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PRAXIS: THE ENFORCEMENT OF PENALTIES IN THE LATE CLASSICAL AND EARLY HELLENISTIC PERIODS

Recent scholarship especially on classical Athenian law has tended to focus predominantly on the trial itself and, to a lesser extent, on the pre-trial proceedings. The proceedings *after* the court-hearings, that is, the methods by which the courts' decisions were executed, have received less attention by comparison, not least when it comes to the aftermath of public legal actions that had resulted in the imposition of a financial penalty on the defendant. Here the focus has been far less on the process of *praxis* itself than on the other methods and procedures by which the Athenians attempted to make a convicted defendant pay his fine. As is well known, these included the imposition of *atimia* on the defendant until the debt had been paid and the doubling of the fine if he missed his deadline for payment. Likewise, considerable attention has been paid to the procedure of *apographe* as well as to the procedures through which *atimia* could be enforced against the debtor. Both the process of *apographe* and the actual enforcement of *atimia* depended to a large extent on the involvement of volunteers. It has often been emphasised that the volunteer prosecutor who had been successful in bringing about the conviction of the defendant might subsequently have played an active role also in the process of executing the verdict.

Unfortunately, the sources offer far less information on the active steps that may have been taken by Athens' *polis* officials in order to exact the fines. There is evidence for an Athenian board of *praktōres*, and for the registration with them of the names of individuals who had incurred fines payable to the *polis*.¹ However, little is known about their other tasks, including any active, physical involvement that they may have had in the process of *praxis* itself. If indeed they were authorised to distrain upon the property of individual debtors, it is still not at all clear if and how responsibility for the exacting of fines was shared between them and the *demarchs*,² who also appear to have played an active part in this aspect of law-enforcement. As for sacred fines, [Dem.] 43.71 may suggest that, in some cases, the personnel responsible for *praxis* were the treasurers of the sanctuary for which the

¹ e.g. Dem. 25.28, [58].48.

² See Whitehead (1986: 125-127, 131-132).

fine was destined, and that they had some responsibility for exacting the fine.³ But, again, it is not known to what extent or by what means they were permitted (let alone required) to compel the debtor to pay the money or to surrender part of his property for sale at a public auction.

The obscurity that surrounds the *active* involvement of Athens' officials in the execution of monetary penalties destined for the *polis'* treasuries, sacred as well as profane, has contributed to a widespread impression of Athenian law-enforcement as a rather haphazard, unpredictable process, which depended almost entirely on the initiative taken by volunteers rather than on the initiative of the *polis'* officials. This impression is to some extent supported by a considerable amount of evidence for individuals who had remained on the registers of public debtors for years (and some families allegedly for generations).⁴ It is also, I think, one of several factors that have given rise to the labelling of not only Athens but of the Greek *poleis* generally as 'stateless societies'.⁵ I do not intend to become involved in that debate at present, except for making two observations. The first is that the Athenian evidence for the role of its officials specifically in the process of *praxis* deserves to be reassessed in a separate study. The second is that, even if the outcome of such a study confirms that their role in the process of *praxis* was indeed a mostly passive one, it is hardly safe to use the Athenian example as a basis for general conclusions on the nature of law-enforcement in other *poleis* across the Greek world.

In what follows I shall discuss some of the very copious epigraphical evidence for the role of officials in the process of *praxis* in other Greek states in the late classical and early Hellenistic period. I shall limit the discussion primarily to their role in exacting fines payable to the public treasuries and to the sanctuaries, with only passing references to their involvement in assisting private individuals in the process of *praxis*. This means that I shall for the present purposes leave out the documentation for the involvement of officials in the enforcement of *asylia* grants. On the other hand, some evidence pertaining to the enforcement of penalty clauses in contracts drawn up between communities and individual contractors will be included in the discussion.

³ The law prescribes a penalty of 100 dr. per olive tree unlawfully uprooted, of which one tenth is payable to Athena: *πρυτανεία δὲ τιθέτω ὁ διώκων τοῦ αὐτοῦ μέρους. ὅτου δ' ἂν καταγνώσθῃ, ἐγγραφόντων οἱ ἄρχοντες, πρὸς οὓς ἂν ἦ ἡ δίκη, τοῖς πράκτορσιν, ὃ τῷ δημοσίῳ γίνεται* <ὃ δὲ τῇ θεῷ γίνεται>, τοῖς ταμίαις τῶν τῆς θεοῦ. ἐὰν δὲ μὴ ἐγγράφωσιν, αὐτοὶ ὀφειλόντων. If Reiske's addition to the text is accepted, it may be inferred that the sanctuary's ten per cent share of the fine imposed on the offender is to be registered with the *tamiai* of Athena and the other 90 per cent, which is destined for the public treasury, must be registered with the board of *praktors*. Contrast *Agora* 16: 56 (*SEG* 30: 61) A fr. a-b 34-36, which suggests that the *praktors* could sometimes be involved in the registration of sacred fines.

⁴ See e.g. Hunter (2000).

⁵ For two succinct overviews see Faraguna (2000), Gianguilio (2004). See also Harris (2007: 159-160).

When an enactment authorises an official, including the personnel associated with sanctuaries, to seize *enechyra* in connection with the imposition of a penalty, there can be no doubt at all that he had the power – and often also a legal obligation – to participate actively in the process of *praxis*, and that his action in this respect did not depend on any initiative taken by a private individual. Such clauses are found frequently in enactments passed by civic subdivisions⁶ and by associations of various kinds.⁷ In addition, this power was vested in an unidentifiable board at Miletos,⁸ in the *amphodarchoi* at Pergamon,⁹ and in the *hiereus* at the Amphiareion at Oropos.¹⁰

Unfortunately, the evidence for *enechyra* carried out by *polis* officials is limited. In the vast majority of instances, all the legal historian has to work from are instructions to specific boards of officials expressed through the verbs *prassein/prassesthai* or various compounds (*eis-*, *ana-*, *ek-*) as well as the variants *praxin poiein/poieisthai*¹¹ and *praxis esto/gignestho*. As will be seen, the use of this vocabulary is not all that transparent. Consequently, it is often difficult, if not impossible, to assess the extent to which the officials in question were authorised to exercise a measure of force against the debtor in order to recover the fine destined for the *polis*' treasury or its sanctuaries.

Several accounts submitted by officials contain a declaration by them to the effect that they had been unable to exact money from contractors or their guarantors, who are now being registered as debtors. One example is *IK Ilion* 5 from the third century, which contains a list of fines imposed by the *agonothetai*. Some are listed under the heading καὶ οὐς ζημιώσαντες καὶ οὐ δυνάμενοι πρᾶξαι καὶ ὁμόσαντες κατὰ τὸν νόμον ἀνεγράψαμεν ὀφείλοντας τῇ πανηγύρει. The *agonothetai* had evidently been responsible for exacting the fines that they themselves had imposed. When they turned out to be unable to do so, they were obliged by law to confirm by

⁶ *IG* XII, 9 90, *LSCG* 91 (Eretria, deme of Tamynai?, C4): ὁ δὲ δῆμ[αρχος εἰ]ἄμ μὴ ὀρκώρει ἢ μὴ ἐ[νεχ]υράρει τοὺς [μ]ῇ ὁμόρα[ντα]ς, πεντα[κο]ρ[ί]ας δ[ρ]αχμὰς [ἄ]ποτινέτω· ἐκπρηττόντων δὲ οἱ ἱεροπ[ο]ιοὶ ἢ αὐτο[ί] ὀφελόντων διπλεῖ. On the *demarchos* here as operating on the level of the civic subdivision rather than as an official 'operating at *polis* level', see Knoepfler (1997: 375).

⁷ For a recent example, see Harris (2008: 81-83).

⁸ *Milet* I, 3 147, Migeotte *L'emprunt public* no. 97 lines 37-43, on which Migeotte comments (1984: 310) 'Cette saisie devait sans doute être exercée par les autorités publiques, puisque son benefice allait au trésor.' He notes, however, that the *enechyra* here may have been intended primarily as a means of putting pressure on the *tamiai* to pay over the money owed to individual subscribers, rather than as a method of exacting a penalty imposed upon them: if they subsequently complied with the regulations, the *enechyra* were to be returned to them.

⁹ *SEG* 13: 521, *OGIS* 483 Col. II 90-101, cf. also Col. I 29-35.

¹⁰ *SEG* 31: 415-416, *SEG* 22: 370, *LSCG Suppl.* no. 35, *IG* VII 235, *I. Oropos* 277.

¹¹ e.g. *CID* IV 51, *SEG* 18: 243.

oath that they had tried but failed, whereupon they proceeded to perform a registration of the debtors.

Similar declarations are found in, for example, *IG XI*, 2 153 from third-century Delos. It relates to the exacting of debts owed by contractors, both arrears and fines imposed for breach of the terms of the contracts.¹² In such cases, the contracts themselves may have contained explicit stipulations to the effect that the officials were authorised directly to distraint upon the property of the contractor and his guarantors without any further procedural requirements.¹³ In other instances, the contracts themselves may have contained cross references to existing, general legislation where such regulations were set out.¹⁴ When carrying out *praxis* on the basis of a contractual agreement, the officials may have been seen in effect to be taking action against persons who, at the point when they signed the contract, had consented to such measures being taken in the event of their failing to fulfil their contractual obligations. Thus, it is not entirely safe to use these examples as evidence for the authority bestowed on officials actively to exact fines in general.

However, *IG XII*, 5 610 from third-century Keos documents an instance where the *boule* collectively declares itself to have been unable to exact the debt incurred by no fewer than forty-six individuals as a result of a series of court decisions.¹⁵ The *boule* subsequently imposed the *hemiolion* upon them and entered this additional

¹² *IG XI*, 2 153 lines 18-19: τάδε ἄλλα ἐπρίατο Ξενομήδης Ἀπατουρίου 135· ἐγγυηταὶ Κάλ[λι]μος Πατροκλέους, Διονυσόδωρος Λυσίλεω· τούτους οὐκ ἐδυνάμεθα εἰσπράξαι, ἀλλ' ὀφείλουσι.

¹³ See e.g. *SEG* 42: 472 (Delphi C2, loan from the sanctuary to private individual): εἰ δέ κα μὴ ποιῇ ---ος] καθὼς γέγραπ[ται, πρ]άκτιμος ἔστω καὶ αὐτὸς καὶ τοὶ ἔγγυοι αὐ[τοῦ] οὐ κα μὴ ἀπο[δ]ῶντι αὐτοῦ καὶ τοῦ ἡμι[ολίου] καὶ ἁ πρᾶξις ἔστω ἕκ] τε αὐ[τοῦ] καὶ τῶν ἐγγύων αὐτοῦ κτλ. Compare also the stipulations in e.g. *ID IV*, 503 lines 33-38: εἰάν δέ τι ἐλλείπει τοῦ μισθώματος, πραθέ<v>των τῶν καρπῶν, [ἀπ]οδόσθων πρὸς τὸ ἐλλεῖπον τοὺς βοῦς [κα]ὶ πρόβατα καὶ τὰ ἀνδράπ[οδα]· εἰάν {εἰάν} δέ, κ[αί] τούτων πραθέντων, ἔτι ἐλλείπει τι τοῦ μισθώματος, εἰσπρασόντων τὸ ἐλλεῖπον ἐκ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων τοῖς μεμισθωμένοις καὶ τοῖς ἐγγυηταῖς· εἰάν δέ μὴ δύνωνται πρᾶ<ξ>α, ἐξομόσαντες ἐπ[ὶ] Δι[ὶ] ἀγοραῖω [μ]ὴ δυνατοὶ εἶναι πρᾶ[ξ]αι, ἀναγραφόντων αὐτοὺς εἰς τὴν στήλην πατρόθεν ὀφείλοντας τῷ θεῷ καὶ αὐτοὺς καὶ τοὺς ἐγγυητάς, καὶ ἀναμισθούντων τὸ τέμενος· εἰάν δέ τις ἔγδεια γίνηται τοῦ μισθώμα[το]ς, ἐγγραφόντων αὐτοὺς καὶ τοῦτο ἡμιόλιον· That the verb εἰσπράσσειν in the present text includes an element of compulsion is suggested also by the clause in lines 42-43 where it is juxtaposed with ἀποδίδωμι· ὅ τι δ' ἂν τις τῶν ἐγγυητῶν εἰσπραχθεῖ τοῦ μισθώματος ὑπὸ τῶν ἱερο[ποι]ῶν ἢ αὐτὸς ἀποδῶ<i> ὑπὲρ τοῦ καταστήσαντος αὐτὸν ἐγγυητῆν, ἐγγραφέτω ἢ βουλή κυρία οὔσα τῷ ἐγγυητῇ τὸν καταστήσαντα τὸ ἀποτείσθην ἀργυρίον ἡμιόλιον καθά[π]ερ τοὺς ὀφληκότητας·

¹⁴ See e.g. *IK Mylasa* 208 and 801.

¹⁵ ἐπὶ Διοκύδους ἄρχοντος τούσδε [ὀφλ]όντας δίκας ὑπὸ τοῦ Πετρησιάρχου κ[αί] οὐκ ἐκ]τείσαντας ἢ βουλή, οὐ δυναμένη πρᾶξαι, ἀνέγραψεν τὸ ἡμι[όλ]ιον κατα[-----]. The editor has restored κατα[δικάσασα], but this is not the only possible option; another possible restoration might be κατ' αὐτῶν, cf. e.g. *IG II*² 244, *SEG* 35: 62 line 33 εἶναι κατ' αὐτῶν τὰς αὐτάς τιμωρίας κτλ.

fine on the register. What is not entirely clear from entries such as this is how far the officials, in this instance the members of the *boule*, were expected to go in their attempt to recover the debt, before they could legitimately declare that they had complied with their obligation to carry out *praxis*. Did they have the authority, and perhaps also a legal duty, to take active measures against the debtors on their own initiative, which may have included distraining upon the debtors' property? Or were their powers limited to passive receipt of the money, while any further action depended on the initiative of private citizens, for example through procedures akin to the Athenian *apographe*?

In principle, either is possible. The collective declaration by the *boule* of their inability to carry out *praxis* may reflect a situation where the officials had been unable to lay their hands on property of sufficient value to meet the debt. Since (to use a Danish expression) it is impossible to shave the hair off a bald man's head, the officials would have had no option but to register the debtors formally, along with the *hemiolion*. Alternatively, the *boule* may have had to resort to this measure, because this official body did not have the legal authority to compel the debtors to pay their fines, let alone seize some or all of their property in satisfaction of the debt. Considering the relatively large number of debtors registered as owing the fines,¹⁶ the latter seems the more probable. But without further information, this must remain a matter for conjecture. For on its own, the verb *πράσσειν* does not reveal the extent of the officials' authority – or their duty – to apply coercion against a debtor who did not consent to paying what he owed.

One text, from third-century Thasos, that may serve as an illustration is *IG XII Suppl.* 348.¹⁷ The inscription is a law that regulates the beaching of ships, and its penalty clause stipulates that if anyone draws up a ship in contravention of the regulation, he incurs a fine of five *stateres*.¹⁸ The *epistatai* are responsible for exacting the fine, *πρηξάντων*. However, their authority in the first instance is confined simply to that of receiving the fine from an offender who has chosen to comply with their decision. If he objects, the *epistatai* cannot proceed to force payment. Instead they have to refer the case to the *apologoi* who in turn are obliged to submit the case to a court on behalf of the *epistatai*. Only if this results in a

¹⁶ In the fourth century, the adult male citizens of Ioulis (territory ca. 47 sq. km) were counted in their hundreds, and Reger has assessed the total population after the incorporation of the even smaller *polis* of Koresia to have been around 3,500. He makes no assessment of the population size of Karthaia, but with its territory of only ca. 67 sq. km its population is unlikely to have been very much larger.

¹⁷ For a recent discussion of this law, see Fröhlich (2004: 196-198).

¹⁸ ὅς δ' ἂν παρὰ ταῦτα ἀνειρύσῃ, ἀποτεισάτω πέντε [στατήρας] τῇ πόλει· *πρηξάντων* δὲ <οἱ> ἐπιστάται. ἂν δέ τι ἀμ[φ]ι[σβ]ητήτ[αι], [δικασάσθων or perhaps εἰσαγόντων? (LR) οἱ] ἀπόλογοι παρὰ δικασταῖς αὐτοῖς· τὴν δὲ καταδίκ[η]ν [παραδόντων τ]ο[ῖ]ς ἐπιστάταις· οἱ δὲ ἐκπρηξάντων. ἂν δὲ μὴ ἐκπρήξωσι[ν], αὐτοὶ ὀφειλόντων[ν]. ἂν δὲ οἱ ἀπόλογοι μὴ δικάσωνται ἢ μὴ παραδῶσιν τοῖς [ἐπιστάταις, ὑπ]όδιοι ἔστωσαν τοῖς εἰσι[οῦ]σιν ἀπολόγοις.

conviction are the *epistatai* authorised to force the offender to pay. What is more, at this second stage, the *epistatai* are not only authorised but also legally obliged to act. If they fail to exact the money, they themselves will incur a penalty.

It must be noted that, at the second stage, the verb used is the compound *ἐκπρηξάντων*, rather than the simple *πρηξάντων* which referred merely to the act of receiving the fine. This might at first glance suggest that the Thasians made a terminological distinction between, on the one hand, the simple verb *πράσσειν* referring to the receipt of money from individuals who had consented to pay, and, on the other hand, the compound *ἐκπράσσειν* denoting a more active involvement by the officials in the process of exacting the fine.¹⁹ But although there are many examples from other Greek communities of the verb *πράσσειν* being employed simply to denote the act of receiving money from a consenting individual, as in the Thasian text,²⁰ it cannot be assumed that its terminological distinction between *πράσσειν* and *ἐκπράσσειν* was applied consistently in legislation, contracts or other documents drawn up in other *poleis* (or, for that matter, in Thasos in the classical period or in the later Hellenistic and Roman periods).

This problem can be illustrated by *CID* IV 1, which contains a prohibition against the cultivation of sacred land.²¹ It stipulates that the *hieromnamones*, in

¹⁹ J. G. F. Powell has made the tentative suggestion that the difference between the simple verb and the compound in both this text and *CID* IV 1 discussed below may have been primarily one of ‘Aktionsart’ similar to that described for Latin by Haverling (2000, esp. 327-340 on the actional *ex*), and that the compound *ἐκπράττειν* indicates that the officials in question are to bring ‘the process’ of *praxis* ‘to its conclusion’. The topic needs further investigation.

²⁰ The examples of leasing contracts employing the verb in this sense, to denote the receipt of rent *et sim.*, are legion. For a possible parallel to the Thasian use of the verb *πράσσειν* in connection with the exacting of fines from individuals who have chosen not to object formally, see *CID* I, 9 D 17-22 (*cf.* RO 1): αἱ δὲ τι τούτων παρβάλλοιτο τῶν γεγραμμένων, θεωρόντων τοί τε δαμιοργοὶ καὶ τοὶ ἄλλοι πάντες Λαβυάδαι, πρᾶσσόντων δὲ τοὶ Πεντεκαίδεκα· αἱ[ι] δὲ καὶ ἀμφιλλέγηι τᾶς θωιάσιος, ἐξομόσας τὸν νό[μ]ον Ὁρόκον λελύσθω. What is not clear from this text, however, is at what stage of the process the person who had incurred a fine had the option of swearing the oath of *exomosia* in order to be released from his obligation. In a very similar Milesian procedure, attested in *SEG* 15: 677; Sokolowski *LSAM* no. 45, the *exomosia* takes place *after* the person fined has been registered with the Milesian *praktores*, but *before* these had proceeded actively (*ἐκπράσσειν*) against him: ἐὰν δὲ τις μὴ ἀποδῶι τὰ γέρεα τῇ ἱερῇ τῆς Ἀρτέμιδος τὰ γεγραμμένα ἐκγραφέτω αὐτὸν πρὸς τοὺς πράκτορας ὁ κύριος τῆς ἱερῆς ἐπαγγελίας ὀφείλοντα τὴν ζημίην τὴν γεγραμμένην. ὅς δ’ ἂν ἐκγραφῇ, εἰὰμ μὴ ἐξομόσει ἐν τῇ βολῇ μὴ θῦσαι ἢ ἀποδοῦναι τὰ γέρεα τὰ γινόμενα, ὀφειλέτω τὴν ζημίην καὶ ἐκπράξάντων αὐτὸν οἱ πράκτορες κατὰ τὸν νόμον.

²¹ *CID* IV 1, *cf.* *CID* I 10: αἱ τις τὰν γὰν ἐπιερ[γ]αζ[ο]ιτο ἂν Ἀμφικτίονες ἰάρωσαν, ἐπεὶ κ[α] ἅ π[ε]ρ[ο]δ[ο]ς γίν[η]ται, ἀποτ[ει]σάτω - - - - - στατήρας Αἰγινάιος κατ[ὰ] τ[ὸ] πέλεθρον ἔ[κ]αστον. τοὶ δὲ ἱερομνάμονες περιούτων ἀεὶ τὰν ἱερὰν γὰν καὶ πρ[α]σσόντων τὸν ἐπιεργαζόμενον· αἱ δὲ μὴ περιεῖεν ἢ μὴ πράσσοιεν, ἀποτεισάτω ὁ μὴ περιούων μὴδ’ ἐ[κ]π[ρ]άσσω τριάκοντα στατήρας· αἱ δὲ καὶ μὴ ἀποτίνηι, Θ[- - - - ἅ

connection with their regular tour of inspection, are to carry out *praxis* against offenders, expressed with the simple verb πράσσειν. However, in the following clause, in which a fine of thirty *stateres* is imposed on the *hieromnamon* who fails to comply with his instructions, the verb used is ἐκπράσσειν. There can be little doubt that the two verbs, πράσσειν and ἐκπράσσειν, refer to the same process of *praxis*. Thus, the Thasian distinction clearly does not apply in the text from Delphi.

On the other hand, there is one clear and important point of correspondence with the Thasian text. Like the Thasian *epistatai*, the *hieromnamones* were obliged, under the threat of a penalty, to (*ek*)*prassein*. This suggests that their remit went further than merely receiving the fine from the offender, and that they did not depend on others taking the initiative if the offender refused to pay. If their remit had been narrowly defined as that of just waiting for the money to be paid or for a volunteer to denounce some or all of the debtor's property, the fine threatened against them for failure to carry out *praxis* hardly makes sense. For it seems by far the most likely that the threat of a fine was meant as an incentive for the officials to take positive action to ensure that the fine was exacted from the debtor, just as a financial reward was frequently used in several *poleis* as an incentive for volunteers to involve themselves actively in the process. I shall return to this point below.

As far as the *praxis* terminology used in different Greek *poleis* is concerned, the combination of a *praxis* clause with a penalty clause directed against the officials responsible for *praxis* allows some certainty that their role in the process was an active one, although it is in many cases difficult to determine what methods and what level of physical force the officials were permitted to apply in order to exact the debt.²² However, such penalty clauses are not the only type of clue that will permit inferences as to the officials' active involvement in the process of *praxis* itself.

I have identified a further four criteria that, alone or in combination, point to the conclusion that the officials instructed to carry out *praxis* were authorised, and sometimes legally obliged, actively to enforce the financial penalty. One of these is a syntactical one. The verb *prassein* and its compounds can take as their direct object not only the money or items that are exacted but also the person against whom the process is directed. When the latter is the case, it is most likely that active forms of the verb refer to a procedure that presupposes the direct involvement of the subject.

πόλις ἐξ ἧς κ' εἶ ὁ ἱερομνάμων? - -] εἰλέσ[θω] τοῦ ἱεροῦ καὶ στρατευόντων ἐπ' αὐτὸς Ἀμφικτύονες.

²² A. Lanni has suggested to me that the obligation of the officials may in some instances simply have been limited to their approaching the debtor in person with a demand that he pay the money owed. In principle, this cannot be ruled out in those cases where the *praxis* clause stipulates simply that the officials were liable to a fine if they failed to exact the money, even if it may seem grossly unfair to a modern observer that such officials risked being penalised personally without at the same time being permitted to take more active steps to deal with recalcitrant debtors.

Space does not permit a full discussion of this criterion here, nor of the possible differences expressed by the verb (ἐκ-/εἰς-/ἀνα-)πράσσειν or its cognate noun *πρᾶξις* in combination with the prepositional phrases ἐκ, κατά, or παρά + the person who is subjected to the process. Here I shall confine my discussion to just three, in addition to the penalty clauses just mentioned. They are: *a.* clauses that grant the agent in the process of *praxis* immunity from prosecution arising from his action, *b.* cross references in the *praxis* clauses to already existing legislation or established legal procedures, and *c.* clauses that grant permission to officials to apply ‘any method they can’ when exacting the penalty from the offender.

a. Immunity from prosecution.

In a number of instances, the *praxis* clause is combined with a clause that grants the officials immunity from any type of prosecution arising from their action. Such clauses are well known from the documents that pertain to the ‘sale’ of slaves into the protection of a sanctuary. Here they normally serve to offer protection to those who intervene actively in order to reverse an act of unlawful re-enslavement, and who might otherwise be exposed to risk because of their intervention.²³ Likewise, the clause is attested in documents granting protection to individual creditors against legal action taken by the persons whom they have subjected to the process of *praxis*.²⁴

The immunity granted to *polis* officials in connection with *praxis* is likely to have been motivated by similar concerns. *SEG* 23: 498 from late third-century Delos provides an example.²⁵ The text concerns the maintenance of a sacred precinct. In the penalty clause it is made clear that the council collectively is to exact the fine payable to the sanctuary, as well as the reward payable to the volunteer who had been responsible for denouncing the offender. When carrying out this duty, the councillors cannot be taken to task for their actions.²⁶ Similar immunity grants

²³ On these clauses see Darmezin (1999: 190-191).

²⁴ cf. also *IK Ephesos* I, 4 lines 39-41: εἰ δέ τινες [ὑποθέ]ντες ἄλλοις κτήματα δεδανεισμένοι εἰσὶμ παρ' ἐτέρων ὡς ἐπ' ἐλευθέρους [τοῖς κ]τήμασιν ἐξαπατήσαντες τοὺς ὑστέρους δανειστάς, ἐξεῖναι τοῖς ὑστέροις [δανειστ]αῖς ἐξαλλάξασι τοὺς πρότερον δανειστάς κατὰ τὸν συλλογισμόν τοῦ κοινοῦ πο[λέμου] ἔχειν τὰ κτήματα· ἐὰν δὲ ἐνοφείληται τι αὐτοῖς ἔτι, εἶναι τῇ κομιδῇ τοῖς [δανειστ]αῖς ἐκ τῆς ἄλλης οὐσίας τοῦ χρεῖστος πασῆς τρόπῳ ὧι ἂν δύνωνται ἀζημίους [ἀπάσης] ζημίας·

²⁵ ἐάν τις ἀλί[σ]κηται τούτ[ων τι] ποιῶν, ἐξουσία εἶναι τῷ λαβόντ[ι] καὶ ἀπάγειν καὶ εἰσαγγέλλειν πρὸς[ε] τὴν βουλὴν· τὴν δὲ βουλὴν τὸμ μὲν δοῦλον μάλιστα ἐν τῷ κύφῳ[ι] πλ[ηγα]ῖς πενήκοντα, τὸν δὲ ἐλεύθ[ε]ρον ζημιῶν δραχμαῖς [δ]έκα καὶ πρᾶτ[τειν] ἀνεύθυνον οὐσαν καὶ διδόνα[ι τοῦ ἀρ]γυρίου τὸ μὲν ἥμισυ τοῖς ἱεροποιοῖς, τὸ δὲ ἥμισυ τῷ εἰσαγγεῖλα[ντι] (cf. Sokolowski *LSCG Suppl.* 53).

²⁶ For a discussion of the term see e.g. Fröhlich (2004: 66-68). In n. 89 he endorses Vial's translation of the present passage ‘sans qu'aucune action puisse lui être intentée’.

appended to *praxis* clauses are known not only from other Delian inscriptions,²⁷ but also from, for example, Delphi,²⁸ fifth-century Gortyn,²⁹ Amyzon,³⁰ Tomoi,³¹ and Herakleia in South Italy.³²

²⁷ e.g. *ID IV 509* (230-220 BC): ἐὰν δέ τις παρὰ τὰ γεγραμμένα πωλεῖ, πεντήκοντα δραχμὰς ὀφειλέτω, καὶ ἐξέστω εἰσαγγέλλειν τῷ βουλομένῳ τῶν πολιτῶν πρὸς τοὺς ἀγορανόμους· οἱ δὲ ἀγορανόμοι εἰσαγόντων τὰς εἰσαγγελίας ταῦτα[...] εἰς τοὺς τριάκοντα καὶ ἓνα ἐν τῷ μηνὶ ἐν ᾧ ἂν εἰσαγγελθεῖ· τὸν δὲ μισθὸν τῷ δικαστηρίῳ παραβαλλέσθω ὁ εἰσαγγεῖλας· ἐὰν δὲ ὀφλεῖ, τὸν τε μισθὸν ἀποτεισάτω τῷ παραβαλομένῳ καὶ τοῦ γεγραμμένου ἐπιτιμίου τὰ δύο μέρη, τὸ δὲ τρίτον μέρος τῷ <δ>ημοσίῳ, καὶ οἱ ἀγ[ο]ρανόμοι πραξάτωσαν αὐτὸν δέκα ἡμερῶν ἀφ' ἧς] ἂν ὀφλεῖ, ἀνεύθυνοι ὄντες, *ID IV 502* (297 BC): φοιτῶσι ἢ ἂν εὖρει ἀναπαλούμενον, ἐξέστω τοῖς ἐπιστάταις εἰσπράξαι τὸν ἐργῶνην καὶ τὸν ἐν[γυητὴν] - - - - - ἐὰν πρ[ο]γινώσκωσιν, ἀζημίους οὖσιν καὶ ἀνυποδίκους, *SEG 48: 1037*: [..]ΑΣ ἢ ὕς ἢ βοσκήματα ἐντὸς τῶν [περι]βραντηρίων ὅσα μὴ εἵνεκεν θυσίας εἰσῆκται, ἐνόχους μὲν εἶναι καὶ ταῖς ἀραις, ζημιούσθαι δὲ αὐτοὺς καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν ἱεροποιῶν καὶ ὑπὸ τῆς βουλῆς καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν λοιπῶν ἀρχόντων τῇ ζημίᾳ ἢ ἐκάστη κυρία ἐστὶν ἢ ἀρχὴ ζημιοῦν καὶ εἰσπράσσειν ἀνευθύνοις οὖσιν κτλ.

²⁸ *SEG 42: 472* (C2), granting immunity to the *hosioi*: εἰ δέ κα μὴ ποιῇ -- ος] καθὼς γέγραπται[αι], [πρ]άκτ[ι]μος ἔστω καὶ ἀ[ν]τὸς καὶ τοῖ ἐγγυοῖ αὐ[τ]οῦ οὐ καὶ μὴ ἀπ[ο]δ[ι]κ[ο]ν αὐτοῦ καὶ τοῦ ἡμ[ι]ολίου καὶ ἀπράξις ἔστω ἐκ] τε αὐ[τ]οῦ καὶ [α]ἱ ἐκ τῶν ἐγγύων αὐτοῦ καὶ [(very fragmentary down to lines 15-16)] ἀζάμοι ἐόντων καὶ ἀνυποδικοὶ πάσας δίκας καὶ ζαμίας καθὼς κα πράξωντι.

²⁹ *IC IV 80 = Nomima I 7* (C5): ἐνεκυραστὰν δὲ μὲ παρέρπεν Γορτύνιον ἐς τὸ 'Ριττένιο. αἱ δὲ κα ν[ικ]αθεῖ τὸν ἐνεκύρον, διπλεῖ καταστᾶσαι τὰν ἀπλόον τιμὰν αἱ ἐν ταῖ 'πόραι ἐ[γ]ρα[π]ται, πράδδεν δὲ τὸν 'Ριττένιον κόσμον. αἱ δὲ κα μὲ πράδδοντι, τὸνς πρην[ί]σ[το]νς ταύτονς πράδδοντας ἅπατον ἔμεν vac. τὰ ἐγγραμμέν', ἄλλα δὲ μέ. *IC IV 87 = Koerner no. 161* = Nomima I 97*: [- - ἀν]αίτον δ' ἔμεν τοῖς ἐσπράτ[ι]ταις ἐσπράδδονσι ὀπυῖ κα μέτε ἀποδο[- -]

³⁰ *Fouilles d'Amyzon* no 28: ὅσοι δὲ ἂν μὴ εἰσενέγκωσιν καθότι γέγραπται ἀποτεισάτωσαν πεν[τ]ήκοντα δραχμὰς καὶ μὴ ἔστ]ω αὐτοῖς μετουσία μήτε τῶν Χρυσασορικῶν μήτε τῶν ἄλλων ἱερῶν μέχρι τοῦ βίου τοῦ ἐαυτῶν] τὴν δὲ πράξιν εἶναι κατὰ τῶν μὴ εἰσενεγκάντων καθότι γέγραπται τοῖς αἰρεθεῖσιν ἀνδράσι τρ[ο]πῶι ᾧ ἂν βούλωνται ἀζημίους οὖσιν καὶ ἀνυποδίκους καὶ αὐτοῖς καὶ τοῖς συνεισπράξασιν μεθ' αὐτῶν.

³¹ *I. Scythiae Minoris* II, 2, *Syll.*³ 731, *SEG 29: 695* (ca. 100 B.C.): τοὺς δὲ αἰρεθέντας ἡγεμόνας ἐξουσίαν ἔχειν ἀναγκάζειν καὶ ζημιοῦν ἐκάστης τῆς ἡμέρας ἀργυροῖς δέξ[α κ]αὶ πράσειν τοὺς ἀτακτούντας τρόπον ὃν ἂν δύνωνται [α]ζημίους ὄντας καὶ ἀνυποδίκους.

³² *IG XIV 645* lines 154-168, *SEG 48: 1232* (C4): τῶς δὲ πρωγγύως τῶς αἰε γενομένως πεπρωγγευκῆμεν τῶν τε μισθωμάτων καὶ τῶν ἐπιζαμιωμάτων καὶ τῶν ἀμπωλημάτων καὶ τὰν καταδικᾶν καὶ αὐτῶς καὶ τὰ χρήματα ἡ κα ἐπιμαρτυρήσωντι, καὶ μὴ ἦμεν μήτε ἡάρνησιν μήτε παλινδικίαν μηδὲ κατ' ἄλλον μηδὲ ἑνᾶ τρόπον τῇ πόλι πράγματα παρέχεν μηδὲ τοῖς ὑπὲρ τᾶς πόλιος πρασσόντασι· αἱ δὲ μὴ, ἀτελες ἦμεν. Here the participle *πρασσόντασι* is probably to be understood in the broad sense as 'acting as the representatives of the *polis*'. However, their duties included the exacting of rent and penalties (*epizamiomata* and *katadikai*) from the guarantors of defaulting contractors, and the immunity clause would have offered them protection against lawsuits launched against them personally by an aggrieved guarantor.

If the role of the officials to whom immunity was granted was merely that of receiving the money exacted through the agency of others, whether volunteers or special boards akin to the *praktōres* attested for Athens, it would be difficult to explain why this protection was felt to be needed. It is far more likely that the clause aimed to protect the officials as individuals against litigation arising from direct action taken by them *ex officio*, for example by seizure of *enechyra* or, in some cases, the physical eviction of the debtor from real estate in connection with a process of confiscation.³³ The aim of such immunity clauses may thus have been to remove as far as possible any disincentive from the officials who were responsible for taking such action against their fellow citizens and other residents in their community.

It must be added, however, that such grants of immunity to officials are quite rare, except in manumission documents and in *asylia* grants where the immunity clause is found relating to officials as well as to volunteers. Normally, the main method by which the relevant officials were incentivised to engage actively in the process of *praxis* seems to have been through the threat of a fine, as mentioned above. In other words, the normal incentive applied to them was the stick rather than the carrot, in stark contrast to the ‘carrot incentive’, *i.e.* the promise of a personal reward, that was applied to encourage volunteers to assist in recovering the fine. With a few notable exceptions where the officials themselves appear to be entitled to a share of the fine exacted by them,³⁴ it seems that the ‘stick incentive’ on its own represented the preferred method of making an official or board of officials overcome any personal fear of retaliation by the debtor or his associates, be it in the form of physical violence or litigation.

It is in itself not surprising if many, if not most, communities made only sparing use of the immunity clause, let alone of the possible option of promising the official a financial reward. In the hands of an unscrupulous and corrupt official, the authorisation to carry out *praxis* was a potentially very dangerous weapon, and the legal reckoning to which the official had to submit when stepping down from office was probably the most important check on his activities in this area. That having been said, the immunity clauses themselves still provide important evidence for the

³³ The narrative of the unfortunate trierarch who delivered Dem. 47 provides a graphic illustration of the possible aftermath of a process of *praxis*, which in this instance had resulted in the speaker’s conviction in a *dike aikeias* (47.45-51). This was despite the fact that the trierarch was (according to his own story) taking action at the behest of the Athenian *boule*, and thus in a sense was carrying out the *praxis* as a representative of the *polis*.

³⁴ In *SEG* 42: 785 (Thasos 470-460) lines 19-30, 30-36, 36-41, and 41-48 it would seem that the officials responsible for carrying out *praxis* are entitled to half of the fine as a reward, and Duchêne (1992: 62 n. 22) cites a number of parallel examples to which one may add *Syll.*³ 671, Laum no. 29 lines 11-15. Duchêne leaves open the possibility that the share allocated to the officials would eventually end up in the public sanctuary.

active involvement and authority of the *polis*' representatives in the process of exacting financial penalties.

b. Cross references to existing legislation or established legal procedures.

Another indication that a *praxis* clause permitted the officials in question to take action against the debtor on their own initiative is the addition in the text of a cross reference, sometimes to a specific law, sometimes to a named legal procedure. In *SEG* 50: 1195 from third-century Kyme, the context of the *praxis* clause is a prohibition against sale, purchase or hypothecation of arms donated by Philetairos to the city. Volunteers are invited to denounce anyone who violates this to the *phylarchoi*. These are authorised to impose a summary fine of five *stateres* for each item unlawfully purchased, sold or hypothecated, unless the person apprehended denies his guilt:

αἱ δέ κε ἀντι]λέγωσ[ι] κρινέτ[ω]σαν οἱ φύλαρχοι καὶ τὰν ζαμίαν πραξάσωσθαμ
παρὰ τῷ ἐνόχῳ ὄντος πρ[ά]ξεος εἰσίσας ἐκ τῶν ὑ]παρχόντων καὶ τῷ σώματος κατ
τὸν νόμον τὸν ὑβριστ[ή]ριον· αἱ δέ κε μὴ πράξοισι αὐτοὶ [.....] Αἰῖα
ιδιώτῃ· αἱ δὲ μὴ αὐτοὶ ὑπεύθυνοι ἔ[στω]σαν ἐλ λογιστηρίῳ.

Although not all of the *praxis* clause has survived on the stone, it seems clear that the *phylarchoi* themselves, if they decided to convict, were legally obliged to distrain upon the property and person of the offender 'in accordance with the *nomos hybristerios*'. What this law prescribed and why its *praxis* clauses were used as a model for the process of *praxis* in the regulations on Philetairos' donation cannot be determined. One possibility is that the *phylarchoi* were in general authorised to carry out *praxis* within the area of their official remit, but that the *nomos hybristerios* contained clauses that provided more detailed information on the methods to be employed in connection with the process of *praxis* itself, perhaps in particular in relation to (*praxis ek?*) *tou somatos*. This may well have referred to the physical seizure of the person of the debtor, which, as pointed out in Professor Mitthof's response, is well attested in the papyri.³⁵ Some laws did contain quite elaborate specifications of the method by which *praxis* was to be undertaken, as for example

³⁵ The earliest epigraphical parallel that I have found so far is the entrenchment clause in *Syll.*³ 45, Koerner no. 84 which prescribes that if the property of a convicted offender amounts to less than ten *stateres*, the offender is to be sold for export and is prohibited from returning to Halikarnassos in future: ἦν δὲ μὴ ἦ αὐτῷ ἄξια δέκα στατήρων, αὐτὸν [π]επρήσθαι ἐπ' ἐξαγωγῇ καὶ μη[δ]αμὰ κάθοδον εἶναι ἐς Ἀλικαρνησόν. The parallel is not exact, however: the provision relating to the sale of the offender is clearly aimed at providing an alternative method of enforcing the combined penalty of permanent exile and confiscation of property in the previous clause: τὰ ἔοντα αὐτῷ πεπρήσθω καὶ τῶπόλλωνος εἶναι ἱερὰ καὶ αὐτὸν φεύγεν αἰεὶ·

the famous Pergamene *astynomos* inscription, *OGIS* 483.³⁶ It is possible that the Kymaian *nomos hybristerios* contained similar stipulations.

Another possibility is that the cross reference was perceived to be necessary because the *phylarchoi* themselves would not normally have had the authority to carry out *praxis*. In that case, the main purpose of the reference to the *nomos hybristerios* may have been that of conferring this authority on them, an authorisation that would have applied *only* in the context of this particular enactment. Such a measure would make sense, if the Kymaians operated with a system where the authority to exact fines by compulsion was normally vested in a single or a limited number of (boards of) officials, such as the *politikos praktor* at Beroia.³⁷ If so, the cross reference to the *nomos hybristerios* may be interpreted as an *ad hoc* measure by which power was in effect delegated to a different board of officials, perhaps in order to increase the deterrent effect of the penalty clause in its entirety. The delegation of power arguably would have facilitated the process of enforcement. It would have reduced the risk of delays, clerical errors or deliberate obstruction that could otherwise have hampered the process, if the *phylarchoi* had not been authorised themselves to take active steps against the offender but, instead, had been obliged to pass on a record of the penalty to a different executive board.³⁸ On this interpretation, the cross reference would have served a purpose comparable to the purpose served by the formula *kathaper ek dikes* according to Meyer-Laurin's interpretation of some of the epigraphical evidence. In the Kymaian text it authorised the *phylarchoi* themselves to proceed directly against the debtor, bypassing any board of officials that was otherwise solely responsible for *praxis* of fines, while in the inscriptions discussed by Meyer-Laurin (1975: 197-201) the formula apparently permitted one private individual directly to proceed against a debtor without first having obtained formal authorisation in the form of a verdict passed by a court.

It must be noted, however, that these two interpretations of the cross reference and its function, that is as specification of *method* and as *authorisation* respectively, are by no means mutually exclusive. This may be illustrated by *IK Lampsakos* 9. The statute invites volunteer denunciation of an offence which most likely concerned the responsibility of the *epimenioi* in connection with sacrificial rituals. The volunteer is entitled to half of the penalty as a reward, while the other half is

³⁶ πράξεως. νννν εἰάν τινες μὴ ἀποδιδῶσιν τῶν κοινῇ ἀνακαθαρθεῖντων ἀμφοδῶν τὸ γεινόμενον μέρος τῆς ἐκδόσεως τῶν κοπρίων ἢ τῶν ἐπιτίμων, λαμβανέτωσαν αὐτῶν οἱ ἀμφοδάρχαι ἐνέχυρα καὶ τιθέσθωσαν ἐνεχυρασίαν πρὸς τοὺς ἀστυνόμους αὐθήμερον ἢ τῇ ὑστεραίᾳ καὶ, εἰ μὴ θείῃ ἐξομώσῃται τὰ ἐνεχυραθέντα ἐν ἡμέραις πέντε, πωλείτωσαν αὐτὰ ἢ ἐν φράτρῃ ἢ ἐν τῇ ἀγορᾷ πληθυύσῃ συναρόντων τῶν ἀστυνόμων καὶ τὸ μὲν γεινόμενον κοιμζέσθωσαν --- (cf. *SEG* 13: 521).

³⁷ *SEG* 43: 381, Gauthier and Hatzopoulos (1993): B lines 101-104 (fines imposed by *gymnasiarchos* to be exacted by the *politikos praktor*); A lines 46-48, B 29-37, 94-97 (written notice given to the *politikos praktor* by the *exetastai*).

³⁸ For an Athenian illustration of what might go wrong, see, *mutatis mutandis*, *Lys.* 9.

payable to the sanctuary of Asklepios. The subsequent *praxis* clause appears to permit the volunteer to exact his share of the fine, and *only* that, according to the regulations that pertained to the *dike hybreos*.³⁹

In this enactment, the cross reference to the *dike hybreos* clearly does not serve the purpose of replacing a genuine legal process that might otherwise have been required before one private individual could legitimately take such an active step against another:⁴⁰ the denunciator's entitlement to his reward has already been established as a result of the legal process heard by a *dikasterion* following his *katangelia*. However, it is still entirely likely that the cross reference to the *dike hybreos* functioned as an authorisation clause. Since the denunciator had been involved in a *public* procedure, a *katangelia*, it could not be taken for granted that he would have been permitted personally to carry out *praxis* against the defendant, as the victorious party in a *dike* would normally be entitled to do. The cross reference to the *dike hybreos* made it clear that, as far as the denunciator's own reward was concerned, he was indeed authorised to proceed as if the action had been a *dike*.

However, it is important to note that the cross reference does not just refer to the entitlement enjoyed by a successful claimant in a *dike*, but that it refers explicitly to the specific procedure of the *dike hybreos*. This precision suggests that the cross reference at the same time served as a way of indicating more specifically the method that denunciator was permitted to apply and under what conditions.⁴¹ A further function of the cross reference may also have been that of specifying the division of labour between the volunteer and the *tamiai*, for the latter appear to have been responsible for dealing in some way with the fine payable to the sanctuary.⁴²

³⁹ *IK Lampsakos* 9, Laum no. 66, *LSAM* 8 lines 30-35: ἐὰν δέ τις τησ[]παδγ[]υσε[]ο[]τηρας ἀποτεισάτω στατήρας πεντήκοντα καὶ δραχ[μ]άς - ἅς ἂν τὸ δι[κ]αστήριον π[ρ]οστιμήσῃ· καταγγελλέτω δὲ ὁ βουλόμενος πρὸς τὸν ἱερὸν [σύ]λλογον· τοῦ δὲ κ[]α<τ>[αδικας]θέ<ν>τος εἶναι τὸ μὲν ἡμισυ ἱερὸν τοῦ Ἀσκληπιοῦ τὸ δὲ λοιπὸν τοῦ [καταγγείλα]ντος· τρ[]ῶ δὲ [ὁ] μὲν ιδιώτης τὸ ἐαυτὸ γενόμενον ὡς δίκην ὕβρεως χ[][]τοῦ θεοῦ οἱτ[]ποησ[]άτωσαν ἃ οἱ νόμοι κελεύουσιν·

⁴⁰ This is one of the bones of contention in the long dispute over the meaning and significance of the term καθάπερ ἐκ δίκης in the papyri, for which see Wolff (1970), Meyer-Laurin (1975) and Kränzlein (1976).

⁴¹ Although I know of no direct parallel to the laws regulating *enechyrasis* known from Crete, it is clear that similar legislation existed in other *poleis*, too. For example, in *IK Lampsakos* 9 lines 24-26 there is a cross reference to a statute concerning 'those who carry out *enechyrasis* contrary to the law' (μὴ εἶναι δὲ μηθεν[ί] μηθὲν ἐ[ν]εχυράσαι ἐν [τ]αῖς ἡμέραις τῶν Ἀσκληπείων, εἰ δὲ μή, ὁ ἐνεχυράσας ἐν[χο]ρος ἔ[σ]τω τῷ νόμῳ τῷ περὶ τῶν παρανόμως ἐνεχυρασάντων'), while face B of a list of fines, *IK Byzantion* (S)elymbria 3, records a penalty of ten *drachmai* imposed on an individual for an offence connected with his seizure of *enechyra*. It is probable that he was penalised for having appropriated an item which could not legally be seized by a creditor: [----] ζαμίοντι τὸν δεῖνα δραχμαῖς] δέκα ὅτι ἐνέχυρα λαζόμενο[ς] ἱματισ[μ]ὸν ἀφείλατο·

⁴² Several different models are attested for different communities. One was that exactment of the entire amount, including the prosecutor's reward, was to be undertaken by the

The fact that cross references of this type could serve several different purposes (and sometimes more than one purpose at the same time) means that each individual case must be assessed on its own merits. Fortunately, the context of an individual cross reference will often permit a reasonably safe conclusion as to its function. Sometimes when a statutory or procedural cross reference is included in a *praxis* clause that specifies *polis* officials as the agents, one of its purposes is clearly to extend the authority already conferred on a specific board to carry out *praxis*, rather than to specify the methods that they are to employ. Thus, *Syll.*³ 672 from second-century Delphi permits the board of *epimeletai* to carry out *praxis* of arrears 'by whatever method they wish, in the same way as they exact other public or sacred funds'.⁴³ The reference to the procedure by which the *epimeletai* normally carry out *praxis* is hardly intended to provide a reference point for further information on the

polis' officials: *SEG* 23: 498 (Delos C3), *ID* IV 509 (Delos 230-220 BC; but note that if the *agoranomoi* prove unable to carry out *praxis* within ten days, they are to make over to the volunteer denunciator the entire property belonging to the offender), *IC* IV 162 (Gortyn C3), *PEP* Teos 41 (cf. also *CID* I 9 face C for this operating at the level of a civic subdivision). Another model, the one just discussed in connection with Lampsakos, was that the prosecutor personally was responsible for collecting his share, while *polis* officials were responsible for collecting the part of the penalty that was destined for the public or a sacred sanctuary. It is probable that a similar model was used in classical Eltynia (*IC* I x 2, *Nomima* II 80, Koerner no. 94, *SEG* 2: 509). A third was that *praxis* of the entire amount was delegated to the volunteer prosecutor, who in turn was responsible for handing over the share payable to the relevant treasury, sacred or secular. An example of this is found in *IG* IX, 1, 4² 798 (Laum no. 1) lines 113-122. Here the penalty clause authorises not only prosecutions *ex officio* but also prosecutions initiated by volunteers (ἐξέστω δὲ καὶ ἄλλωι τῶι λῶντι κρίνεσθαι κατὰ ταῦτά), and in either case, the individual responsible for bringing the prosecution is instructed to carry out *praxis* and to hand over the money exacted to the elected financial administrators of the *koinon* (τὸν δὲ κατακριθέντα οἱ τὰς κρίσεως γραψάμενοι εἰσπράξαντες ὅσα μὲν ποτὶ τὸ κοινὸν συν<ε>ίκει τοῖς ἀρημένοις ἐπὶ τὰν χεῖριζιν τοῦ ἀργυρίου παραδόντω, κτλ.). Compare also *SEG* 51: 1499 (*koinon* of the Leukoeideis, 107-80 B.C.) as well as the stipulation in the new Cretan text presented by Professors Chaniotis and Kritzas in this volume (A21-31). There, both *erutai* and volunteer private citizens (*idiotai*) are authorised to exact penalties from the *kosmoi*. In this case, however, half of the money exacted is payable to the injured party while the other half may be kept by the person carrying out the *praxis* (cf. the examples in n. 34 above).

⁴³ ἀποδιδόντω δὲ οἱ δανεισάμενοι τὸ ἀργύριον πᾶν τῇ πόλει ἐν τῷ πέμπτῳ ἐνιαυτῷ. εἰ δὲ κα μὴ ἀποδιδόντι καθὼς γέγραπται, τὰ ἐνέχυρα αὐτῶν τὰς πόλιος ἔστω, καὶ οἱ ἐπιμεληταὶ αἰεὶ οἱ ἐγδανείζοντες κύρ[ι]οι ἔστωσαν πωλέοντες· εἰ δὲ πωλείμενα τὰ ἐνέχυρα μὴ εὐρίσκοι τὸ ἀργύριον ποθ' ὃ ὑπέκειτο τῇ πόλει, πράκτιμοι ἔστωσαν τοῖς ἐπιμεληταῖς αἰεὶ τοῖς ἐνάρχουσιν τοῦ ἐλλείποντος ἀργυρίου αὐτός τε ὁ δανεισάμενος καὶ οἱ γενόμενοι ἔγγυοι, τρόπῳ ᾧ θέλοιεν πράσσειν, καθὼς καὶ τὰλ[λ]α δαμόσια καὶ ποθίερα πράσσονται.

method of *praxis*. For this is made redundant by the wording τρόπω ᾧ θέλοιεν πράσσειν, which appears to give them very wide, if not full, discretion.⁴⁴

Another example of a cross reference which appears to have extended the remit of the relevant board of officials is *PEP Teos* 41 (Syll.³ 578). The text pertains to the educational endowment of Polythrous. In the entrenchment clause drawn up on fragment B, lines 56-60 specify that the *euthynoi* are to carry out *praxis* of the fine destined for the sanctuary of Hermes, Herakles and the Muses καθάπερ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν δημοσίων δικῶν.⁴⁵ As Fröhlich observes (2004: 111-112), the text suggests that the *euthynoi* in second-century Teos had an official remit that corresponded to that of the *praktōres* as attested in a number of other *poleis*. He suggests that the reason for the cross reference was that they were required to carry out *praxis* also in case a prosecutor chose to proceed under the heading of a private action, since this was not part of their normal remit. But it is equally plausible that the clause reference was required because the *euthynoi*'s normal remit extended only to the exacting of fines payable to the *polis*' treasury, but not to the exacting of sacred fines. Since the fines in the present enactment are defined, on the one hand, as 'belonging to the *polis*', yet, on the other, as the sacred property of the deities mentioned, there may well have been a perceived need for precisely this kind of clarification in regard to the *euthynoi*'s remit and responsibilities.

In other instances, however, it seems most probable that the primary function of the cross references was to point the reader to another enactment in which the *method of praxis* permitted was set out in full. *Milet I*, 3 140C, a treaty between Miletos and Phaistos, contains a clause providing mutual protection against the unlawful enslavement of individuals belonging to each of the two communities. In lines 59-65 it is specified that *praxis* at Miletos is to be carried out in accordance with the *nomos ton tou emporiou epimeleton*, whereas in Phaistos, where the disputes are to be heard by the *politikon dikasterion*, the *kosmoi* are to carry out

⁴⁴ A similar combination of an authorisation clause which confers the authority to πράσσειν on a private individual and a clause permitting the agent in the process of *praxis* to apply any method he or she wishes is found in *IG VII*, 3172 lines 23-35 = Migeotte, *L'emprunt public* no. 13 from third-century Orchomenos: ἀποδότωσαν δὲ τὸ δάνειον οἱ δανεισάμενοι ἢ οἱ ἔγγυοι Νικαρέται ἐν τοῖς Πανβουιωτίοις πρὸ τῆς θυσίας ἐν ἡμέραις τρισίν. ἐὰν δὲ μὴ ἀποδῶσ[ι], πραχθήσονται κατὰ τὸν νόμον ἢ δὲ πράξεις ἔστω ἕκ τε αὐτῶν τῶν δανεισαμένων καὶ ἐκ τῶν ἐγγύων, καὶ ἐξ ἐνὸς[ς] καὶ ἐκ πλειόνων καὶ ἐκ πάντων, καὶ ἐκ τῶν ὑπαρχόντων αὐτοῖς, πραττούσῃ ὃν ἂν τρόπον βούληται. See also *IG XII*, 7 67 B, Migeotte, *L'emprunt public* no. 49 lines 24-29, where the formula τρόπω ᾧ ἂν ἐπίσταιται is combined with the expression πράξει πάσῃ. cf. *IG XII*, 7 69, Migeotte, *L'emprunt public* no. 50 lines 26-32.

⁴⁵ δικασάσθω δὲ αὐτῷ ὁ βουλόμενος καὶ ἐν ἰδίαις δίκαις καὶ ἐν δημοσίαις (...), ὁ δὲ ἀλίσκόμενος ἐκτινέτω διπλάσιον καὶ τὸ μὲν ἡμισυ ἔστω τῆς πόλεως, ἱερὸν Ἑρμοῦ καὶ Ἡρακλέους καὶ Μουσῶν, καὶ καταχωρίζεσθω εἰς τὸν λόγον τὸν προγεγραμμένον, τὸ δὲ ἡμισυ τοῦ καταλαβόντος ἔστω, τὰς δὲ πράξεις τῶν δικῶν τούτων ἐπιτελείτωσαν οἱ εὐθυνοὶ καθάπερ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν δημοσίων δικῶν.

praxis and hand over the purchase sum ‘in whatever way they wish’ within ten days after the verdict has been passed.⁴⁶ However, a very similar clause in the agreements between Miletos and a number of other cities in Crete stipulates that, while *praxis* is to be carried out according to the *nomos emporikos* in Miletos, the *nomos proxenikos* is to be applied in the Kretan cities.⁴⁷ In these documents, then, the cross references almost certainly served to specify not only the personnel authorised to carry out *praxis* but also the method, *tropos*, that was to be applied.

To sum up. Some statutory and procedural cross references served primarily to confer authority on a board to carry out *praxis*, in some cases perhaps because the board would not normally have been authorised to take such action at all, while in other cases because the existing authorisation of a board was extended to apply to an area that was not part of the normal definition of their official remit. In these instances, the cross references appear to have had much the same function as the clause καθάπερ ἐκ δίκης in the Arkesinian inscriptions according to the interpretation of Meyer-Laurin (1975: 197-201), where the community can in effect be seen to have delegated to a private individual the authority to carry out *praxis* without first having had his entitlement confirmed through a court action. In other cases, the main purpose of such a cross reference appears to have been to refer to another piece of legislation that specified the methods and conditions under which the *praxis* could lawfully be carried out. Some cross references to specific laws may have served to limit the officials’ discretion in a number of respects, for example by specifying deadlines or the debtor’s entitlement to redeem any *enechyra* seized from him.⁴⁸ And in some instances, such as *IK Lampsakos* 9, the cross references appear to have fulfilled both functions simultaneously.

Most importantly, however: the cross references themselves provide a strong indication that the officials instructed to carry out *praxis* were authorised to take positive action in order to ensure that the monetary penalties imposed found their way into the treasuries of the *polis* or its sanctuaries.

⁴⁶ τὰς δὲ πράξεις εἶναι ἐμ Μιλήτῳ μὲν κατὰ τὸν νόμον τῶν τοῦ ἐμπορίου ἐπιμελητῶν, ἐμ Φαιστῷ δὲ τοὺς κόσμους πράξαντας ἀποδοῦναι τρόπῳ, ᾧ ἂμ βούλωνται, ἐν ἡμέραις δέκα, ἀφ’ ἧς κα καταδικασθῇ.

⁴⁷ *Milet* I, 3 140B: τῶν δὲ δικασθέντων τὰς πράξεις εἶναι ἐμ Μιλήτῳ μὲν κατὰ τὸν νόμον τὸν ἐμπορικόν, ἐγ Γόρτυνι δ[ἐ] κατὰ τὸν νόμον τὸν προξενικόν, κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ Λύκτιοι, Ἀρκάδες, Ἀριαῖοι, Ὑρταῖοι. See also *Milet* I, 3 140A.

⁴⁸ For an example of a cross-reference serving this purpose, see *Milet* I, 3 147, Migeotte *L’emprunt public* no. 97 lines 37-43: ἐὰν δὲ οἱ ταμίαι μὴ διδῶσιν τὸ τεταγμένον ἐν τῇ ὀρισμένῃ ἡμέρᾳ, τὰ τε ἄλλα κατ’ αὐτῶν ὑπάρχειν κατὰ ταῦτα καὶ ἐνεχυρασίαν εἶναι κατὰ τῶμ μὴ δόντων πρὸς διπλάσιον ἐπὶ τοῦ ταμείου. τὰς δὲ ἐνεχυρασίας ἀναγραφέτω ὁ γραμματεὺς τῶν ταμιῶν ἐπάναγκες. τὰς δὲ λύσεις τῶν ἐνεχύρων γίνεσθαι ἐν ταῖς ἴσαις ἡμέραις, ἐν αἷς καὶ τοῖς τελώναις τοῖς ἐνεχυρασθεῖσιν ὑπὸ τῶν ταμιῶν ἐν τῷ νόμῳ συντέτακται.

c. Permission granted to the official(s) to apply any method they can.

In some inscriptions, the clause that gives a board of officials authority to carry out *praxis* by whatever method they can or wish, ᾧ ἂν δύνωνται τρόπον, is found on its own without any procedural or statutory cross reference. This licence is granted to, for example, the boards of *hieronomoi* and *agoranomoi* in second-century Kyme,⁴⁹ in which both boards are permitted to impose penalties of up to five *stateres* on bill-posters and other offenders in Archippe's stoas and to exact them ᾧ ἂν δύνωνται τρόπον. Similar permission is granted to the elected *hegemones* at Tomoi who are authorised to impose fines of up to ten *argyroi* per day and exact them τρόπον ὃν ἂν δύνωνται.⁵⁰ At Amyzon, the men elected by the *demos* in connection with the levying of an *eisphora* are allowed to exact a fine of – probably – fifty drachmai from *eisphora* dodgers τρόπον ᾧ ἂν βούλωνται.⁵¹ Significantly, the latter two texts combine the 'licence to *prassein*' with an immunity clause. This strongly suggests that the officials concerned, in their capacity as the *polis*' representatives, were permitted to apply a very considerable degree of force against the debtors. This almost certainly would have included the seizure of personal property belonging to the debtor, and they thus contribute to the impression that *polis* officials were, in some circumstances, granted quite significant authorisation *ex officio* to cross the boundaries between the public sphere and the *oikos* sphere of each individual resident in their community.

The four criteria applied

When the four criteria of penalty clause, immunity clause, statutory or procedural cross reference and the 'in whatever way they can/wish' are applied to the material, the picture that emerges is a complex one. The range of different officials known to have had the authority to engage actively in the process of *praxis* in different *poleis* is quite wide and diverse, as illustrated by the appendix to this paper. Some *poleis* that may normally have limited the authority to carry out *praxis* to a single designated board sometimes chose to confer, on an *ad hoc* basis, similar authority on other boards within a particular area of jurisdiction. In other *poleis*, it may simply have been standard practice to distribute this power routinely between a plurality of boards.⁵²

⁴⁹ SEG 33: 1039: εἰ δὲ μὴ, κωλύεωσαν τὸν τούτων τι ποιοῦντα οἱ ἱερονόμοι καὶ οἱ ἀγορανόμοι, [ᾧ] ἂν δύνωνται [τρ]όπον, καὶ ζημιούτωσαν ἕως στα[τ]ήρων πέντε ὄντες ἀνυπόδικ[οι], καὶ πραξάτωσαν τὴν ζημίαν ᾧ ἂν δύνωνται [τρ]όπον, καὶ τὰ διαφορὰ ταῦτα ὑπάρχειν εἰς τὴν ἐπισκευὴν τοῦ ἱεροῦ· ἐὰν δὲ μὴ δύνωνται πράξαι ἀναγκραυάτωσαν καὶ μηδὲν ἥσσον ὁ βουλόμενος τὸν τούτων τ[ι] ποιοῦντα κωλύεω ἀζήμιος·

⁵⁰ I. Scythiae Minoris II, 2 (Syl.³ 731, SEG 29: 695), n. 31 above.

⁵¹ Fouilles d'Amyzon no 28, n. 30 above.

⁵² Fifth-century Chios had conferred this power on at least two boards, the *horophylakes* and the *pentekaideka*. Delos bestowed it on its *boule*, *agoranomoi*, *hieropoioi* and *epistatai*, and, in one extreme instance, on all other *archai*. At Gortyn, the *titai*, and the

It may also be significant that the active role performed by *private* individuals in the process of *praxis* of penalties that were destined for public or sacred treasuries generally seems to have been quite limited, at least until the middle of the second century BC. In the non-Athenian material, there is substantial evidence for volunteer participation, in return for a reward, in processes resembling the Athenian *apographe*. But in texts earlier than the middle of the second century B.C., it is rare to come across a volunteer being allowed to be actively involved in the physical process of exacting in its entirety a penalty payable to the *polis* or to one of its sanctuaries. In those cases where a volunteer prosecutor was authorised to exact *only* the share of the penalty to which he was personally entitled, there was little substantial difference between his position and that of a private creditor, whose authority to carry out *praxis* against fellow members of his community was restricted to very specific circumstances: those where the authority had been conferred on him by the successful conclusion of a *dike* or by the terms of a contractual agreement.

But most importantly, a very significant difference between the volunteer private individual and the *polis* official as agent in the process of *praxis* was that the latter often was legally obliged to engage actively in the process of *praxis*. While three of my four criteria are found in *praxis* clauses that pertain to private individuals as well as those pertaining to *polis* officials, that is the immunity clause, the cross references and the *tropos* clause,⁵³ I have so far found the penalty clause only in *praxis* clauses that assign the task explicitly to *polis* officials. The sole exception is an instance that concerns *syle* rather than *praxis*.⁵⁴ By contrast, the examples where the officials were being compelled to carry out *praxis* are many, and they are distributed widely across the Greek world.

The attempt to compel *polis* officials to act by applying the incentive of a penalty may have been motivated by several practical concerns. First, if the official who failed to carry out *praxis* was liable to pay the entire fine himself or, in some

esprattai appear to have had a similarly active part to play (perhaps along with yet other officials). Kyme allowed both its *hieronomoi* and *agoranomoi* wide discretion when exacting summary fines, while in the third century equally serious licence was given to their *phylarchoi*. Pergamon, which had a designated *praktor*, also entrusted the process of *praxis* to its *astynomoi* and its *amphodarchai*. The latter were authorised to seize *enechyra*. Thasos in C5 obliged both its *archoi* and its *epistatai* to carry out *praxis*, with the latter board being incentivised by a combination of penalty and reward.

⁵³ Immunity and *tropos* clause: e.g. IG XII, 7 67 B (Arkesine C4/3), IK Ephesos I, 4 (Ephesos 297/6 BC); cross reference: SEG 48: 1404 (Kolophon C3), I. di Cos ED 178 (Kos C3).

⁵⁴ IG IX, 1² 573 (Akarnanian *koinon*, end of C4 or C3): Ἀντίμαχον ἐκ τῶς [Ἀκ]αρνανίας[ς, τὸν ἐπιτυγχάνοντα συλᾶ[ν] καὶ τὰν πόλιν, ἐξ ἧς [κ]α ἄγεται· εἰ δὲ μὴ συλῶι, ἀμὲν πόλις ἀποτεισάτω ἑκατὸν μνᾶς ἱερὰς τῷ Ἀπόλλωνι τῷ Μετθαπίῳ καὶ ὁ [ἔ]τας ὁ ἐπιτυχών, εἰ μὴ συλῶι, δέκα μν[ᾶς] ἱερὰς κατὰ ταῦτά· τὸν δὲ συλάσαντα καὶ ἔταν καὶ πόλις μὴ ὑπέχειν δίκαν κτλ.

instances, double the amount, it would have been pointless for the public debtor to try to bribe him to desist. The offender would not save any money by doing so, for the price of compensating the official for his personal financial loss would have been at least as high as the fine that the offender owed anyway.

Secondly, and more importantly, the threat of a financial penalty offered some protection to the debtor who *had* paid up, if the official was tempted to divert the fine into his own pocket instead of the relevant treasury. This was the case not least in those communities that required the officials to declare under oath that they had tried but failed to exact the penalty. If an official who had successfully carried out *praxis* embezzled the sum instead of handing it over and entering it on his records as having been paid, he himself would face a fine of a corresponding or even larger amount, unless he was prepared to perjure himself when swearing his *exomosia*. The fact that boards of officials were often held collectively liable for failure to carry out *praxis* would also have meant that his colleagues would have had a clear incentive to blow the whistle, if they suspected him of that type of embezzlement.⁵⁵

And thirdly, fines constituted income for the individual communities. The deployment of *polis* officials, rather than volunteers, as agents in the process was the option that made most sense from a purely financial point of view. Even at Athens, the assistance rendered by volunteers in connection with *apographai* cost the community money because of the reward payable to the *apographon*. The same pattern of financial incentivisation is replicated in several other classical and Hellenistic *poleis*. This is not surprising, given the potential personal risks that such a denunciation might involved for the volunteer who offered that kind of assistance. By contrast, when *praxis* was assigned to the *polis*' officials, such a reward seems, by and large, to have been perceived as unnecessary. The reason for this was very likely that it was far more realistic to fine an official for evident crimes of omission than to penalise individual private citizens for not engaging actively in the process. The bottom line is that when the task of *praxis* was assigned to officials, the entire sum exacted would end up in the treasury – with a few exceptions, the officials were not themselves entitled to a share of the money that they had brought in.

But the sanctions threatened against officials, if they opted for a purely passive role in the process of *praxis*, are also important in connection with the controversy over the characterisation of 'the Greek *polis*' as a 'stateless society'. I have argued elsewhere (Rubinstein 1998: 131-132) that at least one important characteristic distinguished the role of a citizen when acting in a capacity of official from his role as an *idiotes* in for example the Assembly and the courts. As an official, he was in some contexts legally compelled to act, in principle regardless of any personal obligations and sentiments that he might have had towards his friends or his

⁵⁵ For collective liability if the officials responsible for *praxis* failed to carry it out, see e.g. *PEP Chios* 76 (Chios, C5), *IC* I ix 1 D 128-131 (Dreiros, C3), *IK Erythrai und Klazomenai* 1 (Erythrai C5 or C4), *IC* III iv 7 (Itanos, C3), *IG XII Suppl.* 348 (Thasos, C3).

enemies. When it comes to an official's involvement in the process of *praxis*, especially in those communities that were very small indeed, this was probably a task that was more likely than most to produce a conflict between the official's private interests and attachments and his official duties. The legal obligation placed upon various boards of officials actively to carry out *praxis* could, as we have seen, involve the application of various methods of force against the debtors and their property, including measures that implied the officials' physically entering into the *oikos* sphere of their fellow citizens. This type of activity obviously had the potential to create and exacerbate enmity to the personal detriment of the official. Yet, for some of the boards discussed in this paper, it was not an option simply to wait patiently for the debtor to pay up or for one of the debtor's personal enemies to take the initiative. This in turn suggests that the characterisation of the Greek *polis* generally as 'stateless' is in need of modification, at least as far as the Greek world outside Athens is concerned.⁵⁶

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APPENDIX

Praxis of fines incurred in connection with contracts are indicated in **bold**.

<i>Polis</i>	<i>reference</i>	board of officials	penalty for not <i>prassein</i>	immunity	cross reference	τρόποι δι' ἃν ἐτίσθηται
Amyzon (C2)	<i>F. Amyzon</i> 28	committee elected by <i>demos</i> and their assistants		✓ (ἀζήμιοι καὶ ἀνυπόδικοι)		✓
Arkesine (C4)	<i>IG</i> XII, 7 62 40-45	<i>neopoiai</i>	✓ (double)			
Beroia (C2)	<i>SEG</i> 43: 381 and 27: 261 B lines 29-37	<i>politikos praktor</i>	✓ (simple)			
Chios (C5)	<i>PEP Chios</i> 76	<i>hoi pentekaiddeka horophylakes</i>	✓ (curse) ✓ (simple)			
Delos (C2)	<i>SEG</i> 48: 1037	<i>boule hieropoioi oi λαῖπροι ἄρχοντες</i>		✓ (ἀνεύθυνοι)		
Delos (C3)	<i>ID</i> 502	<i>epistatai</i>		✓ (ἀζήμιοι καὶ ἀνυπόδικοι)		✓
Delos (C3)	<i>ID</i> 509	<i>agoranomoi</i>		✓ (ἀνεύθυνοι)		
Delos (C3)	<i>SEG</i> 23: 498	<i>boule</i>		✓ (ἀνεύθυνος)		
Delphi (C2 late)	<i>SEG</i> 42: 472	<i>hoi hosiōi</i>		✓ (ἀζήμιοι καὶ ἀνυπόδικοι)		
Delphi (C2)	<i>Syl.</i> (3) 672	<i>epimeletai</i>	✓ (amount of debt not recovered + <i>hemiolion</i> + <i>atimia</i>)		✓	✓
Delphi, Amphiktyony (C4)	<i>CID</i> IV, 1, cf. I, 10	<i>hieromnamones</i>	✓ (fine of thirty stateres)			
Dreos (C3)	<i>IC</i> I ix 1	<i>boule ereutai</i> (?)	✓ (double) ✓ (?) (double?)			

Eretria (deme of Tamynai?)	<i>IG</i> XII, 9 90, <i>LSCG</i> 91	<i>demarchos hieropoioi</i>	✓fine (of 50 dr. ?)			
Erythrai (C5 / C4)	<i>IK Erythrai u. Klaz.</i> 1	<i>exetastai</i>	✓(simple)			
Gortyna (C5)	<i>IC</i> IV 75D, <i>Nomima</i> II 46, Koerner no. 149*	<i>esprattai?</i>		✓(ἀμολεῖ πρόσδεθαι, M. Bile: 'sans contestation juridique')		
Gortyna (C5)	<i>IC</i> IV 80, <i>Nomima</i> I 7	<i>hoi preigistoi</i>		✓(ἄπατον ἔμην)		
Gortyna (C5)	<i>IC</i> IV 87, <i>Nomima</i> I 97, Koerner no. 161*	<i>esprattai</i>		✓(ἄν[αιτον ἔμην])		
Herakleia (C4)	<i>IG</i> XIV 645, <i>SEG</i> 48: 1232 I lines 122-128 and 154-168	<i>polianomoi</i>		✓		
Itanos (C3)	<i>IC</i> III iv 7	<i>praktores</i>	✓(double)			
Kyme (C3)	<i>SEG</i> 50: 1195	<i>phylarchoi</i>	✓(text very lacunose)		✓	
Kyme (C2)	<i>SEG</i> 33: 1039	<i>hieronomoi agoranomoi</i>				✓
Lebena (C2)	<i>IC</i> I xvii 2	<i>hiarorgos</i>	✓(αὐτῶι ἔντιτον ἔστω)		✓(?) (κατὰ τὸ δι[ἀγραμμά])	
Miletos (C3)	<i>Milet</i> I, 3 147, Migeotte <i>L'emprunt</i> no. 97	<i>uncertain</i>			✓	
Miletos (C4)	<i>SEG</i> 15: 677, <i>LSAM</i> 45	<i>praktores</i>			✓(κατὰ τὸν νόμον)	
Pergamon (C2)	<i>SEG</i> 13: 521, <i>OGIS</i> 483	<i>astynomoi</i>	✓(fines of fixed amounts)			
Teos (C2)	<i>PEP</i> Teos 41, <i>SEG</i> 14: 751	<i>euthynoi</i>			✓	
Thasos (C3)	<i>IG</i> XII <i>Suppl.</i> 348	<i>epistatai</i>	✓(simple)			
Thasos (C5)	<i>SEG</i> 42: 785	<i>archoi</i>	✓(double)			
		<i>epistatai</i>	✓(double)			
Tomoi (C2 or C1)	<i>I. Scythiae Minoris</i> II, 2, <i>Syl.</i> (3) 731, <i>SEG</i> 29: 695	<i>hegemones</i>		✓		✓

