāva* (After all, would anyone actually acknowledge that things are independent of causes and conditions?) and proceeds to an all-too-easy refutation of his opponent by saying that *this* cannot exist.[8] Equally it is this second sense of *svabhāva* that Hayes would seize upon to show that the Mādhyamika arguments' seeming persuasiveness will evaporate when we diagnose the equivocations between the first and second senses of *svabhāva*. Let us term these two aspects, intrinsic-nature-as-findable-identity and intrinsic-nature-as-independent-existence.[9] As I had mentioned earlier, Hayes spoke of the first sense as identity *simpliciter*, but it is worth our while to stress that what it is is actually a type of *analytically findable* identity, or analytically findable intrinsic nature. So I will deliberately take the liberty of modifying Hayes' formulation a bit and add the qualification of "findability" to identity.

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[6] Hayes, op. cit. (cf. n. 2), at pp. 305 and 311.

[7] A similar statement concerning *svabhāva* being independent is also to be found in Candrakīrti's *ṭīkā* to verse 288 of the twelfth chapter of Āryadeva's *Catuḥśataka*: *tatrātmā nāma bhāvānāṃ yo 'parāyattasvarūpasvabhāvaḥ* "There, what is called *ātman* ("self", "identity"), is entities' intrinsic nature (*svabhāva*), the essence (*svarūpa*) that does not depend on anything else." See T. Tillemans, *Materials for the Study of Āryadeva*, *Dharmapāla and Candrakīrti*, Vienna 1990, p. 126.

[8] See Robinson, op. cit. (cf. n. 1), p. 326.

[9] Hayes' terms are respectively *svabhāva* 1 "identity" and *svabhāva* 2 "causal independence"; cf. Hayes, op. cit. (cf. n. 2), p. 312.

Now, I think that it is quite clear that Nāgārjuna himself made a conscious attempt to fuse these two would-be separate aspects of *svabhāva* in some sort of mutually implicative relationship. In his *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* XVIII.10, we find:

> *pratītya yad bhavati na hi tāvat tad eva tat* |
> *na cānyad api tat tasmān nocchinnaṃ nāpi śāśvatam* ||
>
> Whatever *x* exists in dependence [upon *y*], that *x* is not identical to *y*, nor is it other than *y*. Therefore it is neither eliminated nor eternal.

The passage is in effect stating that whatever exists dependently – i.e., whatever lacks independent existence – also lacks findable identity, for being a findable identity means, according to Nāgārjuna, that one should be able to say rationally, in a way that stands up to analysis, that a thing is either identifiable with or is something different from the things it depends upon. In short: if *x* and *y* are dependent, they do not have independent existence; if they do not have independent existence, they do not have a findable identity. And if this "if ... then" paraphrase of Nāgārjuna's verse is right, it follows by applications of *modus tollens* that whatever *x* and *y* have findable identity must also have independent existence, and will not be dependent on anything. The route from findability to independence is thus short and sweet: for Nāgārjuna, a findable identity entails independence. If we add the term "intrinsic nature," it looks like the following entailment holds for Nāgārjuna: intrinsic-nature-as-findable-entity entails intrinsic-nature-as-independent-existence.

There is another famous passages in the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā*s that rather clearly supports our contention that Nāgārjuna himself saw a link between findability and independence and thus between the two aspects of the semantic range of the supposedly equivocal term, *svabhāva.* This is the extremely well known verse XXIV.18, which makes a series of equivalences or mutual implications, including one between being dependent and being something just simply designated by the mind on the basis of other things, especially its parts:

> *yaḥ pratītyasamutpādaḥ śūnyatāṃ tāṃ pracakṣmahe* |
> *sā prajñaptir upādāya pratipat saiva madhyamā* ||
>
> Dependent arising, that we declare to be voidness. This [voidness] is [equivalent to] being a designation in dependence. And it [i.e., voidness] is precisely the middle way.

Without going into a detailed exegesis of this rich and complex verse, we can fairly readily see that an attempt is once again being made to connect the concepts of dependence and unfindability, or equally, findability and independence. Being a designation in dependence upon something else has to be understood as being just a designation by thought and language and no more (*prajñaptimātra*): the thing in question cannot be found if we subject it to analysis. What is dependent, then, is unfindable under analysis. Note that characterizing all things as dependently arising and as being mere designations also highlights the primordial role of the cognizing mind that is responsible for something being such and such: these "designations" are "mere designations" in that they are mentally created without being somehow "out there" in the object.

We will come back to the type of argumentation strategies used by Nāgārjuna, but in any case I think we already should have an inkling that a relatively natural reading of Nāgārjuna is to take him as accepting a very close link between the two aspects of *svabhāva*. In fact, I strongly suspect that the link is not just a conditional in one direction, but is rather a biconditional, i.e., *x* has independent existence *if and only if* *x* is analytically findable. Besides findability under analysis implying independence, it looks to me that Nāgārjuna would also accept the converse, i.e., that if something were to be of a genuinely independent intrinsic na-

ture (viz., independent of causes, parts, and even the minds that designate it), it would have to be somehow findable under analysis – for example, as something completely distinct from parts or from any kind of causal history, and present in an object independently of the mental processes of designation. It would be a genuine absolute completely other than the relative. The candidates for this sort of absolute would be things like *nirvāṇa* or the "unconditioned" (*asaṃskṛta*), and it is not surprising that Nāgārjuna subjects them to a trenchant critique of unfindability under analysis. In short, it looks like, for Nāgārjuna at least, findability under analysis and independence are two equivalent, mutually implicative, notions. If we say that sometimes the use of the term *svabhāva* seems to highlight one aspect and sometimes the other, that does not mean that the term *svabhāva* is thereby equivocal: we may well have two ways to unpack one and the same concept. If that is right, then the minimum result of our discussion up to this point is that it should begin to look rather doubtful that Nāgārjuna is guilty of the gross equivocation of which he is accused by Hayes. He may perhaps have been wrong, he may have even done something which we cannot easily follow, but he did not just simply play, amateurishly or cunningly, on two different senses.

II

A few words about Robinson's paper and the charge that the Mādhyamika pursued a sophistical strategy of misrepresenting his opponents as accepting an absurd and contradictory notion of *svabhāva*. Robinson had argued: "The validity of Nāgārjuna's refutations hinges upon whether his opponents really upheld the existence of a *svabhāva* or *svabhāva* as he defines the term."[10]

He then proceeded to survey the various opponents' positions to see whether "Nāgārjuna succeed[s] in refuting all views without making any assumptions that are not conceded by the adherents of the particular view under attack."[11] I will not evaluate the actual list of "axioms" that Robinson attributes to the Mādhyamika himself and their non-acceptance by the Mādhyamika's opponents, as fortunately we need not enter into the details of this rather complicated picture. I would maintain that the accuracy of those details is in any case a secondary debate – what is significant for us here is Robinson's general line of argument that the Mādhyamika philosopher is just practicing sleight of hand *because* he attributes to his opponents things they do not accept.

Now, I think we would have to say that it would be quite unfair to accuse Nāgārjuna of deliberate misrepresentation *simply* because he attributed to his opponent things that the same opponent would reject, even vociferously. Certainly if an opponent did not recognize something attributed to him, that in itself would not necessarily mean that he was misrepresented, for it is a natural and even inevitable part of many genuinely philosophical debates between truth-seekers that at some point one group says what the other actually thinks, or what they must think if they are to remain consistent with their own basic principles. Of course, there are good and bad, fair and unfair, ways to do this, but the simple fact of one party adopting such a move in a debate does not in itself mean that it is misrepresenting the other or playing, what Robinson calls, a type of sophistical "shell game."

The issue can be reformulated: Is the Mādhyamika then himself being fair to his opponent, and (often or mostly) doing truth-seeking philosophy, or is he just playing at disingenuous

[10] Robinson, op. cit. (cf. n. 1), p. 326.
[11] Ibid., p. 327.

and sophistical shell games? I think the texts would tend to back mostly the former view, even if the dichotomy is a little simplistic and the line that we want to draw between truth-seeking and sophistry is often shaded. In any case, Mādhyamikas, or at least many Mādhyamikas, were quite aware that misrepresentation was a charge *they* had to answer, and they tried to answer it (as far I can see) with sincerity. Of course, it might be that they were in the long run unsatisfying in their answers, but it is very hard to agree that they were just performing a *trompe l'oeil* or deliberately setting up their opponent with facile self-contradictions. For example, the eighth century Indian writer Kamalaśīla, in his *Madhyamakāloka*, was confronted with the objection that his opponents would not themselves acknowledge the logical reasons which the Mādhyamika was using, and that therefore the reasons would be "unestablished" (*asiddhahetu*). He replied with rather detailed arguments showing that his adversaries *would have to accept* the reason, in spite of their vociferous denials, because it was entailed by other propositions that they did explicitly accept. The tactic of argumentation is clear and figures repeatedly in the discussion of the "neither one nor many" argument (*ekānekaviyogahetu*) in the *Madhyamakāloka*, from folio 215b to 218a in the sDe dge edition (henceforth "D.").[12] Indeed, Kamalaśīla systematically takes up the objections of numerous sorts of Buddhist and non-Buddhists who argue that they have been misrepresented by the Mādhyamika who alleges that things *they* accept (i.e., God, atoms, space, consciousness, etc.) are neither single entities nor several different entities (and are hence unreal). Kamalaśīla's reply is always the same: the adversary accepts by implication, or has in fact accepted (*shugs kyis na khas blangs pa nyid*; *khas blangs pa kho na*), that the pseudo-entity to which he subscribes is neither one thing nor many different things, because he accepts such and such a property of this entity and that property in fact implies being neither one nor many. The key Tibetan term *shugs kyis na* that is used here probably translated a Sanskrit original term along the lines of *sāmarthyāt*, "indirectly," "by implication." One example passage from *Madhyamakāloka* should suffice to show how such "acceptance by implication" works:

> *gang dag gis lus la sogs pa rdul phran bsags pa tsam yin pa'i phyir rdul phra rab rnams so so re re gcig pa nyid du kun brtags pa de dag gis kyang sbyor ba dang bsags pa sogs pa'i chos su khas blangs pa'i phyir shugs kyis na gcig pa nyid dang bral pa nyid kyang khas blangs pa kho na yin te* |.
>
> Those who imagine that each atom individually is one thing since the body and other such [gross objects] are just simply collections of atoms, do in fact also accept by implication that [the atoms] lack oneness, for they accept that [the atoms] have properties (*chos*) such as being junctions or collections [of parts].[13]

Nor should it be thought that this use of "acceptance by implication," or perhaps more simply "implicit acceptance," was an occasional flash in the pan of one Indian thinker – it looks to me to be a more or less basic Indo-Tibetan Mādhyamika argument strategy. In Tibet, the same basic general method of attributing positions by implication was often known as presenting what the "opponent's position ends up being" (*khas len pa'i mthar thug pa*), or less literally, "the upshot" of his views. One also finds in certain texts the related notion *rigs pas 'phul ba*, "imposing [a principle] through logical reasoning" or *'phul mtshams kyi rigs pa*, literally translated as a "logical reasoning which imposes a limit." Interestingly enough, although the term *'phul mtshams* is not, to my knowledge, found in any dictionary, including the three volume *Tibetan–Tibetan–Chinese Dictionary*, or *Bod rgya tshig mdzod chen mo*, and is a bit difficult for me to translate satisfactorily, a quick search of the *Asian Classics*

[12] = Peking edition f. 238b-241a.

[13] sDe dge edition f. 216a-b.

Input Project data base of Tibetan collected works (*gsung 'bum*), reveals that *'phul mtshams* occurs eighty-two times – if we were to add the variants like *rigs pas 'phul*, *'phul nus pa'i rigs pa*, etc., we would be into hundreds of occurrences, largely in later commentaries, but also occasionally in Tsong kha pa's works, like his *dBu ma dgongs pa rab gsal* on Candrakīrti's *Madhyamakāvatāra*. It seems to have escaped lexicographers, and so it escaped western researchers on Mādhyamika too. That said, I have the impression that it was, and still is, more or less common knowledge amongst monks. Indeed, this technique of logically imposing principles upon recalcitrant opponents was, according to the late dGe bshes rTa mgrin Rab brtan, essential in actual dGe lugs pa monastic debates on Mādhyamika and was typically used when someone wanted to show that having an intrinsic nature, or equivalently "being truly established" (*bden par grub pa*), or being truly established as such and such a thing, would imply its being such and such in "complete independence from everything whatsoever" (*gang la'ang bltos med*).[14] In fact, this implication of complete independence from causes, parts and also from the cognizing mind, is amply attested in the texts and is not just an oral tradition. It figures, for example, in an extract from Sera Chos kyi rgyal mtshan's *sKabs dang po'i spyi don* that I translated a number of years ago.[15] I think the implication in question is a compactly formulated version of the principle that we were stressing earlier in looking at the two verses from Nāgārjuna, viz. that findability under analysis, or findable identity, implies complete independence. What is noteworthy in the present context is that this implication, according to experienced debaters like dGe bshes Rab brtan, is known as a case of *rigs pas 'phul ba*. Of course, it would supposedly hold whether the opponent liked it or not – his protests would just be grounds for more debate, a debate which could, nevertheless, be quite sincere and truth-seeking.

III

Let us now take up anew the problem of the link between findability and independence. While it should be clear that the Mādhyamika, with his strategy of implications, upshots and imposed principles, is probably a much more sophisticated and interesting philosopher than Robinson and Hayes made him out to be, his use of these implications between findable identity and independence is a particularly important step and is a hard one to fathom. Perhaps at some point much further down the road we might come to the conclusion that we should give up on it all and go back to detecting misrepresentations, equivocation and other forms of sloppy thinking. But I think that Robinson and Hayes were far too quick in taking that step. So, how does the link work? If we grant, as I think we should, that Mādhyamikas were not cunningly equivocating on *svabhāva* and misrepresenting their opponents, then how did *they* think that the seeming gap between findability and independence should be bridged?

There is unfortunately no quick answer. To arrive at a charitable interpretation of Mādhyamika thought that would start to answer that question, we need to be clearer on how the mass of seemingly diverse arguments in Mādhyamika might work together. I can see at least three types of argument strategies that are relevant to us in this context, all three present in varying

[14] I had the privilege of being dGe bshes rTa mgrin Rab brtan's student for a number of years in the 1970's and early 1980's and often had arguments with him where I presented my own Robinson-like objections.

[15] T. Tillemans, "Two Tibetan Texts on the 'Neither One Nor Many' Argument for *śūnyatā*," *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 12 (1984): 357-388. See especially p. 364 (text f. 26a6): *khyab ste | bden grub kyi gcig yin na gang la'ang bltos med kyi gcig yin dgos | de yin na cha bcas ma yin dgos pa'i phyir |* "The entailment holds because if anything were to be truly one, it would have to be one [thing] which does not depend on anything [else] whatsoever, and in such a case it could not have parts."

degrees in Mādhyamika texts, although for the purposes of this paper I will have to be brief and concentrate on broad outlines rather than on the detailed exegesis of specific textual passages. Here are the three:

(a) a selective use of pan-Indian philosophical debates
(b) etymological and purely semantic arguments
(c) non-obvious facts about our mental-makeup and way of seeing the world.

We first turn to what I am calling "the selective use of pan-Indian philosophical debates." A good example of this is to be found in Dharmapāla's commentary on Āryadeva's *Catuḥśataka*, where this sixth-century Vijñānavāda commentator on Mādhyamika examines the possibility of vision and other sensory experiences, and embarks on a detailed analysis whether or not the subtle matter of the eye has contact with its object.[16] The problem thus is whether or not the senses act at a distance. This is a bona fide pan-Indian debate, known as the problem of *prāpyakāritvavāda* ("action by contact") and *aprāpyakāritvavāda* ("action without contact"), and interestingly enough Dharmapāla accepts the critique of each side against the other.[17] This acceptance of the absurdities raised by both sides means that the Mādhyamika can then move to the desired conclusion that all possibilities of genuine vision are riddled with faults and that it is hence impossible that people do really see anything. For Dharmapāla, Āryadeva's end was best served by showing that both sides of the debate were untenable – the two adversaries' refutations were both accepted, with the result that the matter in question was shown to be without intrinsic nature, that is, inconsistent and unable to resist a thorough examination, and hence unfindable under analysis.

We see a similar strategy at work in the Mādhyamika arguments on causality, e.g., whether effects and causes are essentially identical or different. Causality was regularly examined in terms of two alternatives, *satkāryavāda* and *asatkāryavāda*, or the "theory of the effect existing or not existing [at the time of the cause]" – predictably Nāgārjuna's conclusion is that neither alternative is possible.[18] We also see this use of pan-Indian themes in Nāgārjuna's use of the recurring controversy on parts (*avayava*) and wholes (*avayavin*), i.e., whether parts are identical to or different from wholes, or whether wholes are somehow more or less real than parts. Here too the conclusion is that none of the alternatives are satisfactory, and yet if something genuinely had intrinsic nature it would have to fit in with one of the two possible positions. The conclusion is immediate: no intrinsic nature.

What is noteworthy for us is that this peculiar type of acceptance of both sides' refutations in pan-Indian controversies *does* make for a bridge between intrinsic-nature-as-independent-existence and intrinsic-nature-as-findable-identity. In *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* XVIII.10, cited above (cf. p. 511), we saw that when *x* was dependent on *y*, the two were neither genuinely identical nor different; at least following Candrakīrti's interpretation in the *Prasannapadā*, the argument turns on the *satkāryavāda–asatkāryavāda* debate: the cause would be neither the same nor different from the effect. *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* XXIV.18, it will be

[16] See pp. 156-159 and nn. 290 and 299 in Vol. I of Tillemans, op. cit. (cf. n. 7).

[17] On the general outlines of this debate in Indian philosophy, see chapter XVIII in S. Mookherjee, *The Buddhist Philosophy of Universal Flux*, Delhi 1980.

[18] There are several arguments involved here involving fairly clearly discernible pan-Indian controversies invoking widely accepted principles, often from grammatical analysis. For example, my colleague, Johannes Bronkhorst, has traced how Nāgārjuna used a certain pan-Indian preoccupation concerning the correspondence between words and things to argue that statements like "X causes Y" or "X makes Y" cannot resist analysis, because the effect Y does not yet exist at the time of X. See J. Bronkhorst, *Langage et réalité*: *Sur un épisode de la pensée indienne*, Turnhout 1999.

recalled, made a linkage between being dependent and being a mere designation (*prajñaptimātra*), that is to say, between dependence and being unanalyzable, unfindable. Here Candrakīrti explicitly glosses the verse in terms of the problem of parts and wholes – everything has parts and is dependent upon parts, but cannot be found as the same or different from the parts.

Whether it is causality or part–whole problems that are at stake, the Mādhyamika very often relies upon the same type of argumentation strategy: use one side of a pan-Indian debate off against the other to show that dependence will imply not being findable, and thus show that findability entails independence. If things were dependent *and* findable under analysis, then the cause and effect relationship would be either along the lines of *satkāryavāda* or *asatkāryavāda*, but it is neither of the two; therefore things cannot be both dependent and findable. Similarly for parts and wholes: if things were dependent and findable, then they would be identical or different from their parts; but they are neither; therefore they are not both dependent and findable. The linkage between dependence and being unfindable is thus made by means of an implicit three-step argument:

1. For things to be both dependent and findable under analysis would imply a solution to major pan-Indian debates such as those concerning parts and wholes and causality.
2. These debates have no such solution.
3. Ergo dependence and findability are incompatible and cannot both be asserted.

In sum, if things are dependent, they cannot be findable under analysis; their findability entails their independence from causes, parts and all other factors.

The second approach, i.e., etymologies and semantics, is what one finds in the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā*s' chapter XV on *svabhāva*, and especially in Candrakīrti's exegesis upon this chapter in the *Prasannapadā.* It is the type of argumentation where the Mādhyamika says that if something has *svabhāva*, the word *svabhāva* is to be analyzed as meaning that the thing has its own being, i.e., *svo bhāvaḥ*. Equally, in the world, to say that a property is the *svabhāva* of something is to say that it is "natural," "innate," "intrinsic," and is not "fabricated" by extraneous causal facts, just like heat is said by the world to be an intrinsic nature of fire but not of water (because when we boil water the heat has to be brought in "from the outside"). While an adequate treatment of the use of semantic arguments in Mādhyamika texts would take us much too far afield here, for our purposes now we can probably skirt the detailed textual exegesis. What is to be stressed is that the semantic approach in arguments like the one about fire, water and heat is probably best viewed as providing no more than approximate illustrations and analogies, but not rigorous probative demonstrations about *svabhāva*'s complete independence. Indeed Candrakīrti himself, in the *Prasannapadā*, goes on to stress that actually the heat, because it *is* causally dependent, does *not* have intrinsic nature for the Mādhyamika at all, and he thereby acknowledges rather clearly the approximate and merely illustrative aspect to his discussion about fire, water and heat.[19] Not only that, but in stressing the limits of the fire–heat case, he suggests that what constitutes the intrinsic nature

[19] See *Prasannapadā* p. 260,9-10: *tad evam akṛtakaḥ svabhāva iti lokavyavahāre vyavasthite vayam idānīṃ brūmo yad etad auṣṇyaṃ tad apy agneḥ svabhāvo na bhavatīti gṛhyatāṃ kṛtakatvāt* | "So, thus, when in the world's transactional usage it is established that intrinsic nature is what is not produced [i.e., fabricated], we now assert that it should be understood that heat is not the intrinsic nature of fire either, for it is produced [from causes and conditions]." Cf. also the discussion of this and other uses of *svabhāva* in Chapter XV developed by J.W. de Jong, "Le problème de l'absolu dans l'école mādhyamika," *Revue philosophique* 140 (1950): 322-327; "The Problem of the Absolute in the Madhyamaka School," *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 2 (1972): 1-6.

that he and other Mādhyamikas are refuting is not just the worldly conception of a natural, innate, or intrinsic property like fire's heat, but something more subtle and radical, in that it involves *complete* independence. It may be approximately illustrated by reference to the ordinary worldly notion of nature with its partial independence from certain types of (extraneous) causes, but it is not the same as that notion because it goes much further in its independence. Similarly for the etymological argument about *svo bhāvaḥ*, which immediately precedes the fire–water–heat analogy: this too is explicitly recognized by Candrakīrti to be showing how "it is established, for the world, that intrinsic nature is not a fabricated entity."[20] It is at most indirectly illustrating the type of *svabhāva* which the Mādhyamika is attacking. But once again, that latter *svabhāva* is something rather special and is not simply identifiable with the ordinary notion of intrinsic nature with which the world is familiar.[21]

Finally, the third strategy, viz., invoking non-obvious facts about our mental make-up and way of conceiving the world, is arguably what pins down better the interpretation of the first two as involving a subtle sense of intrinsic nature. An extremely important feature of Mādhyamika philosophy is that it depends heavily on the idea of the Mādhyamika refuting our "superimpositions" (*samāropa*), i.e., our inveterate tendencies to distort the world by systematically imposing upon it "intrinsic natures." *svabhāva* is thus a false projection upon otherwise innocuous objects of our customary world that do not have such *svabhāva*, and the task of the Mādhyamika is to refute these projections, but not the customary world itself. This key emphasis on distinguishing subtle "superimpositions" (*samāropa*) of intrinsic nature from the otherwise innocuous customary world of ordinary objects is to be found in texts of Candrakīrti, Jñānagarbha, Kamalaśīla, and many others, and perhaps even in those of Nāgārjuna himself, at least if we believe the commentators. To take a passage from Jñānagarbha's *Satyadvayavibhaṅgavṛtti* (D. f. 12a-b):

> *gzugs la sogs pa'i lus rtog pa'i nyes pas ma sbags pa gzhan gyi dbang gi bdag nyid rnam par shes pa tsam snang ba dgag par mi nus pa 'ba' zhig tu ma zad kyi | byed na byed pa po la mngon sum la sogs pas phyir gnod pa kho na byed do ||.*
>
> We cannot negate physical things, such as visible matter and the like, which are untainted by conceptualization's corruptions, are of a dependent nature, and which are appearances to simple [non-conceptual] cognition. Not only is this impossible, but if we did [negate such things] then the person who performed [this negation] would in fact be subsequently refuted by direct perception (*pratyakṣa*) and other [valid cognitions].

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[20] *Prasannapadā* p. 260,5: *kṛtakaḥ padārthaḥ sa loke naiva svabhāva iti vyapadiśyate*.

[21] It is also worth noting that what the Mādhyamika is arguing against is *not* simply the notion of an "intrinsic property" as it figures in certain articles in contemporary western analytic philosophy. Compare Stephan Yablo's intuitive characterization: "You know what an intrinsic property is: it's a property that a thing has (or lacks) regardless of what may be going on outside of itself"' (p. 479 in S. Yablo, "Intrinsicness," *Philosophical Topics* 26 [1999]: 479-505). Cf. also I.L. Humberstone, "Intrinsic/Extrinsic," *Synthèse* 108 (1996): 205-267. See the summary of these views in B. Weatherson, "Intrinsic vs. Extrinsic Properties," *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/intrinsic-extrinsic, 2002. One of the ways of distinguishing intrinsic and extrinsic, i.e., that of Brian Ellis (Humberstone, op. cit., p. 206), is suggestive of Candrakīrti's fire–heat–water case: intrinsic properties are those which an object has independently of any outside forces acting on them and extrinsic are those the object has because of outside forces. Cf. also J.M. Dunn, "Relevant Predication 2: Intrinsic Properties and Internal Relations," *Philosophical Studies* 60 (1990): 177-206. On p. 178 Dunn writes: "Metaphysically, an intrinsic property of an object is a property that the object has by virtue of itself, depending on no other thing." In any case, it should be clear that when *these* authors are speaking of no dependence on outside forces, other things, etc., they are *not* saying that an intrinsic property (e.g., an object's mass or atomic composition) is completely independent of any and all factors, like its own causes that brought it into being, its parts, etc., etc.

Compare Kamalaśīla in the *Madhyamakāloka* (D. f. 180a):

> *des na dngos po rnams kyi ngo bo nyid kun rdzob pa la yang gnod pa ni mi byed kyi | 'on kyang de la bden pa'i rnam pa nyid du sgro btags pa sel ba'i phyir rab tu sgrub par byed pa kho na yin no* ||.
>
> We do not invalidate the customary natures of entities, but instead just prove [the absence of real intrinsic nature] in order to exclude what is superimposed upon the [customary entities] as their aspect of being true (*bden pa'i rnam pa*).

Finally, Candrakīrti also stressed that there had to be an all-important distinction between things and the "intrinsic nature" (*svarūpa* = *svabhāva*) of things. Cf. *Prasannapadā* p. 58,10-11:

> *tasmād anutpannā bhāvā ity evaṃ tāvad viparītasvarūpādhyāropapratipakṣeṇa prathamaprakaraṇārambhaḥ | idānīṃ kvacid yaḥ kaścid viśeṣo 'dhyāropitas tadviśeṣāpākaraṇārthaṃ śeṣaprakaraṇārambhaḥ | gantṛgantavyagamanādiko 'pi niravaśeṣo viśeṣo nāsti pratītyasamutpādasyeti pratipādanārtham* ||.
>
> Thus, when [Nāgārjuna] says "entities do not arise" in this way first of all [it is pointed out that] the initial chapter [of the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā*s] was written as a counter to superimpositions of false intrinsic natures; and then that the remaining chapters were written in order to eliminate whatever distinctions are superimposed anywhere; the [passage] is designed to show that dependent arising has absolutely no distinctions at all like goers, places to be gone over and going, etc.

Some remarks. First, all three authors regularly speak in one way or another of superimpositions, be they superimposed intrinsic natures (*svabhāva*, *svarūpa*), distinctions (*viśeṣa*), aspects (*ākāra*) – the differences are essentially those of wording. That said, Kamalaśīla's words, "what is superimposed upon the [customary entities] as their aspect of being true (*bden pa'i rnam pa*)," take on special significance because they show that this superimposition is a *reification*, a way of taking the ordinary as being much more real, consistent, and resistant to analysis than it is. Second, in a recent article, "On *samāropa*," Teruyoshi Tanji says quite rightly about the passage cited from the *Prasannapadā*:

> ... Candrakīrti asserts that, strictly speaking, the effect of *samāropa* is not a thing but the own-being [i.e., intrinsic nature] of a thing, as he observes that ... [*tasmād anutpannā bhāvā ity ... pratipādanārtham*]. This observation [i.e., the passage in *Prasannapadā* p. 58,10-11], being the summary of the subjects of the chapters in the MMK [i.e., *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā*s], expresses aptly the core of Candrakīrti's philosophy of emptiness. It is so important and cardinal that the meaning of all the other statements in his commentary ought to be estimated by way of meeting the view of this observation.[22]

I agree fully. In brief: at least for Jñānagarbha, Kamalaśīla and Candrakīrti, refuting superimpositions (i.e., reifications of things rather than customary things themselves) is what Mādhyamika thought is essentially about.[23] Mādhyamikas would thus refute superimposed ver-

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[22] P. 353 in T. Tanji, "On *samāropa*. Probing the Relationship of the Buddha's Silence and His Teaching," in J. Silk (ed.), *Wisdom*, *Compassion*, *and the Search for Understanding*: *The Buddhist Studies Legacy of Gadjin M. Nagao*, Honolulu 2000, pp. 347-368. See also our remarks on Tanji's article in our review in *The Eastern Buddhist* 33/1 (2001): 181-185.

[23] One way to arrive at a more or less similar interpretation of Nāgārjuna as refuting superimposed reifications is to say that the Mādhyamika tetralemma (*catuṣkoṭi*) is refuting propositions implicitly or explicitly qualified by an operator "ultimately," but is not attacking unqualified propositions. Thus, e.g., Nāgārjuna would be refuting "Ultimately, such and such is the case," but not the simple statement "Such and such is the case." See p. 197 in T. Tillemans, *Scripture*, *Logic and Language*: *Essays on Dharmakīrti and his Tibetan Successors. Studies in Indian and Tibetan Buddhism 1*, Boston 1999. Cf. C. Oetke, "Remarks on the Interpretation of Nāgārjuna's Philosophy," *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 19 (1991): 315-323, where we are advised (p. 318) to inter-

sions of causes, parts, wholes, people, things, what have you, but not the causes, parts, wholes, etc., themselves upon which the superimpositions are made. It is here, in the reliance upon the contrast between superimpositions and the ordinary, that we see clearly that the *svabhāva* which the Mādhyamika is refuting is not just an ordinary and familiar property or nature like heat, impermanence, being blue, etc. – it can and should be distinguished (albeit with difficulty) from ordinary things. The result, however, of it not being identifiable with ordinary things is that it is non-obvious as to what it is.

In fact, while it seems clear that we must see Candrakīrti, Kamalaśīla and other commentators as recommending an interpretation of Nāgārjuna as refuting superimpositions, it is considerably less clear if Nāgārjuna himself is to be read that way. It could be argued that his reasoning does not have anything to do with superimpositions at all and simply targets the ordinary things themselves, showing that, if analyzed, the latter are seen to just exist erroneously and only for benighted worldlings. This is certainly a way in which people (e.g., those of a Jo nang pa inspiration) have taken Mādhyamika thought, viz., that the point of this philosophy is to show that customary things themselves are just "void of themselves" (*rang stong*) and only "exist from the perspective of mistaken consciousness" (*rnam shes 'khrul ba'i ngor yod pa*);[24] it also finds a type of confirmation in the recurrent Buddhist image of the customary world being just like the hairs and other such hallucinations that appear to people suffering from opthalmia (*timira*). I will not delve into the problem of how to eliminate this way of reading Nāgārjuna, if indeed it can be eliminated at all. I personally am increasingly skeptical about current attempts to say in meaningful philosophical terms what Nāgārjuna *himself* really meant apart from how he was interpreted: at the end of the day we may well come to Paul Griffiths' conclusion that Nāgārjuna's texts, by themselves, straight without a commentarial chaser, may be simply too indeterminate to answer philosophers' questions about their precise meaning.[25] In any case, all I wish to claim is that historically the way of reading Nāgārjuna's philosophy as a refutation of superimpositions was very well attested and was explicitly promoted by major commentators of India, be they of the so-called Svātantrika school or of the Prāsaṅgika school. That will have to suffice for us here.

Now, if we adopt the commentarial approach and methodology of Candrakīrti, Kamalaśīla, Jñānagarbha *et alii* on which we have been insisting, the use of semantical arguments, etymologies and pan-Indian debates will have to be interpreted accordingly. Candrakīrti, as we saw above, was especially clear in his exegesis of Nāgārjuna: the myriad of arguments in the

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pret Nāgārjuna's refutations as of the form "On the highest level of truth, it is not so that there are *x* such that *x* is such and such."

[24] See, e.g., a modern Jo nang pa textbook, the *rGyu 'bras theg pa mchog gi gnas lugs zab mo'i don rnam par nges pa rje Jo nang pa chen po'i ring lugs 'jigs med med gdong lnga'i nga ro* of Yon tan bzang po, published by Mi rigs dpe skrung khang, Beijing 1990. In the section on the two truths (p. 116) we find statements like: *de ltar gyi kun rdzob bden pa | chos can | khyod don dam bden pa ma yin te | khyod gshis kyi gnas lugs su ye shes dam pa'i spyod yul du mi bden pa'i phyir | der thal | khyod kyi rang bzhin na rnam shes 'khrul ngo tsam du zad pa gang zhig | 'phags pa mchog gi ye shes kyi gzigs ngor rnam yang ma grub pa'i phyir | kun brdzob bden pa yin na rnam shes 'khrul ngo tsam du zad pas khyab ste ...* "Take such customary truth as the topic: it is not ultimate truth, because it is not true as an object of the highest wisdom about the absolute. This follows because in its nature it is nothing more than a mere perspective of mistaken consciousness and is never established from the perspective of the noble, supreme wisdom. If something is a customary truth, this implies that it is nothing more than a mere perspective of mistaken consciousness."

[25] P. Griffiths, Review of D. Burton, *Emptiness Appraised*, *Journal of Buddhist Ethics* 7 (2000): 22-25. See p. 24: "The first difficulty is one endemic to all scholarship on Nāgārjuna. It is that Nāgārjuna's works are, in this reviewer's judgment, insufficiently precise and systematic to make debates about what he really meant, philosophically speaking, very useful."

*Mūlamadhyamakārikā*s which focused on the basis schemata of Indian thought were exclusively refuting superimpositions. The Mādhyamikas, thus, were not using these pan-Indian arguments against ordinary entities, such as chairs, vases, etc., nor even our ordinary notion of natures, intrinsic properties, etc. (notions which the worldling does undoubtedly have and use),[26] but rather against a peculiar reified version of intrinsic nature, i.e., one which at most exhibits analogies to the ordinary. In that case, the pan-Indian arguments about parts, wholes, causes, perception, etc., etc., are not being used to undermine the purely ordinary notions of parts, wholes, etc., but rather superimpositions, or perhaps more exactly, the notions of parts, wholes, etc., as corrupted by a subtle, erroneous, superimposition which is responsible for them being reified. It is with regard to that rather specific subject matter that both sides of the pan-Indian debates, for the Mādhyamika, have no solution.

What then of the link between findability and independence? The first problem would be exegetical: to look at some of the passages that Hayes discussed and try to see whether Nāgārjuna's arguments could work better and make better sense once we saw them as directed against a rather special target of things corrupted by superimpositions. I think they do make better sense, in that the equivocations and non-sequiturs which Hayes diagnosed with regard to verses like *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* I.5 disappear rather well when we see *svabhāva* as always involving *both* analytically findable identity and independence. Similarly for the other verses that troubled Hayes. True, the verses highlight, at one time or another, one of the aspects of *svabhāva*, but the other aspect is always implicitly present. And if that is so, then the complicated analysis that Hayes gives us is largely unnecessary. Indeed, instead of hastening towards a reading discerning equivocations, we might well want to adopt what Paul Grice once termed the "Modified Occam's Razor": senses are not to be multiplied beyond necessity.[27] It looks like there is no need to do what Hayes did with Nāgārjuna and thus I think we had better not do it.

I could imagine a defender of Hayes' approach saying the following: if we avoid the charge of equivocation by making *svabhāva* non-obvious in this way, we may have temporarily sheltered Nāgārjuna and co. from being charged with sleight of hand, but at the price of fuzz and obscurantism. Why should we believe that people see the world through these mysterious types of superimpositions of *svabhāva*? A quick and somewhat cavalier reply: I am not sure that I can or need to show that people do in fact see the world in this way; my rather longish argument so far has not been that the Mādhyamika philosopher is *right*, but rather that he is not tricky, sloppy, equivocal or amateurish. Now, if one *also* wanted to argue that people *do* make the superimpositions that the Mādhyamika says they do, then unfortunately the Indian Mādhyamika literature would offer very little evidence, apart from a number of quotations from scriptures and a lot of doctrinal talk about people being ignorant, under the influence of karma, etc. And this type of religious "evidence" would of course not be persuasive to anyone other than an already convinced Mahāyāna Buddhist. Indeed it looks like the type of evidence that we would need would be some type of psychological, or phenomenological, analysis of how people perceive and think of objects, so that the Indian Mādhyamika reasonings would have to be supplemented with another, and quite different, sort of analysis, namely, introspection and thought-experiments, perhaps a type of phenomenological analysis of our *Lebenswelt.*

[26] See n. 19 above.
[27] See p. 47 in H.P. Grice, *Studies in the Way of Words*, Cambridge, Mass. 1991.

To my knowledge, the only Mādhyamikas who explicitly discuss these kinds of thought-experiments are the Tibetans in the dGe lugs pa school. Some of their experiments and phenomenological investigations are indeed fascinating in that they provide a set of Mādhyamika meditations which are said to be necessary preliminaries to the use of Nāgārjunian logical reasoning.[28] They are designed to make it vivid that in our way of conceiving of things and persons we take them as being something analytically findable and isolated from their complex background of relations so that they stand out as if something independent of everything else, independent of their relations to the mind, independent of their causal history, of parts, etc. – entities seem to have objective status completely independent of our thinking, the causal chain seems to us to be one thing, the entity itself at the end of the chain another, parts are apprehended as separate from the whole and persons are apprehended as separate entities from the bodies, ideas, impressions, feelings, etc., which constitute their component factors. In general, this independence seems to be fundamental to our apprehension of a thing, whatever it may be, and yet reflection would show that there is something fundamentally wrong here, if things are what they are only because of minds and a myriad of factors, dependencies and relations. This process of recognizing where we go wrong comes to be known in dGe lugs pa Mādhyamika thought as *dgag bya ngos 'dzin*, "recognizing that which is to be denied." Obviously this is a considerable step beyond (or perhaps away from) the Indian texts. Although arguably the notion of the "object to be refuted" (*dgag bya*) looks like what the Indian Mādhyamika is calling "superimpositions of *svabhāva*," there are no exercises or preliminary procedures in the Indian texts to lead us to this recognition or to persuade us that we make the superimpositions we do.[29]

IV

What might have laid at the root of Robinson's and Hayes' treatment of the Mādhyamika? I suspect that their point of departure was their sincere puzzlement as to why anyone intelligent would ever want to subscribe to a Nāgārjunian type of *svabhāva*, once it was brought out clearly and starkly what this *svabhāva* supposedly was, especially when it involved absurd

[28] One such thought-experiment is to imagine a tempting trade-off of one's own old and decrepit psychophysical components for those of the youthful, omniscient, *bodhisattva*, Mañjuśrī. At that point, the "exchanger" (*brje pa po*), i.e., the self whom we feel would benefit from this deal, appears as if it were separate and independent from its components. For Buddhists, such a separate "self" is of course an illusion, but it stands out vividly when "just like a merchant seeking [potential] profit, [the old person] would sincerely grasp at making an exchange." See p. 36 in T. Tillemans, *Persons of Authority*, Stuttgart 1993 (Tibetan and Indo-Tibetan Studies 5).

[29] Note that the fact that commentarial evidence suggests that we should see Mādhyamika philosophy as a refutation of superimpositions is at most a partial vindication of the dGe lugs pa Mādhyamika philosophy about the necessity to recognize the object to be refuted (*dgag bya'i ngos 'dzin*). In fact, the similarity with Tsong kha pa and the dGe lugs pa Mādhyamika is far from complete, even if the Indian Mādhyamika's emphasis on superimpositions could be a surprising source of legitimacy for the notion of a *dgag bya.* The dGe lugs exegesis of Chapter XV in the *Prasannapadā* and *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā*s is, for example, very different from what we have adopted, taking non-fabrication, immutability and independence, as being a *positive* description of a genuine nature, namely, voidness itself. As William Magee has pointed out in a recent publication, it is an exegesis which was contested by many Tibetans and which is also quite different from the way many major modern writers on Candrakīrti and Nāgārjuna (including Hayes, Jay Garfield and D. Seyfort Ruegg) have taken these chapters. Whereas Magee seems to think that Tsong kha pa can perhaps correct these writers, I would tend to think that the balance of the evidence comes down *against* Tsong kha pa here – there are good reasons why people read Chapter XV as they did, essentially the straightforwardness of reading what Candrakīrti says as he says it. See chapters 3-5 in W. Magee, *The Nature of Things*: *Emptiness and Essence in the Geluk World*, Ithaca, N.Y. 1999.

properties like independence.[30] And of course why *not* formulate things clearly and starkly and expose fallacious theses for all to see? Is not this what a rational, analytic reader and critic should do? In fact a so-called "Prāsaṅgika Mādhyamika" like Candrakīrti potentially has a type of response, which we may not ultimately accept, but which is certainly not to be dismissed outright: bringing *svabhāva* out into stark clarity is impossible and even counter-productive, for how could one readily distinguish between superimposed intrinsic natures and the otherwise innocent customary things? The subtlety of the superimposition, and hence the difficulty in distinguishing it from the ordinary that should be conserved, is a key position of certain Tibetan Prāsaṅgika commentators, who speak of the average man's life-world as a kind of inseparable "mixture" (*'dres pa*) between customary truth (which is innocent) and reification (which is not). But it is also implicit in Candrakīrti's discussion of *saṃvṛtimātra*, the "merely customary" – merely customary things are not to be identified with what the average man sees and conceives, but are according to Candrakīrti the ordinary as understood only by those who can see the world free of reifications, i.e., those Noble Ones (*ārya*) who have understood voidness and are free of grasping things as being true (*satyābhimāna*). For these Mādhyamika writers there is thus a sense in which grasping at *svabhāva* can only thrive in the shadows.

An illustration from another context may be of use in showing possible dangers inherent in certain demands for clarity. The extreme difficulty of distinguishing the "purely ordinary" from the ignorant person's hybrid combination of ordinary-plus-superimpositions is not unlike that which, in another context, Wittgenstein faced in trying to separate what is right and wrong in our views on following rules. The ingrained tendency we have is to think that when we follow a rule, like adding two numbers, the results are already determined and implicitly present from the start – Wittgenstein's well-known phrase is that we think rule following is grounded in a "superlative fact." Nonetheless, someone asks "But *are* the steps then *not* determined by the algebraic formula ... in a *queer* way, the use itself is in some sense present." To this Wittgenstein replies, "But of course it is 'in some sense!' Really the only thing wrong with what you say is the expression 'in a queer way'. The rest is all right."[31]

One of the more interesting and persuasive analyses of the complexities inherent in philosophical reform of seemingly acceptable commonsense beliefs is that of Saul Kripke in his *Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language*. The dangerous phase invariably comes in when we feel the need to formulate clearly what we deny and thus filter it out from what is acceptable in the commonsense belief: in other words, a problem arises when we try to explicitly separate the deep-seated queer way of taking things from what is all right and ordinary.

> For in denying that there is any such fact, might we not be expressing a philosophical thesis that doubts or denies something everyone admits? ... We merely wish to deny the existence of the "superlative fact" that philosophers misleadingly attach to such ordinary forms of words, not the propriety of the forms of words themselves. ... Whenever our opponent insists on the perfect propriety of an ordinary form of expression (e.g., that "the steps are determined by the formula," "the future application is already present"), we can insist that if these expressions are properly under-

[30] See Hayes, op. cit. (cf. n. 2), pp. 324-325.

[31] See §195 in L. Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, Oxford 1989. This Wittgensteinian theme of queerness versus the ordinary is a major preoccupation of Stanley Cavell in his exegesis of the opening passages of the *Investigations* discussing the seductiveness of St. Augustine's theory of language. Cf. also his idea of the "uncanniness of the ordinary," e.g., pp. 153-178 in his *In Quest of the Ordinary*: *Lines of Skepticism and Romanticism*, Chicago 1988.

> stood, we agree. The danger comes when we try to formulate what we *are* denying – *what* "erroneous interpretation" our opponent is placing on ordinary means of expression.[32]

The danger, i.e., a type of misplaced clarity, also seems to be what the Prāsaṅgika Mādhyamika alleges to occur in the attempt to isolate ordinary customary things from their superimposed intrinsic natures – the superimpositions at stake look to be close to a type of "superlative fact,"[33] i.e., a hard to isolate queer way of taking things that is held as necessary to ground the ordinary. The danger then is this: the Mādhyamika runs the risk of being simply dismissed as absurd when he lays out a general thesis as to *what* he is denying. From the Mādhyamika philosopher's own point of view, it is thus arguably defensible, and even perhaps profound, that this *svabhāva must* be non-obvious and remain so if it is not itself to be misconstrued and trivialized. And if we follow Mādhyamikas this far, then the starting point of the problem that Hayes and Robinson had in taking Nāgārjuna seriously will have been that they proceeded with clear generalized theses about what was to be denied. In setting out what *svabhāva* was in the form of axioms and theorems, they had already guaranteed that the Mādhyamika would be seen to be absurd: the queer way of taking the ordinary had lost all its potent grip and all its interest. No doubt there will be something disturbing here to the analytic reader intent on giving clear summaries of such and such a philosopher's theses: if a Mādhyamika philosophy like that of Candrakīrti is to receive a just and serious treatment, then the otherwise laudable intellectual work of dissection, disambiguation and formulating clear theses and general principles is not without danger of superficiality; indeed, in certain important areas, it is precisely *not* what we should be doing.

[32] See pp. 69-70 in S.A. Kripke, *Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language*, Oxford 1982.
[33] See Wittgenstein, op. cit. (cf. n. 31), §192.

Joseph S. O'Leary

From Impermanence to Emptiness: Madhyamaka and Momentariness*

For many people, fear of old age or of death is replaced by an anxiety about the implacable tread of Time. This phantasmal but ever-present antagonist becomes a stand-in for the future imponderables which have less of a grip on their imagination. They turn to philosophies of time not from speculative curiosity, but in search of relief from the oppression caused by the incessant falling of sand in the hourglass, by the dismaying speed with which the quiet lapse of hours converts into an unbelievable – yet unchallengeable – reckoning of vanished years. Often the philosophers are more than happy to respond to their demand, with bland assurances that "time, like space, has most evidently proved not to be real, but to be a contradictory appearance" (Bradley 1987: 36). If a deconstruction of time is called for, who holds out more promise than Nāgārjuna, the most radical of the Buddhist philosophers? In its rigid structure, its unfaltering rhythm, its undeniable, ever-present insistence, time would appear to have the character of intrinsic existence (*svabhāva*), which Nāgārjuna systematically refutes. His doctrine that all phenomena are empty (*śūnya*) of such existence promises to end the fret of our chafing against the chain of time.

Some spiritual uses of Nāgārjuna are deftly set forth by David Loy, who finds in him a middle path between the affirmation of permanence, which entails that "time itself is in some sense illusory and unreal," and the affirmation of radical impermanence, which entails that "nothing escapes from the ravages of time" (Loy 1988: 216). "Rather than accepting the reality of both permanence and change by combining them in a hierarchy, I follow Madhyamaka in criticizing and dismissing them both by revealing their conceptual interdependence" (ibid., p. 217). The reader who may doubt the capacity of conceptual dialectics to remove weighty, oppressive realities is not left in the lurch, for Loy goes on to give an empirical, phenomenological account of living in time beyond the dualism of permanent and impermanent. He opposes "the thought-constructed dualism between things and time" (ibid., p. 221), which leads us to conceive the flow of time in contrast to permanent things or a permanent subject that is somehow trapped in this flow. If things and the subject are temporal through and through, there is no permanence to be guarded against the flux. "I am not *in* time because I *am* time, which therefore means that I am *free from* time" (ibid., p. 220).

> Time "flies away" when we experience it dualistically, with the sense of a self that is outside and looking at it. Then time becomes something that I have (or don't have), objectified and quantified into a succession of "now-moments" that cannot be held but incessantly fall away … As Nāgārjuna would put it, that things (or rather "thingings") are time means that there is no second, external time that they are "within" (ibid., p. 221).

In the end, Loy affirms something unchanging in the midst of change: "Dōgen's 'eternal present of time'… is eternal because there is something that does not change: *it is always now*" (p. 223). To accept one's impermanence, then, would mean to recognize and enjoy the space of the present (not conceived as an atomistic instant) as one's vital milieu, to remain mindful of it in all one's activities so that they all take on the "eternity" of the "now." I think it would be better to speak of the perpetuity rather than the eternity of the now, since the phenomenon

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in question is a modest, empirical one, not some theological claim, and the word "eternal" inevitably attracts the suspicion of substantialism (*śāśvatavāda*). It seems clear that mindfully living in the present is the practical solution that Buddhism offers to the problem of time. That Nāgārjuna's comments on temporal categories will be in line with this attitude seems a good hermeneutic assumption.

To bring Nāgārjuna's views on anything, and especially on so slippery a topic as time, into clear focus is never an easy task. Is his method of demonstrating that time is empty of inherent existence a purely dialectical, logical one, or has it a phenomenological dimension as well? Is it directed against Sarvāstivāda claims about the reality of the three times, or is it directed against Sautrāntika theories of the point-instant (*kṣaṇa*) as well? How developed would such theories have been in his time, and how much would they have concerned him or his circle? How far does the scope of his critique extend? Is the target merely the metaphysical speculation of these Abhidharma schools? Or are these speculations seen as expressing ever-renascent delusions of the human mind as it craves for illusory stability? Are everyday language about time and commonsensical calculation about past, present and future left unchanged by the critique of metaphysical projections, or are these everyday conventions themselves under attack? Does Nāgārjuna go beyond the early Buddhist stress on impermanence (*anityatā*) in order to move on to the more radical insight of universal emptiness (*śūnyatā*)? How does his discussion of time in *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* (*MMK*) 19 relate to the other topics of analysis in the *MMK*? What, if any, is the implicit temporal component in his analyses of other topics such as causality and movement?

How to Approach Nāgārjuna

Any discussion of these questions has first to negotiate the more general issue of the nature of Nāgārjuna's thought. A fresh consideration of this might be provoked by David J. Kalupahana's claim that Nāgārjuna was not a Mahāyāna Buddhist in the sectarian sense of the *Lotus Sūtra* for example, and is rather to be seen as one who defended the authentic teaching of the Buddha against metaphysical excrescences, much as Moggalīputtatissa did against similar targets, including the Sarvāstivāda views of Kātyāyanīputra, at the second council of Pāṭaliputra in the mid-third century BC. Whereas Lindtner (1987: 21) says that even in the *MMK* alone "the Mahāyāna background is indisputable," with its use of such topics as *gandharvanagara* (magic city) and its echoes of early Mahāyāna texts such as the *Kāśyapaparivarta* and *Akṣayamatinirdeśa*, Kalupahana attaches little weight to these points (1986: 6, 25 and 179), stressing that in the *MMK* "no reference whatever is made to any one of the major discourses of the Mahāyāna tradition, not even to the famous *Prajñāpāramitā-sūtras*" (ibid., p. 7). He pounces on the reference to the *Kaccāyanagottasutta* (*Saṃyuttanikāya* 2.17) in *MMK* 15.7 and sees much of the *MMK* as elaborating the teaching of that scripture. For a sober and well-nourished reading of the *MMK* it is surely valuable to attend to its echoes of early Buddhist tradition. To see Nāgārjuna as developing the tetralemmas of the fourteen inexpressibles (*avyākṛta*) of the *Vacchagottasaṃyuttam* and parallel texts in the Pāli Tripiṭaka (as suggested by della Santina 1986: 2-5), is not incompatible with seeing him as a Mahāyānist, if Mahāyāna is seen as a critical reaction to the *svabhāva* thinking that had infiltrated Abhidharma scholasticism. To say that Nāgārjuna is totally dedicated to clarifying the doctrine of dependent arising (*pratītyasamutpāda*) does not exclude that his basis is the emptiness doctrine of the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras, for this itself, it might be argued, is nothing other than a clarification of dependent arising. Perhaps the most crucial hermeneutic tip the reader

of Nāgārjuna should follow is to bear in mind the basic Buddhist doctrine of dependent origination and to watch for how Nāgārjuna undoes substantialist and annihilationist misreadings of the doctrine, which themselves would need to be precisely defined. But the next step, surely, is to place him against the background of the anti-substantialist emptiness thinking that culminates in the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras. The dizzying effect of Nāgārjuna's text is not an accident, and brings him close to the paradoxes and the sweeping proclamations of emptiness in those Sūtras.

Even with such a full knowledge of his background, the *MMK* would remain a deeply puzzling text, not to be approached independently of the traditions of interpretation embedded in which it has come down to us. To the variety among the different strands of Madhyamaka, and between the individual authors in a given strand, must be added the variety within a single author or a single text, depending on which side of the issues is being emphasized. The basic tenet of Nāgārjuna, that dependent origination is emptiness, is double-edged. If one places the stress on dependent co-origination, emptiness is merely a safeguard against substantialist misinterpretations of this doctrine. If one places the stress on emptiness, Nāgārjuna is seen as consolidating a Mahāyāna "Copernican revolution" within Buddhism by drawing out little-suspected implications of dependent origination, and by giving logical form to the radical declarations of the Perfection of Wisdom Sūtras. An "absolutistic" tendency may prevail, stressing the "truth of ultimate meaning" (*paramārthasatya*) as something that subverts the bases of the everyday conventional world, as an ineffable reality beyond thought and language, to be understood in a leap of yogic intuition, and capable of being fully grasped only by a Buddha. Within the Prāsaṅgika–Madhyamaka current in the tradition, the only critical reaction possible against this is to stress the valid function of conventional truth (*saṃvṛtisatya*), giving it an equal dignity with the ultimate. Candrakīrti is often thought of as tending to the former pole, Tsong Khapa to the latter, with his stress on "a verbal distinction between existence and inherent existence which cannot be realized in everyday experience" and which can obscure the fact that "Mādhyamika is attacking and refuting our very sense of existence" and not "something merely intellectual" (Napper 1989: 147). However, Candrakīrti often shows due respect for the conventional perspective, and Tsong Khapa sometimes speaks directly from the paramārthic so as to restore to the doctrine of emptiness its shock value. Tsong Khapa saw insight into emptiness not as a mystic intuition bypassing the discursive, but as a fruit of *vipaśyanā*, which is a lucid, integral grasp of the texture of the real, made possible by the prior attainment of *śamatha* or calm abiding. *vipaśyanā* is "an analytical wisdom defined as a wisdom of thorough discrimination of phenomena conjoined with special pliancy induced by the power of analysis" (Napper 1989: 20).

Returning to Nāgārjuna from the vast jungle of later debate, we are liable to say, "here he is talking from the ultimate, paramārthic perspective, and there he is talking from the conventional perspective," but this recourse to a two-truths theory, usually to save the conventional existence of something that Nāgārjuna roundly declares not to exist – time, for example – seems to me prone to produce an arbitrary or abusive hermeneutics. Recourse to that distinction should surely be kept to the strict minimum, as should the practice of saying "here the opponent speaks" when the text gives no clear indication that this is so. Often the effect of such interpretative interventions is to blunt the impact of the text and make its concerns merely academic. Surely when Nāgārjuna attacks the real existence of such entities as time or the Self, he does not leave our everyday functional usage of self-language and time-language entirely unscathed. If the realization that the referents of our everyday speech have no inherent existence but only a provisional, conventional status has something to do with *nirvāṇa*,

then it must signify a profound conversion in our attitudes. It cannot mean that everything goes on just as before, except that we have dumped some superfluous metaphysics.

The meaning of emptiness (*śūnyatā*) does not lend itself to being directly and securely grasped, once and for all. Nāgārjuna does offer, in his irksomely cryptic verses, logical demonstrations that dependently arisen entities are lacking in own-being (*svabhāva*). A concrete phenomenological account of what this means is scarcely favoured by the abstract cast of his arguments and his reliance on a set of argumentative tactics that are not immediately convincing to the modern reader (or even to many of his ancient readers). The contemporary reader needs an experiential foothold, some recognition of emptiness as inscribed in the texture of real life. And of all human experiences, none speaks to us so constantly and so intimately of emptiness as the experience of time. The experience of living in time, and the frustrating exercise of thinking about time, provide an apprenticeship in emptiness. If Nāgārjuna can bring that experience to a new pitch of lucid insight, conversely, the experience can help us make sense of Nāgārjuna's abstruse discourse.

The Emptiness of Time (*MMK* 19)

Buddhist meditation and analysis take as their focus the data of temporal experience and seek to deepen the awareness of impermanence (*anityatā*) by attending to each moment as it arises and passes away. Where other religions and philosophies anchor themselves in some stable transcendent being, Buddhism seeks only a lucid grasp of our existence here and now in its painful instability. That such lucidity can be therapeutic, even salvific, seems a desperate claim. We may begin to discover its plausibility as we attempt to see how the Madhyamaka analysis of impermanence leads to a gracious and liberating encounter with emptiness. The Madhyamaka argument builds on the association of impermanence and emptiness in early Buddhism: "All *saṃskāra* (dispositions, compositions) are impermanent and everything impermanent ends in pain (*duḥkha*). Every *duḥkha* is without Self and what is without Self is empty (*śūnya*)" (*Udānavagga* [*UV*] XII.5.8; tr. Silburn 1955: 179). What is, is impermanent, non-Self, empty, and we create false problems when we project onto it duration, self-identity, substance. Nāgārjuna's inflection of this teaching can be defended as bringing out its inevitable ontological implications:

> What is of deceptive nature is but a delusion, said the Buddha, so all *saṃskāra*, being of deceptive nature, are delusion. But if what is of deceptive nature is delusion, with regard to *what* is it delusion? What the Buddha spoke there lights up emptiness. (*MMK* 13.1-2; after Bugault)

The world is composed (*saṃskṛta*) of the stuff of dispositions (*saṃskāra*); the two words in their amphibology capture the flimsy fabric of the dependently arisen, its emptiness (see Kapani 1992: 174-175).

Juggling with paradoxes involving the three dimensions of time, as *MMK* 19 does, was not a novelty in Buddhism. The purging of time-ideas by dialectical reasoning, and the use of time to undermine substantialist beliefs, can be found in the *Kathāvatthu* (*KV*) more than three centuries before Nāgārjuna's time:

> Does the past exist? "Yes," you reply. Then, is the existent the past? You reply "the existent may be past, and may be not-past." But herein you make out that the past may be the past and may be the not-past. Your position is wrong, and you are refuted. (*KV* I.6; Aung and Rhys Davids 1969: 94)

The reader may often detect a whiff of sophistry in these arguments, as in Nāgārjuna's, but to convict the ancient texts of this vice is no easy matter, since clear understanding of the steps of the argument, awareness of tacit presuppositions or logical rules, without which its force is missed, and insight into the wider concrete context of the debate are likely to be only very scantily available to the modern scholar. The ascription of real existence to past and future *dharma*s seems to have been so well refuted in these older debates that there was little need for Nāgārjuna to argue against it again. It is subtler forms of Sarvāstivāda thought that he tackles.

Does he argue from the insubstantiality of time to the insubstantiality of things, or vice versa? Earlier sections of the *MMK* have tackled many things, such as the visual faculty, the *skandha*s, act and agent, fire and fuel, *svabhāva*, bondage and release, the fruit of action, the Self. Time is invoked not in order to reinforce these arguments, but as a subtler target, consisting in an orientation among different poles, and comparable to other abstract triads such as "upper, lower, middle." The six verses of this chapter have a "meta-"character, aiming at structures of reflection to whose reality we cling even as we subscribe to the deconstruction of more obvious claimants to inherent existence. (However, Candrakīrti's commentary on *MMK* 19 sees the reality of time as an argument for the reality of things, on the part of the opponents, and the refutation of the reality of time as primarily an argument against the reality of things.) Bugault's comment on *MMK* 4.8-9 is illuminating on this strategy of smoking out substantialism as it retreats from one lair to another:

> Provisionally defeated on the first *skandha*, the opponent invokes the substantial reality of the second to found the first, then of the third to found the second, etc., up to the fifth and last. Having no sixth and no further space to retreat to, he finds himself pushed back against emptiness, the very fate from which he fled … This is not an *anavasthā*, an infinite regress, for there are only five *skandha*s. It is a *regressus in finitum.* There is a parallel to this regressive and limited structure in the linking of the first twenty-five chapters of the *Prasannapadā*, as presented by Candrakīrti … The opponent retreats until chapter 25 on *nirvāṇa*, which has the same role in the economy of the *Prasannapadā* as *śūnyatā* has at the end of *MMK* 4. (Bugault 2002: 82)

The discussion of time in *MMK* 19 is disappointing for those who would have liked a biting existential reflection on impermanence. Instead we have a logical critique of our everyday language about time. However, the primary focus is not linguistic but logical. Nāgārjuna is less a linguistic philosopher than a logician working on ontological themes. It is not our way of talking about the three temporal dimensions that reveals their mutual implication, but rather a logical inspection of these notions. In each case such an inspection establishes dependent origination against incorrect svabhāvic interpretations. It establishes the incompatibility of dependent origination and inherent existence and the empty character of all that is dependently originated. Generalizing, he declares at *MMK* 24.18: "We state that whatever is dependent arising, that is emptiness" (Kalupahana 1986: 339). Both expressions belong to the register of *prajñapti*, designation, depending on the consideration of dependently arising phenomena, and are thus not absolutes – either substantialist or annihilationist – hence "that itself is the middle path" (*MMK* 24.18b; see ibid., p. 339). The conventionality of designations is logically and ontologically grounded via the analysis of phenomena as dependently arisen and empty. The discovery of the conventionality of our language comes at the end rather than the beginning of the inquiry. The logic of all this is weakened if we prematurely note that our reasonings and the language we use are merely conventional.

Nāgāruna's critique of time may be more radical than is sometimes thought, depending on what view is being attacked and how far-reaching the attack is. Would the opponents merely

claim an abstract logical inevitability of the three temporal dimensions, perhaps going on to defend *svabhāva* and reject emptiness on the basis that "since time exists, its basis in the reality of things must exist also"? Or would the Sarvāstivāda opponents have been more concerned with a concrete temporality, time as the generation and extinction of *dharma*s, and not particularly anxious to defend the reality of past, present and future as abstract categories? If the opponents appeal to a concrete sense of duration, Nāgārjuna seems rather to shift the discourse to a more abstract level, in order to lay bare the logical quandaries invited by the very structure of temporal discourse.

MMK 19.1-3 reads:

> *pratyutpanno 'nāgataś ca yady atītam apekṣya hi |*
> *pratyutpanno 'nāgataś ca kāle 'tīte bhaviṣyataḥ ||*
> *pratyutpanno 'nāgataś ca na stas tatra punar yadi |*
> *pratyutpanno 'nāgataś ca syātāṃ katham apekṣya tam ||*
> *anapekṣya punaḥ siddhir nātītaṃ vidyate tayoḥ |*
> *pratyutpanno 'nāgataś ca tasmāt kālo na vidyate ||.*

These are not particularly difficult verses, but a review of some translations shows how variously they may be understood. (I ignore the strophic breaking up of the lines in Garfield 1995.)

Kalupahana (1986: 276) translates:

> If the present and the future exist contingent upon the past, then the present and the future would be in the past time.
> Again, if the present and the future were not to exist therein [i.e., in the past], how could the present and the future be contingent upon that?
> Moreover, non-contingent upon the past, their [i.e., of the present and future] establishment is not evident. Therefore, neither a present nor a future time is evident.

Kalupahana uses a heavy "exist" and "would be" instead of "will be" in verse 19.1. Perhaps he wants to underline that the target is the Sarvāstivāda stress on real existence. He comments (1986: 276):

> Analysing time as a separate entity, the metaphysicians assumed that if there were to be any mutual relationship between the present and the future on the one hand and the past on the other, then, since they are distinct entities, the present and the future will have to be inherent in the past. In other words, the past produces the present and future from within itself.

The verse is thus made to resume the Madhyamaka view of erratic Sarvāstivāda reasoning, rather than an argument directly stated by Nāgārjuna himself. Kalupahana does not see Nāgārjuna as drawing an absurd consequence from the opponents' position, but as resuming the opponents' speculation; given their strong "identity version of causation (*svatotpatti*)" (*sic*) (Kalupahana 1986: 276) they are happy to say that each of the temporal dimensions exists in the others.

Oetke (1990: 106) translates:

> If present and future existed depending on the past, (then) present and future would be in the past time.
> If present and future would however not be there [in the past], how would present and future be depending on that?
> But not depending on the past the two [present and future] are not established, therefore the present and future time do not exist.

Oetke, too, has an emphatic "exist" in *MMK* 19.3d. Though "were not there" (subjunctive) would be more felicitous as English than "would not be there" in 19.2, the translation brings out well the connection between 19.1 and 19.2.

The premise that present and future depend on the past leads immediately to the strange consequence of the coexistence of the three times. For Kalupahana this is the result of the svabhāvic presuppositions of the opponents whose position is being presented. For Oetke, it is due to a tacit principle of Nāgārjuna himself to the effect that things that are conditions for each other must exist simultaneously.

> It seems hardly conceivable that Nāgārjuna should have clung both to the thesis of the dependence between the time epochs and to the assumption concerning the entailment between dependence and coexistence without special reasons. (Oetke 1990: 95)

Bronkhorst (1997) thinks Oetke's tacit premise is unnecessary, given a general Indian belief in a direct correspondence between signifier and signified, *śabda* and *artha*, which would entail that the sentence "Devadatta sat in a chair" implies the co-existence of Devadatta, sitting, and chair in the situation referred to by the sentence. Oetke objects that this is too weak, and that what would be needed at the very least is a version of the correspondence principle entailing that the items to which the terms of sentence refer "must exist simultaneously in the same manner as the terms referring to them occur simultaneously in one and the same sentence" (Oetke 2004: 94). In any case, Oetke argues that such a naïve correspondence would be incompatible with Nāgārjuna's ontology.

Oetke argues that the tacit premise also underlies the argument, expounded in *MMK* 1 and 20, that causality is impossible, since if cause and effect coexist the cause is unnecessary since the effect already exists, whereas if they do not coexist the cause cannot produce the effect since it already exists (Oetke 1990: 103). But this argument can stand on its own, it seems to me, without any tacit presupposition. Bugault says that "it is a principle, for the Mādhyamika, that two simultaneous things have no bond of causality between them" (Bugault 2002: 154), which complements Oetke's principle of the simultaneity of what are linked conditionally; father is not the cause of son, or son of father, but both spring up simultaneously as mutually presupposed conditions. However, what Bugault calls a principle is established by a clear argument, which is persuasive enough for the immediate cause of things though it might seem absurd if extended to their remote cause – making it necessary that one's great-great-grandfather still be alive since he is one's cause (see Oetke 2004, correcting O'Leary 2002). If immediate causality is reduced to conditionality, no doubt remote causality can be so as well. But would the simultaneity of what are linked conditionally not still entail the implausible continued existence of the remote ancestor? Presumably the "simultaneity" in question cannot be strictly temporal, and Oetke's tacit presupposition can be restated without any reference to temporal simultaneity. The meaning is that logically a great-great-grandchild presupposes a great-great-grandparent, who is posited as such only in relation to the great-great-grandchild; the one cannot exist as such without the other. Indeed, this is not a tacit presupposition at all but one exhibited openly in the text (unless I am again missing Oetke's point) .

The logical simultaneity, or rather inseparability, of past, present, and future is treated as equivalent to the logical simultaneity of above, middle, and below in *MMK* 19.4. One could rewrite 19.1 for those categories as follows: "If above and middle are contingent on below, above and middle will exist down below," with the conclusion, based on 19.3, that "neither above nor middle are real." The relation of causality works only if cause and effect coexist

temporally, which leads to an absurdity; the relation of conditionality works only if the conditions are mutually inseparable, that is, coexist logically, which leads to undermining of the independent being of the relata, since each has existence only in function of the others. The fact that one cannot have a cause without an effect and vice versa leads to a breakdown of the causal relation. The fact that one cannot have a conditional relatum without its counterpart (father without son, above without below) does not lead to a breakdown of conditionality but to a demonstration from conditionality of the lack of *svabhāva* of conditionally related things. This neat differentiation of causality and conditionality is threatened by such a text as *MMK* 1.6b: "Of an existing thing, what could be the condition? And if it exists already, of what use is a condition?" (tr. after Bugault), but here the *hetupratyaya* or causal condition is in question, which is not the kind of condition involved in talk of temporal relations. In general Nāgārjuna accepts conditionality only when it is voided of causality.

The logic of conditionality leads to absurd consequences: the future cannot be without the past, nor the above without the below, so where one is the other must be. I am not sure if anything in Bronkhorst and Oetke's discussion clears away the suspicion that we are dealing with some kind of sophism here. This logic deconstructs even our everyday temporal language, pointing up a potentially disturbing ontological riddle in our talk of past and future. If they exist no longer, or not yet, how can we link them to present reality? How can there be an intelligible connection between what truly exists and what has no real existence? The Madhyamaka answer would be that the present reality does not truly exist either.

Garfield (1995: 50) translates (from the Tibetan):

> If the present and the future depend on the past, then the present and the future would have existed in the past.
> If the present and the future did not exist there, how could the present and the future be dependent upon it?
> If they are not dependent upon the past, neither of the two would be established. Therefore neither the present nor the future would exist.

As the translation of *MMK* 19.3 suggests, Garfield sees the text as upholding the reality of time, not as "an entity existing independently of temporal phenomena" but as "a set of relations among them" (ibid., p. 254). This is surely a rather flattening interpretation of the text, and is not helped by the sweeping statement that its arguments are "closely akin to those of Zeno, Sextus and McTaggart" (ibid.).

Garfield treats the relation between the three temporal dimensions as a causal one: "If they [present and future] depend upon it [past] in any sense that could plausibly guarantee their inherent existence, they must somehow emerge from it as a basis" (ibid.). I am uneasy with the softening impact of the phrase "in any sense that could guarantee their inherent existence" – a qualification not found explicitly in the text but stressed by Garfield at every possible opportunity. The idea of present and future emerging from past is not in the text either. The mutual reference of the three times is noted as a logical necessity, one that would still pose problems even when the idea of time is purged of the metaphysical reifications that Garfield thinks are the target of the critique. Garfield remarks that if present and future did not exist in the past "we would then either have the situation in which the ostensibly dependent exists, but in the absence of that on which it depends, or in which the necessary condition exists, but without that of which it is the condition" (ibid., p. 255). The svabhāvic thinker imagines that "there must be a real relation between the cause and the effect in which the effect is contained potentially in the cause and this would unfortunately entail the past existence of the present and the future" (ibid., p. 255). But Garfield does not advert to the residual difficulty

posed by the mutual dependence of the temporal dimensions even when no such real causal relation is imagined.

Garfield sees *MKK* 19.3a as proposing that past, present and future simply exist without causal interconnectedness. Then "there would be no sense in which they would be determinately ordered and in which they would be part of the same time" (ibid., pp. 255-256). But 19.3ab does not give that argument, contenting itself with observing that without reference to the past, the other dimensions cannot be established. "Time is by definition an ordering of events in which moments stand in determinate relations to one another, in virtue of which the location of any moment depends on the location of all of the others" (ibid., p. 256). While avoiding causal substantialism, Garfield here strongly affirms the reality of time as a set of relations. I doubt if Nāgārjuna would accept the definition of time as a determinate ordering of events or location of moments. It would seem to give an objective stability to moments and their location. If time is a matter of unfailing regularities, ever-reliable coordinates, then it is not *animitta* (*ŚS* 7) but securely definable and locatable. To see the *MMK* as upholding a Humean world of secure explanatory regularities or a Wittgensteinian one of trustworthy ordinary language is to domesticate and scholasticize Nāgārjuna, making him a linguistic therapist who frees us from substantializations and reifications, but only to let us install ourselves more serenely in the conventional dependently co-arising world. It seems to me that in Buddhism this saṃsāric world is always painful, radically unsatisfactory, and that Nāgārjuna is not just curing us of false theories about it, but is revealing it as radically self-contradictory even in its everyday pragmatic or conventional texture. To say that time is an ultimately impossible concept explodes the unity and identifiability of any system of temporal coordinates. We can no longer securely refer to past, future and present, for our very machinery of reference is riddled with contradiction.

MMK 2.1 tells us that since neither past nor future movement is moving, and present movement cannot be conceived apart from these, movement cannot be conceived at all. Thus even our basic experience of movement is self-contradictory. Garfield sets up what again looks like a straw man, the idea "that motion is an entity, or a property with an existence independent of that of moving things" (Garfield 1995: 124). "Nāgārjuna does presuppose, in developing the view that conventionally things do arise dependent on conditions, that there is motion, or change. For if there were not, there would be no arising" (ibid.). Crucial here is the weight attached to the qualifier "conventionally," a word that has connotations of delusion, contradiction, occultation, frustration, which are diluted in Garfield's reading. Nāgārjuna is pointing out not only the perils of reifying dependent origination (ibid., p. 126), but the inherently contradictory texture of the dependently originated world.

I agree with Garfield that Nāgārjuna accepts conditions as describing "the kind of association he endorses as an analysis of dependent arising" (ibid., p. 104), while rejecting causes as a substantialist delusion. For those who see Nāgārjuna as treating causes and conditions in the same way, "the distinction between the four conditions provides a platform for an exhaustive refutation of production with no positive account of interdependence implicated" (ibid.). But even when conditions are recognized, that which arises from them enjoys only provisional existence, and the relata that they link have only a mutually dependent existence. To insist on the stable regularity of conditions as Garfield does seems rather inconsistent with this. It bolsters the conventional at the expense of ultimate emptiness.

Svabhāvic causes and substances have no existence, but conditions and other survivors of Nāgārjuna's critique are accorded only a conventional, not an ultimate existence. They are

products of *vikalpa* (conceptuality) and *prapañca* (fabrication, elaboration). (For a sense of the rich connotations of *vikalpa*, see Tola and Dragonetti 2001: 24-29.) Nāgārjuna's arguments are not merely about language, the dissolution of linguistic delusions; "they are, without a shade of doubt, about the phenomenal world, which they try to prove to be self-contradictory" (Bronkhorst 1999: 19), "everyday reality does not exist" (ibid., p. 21).

Bugault (2002: 243) translates:

> If the present and the future depend on the past, this implies that they exist already in the past.
> If, on the contrary, the present and the future are absent therefrom, how could they depend on the past?
> However, one cannot found their existence rationally independently of the past. In consequence, present and future do not have [intrinsic] existence.

Bugault adds the notation "intrinsic" (*propre*) to the denial of existence, perhaps drawing on the two-truths theory to suggest that the three dimensions exist conventionally but not ultimately. Or perhaps he is noting some nuance of difference between *bhaviṣyataḥ* in *MMK* 19.1d (future indicative dual of the verb "to be") and *vidyate* in 3b and d. Edgerton (1977: 488) defines *vidyate* as "is found, occurs, exists, is" and notes that in practice it is used as a passive auxiliary with past participles. It may perhaps carry less assertive, existential force than the verb "to be," which does not entail that its negation has more existential force. *na vidyate* should probably not be translated as "does not exist at all," but by some milder expression such as "there is not, does not occur, is not evident, is not real." Bugault's insertion of the word *propre* may reflect this lesser force of the denial.

MMK 19.4 reads:

> *etenaivāvaśiṣṭau dvau krameṇa parivartakau |*
> *uttamādhamamadhyādīn ekatvādīṃś ca lakṣayet* ||.

Translations: "By this same (method) one should consider the remaining two changes in regard to (their) order, as well as the (attributes of being) the highest, the lowest and the middle (or: the latest, the earliest and the middle [?]) etc. and the oneness/sameness, etc." (Oetke 1990: 106). "By the same method, the other two divisions – past and future, upper, lower, middle, etc., unity, etc., should be understood" (Garfield 1995: 50).

The subversive feature of temporal language is the co-existence of terms that contradict one another. The same contradiction can be found in all correlative terms. In his commentary Candrakīrti writes out *MMK* 19.1-3 in two other versions, showing how the argument applies equally well if for "past" we substitute "present" or "future," *mutatis mutandis*. He spoils this parallelism a little by trying to make the current non-existence of the past one of the grounds of the non-existence of past and future, since that argument does not apply in the case of past and future depending on present. Such triads as "highest, middle and lowest" and such dyadic oppositions as "unity, multiplicity" are to be treated in the same way. Candrakīrti adds some examples that are perhaps inapposite, as being too concrete, such as "the realms of desire, of form, of the formless" (Sprung 1979: 189). The extension to all correlative terms undermines the solidity of every reference. "Without one (*eka*) there are not many (*aneka*). Without many (*aneka*) one (*eka*) is not possible. Therefore things that arise dependently (*pratītyasamutpanna*) are indeterminable (*animitta*)" (*ŚS* 7; Lindtner 1987: 37). Wherever we seek to grasp a solid landmark we find it to be a flimsy signifier not pinning down a signified but referring to another signifier in a self-undermining way.

MMK 19.5 reads:

> *nāsthito gṛhyate kālaḥ sthitaḥ kālo na vidyate |*
> *yo gṛhyetāgṛhītaś ca kālaḥ prajñapyate katham ||.*

Translations: "A variable time cannot be grasped and there is no unvarying time that could be grasped. How can one speak of a time that is not grasped?" (after de Jong 1949: 40). "A nonstatic time is not observed. A static time is not evident. Even if the unobserved time were to be observed, how can it be made known?" (Kalupahana 1986: 278). "A nonstatic time is not grasped. Nothing one would grasp as stationary time exists. If time is not grasped, how is it known?" (Garfield 1995: 265). "A mobile time does not let itself be grasped. As for an immobile time susceptible of being grasped, no trace of such is to be found. How, then, speak of a time that is not grasped?" (after Bugault 2002: 244).

The flux of time can be comprehended, we imagine, by being measured. "One may object that time is real because it is measurable (*parimāṇavattva*). The thought here is that what *is* not, cannot in fact be measurable as the horns of a donkey cannot be." The answer: "There is no such thing as invariable, unchanging time which could be understood in terms of periods such as moments and minutes. Hence variable (*asthita*) time cannot be understood; that is to say, it cannot be understood *in* its variableness" (*Prasannapadā* on *MMK* 19.5; tr. Sprung 1979: 190). Faced with the impossibility of mastering the flux, the Sarvāstavādin tried to conceive of a "static moment (*sthitikṣaṇa*)" (Kalupahana 1986: 278). "Sensation, being instantaneous, is a static state, for the instant is static (*eka kṣaṇa sthiti*), in the sense that it springs up only to disappear immediately and does not move or continue into the next instant" (Silburn 1955: 290). No doubt a barrage of arguments, both logical and phenomenological, could have been brought against both ideas, but here it is assumed that both the idea of measuring the flux and that of arresting the moment are transparently absurd. Such desperate resorts reveal the incomprehensibility of time, which is due to its unreality.

This verse seems to undermine the stability Garfield attributed to time as a set of relations among phenomena. But Garfield believes that the target is a hypostatized super-time. In his comment on *MMK* 19.1 (1995: 255) he mentions a difficulty specific to the topic of time:

> If the present and the future depend upon the past, they must succeed or be simultaneous with it. But they must succeed or be simultaneous with it in time. That requires a super-time in which the parts of time are related, and so on, ad infinitum.

If there is any point of attachment for such argumentation in the text it is here at *MMK* 19.5. Garfield comments on this verse: To say that time changes is "to posit a super-time in which that change occurs," while to say that it is static "suggests that past, present, and future coexist"; hence "there is no coherent conception of time as an entity" (ibid., p. 256). Note that 19.4 does not refer back to the coexistence theme of 19.1-3. As to the super-time idea, it seems to distract from the more proximate targets Nāgārjuna has in view.

Candrakīrti indeed gives as one of two possible interpretations of "static time" a kind of super-time, a permanent hypostatized time that would contain and control temporal events: "It might be urged that what is called time is in its invariable essence imperishable but manifests (*abhivyajyate*) itself in time periods such as moments"; he replies: "Time cannot be conceived of as something distinct from periods of time such as moments or minutes" (Sprung 1979: 190; de Jong 1949: 41). In the background lies the Vedic hypostasization of Time as a power, as suggested by a stanza both the *Prasannapadā* and the *Mahāprajñāpāramitāśāstra* (*MPPŚ*) quote: "Time transmutes the elements; time sustains being; times cares for the sleeping; time is insurmountable" (ibid.). The source is the *Kālasūtra* of the Kālavādins, an

Ājīvika group who were partisans of absolute time, a cosmic fire that cooked all beings (Silburn 1955: 5 and 127). This text is also quoted in the *MPPŚ* as it argues against a hypostatized immutable time, which either creates all beings or at least is immutable, has a real existence, is a subtle *dharma*, invisible and unknowable, and manifest in its effects such as flowers, fruits, etc. (65b8-20; Lamotte 1944-1980: 76). A similar vision of time is found in the *Atharvaveda*, which states that "time manifests all beings" (XIX 53.2; Silburn 1955: 138), and frequently in the *Mahābhārata*. Candrakīrti unconvincingly sees as the target of *MMK* 20.1 this hypostatized time, supposed to be proved by the reality of the processes observed in time, such as "the development and contraction of the universe" (May 1980: 232; see de Jong 1949: 43).

This image may lurk behind the delusion refuted in *MMK* 19, the notion that beings really come to be and pass away in time and that their reality is vouched for by the reality of time (though the mythic image would survive only in the most attenuated form in the Buddhist predecessors who are Nāgārjuna's immediate targets). But Garfield may mean by the super-time only what Loy means when he sees Nāgārjuna as refuting a "second, external time" that things are "within" (Loy 1988: 221). This idea, too, is hard to find in *MMK* 19.5, but it might have a point of attachment in 19.6a, whose logic underlies a statement of Āryadeva: "That [time] in which activity and inactivity are perceived in a thing depends upon something else and, consequently, is also an effect" (*Catuḥśataka* [*CŚ*] 9.7 [Lang 1986: 91]; cf. May 1980).

MMK 19.6 reads:

> *bhāvaṃ pratītya kālaś cet kālo bhāvād ṛte kutaḥ* |
> *na ca kaścana bhāvo 'sti kutaḥ kālo bhaviṣyati* ||.

Translations: "If it is assumed that time exists depending upon an existent, how can there be time without an existent? No existent whatsoever is found to exist. Where can time be?" (Kalupahana 1986: 278). "If time depends on an entity, then without an entity how could time exist? There is no existent entity. So how can time exist?" (Garfield 1995: 256). "If the course of things (time) exists presupposing things, how will it be able to exist without them? Now, nothing exists in itself. How then will time be able to exist?" (after Bugault 2002: 245).

Garfield finds this verse to be "double-edged": "Its positive reading contains Nāgārjuna's positive account of the nature of time. Nāgārjuna points out that with no entities to be temporally related, there is no time. That is, the only mode of existence that time has is as a set of relations among empirical phenomena. Apart from those phenomena and those relations, there is no time. (This insight is foundational for Dōgen's later analysis of *uji*, or being–time.) But that means that, given the lack of inherent existence of phenomena, there can be no inherent existence of time. Time is thus merely a dependent set of relations, not an entity in its own right" (Garfield 1995: 257). I am not at all sure that Nāgārjuna is concerned with a phenomenological inseparability of being and time. This would not be a novel idea.

> The Sarvāstivādins are partisans of momentariness; they do not admit an objective time, real in itself ... Time does not differ in nature from the constructive energies [better: conditioned formations] (*saṃskāra*); time is the *saṃskāra*s; the *saṃskāra*s are time. (Silburn 1955: 255)

Here already we have a kind of "being–time," though not in the rich Zen sense. Nāgārjuna does not need to argue against a bifurcation of concrete being and time as empty form. Rather he argues from the admitted co-implication of time and being that neither, because of their mutual dependency, can have inherent existence; or at least that since no being has inherent existence, time, which depends on beings, cannot have inherent existence either (*MMK* 19.6). Mutual establishing affects not only the three dimensions of past, present, future, but also the

relation between time and temporal things, which again are mutually dependent on each other for their existence. If there is no time apart from being, and no being apart from time, we are pushed beyond both to an awareness of empty reality that is neither time nor being. "Being–time" was glimpsed by the Sarvāstivādins, but Nāgārjuna pursues its logical implications to the point where emptiness emerges as the truth of this co-dependence of time and being.

The argument of *MMK* 19 is resumed in the following words:

> The three times (*kālatraya*) do not exist (substantially) since they are unfixed (*asthita*), mutually established (*parasparasiddha*), and since they change [and] since they are not self-established [and finally] since there is no being (*bhāva*). They are merely discriminations (*vikalpamātra*). (*ŚS* 29; Lindtner 1987: 47)

(Again I query the need to insert the qualifying expression "substantially.") The logical inseparability of the three dimensions, on its own, might serve only to break down a highly platonistic claim to the substantial existence of these dimensions, having no bearing on any extra-logical reality. The inseparability of time from phenomena, and its dependence on them, undercuts more effectively the power of time to establish itself against our lived existence. Since phenomena themselves are empty, time, dependent on them, is even more so.

What would it mean, phenomenologically, to say that past, present and future are merely *vikalpa*? Does it mean that they are merely the product of our acts of attending, springing up only when for some reason we need to think of them? Do we see the world in temporal terms only because of our needs? If past and future are mirages of regret and hope, the present, too, can be seen as the product of our attention to it. If past and future have no real existence, neither has the present, defined as it is in correlation to the other two. Talk of the present is also a convention, a concept of utilitarian character but ultimately unstable, useful for handling the constant movement of this saṃsāric world. No more than time itself does the "moment" have its own inherent essence. It is a concept we project onto the flow of things. No more than time itself does the "moment" exist separately from the provisional phenomena it serves to map and correlate. Indeed one might argue that past and future are more useful measuring devices than the moment, and in that sense enjoy a more secure provisional existence, whereas the speed with which the moment disappears shows up the emptiness of provisional existence more dramatically. Nāgārjuna does not descend to such phenomenological inquiries, for his argumentation is rigidly concentrated on a single purpose: to disprove the real existence of all the chief candidates for real existence.

If we give the abstract terms past, present and future concrete reference to the having arisen, arising, or not yet having arisen of *dharma*s, an idea dwelt on by Candrakīrti at the start of his comment on *MMK* 19 but not touched on by Nāgārjuna himself, the argument becomes more upsetting to our trust in temporal orientations and distinctions. The "I" that arises at this moment is no longer the "I" that arose a moment ago, but is the product of a whole new constellation of conditions. If I cling to the identity of past "I" and present "I," then I am trying to make past and present coincide, which ruins the identity of both. But if I rush to the other extreme and deny any continuity whatever, claiming that the past and present events are separate, unrelated *dharma*s, that just pop into existence like sky-blossoms appearing from nowhere (a position that can be either a stubborn "eternalist" strategy upholding the reality of the successive instantaneous Selves or a "nihilist" abandonment to irrationality), then I run into a basic law of temporal discourse, to the effect that the reality of any one dimension presupposes the reality of the others. Each relies on the others for its foundation, a radically un-

stable state of affairs. The uneasy logic of time-language leads to the conclusion that time can enjoy its flimsy provisional functioning at all only because it is basically not real.

Kṣaṇa-Thinking

Impermanence itself, just as much as dependent arising or emptiness, is a counter-intuitive truth, constantly forgotten, not something one simply registers once and for all. More counter-intuitive than impermanence, and more controversial, is the radical thesis of momentariness (*kṣaṇikatva*) developed over the centuries in Buddhist scholasticism. *kṣaṇa*-thinking seeks to grasp the ontological necessity that all conditioned things must perish, and indeed perish as soon as they come to be, so that everything is changing all the time, and nothing abides even for an instant. The historical and systematic connections between early Buddhist reflection on impermanence and the elaboration of *kṣaṇa*-argumentation are complex (Halbfass 1997: 236). The *kṣaṇa*-atomism is associated with the Sautrāntika milieu, the latest of the early Buddhist sects, which emerged in opposition to their parent sect, the Sarvāstivāda, about 150 BC (Bareau 1955: 34 and 155). However, other sects, including the Sarvāstivādins themselves, upheld absolute momentariness. No Sautrāntika treatises are extant. I do not know to what extent the ripostes to them in Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma reveal their special concern with the *kṣaṇa.* The usual accounts of their *kṣaṇa*-thinking draw on late works such as those of Vasubandhu (400–480) and Yaśomitra (c. sixth century CE).

In traditional Indian thought "the ordering of acts comes first and duration is only a consequence of this" so that "there is no duration as such, but successive discontinuous acts whose succession is more or less well regulated" (Silburn 1955: 1). Buddhism opposes the constructed time that derives from an activity of elaboration to the moment, which is independent of such activity. Against the ancient idea that "immortality is found in the prolongation of a well-constructed duration" (ibid., p. 3), Buddhism aims to put an end to duration in putting an end to the action that gives rise to it. In Sautrāntika, time is based on instants, and composed by a fiction of continuity. Ultimate reality is purely momentary, and is known in direct perception; temporal continuity is a mere conceptual construction:

> Sensation cannot produce the impression of changing nor that of lasting. Sensation is pure primitivity whereas the sense of duration, if it exists, is not primitive; we do not have the sensation of the past and the future, since sensation is exempt from memory. (Silburn 1955: 290).

According to Silburn, the Sautrāntikas argued that only the present *kṣaṇa* has substantive existence (*dravyasat*) whereas past and future exist only by designation (*prajñaptisat*). Silburn refers to *Abhidharmakośa* V.27 (La Vallée Poussin 1980: IV, p. 58); but note that Bareau, writing in the same year as Silburn's thesis (of 1948) was published, says he has never found attributed to the Sautrāntikas "the idea that things are not substances (*dravya*) but simple denominations (*prajñapti*)"; he sees the notion that the Sautrāntikas were predecessors of the Mahāyāna as a mistaken interpretation of their commonsensical rejection of some outlandish Sarvāstivāda claims (Bareau 1955: 302). Rejecting the substantive reality of past and future, the Sautrāntikas said: "If you do not accept that the elements no longer exist after having existed, it will not be possible for the three epochs to be established." To which the Sarvāstivādins replied (Silburn 1955: 268-269):

> We have never claimed that the past and the future exist in the manner of the present ... The three epochs, though constant in their true nature, are nonetheless diversified as regards activity, for there are an infinite number of ways of being.

The Sautrāntikas rejected this: something either really exists or is merely fictive, there is no middle ground. Likewise, either "the thing that endures [duration] is a fiction and the instants are real, or the latter are fictive and the former real" (ibid., p. 333). Madhyamaka, it seems, would be happy to admit that both duration and the instant are fictive, and that the present is as much a *prapañca* as the past and the future. Interestingly, the Sarvāstivādins had formulated the objection that if past and future are not real the present, too, is mere *prapañca*: "If the past and future are not real, the present does not exist either, for the present is designated (*prajñāpyate*) in consideration of (*apekṣya*) the past and the future" (Silburn 1955: 273, referencing the *Vibhāṣā* from the Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma, as translated in La Vallée Poussin 1937: 10-11). "If the future exists only as a designation, admit then that the present, too, exists as a designation and not as a thing" (Silburn 1955: 264, referencing ibid., pp. 47-48).

The doctrine of momentariness was refined when it became necessary to defend it against Brahmanic orthodoxy (Mimaki 1976: 1). The positions attacked and defended were generally Sautrāntika ones, and the logic of Dignāga (480–540) and Dharmakīrti (600–660) was the chief defensive weapon. The two chief arguments for momentariness in this tradition of debate were an argument from impermanence (*vināśitvānumāna*), which found mature formulation in Vasubandhu, and an argument from the very nature of being (*sattvānumāna*), which was introduced by Dharmakīrti and became the principal argument (see Frauwallner 1982 and Steinkellner 1968). Being was defined as causal efficacity (*arthakriyā*) and it was argued that only what is immediately present has such efficacity. In the later stages of this tradition, logic overrides intuition in establishing the truth of momentariness and appeal to direct experience plays a diminished role. Thus when Ratnakīrti (1000–1050) refutes an argument for permanence based on recognition, his inferential proof of the momentariness of things annuls the recognition of the pot I perceive today as the one I perceived yesterday. If it is objected that recognition is a perception (*pratyakṣa*) and thus a more trustworthy instrument of knowledge than inferential proof, the reply is that the two instruments of knowledge (*pramāṇa*) have the same validity; perception can annul inference only when the supposed inference is invalid; and conversely a valid inference can annul a fallacious perception (Mimaki 1976: 16-17).

A question one might ask about *kṣaṇa*-thinking is whether it really deepened the Buddhist awareness of impermanence or tended rather to distract from it. Buddhists seek to live in the present moment, in attentive mindfulness (*smṛti*, Pāli *sati*). Present action, the object of mindfulness, is not mapped in relation to any fixed image of a past to be carried through consistently or a future to be built. Such thinking of past and future would bring about the distracting imperfections listed in the *Upakkilesasutta* (*Majjhimanikāya* [*MN*] no. 128.16-27): doubt, inattention, sloth and torpor, fear, elation, inertia, excess of energy, deficiency of energy, longing, perception of diversity, excessive meditation. Each of these is a falling away from full consciousness of each moment of time (see Silburn 1955: 218). A monastic ordering of time permits attention to each moment as an end in itself, in detachment from utilitarian calculation. This is not hedonistic clinging to the moment or despairing abandonment to the moment (two sides of the same coin). Mindfulness controls the flux of saṃsāric life so as to reorient it to nirvāṇic detachment and simplicity. It embraces within the "specious present" a wise openness to past and future that gives this present "depth."

> The fact that parts of other moments of consciousness may, as it were, spread over the present moment or extend beyond it makes for an intricate interlacing and a close organic continuity in the world of mental phenomena. (Nyanaponika 1998: 95)

"Give up what is before, give up what is behind, give up what is in the middle" (*muñca pure muñca pacchato majjhe muñca*; *Dhammapada* [*DhP*] 348, tr. Radhakrishnan 1974: 167-168). This verse warns against clinging to the present as well as against clinging to past or future. When *kṣaṇa* theorists lay a heavy stress on the sole reality of the present instant, too confident in having isolated at last a secure or ultimate point of reference, they risk veering to the extreme positions of eternalism (*śāśvatānta*) or annihilationism (*ucchedānta*). The Sarvāstivādins are suspected of eternalist tendencies, in that, though committed to universal momentariness, they sought to give all moments some kind of permanent identity apart from their fleeting actuality when present. One might suspect that the Sautrāntikas, in corroding the reality of things to the point-instant, courted the risk of annihilationism.

kṣaṇa-essentialism might seem a recondite topic of critique today, but it has a similarity with the temptation to a reductive atomism that continues to haunt the western intellectual landscape – in an empiricist fixation on sense-data or bare particulars, a logical positivism seeking bedrock elementary propositions, a cult of the naked fact in historical research, or representations of the evolutionary process to a string of isolated chance events. The Buddhist doctrines of impermanence and mindfulness, especially as inflected by Zen, have been well received in the West. But the wisdom of living the present moment to the full can fall off into a new form of essentialism when it becomes a formula for hedonistic spontaneity, cutting off the wise attention to past and future that is part of authentic mindfulness; or it may take a grimmer, more stoical form: "The moment is all you've got, all you are." Celebration of such a misconceived present can be an unavowed nihilism. If there is nothing behind and nothing before, life is reduced to a narrow perch on a tightrope, a knife-edge. Paradoxically, this take on the impermanent present moment owes less to Buddhist tradition than to an age-old Western quest for permanence. Our cultural programming leads us to invest in the moment, erected into a pure self-sufficient reality, a locus of totally pristine sensation, perhaps of enlightened ecstasy, all the longings for certitude and stability that have been left frustrated by the collapse of Platonism. It is logical that Nietzsche's diagnosis of the "death of God" should issue in a cult of the moment and even its impossible eternalization in the notion of an "eternal return."

Momentariness in Nāgārjuna

If the doctrine of momentariness tended to harden into a scholastic atomism, we may expect there to have been a reaction to it from within Buddhism itself.

> To take the momentary mode of existence of phenomena, their destruction at each moment, as what truly constitutes their impermanence made perfect sense. Much more problematic is the situation once the practitioner operates in the doctrinal framework of the Mahāyāna tradition, and hence does not accept the existence of discrete momentary conditioned entities that have, despite their temporal and spatial minuteness, an innate own-being (*svabhāva*). (Rospatt 2004: 82)

This incompatibility between *kṣaṇa*-atomism and emptiness seems to underlie Nāgārjuna's refutations of Sautrāntika positions. No more than time itself does the moment have its own inherent essence. It is a concept we project onto the flow of things. No more than time itself does the moment exist separately from the provisional phenomena it serves to map and correlate. Indeed one might argue that past and future are more useful measuring devices than the moment, and in that sense enjoy a more secure provisional existence, whereas the speed with which the moment disappears shows up the emptiness of provisional existence more dramatically. Nāgārjuna does not descend to such phenomenological inquiries, for his argumentation

is rigidly concentrated on a single purpose: to disprove the real existence of all the chief candidates for real existence.

But it must be noted that the word *kṣaṇa* never occurs in the *MMK*.

> He refutes the arising and perishing of things, the three *saṃskṛtalakṣaṇa*s, persisting and non-persisting time, and even uses the idea of impermanence in one or more verses, but he does not go after momentariness *per se* … He may have been aware of the theory of momentariness, or of a theory developing in this direction, but it may still have been a controversial or possibly even esoteric theory in his circles. (Anne MacDonald, personal communication)

Full-fledged *kṣaṇa*-theorizing begins only after Nāgārjuna, and some suggest that he may have prompted its formation as a way of saving reality from his criticism (Vetter 1997: 169); this is in contrast with Conze's account of the Sarvāstivādins as having originally being prompted by the dangers of momentariness to posit an existence of past and future *dharma*s (Conze 1967: 138-139). The word *kṣaṇa* may have been used elsewhere by Nāgārjuna, if Lindtner's translation from the Tibetan is followed:

> Since one moment of mind (*buddhikṣaṇa*) cannot within [the very same] moment (*kṣaṇa*) grasp a form (*rūpa*) born as explained, how could it understand a past (*atīta*) and a future (*anāgata*) form (*rūpa*)? (*ŚS* 49; Lindtner 1987: 57)

MMK 20.6 is typical of a form of argument that recurs often:

> *hetuṃ phalasyādattvā ca yadi hetur nirudhyate |*
> *hetau niruddhe jātaṃ tat phalam āhetukaṃ bhavet ||.*

Kalupahana translates (1986: 282): "If the cause were to cease without passing on the causal status to the effect, then the effect that is born when the cause has ceased would be without a cause." Bugault is more perspicuous: "If the cause were destroyed without having given that which is cause for the fruit, that fruit, since the cause is destroyed, would be born without cause" (Bugault 2002: 252). Kalupahana, as he often does, invokes *kṣaṇa*-thinking here:

> With the dominance of the linear view of causation as well as the theory of momentary destruction (*kṣaṇa-bhaṅga*) of phenomena, the question was raised as to how the cause in the present moment could give rise to the effect in the succeeding moment. The answer was that the effect comes to be without a pause or gap (*samantara nirvarttanāt*). The effect is both given (*datta*), in the sense of being put forward (*prayacchati*) by the cause, and at the same time not given (*na puna dattam*) because it is not identical (*tad eva*) with the cause. (Kalupahana 1986: 282, referring to *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*, ed. Pradhan, p. 99)

Often it is hard to see if something as concrete as the momentary destruction of phenomena is under attack or whether the argument is confined to a more abstract, dialectical plane, simply showing the impossibility of attributing self-nature to movement, without specifying a precise theory.

In *MMK* 21, at the last stage of his examination of relative realities, just before going on to ultimates such as the Tathāgata (*MMK* 22), the Fourfold Truth (*MMK* 24) and *nirvāṇa* (*MMK* 25), Nāgārjuna shows the mutual incompatibility between an existence (*saṃbhava*) that entails dissolution (*vibhava*) and a dissolution that immediately entails existence, in addition to the fact that both are self-contradictory. This refutation of the arising and perishing of things seems to have in view "the phenomenon of momentary impermanence" (Garfield 1995: 267). At least that would be the most graphic example of a *saṃbhava* that immediately entails *vibhava*. In this discussion, too, he remains a rigorous critic of language, eschewing a phenomenological approach for an exposure of the contradictions even in what seem the most innocent svabhāvic assumptions. Candrakīrti takes *MMK* 21, as he took *MMK* 20, to be di-

rected against those who think that time has a real existence. They claim that it is thanks to the existence of time that things are produced and perish, and the Madhyamakas reply that this might be so if things were really produced and destroyed, but they are not (de Jong 1949: 57). This reference to time seems an irrelevant carry-over from *MMK* 19, nor is the existence of time further discussed in Candrakīrti's remarks on *MMK* 20-21. He does not refer *MMK* 21 to the concept of the *kṣaṇa*.

A good reason to connect *MMK* 21 with the *kṣaṇa*-theory is that otherwise its arguments do not hold up very well. Oetke finds an equivocal amphiboly between temporal and non-temporal senses of the terms in *MMK* 21.4: "How should there be production without destruction? For impermanence is never not found in the things." He thinks that Nāgārjuna's argument limps, and is propped up only by a variant of the "tacit premise": production and destruction can be "together with" each other, in a non-temporal logical sense, only if they coexist temporally (Oetke 1990: 104). But if the non-temporal reading is ruled out altogether and we take it that in 4b "the temporal quantifier is used in its primary and literal sense so that the sentence may be taken to say that everything possesses always the property of impermanence" (ibid., p. 94), then, it seems to me, Nāgārjuna's arguments make perfect sense. Their "tacit premise" is simply the view that *dharma*s have only momentary existence, so that they perish as soon as they are produced. The passage "from having always the property of impermanence to the actual destruction at every time of a thing's existence" indeed "involves more than mere paraphrasing" (ibid.). But if the context is *kṣaṇa*-thinking (not necessarily in a very developed form), the immediate entailment of momentariness by impermanence has already been established and can be presupposed. The location of the chapter suggests that Nāgārjuna is tackling a last outpost of svabhāvic thought rather than returning to generalities. In pointing out the inherent contradictoriness of momentary production–destruction he forbids us to repose in the idea of the moment, though it comes so close to the insight into emptiness. Rather we must accept the emptiness of the categories of production and destruction, as the doctrine of instantaneous production–destruction comes close to confessing. The breakdown of these categories voids the moment of its last shred of real existence.

There is, however, a text in which Nāgārjuna explicitly tackles *kṣaṇa*-thinking in its Sautrāntika form. In *Ratnāvalī* (*RV*) I 66-74 he defends momentariness against the Vaiśeṣika, and then goes on to refute an inherently existing *kṣaṇa*. The authenticity of this text has been questioned, rather inconclusively (Vetter 1992); it is drawn on by Christina Scherrer-Schaub in her quest for Nāgārjuna's historical context (in her courses at the École Pratique des Hautes Études). The text confirms in any case that "if [the Madhyamakas] turn to the issue of momentariness at all, then they usually do so only in order to combat it insofar as it is taken to affirm the existence of momentary entities" (Rospatt 1995: 7). Here are verses I 68-70:

> When a thing ceases to exist through momentariness,
> How can anything be old?
> When a thing is non-momentary due to constancy
> How can anything be old?
>
> Since a moment ends it must have
> A beginning and a middle,
> This triple nature of a moment means
> That the world never abides for an instant.
>
> Also the beginning, middle and end
> Are to be analysed like a moment;
> Therefore, beginning, middle and end
> Are not [produced] from self or other. (Hopkins 1975: 26-27)

The *kṣaṇa* appears as the last desperate refuge of a clinging to *svabhāva*, and is subjected to the same dialectical barrage as other claimants to real existence.

Momentariness as the Gate of Emptiness in the *Mahāprajñāpāramitāśāstra*

To pit Nāgārjuna against momentariness is an unsatisfactory exercise, for reasons we have seen. But I shall now take a wide step to another text in the vast reaches of the Madhyamaka tradition, namely the *MPPŚ*, extant only in Chinese, which is a commentary on the *Perfection of Wisdom Sūtra in 8000 Lines*. It may still be true that the Perfection of Wisdom scriptures provide the horizon for a full understanding of Nāgārjuna's thought. The commentator surely found a close link between the Sūtra and Nāgārjuna, since in the course of the work he quotes most of the *MMK*. Consultation of this work cannot confirm the connection we attempted to discern between *MMK* 21 and *kṣaṇa*-thinking, but it does provide a rich context in which a critique of momentariness would develop along lines comparable to Nāgārjuna's critique of other concepts. The text is an interesting chapter in the *Wirkungsgeschichte* of the *MMK*, particularly as giving a sense of the spiritual upshot of Nāgārjuna's analyses. Alexander Rospatt suggested at the 2002 Straniak Stiftung symposium that

> the link between impermanence and emptiness follows from spiritual practice, particularly if *anityatā* is radicalized in terms of momentariness ... It seems almost inevitable that in a Mahāyāna setting this undermining of substantial existence was taken even further, and that the point to which existence had become reduced was finally also erased. (Rospatt 2004: 83)

He cites a Burmese *vipassanā* teacher's testimony that "the experience of momentariness may give way to a meditative state where phenomena cease to exist entirely as separate entities with an own-being," a state in which the objects observed so far "are no longer there and seem to have ceased to exist" (Rospatt 2002: 15-16).

The author of the *MPPŚ*, a master of Abhidharma lore, firmly associates impermanence with momentariness, paraphrasing "all *saṃskāra*s are impermanent" as follows: "all conditioned *dharma*s, being born and perishing from instant to instant, are impermanent" (222a29; Lamotte 1944-1980: 1370). Is there a logical progression from the doctrine of instantaneity to the realization of emptiness? Or is the *kṣaṇa*-theory a svabhāvic cul-de-sac to be refuted on the path through impermanence to emptiness? According to Rospatt there is a *prima facie* contradiction between impermanence and emptiness, insofar as the doctrine of emptiness "is clearly at odds with the Buddha's teaching on *anityatā* inasmuch as this teaching implies that there are real phenomena which are subject to origination and destruction." The contradiction was resolved ingeniously:

> To be *a-nitya* (im-permanent) was interpreted to mean *nityam a-sat* ("permanently, i.e. forever, non-existing"). This denial of existence does not refer directly to the characterized entity as such, but to its supposed own-being or essence (*svabhāva*). Thus the Buddha's teaching that all entities are *anitya* comes to affirm the Mahāyāna teaching that all entities are devoid of substantial existence. (Rospatt 2002: 15-16)

The *MPPŚ* sees impermanence, understood as momentariness, as taking us across the threshold of insight into emptiness:

> Question: Mahāyāna teaches that *dharma*s do not arise and do not perish, and have but one characteristic (*lakṣaṇa*), namely the absence of characteristics. Why is it said here that "all *saṃskāra*s are impermanent" and that this is a seal of the doctrine? How do these teachings not contradict one another?
> Answer: To consider impermanence is to consider emptiness. If one considers instantaneous and impermanent matter (*rūpa*), one knows it as empty. Past matter, being already destroyed, is in-

> visible, hence without the characteristic of matter. Future matter, not yet being born, is without activity, without function, and invisible, hence without the characteristic of matter. Present matter, too, is without duration, invisible, and indiscernable, hence without the characteristic of matter. The absence of the characteristic of matter is emptiness; emptiness is non-birth and non-destruction. Non-birth and non-destruction are in reality one and the same thing as birth and destruction ... Present matter has no duration ... Every *dharma* found retrospectively to have the characteristic of destruction must have it from its birth, but this is not known because of its subtlety ... As the characteristics of birth and destruction always attend the *saṃskāra*s, there is no duration. If there were duration, there would be neither birth nor destruction. Hence present matter has no duration and, in duration, there is neither birth nor destruction, for duration reduced to a unique instant characterises the *saṃskāra*s. (222b27-c6.8-10, 13-16; Lamotte 1944-1980: 1376-1377)

Here the refutation of birth and destruction is derived from examination of the instant. In the instant, matter (or any other phenomenon examined) has no duration; if it did it would be free of birth and destruction; thus birth and destruction coincide in the instant and this makes them equivalent to no birth or destruction. On the basis of momentariness, as the immediate conjunction of birth and destruction, matter is shown to be empty of all characteristics, including birth and destruction. Here birth and destruction prove their own emptiness by their momentariness. In *MMK* 21 they are not given a chance to prove anything, for the legitimacy of the very terms is undercut from the start. The argument there was that it is impossible for there to be production with destruction or production without destruction; since production and destruction are impossible concepts, entities have no real existence, for entities cannot exist apart from production and destruction (*MMK* 21.8). Their emptiness is thus not traced to the rapidity of their production–destruction but to the impossibility of thinking in this way at all. Unlike *MPPŚ*, *MMK* 21 seems to bypass *kṣaṇa*-thinking completely.

Yet the *MPPŚ* denies the reality of birth and destruction as much as of duration. It has invoked impermanence and momentariness, but only as a provisional rhetoric. In reality impermanence does not exist:

> Question: What is the complete notion of *anityatā*?
> Answer: To see the conditioned entities arising and perishing in every moment as dust blown by the wind, as water flowing from a fountain, as flames falling away one after another. All conditioned entities are devoid of solidity, devoid of energy: they can neither be grasped nor be clung to. As illusions they deceive fools. Through this *anityatā* one obtains entry into the gate of *śūnyatā*. Since in emptiness no *dharma* exists, neither does impermanence exist. Why is this? Birth, duration and destruction do not coexist in one and the same instant ... They are mutually opposed by their characters and nature ... Because they do not exist, neither does impermanence. (*MPPŚ* 229b14-22 [Lamotte 1944-1980: 1436]; see also 171a24-b15 [Lamotte 1944-1980: 920-923]; 287c; 290c)

The Buddha spoke of impermanence only to destroy eternalism, among other reasons, and not because he took impermanence to be real. The doctrine of impermanence is of a remedial, not an ultimate nature, and is only the first door to emptiness (228b22-28 [Lamotte 1944-1980: 1436-1437]; 193b1-6 [ibid., pp. 1083-1084]; see Ramanan 1978: 177). Nāgārjuna has a similar attitude to impermanence. Just as letting go of past and future entails letting go of present, so, by a similar logic, to let go of permanence requires that one let go of impermanence as well. Buddhism begins by asserting impermanence against permanence, the present against past and future, but at a higher level it deconstructs the dualism and fixation implicit in such oppositions. "[In a relative sense] everything is impermanent, but [in the absolute sense] nothing is permanent or impermanent" (*ŚS* 58; Lindtner 1987: 61). But it is not necessary to invoke the two truths here; if all is impermanent, there is no permanence to oppose to it, so the permanent/impermanent distinction breaks down. Note that there is an echo here of

the *Prajñāpāramitāsūtra*s, which deny the applicability of a set of paired categories to any *dharma* (beginning with form, *rūpa*). The first pair listed is "impermanent" and "permanent":

> If he does not course in the idea that "form is not permanent or impermanent," "not ease or ill," etc., then he courses in perfect wisdom. And why? That form does not exist in such a way that impermanent or permanent, ease or ill, self or not-self, attractive or repulsive (can be predicated) of it. (Conze 1979: 302; see also ibid., pp. 306 and 314)

"The notion of impermanence is pure when it grasps impermanence correctly, impure when it begins to study impermanence" (229c17-18; Lamotte 1944-1980: 1438). Here we see a thrust against scholastic analysis of impermanence, such as the *kṣaṇa*-theorists practised. The enlightened *bodhisattva* does not bother with any form of examination, such as examination of impermanence, pain, emptiness, non-Self, birth and destruction, existence, non-existence, neither existence nor non-existence. He rejects all such vain chatter (*prapañca*) (205a20-23; Lamotte 1944-1980: 1202). In the *MMK*, too, analysis of the impermanent realities, valuable as it is, does not take us all the way to the ultimate "quiescence of fabrications" (*MMK* dedication verse and 25.24). For this one has to allow the conventional status of the analysis itself to come to light, so that it, too, is seen as fabrication.

An instance of this is the surpassing of temporal analysis in the insight that time does not exist at all. Ramanan claims that in the *MPPŚ*, "the denial of time as a substance is not a total denial of time but is a revelation of time as a derived notion" (Ramanan 1978: 197).

> If there were absolutely no past and future, if there were only the present lasting for a moment, then even the Buddha could not have striven in the path and achieved the immeasurable merits ... So it must be known that the past and future are there indeed. (254c14-18; Lamotte 1944-1980: 1691)

That sounds rather like Garfield's reading of *MMK* 19. But Ramanan fails to notice that this is a Sarvāstivāda statement! The Mahāyāna position (255a23-b15; Lamotte 1944-1980: 1694-1695) contradicts it: time does not exist. The Buddha's analysis of the three times and his unobstructed penetration of their nature is not yet insight into emptiness; this *dharma*-analysis is surpassed by the preaching of unlimited emptiness: as the triple time does not exist, nothing whatever exists. This is presented as a teaching of the *Prajñāpāramitāsūtra*s.

Undoubtedly there is a more absolutistic feel to the discourse on time in the *MPPŚ* and in Candrakīrti than is apparent in the *MMK.* Yet what these later developments suggest at least is that Nāgārjuna lends himself to be used not only to shatter metaphysical reifications, or the dogmatism of *kṣaṇa*-thinking, but equally the rigidity of our trust in normal temporal categories. Time, like everything that arises in dependent co-origination, is proved to be unreal and empty, and this is a step to the supreme liberating vision wherein the dependent (*pratītya*) and relative (*upādāya*) world of becoming is shown, as non-dependent and non-relative, to be *nirvāṇa* (*MMK* 25.9). This idea should not be invoked blithely. "The eventual equation of the phenomenal world with emptiness, of *saṃsāra* with *nirvāṇa*, and of the conventional and the ultimate" (Garfield 1995: 101) is very, very eventual, so that only a Buddha can perceive it correctly. Asserted too early, too sweepingly, it can short-circuit the path to liberation. To say that emptiness is "merely a characteristic of conventional reality" (ibid., p. 91) could imply that Madhyamaka thought is merely a wise conventionalism, and that if one just gets the conventions right one is already in touch with emptiness, already enjoying *nirvāṇa.* I have tried to suggest that Madhyamaka arguments that allow time and the *kṣaṇa* to deconstruct themselves are aiming not at a demystified vision of temporal conventions, but at a vision of emp-

tiness in which time is not seen at all, or seen at most as a useful mirage for guiding the suffering sentient beings who are still entangled in delusive temporal categories.

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KV	*Kathāvatthu*, tr. in Aung and Rhys Davids 1969.
CŚ	*Catuḥśataka* of Āryadeva, tr. in Lang 1986.
Dhp	*Dhammapada*, ed. and tr. in Radhakrishnan 1974.
PP	*Prasannapadā* of Candrakīrti, tr. in Sprung 1979.
MN	*Majjhimanikāya*, tr. in Ñāṇamoli and Bodhi 1995.
MPPŚ	*Mahāprajñāpāramitāśāstra*, Taishō ed. No. 1509; tr. in Lamotte 1944-1980.
MMK	*Mūlamadhyamakakārikā*. Ed. Jan W. de Jong. Adyar 1977. Tr. in Kalupahana 1986, Garfield 1995 and Bugault 2002.
RV	*Ratnāvalī*, tr. in Hopkins 1975.
ŚS	*Śūnyatāsaptatī*, ed. and tr. in Lindtner 1987.

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Lambert Schmithausen

Nichtselbst, Leerheit und altruistische Ethik im *Bodhicaryāvatāra*

1. Einleitung

Bei heutigen Buddhisten und auch bei Buddhologen – zumal solchen, die selbst Buddhisten sind – liest man nicht selten, die Einsicht in das Nichtvorhandensein eines Selbstes oder in die Leerheit münde *zwangsläufig* in universales Mitleid ein. Das ist jedoch m.E. nicht ohne weiteres einsichtig. Einsichtig erscheint eher *Loslösung* von den als nichtselbsthaft bzw. leer erkannten Dingen, und folglich *Aufhören* von Handlungen, die auf dem Anhaften an ihnen basieren. Woher aber soll der Impuls für ein darüber hinausgehendes altruistisches Tätigwerden kommen? Kommt er wirklich allein aus der Nichtselbst- bzw. Leerheitserfahrung? Oder kommt er nur zum Vorschein, wenn er schon vorher unabhängig davon – durch Üben von Mitgefühl etwa – in das Persönlichkeitskontinuum eingespeist worden ist, und wird durch die genannten Erfahrungen lediglich von Behinderungen befreit?

Für den Ideengeschichtler und Philologen liegt es nahe, zunächst einmal die traditionellen Texte nach einer Antwort zu durchforsten. Nach meinem bisherigen Eindruck, den ich vor einigen Jahren, auf der Basis zugestandenermaßen keineswegs erschöpfender Untersuchungen, in zwei kurzen Beiträgen[1] zu skizzieren versucht habe, ist eine solche automatische Ableitung des Mitleids aus dem Nichtvorhandensein eines Selbstes oder aus der Leerheit zumindest in der vor- bzw. nicht-tantrischen Primärliteratur des indischen Buddhismus relativ selten, bzw. nur unter bestimmten Bedingungen, anzutreffen.

Im alten Buddhismus dient die Betrachtung der Nichtselbsthaftigkeit nach allem, was ich sagen kann, stets der *Loslösung*. Loslösung und Mitleid sind zwar nicht inkompatibel, können aber doch auch in einer gewissen Spannung zueinander stehen.[2] Zur Begründung von ethischem Verhalten wird in den kanonischen Texten m.W. nicht die Nichtselbsthaftigkeit (der Persönlichkeitskonstituenten etc.) bzw. die Nichtfeststellbarkeit eines Selbstes (*attan/ātman*) herangezogen, sondern (neben der Karma-Lehre)[3] die "Goldene Regel", nach der die anderen so zu behandeln sind, wie man selbst behandelt werden möchte. Hier ist also das Selbst nicht eliminiert, sondern im Gegenteil – unhinterfragt – vorausgesetzt.[4]

Auch für das Mahāyāna bezeugen nach meinen bisherigen Beobachtungen nur wenige Texte eine direkte Ableitung des Mitleids aus der Leerheit, und es bleibt offen, wie das zu verstehen ist.[5] Viel häufiger findet man Aussagen, nach denen zwar beide für den Bodhisattva-Weg unabdingbar sind, sie aber keinesfalls zwangsläufig einander nach sich ziehen, sondern eher geradezu in einer Spannung zueinander stehen und sorgfältig gegeneinander ausbalanciert

[1] Sc. Schmithausen 2000a und 2000b.

[2] Am eklatantesten in der Schmithausen 2000a: 135-136 (mit Anm. 76) zitierten *Vibhāṣā*-Stelle (*T* Bd. 27, 428c17-21).

[3] Und gelegentlich auch dem Hinweis auf diesseitige Nach- und Vorteile (so z.B. *Majjhimanikāya* Bd. III, pp. 163-164 und 170-171). Auch im *BCA* wird beiläufig auf die erwünschten und unerwünschten Folgen im Jenseits (8.126-129) und Diesseits (8.132) hingewiesen.

[4] Schmithausen 2000a: 127-128 und 2000c: 30-34.

[5] Ders. 2000b: 448-449.

Karin Preisendanz (ed.), *Expanding and Merging Horizons*: *Contributions to South Asian and Cross-Cultural Studies in Commemoration of Wilhelm Halbfass*, Wien: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 2007, pp. 551-570.

werden müssen.[6] Manchmal heißt es, daß in der *eigentlichen* Leerheitserfahrung das Mitleid nicht aktuell auftreten könne, sondern nur im Anschluß an diese.[7] Allenfalls beim Buddha wird eine vollkommene Synthese postuliert (und offenbar auch in der Vajrayāna-Praxis,[8] vielleicht, weil sie "die Frucht zum Weg macht", d.h. den Status eines Buddha durch meditativ–rituelle Vorwegnahme zu realisieren versucht).

Zur Ethik-Begründung dient auch im Mahāyāna häufig die Goldene Regel in Gestalt der Betrachtung der anderen bzw. aller Lebewesen als einem selbst gleich (*ātma-para-samacittatā* etc.); so etwa im *Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra*, wo dies einmal (vs. 14.37) auch als "Sehen eines großen Selbstes" bezeichnet wird. Sie kann aber vermittels der Schau der Leerheit als des einheitlichen wahren Wesens aller Dinge und Lebewesen (*dharmadhātu*) vertieft werden, wobei es in diesem Zusammenhang aber weniger auf den Aspekt der Leerheit als auf den ihrer *Allgegenwart* ankommt.[9] Möglicherweise stammt dieser Gedanke aus Kreisen, die den *tathāgatagarbha*-Gedanken lehrten, die verborgene oder potentielle Anwesenheit der Buddhaschaft in allen Lebewesen. In einer Lehrrede dieser Tradition, dem *Aṅgulimālīyasūtra*, wird jedenfalls die Anwesenheit eines durchgängigen, einheitlichen Wesens in allen Lebewesen ausdrücklich als Grund für asketisch–ethisches Verhalten ihnen gegenüber gelehrt.[10] Die verborgene oder potentielle Buddhaschaft in den Lebewesen kann natürlich auch unabhängig von einer solchen Wesenseinheit eine Haltung des *Respektes* ihnen gegenüber begründen.[11]

Śāntidevas *Bodhicaryāvatāra* (*BCA*) ist im Rahmen dieses zentralen Fragenkomplexes von großem Interesse, nicht zuletzt weil sein Verfasser sich eingehend um die Begründung bzw. Motivation altruistischen Verhaltens bemüht und dabei auch neue Wege zu gehen scheint. Es gibt jedoch im 9. Kapitel des *BCA* (über die Einsicht, *prajñā*) auch ein paar Stellen, an denen die Spannung zwischen Nichtselbst bzw. Leerheit einerseits und Mitleid bzw. altruistischer Ethik andererseits zum Ausdruck kommt, und auf diese möchte ich zuerst eingehen (Abschnitt 2). Anschließend sollen dann einige Partien des *BCA*, die sich um die Motivierung eines altruistischen Verhaltens bemühen, besprochen werden, zunächst solche aus dem 8. Kapitel (Abschnitt 3), und dann eine aus dem 6. Kapitel (Abschnitt 4). Ich ziehe dabei auch Prajñākaramatis Kommentar (*BCAP*) mit hinzu, da er zur Klärung der Argumentation Śāntidevas wesentlich beiträgt und in einigen Fällen diese auch weiterführt. Auf eine darüber hinausgehende Berücksichtigung der umfangreichen indischen und tibetischen Kommentar-Literatur, wie sie für einzelne Verse von Paul Williams (1998) durchgeführt wurde, muß ich

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[6] Ders. 2000b: 442-446. Die "mit allen vorzüglichen Qualitäten versehene Leerheit" ist, wenn ich recht sehe, ein Ausdruck für eben diese Balance: vgl. *Aṣṭasāhasrikā* (*Aṣṭ*) p. 183,10, dazu *Abhisamayālaṅkārālokā* (*AAĀ*) p. 496,9: "'mit allen vorzüglichen Qualitäten versehen', d.h. nicht ohne Freigebigkeit usw." (*sarvākāravaropetām iti dānādy-avikalām*).

[7] Ders. 2000b: 448 mit Anm. 66. Ich erinnere mich, daß der Dalai Lama in einer seiner Unterweisungen im Herbst 1998 in Schneverdingen eine ähnliche Feststellung machte, mit dem Zusatz, daß Koinzidenz nur in der tantrischen Praxis möglich sei. Explizit im gleichen Sinne auch Geshe Thubten Ngawang in: *Tibet und Buddhismus* (Vierteljahresschrift des Tibetischen Zentrums e.V. Hamburg), 16. Jg. Nr. 63 (2002): 11: "Im Vollkommenheitsfahrzeug" werden "Weisheit und Methode ... voneinander getrennt praktiziert. Im Tantrayāna ... werden Weisheit und Methode als Einheit geübt."

[8] Vgl. die vorige n.

[9] Schmithausen 2000b: 449-450 und 2000c: 34.

[10] *Peking-Kanjur* mDo, Bd. Tsu, 202b2-205a8 ≈ *T* Bd. 2, 540a18-541a24 (Abstandnehmen von Geschlechtsverkehr, Töten und Fleischverzehr). Vgl. Schmithausen 2000b: 450 und 2000c: 34.

[11] *Ratnagotravibhāga* (ed. E.H. Johnston, Patna 1950) 1.166.

im Rahmen dieses Beitrages verzichten. Mein Ziel liegt nicht in einer erschöpfenden Analyse des exegetischen oder logischen Potentials der einzelnen Gedankengänge oder gar in einer philosophischen Kritik. Es geht mir mehr um eine Herausarbeitung der *Bandbreite* dieser Gedankengänge, bei denen es sich m.E., auch wenn manche in der Gestalt formeller Schlußfolgerungen auftreten, letztlich weniger um Beweise als um *Betrachtungen* handelt, mit denen der angehende Bodhisattva die eigene altruistische Gesinnung, nach der er strebt, festigen soll. Aus dieser Perspektive hoffe ich, mit den vorliegenden Zeilen einen kleinen Beitrag zum Verständnis des *BCA* zu leisten, wenngleich in dem Bewußtsein, daß er angesichts seines zugestandenermaßen skizzenhaften Charakters den Ansprüchen des Kollegen, dessen Andenken dieser Band gewidmet ist, kaum genügt hätte.

2. Zur Spannung zwischen Loslösung und Zuwendung

2.1. Spannung zwischen Nichtselbst und Mitleid

Der Vers *BCA* 9.76, der auch in der älteren Fassung des *BCA*[12] (Tun-huang-Fassung [*Th*] 8.53) eine weitgehende Entsprechung hat, steht im Kontext der Widerlegung eines wie auch immer zu denkenden durchgängigen, mit sich selbst identischen Ichs (*aham*), Selbstes (*ātman*) oder Lebewesens (*sattva*) – wir würden vielleicht eher sagen: einer Person, aber der indische Begriff *sattva* schließt auch Tiere ein. Ein solches Ich oder Lebewesen, welches das Bündel von Reihen augenblicklicher Faktoren, das wir, zumeist unter Voraussetzung eines solchen vereinheitlichenden Prinzips, als "Ich" oder "Lebewesen" anzusprechen gewohnt sind, zu einer dauerhaften Ganzheit zusammenschlösse, ist nach buddhistischer Auffassung bei eingehender Analyse unter, neben oder hinter den beobachtbaren Faktoren nicht festzustellen:

> Ebenso wie [sich] der Stamm einer Bananenstaude, wenn man ihn zerlegt, als keiner [erweist] (er ist bekanntlich hohl!), so [erweist sich] auch das Ich, wenn man es kritisch prüft, als inexistent. (*BCA* 9.75 = *Th* 8.55)[13]

In Vers 76 stellt nun ein Opponent dem Proponenten, der von der Nichtexistenz eines Selbstes oder ganzheitlichen Lebewesens überzeugt ist, die naheliegende Frage:

> Wenn es kein Lebewesen gäbe, worauf könnte sich dann das Mitgefühl richten? (*BCA* 9.76ab)

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[12] D.h. der in tibetischen Hss. aus Tun-huang erhaltenen kürzeren Version, die den Verfasser Akṣayamati – nach Saito (1986: 100-101 und 1993: 20-22) ein Epithet Śāntidevas – nennt und die auch einem anonymen, in tibetischer Übersetzung erhaltenen Kommentar zugrundeliegt (Näheres s. Saito 1986: 98-100 und 1993: 16). Nach Saito (1986: 103-104) ist die kürzere Fassung die ältere und dürfte im wesentlichen den authentischen Text repräsentieren, während die längere, auf Sanskrit erhaltene Fassung eine spätere, nicht auf den ursprünglichen Verfasser zurückgehende Überarbeitung darstellt. Sie unterscheidet sich von der kürzeren Fassung nicht nur durch die Zahl der Kapitel (10 statt 9, weil das 2. Kapitel der kürzeren Fassung in der längeren in zwei Kapitel aufgeteilt wurde), sondern, vor allem in den späteren Kapiteln, auch durch Umformulierungen, (z.T. erhebliche) Zufügungen, aber auch Auslassungen sowie Änderungen der Anordnung des Materials (vgl. Abschnitt 3 mit n. 25). Für die Fragestellung der vorliegenden Untersuchung spielt es keine Rolle, ob die auf Sanskrit erhaltene längere Fassung von einem anderen Autor als die kürzere stammt, da es mir um die Bandbreite der Ideen als solcher geht. Ich gehe daher durchweg von der Sanskrit-Fassung aus und nenne den Verfasser weiterhin Śāntideva, ohne damit eine Aussage über den Urheber der Überarbeitung machen zu wollen. Durch Hinweise auf die jeweilige textliche Grundlage wird aber auch dem Aspekt der ideengeschichtlichen Entwicklung Rechnung getragen, auch wenn diese als solche nicht thematisiert wird.

[13] In der kürzeren Version steht dieser Vers also nicht vor, sondern, durch einen weiteren Vers davon getrennt, *hinter* dem 9.76 entsprechenden Vers (Saito 1993: 18 und 2000: 56).

Der Opponent betrachtet ganz offenkundig das Mitleid mitnichten als einen automatischen Ausfluß der vom Proponenten vertretenen Nichtexistenz eines Selbstes, sondern sieht ganz im Gegenteil einen Widerspruch oder jedenfalls eine Spannung zwischen beiden.

Die Antwort Śāntidevas erkennt diese Spannung durchaus an. Sie lautet in der kürzeren Fassung:

> [Das Mitleid richtet sich auf ein Lebewesen,] das man sich, lediglich als Zugeständnis um des Zieles willen, als Selbst vorstellt. (*Th* 8.53ab)

Es ist am einfachsten, "Selbst" hier im Sinne von "Person" allgemein, also nicht im Sinne speziell der *eigenen* Person, zu verstehen. Dies stützt nicht nur der Kommentar zu der älteren Version (der verschiedene Gründe dafür anführt, warum es in vielen Situationen praktischer ist, von Personen oder Devadatta usw. zu reden als von *skandha*-Bündeln).[14] Auch die längere Version spricht hierfür, insofern sie das Wort "Selbst" gar nicht (mehr) verwendet. Hier heißt es nämlich:

> [Das Mitleid richtet sich auf ein Lebewesen,] das bloß vorgestellt ist, [allerdings] mittels eines Irrtums, den man um des Zieles willen zugesteht (oder: sich [als bewußtes Zugeständnis] zueigen macht). (*BCA* 9.76cd)

Der Begriff des Zieles (*kārya*) impliziert aber auch seinerseits wieder die Vorstellung eines Lebewesens, *dessen* Ziel es ist und das sich um seine Verwirklichung bemüht, also die Vorstellung der Person des Bodhisattva selbst. Die längere Version bringt dies in der Tat ausdrücklich zur Sprache (*BCA* 9.77). Auch in diesem Fall handelt es sich jedoch, so der Text, um einen (als bewußtes Zugeständnis akzeptierten) Irrtum (*moha*). Ein solcher zur Verwirklichung eines Zieles akzeptierter Irrtum werde, so der Text, *nicht* abgelehnt, wenn er dem Zurruhekommen des Leidens dient. Gemeint ist, im Falle des Bodhisattva, gewiß nicht nur das Zurruhekommen des eigenen Leides, sondern, wie Prajñākaramati (*BCAP* p. 490,6) richtig feststellt, zugleich die Beseitigung des Leidens möglichst aller Lebewesen. Eine solche Beseitigung ist allerdings nur mittels Erlangung der Buddhaschaft realisierbar, und nach Auffassung Prajñākaramatis (p. 488,1) ist mit dem Ziel (*kārya*) eben die Buddhaschaft gemeint, die ihrerseits das Nichtwahrnehmen (*anupalambha*) aller *dharma*s voraussetzt (p. 488,1-2). Der Weg hierhin ist jedoch lang und mühsam und wird nur aufgrund der motivierenden Kraft des Mitleids (*karuṇā*) in Angriff genommen (p. 488,2-4). Dieses aber hat, jedenfalls zu Beginn des Bodhisattva-Weges, die leidenden Lebewesen zum Gegenstand (pp. 487,9 und 488,4-5).

Die Lebewesen sind somit zwar der eigentliche Anlaß und somit Voraussetzung für den Bodhisattva-Weg, sind aber auf der Ebene der höchsten Wahrheit (bzw. Wirklichkeit) verschwunden und nur rekonstituierbar, wenn man sich auf die Ebene des Irrtums (*moha*) bzw., so Prajñākaramati, der vordergründigen Wahrheit, der letzlich illusorischen Normal-Wirklichkeit (*saṃvṛti-satya*), zurückbegibt (*BCAP* p. 488,5-6).[15] Man kann vielleicht sagen: Die im Traum des *saṃsāra* als leidend wahrgenommenen Mit-Lebewesen, die zum Erwachen zu bringen der Bodhisattva gelobt hat, sind auf der Ebene des Erwachens verschwunden, und der Bodhisattva muß, wenn er sie retten will, auf die Ebene des Traumes zurückkehren (bzw. darf diese nicht endgültig verlassen).

[14] Saito 1993: 79-80.
[15] Beachte hierzu auch Crosby und Skilton 1995: 86-87.

Prajñākaramati (*BCAP* pp. 488,12-489,2) zitiert in diesem Zusammenhang zwei Verse aus Preisgedichten auf den Buddha, die die Spannung zwischen Einsicht und Mitleid mit aller nur wünschenswerten Klarheit zum Ausdruck bringen. Der erste stammt von Triratnadāsa[16] und lautet:

> Weil die Einsicht auf die wahre Wirklichkeit (*tattva*) ausgerichtet ist, das Mitleid hingegen auf die vordergründige [Sichtweise] (*saṃvṛti*), deshalb wurde Dir (= dem Buddha), als Du der Wirklichkeit gemäß nachdachtest, [klar,] daß die Welt ohne Lebewesen ist. Als Du aber vom Mitleid, der Mutter der Besitzer der zehn Kräfte (= Buddhas), durchdrungen wurdest, da kam bei Dir Liebe zu der gequälten Welt (= den Lebewesen) auf wie bei einem Vater zu seinem Sohn.

Das zweite Zitat stammt aus einem Nāgārjuna zugeschriebenen Preisgedicht:[17]

> Die Vorstellung "Lebewesen" tritt bei Dir, o Beschützer, überhaupt nicht auf, und doch bist Du im höchsten Maße mitfühlend gegenüber den vom Leid gequälten Lebewesen.

Prajñākaramati betont allerdings in diesem Kontext, daß auch die vordergründige Sichtweise nicht jeglicher Grundlage entbehre. Vielmehr bestehe sie im vorliegenden Kontext darin, daß man die fünf *skandha*s – körperliche Gestalt, Empfindungen usw. – konventionell als "Lebewesen" bezeichnet. Prajñākaramati scheint hier den Standpunkt des konservativen Abhidharma zugrundezulegen. Insofern nach diesem die *skandha*s als solche im Gegensatz zu der ihnen auffingierten personalen Einheit durchaus existieren, ist hier das Mitleid keineswegs völlig gegenstandslos (*BCAP* p. 489,3-4). Wenn es möglich wäre, Mitleid im Bewußtsein dieses Sachverhaltes so zu üben, daß es sich, ohne Rückgriff auf die Vorstellung einer personalen Einheit, auf bloße *skandha*-Bündel, also Daseinsfaktoren (*dharma*s), bezöge, wäre es mit der Wirklichkeitsauffassung der konservativen Schulen und der Nichtexistenz eines Selbst kompatibel.

Es scheint aber, daß die konservativen Schulen eine solche Form des Mitleids nicht konzipiert haben, nicht einmal im Falle des Großen Mitleids des Buddha; denn selbst dieses gilt zumindest den Sarvāstivādins (Vaibhāṣikas) als eine vordergründige (*saṃvṛti*-) Vorstellung, deren Gegenstand die Lebewesen (*sattva*) sind.[18] Hingegen findet sich der Begriff eines [bloße] Daseinsfaktoren zum Gegenstand habenden Wohlwollens (und später auch Mitleids) in bestimmten Lehrreden und Traktaten des Mahāyāna (zuerst wohl im *Bodhisattvapiṭaka-sūtra*),[19] in einer Begriffsreihe, die auch von Prajñākaramati (p. 488,6-7) erwähnt wird. Diese Begriffsreihe geht aber noch einen Schritt weiter, indem sie als letzte Stufe noch ein Wohlwollen bzw. Mitleid, das keinerlei Objekt mehr hat, hinzufügt. Damit sollen offenbar Formen von Wohlwollen und Mitleid konzipiert werden, die sogar mit der Ebene der mahāyānistischen Einsicht in die wahre Wirklichkeit als *dharma-nairātmya*, als Wesenlosigkeit oder Leerheit auch der Daseinsfaktoren, in Einklang stehen. Von dieser Form des Mitleids macht Prajñākaramati jedoch im vorliegenden Kontext, in dem es ja nur um die Nichtexistenz eines Selbstes bzw. ganzheitlichen Lebewesens geht, keinen weiteren Gebrauch. Er deutet nur an,

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[16] *Guṇāparyantastotra*, Vers 33 (s. *Bodhicaryāvatāra*, ed. P.L. Vaidya, Darbhanga 1960, p. 299,9; *Peking Tanjur* bsTod tshogs, Bd. Ka-1, 232a8-b2).

[17] *Niraupamyastava*, Vers 9 (s. La Vallée Poussin 1913: 5).

[18] Z.B. Vasubandhu, *Abhidharmakośa* 7.33a mit *Bhāṣya* (ed. P. Pradhan, Patna 1967, p. 414,16-19).

[19] Pagel 1995: 142. Vgl. Schmithausen 2000b: 447 mit Anm. 61-65.

daß sie, ebenso wie die auf bloße Daseinsfaktoren bezogene, einem fortgeschritten Stadium des Bodhisattva-Weges zuzuordnen sei.[20]

2.2. Spannung zwischen Leerheit und Mitleid bzw. ethischem Handeln

Vom Begriff der Leerheit (*śūnyatā*), also der eigentlichen Madhyamaka-Position, handelt hingegen *BCA* 9.53. Der Vers gehört nur der längeren Version an und wird überdies von Prajñākaramati auf zwei verschiedene Weisen gelesen und kommentiert. Es interessiert hier nur die zweite, nach welcher der Vers wie folgt zu verstehen ist:

> Dadurch, daß man von den Extremen des Anhaftens und des Zurückschreckens befreit wird (Lesung *sakti-trāsânta-nirmuktyā*), gelingt das Verweilen in der Welt (*saṃsāra*), mittels eines Irrtums, um der leidenden [Lebewesen] willen: dies ist die Frucht der Leerheit.

Nach Prajñākaramatis Erklärung sind mit Anhaften und Zurückschrecken hier genau genommen die *Anlässe* dafür gemeint, d.h. der Glaube an Beständigkeit und der Glaube an ein automatisches Aufhören, Eternalismus und "Nihilismus". Ersteren beseitigt man durch gründliches Nachdenken über die höchste Wahrheit, letzteren durch das Zugeständnis der vordergründigen Wahrheit. Beides zusammen macht den Mittleren Weg aus und ermöglicht es dem Bodhisattva, um der leidenden, im *saṃsāra* umherirrenden Lebewesen willen in der Welt zu verbleiben. Dabei ist das Mitleid sein Motiv, und durch die Einsicht in die wahre Wirklichkeit weilt er in der Welt, ohne von ihren Mängeln besudelt zu werden.

Hier klingt alles ganz harmonisch, die Spannung zwischen Leerheit und Mitleid wird kaum spürbar. Daß sie aber latent doch vorhanden ist, zeigt der anschließend von Prajñākaramati (*BCAP* p. 446,8-9) aufgeworfene Einwand:

> Aber im Sinne der höchsten Wahrheit gibt es doch gar nichts, was man "im *saṃsāra* herumirrende [Lebewesen]" nennen könnte; wieso verbleibt da [der Bodhisattva um deretwillen] in der [Welt]?

Die Antwort ist nach Prajñākaramati (p. 446,9-10) im Vers mit dem Wort "mittels eines Irrtums" angedeutet, d.h. weil im Sinne der vordergründigen Sichtweise eben doch ein "Lebewesen" wahrgenommen wird. Die Frage wird hier also ähnlich beantwortet wie in dem zuvor (Abschnitt 2.1) behandelten Vers 76, auf den Prajñākaramati in der Tat verweist. Nur daß an der vorliegenden Stelle die Spannung nicht die zwischen der Einsicht in die *Nichtexistenz eines Selbst* und der Vorstellung von Lebewesen, sondern die zwischen der *Leerheit* und der Vorstellung von Lebewesen ist. Zwar kann die Leerheit auch im engeren Sinne der Nichtexistenz eines Selbst verstanden werden, doch legt der Kontext von *BCA* 9.53 eine solche Einengung nicht nahe. Faßt man aber die Leerheit im Sinne des Madhyamaka als letztliche Unwirklichkeit nicht nur von Lebewesen oder Personen als einheitlichen Entitäten, sondern auch der sie konstituierenden psycho-physischen Bestandteile, der *skandha*s, so führt auch der Rückgriff auf diese Bestandteile nicht aus der vordergründigen Sichtweise, aus dem irrtümlichen Sehen von Entitäten, heraus.

In seiner Erklärung des letzten Versviertels macht Prajñākaramati (*BCAP* p. 446,12-14) jedoch deutlich, daß Mitleid und Leerheit trotz der zwischen ihnen bestehenden Spannung einander ergänzende, komplementäre Momente der Spiritualität des Bodhisattva sind:

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[20] *BCAP* p. 228,30: *tataḥ paraṃ dharmālambanā anālambanā ca*.

> Dies ist die Frucht der Leerheit, daß [der Bodhisattva], obwohl, dank des Mitleids im *saṃsāra* verbleibend, aufgrund der Schau der Leerheit von den Mängeln des *saṃsāra* nicht besudelt wird; dies, nämlich daß sein Erlöschen derart ist, daß er weder auf die Welt noch auf das Nirvāṇa fixiert ist (*apratiṣṭhitanirvāṇatā*), ist die Frucht der Leerheit.

Die Spannung zwischen Leerheit und Ethik zeigt sich auch an weiteren Stellen. So läßt Prajñākaramati in seinem Kommentar zu *BCA* 9.4d einen Opponenten folgenden Einwand vorbringen: Wenn in Wahrheit alle Dinge wesenlos sind und wir davon ausgehen dürfen, daß die Bodhisattvas über die wahre Wirklichkeit Bescheid wissen: wie ist es dann zu erklären, daß sie in ihrem Bestreben, die Buddhaschaft zu erlangen und alle Lebewesen zu retten, Freigebigkeit usw. praktizieren, obwohl doch auch diese Handlungen illusorisch wie ein Zaubertrug (*māyādi-svabhāva*) und somit wesenlos sind (*BCAP* p. 372,1-3 und 9-10)? Auch hier lautet die Antwort, die Prajñākaramati dem Vers[21] entnimmt, wieder, daß dies um des Zieles willen (*kāryārtham*) geschehe. Es sei nun einmal so, daß Freigebigkeit usw., in der rechten Weise praktiziert,[22] obwohl vordergründig und in Wahrheit wesenlos, zur Ursache für das Erreichen des höchsten Gutes bzw. der höchsten Wahrheit werden und dies auf keinem anderen Wege zu erreichen ist.

Interessant ist auch der von Prajñākaramati in der Einleitung zu *BCA* 9.11 (*Th* 8.9c-10b) einem Opponenten in den Mund gelegte Einwand, daß, wenn die Lebewesen illusorisch wären wie durch Zaubertrug in Erscheinung tretende Personen, das Töten eines Menschen nicht wirklich Töten und somit schlechtes Karma sein könnte, ebensowenig wie das "Töten" einer durch Zaubertrug zur Erscheinung gebrachten Person (*BCAP* p. 382,12-14).[23] Auch hier zeigt sich wieder die Spannung zwischen Leerheit und Ethik. Der *BCA* löst das Problem durch die Annahme eines Unterschiedes auf der Ebene des Scheins: im Gegensatz zu der gezauberten Person ist die "normale" Person mit Geist versehen und ihre Vernichtung deshalb ein Tötungsvergehen. Die gesamte Ethik gehört also zwar in den Bereich der illusorischen, vordergründigen Ebene. Dort gilt sie aber in vollem Umfang, denn diese Ebene hat trotz ihrer illusorischen Qualität durchaus ihre eigenen Gesetze, zu denen auch das Karma-Gesetz gehört.

3. Zur Motivation altruistischer Ethik im 8. Kapitel des *Bodhicaryāvatāra*

An den bisher behandelten Stellen aus dem 9. Kapitel des *BCA* ging es darum, die Spannung zu verarbeiten, die zwischen Mitleid und altruistischem Handeln einerseits und der Einsicht in die wahre Wirklichkeit des Nichtselbst oder der Leerheit anderseits besteht. Diese Spannung wird zwar durchweg von einem Gegner artikuliert, aber von Śāntideva bzw. Prajñākaramati keineswegs abgestritten, sondern zumeist lediglich entschärft, indem die beiden Pole auf zwei verschiedene Wahrheits(/Wirklichkeits)ebenen verteilt und so gewissermaßen koexistenzfähig gemacht werden. Eine wirkliche Synthese versucht allenfalls das bereits er-

[21] Die kürzere Version (*Th* 8.4) weicht ab und hat keine Entsprechung für das hier allein relevante *kāryārtham*.

[22] Wie Prajñākaramati andeutet, müssen Freigebigkeit usw. zu diesem Zweck so geübt werden, daß sie unter drei Aspekten rein sind (*trikoṭi-pariśuddhyā*: *BCAP* p. 372,10), d.h. – wie ein anderer Text erklärt – in der Weise, daß man sich bewußt bleibt, daß Subjekt, Akt und Objekt (also z.B. Spender, Spendeakt und Empfänger) *leer* sind (*AAĀ* p. 311,14-15), bzw. dergestalt, daß man die Wahrnehmung (*upalambha*) von Subjekt, Objekt und Akt, die mit der Aktivität zum Heile anderer normalerweise verbunden ist, durch die Übung des Nichtwahrnehmens (*anupalambha*) solcher Entitäten ausbalanciert oder zurückdrängt (vgl. *AAĀ* p. 311,17-19).

[23] Ähnlich der anonyme Kommentar zur kürzeren Fassung (Saito 1993: 63,10-12).

wähnte Schema der drei Stufen des Mitleids, das außer dem normalen, Lebewesen zum Gegenstand habenden Mitleid eines, das nur *dharma*s zum Gegenstand hat, sowie ein gegenstandsloses Mitleid ansetzt.

Zumindest mit letzterem bewegen wir uns allerdings – falls es nicht bloß im Sinne eines ständigen Ausbalancierens der normalen Sichtweise durch das Wissen um die Leerheit zu verstehen ist – auf einem schwer nachvollziehbaren Niveau, dem des Buddha oder zumindest weit fortgeschrittener Bodhisattvas, für die zumindest im Mahāyāna (und Vajrayāna) manchmal eine Art *coincidentia oppositorum* in Anspruch genommen wird.[24]

In der zweiten Hälfte des Kapitels des *BCA* (das der Vertiefung, *dhyāna*, gewidmet ist) geht es hingegen ausschließlich darum, den angehenden Bodhisattva überhaupt erst einmal dazu zu motivieren, die anderen Lebewesen in sein Streben nach Glück und nach Befreiung von Leid, insbesondere im Sinne der endgültigen Erlösung, einzubeziehen.

Der gesamte, mit fast hundert Versen recht umfangreiche Abschnitt fehlt übrigens in dem entsprechenden Kapitel der kürzeren Fassung. Etwa die Hälfte der Verse findet sich dort jedoch, mit gelegentlichen Varianten, im Kapitel über die Tatkraft (*vīrya*).[25] Einige der einschlägigen Verse sind auch in einer Versreihe am Ende des ebenfalls von Śāntideva stammenden *Śikṣāsamuccaya* (= *Śikṣ*) enthalten.[26] Der Abschnitt gliedert sich in zwei Teile, die

[24] Vgl. z.B. die Gleichzeitigkeit von Erkenntnis der höchsten Wirklichkeit (*paramârtha*) und Erkenntnis der vordergründigen Wirklichkeit (*saṃvṛti*) im Falle des "spiegel[gleichen] Wissens" (*ādarśa-jñāna*) des Buddha nach der Lehre der späten Yogācāras: z.B. **Buddhabhūmisūtra-Upadeśa* (*T* Bd. 26) 302c12-15 und 25-26.

[25] Saito 1986: 98-100 und 2000: 33-40. Der anonyme Kommentar zur kürzeren Fassung (*Peking-Tanjur* dBu-ma, Bd. La, 375a2-4) stellt ausdrücklich fest, daß die Verse sekundär von anderen Kommentatoren, und nicht etwa vom Autor selbst, aus dem *vīrya*- in das *dhyāna*-Kapitel verschoben worden seien (Saito 1986: 99). Ihre ursprüngliche Einordnung in dem Kapitel über Tatkraft erscheint plausibel, da sie ja den angehenden Bodhisattva zu altruistischem Handeln motivieren sollen und *auch in der längeren Fassung* die Behandlung dieser Thematik anhand der Schlüsselbegriffe *parâtma-samatā* und *parâtma-parivartana* zu Anfang dieses Kapitels ausdrücklich angekündigt wird (*BCA* 7.16cd = *Th* 6.2cd). Nach Auskunft des anonymen Kommentars begründeten die genannten Kommentatoren die Verschiebung der betreffenden Verse ans Ende des *dhyāna*-Kapitels damit, daß die entsprechenden Betrachtungen sowohl in der [Vollkommenheit der] Versenkung wie auch in [der] der Einsicht einbegriffen seien (Saito 1986: 99,7-8). Einleuchtender erschiene mir, daß die Umstellung den Zweck gehabt haben könnte, ein allzu großes Übergewicht der Einsicht (*prajñā*) auszutarieren, deren Behandlung (im folgenden, nunmehr 9. Kapitel) in der längeren Fassung erheblich erweitert worden war. Mit Einsicht und Leerheit allein, ohne starke altruistische Motivation, kommt man ja nur zum Nirvāṇa, nicht zur Buddhaschaft. Crosby und Skilton (1995: 83-84) wollen in dem Textstück eine Eingliederung der Cittamātra-Position (zur Vorbereitung der Einsicht in die letztgültige Wahrheit im Sinne des Madhyamaka) sehen. Es trifft zwar zu, daß die Idee der Gleichheit der anderen mit einem selbst (*parâtma-samatā*) in einigen älteren Yogācāra-Werken, vor allem dem *Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra* (*MSA*), eine wichtige Rolle spielt, und es liegt nahe, daß sich Śāntideva davon hat inspirieren lassen. Mit einer Bestimmung der wahren Wirklichkeit als Bewußtsein oder Geist hat die *parâtma-samatā* aber m.E. wenig zu tun. Im *MSA* ist auch die Erkenntnis des *cittamātra* nur ein Zwischenschritt, der überstiegen werden muß und in die Schau des vom Gegensatz Erfaßtes–Erfassendes freien *dharmadhātu* einmündet (*MSA* 6.7-8). Erst aus der Erfahrung der Allverbreitetheit des *dharmadhātu* resultiert dann ein erfahrungsmäßig gegründetes Bewußtsein der Gleichheit der anderen mit einem selbst (*MSA* 14.30; s. auch *Madhyāntavibhāga-Bhāṣya* p. 35,10f. [ed. G.M. Nagao, Tokyo 1964]).

[26] Die bei Crosby und Skilton (1995: 80) zu findende Behauptung, diese Versreihe stamme aus dem *Tathāgataguhyasūtra*, dürfte auf einem Mißverständnis basieren. Die Versreihe wird, im Gegensatz zu dem vorhergehenden Vers, nicht mit "und ebendort (sc. im *Tathāgataguhyasūtra*) heißt es" (*tathâtraîvâha*) eingeführt, sondern lediglich mit "es heißt ferner" (*āha ca*), und sie ist im Gegensatz zu den beiden vorangehenden Zitaten im *Tathāgataguhyasūtra* (zumindest in der chinesischen Fassung) auch nicht nachweisbar. Die Versrei-

durch die Stichworte "Gleichheit der anderen und des Selbst (od. mit einem selbst)" (*parâtma-samatā*) und "Austauschung der anderen und des Selbst" (*parâtma-parivartana*) markiert sind. Der erste Abschnitt umfaßt mehrere Gedankenstränge, die im folgenden jeweils separat behandelt werden (3.1-3.5 und 3.7).

3.1. Goldene Regel

Śāntideva beginnt, ganz im Sinne der buddhistischen Tradition, mit der Goldenen Regel (genauer: einer positiven Entsprechung):

> Zu Anfang soll sich [der Bodhisattva] ernsthaft in der [Vorstellung der] Gleichheit der anderen mit ihm selbst usw. üben, [und zwar] so: "Für alle sind Glück und Leid gleich; deshalb muß ich sie schützen, wie mich selbst." (*BCA* 8.90)[27]

Prajñākaramati erklärt, gewiß zurecht:

> Jene [anderen Lebewesen] unterscheiden sich doch [im Grunde] überhaupt nicht von mir! Deshalb ist auch für sie, ebenso wie für mich, Leid unangenehm, und ebenso wie für mich ist auch für sie Glück wohltuend. Deshalb ... muß ich, so wie ich mich selbst vor Leid und Ursachen für Leid rette, auch die anderen Lebewesen [davor] retten. So wie ich mich selbst in jeder Hinsicht glücklich machen möchte, so auch die anderen. (*BCAP* p. 328,4-9)

In diesem Sinne wird man auch die als formale Schlußfolgerung präsentierte Aussage von Vers 94 zu verstehen haben:

> Ich muß das Leid der anderen beseitigen, weil es Leid ist, wie mein eigenes Leid; ich muß die anderen glücklich machen, weil sie Lebewesen sind, so wie ich das Lebewesen, das ich selbst bin,[28] [glücklich zu machen bestrebt bin]. (*BCA* 8.94 ≈ *Th* 6.37)

Die "Goldene Regel"[29] arbeitet, wie die obigen Formulierungen zeigen, wie im alten Kanon ganz unbekümmert mit den Begriffen "ich" und "andere Lebewesen" bzw. "Personen". Von der Lehre, daß es in Wahrheit kein Selbst, Ich oder Lebewesen gibt, ist nichts zu spüren. Die Goldene Regel argumentiert vielmehr auf der Ebene der alltäglichen, vordergründigen Sichtweise.

Śāntideva fordert in seiner Formulierung der Goldenen Regel deutlich *aktive* Zuwendung: die anderen Lebewesen sind zu beschützen und zu beglücken, Leid ist von ihnen abzuwehren. Nicht daß es im alten Buddhismus solche Formulierungen überhaupt nicht gäbe, aber im Vordergrund steht *dort* doch, daß man die anderen *in Ruhe lassen* soll, indem man vom Töten usw. Abstand nimmt. Die Bodhisattva-Ethik gibt sich damit nicht zufrieden, sondern verlangt nachdrücklich aktiven Einsatz für die anderen.[30]

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he dürfte vielmehr von Śāntideva selbst stammen. Auch *Śikṣ* p. 155ff. wird eine Reihe von Versen, die sich weitgehend auch im 6. Kapitel des *BCA* finden, mit *āha ca* eingeleitet.

[27] Dieser Vers fehlt allerdings in der kürzeren Version (Saito 2000: 33; cf. ders. 1986: 108, n. 38).

[28] *ātmasattvavat*. *Th*: *bdag lus bzhin*, d.h. "wie den eigenen Körper", oder vielleicht: "wie die eigene Person".

[29] Vgl. auch *Th* 6.36 (≈ *BCA* 8.93): "... Obgleich das Leid des anderen mich nicht trifft (d.h. für mich nicht spürbar ist), [weiß ich doch] in Analogie zu meiner eigenen Empfindung (*rang gi nyams las dpag byas nas* = **ātmaupamyena*?), daß dieses Leid für ihn schwer erträglich ist."

[30] Die Frage, wieweit dies tatsächlich, in der Lebenswirklichkeit, in die Praxis umgesetzt wurde oder "Gedankenethik" bleibt, kann hier offenbleiben. In der obigen Formulierung ist jedenfalls deutlich auch die Umsetzung in die Praxis gefordert. Daß dabei Hilfestellung auf dem Heilsweg höher rangiert als Hilfe in All-

3.2. Die Gesamtheit der Lebewesen als Organismus

In Vers 91 illustriert Śāntideva die Einbeziehung der anderen Lebewesen in das Streben nach Leidfreiheit und Glück am Beispiel des Zusammenwirkens der Körperglieder:

> Wie der Körper, der [doch] aufgrund der Verschiedenheit [seiner Teile:] der Hände usw. uneinheitlich ist, als *einer* (d.h. als ganzer) [für] schutzwürdig [gilt], so ist diese ganze Welt [der Lebewesen, obwohl] verschieden, ganz genau so [als eine, als ganze, zu beschützen], weil sie so beschaffen ist, daß [für alle] Leid und Glück unterschiedslos [Leid und Glück] sind.[31] (*BCA* 8.91 ≈ *Th* 6.34[32])

Śāntideva geht also von der Tatsache aus, daß jeder den eigenen Körper, obwohl er aus unterschiedlichen Teilen besteht, als ganzen zu schützen bemüht ist, als wäre er eine Einheit. Analog soll sich der Bodhisattva die ganze Welt (d.h. alle Lebewesen) gewissermaßen als einen Organismus vorstellen (vgl. auch *BCA* 8.114 = *Th* 6.44),[33] der, obwohl in viele Individuen unterschieden, dennoch – aufgrund der Goldenen Regel – als ganzer, wie eine Einheit, von ihm zu beschützen ist.

Die Analogie stimmt natürlich nur, wenn der einzelne Bodhisattva einem einzelnen Körperglied entspricht und von der Tatsache ausgegangen wird, daß die einzelnen Körperglieder füreinander tätig werden, wie in Vers 99 ausdrücklich festgestellt wird:

> ... Wieso schützt die Hand den Fuß, wo doch der Schmerz des Fußes nicht der der Hand ist? (*BCA* 8.99cd = *Th* 6.42cd)

Hand und Fuß handeln somit so, als sei der gesamte Körper eine Einheit. Aus buddhistischer Sicht ist er das natürlich nicht wirklich, die Einheit ist eine bloß fiktive. Und das sie fingierende Subjekt sind genau genommen ja wohl nicht die einzelnen Körperteile, sondern der Geist, also eine übergeordnete Instanz. Insofern kommt das Bild nicht ganz hin, denn im Falle des Bodhisattva ist es allein der einzelne, einem einzelnen Körperteil vergleichbare Bodhisattva selbst, der alle Lebewesen trotz ihrer Verschiedenheit als eine Einheit auffaßt. Und er tut dies nicht unwillkürlich, wie die Hand oder auch der Geist, sondern absichtlich. Ganz bewußt nimmt er die Goldene Regel zum Anlaß, im Interesse seiner spirituellen Vervollkommnung die *Vorstellung* der Gesamtheit der Lebewesen als einer übergeordneten Einheit zu kultivieren, als eines Organismus gewissermaßen, in dem er, als ein Teil, für das Wohlergehen aller Teile mitverantwortlich ist.

3.3. Problem der Grenzziehung zwischen "selbst" und "anderen"

In *BCA* 8.97 (= *Śikṣ* p. 358,3-4 = *Th* 6.40) läßt Śāntideva einen Opponenten die Stringenz der Goldenen Regel mit dem Hinweis in Frage stellen, daß der Schmerz des anderen nun einmal der des *anderen* ist, daß man *selbst* ihn eben *nicht* spürt. Versteht man die Intention des Op-

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tagsnöten, bedeutet nicht, daß der Bodhisattva letztere vernachlässigen dürfte. Die *Bodhisattvabhūmi* (ed. N. Dutt, Patna 1966, pp. 80-94, 97,9-24 und 100,13-105,3) etwa läßt in diesem Punkt an Deutlichkeit nichts zu wünschen übrig.

[31] Vgl. Vibhūticandra (*Peking-Tanjur* dBu-ma, Bd. Śa) 296a6, wo *abhinnaduḥkhasukhātmakam* erklärt wird als *ji ltar gcig sdug bsngal mi 'dod pa de bzhin gzhan yang ngo || ji ltar <g>cig bde ba la dga' ba ltar gzhan yang yin pas*. Vgl. Gruber 1988: 45.

[32] *Th* 6.34 weicht vor allem in der zweiten Vershälfte deutlich ab (*... *bhinna-duḥkhaṃ sukhârthikaṃ sarvam* ∪ – *yathâtmā* ?).

[33] Hierzu auch Ōnishi 1999, der (p. 407) auch *BCA* 8.91 heranzieht.

ponenten dahingehend, daß er nicht rücksichtslosem Verhalten das Wort reden will, sondern sich lediglich dem aktiven Altruismus des Mahāyāna nicht anschließen möchte, so könnte es sich bei diesem Opponenten durchaus um einen Anhänger des älteren, konservativen Buddhismus handeln, dem es in erster Linie um die eigene Erlösung geht. Jedenfalls handelt es sich um jemand, der an die Lehre von Karma und Wiedergeburt glaubt; denn Śāntideva versucht, ihn mit dem Argument zu überzeugen, daß er, wenn ihn das Leid anderer Personen (bzw. der in anderen Körpern auftretende Schmerz) nicht kümmert, er auch nicht dem Schmerz, den er in einem zukünftigen Körper (also in der nächsten Existenz) erfahren könnte, vorzubeugen bräuchte, indem er in diesem Leben heilsame Werke tut und schlechte unterläßt (*BCAP* p. 332,3). Der Gegner hält dem entgegen, daß es sich doch auch in der zukünftigen Existenz um *ihn selbst* handle, doch nach Śāntideva ist das eine falsche Vorstellung; der in der zukünftigen Existenz zur Entstehung Kommende, so erklärt er, sei schlicht ein *anderer* als der, der hier gestorben ist (*BCA* 8.98 = *Śikṣ* p. 358,5-6 ≈ *Th* 6.41).

Die komplexe philosophische und exegetische Problematik dieser Argumentation ist von P. Williams (1994; vgl. auch ders. 2000: 425-433) und Mark Siderits (2000a: 413-415; vgl. auch ders. 2000b: 453-455) eingehend erörtert worden; bei Williams kommen auch die tibetischen Exegeten zu Wort. Ich beschränke mich hier auf einige Bemerkungen zum Verständnis des Sanskrit-Textes Śāntidevas; denn dieser leidet in der Tat an einer gewissen Uneindeutigkeit. Einerseits nämlich redet Śāntideva in Vers 97 vom zukünftigen *Körper* und meint damit, wie auch aus der Paralleldiskussion im *Śikṣ* (vgl. den Einwand p. 358,7) hervorgeht, zweifellos in erster Linie den Körper in der Existenz nach dem Tode. Anderseits bleibt unklar, ob unter demjenigen, der nach Vers 98 ein anderer ist als der, welcher gestorben ist, der zukünftige Körper oder vielmehr, wie Prajñākaramati annimmt, die gesamte zukünftige "Person" (im Sinne aller fünf *skandha*s) zu verstehen ist.

Mein Eindruck ist, daß der Opponent von der *Person* und von einer – wie immer fundierten – Identität der wiedergeborenen Person mit der verstorbenen ausgeht, Śāntideva hingegen in seiner Entgegnung auf den *Körper* abhebt. Dafür scheint mir jedenfalls der Fortgang der Diskussion im *Śikṣ* (p. 358,7-19) zu sprechen; hier reagiert nämlich der Gegner auf die Feststellung Śāntidevas, daß der, der geboren wird, schlicht ein anderer sei als der, der gestorben ist, mit der Frage, was es dann für einen Zweck habe, "Verdienst" (*puṇya*), also gutes Karma, anzusammeln.[34] Diese Frage ergibt nur Sinn, wenn man davon ausgeht, daß der Gegner Śāntidevas Äußerung als Leugnung einer über den Tod hinausreichenden Kontinuität der *Person* verstanden hat. Śāntidevas Antwort (*Śikṣ* p. 358,8-12) stellt jedoch wieder den *Körper* in den Vordergrund. Er entgegnet nämlich, daß *dessen* Kontinuität schon innerhalb des gegenwärtigen Lebens nicht gegeben sei, daß der Körper von Lebensphase zu Lebensphase, ja genau genommen von Augenblick zu Augenblick ein anderer werde – er sagt ausdrücklich: der frühere *sterbe ab* und ein neuer "werde geboren" oder "komme"[35] – und man dennoch für die späteren Phasen Vorsorge treffe.

Im Gegensatz zum *Śikṣ* beschränkt sich Śāntideva im *BCA*, wenn man nicht sehr zwischen den Zeilen liest, auf das Beispiel des Körpers der Existenz nach dem Tode, der ja unstrittig

[34] *Śikṣ* p. 358,7: *anyaś cej jāyate tatra, kiṃ puṇyena prayojanam*.

[35] *Śikṣ* p. 358,9-11: *mṛte garbhagate tāvad anyo bālaḥ prajāyate* | *mṛte bāle* (Ed., Hs.: *bālye*) *kumāratvaṃ*, *tannāśād āgato* (vgl. Tib. *de zhig nas ni* ...; Ed., Hs.: *-nāśāyāgato*) *yuvā* | *tannāśāc cāgato vṛddhaḥ* ... . Eine Kopie der Hs. verdanke ich Jens Braarvig.

ein anderer ist als der gegenwärtige und somit ein für den Gegner plausibleres Beispiel darstellt als spätere Phasen des gegenwärtigen Körpers – sofern denn der Gegner überhaupt bereit ist, sich auf den Körper als Identifikationsgrundlage einzulassen.

Aber selbst wenn Śāntideva in Vers 98 im Sinne Prajñākaramatis, der, wie gesagt, von "fünf *skandha*s" spricht, die Verschiedenheit der zukünftigen "*Person*" von der gegenwärtigen im Auge gehabt haben sollte, konnte er sich auch dabei auf einen so autoritativen Text wie das *Śālistambasūtra* stützen. Dort heißt es klipp und klar, daß, unbeschadet der Ursache–Wirkung-Beziehung, die *skandha*s bei der Wiedergeburt *andere* seien als die zum Zeitpunkt des Sterbens, *nicht dieselben*.[36] Und unter Voraussetzung der Augenblicklichkeit aller verursachten *dharma*s gilt das gleiche dann auch für die jeweils späteren Phasen der *skandha*s der *gegenwärtigen* Existenz im Verhältnis zu den jeweils früheren. Gewiß, die Mādhyamikas[37] und auch andere Schulen[38] sagen in anderen Zusammenhängen, daß die Wirkung weder mit der Ursache identisch sei *noch etwas anderes* als diese (d.h. auch nicht etwas völlig Beziehungsloses). Diese Formulierung wäre aber im Rahmen der vorliegenden Diskussion kontraproduktiv; denn es geht ja darum, dem Opponenten zu demonstrieren, daß er inkonsequent ist, wenn er sich weigert anzuerkennen, daß man auch dem Leid eines *anderen* vorbeugen soll.

Angemerkt sei noch, daß sich im *Śikṣ* auch noch ein ganz anderer Versuch findet, die Abgrenzung von "selbst" und "anderem" in Frage zu stellen: der für das Madhyamaka typische Hinweis auf die *gegenseitige Abhängigkeit* dieser Begriffe:

> Daß [jener] ein anderer und [dieser man] selbst ist, ist [nur] im Hinblick auf [den jeweils anderen aussagbar und daher] falsch (d.h. keine das Wesen der Sache treffende Aussage), wie "diesseitiges [Ufer]" und "jenseitiges[Ufer]". Jenes Ufer ist [nur im Kontrast zu einem diesseitigen Ufer ein jenseitiges und] nicht aus sich (und damit wesenhaft) als jenseitiges [Ufer konstituiert]; im Hinblick auf was soll da [das angeblich diesseitige Ufer] ein diesseitiges sein? [Ebenso] ist [man] als [man] selbst nicht aus sich konstituiert; im Hinblick auf was kann da [der vermeintliche andere als] anderer [konstituiert] werden? (*Śikṣ* p. 357,16-358,2)[39]

3.4. Begründung altruistischer Ethik mit der Nichtexistenz eines Selbstes

Folgt man den weitergehenden Ausführungen der Versreihe am Ende des *Śikṣ*, so wäre aus der Sicht der buddhistischen Daseinsanalyse der Gegner, der nicht bereit ist, das Leid eines anderen abzuwehren, schon dann inkonsequent, wenn er späterem Leid im gegenwärtigen Körper vorbeugt, da auch dieser nicht nur von Lebensstadium zu Lebensstadium, sondern letztlich von Augenblick zu Augenblick ein *anderer* ist (*Śikṣ* p. 358,8-12). Nicht einmal in einem bestimmten Augenblick ist er eine Einheit, sondern bloß ein Aggregat von Teilen. Der Gegner könnte nun versuchen, in eben diesem Aggregat bzw. der Serie – dem Kontinuum der körperlichen Faktoren, bzw. der Gesamtperson einschließlich der (ebenfalls augenblickli-

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[36] *Mahāyānasūtrasaṃgraha* pp. 105,33-106,1 (ed. P.L. Vaidya, Darbhanga 1961); vgl. auch p. 114,3-5; Schoening 1995: Bd. II, p. 731.

[37] Z.B. *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* 18.10; *Prasannapadā* p. 26,8-9 (ed. L. de La Vallée Poussin, *Mūlamadhyamakakārikās de Nāgārjuna avec la Prasannapadā, commentaire de Candrakīrti*, St.-Petersbourg 1913).

[38] Z.B. *Visuddhimagga* 17.167 (ed. Warren und Kosambi, Cambridge, Mass. 1950); *Paramārthagāthā* 26 (A. Wayman, *Analysis of the Śrāvakabhūmi Manuscript*, Berkeley / Los Angeles 1961, p. 171).

[39] *āpekṣikaṃ parâtmatvaṃ pārâpāraṃ* (Ed., Hs.: *-vāraṃ*) *yathā mṛṣā* || *tat kūlaṃ na svataḥ pāram*, *kim apekṣyâstv apāratā* | *ātmatvaṃ na svataḥ siddham, kim apekṣya paro bhavet* ||.

chen) geistigen Faktoren – den Gegenstand der Ichvorstellung zu finden. Auch diesen Ausweg weist Śāntideva in Vers 8.101ab des *BCA* (vgl. *Th* 6.43 und *Śikṣ* p. 359,14) mit der Erklärung zurück, daß Kontinuum und Aggregat "falsch" (*mṛṣā*), also illusorisch, seien.

Nach Prajñākaramatis (*BCAP* p. 334,10-14) Erklärung ist das Kontinuum nichts anderes als eine ununterbrochene Aufeinanderfolge im Verhältnis von Ursache und Wirkung stehender Augenblicke; eine darüber hinausgehende, eigene Entität "Kontinuum" sei nicht faßbar; der Ausdruck "Kontinuum" sei nur geprägt worden, um jene Augenblicke bequem mit einem Wort bezeichnen zu können; das Kontinuum existiere daher nicht wirklich, sondern nur als Benennung. Ähnlich argumentiert Prajñākaramati (p. 334,15-18) auch im Falle des Aggregates: eine eigene Entität "Aggregat" neben den Bestandteilen sei nicht faßbar und lasse sich weder als identisch mit diesen noch als verschieden von ihnen begreifen. Stimmt man dem zu, so bleibt der Ichvorstellung keine sachliche Grundlage, auf die sie sich beziehen könnte; sie ist bloß eine unangemessene Gewohnheit und ist aufzugeben (vgl. *BCA* 8.100; *Śikṣ* pp. 359,15 und 360,3-4).

Die Konsequenz aus diesen Überlegungen formuliert Śāntideva so:

> Der, [um] *dessen* Leid [es sich handeln soll], den gibt es nicht; wessen eigenes [Leid] könnte es da sein? (8.101cd)
>
> Da sie keinen Eigentümer haben, sind schlechthin alle [Vorkommen von] Leid unterschiedslos abzuwehren, allein deshalb, weil sie Leid sind; was könnte da eine Einschränkung begründen? (8.102)
>
> Wenn [einer fragen sollte:] "Warum muß denn Leid [überhaupt] abgewehrt werden?", [so muß die Antwort lauten:] Weil alle [hierin] einer Meinung sind. Wenn [Leid somit etwas ist, das] abgewehrt werden muß, dann gilt das für jegliches [Leid]; wenn nicht, dann bei einem selbst [ebensowenig] wie bei allen [anderen].[40] (8.103)

Dies ist offenbar in der Tat ein Versuch, die Lehre von der Nichtexistenz eines Selbstes, im weiteren Sinne jedweden eine essentielle Einheit der Person konstituierenden Prinzips, *direkt* als Grundlage einer altruistischen Ethik zu verwenden. Eine philosophische Kritik an diesem Versuch, der übrigens in der kürzeren Fassung fehlt, hat Paul Williams vorgelegt, nach dessen Auffassung Śāntideva mit diesem Ansatz sogar den Bodhisattva-Weg ruiniert.[41] Es erstaunt nicht, daß diese Kritik, auch aus methodologischer Sicht, ihrerseits Kritik ausgelöst hat.[42] Da aber Śāntideva (oder wer auch immer der Autor dieser Verse war) seine Überlegung als formale Schlußfolgerung (mit These, Begründung und Beispiel) vorbringt, ist es zweifellos gerechtfertigt, sein Argument (wie P. Williams es tut) zunächst einmal philosophisch ernst zu nehmen und kritisch zu prüfen. Anderseits frage auch ich mich, wie ernst die formallogische Auskleidung denn gemeint ist. Einige der übrigen Argumente sind ja deutlich Einübungen von *Betrachtungsweisen*, die sich nicht an der Realität, sondern am spirituellen Ziel orientieren (vgl. z.B. Abschnitt 3.2 oder 3.5, und vor allem auch Abschnitt 2). In diese Richtung scheint mir auch der ideengeschichtliche Kontext des vorliegenden Argumentes zu weisen, den ich im folgenden aus meiner Sicht zu skizzieren versuche.

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[40] Lesung *ātmani sarvavat* mit Hss.; Tib. → **ātmāpi sattvavat*.

[41] Williams 1998: 104-176 ("The Absence of Self and the Removal of Pain: How Śāntideva Destroyed the Bodhisattva Path").

[42] Pettit 1999: 129-134; Siderits 2000a: 415-422, wozu Williams 2000: 433-444 und wiederum Siderits 2000b: 455-458. Vgl. auch Siderits 2002: 335-342.

Wie oben (Abschnitt 1) bereits angedeutet wurde, dient der Begriff des Nichtselbst in den kanonischen Lehrreden des frühen Buddhismus (soweit ich sehe: durchgängig) der spirituellen *Loslösung*. Dabei stehen naturgemäß die (vordergründig) angenehmen, als glückhaft erfahrenen Gegebenheiten im Vordergrund. Die Einsicht, daß diese vergänglich, leidhaft/ungenügend und nicht wirklich das Ich/Selbst oder diesem zueigen sind, hat zur Folge, daß man sich von ihnen innerlich löst. Das führt automatisch zur Befreiung vom Leiden, da dieses durch Anhaften bedingt ist. Der Wunsch nach Befreiung vom Leiden war der Antrieb, aus dem heraus man sich auf die Betrachtung, die zur Einsicht in die Nichtselbsthaftigkeit der Gegebenheiten (vor allem der glückhaften) führt, eingelassen hatte. Er bildet den *Hintergrund* dieser Betrachtung, nicht ihren Inhalt. Durch das Ergebnis der Betrachtung der Nichtselbsthaftigkeit, die Loslösung, wird er, wie gesagt, automatisch erreicht, und zwar in einem doppelten Sinne: zum einen dadurch, daß durch die Loslösung das Zustandekommen einer neuen, Leid mit sich bringenden Wiedergeburt verhindert wird; zum anderen aber schon hier und jetzt, insofern auch die gegenwärtigen unangenehmen, leidvollen Gegebenheiten nicht mehr als Ich oder diesem zueigen erfahren werden und sie einen somit gar nichts mehr angehen, gleichgültig werden (vorausgesetzt, das Intensitätsniveau der Betrachtung läßt sich aufrechterhalten, auch etwa gegen starken körperlichen Schmerz). Das Paradoxon, daß die leidvollen Gegebenheiten, zu deren Beseitigung man die Nichtselbst-Betrachtung aufgenommen hatte, sich durch eben diese als etwas erweisen, das einen eigentlich gar nicht betrifft, dürfte in der konkreten Dynamik der spirituellen Praxis aufgehoben sein.

Śāntideva projiziert nun, ganz im Sinne des soeben aufgezeigten (und durch die Dogmatisierung der Nicht*existenz* eines Selbstes noch verschärften) Paradoxons, die Betrachtung der Nichtselbsthaftigkeit *zurück* auf den ursprünglich von ihr nur *vorausgesetzten* Wunsch nach Befreiung vom Leiden. Warum soll man *sich* von Leid befreien, wenn es ein Ich, dem Leid zueigen sein könnte, gar nicht gibt? Die naheliegende Antwort wäre nun in der Tat, daß es keinen Grund gibt, Leid, das niemanden betrifft – ob das philosophisch denkbar ist, sei dahingestellt –, zu beseitigen, und Śāntideva trägt dieser Möglichkeit ja in der Tat im letzten Viertel des Verses 8.103 Rechnung. Wenn man sich aber, in der konkreten Situation der spirituellen Praxis, noch auf der Ebene des Wunsches nach Befreiung vom Leid bewegt, muß man die Nichtselbsthaftigkeit gewissermaßen in diesen Kontext hinein- oder "hinunter"holen.[43] Die Leidbeseitigung bleibt dann das Ziel, läßt sich aber in Anbetracht des Wissens um die Nichtselbsthaftigkeit nicht mehr auf das eigene Ich, die eigene Person, beschränken.

Mit diesem Argument, das wie gesagt in der kürzeren Fassung (noch) fehlt, betritt Śāntideva m.W. Neuland. Mir ist aus der älteren Literatur nur entfernt vergleichbares Material bekannt. In der *Śrāvakabhūmi*[44] etwa wird dem Übenden, um ihn zu Wohlwollen (*maitrī*) auch gegenüber Feinden zu motivieren, empfohlen, die Vorstellung "Feind" mit der Überlegung abzubauen, daß es in Wahrheit keinen gibt, der beschimpft, zürnt oder schlägt, noch einen, dem

[43] Das entspricht (einer betrachtungsmäßigen Vorwegnahme) der Sichtweise der nach der nichtkonzeptualisierenden Schau der wahren Wirklichkeit eintretenden Erfahrung (*tatpṛṣṭhalabdhajñāna*) der vielheitlichen Gegebenheiten im Lichte der vorhergehenden Schau, wozu Pettit 1999: 133 und Schmithausen 2000b: 448.

[44] *Śrāvakabhūmi* (ed. Karunesha Shukla, Patna 1973) p. 378,12-19. Maithrimurthi 1999: 279 und 298 (Absatz [i.]). Vgl. auch die Verwendung des gleichen Argumentes zur Begründung geduldigen Ertragens in der *Bodhisattvabhūmi* (ed. Unrai Wogihara, Tokyo 1936) pp. 190,18-191,1 (= ed. Nalinaksha Dutt, Patna 1966, p. 131,11-17) sowie p. 196,25-27 (Dutt p. 135,18-19): *niḥsattvāṃś ca sarvadharmān* (Wogihara *-āṃ*) *viditvā ... sarvam ... apakāraṃ kṣamate.*

dies widerfährt. Es ist aber deutlich, daß es sich hier um eine im Rahmen einer bestimmten spirituellen Praxis *punktuell* eingesetzte Betrachtung handelt, die dem Abbau einer bestimmten unheilsamen Vorstellung dient, nicht um eine generelle Begründung altruistischer Ethik, schon gar nicht um eine formalisierte. Das Gleiche gilt auch, wenn es im *Mahāprajñāpāramitā-Upadeśa* heißt, der Bodhisattva kultiviere im Hinblick auf alle *dharma*s den Gedanken der völligen Leerheit, um zu verhindern, daß er zwar den Buddha, nicht aber ein Tier als gabenwürdig ansieht.[45] Auch hier geht es nicht darum, ein altruistisches Verhalten (Spenden) als solches zu motivieren. Dieses ist vielmehr vorausgesetzt, und es geht lediglich um den Abbau einer Ungleichbehandlung.

3.5. Begründung altruistischer Ethik durch Extension des Ich

An der soeben behandelten Stelle hatte Śāntideva aus der Tatsache, daß in der Person bei strenger Analyse nichts zu finden ist, worauf sich die Ichvorstellung zurecht beziehen könnte, die Konsequenz gezogen, daß es nur "herrenloses" Leid gebe und *deshalb* bei seiner Beseitigung oder Verhinderung kein Unterschied zwischen eigenem und fremdem Leid gemacht werden könne. Im *Śikṣ* versucht er in der gleichen Situation, das gleiche Ziel auf einem anderen Weg, dem der unbegrenzten *Ausdehnung* des Ich, zu erreichen:

> Kontinuum und Aggregat sind falsch (d.h. illusorisch). ... Die Ichvorstellung [richtet sich nur] aus Gewohnheit auf sie. Warum sollte sie nicht [so] entstehen, [daß sie sich] auf eine andere [Person richtet]? (*Śikṣ* p. 359,14-15)

Mit anderen Worten: Man soll auf alle Lebewesen den Status des Ich oder Selbst (*ātmatva*) übertragen, indem man diese Vorstellung, im Interesse altruistischer Praxis, bewußt kultiviert und so allmählich zur Gewohnheit werden läßt (*Śikṣ* p. 361,10-11).

Auch im 8. Kapitel des *BCA* findet sich die bewußte Ausweitung der Ichvorstellung auf alle Lebewesen, am deutlichsten in Vers 115,[46] wo es, im Anschluß an die Vorstellung aller Le-

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[45] *T* Bd. 25, 681c20-682a1. Unmittelbar einleuchtend ist die Auswirkung der Leerheitsbetrachtung auf die Fähigkeit, das Abhacken von Gliedmaßen zu ertragen (*kṣānti*) (ib. 682a11-14).

[46] Vgl. ferner *BCA* 8.111-112 (nicht in *Th*): "Aus Gewohnheit kommt mit Bezug auf Tropfen von Samen und Blut (die bei der Empfängnis den Anfang des neuen Körpers konstituieren), obwohl sie doch anderen (sc. Vater und Mutter) gehören, die Vorstellung 'ich' zustande, auch wenn es doch gar keine sach[lich]e [Grundlage dafür] gibt; warum wird nicht ebenso auch der anderen gehörende (= fremde) Körper als Selbst aufgefaßt? [Denn] daß der eigene Körper [in Wirklichkeit genau so etwas] Fremdes ist, steht ja [aufgrund seines zuvor aufgezeigten Ursprungs] völlig fest. Da kann doch [die vorgeschlagene Extension der Ichvorstellung auf die anderen Körper] nicht schwierig sein!" Ich interpretiere diesen Vers bewußt im Sinne der Extension des Selbst oder Ich (als einer Form der Gleichsetzung der anderen mit dem Selbst [*parâtma-samatā*]) – im Text heißt es ja: "*auch* der anderen gehörende Körper" (*kāyo 'nyadīyo* ***'pi***) –, und nicht, wie etwa Steinkellner (1981:104-105) und einige der Kommentatoren, im Sinne der Austauschung der anderen und des Selbst (*parâtma-parivartana*, s. Abschnitt 3.6). Diese wird m.E. erst von Vers 8.120 (= *Th* 6.50) an mit der expliziten Aufnahme des 8.16 (≈ *Th* 6.2) eingeführten Stichwortes thematisiert (vgl. auch Crosby und Skilton 1995: 80; auch 8.113 widerspricht dem m.E. nicht). Es ist allerdings zuzugestehen, daß der gleiche Gedanke, in ganz ähnlicher Formulierung, auch in dem Abschnitt über die Austauschung der anderen und des Selbst vorkommt (*BCA* 8.158), und *dort* auch schon in der kürzeren Fassung gestanden hat (*Th* 6.71). Und dort heißt es ebenfalls, daß man die Ichvorstellung *auch* mit Bezug auf die anderen [Körper] kultivieren solle (*anyeṣv api bhāvaya*). Das *api* paßt aber im Kontext der Austauschung der anderen und des Selbst nur, wenn man ihm eine nicht streng additive Funktion zuweist (vielleicht sollte man es hier besser mit "ebensogut [statt dessen]" wiedergeben). In seiner üblichen Funktion hingegen ist es in diesem Kontext dysfunktional, und eben dies könnte der Grund gewesen sein, warum der Gedanke

bewesen als Teilen eines übergeordneten Ganzen (*BCA* 8.114), mit dem man sich solidarisch fühlt bzw., nunmehr, *identifiziert*, heißt:

> Wie die Vorstellung des Selbst (oder: die Vorstellung "[das bin ich] selbst") sich aus Gewohnheit auf diesen eigenen Körper richtet, der doch ohne Selbst ist – warum sollte nicht ebenso aufgrund [entsprechender, bewußt kultivierter] Gewöhnung auch mit Bezug auf die anderen [die Vorstellung,] daß sie das Selbst sind, zustandekommen? (*BCA* 8.115 = *Th* 6.45)[47]

3.6. Austauschung der anderen und des Selbst

Auf dem Hintergrund der Grundlosigkeit der gewöhnlichen, auf die eigene Person bezogenen Ichvorstellung läßt sich auch eine weitere Betrachtung verstehen, mit der Śāntideva die Betrachtung der anderen Lebewesen als dem Selbst gleich oder in das Selbst einbegriffen noch überbieten zu wollen scheint: die "Austauschung der anderen und des Selbst" (*parâtma-parivartana*: *BCA* 8.120 = *Th* 6.50).[48] Hierbei wird die Aufmerksamkeit u.a. auf die vielen Nachteile gerichtet, die einem das eigene Selbst, einem Feind gleich, bereitet, indem es sich dank der Eigenliebe schon vor kleinen Gefahren fürchtet oder zur Befriedigung seiner Bedürfnisse alle möglichen Untaten begeht (*BCA* 8.121-124 ≈ *Th* 6.51-54). Es wird auf die unheilvollen Wirkungen von egoistischem und die günstigen Wirkungen von altruistischem Streben und Handeln hingewiesen, die das Selbst oder Ich gleichsam auf die Seite der feindlichen anderen und die anderen auf die Seite des Ich rücken lassen (*BCA* 8.125-130 = *Th* 6.55-60), und es werden Betrachtungen gelehrt, mittels derer man den eigenen Geist systematisch dazu bringt, den Standpunkt der anderen einzunehmen und das alte Ich als fremde Person zu betrachten und zu erniedrigen (*BCA* 8.137-173, *Th* 6.66-85). Sogar Fehleinstellungen wie Neid und Stolz werden hier, gegen die nun als ein *anderer* betrachtete *eigene* Person gewendet, bewußt als spirituelle Mittel eingesetzt (*BCA* 8.140-142; nicht in *Th*). Auf weitere Einzelheiten braucht hier nicht eingegangen zu werden.

Die Behandlung der Austauschung der anderen und des Selbst nimmt im *BCA* breiten Raum ein (nach Crosby und Skilton 1995: 53 Verse), und auch in der kürzeren Fassung wird ihr mit 36 Versen offenbar großes Gewicht beigemessen. In der Versreihe am Ende des *Śikṣ* kommt sie jedoch nicht vor, jedenfalls nicht in deutlich ausformulierter, terminologisch fixierter Form, und zumindest der Terminus ist mir auch aus keinem Text vor Śāntideva bekannt. Es ist gut möglich, daß zumindest ihre explizite Ausformung auf ihn selbst[49] zurückgeht.

3.7. Der Bodhisattva nimmt zusätzliches Leid auf sich

Nachgetragen sei noch ein letzter Einwand (*BCA* 8.104, fehlt in *Th*), den der Gegner (vielleicht ein Anhänger des konservativen Buddhismus) gegen Śāntidevas Forderung nach altruistischer Aktivität vorbringt. Warum sollte, so meint er, der Bodhisattva sich in dem Bemühen, das Leid der anderen zu beseitigen, eine Menge zusätzliches eigenes Leid einhandeln?

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in der längeren Version in den Abschnitt über die Gleichsetzung der anderen mit dem Selbst übernommen worden (allerdings zugleich auch am ursprünglichen Ort stehengeblieben) ist.

[47] Die offenkundig spirituell–praktische Intention dieses Verses betont auch, wenngleich mit anderer Terminologie, Ōnishi 1999.

[48] Der Abschnitt beginnt m.E. mit diesem Vers (s. n. 46).

[49] D.h., falls die Zusätze in der längeren Fassung von jemand anders stammen, auf den eigentlichen Verfasser des *Bodhicaryāvatāra*, d.h. der kürzeren Fassung.

Dabei ist vor allem daran gedacht, daß der Bodhisattva durch das Mitleid am Leid der anderen *emotional Anteil nimmt*. Zumindest für den Mitleidenden *vermehrt* also das Mitleid die Gesamtmenge des Leidens statt sie zu reduzieren, und läuft damit seinem Streben nach Leidüberwindung zuwider. Die Antwort hebt auf das quantitative Verhältnis der beiden Leid-Mengen ab:

> Wieso ist das durch das Mitleid involvierte Leid *viel*, wenn man es mit dem Leid der [ganzen] Welt vergleicht? (*BCA* 8.104cd)

Die eigentliche Antwort gibt aber erst der nächste Vers:

> Wenn durch das Leiden eines einzigen das Leiden vieler ein Ende nimmt, dann muß jemand, der Mitgefühl mit sich selbst *und* den *anderen* hat, sich dieses Leiden [zugunsten der anderen] unbedingt auferlegen. (*BCA* 8.105)

Wohl gemerkt: es geht hier nur darum, *sich selbst* zugunsten anderer Leid aufzuerlegen; aus Gründen quantitativer Leidabwägung *anderen* auferlegtes Leiden (etwa bei medizinischen Tierversuchen) ist damit nicht automatisch sanktioniert.

4. Zur Motivation altruistischer Ethik im 6. Kapitel des *Bodhicaryāvatāra*: Der Respekt vor dem Buddha gebietet Respekt vor den Lebewesen

Zum Schluß möchte ich noch auf das Ende des 6. Kapitels eingehen. Hier wird die respektvolle Behandlung der Lebewesen mit dem *Respekt vor dem Buddha* bzw. der Buddhaverehrung begründet: Man soll die Lebewesen zufriedenstellen und darf sie nicht kränken, weil ihr Glück die Buddhas beglückt und ihr Schmerz die Buddhas betrübt; wenn man also die Lebewesen zufriedenstellt oder kränkt, erfreut bzw. kränkt man damit zugleich die Buddhas (*BCA* 6.122, zitiert *Śikṣ* p. 156,1-2).

Noch schärfer faßt *BCA* 6.126 (zit. *Śikṣ* p. 156,9-10) diesen Gedanken:

> Von Mitleid beseelt haben die [Buddhas] diese ganze Welt [der Lebewesen] zu ihrem Selbst gemacht, daran ist ja überhaupt nicht zu zweifeln. Bedeutet das denn nicht, daß, [wenn] diese [Lebewesen wahrgenommen werden, eigentlich] eben jene Beschützer in Lebewesengestalt wahrgenommen werden? Wie könnte man da diesen keinen Respekt entgegenbringen!

Hier klingt die Lehre vom *tathāgatagarbha*, von der in allen Lebewesen versteckt vorhandenen Buddhaschaft, an, deretwegen sie Respekt verdienen wie der Buddha selbst. Aber Śāntideva redet hier nicht von einer solchen versteckten oder potentiellen Buddhaschaft der Lebewesen. Die "Buddhaschaft" der Lebewesen besteht lediglich darin, daß *die Buddhas* diese Lebewesen, im Sinne eines *spirituellen Aktes*, in ihr Selbst einbezogen (*ātmīkṛta*) haben. Diese Aussage läßt sich, mit Prajñākaramati (*BCAP* p. 239,10-11), zwanglos im Sinne der im 8. Kapitel des *BCA* gelehrten Gleichsetzung aller Lebewesen mit dem Selbst (*sarva-sattva-samatâpādana*) oder des Austauschens der anderen und des Selbst (*parâtma-parivartana*) erklären.

Prajñākaramati (*BCAP* p. 239,10) führt aber darüber hinaus noch einen weiteren Grund dafür an, daß die Buddhas alle Lebewesen in ihr Selbst einbezogen haben: das erfahrungsmäßige Durchstoßen zum Wesen aller *dharma*s als einem alldurchdringenden (*sarvatraga-dharma-dhātu-prativedha*). Dies ist genau derselbe Grund, aus dem (wie in Abschnitt 1 angedeutet) auch in einigen frühen Yogācāra-Texten die Gleichheit der anderen mit dem Selbst abgeleitet wird. Diese Motivation wird allerdings erst mit dem Erreichen der ersten eigentlichen Bodhisattva-Stufe, der *pramuditā bhūmiḥ*, möglich, da eine direkte Erfahrung der wahren Wirklichkeit unterhalb dieser Stufe nicht gelingt. Es handelt sich offensichtlich um eine tiefere,

erfahrungsmäßig abgesicherte Einbeziehung der anderen Lebewesen in das Selbst als diejenige, welche der Bodhisattva schon zu Anfang durch die bloße Reflexion auf die Goldene Regel entwickelt.

Es ist aufschlußreich, daß Prajñākaramati hier nicht den Terminus "Leerheit" verwendet, sondern im Anschluß an die Yogācāra-Texte vom *alldurchdringenden* wahren Wesen der *dharma*s ausgeht. Es ist eben offenbar nicht der qualitative Aspekt der Leerheit, sondern der *extensionale* Aspekt ihrer Allgegenwart als wahres Wesen aller Lebewesen, der zur Begründung einer altruistischen Motivation taugt. Insofern die Schau der wahren Wirklichkeit als wahres Wesen (*svabhāva*) und in diesem Sinne wahres Selbst (*ātman*) aller Lebewesen die alte, enge Ichvorstellung auslöscht, kann nach der Rückkehr aus dieser Erfahrung in die vielheitliche Erscheinungswelt das alte Ich seine Sonderstellung als privilegierter Bezugspunkt des Strebens nicht mehr wiedergewinnen. Auf dem Hintergrund der Erfahrung des einheitlichen wahren Wesens aller Lebewesen sind diese nunmehr der eigenen Person gleichrangige Bezugspunkte des Strebens.

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Claus Oetke

Some Aspects of Textual Exegesis with Regard to Dharmakīrti's *Sattvānumāna*

I

In his paper "*Arthakriyā* und *kṣaṇikatva*: Einige Beobachtungen" W. Halbfass (H) makes some remarks which concern principles of textual exegesis suggesting a conflict between an analysis employing "means of Western Logic and Analysis" on the one hand and some genuine sort of understanding on the other. More particularly, H refers to my investigations on Dharmakīrti's *sattvānumāna* in Oetke 1993 and suggests that, on the one hand, studies exemplified by this work, are apt to promote the understanding of Dharmakīrti and Buddhist Logic, but on the other hand a one-sided concentration on the "logical-analytical dimension in Dharmakīrti's thinking" together with the pursuit of an "ideal of precision which is imposed by modern logic but not by Dharmakīrti's own orientation and its historical context" lead to a free play with conceivable possibilities which are not concerned with the way in which Dharmakīrti really thought, but with the question as to how he could or rather should have thought. Accordingly one is tempted to diagnose an "analytic overkill." Moreover, H asserts that greater precision pursued for its own sake does not *eo ipso* entail more clarity and better understanding, since we do not understand Dharmakīrti better by measuring his arguments against an ideal of formal precision which is alien to himself and because whoever wants to understand a thinker like Dharmakīrti who orientated himself by practical and soteriological aims must try to understand his intentions, which are not purely of a theoretical and analytical character, and it is emphasized that one must not overlook the functions which Dharmakīrti assigns to his arguments and proofs.[1]

The quoted passages contain a mixture of accurate and inaccurate remarks. More important is, however, the fact that they exhibit a crucial lack of reflection. But before addressing the main issue some points which appear to me incorrect or misleading deserve to be mentioned:

[1] Halbfass 1997: 237: "… Dies soll nicht besagen, daß solche Details irrelevant sind. OETKEs eindringliche Beobachtungen … sind gewiß geeignet, das Verständnis Dharmakīrtis und der buddhistischen Logik wesentlich zu fördern. Fragwürdig ist jedoch die Einseitigkeit, mit der sich OETKE auf die logisch-analytische Dimension im Denken Dharmakīrtis konzentriert und dabei ein Ideal von Präzision verfolgt, das durch die moderne Logik, nicht aber durch Dharmakīrtis eigene Orientierung und ihren historischen Kontext vorgegeben ist. Die durchaus vorhandenen Ansätze zum geschichtlichen Verstehenwollen und zum aufmerksamen und vorsichtigen Mitdenken werden immer wieder abgelöst und überdeckt durch ein freies Durchspielen gedanklicher Möglichkeiten, dem es nicht so sehr darum geht, wie Dharmakīrti wirklich gedacht hat, sondern darum, wie er hätte denken können oder sollen. Man mag versucht sein, hier von einem „analytischen overkill" zu sprechen. Größere, um ihrer selbst willen verfolgte Präzision führt keineswegs *eo ipso* zu größerer Klarheit und zu besserem Verständnis. Wir verstehen Dharmakīrti nicht dadurch besser, daß wir seine Argumente am Maßstab eines ihm fremden formalen Präzisionsideals beurteilen und weiterführen. Wer einen religiös-philosophischen, explizit an praktischen und soteriologischen Zielen orientierten Denker wie Dharmakīrti verstehen will, muß auch versuchen, seine Absichten, die nicht rein theoretischer und analytischer Natur sind, zu verstehen, und er darf die Funktion nicht übersehen, die er seinen Argumenten und Beweisen zuweist oder zumutet. Das Verständnis des Buddhawortes, der historische Kontext, die soteriologische Absicht und die Seins- und Selbsterfahrung, die seinem Denken die Richtung geben, werden in der theoretischen und formalen Struktur seiner Argumente und Beweisgänge kaum reflektiert … ."

Karin Preisendanz (ed.), *Expanding and Merging Horizons*: *Contributions to South Asian and Cross-Cultural Studies in Commemoration of Wilhelm Halbfass*, Wien: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 2007, pp. 571-584.

1. I see no basis for the assertion that the investigations in Oetke 1993 are certainly apt to further an understanding of Buddhist Logic to an essential degree ("… sind gewiß geeignet, das Verständnis … der buddhistischen Logik wesentlich zu fördern"), at least provided that the expression "Buddhist Logic" is understood in the usual sense. Naturally I would be happy if that were so, but on the other hand I would be surprised if this turned out to be the case. At least I can say that this never was my ambition in *this* context.

2. Presumably, H tends to refer by the expression "analytical overkill" to a number of distinctions and in particular the formulation of a vast number of principles and theorems in the main part of Oetke 1993. If this is so, then the adjective "analytic" is surely inappropriate. It would be more to the point – if one thinks that these phenomena represent an "overkill" – to speak of "hermeneutical" or "exegetical overkill." As a matter of fact, the differentiations and explications were on the one hand due to the fact that certain interpretational issues could not be definitely settled on the basis of certain criteria – and we will see below, why this is partly a matter of principle – while the differences appeared to be relevant for the context of investigation, and on the other hand motivated by the circumstance that it should be – as far as possible – ensured that the conclusions rest on a solid textual basis in the sense that they can be supported not merely by selected individual textual passages but rather by a "network of remarks." I have sympathy with the scepticism whether this is really needed as well as with the worry that things might be excessively complicated. On the other hand, it needs to be considered that a scrupulous scrutiny of what can be derived from a text with more or less cogency and in particular a clarification as to whether something can be gathered from a text by the mere wording, by the wording plus context or only with the help of additional assumptions is a vital affair. Since there is no doubt that exactly in this respect much of what happens in Indian and Tibetan studies is far below the standards that must be required in a serious science, one should be hesitant to propagate a relaxation of exegetical demands.

3. The basis of the tenet that Oetke 1993 pursues an ideal of precision which is imposed by modern logic appears mysterious to me. If this relates to the circumstance that all the important principles and "theorems" have been presented both in (regimented) natural language and by formulations in which logical symbols occur, then it must be observed that the accompanying symbolic representations merely perform the function of "stabilizing" the interpretation of the natural formulations. They serve the purpose to make formulations of interpretations of textual passages that are taken into consideration or of hypothetical premises and assumptions underlying certain arguments less vulnerable to uncertainties pertaining to the intended meanings (for someone who is able to read the symbolic notation). In other words, they are primarily meant to clarify what the interpreter of the text means. This, so to speak, "meta-exegetical" use of symbolic language is an important aspect which must never be confused with other functions which symbolic notations can equally perform. The interpretations themselves are, however, not at all generated by "ideals of precision prescribed by modern logic" but follow from simple considerations about what some statement might mean together with the discovery of alternative solutions or about premises or consequences of some step in an argument or of a certain theorem. In this regard there is no fundamental contrast to usual exegetical practice.

We should leave the topic of points of incorrectness or misunderstandings in H's account because that which is correct in it is much more interesting. But what is correct in the quoted passage? I think, above all the remark that the investigations are not so much concerned about what "Dharmakīrti really thought." Although we will see that this assessment requires

some substantial qualification, it is in some crucial respects fully correct. But the point of making this statement is less obvious. For it can hardly represent H's own original discovery – unless he did not read Oetke 1993 in its entirety – because it re-iterates something which has been explicitly acknowledged in the book – in particular on p. 205, where it has been emphasized that the study represents a separate type of investigation which must be distinguished both from "historical" investigations which, e.g., attempt to fix the date or the author of some work and from those that can be labelled as "geistesgeschichtlich" and which aim among other things at the identification of what somebody actually thought or believed, etc. The only plausible explanation is that H intended to voice a criticism. But then the question arises: What is the basis of the criticism? Since H brings at several places the notion of an understanding of Dharmakīrti into play, one should probably presume that the crucial defect which he thinks needs to be criticized is a failure to contribute to an understanding of this man. But why is understanding of a person so crucial especially because it has been explicitly declared in Oetke 1993 that "abstract entities" like doctrines, theories, dogmas, theorems, etc., are the primary object of understanding in the context of investigations of the third type? Accordingly we are confronted with two questions: 1) Is it really true that the studies of Oetke 1993 do not contribute in any way to an understanding of some person, in particular Dharmakīrti? 2) Is it imperative that every study in the humanities must contribute to an understanding of persons? My answer to the first question is that this is at best partially true. In a certain – and very fundamental – respect a study of the type of Oetke 1993 in fact contributes to an understanding of persons. I think that the thesis embodied in the second question should be flatly denied, at least if it is meant that every study has to contribute to an understanding of persons in a direct manner. I do not even want to insist on the fact that this tenet must be at any rate untenable because certain disciplines belonging to the humanities like linguistics are surely not primarily concerned with understanding of persons. Therefore I will present a reconsideration of certain issues which have been dealt with in Oetke 1993. Apart from a confirmation of my contentions this can also perform the function of enabling readers to become acquainted with some of the most central topics of Oetke 1993 and its results without immersing themselves in painstaking details. Moreover, some results will be presented which have no exact parallel in Oetke 1993.

Two issues will be discussed which are respectively related to a passage of the *Pramāṇaviniścaya* in which Dharmakīrti presents his *sattvānumāna* and a segment of the *Hetubindu* which deals with causality. One could establish a connection between the two topics in such a way that whereas the first section deals with the need to go beyond an identification of what somebody "really thought" the second section highlights the relevance of going beyond this level.

II

The section of the *Pramāṇaviniścaya* (*PVin*) in which a proof of momentariness is presented which relies on the explication of existence as capability of producing an effect (or: of fulfilling a purpose) (*arthakriyāsāmarthya*) reads as follows:

> *PVin* f. 277a4-6 = Steinkellner 1973: 78,14-24 (29*,14-24) *skad cig ma ma yin pa ni de ltar ma yin te | rnam pa thams cad du mi srid pa'i phyir ro || skad cig ma ma yin pa de ni don byed par srid pa ma yin te | rim daṅ cig car 'gal ba'i phyir ro || rim gyis ni ma yin te | ltos pa med par raṅ yod tsam gyis byed pa por gyur pa ni sdod par mi rigs pa'i phyir ro | sṅar byed pa po ma yin pa ni phyis kyaṅ mi 'gyur te | raṅ gi ṅo bo(r) 'gyur ba med pa'i phyir ro || ltos pa yin na yaṅ bśad zin*

to || cig car byed pa yaṅ ma yin te | de'i raṅ gi ṅo bo ni phyis kyaṅ mi byed par mi 'thad pa'i phyir ro | des na nus pa thams cad ldog pa de ni yod pa'i mtshan ñid las 'das pa yin no ||.

[Something which] is non-momentary is not like that (i.e., like the final momentary consciousness-moment of an Arhat) because it cannot be [causally efficient] in any possible manner. [For] that which is non-momentary cannot produce an entity[2] because it [involves a] contradiction [both on the hypothesis of] succession and [of] simultaneity [regarding the manner in which it produces an effect]. It does not [produce an effect or effects] in succession because regarding something which is a producer only by its own existence without any dependence [on anything else the assumption of] a delay [of its production] is inappropriate. Something which is not a producer before cannot even [produce] later because there is no change of the own-essence [of a thing]. If, on the other hand, it [should] be dependent [on collaborating causes with respect to its causal efficacy, then] it has been already taught before [what needs to be said against this hypothesis]. It does [however] not produce [an effect or effects] simultaneously either because even later its own essence cannot be non-productive. Therefore this [thing] which lacks potentiality [to produce effects] altogether has transgressed the limits of existence.

It can be assumed as certain that the reference to a preceding textual passage in connection with the refutation of causation depending on collaborating causes relates to *PVin* f. 272b3ff. = Steinkellner 1973: 56,28ff. (18*,28ff.). In this section Dharmakīrti attempts to prove that knowledge of the allegedly eternal Vedic words cannot be caused by those words together with collaborating factors. The argument there refers to considerations regarding the conditions under which a collaborating cause can be considered as the collaborator of the principal cause and rests on an unconvincing claim to the effect that the relationship of collaboration between collaborating and principal causes requires an additional relation which guarantees that this relation pertains to the relevant relata and not to anything else and so on *ad infinitum*.[3] The decisive point is that even if one ignores this aspect the argument still possesses sufficient substance which makes it worth being considered because the remainder of the proof that relates to causal effectiveness which does not depend on collaborating causes involves significant problems. At least in this connection it is imperative to take into account the fact that the alternative between causing in succession and causing simultaneously allows for diverse readings. For it does not suffice to rely on mere intuition in this respect. If one looks at the matter merely cursorily, then one might think that, if one supposes that some cause C produces three effects E_1, E_2 and E_3, the first alternative is represented by a situation in which E_1, E_2 and E_3 are produced at three different times and the second alternative by a situation in which all those effects are produced at some identical time. However, this should not be meant by the distinction between causing in succession and causing in sequence, and the reason is that such an alternative would not be exhaustive: The complementary counterpart of the proposition that all effects are produced at different times is not that all effects are produced at the same time but that not all effects are produced at the same time. Accordingly, if one supposes that the alternative of causing in succession consists in the hypothesis that all effects of some cause are produced at different times, or more precisely, that no two effects are produced at some identical time, then the contrary hypothesis would be that some effects are produced at the same time. But is it imperative to read the first alternative in the suggested manner? The answer is: No.

[2] Or: "cannot fulfil a purpose." However, it appears that this alternative reading of the expression *don byed pa* = *arthakriyā* is not relevant in the pertinent context, at least inasmuch as the argument is concerned.

[3] The principles on which the regress-argument relies has been discussed in Oetke 1993: 45ff. It possesses affinities with the construction of a regress from the predicative binding: 1) S is F, 2) Being F is connected with S, 3) There is a connection between S and being F, 4) S (and being F) are connected in some special manner to a connection between S and being F, 5) There is a connection between S (and being F) and a connection between S and being F.

One must first differentiate between at least two different interpretations of the contrast between causing in succession and causing simultaneously:

1) "There are at least two effects which are produced at different times by some cause" vs. "All effects of some cause are produced at the same time."

2) "All effects produced by some cause are produced at different times" vs. "Some effects of some cause are produced at the same time" – this corresponds to the hypothesis considered above.

However, a little reflection brings to light that it has been tacitly presupposed that the contrast between causing in succession and causing simultaneously refers to the internal relation between numerically different effects. Is this assumption compelling? The answer must be again: No. At least the wording of the expressions allows also for the possibility that the alternative relates either to the manner in which each single effect is caused or to the temporal relation between the cause and the effect. Accordingly one should reckon with the possibility that the contrast has to be explicated in the following ways:

1*) "There is some effect which is produced by some cause in successive stages" vs. "Every effect which is produced by some cause is produced at one single instant."

How 2*) would read is obvious.

1**) "Some effect is produced by a cause in such a manner that the cause itself and its production of the effect originate in succession" vs. "Every effect which is produced by a cause is produced simultaneously with the cause, i.e., at the first instant at which the cause exists."

Is this a futile play with "possibilities"? I think one should answer as follows: First, the fact needs to be recognized that all the mentioned readings harmonize with the formulations which characterize the alternatives, viz. *rim gyis* (**krameṇa*) and *cig car* (**yaugapadyena*), and are compatible with the textual context. To be sure, the last mentioned alternative appears to presuppose a less natural reading of the expressions themselves, but on the other hand it perfectly matches the wider context in which the refutation is expressed. Secondly, the diverse readings embody substantial differences. They are not merely variant formulations of identical ideas, and a choice between the alternatives affects the interpretation of the context: If, e.g., one adopts 1), the expression "delay [of production]" needs to be understood as referring to the circumstance that something is caused later than something else, whereas if one adopted 1*) the expression should be taken as relating to the fact that the process of the production of an entity is not immediately completed, and if one supposes 1**), then the same expression should mean that a cause does not become productive as soon as it has originated. Accordingly, the refutations represent different arguments. Possibly, the premises on which the argumentation rests as a whole are identical in all cases. But since this is not immediately evident, one needs first a clear distinction between the alternatives before one assesses the consequences which they entail, *if* one pursues the task of identifying hidden premises of the proof.

Is it appropriate to object that there is no evidence that the author of the pertinent textual passage, i.e., Dharmakīrti, had all the above mentioned differences "in mind" at the time at which he produced it? I think that such an objection could merely reveal lack of reflection. First of all: What should be considered as the time which is relevant for the occurrence or non-occurrence of the thought-episodes in question? Is it the time at which Dharmakīrti

formed the conception of the *sattvānumāna* "in his mind"? Or the time at which he started to write the treatise to which the above cited section belongs? Or the time at which he wrote the section itself? Or the moment at which he scribbled down the words corresponding to *rim gyis* and *cig car*? Or some time at which he reflected on the question what the distinction embodied by these two expressions exactly means? … But are not all such considerations idle speculation? How should one draw safe conclusions about the occurrence or non-occurrence of certain thought-episodes of the writer of the pertinent textual passage? And even if that *were* possible, would it be really *relevant*? Would it enhance our understanding if we knew that at the moment at which Dharmakīrti scribbled down the word corresponding to *rim gyis* the thought occurred to him that his handwriting was a bit sloppy or that the light at his table was a bit dark, etc., etc.? Even if we narrow down the perspective to "accompanying intentions" the relevance is by no means certain. Supposed that Dharmakīrti envisaged a situation in which some cause C produces at three different times three effects E_1, E_2 and E_3 as an exemplification of the first alternative, should we take this as the touchstone for the determination of the correct intended meaning? But suppose Dharmakīrti also envisaged a situation in which C produces E_1, E_2 and E_3 at a single moment as an exemplification of the alternative possibility – should this determine the "intended meaning" of the concept of simultaneous production? Should one be under such circumstances obliged to interpret causing in succession and causing in sequence as amounting to the same as producing all effects at different times and producing all effects at the same time? However, is there not reason to suppose that this cannot or should not be the intended meaning because we possess strong evidence for the assumption that the author of the text considered the pertinent alternatives as exhaustive? Is it not legitimate to discard the aspect of accompanying thought-episodes or intentional acts in favour of the principle of what is most reasonable (in our eyes) *given* certain intentions and goals which can be attributed to some author in question? It is not necessary to insist that this *must* be the guiding principle of *every* text-interpretation. It suffices to claim that there is at least a variety of interpretation which orientates itself by this standard as well as to the idea of "making sense" of particular actions or ways of behaviour. Probably, there exists even a possible corresponding use of the word "mean" and related expressions. – Accordingly one might distinguish "rational meaning" from both "linguistic meaning" and "intentional meaning." – These assumptions are by no means outlandish and are related to some suggestions which have been made by Gareth Evans in his book *The Varieties of Reference* (edited by J. McDowell, Oxford 1982), in particular pp. 129ff. (§ 5.3). On this background it should not be difficult to recognize why a considerable number of "possibilities" comes into the field of vision: The plurality of possibilities ensues from the indeterminacy of the principle of being reasonable on the backdrop of certain intentions and goals as well as from the indefiniteness which is inherent in the notion of making sense of something.

Is it reasonable to reject the pertinent variety of understanding and interpretation because of the mentioned lack of uniquely determining criteria? I think that those who claim that the only legitimate concern is the identification of what somebody has "really thought" deserve the following reply: To discard investigations concerning what is (most) reasonable in the light of given intentions and goals because they are not directly related to specific thought-episodes or speech-act intentions means that, in the case of a figure like Dharmakīrti, one refuses to take somebody's philosophy or system of thought seriously. This does not at all imply that it is illegitimate to criticize or even rebuff theorems which have been propounded by Dharmakīrti or other philosophers of the Indian tradition. The decisive point is rather that the biased emphasis on personal, biographical and psychological aspects in combination with

the axiom that identification of what somebody really thought is the only relevant issue dismisses serious explorations which take that which has been thought as an object of study. Such an approach does not provide any room for research that relates to the content of a system of thoughts, such as the identification of what would be most sensible or reasonable in some context of accepted theorems, held opinions or intended aims *irrespective of whether or not* the concerned thinker has drawn himself similar conclusions or for investigations pertaining to objective features of philosophical tenets or theories like required premises, relations of compability or incompability with respect to other tenets, etc., which do not presuppose that the advocate of the tenets and theorems has explicitly recognized those features. Even if it turned out that Dharmakīrti was a "poor thinker" such an attitude could not be justified because it means that his philosophy – or at least certain philosophical tenets – are not taken seriously *from the very outset*. Therefore I claim that the biased outlook which has been delineated above engenders poor science.

The argumentation by which the second alternative of simultaneous causing by a non-momentary entity is refuted could support the assumption that the author had among the above mentioned variants 1), 1*) or 1**) rather than 2), 2*) or 2**) "in mind." For the formulation of the ensuing consequence, viz. the lack of a productive essence at later times of the existence of a non-momentary entity, furnishes in this manner a most straightforward argument for the rejection of the second alternative in particular. However, the supposition that the author in fact intended to employ a specific argument against that alternative, is at least a possible hypothesis. On the other hand, the notion of "later than" obviously relates to the relation between a previous and a subsequent causing and not to the relation between a thing's existence and its production of an effect, and since one must account for the possibility that Dharmakīrti presented his argument in an elliptical form, such that his refutation should be taken as illustrative and as providing the clue for the refutation of the possibility that some entity produces all its effects simultaneously at some later time during its existence – as it merely requires to substitute "later" by "previously" – it would be illegitimate to consider the issue of the choice between 1), 1*) and 1**) as definitely settled. Nevertheless, the fact that 1**) fits most naturally into the argumentative context is remarkable in view of the fact that it appears to presuppose a less natural reading for the pertinent terms denoting the alternatives. Even if one regarded the methodology which is pursued here as "overcautious" and deemed the issue of the choice between 1), 1*) and 1**) as settled in favour of 1**) because of the argumentation one should acknowledge that the method of interpretation which is adopted here represents a progress with respect to a merely intuitive grasp. For, if one decided in favour of 1**) on that basis, one would do it on explicit grounds and with a clear mind and not because one has failed to recognize differences in a state of muddledness. But most decisive is the fact that if one asserts that the issue of the correct interpretation of the alternatives of causing in succession and causing simultaneously can be definitely settled by considerations pertaining to the arguments which are presented in the text one implicitly acknowledges the decisive role of criteria of rationality and the potential relevance of "rational meaning." If somebody contends that intentions, thought-episodes or other states of mind are equally important, e.g., in the respect that we should assume that the author of the *PVin* intended to present a consistent proof or that at the time of his writing the pertinent passage he was aware of what he was doing, etc., then we can concede this. It merely shows that the aspect of what was in some author's mind must not be altogether excluded from our investigations. The distinguishing feature is that it is not the only thing which matters here.

Since the danger of neglecting relevant interpretational variants has been diminished by the above investigations we can confidently assume that the proof which is presented in the initially cited *PVin* passage entails the following consequences:

1. Dharmakīrti does not allow for the possibility that some entity never produces any effect.
2. Dharmakīrti is obliged to assume that the hypothesis of a permanent entity which produces numerically different but qualitatively identical effects involves a change of the "own-essence" of the entity in question.

These are remarkable results: The first consequence is significant because Dharmakīrti's explication of his criterion of existence as *don byed nus pa* = **arthakriyāsamartha* or *arthakriyāsāmarthya* which is mentioned in *PVin* f. 276b7 = Steinkellner 1973: 76,24 does by itself not necessitate such a consequence. It merely says that the capability for producing an effect is a necessary requirement of existence. The significance of the second consequence results from the circumstance that the hypothesis of an entity producing successively qualitatively indistinguishable effects does not militate against the assumption that its own nature has not been subject to some change. Therefore it appears unavoidable to assume that Dharmakīrti presupposed that that which is called "own-essence" is subject to a more rigorous requirement of identity or persistence.

In this place one might be tempted to offer the following simple explanation: 1. The author of the *PVin* took it as axiomatic that the own-essence of every entity cannot persist if some entity produces first some effect and does not produce numerically the same effect at a subsequent instant. 2. Dharmakīrti equated capability for producing an effect with actually producing an effect because he relied on his argument against the possibility of producing effects in collaboration with auxiliary causes. I consider these accounts as cheap. On the one hand the argumentation which is presented in the *PVin* against the possibility of causing in collaboration with auxiliary causes is assailable and quite unconvincing. On the other hand the suggestion that Dharmakīrti took as axiomatic the theorem that production of numerically different and qualitatively identical effects at different times entails change of own-essence merely shifts the problem, since one must ask: Why did Dharmakīrti take this as axiomatic? If one retorts that the axiom follows from Dharmakīrti's concept of own-essence (*svabhāva*) and that the theorem "If C produces at time T_1 A and C does not produce at time T_2 A, then there is no own-essence which C possesses both at T_1 and T_2" merely reflects a terminological stipulation regarding "self-essence," one is obliged to give a poor account of Dharmakīrti's reasoning. For if one simply hypothesizes a concept of "own-essence" which is definable in a corresponding manner, the theorem that the own-essence of an entity cannot be subject to change and that things possess "own-essences" of this type at all becomes utterly implausible. By such an account we would ascribe to the writer of the *PVin* quite a poor argument for a theorem which occupies a central place in his philosophy. Accordingly the attitude of contenting oneself with offering this explanation would once more entail that one does not take seriously a theory propounded by some author from the very outset.

III

As the *PVin* passage in which the proof of momentariness on the basis of existence (*sattvānumāna*) is presented does not allow us to decide whether or not the suggested "poor account" must be accepted as a faithful representation of Dharmakīrti's reasoning in the final analysis,

it becomes imperative to investigate additional material. It seems that a passage in the *Hetubindu* is especially relevant in this connection. It is in the first place a segment that is introduced by the question how it is possible to know that everything which is existent necessarily possesses a perishable own-essence (*katham idam avagamyate sad avaśyaṃ naśvara-svabhāvam iti*) (Steinkellner 1967: 43,17 [7*,17]), which contains a subsection that is dedicated to a refutation of the hypothesis that a permanent entity like a seed, which possesses a *svabhāva* of producing a certain effect, actually does not produce that effect all by itself but dependently on other (auxiliary) causes (Steinkellner 1967: 45,16 [8*,16] *syād etat*: *bījādīnām aṅkurādijananasvabhāvānām api salilādihetvantarāpekṣaṇāt kevalā na janayanti* …). The significance of this passage results from the circumstance that Dharmakīrti does not refute the hypothesis on the basis of the questionable considerations by which he tried to exclude the possibility of producing effects in collaboration with auxiliary causes in the *PVin*, but by deliberations which relate to the notion of "own-essence" (*svabhāva*). Since it is not possible to deal with the details of the argumentation here, I will describe merely the outlines in the hope that it might be allowed to refer readers who desire a justification for certain statements to the chapter of Oetke 1993 that deals with the "digression on causality in the *Hetubindu*." The argument seems to run as follows:

Step 1: It is only the last phase of common sense-entities like seeds which can possess a producing *svabhāva* (with respect to some particular effect, e.g., a sprout).

Reasons:

a) Because something which does not actually produce some effect at some time cannot possess a producing *svabhāva*;

b) because the character of a *svabhāva* cannot change and because it therefore cannot occur that one and the same entity is determined at one time as a producing *svabhāva* and at some other time not.[4]

Step 2: It is not possible that some permanent entity produces some effect on account of being at some time in a state in which it possesses a producing *svabhāva*.

Reasons:

a) Because if some entity possesses a *svabhāva* at some time of its existence, then it must possess it at all times of its existence;

b) because if an entity is alone capable to produce something, then it also produces that;

or alternatively

b*) because if an entity possesses at some time alone a *svabhāva* that is capable to produce something, it must also produce the effect at the respective time;

c) because only an entity which possesses a *svabhāva* that is capable to produce something can produce an effect.

The proposition 2c) is crucial. It represents an "input-condition" for the applicability of the concept of *svabhāva*, for it entails that *if* some entity is capable to produce some effect, *then* it possesses a *svabhāva* which is capable to produce something. This in its turn attains relevance on the background of the theorem that if something possesses a *svabhāva* which is

[4] The "weaker reading" of *svabhāvasyānyathātvāsaṃbhavāt* which is discussed in Oetke 1993: 154 appears to me preferable now.

capable to produce something it actually produces the pertinent effect, since we can derive (by transitivity): *if* some entity is capable to produce some effect, *then* it actually produces the pertinent effect.

Dharmakīrti's reasoning in the *HB* can be modelled by a series of derivational steps which looks as follows:

(I) For all (particulars) x and for all (time-instants or time-intervals) t such that x exists in t it holds good that x possesses in t a capability to cause either alone or in collaboration with other factors that there is some y which is an effect of x.

(II) For all x and for all t such that x exists in t it holds good that x causes in t either alone or in collaboration with other factors that there is some y which is an effect of x.

(III) For all x and for all t such that x exists in t it holds good that x causes in t that there is some y which is an effect of x.

(IV) For all x and for all t such that x exists in t it holds good that x produces some y in t which is an effect of x.

(V) For all x there is some y which is an effect of x and such that for all t in which x exists x produces y in t.

Assuming that (IV) represents merely a paraphrase of (III) the steps leading from (I) to (II), from (II) to (III) and from (III) to (IV) need to be scrutinized. Since the pertinent section of the *HB* contains compelling evidence that Dharmakīrti was clearly aware of the difference between potentiality and actuality, between capability for producing and actually producing something, the hypothesis that the transition from (I) to (II) is due to ignorance or confusion appears untenable. However, we obtain the clue for an alternative – and I presume much better – solution if we reflect on what "capability to cause something" means or could mean. Is not the following explication plausible: That some x possesses the capability to cause something means that x possesses a nature due to which it holds good that if certain circumstances obtain or were given, then x actually causes or would cause the pertinent effect. In some recent works in philosophy – see above all D.M. Armstrong, *A Materialist Theory of the Mind*, London 1968, pp. 85ff. – two different views regarding the nature of dispositions have been distinguished and discussed. The first is called "the Realist view" and can be roughly characterized as the position which supposes that "to speak of an object's having a dispositional property entails that the object is in some non-dispositional state or that it has some property (there exists a 'categorical basis') which is responsible for the object manifesting certain behaviour in certain circumstances, manifestations whose nature makes the dispositional property the particular dispositional property it is" (cf. Armstrong 1968: 86). The opposite position, which is labelled "phenomenalist" or "operationalist," disputes that there is an entailment between dispositional properties and non-dispositional states. Now, could it not be a plausible explanation for Dharmakīrti's equation between capability and actuality that he held a "phenomenalist view" or at least that in the context of the proof(s) of momentariness he hypothesized a strong phenomenalist premise in the sense that dispositional properties, in particular capabilities, are definitely *not* based on categorical properties?

Let us see, what *would* follow *if* a phenomenalist position of the described sort were supposed. Does not such a view preclude the possibility to relate different property-descriptions of the form "If P, then x causes A," "If Q, then x causes B," etc., – or "If S obtains, then x

causes A," "If T obtains, then x causes B," etc., – to some identical (categorical) property? Moreover, would not the assumption of the existence or persistence of some non-actual causal potency be futile under such premises? Could not this excellently explain why Dharmakīrti claimed that if an entity produced certain effects at certain times and at other times not, this would entail a change of "own-essence"? Is this not a suitable basis for understanding the puzzling ingredients of Dharmakīrti's *svabhāva*-concept? To be sure, the hypothesis of a phenomenalist stance would not suffice to *justify* Dharmakīrti's concept of *svabhāva* and the role which he assigns to it. It would moreover not bestow any additional compulsion to Dharmakīrti's *sattvānumāna*. But the charge that the proof rests on arbitrary conceptual stipulations and a "sophistic" exploitation of certain terminological ambiguities would be averted. The possibility is open to discern a considerably deeper foundation for a principal tenet of Dharmakīrti's philosophy.

One might even go a step further and assert that by relating Dharmakīrti's theorem of momentariness to a phenomenalist position regarding causal capability one obtains a rare opportunity of making the analysis of a doctrine of the Indian tradition relevant for modern philosophy. Could one not claim that Dharmakīrti's doctrine of momentariness is suited to bring to light certain problems which ensue from a phenomenalist stance concerning dispositions?

A phenomenalist outlook can also make the transition from (II) to (III) intelligible. It is remarkable that Dharmakīrti in the *HB* appears to acknowledge the possibility of causing in collaboration with auxiliary causes. This is interpreted as the production of an effect by a multitude of causal factors and connected with the theorem that whereas on the one hand the collection of (auxiliary) causes together produces numerically one and the same entity, on the other hand the individual members of the collection are responsible for different features of the product. However, the author of the *HB* emphatically denies the possibility that either a single cause or a collection of causes persists during different moments such that it produces certain effects at some time and at some other time not. A phenomenalist view could explain this. Without "categorical states" it is difficult to see on what basis one should attribute to a thing a property which is describable by "If P (obtains), then x causes A" regarding times at which the initial conditions are not fulfilled and the entity in question does not cause an effect of the pertinent sort. Even if such an effect were produced at some time there is no basis for assuming that this property should persist after the production of the effect or at previous times at which the effect was not yet produced. Thus one merely requires as an additional assumption the premise that one and the same entity cannot possess different causal capacities, that that which one could intuitively consider as the causally relevant nature of an entity must remain constant in order to derive the tenet which is represented by (III).

In contradistinction to (IV) (V) is not compatible with the possibility that a permanent, perhaps everlasting, entity subsequently produces numerically different and qualitatively identical effects. Obviously, the hypothesis of a phenomenalistic outlook regarding causal dispositions alone cannot explain a denial of this possibility. I am inclined to believe, however, that certain general views concerning causality were held by the proponent of the *sattvānumāna* and that they were responsible for the fact that Dharmakīrti was convinced of the truth of a causal theory that entailed (V). Let us see what is needed in order to justify a transition from (IV) to (V). Apparently at least the following additional suppositions must be made:

(A) Strong causal determinacy: Every difference of causal outcome must be due to a difference of causally relevant initial conditions.

(B) Causal homogeneity of time: For every time T_1 and every time T_2 it is causally irrelevant whether some (complex of) causal factor(s) is located at T_1 or at T_2.

(C) Causal irrelevance of prehistory: If some C produces an effect E on account of (a collection of) state-of-affairs prevailing at some time T, then nothing which happened before T is relevant for the fact that C produces E – excluding the fact that events which happened before are responsible for the existence of C and the states-of-affairs prevailing at T.

The import of (A) can best be recognized by contrasting it with an alternative: Suppose that it is true that every event must possess some cause. This does not entail that everything which is (*de facto*) caused by something is also necessarily caused by it. One could assume that the relevance of causal factors pertains merely to the circumstance that their existence enhances a statistical probability of the occurrence of certain effects, so that as soon as a certain causally relevant complex originates there might be an increased probability that at the subsequent moment a certain effect occurs, but since it is only a matter of probability the actual production might be deferred to some subsequent instance. But let us suppose that even this possibility should be ruled out by some strong tenet of non-realism regarding causal dispositions and assume that if some causally relevant complex exists it necessarily produces some type of effect. This is compatible with the proposition that causal determination does not pertain to the numerical identity of the effect, so that one could say that even if the occurrence of an effect of some sort is necessitated by the existence of a causal complex it is still undetermined which entity will be produced as an effect. In order to rule out such a possibility one would have to embrace a tenet which could be expressed thus: Whenever A is produced as an effect of some C, if instead of A some numerically different B were produced then something which is different from C must exist. It is easy to see that a position of "strong causal determinacy" is by no means self-evident.

However, even if one conceded such a tenet, one needs additional premises. Suppose that causal homogeneity of time would not hold good, then it is conceivable that differences of causal behaviour are to be described in terms of changes of position in time instead of changes of the "own-nature" of things. On the other hand, if one rejected causal irrelevance of prehistory one could assume that, e.g., the mere fact that some C has produced A at T_1 together with the inherent nature of C determines that C produces B, which is numerically different from A, at a subsequent moment T_2 even on the supposition that A neither directly nor indirectly has an effect on C.

It is noteworthy that there is nothing in the proofs of momentariness which commits its propounder to the tenet that time-instants are infinitely small. Everything which Dharmakīrti says both in the *PVin* and in the *HB* is perfectly compatible with the thesis that a moment (*kṣaṇa*) equals, say, 10^{-500} milliseconds. This is extremely short, but not infinitely small.

IV

Now it is time to address the question as to why considerations as those that have been presented above might be relevant. First of all, it is not only true that Dharmakīrti does not explicitly state any of the theorems in the investigated textual passages, but also that there is not even evidence that he was ever in a position to formulate them. However, if one takes this circumstance as a sufficient ground for deducing their irrelevance one adopts a stance which deserves to be questioned. Various philosophers in the twentieth century have drawn atten-

tion to the phenomenon of basic convictions which have never been articulated, never been brought to awareness, never been adopted at any specific time, and employed various terms – e.g., "certainty," "Gewißheit" (Wittgenstein) and "creencias básicas" (Ortega y Gasset) – in order to refer to them. There is, however, no compelling reason to restrict the area of basic convictions to the world of common sense and everyday – including linguistic – practices. Could not "basic convictions" exist which are related to philosophy or which are particularly manifested in the context of philosophy, and if this is so, would not "strong causal determinacy," "causal homogeneity of time," "causal irrelevance of prehistory," and "phenomenalist view concerning causal dispositions" be suitable candidates for such a status? But suppose there are basic convictions which are apt to come to light in the context of philosophy and philosophical reasoning, what is the proof which demonstrates that it is not worthwhile to explore them? Is it perhaps because they are so deep-rooted that it is not probable that they were held by some particular thinker alone? But once more one should ask: Where is the argument which shows that studies on Dharmakīrti's texts must exclusively aim at revealing facts which are particular to Dharmakīrti? H does not even offer the beginning of such an argument. Moreover, where is the proof that identifications of basic convictions, irrespective of whether they can be attributed to one or several individuals, do not contribute to a better understanding of a person? Where is the proof that biographical facts possess a distinguished status at all? Professional philosophers have often assumed that, say, Plato's doctrine of "eros" possesses aspects which are worth an investigation irrespective of Plato's biography. Is it under *all* circumstances essential to know whether Plato's views had been developed under the influence of personal love affairs or religious experiences or whatever else? Understanding a person might be a legitimate aim, but H does not say why he thinks that understanding a philosophical theory or the precise content of philosophical theorems are less important.[5] H's remarks (1997) present an unsatisfactory treatment of this topic.

As a challenge I propound the following theses:

1) It is an error to suppose that circumstantial and psychological facts always determine the truth conditions of statements to such an extent that they can be uniquely assessed as true or false.

2) Basic convictions shared by groups of people or by an entire society are not less important than episodes of intending and believing.

1) provides a basis for explorations of "rational meaning" in accordance with section II; 2) motivates the investigation concerning tacitly presupposed principles which has been illus-

[5] It deserves to be noted that H seems to be unaware of the imprecision of his maxim that one must (!) not disregard the functions which some thinker assigns to his arguments and proofs. Let us concede that it is imperative to consider functions of arguments and proofs. Does not the proposition that the argument that a *svabhāva* which is capable of producing an effect at some time cannot become inefficient at later times disproves in the *PVin* the alternative of simultaneous causing represent an information about the function of the argument? And is it not a function of this dismissal to establish that a permanent entity cannot be causally efficient, and is it not a function of the refutation of causal efficacy of permanent entities to establish the tenet of momentariness? Even regarding the proof of momentariness as a whole could one not claim that it possesses the function of demonstrating how the physical world really is? Is it not quite absurd to claim that accounts of function *must* bring soteriological aspects into play? Apparently H has confused different levels of queries about function. The circumstance that the function of a carburettor is to mix air with gasoline spray to make an explosive mixture does of course not preclude that the total functional system to which a carburettor belongs performs itself a function (of some higher order), and a functional system of higher order might perform a function in a system of still higher order and so on. H has failed to identify the exact place at which considerations of soteriology are perhaps relevant. At any rate it is imperative to neatly distinguish different functional levels.

trated in section III. Those who wish to advocate the proposition that everything which is not directly related to the identification of what some So-and-so "really thought" is merely an irrelevant play with possibilities should first attempt to disprove the two theses.

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