

Introduction

Dharmakīrti's Attitude toward the Self

More systematically and radically than Dignāga, Dharmakīrti embodies the early medieval Buddhist intellectuals' turn toward apologetics on behalf of Buddhism as a whole and against the growing hostility of the brahmanical *élites*.¹ And as his provocative identification of the false view of a self² (*ātmadr̥ṣṭi*) with nescience³ (*avidyā*) most clearly testifies, Dharmakīrti was a staunch adversary of the self. Indeed, the word *ātman* occurs with relative frequency in his works. However, most of these occurrences pertain to statements regarding selflessness (*nair-ātmya*) as the only possible way to liberation, or, equivalently, to the belief in a self as the root-cause of defilements, rebirth and suffering. In other words, *arguments* against the self or the person are surprisingly rare in the works of such an uncompromising proponent of selflessness – at least in comparison with works of other noted Buddhist scholars such as Vasubandhu, Candrakīrti, Śāntarakṣita, Kamalaśīla and Śāṅkaranandana, whose writings generally include at least one independent section dedicated to the refutation of the *ātman* and/or the

¹ The present introduction aims at depicting Dharmakīrti's general attitude toward the self (especially the belief in a self as the hallmark of nescience) and providing his critique with a religio-philosophical meaning. It mainly deals with those of Dharmakīrti's allusions to the self that have not found their place in the body of this study due to their lack of argumentative value or isolated character.

² When *ātman* occurs in such compounds as *ātmadr̥ṣṭi* we have generally translated it as “a self” rather than “the self” since the latter translation might misleadingly induce the reader to think that *ātmadr̥ṣṭi* is a misconception of the self understood as a real entity, instead of conveying the idea that *ātmadr̥ṣṭi* is precisely the false view that there *is* such a thing as a self. Unfortunately we could not achieve complete consistency in this respect, as the context in which such compounds appear sometimes calls for a definite article that sounds more natural in English.

³ See below, §§0.1.1–2.

pudgala. Moreover, several among his arguments *apparently* exhaust themselves in merely presenting as paradigmatic instances of logical fallacies the proofs of the self put forward by Naiyāyika, Vaiśeṣika and Sāṅkhya opponents.

The reason(s) why Dharmakīrti did not, contrary to Vasubandhu or Śāntarakṣita, criticise these proofs in a systematic manner, remain(s) shrouded in mystery. Did he hold Vasubandhu to have provided a sufficiently extensive and convincing treatment of the issue? But why, then, did Dharmakīrti not answer Uddyotakara's counterarguments, as he did on the issues of language and universals? Why did Dharmakīrti overlook the flagship among the Buddhist as well as non-Buddhist Ātmavādin's arguments, viz. that of the self as the only possible way to account for the synthesis or coordination (*pratisandhāna*) of cognitions? Whatever the answers to these questions,⁴ a systematic study of Dharmakīrti's arguments reveals that his critique nearly covers the entire range of his opponents' proof strategies. But it also reveals that Dharmakīrti's polemics against the self does by no means reflect a disinterested and religiously uncommitted search for truth.

First, his critique must be located in the context of the Buddhist epistemologists' self-representation (and, probably, self-legitimation) as those Buddhists who, by defeating the non-Buddhists' misleading and soteriologically harmful epistemological views, make the path to liberation *possible*.⁵ Second, Dharmakīrti's arguments must be read against the background of his anthropological and epistemological elaborations on scriptural authority: should a given treatise present as inferable things that are *not*, as the Veda and Brahmanical religious-philosophical *śāstras* do, this treatise ought to be rejected as unreliable and hence not eligible as a scriptural basis for the religious endeavours

⁴ Dharmakīrti was certainly well aware of the fact that claiming the notion of a self to be the most congenial sign of nescience, i.e., a wrong notion (*viparyāsa*), was not enough to *refute* it. That, contrary to Vasubandhu before him or Śāntarakṣita after him, he did not deem useful to refute all the Buddhist and non-Buddhist attempts to prove the existence of a self, might be due to his conviction that the proof of momentariness (*kṣaṇikatva*), and especially what would become the *sattvānumāna* from PVin 2 onward, was a sufficient argument against a permanent self. See below, §0.2.2.

⁵ See Krasser 2005, Eltschinger 2005: 154–162, Eltschinger forthc. b (§2.2).

of practically rational persons (*prekṣāvatpuruṣa*). Third, one should not lose sight of the fact that numerous Buddhist sources, including epistemological ones, can be interpreted as holding the critique of the self to be instrumental in the eradication of at least one – admittedly benign – form of the personalistic false view (*satkāyadrṣṭi*), which Dharmakīrti equates with nescience and therefore with the cause of suffering. Fourth, Dharmakīrti's arguments culminate in a long section of PV 2 aimed at demonstrating that any variant of *ātmavāda* makes liberation impossible. In other words, the Buddhist critique of the self is religiously and soteriologically committed in that it is instrumental in a rational person's choice of a reliable religio-philosophical system capable of fulfilling his/her expectations as to elevation (*abhyudaya*) and *summum bonum* (*niḥśreyasa*). And since the only soteriologically reliable path is Buddhism – which alone prescribes selflessness as the means toward liberation –,⁶ the critique of the self is apologetically committed too.

⁶ Cf. AKBh_{Pr} 461,1–4/AKBh_{LE} 34,1–8: *kiṃ khalv ato 'nyatra mokṣo nāsti / nāsti / kiṃ kāraṇam / vitathātmadrṣṭiniviṣṭatvāt / na hi te skandhasantāna evātmaprajñaptiṃ vyavasyanti / kiṃ tarhi / dravyāntaram evātmānaṃ parikalpayanti / ātmagrāhaprabhavāś ca sarvakleśā iti /*. “[Objection:] But isn't there any liberation outside the^a [teaching of the Buddha]? [Answer:] There isn't. – Why? – Because the [outsiders] stick to the erroneous view of a self, for [contrary to us,] they do not consider the designation 'self' [to refer] merely to the series of the constituents; rather, they conceive the self as an independent substance. Now, all [the] defilements [which are responsible for bondage] originate from the belief in a self[, and this is the reason why there is no means of liberation outside selflessness as prescribed by the Buddha].” [^a *ataḥ* is to be understood against the background of AK 8.43, especially *śāsanam muneḥ*.] Cf. also AK, antepenultimate and ultimate stanzas (AKBh_{Pr} 478,14–21/AKBh_{LE} 168,1–8): *ity etāṃ suvihatetumārgasuddhāṃ buddhānāṃ pravacanadharmatāṃ niśāmya / andhānāṃ vividhakudṛṣṭiceṣṭitānāṃ tīrthyānāṃ matam apavidhya yānti anandhāḥ // imāṃ hi nirvāṇapuraikavartiniṃ tathāgatāditya-vaco'mśubhāsvatīm / nirātmatām āryasahasravāhitām na mandacakṣur vivṛtām apīkṣate //*. “Those who are not blind proceed by observing that the [fundamental] law [inherent] in the teaching of the *buddhas* is unobjectionable (*śuddha*) thanks to a well ordained path of [argumentative] reasons and by rejecting the doctrine of blind outsiders [such as Kapila and Ulūka] who were prompted by various evil false views. For the weak-eyed [outsider or personalist] fails to see, even [though it is] manifest, this selflessness which is the only path to the city of *nirvāṇa*, which is radiant due to the rays which are the words of the sun[-like] Tathāgata [and] which is conveyed by thousands of noble ones.” On the city of *nirvāṇa*, see below, fn. 374, p. 282.

0.1. DHARMAKĪRTI'S ACCOUNT OF THE BELIEF IN A SELF AS NESCIENCE

0.1.1. According to Dharmakīrti, nescience/ignorance/delusion (*avidyā*, *ajñāna*, *moha*) basically consists in erroneous perception (*mithyo-palabdhi*), pseudo-perception (*pratyakṣābhāsa*), concealment (*saṃvṛti*) and conceptuality (*vikalpa*), which all superimpose unreal aspects (*abhūtākāra*) onto the real.⁷ And Dharmakīrti calls “personalistic false view” that part of nescience which, superimposing a fictitious self and that which is believed to belong to this self (*ātmīya*), gives rise to all defilements (*kleśa*) and commits living beings to action and rebirth.⁸ Dharmakīrti equates the personalistic false view with nescience in several sections of his PV.⁹ The identification of *satkāyadarśana* with nescience occurs first in PV 1.222:

The birth of all kinds of defects¹⁰ is due to the personalistic false view [i.e., to the clinging to the self and what belongs to the self, and] this [false view of a self] is [nothing but] nescience.¹¹

Its identity with ignorance is stressed in Dharmakīrti's commentary on the same stanza:

All defects are born of the personalistic false view, and it is this [false view] that is called “ignorance” [in our doctrinal system].¹²

As for equating the personalistic belief with delusion, it is done at least twice in PV 2:

⁷ On Dharmakīrti's views regarding *avidyā*, see Vetter 1990: 22–26, Franco 2001: 289–300, Eltschinger 2009b and 2010c. The present section is but an adaptation of §§1.3 and 2.1 of the latter two essays. On Dharmakīrti's identification of nescience to conceptuality, see especially Eltschinger 2009b: 41–62.

⁸ On the *satkāyadṛṣṭi*, see Rahder 1932, *Kośa* IV.15–17, fn. 3, and *Traité* II.737, fn. 3. See also below, fn. 26, p. 7.

⁹ For a hypothesis and detailed references regarding Dharmakīrti's likely sources for these identifications, see Eltschinger 2009b: 70–76.

¹⁰ On the nature of these *doṣas* see below, fn. 67, p. 203.

¹¹ PV 1.222ac1: *sarvāsāṃ doṣajātīnāṃ jātiḥ satkāyadarśanāt / sāvidyā [...]* //.

¹² PVSV 111,19–20: *satkāyadarśanajāḥ sarvadoṣāḥ / tad eva cājñānam ity ucyate /*.

Delusion is the root[-cause] of defects, and this [delusion] consists in the belief in a [personal] being.¹³

All the impurities have this [delusion] as [their] root[-cause], and this [delusion] is the personalistic false view.¹⁴

0.1.2. Dharmakīrti was well aware of the fact that his interpretation of nescience as the false view of a self could incur criticism from many of his coreligionists, even though he was by no means the first Buddhist scholar to interpret it in this manner. Whereas his general understanding of nescience in terms of erroneous cognition was closely in line with Vasubandhu's position, his identification of a false view (*drṣṭi*) with nescience could be rejected on the grounds that Vasubandhu held the false view to be *associated* (*samprayukta*) with nescience and not *identical* with nescience;¹⁵ consequently, this identification could easily be found guilty of contradicting Buddhist scriptures (*āgamavirodha*). Dharmakīrti was thus compelled both to explain how something can be said to be associated with itself and to account for such a loss of the meaning of "associated" (*samprayuktārtha*). He seems to have entrusted (hypothetical) followers and/or commentators with the task of answering these questions of a more dogmatic character. His exegetical justification for this identification occurs in the following stanza:

Delusion is presented as the [principal] cause of defects [in one *sūtra*, and] in another one, it is the personalistic false view, because [defects] are eliminated when the [personalistic false view] is eliminated.¹⁶

In his commentary,¹⁷ Dharmakīrti argues that if the Buddha has taught delusion to be the cause of defilements in one *sūtra*, and the persona-

¹³ PV 2.196ab₁: *mohaś ca mūlaṃ doṣāṇāṃ sa ca sattvagrahaḥ* [...] /.

¹⁴ PV 2.212cd: *tanmūlās ca malāḥ sarve sa ca satkāyadarśanam* //.

¹⁵ See AK 3.29c.

¹⁶ PV 1.223 (leaving *ata eva* untranslated): *moho nidānaṃ doṣāṇāṃ ata evābhīdhyate / satkāyadrṣṭir anyatra tatprahāṇe prahāṇataḥ* //. Note also PV 2.214: *vyākhyeyo 'tra virodho yas tadvirodhāc ca tanmayaiḥ / virodhaḥ śūnyatādrṣṭeḥ sarvadoṣaiḥ prasidhyati* //. "The contradiction [with scripture] which [seems to ensue] on this point has to be explained. However, since [the perception of emptiness] is contradictory to this [personalistic false view], it is established that the perception of emptiness contradicts all the defects [too], which are born of this [personalistic false view]." On *maya*, see below, fn. 41, p. 10.

listic false view in another one, he could only have the same primary cause (*pradhāna[hetu]*) in mind, because in both cases he is pointing out the factor that, when eliminated, leads to the elimination of the defilements, i.e., the “material” cause (*upādāna*). In other words, “delusion” and “personalistic false view” are synonymous. How do the commentators with this type of doctrinal background explain away the contradiction with the scripture that seems to ensue from this identification? What does “associated” mean in the Abhidharmic statement “nescience is associated with the false view(s)” if nescience and the personalistic false view are one and the same thing?¹⁸ According to Devendrabuddhi, “associated” points here to a relationship between the parts and the whole (*ekadeśaikadeśibhāva*); Śākyabuddhi explains it as being like the relationship between the body and its limbs (*aṅgāṅgibhāva*).¹⁹ According to Prajñākaragupta, “associated” refers to a relationship between universal and specific instance (*sāmānyaviśeṣabhāva*).²⁰ Nescience and the personalistic false view stand in the same kind of relationship as a forest and *palāśa*-trees (*Butea frondosa*) in the expression: “The forest has *palāśa*-trees” (*palāśayuktaṃ vanam iti*), or the body and limbs such as hands in the expression: “The body has [limbs] such as hands” (*pāṇyādiyuktaṃ śarīram iti*).²¹ The apparent contradiction with scripture can then be explained away easily: the statement that nescience is associated with the personalistic false view means that nescience, considered as a whole, a body or a universal, possesses the personalistic false view considered as a part, a member/limb, or a specific instance.²² As Prajñākaragupta concludes, “by mentioning [that the personalistic false view is] a specific instance,

¹⁷ See PVS 111,23–112,5, Dunne 2004: 372–373, Eltschinger 2007: 236–239.

¹⁸ See PVP D92b7–93a1/P107a7–8, PVA 146,14–16 and PVV 85,15–17.

¹⁹ See PVP D93a1/P107a8–b1 and PVṬ Ñe D137a5/P169a6; see also PVA 146,14 and PVV 85,16–17.

²⁰ See PVA 146,20; see also PVV 85,20.

²¹ For *palāśayuktaṃ vanam iti*, see PVP D93a1–2/P107b1, PVA 146,20, PVV 85,20, Vibh. 85, fn. 10. For *pāṇyādiyuktaṃ śarīram iti*, see PVP D93a2/P107b1 and Vibh. 85, fn. 10. The second example obviously does not fit together with the explanation of “associated” as *sāmānyaviśeṣabhāva*, hence its disappearance in the PVA and PVV.

²² See PVP D93a3/P107b2–3, PVṬ Ñe D137a5–7/P169a6–b1, PVA 146,21.

nescience consisting in this [i.e., a false view,] is pointed out as being primarily the cause [of defilements].”²³ Or, according to Manorathanandin, “[Dharmakīrti’s] aim [in defining nescience as the personalistic false view] is to show that nescience consisting in a false view is primarily the cause of defilements.”²⁴ As we can see, although Dharmakīrti was by no means the first Buddhist intellectual to connect *avidyā* with *ātmadr̥ṣṭi* and the like or to define the former by means of the latter, he may have been the first to develop an exegetical strategy to justify an equation that could easily be taken, at least among the Ābhidharmikas, as unorthodox.

0.1.3. Various terms refer to this kind of nescience in Dharmakīrti’s writings: “personalistic false view” (*satkāyadr̥ṣṭi*, °*darśana*), “false view of a self” (*ātmadarśana*), “belief in/adhesion to a self” (*ātmagraha*, *ātmābhīniveśa*), and “false view of/belief in a [substantial] living being” (*sattvadr̥ṣṭi*, *sattvadarśana*, *sattvagraha*).²⁵ According to Yogācāra and Sautrāntika definitions, the personalistic belief consists in regarding the five constituents to which one clings (*upādānaskandha*) either as a self (*ātmataḥ*) or as one’s own (*ātmīyataḥ*, i.e., as belonging to the self).²⁶ People who are deluded by this false view hold a basically transient (*sat < sīdati*) collection or cluster to be both permanent (*nityasañjñā*) and unitary (*piṇḍasañjñā*). In his account of the future Buddha’s philosophical reflections on the eve of his career, Dharmakīrti presents the cause of suffering (*duḥkhaḥetu*) in the following way:

²³ PVA 146,21–22: *evaṃ viśeṣābhidhānena tatsvabhāvāvidyā nidānabhūtā prādhānyena nirḍiṣṭā* /.

²⁴ PVV 85,20–21: *dr̥ṣṭisvabhāvāvidyā prādhānyena kleśahetur ity upadarśanam [...]* *prayojanam* /.

²⁵ For the various designations of nescience in Dharmakīrti’s works (especially in PV 2), see Vetter 1990: 23.

²⁶ That *satkāya* should be interpreted as the five *upādānaskandhas* is obvious from the definitions adduced in the *Maulī Bhūmiḥ* of the *Yogācārabhūmi* (see Ahn 2003: 62, and for a German translation, Ahn 2003: 169–172), AS 7,8 (see Ahn 2003: 170, fn. 27, and for a German translation, Ahn *ibid.*), PSk 9,12–13 (for a French translation, see Dantinne 1980: 15), TrBh_B *14,14–16/TrBh_L 23,12–14, AKBh_{Pr} 281,20–21 on AK 5.7.

The cause [of suffering, i.e., of rebirth,] is attachment bearing upon the conditioning factors, [an attachment that is] due to the belief in the self and what [supposedly] belongs to the self.²⁷

According to Devendrabuddhi, craving proceeds from one's adhering to the painful conditioned factors that are intrinsically free from the self and one's own, under the aspects of the self and one's own.²⁸ This is tantamount to saying that defilements such as craving only occur once unreal aspects have been superimposed on *dharmas*, specifically on the five constituents to which one clings, which lack these aspects entirely. While commenting on another passage, Devendrabuddhi claims that defilements such as desire (another equivalent for attachment and craving) proceed from one's superimposing aspects such as "permanent," "pleasurable," "self" and "one's own" on the impermanent, painful, selfless and empty constituents.²⁹ A huge number of passages presenting the same idea could be adduced here: the personalistic belief is responsible for one's superimposing contrary aspects such as self and one's own on the selfless and empty constituents.³⁰ As Dharmakīrti himself has it, "desire [arises] from the superimposition of another [i.e., unreal] nature onto something (*dharma*) that does not have this nature."³¹ PV 2.270 provides us with Dharmakīrti's most significant statement as to how craving takes place once unreal aspects have been ascribed to reality:

Having[, due to ignorance,³²] superimposed sixteen unreal aspects, viz. "lasting," "pleasant," "mine," "I," etc., onto the four [nobles'] truths,³³ one craves [for what is pleasurable to the self].³⁴

²⁷ PV 2.135ac₁: *ātmātmīyagrahakṛtaḥ snehaḥ saṃskāragocaraḥ / hetuḥ [...]* // *sneha* = *trṣṇā* according to PVP D56a7/P64a4 and PVṬ Ñe D117b3–4/P143b7; Śākya-buddhi (PVṬ Ñe D117b4/P143b7–8) explains *gocara* as **viśaya*.

²⁸ See PVP D56b1/P64a5–6.

²⁹ See PVP D60b2–3/P69a4–5.

³⁰ See, e.g., PVP D88a4–5/P101b4 and PVP D88a6/P101b5–6.

³¹ PV 2.196ab: *ātmāntarasamāropād rāgo dharme 'tadātmake /*.

³² According to PVP D116a1/P134b2 (*sgro btags nas ni mi śes pa'i phyir*).

³³ At least according to the Vaibhāṣikas, each of the four nobles' truths is to be successively contemplated under four different aspects: the truth of suffering, under the aspects "impermanent," "painful," "empty" and "selfless"; the truth of origin, under

According to Devendrabuddhi and Śākyabuddhi, nescience, i.e., the false view of a self, has one grasp aspects that are contrary to the real ones, i.e., it makes one superimpose an "I" onto what is selfless and a "mine" onto what is empty.³⁵ But nescience is also responsible for deluded persons taking momentary things to be lasting (*sthira*) or even unchangeably permanent (*kūṭasthanitya*),³⁶ or holding intrinsically painful things to be pleasurable, i.e., not to be under the sway of cankers

the aspects of "(distant/material) cause" (as a seed), "arising," "(serial) causation" and "(joint) condition"; the truth of cessation, under the aspects of "cessation," "calm," "excellent" and "salvation"; the truth of the path, under the aspects of "path," "fitness," "access" and "conducive to release." See AKBh_{Pr} 343,16–19 on AK 6.17c₁, PVP D62a3–7/P71a1–6 and Wayman 1980. The AKBh records a lengthy discussion pertaining to four different ways of interpreting these sixteen aspects (see AKBh_{Pr} 400,1–401,17 on AK 7.13a, *Kośa* V.30–39, Pruden 1988–1990: IV.1110–1116). According to the fourth exegetical pattern, each of these aspects aims at counteracting (*pratipakṣa*) a particular false view. The aspects *anitya*, *duḥkha*, *śūnya* and *anātman* counteract the false views of permanence, pleasurableness, one's own, and self; the aspects of *hetu*, *samudaya*, *prabhava* and *pratya* contradict the false views of the absence of a cause, of a unique cause such as God or primordial matter (according to AKVy 628,30–31), of an evolution of being, and of an intelligent creation; the aspects *nirodha*, *sānta*, *praṇīta* and *niḥsarana* oppose the false views that release does not exist, that release is painful, that the bliss of *dhyānas* is the most excellent, and that liberation, because it is subject to falling again and again, is not definitive; as for the aspects *mārga*, *nyāya*, *pratipad* and *nairyāṇika*, they respectively counteract the false views that there is no path, that this is a wrong path, that there is another path, and that the path is subject to retrogression (see AKBh_{Pr} 401,11–17, *Kośa* V.38–39, Pruden 1988–1990: IV.1115–1116). The explanations provided by Dharmakīrti's commentators are too scarce to allow us to determine which interpretation, if any, they favoured. Devendrabuddhi and Śākyabuddhi content themselves with listing the four aspects superimposed on each of the last three truths (see PVP D115b6–7/P134a8–b2 and PVT *Ñe* D147b3–5/P182a8–b2).

³⁴ PV 2.270: *sthiraṃ sukhaṃ mamāhaṃ cetyādi satyacatuṣṭaye / abhūtān ṣoḍaśākārān āropya paritrṣyati //*.

³⁵ See PVP D115b3–4/P134a4, PVP D115b6/P134a7–8 and PVT *Ñe* D147a1–2/P181b3–5.

³⁶ See PVP D115b4/P134a5–6 (to be compared with Vibh. 102, fn. 1) and PVT *Ñe* D147a6–7/P182a2–3.

(*sāsrava*) or dependent on causes (*hetuparatantra*) in each of their successive moments (*pratikṣaṇam*).³⁷

0.1.4. According to Dharmakīrti and his commentators, the personalistic false view is the (principal) cause (*nidāna*), the origin (*yonī*, *prabhava*), or the root (*mūla*) of all (kinds of) defects (*doṣa*), defilements (*kleśa*, *upakleśa*) or moral impurities (*mala*).³⁸ Among the expressions denoting the fact that defilements such as desire originate from the false view of a self, one also encounters “cause” (*kāraṇa*, alone or with preceding *utpatti*°, *pradhāna*°; *hetu*³⁹), “arising” (*jāti*, *utpatti*⁴⁰) and suffixal elements such as °*pūrvaka*, °*maya*,⁴¹ °*hetuka*, °*ja*, °*mūla*, or °*kṛta*. Defilements originate from the personalistic false view (*satkāya-darśanaja*, *’jig tshogs su lta ba’i rañ b’zin*), (causally) presuppose the false view of a self or the adherence to the self and one’s own (*bdag tu lta ba sñon du son ba can*, *ātmātmīyābhīniveśapūrvaka*), arise from the false view of a self (*bdag tu lta ba las byuñ ba*), or have nescience for their cause (*avidyāhetuka*).⁴² They are all based on the beliefs in “I” and “mine” (*ñar ’dzin pa dañ ña yir ’dzin pa dag la gnas pa*) and arise in dependence on a mind that complies with the false view of a self and one’s own (*bdag dañ bdag gir lta ba’i rjes su ’brel ba’i sems la ltos nas [...]* *’gyur ba*).⁴³

0.1.5. As we have seen, the belief in a self and what belongs to the self is the cause of suffering, i.e., attachment bearing on the conditioning factors. In other words, nescience is the cause of craving (*trṣṇā*), which is

³⁷ See PVP D115b5/P134a6. *duḥkha(bhūta)* is regularly explained as *sāsrava* in the PVP; see, e.g., PVP D57b7/P66a1 and PVP D58a3/P66a5.

³⁸ E.g., PV 2.197a (*doṣa*), PV 1.222a (*sarvāsāṃ doṣajātīnām*), PV 2.214d (*sarvadoṣa*), PVSVT 401,24–25 and PVP D91a2/P105a5 (*sarvakleśa*), PVP D60a2–3/P68b4 (*ñon moñs pa dañ ñe ba’i ñon moñs*, **kleśopakleśāḥ*), PV 2.212c (*malāḥ sarve*).

³⁹ E.g., PVSVT 50,28 (*kāraṇa*), PVSVT 401,29 and PVP D91a2/P105a5 (*utpattikāraṇa*), PVSVT 402,23–24 (*pradhānakāraṇa*), PVSVT 401,21 (*hetu*).

⁴⁰ E.g., PV 1.222b (*jāti*), PVSVT 401,22 and 26 (*utpatti*).

⁴¹ Rendered in Tib. as *rañ b’zin (can)*. Note PVT Ñe D137b3/P169b6: *rañ b’zin ni ño bo ñid dam rgyu yin no //*. “**maya* [points] either [to] the nature (**rūpa*) or [to] the cause (**hetu*).”

⁴² Respectively PVS 111,19, PVP D93b1/P108a1 (on *rañ b’zin*, see above, fn. 41), PVP D60a2–3/P68b4, PVS 8,20, PVP D93a5/P107b5, PVSVT 401,24 and 25.

⁴³ Respectively PVP D93b1–2/P108a1–2 and PVP D67b4/P77a6–7.

nothing but the traditional sequence of dependent origination, where both nescience and craving function as the cause of suffering: as defilements, they both give rise to other defilements (e.g., *trṣṇā*→*upādāna*) and to actions (*kriyā*, e.g., *avidyā*→*saṃskāra*, or *upādāna*→*bhava*), the latter being in turn responsible for new foundations (*vastu*) of existence (e.g., *saṃskāra*→*viññāna*, or *bhava*→*jāti*).⁴⁴ Insofar as they give rise to actions leading to new existential foundations, nescience and craving⁴⁵ are the two causes of (re)birth (*[punar]janman*) and transmigration (*saṃsāra*),⁴⁶ which are the hallmarks of suffering.⁴⁷ Whereas Devendrabuddhi simply defines suffering as (re)birth (*skye ba'i mtshan ñid can gyi sdug bsñal*), Dharmakīrti characterizes it as the constituents undergoing transmigration (*duḥkhaṃ saṃsāriṇaḥ skandhāḥ*).⁴⁸ It is hardly surprising, then, that according to Dharmakīrti, “as long as (s)he adheres to a self, the [person who experiences craving remains] in *saṃsāra*.”⁴⁹ According to Devendrabuddhi, for whom “the personalistic false view is the cause of the connection (**pratisandhi*) to a new existence (**punarbhava*),”⁵⁰ “the [person] who is under the sway of the false view of a self has the notion of pleasure (**sukhasañjñā*) with regard to suffering [and] will be connected to a new existence.”⁵¹ The link between the false view of a self, attachment and rebirth can be summarized as follows:

⁴⁴ See AK 3.27 and AKBh_{Pr} 134,26–135,3, *Kośa* II.69, Pruden 1988–1990: II.407.

⁴⁵ See PVP D56a6/P64a3, PVP D57b3/P65b4, PVP D115b6/P134a8, PVP D116a1/P134b3, PVP D115b2/P134a2–3, PVP D58b1/P66b4.

⁴⁶ For definitions of *saṃsāra*, see PVP D62b3–4/P71b2–3 (to be compared with PVV 62,11–12), PVP D95b6/P110b3 (together with PVT Ñe D138b6–7/P171a7–8), TSP_K 184,21–22/TSP_S 230,8–9 (unidentified quotation).

⁴⁷ See PVT Ñe D148a1/P182b6. Suffering is also defined in terms of *duḥkhatātraya* in PVP D62b4/P71b3–4 (together with PVT Ñe D120b5–7/P147b5–7). On the three types of painfulness, see below, Chapter 3, §3.3.7.

⁴⁸ Respectively PVP D56a6/P64a3 and PV 2.146c.

⁴⁹ PV 2.218cd (leaving *tena* untranslated): *tenātmābhiniveśo yāvat tāvat sa saṃsāre* //.

⁵⁰ PVP D85a6–7/P98a3–4: *'jig tshogs lta ba yañ srid par ñiñ mtshams sbyor ba'i rgyur gyur pa*. See also PVP D85b5/P98b2–3.

⁵¹ PVP D85a6/P98a3: *gañ la bdag tu lta ba yod pa de ni sdug bsñal la bde ba'i 'du śes can yin te / yañ srid par mtshams sbyor bar 'gyur ro* //.

Thus when there is adherence to a self, a multitude of defects such as attachment to one's own (**ātmīyasnehādidoṣa*) arise, and attachment to a self causes [one] to take a [new existential] place (**sthāna*).⁵²

0.1.6. Let us now consider the genealogy of defilements from the personalistic false view. As we shall see, Dharmakīrti provides a coherent picture of the sequence *avidyā–(śaḍāyatana–sparśa–vedanā–)trṣṇā–upādāna–bhava–jāti*, although some items in his account have no explicit equivalent in the traditional twelve-membered chain of dependent origination. In Dharmakīrti's opinion, the false view of a self may be held directly responsible for the rise of at least three factors: the notion of otherness, the belief in one's own, and attachment/craving. In an interesting statement, Dharmakīrti points out:

Once [the notion of] the self exists, the notion of the other (*parasañjñā*) [arises, and] from this distinction between the self and the other [are born] grasping and aversion; bound to these two, all the defects arise.⁵³

Devendrabuddhi accounts as follows for the genealogy of otherness:

As long as the thought adheres to a self (**ātmēti*), [it has] the notion of a self (**ātmasañjñā*), and once this [notion] exists, all that [the thought] does not grasp in this way is [held to be] other.⁵⁴

In another statement, Dharmakīrti declares that “the [false] view of a self generates the belief in one's own (*ātmīyagraha*).”⁵⁵ Persons deluded by the false view of a self regard the constituents of being both as a self and as belonging to the self, but this feeling of property may well be extended beyond the constituents and range over parts of the world that have been posited as other than the self. The personalistic belief is responsible for yet another factor, which is variously termed “desire” (*rāga*), “craving” (*trṣṇā*), “grasping” (*parigraha*) or “attachment” (*sne-*

⁵² PVP D58a7–b1/P66b3–4: *de ltar na bdag tu mñon par žen pa yod na bdag gir chags pa la sogs pa'i skyon gyi tshogs 'jug par 'gyur žiñ / bdag tu chags pas kyañ gnas yoñs su len par byed do //*.

⁵³ PV 2.219 (*āryā metre*): *ātmani sati parasañjñā svaparavibhāgāt parigrahadveṣa u / anayoḥ sampratibaddhāḥ sarve doṣāḥ prajāyante //*.

⁵⁴ PVP D95b7/P110b4–5: *ji srid du blo bdag ces mñon par žen pa de srid du bdag tu 'du šes pa dañ de yod na de ltar mi 'dzin pa gañ yin pa de thams cad gžan yin no //*.

⁵⁵ PVS 111,18: *ātmadarśanam ātmīyagrahaṃ prasūte //*.

ha), and clearly corresponds to the eighth link of dependent origination, i.e., craving. In spite of this functional equivalence, these terms seem not to be necessarily synonymous, for Dharmakīrti is likely to have introduced a causal sequence between them, thus splitting the traditional eighth link into two. If this is correct, from the false view of a self arises first attachment or love for the self and one's own, and then craving for the things that are regarded as beneficial or pleasurable to the self. This can be seen in the following stanza:

He who sees a self has a constant attachment for this [self, thinking of it as] "I." Because of [this] attachment [for the self,] he craves for the pleasures [of this self, and his] thirst conceals [from him] the defects [of the things he deems conducive to these pleasures].⁵⁶

Here, both Devendrabuddhi and Manorathanandin interpret "attachment" as "attachment for the self."⁵⁷ Whereas attachment regards the self (but bears upon the conditioning factors), craving regards the pleasures (*sukha*) of the self,⁵⁸ i.e., the things that are deemed conducive to these pleasures,⁵⁹ or impure (*sāsrava*) things that are (deemed) favourable (*anugrahaka*) in that they are conducive to the pleasures (of the self).⁶⁰ Besides the frequent occurrence of expressions such as *ātmāsneha*,⁶¹ *ātmātmīyasneha*⁶² or even **satkāyasneha*,⁶³ Devendrabuddhi's definition of *sneha* is worth noticing:

⁵⁶ PV 2.217 (*āryā* metre): *yaḥ paśyaty ātmānaṃ tatrāsyāham iti śāśvataḥ snehaḥ / snehāt sukheṣu tṛṣṇyati tṛṣṇā doṣāṃs tiraskurute //*. Śākyabuddhi interprets *doṣa* as "birth, ageing and death" (**jātijarāmaraṇa*, PVṛ Ṇe D138b1/P170b8).

⁵⁷ See PVP D95a6/P110a2 and PVV 87,3.

⁵⁸ PVP D95a6/P111a2: *bdag gi bde la sred 'gyur*.

⁵⁹ PVV 87,3–4: *sukhasādhanatvenādhyavasitānām vastūnām*.

⁶⁰ See PVP D95b1/P111a4–5 and PVSṬ 402,8.

⁶¹ See, e.g., PVP D58a1–2/P66a3.

⁶² See PVP D57b3/P65b4. Attachment for the self and what belongs to the self is said to regard the object that is clung to as the self and one's own (*ātmātmīyatvābhiniṣiṣṭe viṣaya ātmātmīyasnehaḥ*, PVSṬ 401,26–27).

⁶³ See, e.g., PVP D90b5/P104b7.

[We call] “attachment” an inclination for the self and one’s own which presupposes the [afore-mentioned delusion].⁶⁴

According to Dharmakīrti, attachment for the self and what belongs (or ought to belong) to the self is in turn the cause of hostility (*pratigha*) and aversion (*dveṣa*):

Indeed, he who, without grasping (*parigraha*), sees that there is neither I nor mine, is not attached to anything and, [being so] devoid of attachment, is not averse to anything [either], for there is no [aversion] regarding that which does not hinder the self or one’s own, nor regarding that which opposes the [said] hindrance.⁶⁵

One can show hostility or aversion only for that which hinders (*uparodha*) or harms (*pīḍā*) what has been taken as the self and one’s own.⁶⁶

Aversion [arises] with regard to that alone which offers opposition (*pratikūlavartin*) by its hostility to that upon which the attachment for the self and one’s own bears (*viśayabhūta*). Therefore, there is no aversion without attachment for the self and one’s own.⁶⁷

And in Dharmakīrti’s eyes, that which is other than the self gives rise to aversion only insofar as it opposes love for the self and one’s own, but arouses craving as soon as it is regarded as pleasurable to the self. Craving for the pleasures of the self and that which is conducive to them generally implies one’s running around in search of pleasure. This is indeed the Vaibhāṣika definition of the ninth link of dependent origination, appropriation or clinging (*upādāna*),⁶⁸ which Dharmakīrti obviously has in mind in PV 2.218ab:

⁶⁴ PVP D60a2/P68b2–3: *de sñon du soñ ba can gyi bdag dan bdag gir zen pa ni chags pa’o* //. See also PVP D94b7/P109b4–5.

⁶⁵ PVSṢV 111,15–17: *na hi nāhaṃ na mameti paśyataḥ parigrahaṃ antareṇa kvacit snehaḥ / na cānanurāgiṇaḥ kvacid dveṣaḥ / ātmātmīyānuparodhiny uparodhapratighā-tini ca tadabhāvāt* /.

⁶⁶ See PVSṢV 402,12 and PVP D60a2/P68b3.

⁶⁷ PVSṢV 402,13–15: *ātmātmīyasnehaviśayabhūtavirodhena yaḥ sthitaḥ pratikūlavartī tatraiva dveṣaḥ / tasmān nātmātmīyasnehaṃ antareṇa dveṣa iti* /.

⁶⁸ See AK 3.23cd.

Seeing [but desirable] qualities [to the things that he deems pleasurable to the self], he craves [for them, thinking of them as having to become] "mine," and clings (*upā√dā-*) to the means [that are conducive] to them.⁶⁹

But Dharmakīrti also holds attachment to the self to be the cause of the three different kinds of craving that the oldest layers of Buddhist canonical literature have made responsible for rebirth (*paunarbhavika*): craving for (future) existence (*bhavatrṣṇā*), craving for sensual pleasures (*kāmatrṣṇā*), and craving for non-existence/annihilation (*vibhavatrṣṇā*).⁷⁰ According to him, craving for sensual pleasures is to be interpreted as the actions (*pravṛtti*) of living beings to secure what they hold to be pleasurable (*sukhāpti*), whereas craving for annihilation refers to those of their actions that aim at avoiding suffering (*duḥkhānāpti*). This matches again perfectly with the Vaibhāṣika account of the tenth link of dependent origination, viz. *bhava* (literally "existence"), which is to be understood as the "action which results in future existence" (*bhaviṣyadbhavaphalaṃ karma*): *bhava* refers to the actions resulting in rebirth which are accumulated by those who run around (under the sway of craving) in order to quench their thirst.⁷¹ In these stanzas, Dharmakīrti brings together both meanings of *bhava*, i.e., action to secure the pleasures of the self and the (future) existence to which they inevitably lead:

The cause [of suffering] is the longing for [re]existence, because human beings reach a specific [existential] place [and condition] due to [their] hope of obtaining it. The [afore-mentioned longing for existence] is [called] the desire for [re]existence. And since a living being [only] acts with the desire to obtain pleasure and avoid suffering, these two [i.e., craving for pleasure and craving for the avoidance of suffering,] are regarded as the desire for sensual pleasures and the desire for annihilation. And since attachment to the self is the cause [of it, this dual action] pertains to everything for [the living being] who has the notion of [something] pleasurable with regard to [something] unplea-

⁶⁹ PV 2.218ab (*āryā* metre): *guṇadarśī paritrṣṇan mameti tatsādhanāny upādatte /*.

⁷⁰ For references to canonical *loci* by Dharmakīrti's commentators, see PVP D79b3–4/P91a7–8, PVA 134,33–135,2 and PVV 74,10–11. For their Pali equivalent, see Vetter 1990: 87, fn. 1.

⁷¹ See AKBh_{Pr} 132,19–21 and AK 3.24ab.

surable. Therefore, craving is the basis of existence [i.e., the cause of bondage].⁷²

0.2. THE “SPECULATIVE” FORM OF THE PERSONALISTIC BELIEF AND THE FUNCTION OF PHILOSOPHY

0.2.1. Buddhist treatises such as the YBhū and the AKBh regard the personalistic false view as twofold. The one we have considered so far corresponds to the *satkāyadr̥ṣṭi* in its innate or natural (*sahaja*) form, which afflicts (nearly) all sentient beings including animals such as wild beasts and birds. And since the innate personalistic belief can only be eliminated by the path of mental cultivation (*bhāvanāheya*), only *buddhas*, *śrāvakas/arhats* and *pratyekabuddhas* have rid themselves of it. The other form of the personalistic false view is of a theoretical, “speculative” (*vi-* or *pari-kalpita*) nature, and can be eliminated by the path of vision (*darśanaheya*). In its speculative form, the *satkāyadr̥ṣṭi* characterizes the outsider (*anyatīrthya*, *tīrthika*) intellectuals elaborating philosophical views concerning the self. Such is the YBhū’s account of the twofold *satkāyadr̥ṣṭi*:

What does the personalistic false view consist of? – We call “personalistic false view” the false view of, the adhesion (**abhiniveśa*) to and the mentalization (*sems la ’jog pa*) of a self and what [supposedly] belongs to [this] self (**ātmātmīyadr̥ṣṭi*) regarding the [five] constituents to which one clings (**upādānaskandha*). And one ought to know (**veditavya*) that this [personalistic false view] is twofold (**dvi[vi]dha*): innate (**sahaja*) and speculative (**pari-kalpita*). Among them (**tatra*), the innate [personalistic false view] is that of all the immature ordinary persons (**bālapṛthagjana*) and up to wild animals (**mṛga*) and birds (**pakṣin*). As for the speculative [personalistic false view], it must be seen (**draṣṭavya*) as that of the outsiders (**anyatīrthya*).⁷³

⁷² PV 2.183a₂–185: *hetur bhavavāñchā parigrahaḥ / yasmād deśaviśeṣasya tatprāpty-āśākrto nṛṇām // sā bhavēchāptyanāptiḥ pravṛttiḥ sukhaduḥkhaḥ / yato ’pi prāṇināḥ kāmavibhavecche ca te mate // sarvatra cātmasnehasya hetutvāt sampravartate / asukhe sukhasaṅgīṇasya tasmāt tṛṣṇā bhavāśrayaḥ //*

⁷³ VinSg 112b6–113a1 (as quoted in Kritzer 2005: 293): *’jig tshogs la lta ba gaṅ zé na / ñe bar len pa’i phuṅ po dag la bdag gam bdag gir ba lta ba daṅ / mñon par zen pa daṅ sems la ’jog pa gaṅ yin pa de ni ’jig tshogs la lta ba zés bya’o // de ’aṅ rnam pa gñis su rig par bya ste / lhan cig skyes pa daṅ kun brtags pa’o // de la lhan cig skyes*

According to Yaśomitra, the personalistic belief in its speculative form characterizes Ātmavādins such as Kapila and Ulūka, the founders of the religio-philosophical systems of Sāṅkhya and Vaiśeṣika.⁷⁴ That Dharmakīrti acknowledged the distinction between the innate and speculative forms of the *satkāyadr̥ṣṭi* can easily be substantiated.⁷⁵ Śākya-buddhi accounts for this distinction as follows:

pa ni byis pa so so'i skye bo thams cad dañ tha na ri dags dañ bya rnam kyī yañ yin no // kun brtags pa ni gžan mu stegs can rnam kyī yin par blta bar bya'o //. On this distinction, see also PrSVy IIIv5 (Muroji 1991: 83; *sahajātmadr̥ṣṭi*) and PrSVy IIIv6–7 (Muroji 1991: 81; *parikalpitātmadr̥ṣṭi*), AKBh_{Pr} 290,19–20 (*sahajā satkāyadr̥ṣṭir avyākṛtā / yā mṛgapakṣiṇām api vartate / vikalpitā tv akuśaleti pūrvācāryāḥ* /; see Kritzer 2005: 292); see also LASū 117,17–118,13 and ASBh 62,3–4. As Prajñākaragupta rightly points out, the (innate) *satkāyadr̥ṣṭi* is nothing but defiled ignorance/delusion (see PVA 145,12–13, together with stanza 886). On *mṛgapakṣin*, see also VP 2.149–150.

⁷⁴ AKVy 463,17–18: *yātmavāḍibhiḥ kapilolūkādibhir vikalpitā* /. Note that the Sāṅkhya and the Vaiśeṣika are the only non-Buddhist schools criticised in AKBh 9. Interestingly enough, these are also the exclusive target of Āryadeva's ŚŚ according to its commentary by Vasu(bandhu?) (both translated into Chinese by Kumārajīva in 404, Tucci 1929: xiv): "Kapila, Ulūka and others say that the *ātman* and the *dharma*s exist. Kapila says: 'From the primeval matter (*pradhāna*) in the beginning, the intellect (*buddhi*) arises. From the intellect arises the *ahankāra*; from *ahankāra* arise the five subtle elements (*sūkṣmabhūta*); from the five subtle elements arise the five material elements (*mahābhūta*); from the five *mahābhūta*s arise the eleven organs of senses. The *ātman* is the controlling agent (*adhiṣṭhātṛ*), has the characteristics of being eternal and intelligent. He is indifferent (*udāsīna* or *madhyastha*). He eternally remains and is neither destroyed nor perishes. He comprehends all the *dharma*s. Those who can understand these twenty-five principles obtain liberation. Those who do not understand these cannot get rid of the *saṃsāra*.' Ulūka says: 'Really there is an *ātman* eternal; because of the characteristics of breathing out (*prāṇa*), inspiration (*apāna*) (*nimeṣa*), *unmeṣa* vitality *āyuh* [sic], and so on; therefore it is known that there is an *ātman*. And again, because (of the necessity of the existence of) a place where desire and hatred, joy and sorrow, and the intelligence might adhere, the *ātman* is really existent.'" Translation Tucci 1929: *19–*20 (quoted without the Chinese characters). On the Vaiśeṣika position, see below, §0.2.2. and fn. 82, p. 20.

⁷⁵ PV 2.199ad₁: *satkāyadr̥ṣṭer vīgamād ādya evābhavo bhavet / mārge cet sahajāhāner na [...] //*. "[Objection:] Non-[re]existence (*abhava*) [i.e., liberation from *saṃsāra*,] should occur [already] on the initial path [i.e., on the path of vision], for the false view of a self[, which is the cause of the connection to a new birth,] ceases [at that time. Answer:] No, because [at that time] one does not rid oneself of the innate [false view of a self]." See also PV 2.200 and PVP D85b1–2/P98a5–7.

The speculative [personalistic false view] arises from [one's] thinking about (**cint-*?) [religio-philosophical] treatises (**śāstra*), etc. As for the innate [personalistic false view], it arises from a beginningless impregnation (**anādivāsanā*) [...] The one that arises from a beginningless impregnation can only be eliminated by the path of [mental] cultivation.⁷⁶

Now, a Buddhist philosopher is certainly not in a position to uproot the innate *satkāyadr̥ṣṭi* in any other mental stream (something even *buddhas* cannot do). But what he *can* do, and is actually concerned with, is to refute the various expressions of the speculative personalistic belief, which leads the world astray. And together with the Naiyāyikas and the Buddhist personalists, Yaśomitra's Sāṅkhyas and Vaiśeṣikas are precisely the target of Dharmakīrti's arguments against the self. This is what the present book is about.

0.2.2. According to the conclusive stanza of PV 1, the belief in an eternal self that would be the agent of good and bad deeds is one of the five marks of complete stupidity:⁷⁷

[Believing in the] authority of the Veda, claiming something [permanent] to be an agent,⁷⁸ seeking merit in ablutions, taking pride in one's caste, and undertaking penance to remove sin, these are the five signs of complete stupidity devoid of any discrimination.⁷⁹

⁷⁶ PVṬ Ñe D131b6–7/P162a7–b1: *kun tu brtags pa ni bstan bcos sems pa la sogs pa'i sgo nas byuñ ba'o // lhan cig skyes pa ni thog ma med pa'i bag chags las byuñ ba'o // [...] thog ma med pa'i bag chags las byuñ ba de ni bsgom pa'i lam ñid kyis spañ bar bya ba ñid yin [...] //*

⁷⁷ Complete stupidity, i.e., being devoid of any rational knowledge (*nyāyānusārijñānarahita*), of any knowledge deriving from the force of the means of valid cognition (*pramāṇabalaṃ vijñānam*; PVṬ Ñe D70b5–6/P85a7–8 = PVSVṬ 619,5–7).

⁷⁸ Our interpretation of *kasyacit kartṛvādaḥ* is based on Śākyabuddhi's, who understands *kasyacit* as **ātmāder nityasya* (PVṬ Ñe D70a5/P84b6), thus taking *kartṛ* as "agent" (see below, fn. 80–81, p. 19–20, PV 1.332a and PVS 174,14–16) and supplying a **tva*. Note, however, that Kaṇvakagomin interprets *kasyacit* as *naiyāyikādeḥ* (PVSVṬ 618,18), and *kartṛ* as "creator" (*īśvaras tattvādināṃ karteti*; PVSVṬ 618,18). According to the latter interpretation, *kasyacit kartṛvādaḥ* rather means "someone's claiming that there is a creator [God]."

⁷⁹ PV 1.340: *vedaprāmāṇyaṃ kasyacit kartṛvādaḥ snāne dharmecchā jātivādāvalepaḥ / santāpārambhaḥ pāpāhānāya ceti dhvastaprajñāne pañca liṅgāni jāḍye //*. Translation Eltschinger/Krasser/Taber 2012: 77–78. Having shown, throughout the

Dharmakīrti holds the claim that something permanent is an agent to be rooted in the Veda itself:

[The Veda says that] a permanent soul is the agent [of action].⁸⁰

This he explains as follows in his commentary:

The Veda declares that a soul (*pūṃs*) which neither loses its former nature nor assumes a new one [i.e., which is permanent,] is successively the agent of [good and bad] deeds and the experiencer of the fruits of [those] deeds: [it is supposedly the experiencer] due to being the inherence cause [of pleasant

PVSV, that the outsiders only talk nonsense (*ayuktābhīdhāyitva*), Dharmakīrti concludes the work by pointing out, in a merely indicative way (*dīnāmātram*), the five principal signs of their stupidity (*jāḍya*; compare PVṬ *Ñe* D70a2–3/P84b1–2 with PVSVṬ 618,12–13). That Dharmakīrti alludes to only five signs is a synecdoche (**upalakṣaṇa*), for the signs of the outsiders' stupidity are innumerable (**aprameya*; PVṬ *Ñe* D70b6/P85a8–b1, to be compared with PVSVṬ 619,7–8). For explanations regarding each of the five marks, see Eltschinger/Krasser/Taber 2012, fn. 170–174, pp. 77–78.

⁸⁰ PV 1.332a: *nityasya pūṃsaḥ kartṛtvam*. As Hugo David kindly informs us, the idea that the Veda rather than the Upaniṣads proper teaches the existence of a permanent self is not specific to Dharmakīrti and recurs in Kumārila's writings. This is especially the case of ŚV *sambandhākṣepaparihāra* 102–104, where Kumārila criticises Sāṅkhya ideas on gnosis and liberation: *jñānaṃ mokṣanimittaṃ ca gamyate nendriyādīnā / na ca sāṅkhyādivijñānān mokṣo vedena codyate // ātmā jñātavya ity etan mokṣārthaṃ na ca coditam / karma pravṛttihetutvam ātmajñānasya lakṣyate // vijñāte cāsya pārārthe yāpi nāma phalaśrutiḥ / sārthavādo bhaved eva na svar-gādeḥ phalāntaram //*. "That [discriminating] knowledge is the cause of liberation is not understood by means of the senses[, inference], etc.; nor is it prescribed by the Veda that liberation comes from [discriminating] knowledge [of the self as it is taught] by Sāṅkhya, etc. When it is said that the self is to be known, this is not prescribed for the purpose of liberation. It is indicated [rather] that knowledge of the self is the cause of carrying out [ritual] acts [such as *jyotiṣṭoma*, which bear fruit beyond the present life]. Given that it is for the sake of something else [i.e., the ritual acts], the declaration of its fruit is an *arthavāda*. There is no other fruit [of ritual acts] than heaven, etc." Translation Taber 2007: 178 (slightly modified). As Taber (2007: 160) comments, "only on the basis of an understanding that the self survives the body would one undertake actions whose consequences are to be enjoyed in another world." The passage referred to is likely to be adapted from BĀU 2.4.5. On Kumārila's doctrines of (supreme) self and liberation in the ŚV, the *Tantravārttika*, the *Tupṭikā* and the *Brhaṭṭikā*, see Mesquita 1994, Taber 2007 and Yoshimizu (Kiyotaka) 2007.

and unpleasant sensations,] and [the agent] due to assuming the control [of bodily actions], etc. And this has repeatedly been shown to be incorrect.⁸¹

Although it does not adduce any argument against the self, this passage deserves closer examination.

Here, Dharmakīrti is more likely to criticise Vaiśeṣika (and Naiyāyika) ideas than the Veda itself. Consider the Vaiśeṣika's classic statement regarding the inference of the self:

The marks of the self are breathing up and down, closing and opening [the eyes], life, the movements of the mental organ, and the transformations of the other sense organs; pleasure and pain; desire and aversion; and effort.⁸²

Now, Praśastapāda seems to divide these inferential marks into two categories: those that allow one to infer the self as a controlling agent (*adhiṣṭhātṛ*), and those that are the marks of a property-possessor (*guṇin*), i.e., an inherence cause.⁸³ Here are Praśastapāda's remarks as regards the first inference:

⁸¹ PVSV 174,14–16: *apracūṭānūpannapūrvāpararūpaḥ pumān kartā krameṇa karmaṇām karmaphalānām ca bhoktā samavāyikāraṇādhiṣṭhānabhāvādinety āha vedāḥ / tac cāyuktam ity āveditaprāyam /*. For Kaṇvakagomin's (PVSV 611,7–12) and Śākyabuddhi's (PVT Ñe D64b3–6/P77b1–5) diverging commentaries on this passage, see Eltschinger/Krasser/Taber 2012, fn. 135, pp. 65–68.

⁸² VSū 3.2.4: *prāṇāpānanimēṣonmeṣajīvanamanogatīndriyāntaravikārāḥ sukhaduḥkha icchādveṣau prayatnaś cety ātmaliṅgāni /*. On this *sūtra* see, e.g., Preisendanz 1994: 263–274 and Oetke 1988: 319–322 and 334–340.

⁸³ The concept of inherence cause (*samavāyikāraṇa*) is at home in Vaiśeṣika, as is the description of the self as a *samavāyikāraṇa*. On *samavāyikāraṇa* in general, see VSū 1.1.14 and DPŚ 91 (Miyamoto 2007: 26); on *samavāya* and *samavāyikāraṇa* in connection with the self, see VSū 10.1 and especially DPŚ 10 (Miyamoto 2007: 10): **ka ātmā / yo buddhisukhaḍuḥkhecchādveṣaprayatnasamskāradharmādharmāṇām samavāyikāraṇam jñānotpādanalakṣaṇam sa evātmā /*. “What is the self? The self is that which is the inherence cause of cognition, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, effort, residual traces, merit and demerit, [and that which is] characterized as producing cognition.” Read in the light of Devendrabuddhi's, Śākyabuddhi's and Manoranandin's commentaries, PV 2.63–72 presents interesting materials in connection with the critique of the Vaiśeṣika conception of the self and its function as a *samavāyikāraṇa* (on this passage and the identity of Dharmakīrti's opponent[s], see Franco's detailed discussion in Franco 1994 and 1997: 133–155). These stanzas occur right in the middle of Dharmakīrti's lengthy polemics against the Materialist's reduction of the mind (*citta*, *caitanya*) to a property (*dharma*) of the four material

elements (*[mahā]bhūta*). Here, the Materialist attempts to prove that the relationship which obtains between the elements and the mind is one of support and supported (*āśrayāśrayibhāva*, also *ādhāryādhārabhāva*): the material elements are the support while the mind (or: cognition) is the supported entity. Dharmakīrti opens this new part of his critique on the following six stanzas (PV 2.63–68, translated on the basis of Devendrabuddhi's and Śākyabuddhi's commentaries [PVP D31b4–33a6/P35b5–37b3, PVT Ñe D101b5–103a5/P124a8–126a4]): *anāśrayāt sadasator nāśrayaḥ sthitikāraṇam / sataś ced āśrayo nāsyāḥ sthātur avyatiṛekataḥ // vyatiṛeke 'pi taddhetus tena bhāvasya kiṃ kṛtam / avināśaprasaṅgaḥ sa nāśahetor mato yadi // tulyaḥ prasaṅgaḥ tatrāpi kiṃ punaḥ sthitihetunā / ā nāśakāgamāt sthānaṃ tataś ced vastudharmatā // nāśasya saty abādho 'sāv iti kiṃ sthitihetunā / yathā jalāder ādhāra iti cet tulyam atra ca // pratikṣaṇavināśe hi bhāvānāṃ bhāvasantateḥ / tathotpatteḥ sa hetutvād āśrayo 'yuktam anyathā // syād ādhāro jalādīnāṃ gamanapratibandhataḥ / agatīnāṃ kim ādhārair guṇasāmānyakarmaṇām //*. “For neither what exists nor what does not exist [can] have a support. Objection: No, [for] a support is the cause of the duration of an [already] existing [thing, and hence existing things do have a support. Answer: This agent of an entity's duration can]not [be] the support [of an already existing entity] because this [duration] is not distinct from the agent of duration. [And] even if [duration] were distinct [from the agent of duration, it would have to be] the cause of this [duration]. What does [then] this [agent of duration] cause to the entity [itself, so that it can be regarded as its support]? [Moreover,] it [would] follow that [the supported entity, i.e., the mind,] would not be destroyed [at any time. And] if one accepts that this [destruction] is due to a cause of destruction, the same [undesirable] consequence [will follow] in the case of this [cause of destruction] as well. What [then] can be the use of a cause of duration? [Objection: The entity] lasts thanks to this [agent of duration] until it meets with an agent of destruction. [Answer: But then,] destruction being the [very] nature of the entity, this [destruction will be] unobstructible. Therefore, what can be the use of a cause of duration? Objection: [There is a support,] just as [there is] a sustainer[, like a vessel,] of [really existing things] such as water. [Answer:] But [exactly] the same [as before is to be replied] in this case! For if [real] entities[, which have the property of arising in ever different locations,] perish at every [single] moment, [it is not because it causes water to continue to exist that] this [vessel] is a sustainer[, but] because it is the cause of [the fact that] the series of the entity arises like this [i.e., in the same place as its sustainer. Being a sustainer] cannot be otherwise. [Moreover, a vessel for instance] could [possibly] be the sustainer of [things] like water[, which have the property to flow], because it prevents [them] from moving, [but then,] what about the sustainers of qualities, universals and actions, which are [entirely] devoid of motion?” After this rather dry row of arguments against the *āśrayāśrayibhāva* as a model for the relationship between body and mind (but also against Vaiśeṣika models of the relations obtaining between the categories), Dharmakīrti concludes as follows (PV 2.69): *etena samavāyaś ca samavāyi ca kāraṇam / vyavasthitatvaṃ jātyāder nirastam anapāśrayāt //*. “With this [refutation of the *āśrayāśrayibhāva*], inherence, the inherence

cause and the fixity of [things] like classes are [*ipso facto*] discarded, because [as we have just shown,] there [can] be no support(/substratum)." In other words, Vaiśeṣika ontology relies on relations that do not stand criticism, for according to both Devendrabuddhi (PVP D33a6-7/P37b4) and Śākyabuddhi (PVT *Ñe* D103a5-6/P126a5), inherence amounts to nothing but an *āśrayāśrayibhāva* between things that are established inseparately, such as substances and qualities (*apṛthaksiddha*, *ayutasiddha*; PVT *Ñe* D103a5/P126a4-5, Vibh. 36, fn. 1; cf. PDhS 86,2-3: *ayutasiddhānām ādhāryādhārabhūtānām yaḥ sambandha ihapratyayaheṭuḥ sa samavāyaḥ* / "Inherence is the [necessary] condition for the cognition 'here' regarding things that are established inseparately [and] stand in a relationship of sustainer and sustained." Translation Franco 1997: 318). Now if the *āśrayāśrayibhāva* is dismissed, the Vaiśeṣika conception of the self as the *samavāyikāraṇa* of its qualities pleasure, pain and cognition is bound to crumble, and such is the purport of the commentators' explanations on PV 2.69. According to Devendrabuddhi (PVP D33a7/P37b4), Śākyabuddhi (PVT *Ñe* D103a6/P126a5-6) and Manorathanandin (PVV 36,6-7), Dharmakīrti's allusion to the inherence cause targets (pseudo-)entities such as the non-Buddhists' *ātman* in their relationship with pleasure, pain (**sukhaduḥkhādi*, PVT) and cognitions (*buddhyādi*, PVV). The gist of the critique appears in PV 2.65c: things (such as the Vaiśeṣika qualities of the self or the Materialist's mind) possessing a permanent support (the self or the material elements) will have no end. (For explanations of *jātyāder vyavasthitatvam*, see PVP D33a7/P37b4, PVT *Ñe* D103a7/P126a6-7 and PVV 36,7-8; according to PVP D33a7-b1/P37b5-6, "etc." refers to relationships such as the *dharmadharmin* relation, the mind's dependence on the material elements, etc.; interestingly enough, Śākyabuddhi finds his "Vaibhāṣika coreligionists" [*raṇ gi sde pa bye brag tu smra ba rnams*] guilty of the same kind of error). In PV 2.70-72, Dharmakīrti summarizes the previous discussion as follows (translated according to PVP D33b2-34a2/P37b7-38a8 and PVT *Ñe* D103b1-104a2/P126a8-b1-127a3): *parato bhāvanāśaś cet tasya kiṃ sthithetunā / sa vinaśyed vināpy anyair aśaktāḥ sthithetavaḥ // sthitimān sāsrayaḥ sarvaḥ sarvotpat-tā ca sāsrayaḥ / tasmāt sarvasya bhāvasya na vināśaḥ kadācana // svayaṃ vinaśvarātmā cet tasya kaḥ sthāpakaḥ paraḥ / svayaṃ na naśvarātmā cet tasya kaḥ sthāpakaḥ paraḥ //*. "[To sum up:] if an entity owed its destruction to [something] else[, then it would last as long as the cause of its destruction is not present; under such circumstances], what would be the use of an [extraneous] cause of its duration [that would serve no purpose]? And were this [entity] to perish [by itself,] without [the intervention of] other [entities, then it would perish in any case, and] the [alleged] causes of [its] duration [would] lack any efficacy. [Moreover,] all that which possesses a support possesses duration, and all that which arises possesses a support. Therefore, no entity [would] ever perish. If [an entity] is of a transient nature in itself[, then, since it does not depart from this nature, it will perish by itself; under such circumstances,] which other [entity could] cause it to continue to exist? [But] if [this entity] is not of a transient nature in itself[, then it will last by itself; under such circumstances,] which other [entity could] cause it to continue to exist?" According to Devendrabuddhi, Śākyabuddhi, Manorathanandin and Vibhūti-

candra (see the references below), PV 2.71 must be interpreted at least partly as a critique of Ātmavādin (especially Vaiśeṣika) conceptions, and this along the same line of argument as above: if cognition, pleasure and pain have the permanent self as their support (or *samavāyikāraṇa*), then they should never cease to exist (the objection of course applies to the Materialist who holds the four material elements to be permanent: if the mind is a property of the elements, then it should last forever [see PVP D33b7/P38a5–6 and Vibh. 37, fn. 2]). PVP D33b5–7/P38a3–5 makes explicit the complex structure of PV 2.71 as follows: *ñnos po 'ga' žig skye ba dan ldan pa gañ yin pa de ni kun rten bcas yin par 'dod pa des na / re žig bdag la brten pa'i bde ba la sogs pa* (D : P *pa'i*) *gañ dag yin pa'i rten rtag pa de dag ni rtag tu gnas par byed pa dan ma bral ba'i phyir 'jig pa med pa ñid yin no //^a gañ dag gi* (D : P *gis*) *yañ mi rtag pa ñid rten yin na de'i yañ gžan dan de'i yañ gžan* (P : D *gžan ma*) *yin pa de ltar na / rdul phra rab rtag pa'i bar du^b rten yin pa'i phyir rtag tu gnas pa ñid du 'gyur ro^c //*. [^a Cf. PVP 36,20–21: *tatra yo nāma kaścin nityāśrayo yathā sukhādir ātmāśritaḥ sarvaḥ sa nityaṃ sthitimān syāt sthāpakaḥ sadā sthiteḥ* /.^b Cf. Vibh. 36, fn. 6: *yo nāmānityāśrayas tasyāpy anyo yāvan nityāḥ paramāṇava ity āha* /.^c Cf. Vibh. 37, fn. 1: *iti nityam eva sthitiḥ*.] “It is accepted that all entities that have arising possess a support, [and] thus: to begin with (**tāvat*), those [entities] that possess a permanent support (**nityāśraya*) – [like] pleasure, etc. (**sukhādi*), which rely on the self (**ātmāśrita?*) – [will] not perish, because they are never without [something] that causes [them] to last (**sthāpaka*). As for those [entities that, like pots,^a] possess an impermanent support (**anityāśraya*), this [impermanent] support also has another [entity] for its support, and the [latter] another, and so [on] up to the permanent atoms (**paramāṇu*); therefore, [they too] will always continue [to exist].” ^a According to PVT Ñe D103b6/P126b6–7 (*gañ dag gi žes bya ba ni gzugs la sogs pa'i'o //*). ^b Note PVT Ñe D103b6–104a1/P126b7–127a1 (to be compared with PVP 36,22–37,2, translated in Franco 1997: 320–321): *de'i yañ gžan dan de'i yañ gžan yin pa žes bya ba ni re žig bum pa'i yan lag can gyi tha ma'i gyo mo rten yin žiñ de dag gi yañ rañ ñid kyi rtsom pa yin la de dag gi yañ rañ ñid rtsom pa po gžan yin pa de ltar na yan lag can rdul gñis kyi bar du'o // de'i yañ rdul phra rab rtag pa'i bar du rten yin no // de bas na re žig rdul gñis pa ni rtag tu gnas pa yin žiñ / de'i stobs kyi des brtsams dan / bum pa la sogs pa'i yan lag can gyi* (P : D *gyis*) *mthar thug pa'i bar du'o //*. “This [impermanent] support also has another [entity] for its support, and the [latter] another,’ i.e.: to begin with (**tāvat*), the last gross part (Tib. *gyo mo* probably = Skt. *kapāla*, pot-half?) of the whole (**avayavin*) consisting in a pot is a support; this [support] too has [a support, i.e., the parts] which aggregate [so as to constitute] it (**svātmany ārambhakaḥ/svārambhakaḥ?*), and the latter, another [i.e., the parts that in turn] aggregate [so as to constitute] it, and so [on.] up to the atomic dyad (**dvyaṇuka*), and this [atomic dyad] in turn has the permanent atoms (**paramāṇu*) [for its] support. Therefore, first the atomic dyad lasts forever, and thanks to it, [the wholes] resulting from the aggregation of the [parts] (**tadārab-dha?*), and [this] up to, finally, the whole [that consists in] a pot, etc. (**ghaṭadyava-yavin*).” The translation of this passage is tentative.

[The self] is inferred [as] the body's controlling agent endowed with effort from the undertaking [of action] and abstaining [from it], which inhere in the body [and] are suitable for obtaining what is useful and rejecting what is harmful, just as a charioteer [is inferred] from the action of the chariot. And [the self is also inferred thus] through breath, etc.⁸⁴

As for his views regarding the second inference, they are as follows:

And [the self] is inferred [as] a property-possessor from the properties that are pleasure, pain, desire, aversion and effort.⁸⁵

Thus, whereas the first inference ($\rightarrow adhiṣṭhātr$) seems to be concerned with the self as an agent inasmuch as it presides over bodily actions, the second one ($\rightarrow guṇin$, i.e., *samavāyikāraṇa*⁸⁶) seems to deal with the self as an experiencer inasmuch as it experiences pleasure and pain, but also – and this has eschatological consequences – merit and demerit (*dharmādharma*).⁸⁷ In other words, the self is an agent in that it controls bodily action, and an experiencer in that it is the inherence cause of pleasant and unpleasant sensations as well as merit and demerit.⁸⁸ And according to Karṇakagomin's commentary on PVSV 174,14–16, the doctrine alluded to by Dharmakīrti is summarized in Śāntarakṣita's TS as follows:

However, others admit that the self is the substratum of desire, etc., while not consisting of consciousness by itself, that it is permanent and omnipresent, that it is the agent of acts [both] good and bad, and the experiencer of the fruit of these [acts, and finally] that it is conscious due to its association with consciousness, but not by nature. Its connection with cognition, effort, etc., is

⁸⁴ PDhS 15,8–10: *śarīrasamavāyinībhyāṃ ca hitāhitaprāptiparihārayogyābhyāṃ pravṛttinivṛttibhyāṃ rathakarmaṇā sārathivat prayatnavān vighrahasyādhiṣṭhātānumīyate prāṇādibhiś ceti* /. See Oetke 1988: 279 (arguments no. 3 and 4).

⁸⁵ PDhS 16,3–4: *sukhaduḥkhecchādveṣaprayatnaiś ca guṇair guṇy anumīyate* /. See Oetke 1988: 280 (argument no. 9). To be compared with NSū 1.1.10: *icchādveṣaprayatnasukhaduḥkhajñānāny ātmano liṅgam* /. "The marks of the self are desire, aversion, effort, pleasure, pain [and] cognitions."

⁸⁶ See VSū 1.1.5 and VSū 1.1.14.

⁸⁷ See PDhS 16,7–8 and DPŚ 10, quoted above, fn. 83, p. 20.

⁸⁸ Interestingly enough, the author of the commentary on Āryadeva's ŚŚ seems to be already familiar with this twofold division of VSū 3.2.4. See above, fn. 74, p. 17.

called its agency; whereas the inherence of the awareness of pleasure, pain and so on [in the self] is [its] being an experiencer.⁸⁹

In his short rebuttal of these conceptions (PVSV 174,16), Dharmakīrti declares that the agency of permanent entities has already been refuted several times.⁹⁰ This, however, raises an interesting question.

⁸⁹ TS 171–173: *anye punar ihātmānam icchādīnām samāśrayam / svato 'cidrūpam icchanti nityam sarvagataṃ tathā // śubhāśubhānām kartāraṃ karmaṇām tatphalasya ca / bhoktāraṃ cetanāyogāc cetanaṃ na svarūpataḥ // jñānayatnādisambandhaḥ karṭṛtvam tasya bhānyate / sukhaduḥkhādisamvittisamavāyas tu bhoktṛtā //*. Here is Prajñākaramati's introduction to TS 171–172, which he also quotes (BCAP_{Sh} 327,7–13/BCAP_{LVP} 295,17–23): *tatra naiyāyikās tāvan nityam^a sarvagataṃ pratiprāṇibhinnaṃ^b cetanāyogāt tu cetanaṃ sukhādiguṇādhāraṃ śubhāśubhakarmakartāraṃ tatphalopabhoktāraṃ paralokinaṃ cātmānam icchanti / naiyāyikavad vaiśeṣikā api / tad uktam / . [^a nityam BCAP_{LVP} : nitya° BCAP_{Sh}. ^b pratiprāṇibhinnaṃ acetanaṃ BCAP_{LVP} : pratiprāṇibhinnaacetanaṃ BCAP_{Sh}.]* “In this regard, first of all the Naiyāyikas admit that the self is permanent, omnipresent, distinct according to each living being, not conscious [by nature] and yet conscious because of [its] association with consciousness; [it is] the substratum of the properties that are pleasure, etc., the agent of actions [whether] good or bad, the experiencer of the fruit of these [actions], and it transmigrates to another world. As the Naiyāyikas, the Vaiśeṣikas too [admit this]; this has been said [in the following two stanzas].” As we can see, both Śāntarakṣita and Prajñākaramati hold these ideas to be common to Naiyāyikas and Vaiśeṣikas. On the self as *adhiṣṭhātṛ*, see also ŚV *ātmavāda* 76 (Oetke 1988: 434), SK 17b_{2c}, and the Sāṅkhya *pūrvapakṣa* quoted above, fn. 74, p. 17.

⁹⁰ All the non-Buddhist schools targetted by Dharmakīrti acknowledge the permanence (*nityatā*) of the self. For Mīmāṃsā, see ŚV *ātmavāda* 7ac₁ and 20–21 (Oetke 1988: 425); for Sāṅkhya, see SK 3d; for Vaiśeṣika, see DPŚ 95 (Miyamoto 2007: 27) and PDhS 3,15–17; for Nyāya, see NSū 3.1.18–26. Note that certain Buddhist Pudgalavādins (Haimavatas?) who were neither Vātsīputrīyas nor Sāṃmitīyas admitted the permanence of the *pudgala*. See, e.g., the following excerpt from the SNŚ (463c23–25): “In the opinion of these schools, the Buddha spoke of attaining the unshakeable happiness [in *parinirvāṇa*] and so the person is eternal. Since the person attains the unshakeable happiness and has no aggregates, the person dwells beyond the possibility of knowledge; therefore the person is eternal.” Translation Priestley 1999: 41. Note that according to the Vātsīputrīyas and the Sāṃmitīyas, “the *pudgala* is neither eternal nor subject to annihilation, since it is neither the same as the aggregates nor different from them” (Priestley 1999: 41). That Dharmakīrti was alluding here to the two *vināśitvānumānas* (“inference [of momentariness in the sense] of [causeless] annihilation”) of his PVSV (98,4–100,24 and 141,17–150,5) is very unlikely (on the *vināśitvānumāna*, see Steinkellner 1968: 363–369 and Rospatt 1995: 178–195). Indeed, the *vināśitvānumāna* type of the proof of

Śākyabuddhi and Karṇakagomin explain that this idea has already been discarded by the *śāstrakāra* himself – Dharmakīrti – and by his coreligionists (*svayūthya*).⁹¹ Now, the argument against the causal efficacy of permanent entities is the so-called inference of momentariness from the mere fact of existence (*sattvānumāna*), which Dharmakīrti introduces first in PVin 2, i.e., after the PVSV.⁹² Does, then, Dharmakīrti refer to earlier remarks of his discarding the agency of permanent entities, to ideas elaborated by his coreligionists, or to both? Be it with regard to the Vaiśeṣika's universals (*sāmānya*) or to the Mīmāṃsā's notion of a Vedic sound (*śabda*), Dharmakīrti emphasizes time and again,

momentariness (*kṣaṇikatva*, *kṣaṇabhāṅgitva*), which was developed for purely intra-Buddhistic needs (see Sakai 2010: 23–24), only demonstrates that whatever is produced (*kṛtaka*) by causes and conditions (*hetupratyaya*) is not only impermanent (*anitya*), but also necessarily momentary (*kṣaṇika*). This proof is, however, incapable of proving that whatever *exists* (*sat*) – including that which is not empirically seen to be subject to annihilation (*vināśa*) – is momentary. And this is the task of the *sattvānumāna*. To wit: to exist amounts to be causally efficient (*arthakriyāsamārtha*; see, e.g., PV 1.166ab and PV 3.3ab); now, momentary entities alone are causally efficient, for a non-momentary (*akṣaṇika*) entity (say, the self) is incapable of bringing about an effect either gradually (*krameṇa*) or at one time (*yugapadyena*); therefore, non-momentary entities do not exist. On the *sattvānumāna*, see below, and fn. 92.

⁹¹ See PVT Ā D64b6/P77b6–7 and PVSVT 611,17.

⁹² PVin 2 80,1–6: *na hi tasyākṣaṇikasyārthakriyā sambhavati / kramayaugapadyavirodhāt / akramah / anapekṣasya kartuḥ svasattāmātreṇa kṣepāyogāt / prāḡ akartuḥ paścād api svabhāvāparāvṛtteḥ / apekṣāyām cōktam / nāpi yugapatkriyā / tatsva-bhāvasya paścād apy akriyāyogāt / tad ayaṃ bhāvo nivṛttasarvasāmarthyah sattā-lakṣaṇam atipatati /*. “For such a non-momentary [thing] cannot have any causal efficacy, since [its efficacy] is contradictory [whether it is regarded as occurring] gradually or simultaneously. [It can]not [be efficacious] gradually, because [if it is] an agent that does not depend [on cooperative causes but acts] due to its mere existence, [it] cannot remain [inefficacious; but if it is] not an agent previously, [it cannot become an agent] later either, since no change [can occur] in its nature; and [we] have [already] explained [that it is impossible as well] if [it] depends on [other cooperative causes]. Nor is it efficacious simultaneously, since the nature of this [once efficacious entity] cannot be[come] inefficacious later. Therefore this [pseudo-]entity that is devoid of any efficacy does not fit with the definition of existence.” Translation (modified) Yoshimizu 1999: 234–235. See also HB II.145, n. 107, Steinkellner 1968: 373, Oetke 1993: 27, Rospatt 1995: 162, fn. 362. On the development of the *vināśītvānumāna* into the *sattvānumāna*, see Steinkellner 1968 and Sakai 2010: 22–43; on the structure of Dharmakīrti's *sattvānumāna*, see Oetke 1993. See also above, fn. 90, p. 25, in fine.

in the PV, that permanent entities like these cannot produce anything without undergoing *change*, i.e., without *ipso facto* losing their permanence.⁹³ This is likely to be at least one among Dharmakīrti's intentions in PVSV 174,16. However, as pointed out first by Nagatomi and demonstrated by Yoshimizu,⁹⁴ the basic structure of Dharmakīrti's *sattvānumāna* is already to be found in early Sarvāstivāda, Sautrāntika and Yogācāra texts, especially in the context of the refutation of a permanent God's creation. But in the same important contribution, Yoshimizu has also drawn attention to an interesting passage of Vasubandhu's KSP, where a proof strategy that clearly foreshadows Dharmakīrti's *sattvānumāna* is used *in order to refute a permanent self*.⁹⁵ This passage, which Dharmakīrti may well have had in mind, runs as follows:

⁹³ On the negation of the permanent Vedic words' efficiency in PV 1 and PVSV, see PVSV 117,15–16, PV 1.252cd (together with PVSV 131,16–21), PVSV 136,13–16; on that of the permanent universal, see PVSV 73,7–11; more generally, see Eltschinger 2007: 189–196. On Dharmakīrti's refutation of the permanent Vedic words' causal efficiency in PVin 2 67,6–9, see Steinkellner 1979: 67–68 and Yoshimizu 1999: 234–235, fn. 11. A somewhat similar argument can be found in the MPPU (149a12–14): “Si l'Ātman était éternel, il ne pourrait éprouver ni douleur (*duḥkha*) ni bonheur (*sukha*). Pourquoi? Quand la douleur survient, on s'attriste, et, quand le bonheur arrive, on se réjouit. Mais ce qui est modifié (*vikṛta*) par la tristesse et la joie n'est pas éternel.” Translation *Traité* II.742.

⁹⁴ See Nagatomi 1967: 64–69 and Yoshimizu 1999: 231–243. On early Yogācāra (YBhū, ŚrBhū) refutations of a permanent God, see Chemparathy 1968 and Yoshimizu 1999: 242–243, fn. 23.

⁹⁵ Note that the issue of the causality of permanent entities had already been touched upon in the MSA(Bh)'s critique of the *pudgala*. Suffice it to quote here MSA 18.99–100: *akarṭṛtvād anityatvāt sakṛnnityapravṛttitaḥ / darśanādiṣu yatnasya svayambhūtvam na yujyate / tathāsthitasya naṣṭasya prāgabdhāvād anityataḥ / tṛtīyapakṣābhāvāc ca pratyayatvam na yujyate* //. “Because the [*pudgala*] would no [longer] be an agent, because [its exertion] is impermanent, [and] because [exertion] would occur [all] at once [and] permanently, [this *pudgala*'s] effort in order to see [visible things], etc., cannot be self-arisen. Neither a [*pudgala*] that [always] remains as it is nor a perishable [*pudgala*] can be the [causal] condition [of the exertion aimed at producing seeing, etc., and this for three reasons:] because [this exertion] does not exist before[, hence cannot be due to a permanent cause]; because [this *pudgala*] would [*ipso facto*] be impermanent; and because there is no third hypothesis [i.e., the hypothesis of a *pudgala* that would be neither permanent nor impermanent].” On these stanzas and Vasubandhu's commentary, see Eltschinger 2010a: 320–322. See also below, Chapter 1, §1.2.3, and fn. 201, p. 110.

If certain consciousnesses (*rnam par śes pa*, **vijñāna* [i.e., the six kinds of consciousnesses]) depend on the [self], how do you think the self is their basis? If you say that the arising [of these consciousnesses depends on the self], why [would they] arise gradually (*rim gyis*, **krameṇa*), since no differentiation occurs in the self? If you say that [they arise gradually] since [the self] depends on other cooperative causes (*lhan cig byed pa'i rgyu*, **sahakārihetu*), how do you understand that [the self, which is] other than these [cooperative causes], has the ability to make these [consciousnesses arise]? [Rather, the cooperative causes must have this ability.] If, then, you say that the lasting existence (*'dug pa*, **sthiti*) [of these consciousnesses] depends on the [self], what [sort of] lasting existence is possible with regard to these [consciousnesses] that cannot remain after having arisen and [yet] do not fall [i.e., are not unstable] (*ltuñ ba mayin pa*)?⁹⁶

As we can see, this is exactly the kind of critique that, anticipating the universalisation of the argument in PVin 2, Dharmakīrti might have referred to in PVSV 174,16. Besides, Dharmakīrti himself alludes several times to the causality of permanent entities in the context of an argument against a permanent self:⁹⁷

⁹⁶ KSP D143b3–5/P166b4–6, as quoted in Yoshimizu 1999: 236–237, fn. 18: *rnam par śes pa rnams ci źig de la rag lus na / gañ gis na bdag de'i rten du rtog / gal te skye ba yin no źe na / bdag la ni khyad par du 'gyur ba med na / ci'i phyir rim gyis 'byuñ / gal te lhan cig byed pa'i rgyu gźan la ltos pa'i phyir ro źe na / de dag las gźan pa la de skyed pa'i nus pa yod par ji ltar khoñ du chud / 'on te 'dug pa źig de la rag las pa yin no źe na / skyes nas mi gnas pa dag dañ / ltuñ ba ma yin pa dag la 'dug pa ci źig yod / de bas na rten de 'dra ba'i rdzas ni mi 'dod do //*. Translation (modified) Yoshimizu 1999: 236. As Yoshimizu (1999: 235–236) makes clear, the KSP accepts the existence of a seventh *vijñāna*, the *ālayavijñāna* which it defines as the receptacle of the seeds of all *dharma*s (*chos thams cad kyi sa bon gyi gźi*; see Schmithausen 1987: II.275, fn. 138). Vasubandhu's argument is directed against an Ātmavādin opponent claiming that the self (**ātman*) is the basis of the six consciousnesses, not the *ālayavijñāna* (KSP D143a7/P166a7–8: *'o na ci'i phyir bdag gi rdzas ñid rnam par śes pa drug gi rten du mi 'dod ce na /*. “Why, then, don't you accept the very substantial [existence] of the self [*bdag*, **ātman*] as the basis of the six consciousnesses?” Translation Yoshimizu 1999: 236). For an analysis of this passage, see Yoshimizu 1999: 235–243. For Sumatīśīla's commentary on this passage, see Yoshimizu 1999: 239–241, fn. 22.

⁹⁷ As PVP D86a6/P99a6 testifies: *gźan yañ bdag ñid kyi 'chiñ ba dañ thar pa ni yod pa ma yin no //*. “Moreover, a [permanent] self has neither bondage nor liberation.”

[There can be neither bondage nor liberation for something permanent.] Being the cause of the arising of suffering is [what we call] “bondage”: [since what is permanent is devoid of the capacity to bring about anything,⁹⁸] how [could this belong] to [something] permanent? [And] being the cause of the non-arising of suffering is [what we call] “liberation”: how [could this belong] to [something] permanent?⁹⁹

And as we shall see, the causality of supposedly permanent entities forms the background of two among the arguments that will be dealt with in detail below: first, Dharmakīrti's symmetric claim that the *pud-gala* can be the agent neither of bondage nor of liberation;¹⁰⁰ second, his claim that the very permanence of the self contradicts its being an agent of psychophysical actions and an experiencer of their results.¹⁰¹

0.2.3. In the inference, “Whatever exists (*sat*, i.e., is causally efficacious) is momentary (*kṣaṇika*),” demonstrating that a non-momentary entity such as the self cannot produce an effect either gradually or at one time (i.e., lacks causal efficacy) served to negate the possibility that a non-momentary entity may exist. In technical terms, this demonstration is a (means of) valid cognition negating/excluding (the presence of the logical reason) in the contrary (of the property to be proved) (*[sādhya]* *[viparyaye bādhakapramāṇam*, VN 2,1 and 6). In other words, none of the dissimilar instances can be considered to exist, and this is the function of Dharmakīrti's *sattvānumāna*.¹⁰² Consider, now, the following inference: “Whatever is produced (*kṛtaka*) is selfless (*nirātma-ka*).”¹⁰³ How to establish that nothing of what can be assumed as a

⁹⁸ According to PVP D86a7/P99a7 (*'ga' zig la yañ nus pa med pa'i phyir*).

⁹⁹ PV 2.202: *duḥkhotpādanahetutvaṃ bandho nityasya tat kutaḥ / aduḥkhotpādahetutvaṃ mokṣo nityasya tat kutaḥ //*. Note PVP D86b2–3/P99b2–3: *de dag ni rañ gi sde pa bstan bcos mdzad pa gzan gyis mañ du bśad zin pa'i phyir ma spros so //*. “Since the [impossibility, for permanent entities, to bring about their effect] has [already] been dealt with extensively by other coreligionists (**svayūthya*) who have authored treatises (**śāstrakāra*) [on that topic?], we won't expatiate [upon it here].”

¹⁰⁰ See below, Chapter 1, §1.2.3. This argument follows immediately upon PV 2.202 (see above, fn. 99).

¹⁰¹ See below, Chapter 2, §2.4.

¹⁰² See above, §0.2.2.

¹⁰³ See PVT *Ñe* D17a7–b1/P19a6–7: *gañ byas pa de ni bdag med pa ñid yin no zes bya ba la sogs pa'i sbyor ba la byas pa ñid la sogs pa'i gtan tshigs kyis bdag med pa ñid*

dissimilar instance (i.e., entities provided with a self, *sātmaka*) exists? This is what Dharmakīrti seems to be up to in a rather intricate passage of his PVSV on PV 1.291. To put it briefly, Dharmakīrti attempts to show that the Ātmavādins' self does not meet the conditions required of a self, i.e., owing its existence to itself alone (*svato bhāvaḥ*, as the Mādhyamika would say), and not to something else (*parato bhāvaḥ*). In other words, the non-Buddhists' self lacks independence or autonomy (*svātantrya*).¹⁰⁴ And why so? Because its control over both action (*kriyā*) and experience (*bhoga*), i.e., its being an agent and an experiencer, ruins its autonomy by making it dependent (*paravaśa*) on a series of causes that enable it to act and experience (e.g., as regards action: desire, which in turn depends on an object previously experienced as pleasurable, etc.; and as regards experience, the object experienced, as well as the internal organ that grasps it, etc.). In other words, the self is *produced* anew by every successive phase of its action and experience. Thus as it is defined by the Ātmavādins, the self turns out to be simply... selfless (*nirātman*). And if even the self is selfless in that it is produced, it can be safely concluded that the logical reason "being produced" is pervaded by the property "selflessness." Here is the passage under consideration:

[But it is] not so [in the case of] selflessness, etc., [i.e., selflessness, etc., are not a mere absence,]¹⁰⁵ because [they] are a specific nature [of real things].

rtogs pa [...] // . "In the argument (**prayoga*): 'What[ever] is produced is selfless' (**yat kṛtakam tan nirātmakam eva?*), one cognizes selflessness (**nirātmya*) through a [logical] reason (**hetu*) such as 'being produced' (**kṛtakatva*)."

¹⁰⁴ On the self's lack of autonomy, see *Traité* II.743, where *svātantrya* is meant in a moral rather than ontological sense. The locus classicus regarding the self's lacking autonomy and hence not being a genuine self is SN III.66–68 (*Anattalakkhaṇa Sutta*, traditionally held to be the Buddha's second discourse); see also MN I.230–231 (*Cūlasaccaka Sutta*). On these passages, see Collins 1982: 97. Note PVSVṬ 274,9–10: *ātmaśabdo 'pi kvacid arthe svatantrasya khyāpanāya kṛtaḥ*. "As for the word 'self' (*ātmaśabdo 'pi*), it is coined in order to express [something] autonomous with regard to a certain effect." Note also PVSVṬ 274,13–14: *tathā hi svatantreṇātmādinā yo 'dhīṣṭhitaḥ sa sasvāmikaḥ parair iṣyate* /. "For [our Ātmavādin] opponents admit that what is controlled by an autonomous self, etc., possesses a ruler/owner."

¹⁰⁵ I.e., are not **virahamātralakṣaṇāḥ* (PVṬ Ñe D17a1/P18b6), or *viraharūpāḥ* (PVSVṬ 548,17–18).

Indeed, the self¹⁰⁶ [that you acknowledge is] not independent in the control over [good and bad] deeds and the experience [of their pleasant and unpleasant results,¹⁰⁷ and hence] is selfless (*nirātman*), for [being a genuine] self is characterized by independence with regard to the [appropriation of deeds and experience]. Therefore selflessness, [which is] a [real] nature, is not the mere absence of a self [that is nothing, like a hare's horn]. Otherwise, [i.e., if selflessness were the mere absence of a self, it would be totally indeterminate.¹⁰⁸ Now,] since [a logical reason] such as "being produced [by causes and conditions]"¹⁰⁹ could not [apply] to [something] indeterminate, there would be no proof of selflessness through it. [But there is one, and this is the reason why the Buddhist does not accept selflessness to be the mere absence of a self¹¹⁰,]¹¹¹

¹⁰⁶ Here, Dharmakīrti is playing on the two meanings of *ātman* as "self" and "(intrinsic) nature" (see PVT *Ñe* D17a2–3/P18b7–8 = PVSVT 548,20: *ātmā svabhāvaḥ*, and [ad *nirātmanā*] PVT *Ñe* D17a3/P18b8 = PVSVT 548,20: *svabhāvaparyāyo 'trātmaśabdaḥ* /).

¹⁰⁷ Śākyabuddhi and Karṇakagomin interpret *asvatantra* as *paravaśa* (PVT *Ñe* D17a2–3/P18b7–8 = PVSVT 548,20; on *vaśa* [Pali *vasa*], see MN I.231), with a locative case relationship to *kriyābhogādhiṣṭhāna* (*tatra*). *adhiṣṭhāna* is explained as *svīkāra* ("appropriation," PVT *Ñe* D17a2/P18b7 = PVSVT 548,19–20), with a genitive case relationship to *kriyābhoga* (*tayoh*). Karṇakagomin interprets *kriyā* as *śubhāśubha-karaṇam* (PVSVT 548,19). As for *bhoga*, it is explained as *sukhaduḥkhānubhava* (PVT *Ñe* D17a2/P18b7 = PVSVT 548,19; note, e.g., TK 144,1: *sukhaduḥkhānubhavo hi bhogaḥ*).

¹⁰⁸ According to PVT *Ñe* D17a6/P19a4–5 = PVSVT 548,25–26 (*anyathā yadi nirvṛtti-mātram nairātmyam syāt tadā niḥsvabhāvatvān nirupākhyam eva tad bhavet* /). On the indeterminacy of the self, see also MPPU 148c28–149a3: "[L]a vraie nature (*bhūtasvabhāva*) de l'Ātman ne peut être établie avec précision (*niyama*); on ne peut pas établir s'il est éternel (*nitya*) ou transitoire (*anitya*), autonome (*svatantra*) ou non-autonome (*asvatantra*), actif (*kāraka*) ou inactif (*akāraka*), matériel (*rūpin*) ou immatériel (*arūpin*), et autres caractères (*nimitta*) de ce genre. Là où il y a caractère (*nimitta*), il y a réalité (*dharma*), mais, sans caractère, pas de réalité. Puisque l'Ātman n'a pas de caractère, nous savons qu'il n'existe pas." Translation *Traité* II.740.

¹⁰⁹ Here, *ādi* ("such as") refers to logical reasons such as "following immediately upon effort" (*prayatnānantarīyakatvādi*, PVT *Ñe* D17a6–7/P19a5 = PVSVT 548,27–28). These logical reasons are properties of real things (*vastudharma*).

¹¹⁰ According to PVT *Ñe* D17a7–b1/P19a7 (*de bas na saṅs rgyas pa ni med pa tsam gyis bdag med pa la sogs pa bdag med par mi 'dod do* /) and PVSVT 549,6 (*iṣyate ca / tasmān na bauddhasyātmavirahamātram nairātmyam* /). For the first part of Śākyabuddhi's explanation, see above, fn. 103, p. 29.

The passage is also interesting because Dharmakīrti specifies what selflessness is *not*, i.e., the mere absence of a self. In other words, here he is addressing the reproach that in the Nairātmyavāda perspective, one has to realize what turns out to be a mere non-entity. He argues that on the contrary, from the Buddhist point of view, realizing selflessness means becoming aware of an essential feature of reality.¹¹² In order to explain why it is so, Dharmakīrti points out the Ātmavādin's fundamental mistake: his opponent believes in a self understood as a substance, i.e., as a permanent, unchanging and independent entity that he presents as the substratum of experience and karmic results.¹¹³ Contrary to the Ātmavādin's self, the Buddhist selflessness is nothing like a mere non-entity such as a hare's horn (in which case nothing could be proved about it as it would remain perfectly indeterminate apart from its being non-existent): it is an essential component of reality.¹¹⁴

0.2.4. But let us turn back to Dharmakīrti's critique of the Veda. As we shall see below,¹¹⁵ Dharmakīrti's main charge against the self is that it cannot be validly inferred, and that all the proofs put forward by the Veda as well as his Sāṅkhya, Vaiśeṣika, Naiyāyika and Pudgalavādin opponents can be shown to be fallacious. In other words, one cannot conclude to the existence of a self on the basis of an inference functioning by force of something real (*vastubalapravṛtta*) or, better, of an inference that does not depend on scripture (*anāgamāpekṣa*). Thus, these religio-philosophical systems cannot be elected as reliable bases for the rational human beings' religious practice. Dharmakīrti spells this out in a famous passage in which he presents the threefold method al-

¹¹¹ PVSV 154,12–16: *naivam nairātmyādayaḥ / svabhāvaviśeṣāt / kriyābhogādhiṣṭhā-nāsvatanthro hy ātmā nirātmā / tatsvātantryalakṣaṇatvād ātmanaḥ / tad rūpaṃ nair-ātmyaṃ nātmanivṛttimātram / anyathā nirupākhye kṛtakatvādyayogān na tato nair-ātmyasiddhiḥ syāt /*.

¹¹² See above, fn. 33, p. 8, Eltschinger 2009a: 200–207, Eltschinger 2010b: 410–411 and Eltschinger 2010c: 50–55.

¹¹³ See above, §0.2.2.

¹¹⁴ See PVP D108b4–5/P126a2–3 ad PV 2.252 (quoted below, fn. 342, p. 274).

¹¹⁵ See below, Chapter 2, §2.2.

lowing one to hypothesize a treatise's reliability (*avisaṃvāda*) and hence scripturality (*āgamatā*):¹¹⁶

A [treatise]'s reliability consists in the fact that neither perception nor the two kinds of inference invalidate the empirical and transempirical things [that are] their [respective] objects. [A treatise's] not being invalidated by perception consists [first] in the fact that the things it holds to be perceptible are indeed such [i.e., perceptible], as [the five *skandhas*, i.e., colours] such as blue, [affective sensations such as] pleasure and pain, [ideation consisting in one's] grasping the characteristics [of things, conditioning factors] such as desire, and cognitions[, which are perceived by sensory perception and self-awareness. Second, a treatise's not being invalidated by perception consists] in the fact that the [things] it does not hold to be such [i.e., perceptible] are [indeed] imperceptible, as [pseudo-constituents] such as pleasure, which [the Sāṅkhya erroneously takes to] combine in the form of sounds, etc., and [categories] such as substances, motions, universals and connections[, which the Vaiśeṣika erroneously takes to be perceptible]. Similarly, [a treatise's not being invalidated by inference] consists [first] in the fact that the [things] it holds to be the objects of an inference that does not depend on scripture are really such [i.e., inferable], as the four nobles' truths, [and second] in the fact that the [things it holds to be] uninferable are really such [i.e., uninferable], as the self, [God,] etc. [And this type of invalidation is] also [relevant] concerning the inference that depends on scripture[, which consists in identifying internal contradictions within a treatise]: for example, once it is admitted that demerit has the nature of [defilements] such as desire and the [corporeal and verbal acts] that originate from them, one does not prescribe [things] such as ablutions and fire oblation in order to remove it [i.e., demerit, because they cannot annihilate its cause].¹¹⁷

¹¹⁶ On the threefold analysis (*parīkṣātraya*) and Dharmakīrti's strategies for scriptural evaluation, see Tillemans 1993: 9–15, Keira 2006, Eltschinger 2007: 92–114 and Krasser 2012.

¹¹⁷ PV 1.215 and PVSV 108,20–109,3: *pratyakṣeṇānumānena dvividhenāpy abādhanam / dṛṣṭādrṣṭārthayor asyāvisaṃvādas tadarthayoḥ // pratyakṣeṇābādhanam pratyakṣābhimatānām arthānām tathābhāvaḥ / yathā nīlādisukhaduḥkhanimitto-palakṣaṇarāgādibuddhīnām / atathābhimatānām cāpratyakṣatā / yathā śabdādirūpasanniveśīnām sukhādīnām dravyakarmasāmānyasamyogādīnām ca / tathānāgamāpekṣānumānaviśayābhimatānām tathābhāvaḥ / yathā caturṇām āryasatyānām / ananumeyānām tathābhāvaḥ / yathātmādīnām / āgamāpekṣānumāne 'pi yathā*

This passage is closely connected to the one in which Dharmakīrti blamed the Veda for claiming a permanent self to be the agent of psychophysical actions and the experiencer of their eschatological results.¹¹⁸ For a treatise (e.g., the Veda) that wrongly claims uninferable entities like the self or God to be inferable must be discarded as unreliable. Once again, one should be wary of regarding this criticism as pertaining merely to issues of logic and epistemology, for as Dharmakīrti himself declares:

The [ordinary] person [who wishes to engage in action] cannot live without resorting to scriptural authority[, and this for two reasons: first], because [this person] learns (*śravaṇa*) [from scripture what] great benefits or misfortunes[, such as heaven or hell, can be expected from his] engaging in or abstaining from certain [intentions such as violence], whose results [remain completely] imperceptible [to him]; and [second,] because [this person] does not see any contradiction to the existence of these [desirable and undesirable results].¹¹⁹

In other words, ordinary persons of limited cognitive capacity (*arvāg-darśin*) have no other possibility than to rely on scripture while engaging in action. But to opt for a scripture, they have to resort to reason(ing) (*yukti*) and test the available treatises as to whether those of their statements bearing on empirical – i.e., perceptible and inferable – things stand critical analysis. The critique of the self is thus concerned with the very possibility, for ordinary persons, of engaging in an eschatologically and soteriologically successful practice.

0.2.5. Most of the arguments against the self and the *pudgala* that will be dealt with in the present book fall under this heading, i.e., are aimed at showing that the proofs (*sādhana*) put forward by the Ātmavādins are fallacious. Two among these proofs are paradigmatic instances of logical fallacies and recur throughout Dharmakīrti's works. First, the

rāgādirūpaṃ tatprabhavaṃ cādharmam abhyupagamyā tatprahāṇāya snānāgniho-trāder anupadeśaḥ /. On this passage, see Yaita 1987: 7–8, Dunne 2004: 362–363, Eltschinger 2007: 105–109 and 221–223 (fn. 23–27), and Moriyama forthc.

¹¹⁸ See above, §0.2.2.

¹¹⁹ PVSV 108,2–5: *nāyaṃ puruṣo 'nāśrityāgamaprāmāṇyam āsitum samarthah / aty-akṣaphalānāṃ keṣāñcit pravṛttinivṛttyor mahānuśaṃsāpāyaśravaṇāt tadbhāve viro-dhādarśanāc ca* /.

so-called (*kevala*)*vyatirekin*, a Naiyāyika argument that can be formulated as follows: “This living body possesses a self, because it possesses breath, etc.” Dharmakīrti’s critique of this pseudo-proof appears in the PVSV, PVin 2, PVin 3 and NB 3.¹²⁰ Second, a Sāṅkhya argument to the effect that “[things] like the sense organs are for the benefit of another [(i.e., uncomposed) entity], because they are composite [entities].” Dharmakīrti’s critique, which can be found in the PVSV, PV 4, PVin 3 and NB 3, is strongly indebted to Vasubandhu and Dignāga.¹²¹ Third, the Vaiśeṣikas’ and Naiyāyikas’ repeated claims to the inferability of the self, which Dharmakīrti undermines in the PVSV by showing that, contrary to the sense organs, an imperceptible self can be inferred neither on the basis of a logical reason consisting in an essential property (*svabhāvahetu*) nor on the basis of a logical reason consisting in an effect (*kāryahetu*).¹²² Fourth, the Buddhist Pudgalavādins’ recourse to effect as a logical reason in order to establish their *pudgala*, an argument Dharmakīrti criticises in the PVSV in a way that improves on Vasubandhu’s strategy in the AKBh.¹²³ Fifth, the Naiyāyikas’ and the Vaiśeṣikas’ recourse to memory (*smṛti*, *smaraṇa*) as providing an argument in favour of the self, which Dharmakīrti criticises, here again in the footsteps of Vasubandhu’s AKBh and probably against Pakṣilasvāmin, in PV 2.¹²⁴

0.2.6. However, Dharmakīrti’s most significant contribution to the critique of the self is arguably his thirty-seven-verses long critique of (mainly) Nyāya soteriology, where he shows that the Ātmavādin must renounce all hope of achieving liberation through the cultivation of suffering (*duḥkhabhāvanā*) applied to what supposedly belongs to the self (e.g., cognition, sense organs, etc.) as long as he does not abandon the self. For as we have seen,¹²⁵ the idea of “one’s own” (*ātmīya*) or “mine” (*mama[kāra]*) is the natural and necessary outcome of the false

¹²⁰ See below, Chapter 2, §2.1.

¹²¹ See below, Chapter 2, §2.3.

¹²² See below, Chapter 2, §2.2.

¹²³ See below, Chapter 1, §§1.2.1–2.

¹²⁴ See below, Chapter 2, §2.4.

¹²⁵ See above, §0.1.

view of a self: how could one, then, show detachment (*vairāgya*)¹²⁶ toward what belongs to the self as long as one believes in (*graha*) and hence is attached to (*sneha*) the self?¹²⁷

How is this “soteriological” argument to be connected in its overall meaning with those reviewed above? Dharmakīrti’s critique of Nyāya soteriology occurs in PV 2.220–256. These stanzas belong to his examination (*parīkṣā*, *vicāra*) of the Buddha as a protector (*tāyin*) of the suffering sentient beings (PV 2.146–279): according to him, the Buddha has become (like) a means of valid cognition (*pramāṇabhūta*) because he teaches the four nobles’ truths *or* the path toward salvation in a reliable manner.¹²⁸ More specifically, PV 2.220–256 occurs right in the middle of Dharmakīrti’s examination of the truth of the path (*mārga-satya*, PV 2.205–279). In other words, the critical appraisal of concurrent religious paths serves as a reason for assessing their respective authority (*prāmāṇya*) in soteriologically relevant matters. In these stanzas, Dharmakīrti shows that someone who desires liberation (*mumukṣu*) cannot achieve salvation through the Buddhist-like but *ātman*-centered soteriology of the Nyāya. And this is enough to demonstrate that the Nyāya lacks authority since it fails to identify and teach what is expedient for one to secure final release. In this regard, PV 2.220–256 pursues the same ambition as the previous arguments: the critical evaluation of the sixth-century Indian philosophical systems as religious paths.

¹²⁶ See below, fn. 1, p. 187.

¹²⁷ See below, Chapter 3.

¹²⁸ On Dharmakīrti’s interpretation of the epithet *pramāṇabhūta*, see Krasser 2001. On the structure(s) of PV 2, see Franco 1997: 15–43.