

Chapter 2

Dharmakīrti against Ātmavādin Arguments

2.1. AGAINST THE SO-CALLED VYATIREKIN

2.1.1. The Context of PVSV 12,26–13,11: A Critique of Non-Perception as a Means to Establish Co-Absence (vyatireka).

Dharmakīrti's first argument against the *ātman* occurs very early in the PVSV and targets the Naiyāyikas' (*kevala*)vyatirekin, an allegedly valid logical reason (*hetu*) that possesses (only) co-absence, i.e., is absent wherever the property to be proved (*sādhya*) is absent (*nivṛtti*, *abhāva*, etc.). The argument recurs in almost the same form towards the end of PVin 2.¹ In both the PVSV and PVin 2, it is part of Dharmakīrti's lengthy critique of his Buddhist and non-Buddhist predecessors' view that mere non-perception (*adarśanamātra*) is the method to be followed in order to establish co-absence.² In Dharmakīrti's opinion, problematic logical reasons (*hetvābhāsa*, lit. "pseudo-reasons") such as the (*kevala*)vyatirekin and the over-exclusive (*asādhāraṇa*) logical reason would

¹ PVin 2 95,11–96,5; see Steinkellner 1979: 124–126.

² See Steinkellner 1966 and Katsura 1992. As PSV ad PS 5.34 (see Katsura 1992: 226 and fn. 14) as well as Dharmakīrti's own statements in PV 4.207 and PVin 3 117,12–14 (see Ono 1999: 308–309) testify, Dignāga is very likely to have recognized mere non-perception as a proper method for establishing the absence of the logical reason in the dissimilar instances. According to Katsura (1992: 227), Īśvarasena "must have inherited the idea of mere non-perception from Dignāga. However, he gave it the status of a valid means of cognition (*pramāṇa*); thus he admitted a third type of *pramāṇa* in addition to Dignāga's perception (*pratyakṣa*) and inference (*anumāna*). By doing so, I think, Īśvarasena believed that he could firmly establish co-absence (*vyatireka*) and the pervasion between two items, so that he could remove the hypothetical and inductive nature of Dignāga's logic." See also Ono 1999: 303–304 and fn. 9.

turn out to be proper logical reasons if mere non-perception were a proper method of ascertainment (the same applies *mutatis mutandis* to the inference possessing a remainder [śeṣavadanumāna]).³ But Dharmakīrti's critique of the (*kevala*)vyatirekīhetu permeates his whole work, for it can be found again in PV 4.205ff., PVin 3 115,7–124,5 and NB_M 3.96–108/NB_S 3.98–110, viz. in the context of his reinterpretation of Dignāga's "wheel of logical reasons" (*hetucakra*).⁴ Note that while these passages provide important materials for the exegesis of the PVSV and PVin 2 argument, they also reflect different philosophical preoccupations⁵ and, as far as PVin 3 and NB 3 are concerned, develop a new line of argument against the (*kevala*)vyatirekin.⁶ But in all cases, Dharmakīrti's aim is to demonstrate that only a natural relation (*svabhāvavapratibandha*) between the *probandum* and the *probans* allows us to ascertain both co-presence and co-absence.⁷

³ On the *śeṣavadanumāna*, see PVSV 12,15–25 (and PVin 2 95,1–10; Steinkellner 1979: 122–124); on the *asādhāraṇahetu*, see PVSV 14,1–5 (and PVin 2 96,12–15; Steinkellner 1979: 128), Ono 1999: 305, and below, fn. 5.

⁴ On Dignāga's *hetucakra*, see Frauwallner 1959: 162–164; on Dharmakīrti's reinterpretation, see, e.g., Ono 1999 and Iwata 2002.

⁵ Whereas the PVSV and the PVin 2 arguments are directed against the (*kevala*)vyatirekin as such, the arguments to be found in PV 4, PVin 3 and NB 3 deal with the so-called over-exclusive (inconclusive) logical reason (*asādhāraṇ[ānaikāntik]ahetu*, a logical reason that occurs only in the subject [*dharmīn*] of the proof and lacks both co-presence and co-absence [*anvayavyatireka*]). Dignāga's example of an over-exclusive logical reason was "because it is audible" (*śrāvaṇatvāt*) in the proof that sound is permanent (*śabdo nityaḥ*). In PV 4, PVin 3 and NB 3, Dharmakīrti has changed this example into "because it possesses breath, etc." (*prāṇādimattvāt*) in the proof that the living body possesses a self (*jīvaccharīraṃ sātmacam*). As shown by Ono (1999: 307), however, *śrāvaṇatvāt* and *prāṇādimattvāt* have the same logical structure and entail the same fallacy according to Dharmakīrti's system. On this, the reasons for Dharmakīrti's modification and its consequences, see Ono 1999 and Iwata 2004.

⁶ See below, §2.1.5.

⁷ On the *svabhāvavapratibandha*, see above, Chapter 1, §§1.2.1.3.1–2, fn. 148, p. 96, fn. 151, p. 98, and below, §2.1.4. See also, among many other studies, Steinkellner 1974, Katsura 1992: 224–225 and Eltschinger 2010b: 414–415 (§10c).

2.1.2. The (kevala)vyatirekīhetu and the Inference of the Self

Given the way Dharmakīrti presents his opponent's thesis, and particularly the inference that his opponent adduces as an example of valid logical reason – i.e., “this living body is not without a self because [if it were,] it would follow that it would not have breath, etc. (*prāṇādī*)” –, the target here is most probably Uddyotakara's defence of the *vyatirekīhetu*. Thus in the NV (where mere non-perception is apparently accepted as a valid means of establishing co-absence),⁸ this logical reason is defined in the following way:

[A logical reason] having [only] co-absence (*vyatirekin*) is [a reason] which, pervading the intended [object of the inference] while there is no similar instance (*sapakṣa*), is not present in dissimilar instances (*vīpakṣa*) – for example: “This living body is not without a self because [if it were,] it would follow that it would not have breath, etc.”⁹

The sources of this passage are still shrouded in mystery. It has been assumed that the *vyatirekīhetu*'s defence found in the NV was borrowed by Uddyotakara from an earlier Naiyāyika work, but its actual authorship remains unclear.¹⁰ In any case, the inference of the self put

⁸ See Ono 1999: 309; see also above, fn. 2, p. 117.

⁹ NV 43,11–12 ad NSū 1.1.5: *vyatirekī vivakṣitavyāpitve sati sapakṣābhāve sati vipakṣāvṛttiḥ / yathā nedaṃ jīvaccharīraṃ nirātmakam aprāṇādimattvaprasaṅgād iti /*. On this passage as the object of Dharmakīrti's criticism see, e.g., Prets 1999: 333–334, Kano 2001: 410 and Iwata 2004: 118, fn. 39. On Uddyotakara's definition of the *vyatirekīhetu* see Okazaki 1995 and 2003. For other mentions of this example by Uddyotakara see, e.g., NV 53,4–5 ad NSū 1.1.5, NV 88,12–13 ad NSū 1.1.23, NV 116,10–17 ad NSū 1.1.35 (see below, fn. 19, p. 123), NV 116,20–117,3 ad NSū 1.1.35 (see below, fn. 19, p. 123).

¹⁰ According to Steinkellner (1979: 125, fn. 479), Uddyotakara's typology of logical reasons was first stated by another, so far unknown Naiyāyika, since Uddyotakara's analysis of the term “threefold” (*trividha*) in NSū 1.1.5 as meaning *anvayavyatirekīhetu*, *anvayahetu* and *vyatirekīhetu* is presented as that of another Naiyāyika, and since after presenting his own version of the wheel of logical reasons, he states that a heterodox teacher of the school (*ekāntavādin*) acknowledges (as Uddyotakara himself does) two kinds of *anvayin* and one kind of *vyatirekin* as valid reasons. However, as shown in Prets 1999: 334–335, both arguments seem doubtful (it is uncertain whether Uddyotakara “shares the view of someone else or advocates his own” when stating this interpretation of the term *trividha*; besides, the term *ekāntavādin* may not refer here to another Naiyāyika but to “somebody who teaches

forward here – which might have as its original basis the Upaniṣadic association of breath with the self¹¹ – is not alluded to in the list of marks (*liṅga*) of the self enumerated in NSū 1.1.10, where *prāṇa* is not found.¹² The term does appear however in the corresponding list of the VS:

The marks of the self are breathing up and down (*prāṇāpāna*), closing and opening [the eyes], life, the movements of the mental organ and the transformations of the other sense organs; pleasure and pain; desire and aversion; and effort.¹³

Vaiśeṣikas such as Praśastapāda or Candrānanda interpret the presence of *prāṇāpāna* in VSū 3.2.4 as meaning that the self can be inferred as an agent endowed with effort (*prayatna*) from the observation of the particular action of breathing;¹⁴ but the argument might in fact be

universal propositions,” and in any case the *ekāntavādin* is not presented as the proponent of the inference from *prāṇādi* but only as someone for whom there are two kinds of *anvayin* and one kind of *vyatirekin*). On the NV’s unknown Naiyāyika sources, see Oberhammer 1962.

¹¹ On this association (and sometimes equation) see, e.g., Olivelle 1998: 23, BĀU 4.4.4, ChU 3.14.2–3, etc.

¹² NSū 1.1.10: *icchādveṣaprayatnasukhaduḥkhaññānāny ātmano liṅgam* /. “The marks of the self are desire, aversion, effort, pleasure, pain [and] cognitions.” On the ways in which the self is established through its marks in Vaiśeṣika and/or Nyāya, see, e.g., Chakravarti 1982, Oetke 1988: Part II, Watson 2006: Chapter 1 and Ratié 2011a: 62–80.

¹³ VSū 3.2.4: *prāṇāpānanimeṣonmeṣajīvanamanogātīndriyāntaravikārāḥ sukhaduḥkha icchādveṣau prayatnaś cety ātmaliṅgāni* /. On this *sūtra* see, e.g., Preisendanz 1994: 263–274. The presence of *prāṇādi* in it had already been noted in connection with the *vyatirekīhetu* example in Steinkellner 1979: 125, fn. 479. For allusions to these items by the Buddhist epistemologists, see below, fn. 32, p. 127 (PVSVT 62,24–25) and 66, p. 136 (NBṬ_M 214,19–20/NBṬ_S 76,3–4).

¹⁴ See PDhS 15,8–10, quoted above (Introduction, fn. 84, p. 24). Praśastapāda adds (PDhS 15,10–12): *katham / śarīraparigrhīte vāyau vikṛtakarmadarśanād bhastrādhmāpayiteva* /. “How [is the self inferred from breath as the body’s controlling agent endowed with effort]? [Answer: We infer the self thus] because [we] observe an altered action in the air [that is] absorbed in the body, as [in the case] of a leathern bag that has been filled with air.” Cf. NK 211,8–212,2, which explains *prāṇādi*- as the *prāṇāpāna*- of VSū 3.2.4 (the *sūtra* is quoted in NK 211,6–7): *katham iti praśnapūrvakaṃ prāṇāpānāyor liṅgatvaṃ darśayati śarīraparigrhīta iti / vāyus tir-yaggamanasvabhāvaḥ śarīraparigrhīte ca vāyau prāṇāpānākhye vikṛtaṃ svabhāva-*

much earlier, since it is apparently already criticized in the MP, where the character called Nāgasena argues that breathing up and down are rather activities that belong to the body.¹⁵ The ŚBh for instance mentions a criticism of this Buddhist counterargument that, according to

*viparītaṃ karmordhvagamanam adhogamanam ca dṛśyate / tasmāt prayatnavān
vīgrahasyādhiṣṭhātānumīyate yas tathā vāyuṃ prerayati / anyathāsyā vikṛtatvāsambhavāt / bhastrādhmāpayiteveti dṛṣṭāntaḥ / śarīraṃ prayatnavadadhiṣṭhitam icchāpūrvakavikṛtavāyuvāśrayatvād bhastrāvāt /* “[With the sentence] ‘in the [air that is] absorbed by the body [...]’ [Prašastapāda] shows how breathing up and down are marks [of the self, as an answer] to the question just asked: ‘How?’ Air has as its nature to move horizontally; now, [we] observe an action, [namely] a movement upwards and a movement downwards, in the air called ‘breathing up’ and ‘breathing down’ [that is] absorbed by the body, [and this action is] ‘altered’ [i.e.,] changed in its nature. Therefore [we] infer a controlling agent of the body that is endowed with effort and prompts the air in such a way, because otherwise the alteration of this [action] would be impossible. The [inference’s] example is [given in] ‘as [in the case] of a leathern bag that has been filled with air.’ [To wit:] the body is controlled by [something] endowed with effort, because [it] is the locus of the altered air, which [must have been] preceded by a will [to alter it], just as [in the case of] a leathern bag.” Cf. VSV 28,16–18: *tiryakpavanasya vāyor dehasthitasya yat prāṇāpānakarma tat prayatnakāryam / śarīraparigrhītavāyuvīṣayatve sati vikṛtatvād bhastrāparigrhītavāyukarmavat /* “When air, which [usually moves] horizontally, resides in the body, its action [consisting of] breathing up and down is the effect of an effort, because when [the action] concerns the air that is absorbed by the body, it is altered, as [in the case] of the action of the air absorbed by a leathern bag.” The same argument is found again, e.g., in the NM, where Jayanta, after defending the inference of the self from the marks mentioned in NSū 1.1.10, adds (NM_M II.293,5–6/NM_V II.219,24) that “nonetheless, regarding this [self] there is a great deal of additional reasons” (*tatra tv asti hetunivaho bahur anyah*), among which the following (NM_M II.293,13–14/NM_V II.220,5–6): *prāṇādīmārutānām antaścalatām calācalagatīnām / sahajanijakarmavikṛtau kāraṇam anumīyate kiñcit //* “A certain [controlling entity] is inferred as the cause of the alteration of the natural and characteristic action of the airs that are breathing up, etc., which circulate inside [the body] and which keep moving [up and down].” Cf. GBhV II.220,20: *sahajanijakarmavikṛtau / sahajam yan nijaṃ karma tiryaggaṭilakṣaṇam tasya vikṛtir ūrdhvam adhaś ca gatiḥ /* “‘The alteration of the natural and characteristic action’ [means] the alteration [i.e.,] the movement up and down, of [air’s] natural [and] characteristic action, which is characterized as a horizontal movement.” See also NR 505,6–9, quoted below, fn. 18, p. 122.

¹⁵ See MP 30,27–31,9, where Nāgasena concludes (31,8–9): *n’eso jīvo / assāsapassāsā nām’ete kāyasaṅkhārā ti /* “This is not the life-principle; in-breathing and out-breathing are bodily activities.” Translation Horner 1969: 41; see also Collins 1982: 184 (and for the same passage in Chinese sources, Demiéville 1924: 101–102).

Kumārila, does not belong to Śabara himself,¹⁶ and that Pārthasārathimīśra explicitly ascribes to the “Vaiśeṣikas, etc.”¹⁷ According to the Ātmavādin portrayed by Śabara, the action of breathing does not belong to the body itself because the former does not last as long as the latter, as can be observed in the case of a corpse, so that a breathing agent other than the body must be inferred.¹⁸

¹⁶ Kumārila explains that the arguments adduced in this passage of the ŚBh do not belong to Śabara himself and that he only mentions them with a view to refute them before putting forward his own, superior proof of the self. See ŚV *ātmavāda* 92ab: *parair abhigatān pūrvam ātmahetūn nirasyati* /. “[Śabara] first eliminates the reasons [for acknowledging] the self that are admitted by others.”

¹⁷ See NR 504,6–7: *bhāṣyakāreṇa prāṇādibhir enam upalabhāmaha iti vaiśeṣikādisammatā hetava upanyastāḥ* /. “The author of the *Bhāṣya* [now] brings forward the reasons acknowledged by the Vaiśeṣikas, etc., in ‘we perceive it through breath, etc.’” See also Biardeau 1968, in which the author examines the whole passage devoted to the *ātman* in Śabara’s commentary on Jaimini’s *sūtra* 1.1.5 and notices (1968: 111) that “en fait les arguments du Mīmāṃsaka en totalité reprennent les thèmes succinctement exposés dans les *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* III 2 4–21.”

¹⁸ See ŚBh 72,4–73,2 (Śabara is explaining that it is not the body itself that possesses the sacrificial paraphernalia [*yajñāyudha*] but the entity to whom the body belongs): *āha ko ’sāv anyo nainam upalabhāmahe / prāṇādibhir enam upalabhāmahe / yo ’sau prāṇity apāṇity unmeṣati^a nimeṣatityādiceṣṭitavān / so ’tra śarīre yajñāyudhīti / nanu śarīram eva prāṇity apāṇiti ca / na / prāṇādayaḥ śarīraguṇavidharmāṇo ’yāvaccharīrabhāvitvāt / yāvac charīraṃ tāvad asya guṇā rūpādayaḥ / prāṇādayas tu saty api śarīre na bhavanti / sukhādayaś ca svayam upalabhyante na rūpādaya iva śarīraguṇāḥ pareṇāpīti / tasmāc charīraguṇavaidharmyād anyāḥ śarīrād yajñāyudhīti* /. [^a *unmeṣati* conj.: *ucchvasiti* ŚBh, Frauwallner 1968: 50.] “[The objector] says: ‘What is this other [entity to which the body supposedly belongs]? [For] we do not perceive it.’ [Answer:] We perceive it through breath, etc. That which possesses motion (*ceṣṭitavān*), i.e., that which breathes up, breathes down, opens and closes the eyes (*unmeṣati nimeṣati*) and so on, is that which, in the body, possesses the sacrificial paraphernalia. [Objection:] But it is the body that breathes up and down. [Answer:] No. Breath, etc., are properties that differ from the properties of the body, because they do not exist as long as the body [exists]: the properties of the body, such as [its] colour, [last] as long as the body, whereas breath, etc., no [longer] exist even though the body [still] exists. And pleasure, etc., are perceived by oneself [only], contrary to colour, etc., which, as properties of the body, [are perceived] by other [people] as well. Therefore, due to the fact that these properties differ from the properties of the body, [we know that what] possesses the sacrificial paraphernalia is other than the body.” Cf. NR 505,6–9, where the explanation of how breathing up and down are marks from which one can infer the existence of the self is reminiscent of Candrānanda’s and Praśastapāda’s (see

However, when stating the inference of the self from *prāṇādi*, Uddyotakara does not mention action as the basis of the reasoning, nor the idea that breathing cannot belong to the body itself and is therefore related to a substance different from the body. Rather, as is made clear in Uddyotakara's commentary ad NSū 1.1.35, the inference that he has in mind rests on the mere fact that in the debate over the existence of an enduring self, all parties acknowledge at least the invariable concomitance between the absence of breath, etc., and the absence of self (since even the Buddhists, who deny the existence of the self, admit that what is devoid of breath is devoid of self). It is from this universally acknowledged invariable concomitance between the absence of breath and the absence of self that the presence of the self is inferred in the living body from the presence of *prāṇa* in it (which, in Western logic, sounds like a formally invalid argument): the absence of the self is excluded from the living body on the grounds that there is no absence of *prāṇa* in the living body.¹⁹

above, fn. 14, p. 120): *mā bhūd dehadharmaḥ / tathāpi katham ātmaliṅgatvam / vāyor hy ūrdhvādhogativīśeṣaḥ prāṇāpānaśabdābhyām ucyate / sa ca vāyudharmaḥ katham ātmaliṅgam ucyate, tiryaggamanaśīlasya vāyor nākasmiād ūrdhvādhogatiḥ sambhavatīti taddhetuprayatno 'numīyate / prayatnāś ca guṇatvād guṇinam anumāpayati / sa cātmēti /*. "Let us admit [then] that [breathing up and so on] are not properties of the body; nonetheless, how are [they] marks of the self? [Answer:] The air's particularity of moving up and down is expressed through the words 'breathing up' and 'breathing down.' [Objection:] And this property of air, why is it called a mark of the self? [Answer:] Because [since] air has as its nature to move horizontally, it cannot move up or down without any [particular] cause [prompting it to do so]; therefore an effort which is the cause of these [movements] is inferred, and effort, since it is a property, makes [us] infer a property-bearer – and this is the self."

¹⁹ See NV 116,10–17: *udāharaṇam tu nedaṁ nirātmakam jīvaccharīram aprāṇādi-mattvaprasaṅgād iti / yadubhayapakṣasampratipannam aprāṇādimat tat sarvaṁ nirātmakam dṛṣṭam / na cedam aprāṇādimad bhavati / tasmān nedaṁ nirātmakam iti / so 'yam avītaḥ parapakṣapratīṣedhāya bhavatīti / tāv etau vītāvītahetū lakṣaṇābhyām pṛthagabhihitāu iti / tatra svarūpeṇārthaparicchedakatvaṁ vītadharmaḥ / avītadharmaḥ punaḥ parapakṣapratīṣedhenaiva pravartata iti / ekasya vidhīyamāno 'rtha itarasya pratīṣidhyamānaḥ /*. "Rather, the [right] example [regarding the proof described by NSū 1.1.35 as *tathā vaidharmyāt*] is: 'This living body is not without a self because [if it were,] it would follow that it would not have breath, etc.' [We] observe that whatever is acknowledged by both parties as not having breath, etc., is selfless. Now, this [living body] is not without breath, etc.; therefore

In this respect it should be noted that VSū 3.2.9 answers in the following way the objection according to which the self, if it is only postulated as an indeterminate cause accounting for the marks of the self, is merely scriptural (*āgamika*),²⁰ a word that also appears in Dhar-

it is not selfless. This is the indirect (*avīta*) [logical reason], which is aimed at refuting the opponent's thesis. These two logical reasons, direct (*vīta*) and indirect, are distinguished [here] through their [respective] characteristics. Among these [two], the property of the direct [reason] is the fact that it determines its object through its own form, whereas the property of the indirect [reason] functions through the mere refutation of the opponent's thesis; the object of the former is asserted [while] the [object] of the latter is negated." See also NV 116,20–117,3: *yadi cāvyabhicārād dhetur arthaṃ pratipādayati / tadācodyam etat katham avītaḥ pratipādaka ity avitasyāpi vyatirekāvyabhicāritvāt pratipādakatvam iti / katham / yāvad aprāṇādimat tat sarvaṃ nirātmakaṃ dṛṣṭam iti / aprāṇādimattvaṃ ca jīvaccharīrān nivartate / tasmāt tadavyabhicāri nirātmakatvam api nivartasyatīti /* "And if the logical reason demonstrates the object because of invariability (*avyabhicāra*), then there is no point in objecting this: 'How can the indirect [reason] demonstrate?' because the indirect [reason] too demonstrates due to the invariability of co-absence. [We answer the question] 'how?' [in the following way:] Because [we] see that whatever is without breath, etc., is selfless; now, being without breath, etc., is excluded from the living body; therefore selflessness as well, which does not deviate (*avyabhicārin*) from [not having breath, etc.] must be excluded [from the living body]." On the distinction between *vīta* and *avīta/āvīta* reasons (which seems to have first appeared in the Sāṅkhya, although Franco has challenged this view), see Frauwallner 1958: 228, 264–265 and 268–269, Franco 1999, Kano 2001: 409, Okazaki 1995: 3 and Okazaki 2006.

²⁰ See VSū 3.2.7: *sāmānyato dṛṣṭāc cāviśeṣaḥ /* "[Objection:] And because [the self is inferred as] that which is apprehended as a generality (*sāmānyato dṛṣṭam*), there is no distinction." VSV 29,14–16 explains: *prāṇādīnāṃ nirnimittanāṃ sukhādīnāṃ cānāśritānāṃ anutpattir ata eṣāṃ kenāpi nimittenāśrayeṇa bhāvyam ity ato 'pi sāmānyato dṛṣṭād ākāśādīnāṃ anirāsād aviśeṣas teṣāṃ api hetutvasambhavāt /* "[In the reasoning:] 'Breath, etc., [if they were] without a cause, and pleasure, etc., [if they did] not reside in a substratum, could not arise, therefore they must have some cause [and] substratum,' since space for instance is not excluded from this [cause and substratum] apprehended as a [mere] generality, 'there is no distinction' [between space and this cause and substratum that you claim to be the self], because [space, etc.] can be causes as well." VSū 3.2.8 concludes: *tasmād āgami-kam /* "Therefore [this] is [merely] scriptural." VSV 29,19 explains: *ātmāstīti pravādamātram ity arthaḥ /* "The meaning is: this [assertion] that the self exists is a mere opinion." On the meaning of *pravāda* see, e.g., PVSVT 616,13–14, which glosses *pravādeṣu* in PVSV 175,22 as *siddhānteṣu*, and VP 1.8 (with VPV 30–35), where *pravāda* is used in the similar sense of a mere opinion that has not been rationally

makīrti's critique²¹):

It is not [merely] scriptural, because of the *vyatireka* of the word "I."²²

The word *vyatireka* in this *sūtra* has been interpreted in various ways by modern scholars, the words *aham iti śabdasya vyatirekāt* being diversely understood as meaning "given that the word 'I' [means] something more [than the body],"²³ or "because of the restricted use of the word I,"²⁴ or "because [it is] distinguished [from others (i.e., other substances, VE/IR)] by the word 'I,'"²⁵ or again "because of the distinction of the word 'I' [from other words]."²⁶ Oetke for instance considers that the reasoning presupposes a metaphysical principle regarding the nature of speech, i.e., the idea that each word reveals a particular object.²⁷ In any case, posterior Vaiśeṣika authors interpret the *sūtra* as meaning that the affirmation of the self's existence is not merely scriptural because breath, etc., require a cause or a substratum and because breath, etc., are only ascribed to that which the word 'I' denotes and not to any other substance: while we can say "I have breath," we do not say "earth has breath."²⁸ In other words, the Vaiśeṣikas emphasize that breath,

justified. On *sāmānyato dṛṣṭam*, see below, fn. 89, p. 143, 90, p. 144, 93, p. 145, and 96, p. 146.

²¹ On Dharmakīrti's assertion that his opponent's self is "scriptural[ly established], not inferential[ly]" (*āgamikatvam [...] nānumeyatvam*), see below, fn. 46, p. 129.

²² VSū 3.2.9: *aham iti śabdavyatirekāt nāgamikam /*.

²³ Biarreau 1968: 116 ("Étant donné que le terme 'je' [exprime] quelque chose de plus [que le corps]").

²⁴ Schuster 1972: 343.

²⁵ See Honda 1990: 141.

²⁶ Oetke 1988: 321 ("wegen der Verschiedenheit des Wortes 'ich' [von anderen Wörtern]"). Preisendanz 1994: 229 gives a similar interpretation.

²⁷ See Oetke 1988: 323–324 on this "'sprachphilosophische' Doktrin" according to which "jedes Wort einen Gegenstand bezeichnet"; see also Preisendanz 1994: 229.

²⁸ See VSV 29,22–23: *aham itiśabdena kṣityādibhinātma dravyaviṣayepaikādhikarānyād ahaṃ prāṇādīmān ahaṃ sukhavān iti / tasmāt prāṇādiliṅgatvān nāgamikam /*. "Since in [such expressions as:] 'I have breath, etc., I have pleasure,' [the words 'breath,' etc.,] are co-referential (*aikādhikarānya*) with the word 'I' – which denotes a substance distinct from [all other substances] such as earth –, [and] since breath, etc., are marks [of the self], this [assertion that the self exists] is not [merely] scriptural." Cf. PDhS 16,6–7: *tathāhaṃśabdenāpi prthivyādiśabdavyatirekād iti /*. "Similarly, [the self] is also [inferred] due to the word 'I,' because of the co-absence

etc., are legitimate marks of the self because nobody attributes the property of having breath to that which cannot be designated as “I,” and this *vyatireka* of the word “I” might be seen as the basis of the co-absence presented by Uddyotakara between what is devoid of self and what is devoid of breath, etc. Thus, when stating that his opponent’s self is only scriptural because he distinguishes what is selfless and what is not “according to [mere] acceptance,” Dharmakīrti might also have in mind this Vaiśeṣika reasoning according to which the mere linguistic use of the “I” enables us to distinguish what is selfless and what is not.

2.1.3. Dharmakīrti’s Argument in PVSV 12,26–13,11: English Translation²⁹

Moreover, [if the absence of the logical reason from the dissimilar instances were determined through non-perception,] the [logical reason] that possesses [only] co-absence (*vyatirekin*) would be a [valid] logical reason as well (PV 1.18c). [An example of a logical reason that possesses only co-absence is:] this living body is not without a self because [if it were,] it would follow that it would not have breath, etc.³⁰ ³¹One does not perceive breath, etc.,³² in the

(*vyatireka*) [of this word] with words such as ‘earth.’” See also NK 218,8–11 ad loc.: *yo yasyārthasya vācakaḥ sa tacchabdena samānādhikaraṇo dṛṣṭo yathā dravyaṃ pṛthivī / ahaṃśabdasya tu pṛthivyādivācakaiḥ śabdaiḥ saha vyatirekaḥ samānādhikaraṇatvābhāvaḥ / ahaṃ pṛthivy ahaṃ udakam iti prayogābhāvāt / tasmān nāyaṃ pṛthivyādiviśayaḥ /* “[We] observe that [a designation] that denotes an object [x] is co-referential with the word [for x] – for example, the word ‘substance’ [is co-referential with the word] ‘earth.’ But the word ‘I’ is co-absent with words denoting earth and so on [i.e.,] it has no co-referentiality with them, because of the absence of such uses as: ‘I am earth,’ ‘I am water.’ Therefore this [word ‘I’] does not designate [substances other than the self] such as earth.”

²⁹ For references to the parallel in PVin 2 and Steinkellner’s translation, see above, fn. 1, p. 117, and below, fn. 46, p. 129; for a partial translation of the passage, see Ono 1999: 305–306.

³⁰ PVT Je D31a7/P37b2: *sbyor ba ni gson po’i lus ni bdag dan bcas pa yin te / srog la sogs pa dan ldan pa’i phyir ro zes bya ba /* “The formal application (**prayoga*) [here is as follows]: the living body possesses a self, because it possesses breath, etc.” PVSVT 62,22–23: *prāṇādimattvāc ca sātmakam / ayaṃ ca hetuḥ sātmake kvacin na dṛṣṭo nirātmakebhyāś ca vyāvṛtta iti sādhyānivrtau nivrṭtidharmā vyatirekī kathayate /* “And [thus the living body] possesses a self, because it possesses breath, etc. Now, [according to our opponent,] this logical reason is not perceived in any[thing]

[things that,] like pots, are selfless, [be they] visible or invisible;³³ therefore by [thus] excluding the [non-possession of breath, etc., in the living body and hence selflessness], one can know [that] the self [exists in the living body].³⁴
³⁵[However, we reply the following:] Since the non-perception of [something] imperceptible (*adr̥śyānupalambha*) [like the self] does not [allow one to] establish the non-existence [of this self in things like pots], the selflessness of [things] like pots is not established; therefore breath, etc., are not excluded [from that which is selfless].³⁶ ³⁷Objection: Since [the Buddhists] admit [self-

possessing a self and is excluded from the [things that are] selfless. Thus [he] calls *vyatirekin* a [logical reason] that has the property of being absent when the [property] to be proved is absent.”

- ³¹ According to PVT *Je* D31a7–b1/P37b2–3, the following is stated by the opponent after he has made mere non-perception a means of valid cognition (**adarśanamātram pramāṇīkṛtya*). On *adarśanamātra* as a means of valid cognition, see above, fn. 2, p. 117.
- ³² PVT *Je* D31b1–2/P37b3–4 = PVSVT 62,24–25: *prāṇādyadarśanāt prāṇāpānonmēṣanimeṣādarśanāt* /. “Because one does not perceive breath, etc., [i.e.] because one does not perceive breathing up, breathing down, closing and opening [the eyes].” See above, fn. 13, p. 120.
- ³³ PVT *Je* D31b2/P37b4–5 = PVSVT 62,25–26: *dr̥ṣṭeṣu svabhāvānupalambhenaivādarśanam prāṇādīnām upalabdhiḥlakṣaṇaprāptatvāt / adr̥ṣṭeṣv api tajjātīyatayā* /. “In the [case of] visible [things], the non-perception [of breath, etc.] is due to the non-perception of a thing (*svabhāvānupalambha*), because breath, etc., have attained the [causal] characteristics for a perception (*upalabdhiḥlakṣaṇaprāpta*), [and it is so] in [the case of] invisible [things] too, because they are of this sort [too].” PVSVT 62,26 adds: *tena nairātmyam prāṇādyabhāvena vyāptam* /. “Therefore selflessness is pervaded by the absence of breath, etc.”
- ³⁴ Translated according to PVSVT 62,27–28 (*jīvaccharīre tu tannivṛtṭyā prāṇādimatvābhāvanivṛtṭyā nairātmyasya nivṛtṭer ātmagatīḥ syāt* /), which is closer to Uddyotakara’s own explanation (see above, fn. 19, p. 123) than PVT *Je* D31b2–3/P37b5–6: *de las log pas žes bya ba ni bdag med pa de las srog la sogs pa ma mthoñ ba tsam gyis log pas gson po’i lus la bdag yod par rtogs par ’gyur ro* /. Translated according to Śākyabuddhi’s interpretation, the sentence would be: “Therefore, by [thus] excluding [breath, etc.] from that [which is selfless], one can know [that] the self [exists in the living body].”
- ³⁵ According to PVT *Je* D31b3/P37b6 = PVSVT 62,28, the opponent now asks Dharmakīrti how he can hold the logical reason “because it possesses breath, etc.,” to be a cause of doubt (*saṃśayaḥetu*). On this point, see Iwata 2004: 124.
- ³⁶ PVT *Je* D31b4–5/P37b8: *bum pa la sogs pa las srog la sogs pa log tu zin kyañ / ’on kyañ bdag med pa las log go žes bya ba ni med do žes bya ba’i tha tshig go* /. “The [intended] meaning is that although breath, etc., are excluded from [things] like

lessness], it is established [that things like pots are selfless. Answer:] Now [if the Buddhists' acceptance is authoritative,³⁸ how [is it that you attempt] to prove [the existence] of a self [in the living body]?³⁹ ⁴⁰And how [is it that] the proof of selflessness, [which is] not authoritative (*apramāṇika*) [according to you as regards the living body, applies] to [something] other [than the living body, i.e., to things like pots]?⁴¹ Moreover, [our opponent] distinguishes according to [mere] acceptance [a living body that is endowed] with a self and [things like pots that are] selfless, and then claims [that the logical reason, namely possessing breath, etc.,] is conclusive [regarding the self] due to the absence [of breath, etc., only] in those [things that are selfless; in so doing,] he can [only] acknowledge that the self is scriptural[ly established], not inferential[ly].⁴² As a consequence, since the absence of a self [remains] unestablished in spite of the fact that one does not perceive [it in things like pots, breath, etc., can be excluded from no selfless thing at all, and thus breath, etc., are simply inconclusive].⁴³ ⁴⁴[And] even if breath, etc., were absent in a

pots, yet they are not excluded from [things that are] selfless." PVSVT 62,30–63,9: *prāṇādyabhāvena sandigdhasya nairātmyasyāpy asiddhir iti yāvat* /. "The [intended] meaning is that selflessness, which is doubtful, is not established either through the absence of breath, etc."

³⁷ On the Ātmavādin's claim that selflessness is accepted by both parties, see above, fn. 19, p. 123.

³⁸ According to PVT *Je* D31b5/P38a1–2 = PVSVT 63,11 (*yadi bauddhābhyupagamaḥ pramāṇam*).

³⁹ PVT *Je* D31b6/P38a2 = PVSVT 63,11–12: *tad api bauddhena nairātmakam iṣṭam* /. "[For] this [living body] too is accepted by the Buddhist as selfless."

⁴⁰ PVT *Je* D31b6/P38a2–3 ≈ PVSVT 63,12–13: *jīvaccharīre nairātmyābhyupagamo 'pramāṇikas tato 'syātmā sādhyata iti / yady evam [...]* /. "[The Ātmavādin opponent holds] the acceptance of the living body's selflessness not [to be] authoritative; therefore, the self is demonstrated for him. If so [...]" Instead of *tato 'syātmā sādhyate*, the PVT reads: *de'i phyir 'di ni bdag med par mi 'dod do že na* /. "Therefore, [he] does not accept that this [living body] is selfless."

⁴¹ PVT *Je* D31b7/P38a3–4 ≈ PVSVT 63,14: *na hi bauddhasyābhyupagamaḥ kvacit pramāṇam kvacin neti* /. "For the Buddhist's acceptance [can]not [be] authoritative here[, but] not there."

⁴² See above, fn. 20, p. 124, and 22, p. 125.

⁴³ According to PVT *Je* D32a3/P38a8 = PVSVT 63,19–20 (*nāsti kutaścīn nairātmakāt prāṇāder nivr̥ttir ity agamakatvam* /). It may be tempting to read *ātmano nivr̥ttyasiddhiḥ* rather than *ātmano nivr̥ttyasiddheḥ*, which looks utterly elliptical, but

certain [visible pot] when [a self] is absent, [yet] the absence [of breath, etc.,] in all [of them] would not be established for want of a relation [between breath and the self]; therefore [breath, etc.,] are inconclusive [as a logical reason]^{45,46}

2.1.4. Explanations (Mainly Based on PV 4 and PVin 3)

Uddyotakara attempted to play down Dignāga's doctrine of the three characteristics (*trairūpya*) of a valid logical reason by claiming that logical validity, i.e., a logical reason's conclusiveness (*gamakatva*, *aikāntikatva*), does not necessarily imply that all three conditions be instantiated.⁴⁷ In other words, the (*kevala*)*vyatirekin* is valid insofar as it meets the first and the third requirements by being a property of the subject of the proof (*pakṣadharmatā*) and being absent wherever the

PVSV_{Tib} P418a8, PVT_{Je} D32a3/P38a8 (both *bdag ldog pa ma grub pa'i phyir*), PVSV_S 63,4, PVSVT_{Je} 63,19 (*ātmano nivr̥tṭyasiddheḥ*) seem to rule out this possibility.

⁴⁴ PVT_{Je} D32a3-4/P38b1 = PVSVT_{Je} 63,20-21: *evaṃ^a tāvan naivātmanaḥ kutaścin nivr̥tṭiḥ siddhā / abhyupagamyā tūcyate /*. [^a *evaṃ* em. (Tib. *de ltar na*) : *etat* Ed.] "Thus, so far (*tāvat*) it has been established that the self [can]not [be] excluded from anything. But, [provisionally] accepting [that it can, Dharmakīrti] says [the following]."

⁴⁵ PVT_{Je} D31a5/P38b3 = PVSVT_{Je} 63,23: *sandigdavyatirekitvād agamakativam /*. "[The logical reason 'breath, etc.,'] is inconclusive, because its possessing co-absence is doubtful."

⁴⁶ PVSV 12,26-13,11 (together with PV 1.18c) ≈ PVin 2 95,11-96,5: *kiṃ ca / vyatireky api hetuḥ syāt / nedaṃ nirātmakaṃ jīvaccharīram aprāṇādīmattvaprasaṅgād iti / nirātmakeṣu ghaṭādiṣu dṛṣṭādr̥ṣṭeṣu prāṇādyadarśanāt / tannivr̥tṭyātmagatiḥ syāt^a / adṛṣyānupalambhād abhāvāsiddhau ghaṭādīnāṃ nairātmāsiddheḥ prāṇāder anivr̥tṭiḥ / abhyupagamāt siddham iti cet / katham idānim ātmasiddhiḥ / parasyāpy apramāṇikā katham^b nairātmāsiddhiḥ / abhyupagameṇa ca sātmaṇātmaṇau vibhajya tatrābhāvena gamakatvaṃ kathayatāgamikatvam ātmani pratipannaṃ syān nānumeyatvam / tasmād adarśane 'py ātmano nivr̥tṭyasiddheḥ / tannivr̥tṭtau kvacin nivr̥tṭāv api prāṇādināṃ apratibandhāt / sarvatra nivr̥tṭyasiddher agamakativam /*. ^a PVin 2 95,12-13 reads: *nirātmakānāṃ ghaṭādīnāṃ dṛṣṭādr̥ṣṭānāṃ prāṇādyabhāvena vyāptes tannivr̥tṭtau vyāpyanivr̥tṭer ātmagatiḥ syāt /*. "Da die gesehenen und nicht gesehenen seelenlosen (Dinge) wie Topf usw. durch das Fehlen von Atem usw. umfaßt sind, würde sich, weil das Umfaßte (die Seelenlosigkeit) beim Fehlen dieses (Fehlens von Atem usw.) fehlt, die Erkenntnis ergeben, daß [der Gegenstand, der lebendige Körper] eine Seele hat." Translation Steinkellner 1979: 125-126. ^b *katham* with no equivalent in PVin (but see PVin_{Tib} 42*,31: *ji ltar*).

⁴⁷ See above, §2.1.2, and Prets 1999: 333-336. On *trairūpya* see, e.g., Katsura 1985.

property to be proved is absent (*vipakṣe 'sattvam*). Now according to Dharmakīrti, co-absence *cannot* be ascertained because the self does not meet the conditions for a perception (*anupalabdhi*lakṣaṇaprāpta), i.e., is (radically) imperceptible (*adrśya*, *atyantaparokṣa*) or beyond cognitive reach (*viprakṣṭa*) for ordinary, non-enlightened living beings.⁴⁸ Thus, the basic problem faced by the (*kevala*)*vyatirekin* is that the scope of the similar and dissimilar instances (*sapakṣa*, *vipakṣa*) is uncertain: what does possess a self, and what not? Indeed, whereas the non-perception of something perceptible allows one to conclude to its absence *hic et nunc*, the non-perception of something imperceptible (*adrśyānupalabdhi*) does not allow one to treat this imperceptible thing as nonexistent, be it linguistically, cognitively or practically.⁴⁹ Dharmakīrti himself spells this out as follows in PV 4 and PVin 3:

And one knows that breath, etc., [which fulfil the conditions for perception,] exist or do not exist by perceiving [them] somewhere [i.e., in a living body]. If one could similarly perceive the self [somewhere], one could know that it exists or does not exist [there].⁵⁰

Or, equivalently:

It is indeed by perceiving [them] somewhere that one knows that breath, etc., exist [there] or not. But [it is] not so [in the case of] the self. Therefore one does not know whether it exists or not.⁵¹

As a consequence,

because [the self] is beyond cognitive reach, the occurrence or the absence of the self [in this or that thing] is not established; therefore, [the occurrence or

⁴⁸ On the acknowledgement of the self's imperceptibility by most Ātmavādin, see below, fn. 71, p. 139.

⁴⁹ On the distinction between *drśya*- and *adrśya-anupalabdhi*, see, e.g., Katsura 1992: 228–231 and Eltschinger 2010b: 416–419 (§10e); see also Tillemans 1999 and Ono 1999: 309–310.

⁵⁰ PV 4.212: *prāṇādeś ca kvacid drṣṭyā sattvāsattvaṃ pratīyate / tathātmā yadi drṣyeta sattvāsattvaṃ pratīyeta*^a //. [^a *pratīyeta* em. (Tib. *rtogs par 'gyur*) : *pratīyate* Ed.] See Ono 1999: 310, fn. 26.

⁵¹ PVin 3 118,10–11: *prāṇādayo 'pi hi kvacid darśanād eva sadasataḥ pratīyante / na caivam ātmeti na tasya sadasattvapratītiḥ* //. See Ono 1999: 310, fn. 26.

the absence] of breath, etc., [is not established] either in the [things that possess or do not possess a self].⁵²

And since this cannot be known, neither co-presence nor co-absence can be ascertained, because one cannot ascertain that breath, etc., are only present where the self is present. As Iwata has it,

[i]n the above-mentioned refutation of the Naiyāyikas' claim of the mere negative concomitance, Dharmakīrti does not resort to the argument that since the reason "breathing, etc." belongs only to the subject of inference, it is absent from both similar and dissimilar instances. The basis for his refutation is that since similar instances include a self, which is beyond the sphere of cognition, it is impossible to ascertain whether the reason is present in them or not. In other words, he reduces the uncommon [*asādhāraṇa*, VE/IR] reason to the reason that is doubtful with regard to both the positive and negative concomitance.⁵³

But the reason why neither co-presence nor co-absence can be ascertained is that the two properties lack both types of natural relation, viz. identity (*tādātmya*) and causality (*tadutpatti*).⁵⁴ This is Dharmakīrti's claim at the very beginning of his discussion of the over-exclusive logical reason in PV 4:

[We] call "invariable relation" the fact that the exclusion [of the logical reason from the dissimilar instances] is conclusive. And this [conclusiveness does] not [occur] in the case of [logical reasons, such as "breath, etc.," that are] not related [to the property to be proved]. It is because of this [relation] that co-presence is warranted[, not by means of mere non-perception]. For the [the logical reason's] possessing co-absence can [only] be established if [it is] established [that the *probandum*] is identical [with the *proban*s] or is the cause [of the latter]. Therefore, in the [case of an over-]specific [logical reason], neither co-absence nor co-presence [is established].⁵⁵

⁵² PVin 3 116,10–11: *viprakarṣād ātmano vṛttivyatirekāsiddhes tatra prāṇādīnām api* /. See also Iwata 2004: 123.

⁵³ Iwata 2004: 124.

⁵⁴ See Iwata 2004: 125.

⁵⁵ PV 4.205–206: *aikāntikatvaṃ vyāvṛtter avinābhāva ucyate / tac ca nāpratibaddheṣu tata evānvayasthitiḥ // svātmatve hetubhāve vā siddhe hi vyatirekitā / sidhyed ato viśeṣe na vyatireko na cānvayaḥ* //. See also Ono 1999: 308.

Now, the type of natural relation that obtains between breath and the self cannot be one of identity, as Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla make clear by pointing out that the Ātmavādin himself ascribes to breath properties (such as impermanence, non-omnipresence and corporeality) that are contrary to those that he attributes to the self.⁵⁶

Since obviously breath and the self are distinct, the only type of natural relation that can obtain between them is that of causality. In Dharmakīrti's system, the ascertainment of causality relies on a complex empirical procedure involving several perceptions and non-perceptions.⁵⁷ Now, the reason why this method of ascertaining causality does not apply to the inference of the self is – once again – that the self is radically imperceptible (*atyantaparokṣa*):

One could know their relation through perception and non-perception, but these [perception and non-perception] are not established for [something] radically imperceptible [such as the self].⁵⁸

Dharmakīrti spells this out in PV 4:

Objection: The absence of [the logical reason] breath, etc., pervades [the absence of the property to be proved, namely] selflessness. Therefore [the logical reason] breath, etc., must be absent when [the property to be proved,] the self, is absent. [Answer:] This is not [the case], because the absence of the one [i.e., the self,] is not [necessarily] related (*ayoga*) to the absence of the other one [breath, etc.]. Objection: Then [breath, etc., will be either] identical [to the self or] born from it. [Answer:] This is not [the case either, for this relation] is [only] established if one perceives this [breath, etc.,] when one perceives the

⁵⁶ TSP_K 89,11–13/TSP_S 82,32–33 (together with TS 209ab): *tayor ātmaprāṇādikayor na tādātmyalakṣaṇaḥ sambandho 'sti svabhāvabhedābhyupagamāt / tathā hy anityā avyāpino mūrttās ca prāṇādayaḥ / tadviparītas tv ātmā /*. “Between these two [i.e.,] the self [on the one hand] and breath, etc., [on the other hand,] there is no relation characterized as identity, because it is admitted that they differ in nature. [And] indeed, [according to you, things] like breath are impermanent, non-omnipresent and corporeal, whereas the self [has properties that are] contrary to [all] this.” The text is quoted in full below, fn. 63, p. 135. On the attempt by some Ātmavādins to show that breath is not merely corporeal, see above, fn. 18, p. 122.

⁵⁷ On the determination of causality, see, e.g., Kajiyama 1963, Inami 1999, Lasic 1999 and Lasic 2003; see also below, fn. 103, p. 149.

⁵⁸ PVin 3 118,7–8: *upalambhānupalambhābhyāṃ hi tayoḥ pratibandhaṃ jānīyāt / tau cātyantaparokṣasya na sidhyataḥ /*. See also Iwata 2004: 126–127.

self, and if one does not cognize [the self] when one does not cognize [breath, etc.]. Now, [these] perception and non-perception are not established for [the self, which is] radically imperceptible.⁵⁹

As a consequence,

[a logical reason such as “breath, etc.” is a cause of doubt] because [the self can]not [be] established through [breath, etc., which are] something different [from it but] are not [its] effects. [And] indeed, a causality relationship between [things] like breath and the self is not established, because this [causality relationship] rests on the perception [of breath, etc., whenever one perceives the self,] and the non-perception [of the self whenever one perceives breath, etc.]. Therefore it is not the case that [the self] exists when [breath, etc., which are] not related [to it], exist. Therefore there is [only] doubt.⁶⁰

As Ono nicely puts it, “[t]he reason why so-called ‘pure negative’ logical reason is fallacious is, paradoxical as it may be, that it does not have negative concomitance in Dharmakīrti’s sense.”⁶¹

⁵⁹ PV 4.208–210: *prāṇādyabhāvo nairātmyavyāpīti vinivartane / ātmano vinivarteta prāṇādir yadi tac ca na // anyasya vinivṛttyānyavinivṛtter ayogataḥ / tadātmā tatprasūtaś cen naitad ātmopalambhane // tasyopalambdhāv agatāv agatau ca prasi-dhyati / te cātyantaparokṣasya dṛṣṭyadrṣṭi na sidhyataḥ //*. See also Ono 1999: 309.

⁶⁰ PVin 3 116,11–13: *arthāntarād akāryabhūtād asiddheś ca / na hi kāryakāraṇabhā-vaḥ prāṇādīnām ātmanaś ca sidhyati / tasyopalambhānupalambhāśrayatvāt / tena nāpratibaddhasya bhāve bhāva iti saṃśayaḥ* /. See Iwata 2004: 126; note also PVin 3 117,8–12: *sa cātmapratibandhas tādātmyatadutpattibhyām anyo nāstīty uktam / te ca darśanena vinā na sidhyataḥ / tan nātmāvinābhāvī prāṇādīḥ / tata eva nātma-nivṛttāv asya nivṛttir api / yato vyatirekīty ucyate / na hy apratibaddhaḥ kasyacin nivṛttau niyamena nivartate / tasmād viśeṣasya na vyatireko nānvayaḥ* /. “And [we have already] said that [breath’s] relation to the self [can]not be other than identity or causality. Now, these two [types of relation] are not established without percep-tion[, but the self is imperceptible].^a Therefore breath, etc., have no [ascertained] invariable relation to the self[, and] this is the reason why those [breath, etc.] are not absent when the self is absent [simply] because one says that they possess co-absence. Indeed, [x] is not necessarily absent when a certain [y to which x is] not related is absent. Therefore, the [over-]specific [logical reason] has neither co-absence nor co-presence.” [^a According to PVinT *Tshe* D155b4–5: *de’i bdag ñid dan de las ‘byuñ ba de dag kyañ gañ la mthoñ ba yod pa de ñid la ‘grub la / bdag ni mthoñ ba med pa de’i phyir* /.] See Ono 1999: 308, fn. 22.

⁶¹ Ono 1999: 308.

In the TS(P), Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla give a synthetic account of Dharmakīrti's criticism that is worth quoting by way of conclusion:⁶²

Moreover, if a [natural] relation were established between breath, etc., and the self, then this conclusion [would] be sound; otherwise, [it is] inconsistent, [for] when the son of a barren woman is missing, it does not follow as a consequence that the living body [is devoid of breath, etc. And] indeed, the consequence you draw in the case of the absence of breath, etc., [functions] similarly. For if a certain relation characterized either as identity or as causality were established between breath, etc., and the self, then it would be rational to conclude that breath, etc., are absent in the body when the self is lacking. For otherwise, the conclusion that the one (*anya*) is absent when [the other one, which is] not related [to it], is absent, would be inconsistent, because of its absurdity. [And] indeed, breath, etc., [which are] not related to it, are not [necessarily] absent when the son of a barren woman is absent. Therefore, when someone draws the [following] conclusion: "It follows that breath, etc., which are not related to it, are absent when the son of a barren woman is absent, as [in] a pot," [this conclusion] is inconclusive. In the same way, your own conclusion to the effect that breath, etc., are absent when the self is absent is strictly inconclusive. Here the meaning is: because a [natural] relation [between them] is unestablished. In order to [answer the following objection:] "But how [is it] that a [natural] relation [between them] is unestablished?", [Śāntarakṣita] says: First, [the relation that obtains] in this [case] is not [one of] identity, because it is acknowledged that both of them differ [in nature]. But [there is] no causality relation [between them], because [if there were,] it would follow [that breath, etc., would be produced] at one time. Therefore how [can] breathing up and down (*prāṇāpāna*), etc., which are de-

⁶² The passage answers the following objection in TSP_K 82,6–11/TSP_S 76,26–31 (together with TS 184): *punaḥ sa eva vyatirekinam hetum ātmasiddhaye prayuktavān – nedaṃ nirātmakam jīvaccharīram aprāṇādīmatvaprasaṅgād ghaṭādivad iti / tad darśayati – prāṇādibhir viyuktaś ca jīvaddeho bhaved ayam / nairātmyād ghaṭavat tasmān naivāsty asya nirātmātā //*. "But the same [author]^a has used the logical reason that [supposedly] possesses [only] co-absence in order to prove [the existence of] the self: 'This living body is not selfless, because [if it were,] it would follow that it would not possess breath, etc., like a pot.' [Śāntarakṣita] presents this [argument in the next stanza]: 'Moreover, this living body would be devoid of breath, etc., because [it would] be selfless, like a pot. Therefore, it is not selfless.'" [^a *sa* most likely refers back to Uddyotakara (mentioned in TSP_K 81,9/TSP_S 76,1).] On this passage see Kapstein 1989.

void of [any] relation to the [self], be absent from the body when the self is absent [from it]? [...] Between these two [i.e.,] the self [on the one hand,] and breath, etc., [on the other hand,] there is no relation characterized as identity, because it is admitted that they differ in nature. [And] indeed, [according to you, things] like breath are impermanent, non-omnipresent and corporeal, whereas the self [has properties that are] contrary to [all] this. Moreover, [there is] no [relation] characterized as causality [between the self and breath, etc.,] because [if there were,] it would follow that breath, etc., would [be produced] at one time since they would have a complete cause [independent of any cooperating factor, i.e., a permanent self]. Now, there is no other [type of] relation except these [two, viz. identity and causality]. Therefore how [can] breath, etc., which are devoid of [any] relation [to a self], be absent from the body (*tanoḥ śarīrāt*) specified by life [when the self is supposedly absent]? [...] One must consider that this renders null and void those [things] that, like desire, aversion, effort, pleasure, pain and cognition, are presented by the opponents as [inferential] marks of the self, because they have no relation [with the self. Here,] the formal application [is as follows]: Whatever is not related to x does not make x known, as a crane? (*balāka*), etc., does not make sesamum, etc., known. Now, breath, etc., are not related to the self. [The logical reason involved in the argument is] the non-perception of the pervader.⁶³

⁶³ TSP_K 88,22–89,19/TSP_S 82,16–83,7 (together with TS 207–210): *prāṇādīnām ca sambandho yadi siddhaḥ sahātmanā / bhavet tadā prasaṅgo 'yaṃ yujyate 'saṅgato 'nyathā // na vandhyāsutaśūnyatve jīvaddehaḥ prasajyate / prāṇādivirahe hy evaṃ tavāpy etat prasaṅjanam // yadi hi prāṇādīnām ātmanā saha tādātmyalakṣaṇas tadutpattilakṣaṇo vā kaścit sambandhaḥ siddho bhavet tadātmanivṛttau śarīre prāṇādinivṛttiprasaṅgo yuktimān bhavet / anyathā hy apratibaddhasya nivṛttāv anya-nivṛttiprasaṅgo 'saṅgata eva syād atiprasaṅgāt / na hi vandhyāputranivṛttau tad-asambaddhānām prāṇādīnām nivṛttir bhavati / tasmād yathā vandhyāsūnūnivṛttau^a tadasambaddhānām prāṇādīnām nivṛttiḥ prāpnoti ghaṭādivad iti kenacit prasaṅgāpādanaṃ kriyamāṇam anaikāntikaṃ bhavati / evaṃ tavāpy etad ātmanivṛttau prāṇādinivṛttiprasaṅjanam anaikāntikaṃ eva / sambandhāsiddher iti bhāvaḥ / kathaṃ punaḥ sambandhāsiddhir ity āha – na tāvad iha tādātmyaṃ bhedāṅgīkaraṇāt tayoḥ / kāryakāraṇatā nāpi yaugapadyaprasaṅgataḥ // tad ātmano nivṛttau hi tatsambandhavivarjitāḥ / kim amī vinivartante prāṇāpānādayas tanoḥ // [...] taylor ātmaprāṇādikayor na tādātmyalakṣaṇaḥ sambandho 'sti svabhāvabhedābhyupagamāt / tathā hy anityā avyāpino mūrttāś ca prāṇādayaḥ / tadviparītas tv ātmā / nāpi tadutpattilakṣaṇaḥ / prāṇādīnām avikalakāraṇatvena yaugapadyaprasaṅgāt / na caitadvyatirekeṇa sambandhāntaram asti / tasmāt sambandharahitāḥ prāṇāda-*

2.1.5. Dharmakīrti's Argument in PVin 3 and NB 3

Both in PVin 3 and NB 3,⁶⁴ Dharmakīrti further develops against the *vyatirekin* a line of argument initiated in the context of his discussion of Dignāga's example of an over-exclusive logical reason (*asādhāraṇ[ānai-kāntik]ahetu*), viz. "because it is audible" (*śrāvaṇatvāt*). He explains this reason's inconclusiveness as follows:

The over-exclusive [logical reason *śrāvaṇatvāt*] is a cause of doubt too, for [both its] occurrence [in the similar instances] and [its] absence [from the dissimilar instances] are doubtful[, and this for two reasons: first] because, since no[thing] can remain outside the two[, viz. being permanent or being impermanent, this logical reason] cannot be ascertained as lacking in both [of them; and second,] because there is no demonstration of the cognition that it exists in one of the two.⁶⁵

Applied to the *vyatirekin*, this argument runs as follows:

When these two characteristics [i.e., the presence of the logical reason in the similar instances and its absence in the dissimilar instances] are doubtful, [the logical reason is also] inconclusive, as [it is the case in the following argument:] "The living body possesses a self, because it is endowed with [things] like breath."⁶⁶⁶⁷ [This over-exclusive logical reason is inconclusive for two reasons: first, because] apart from what possesses a self and what does

yaḥ kim iti tanoḥ śarīrāj jīvanaviśiṣṭād vinivartate / [...] etenecchādveṣaprayatna-sukhaduḥkhaññānādīni yāny ātmaliṅga tvena parair uktāni tāni pratiśiddhāni draṣṭavyāni / sambandhāsiddheḥ / prayogo ye yatra na pratibaddhās te tasya gamakā na bhavanti yathā tilāder balākādayaḥ / na pratibaddhāś ca prāṇādaya ātmanīti vyāpakānupalabdhiḥ / .^a vandhyāsūnūnivr̥ttau em. (TSP_K, TSP_{Tib} D198b6) : vandhyāsūnūnivr̥ttau tadā sambaddhānivr̥ttau TSP_S.

⁶⁴ See PVin 3 115,9–116,2 (see Iwata 2004: 119–121 and Ono 1999: 310, fn. 27) and NB_M 3.96–108/NB_S 3.98–110 (quoted below, fn. 69, p. 137).

⁶⁵ PVin 3 45,10–46,1: *asādhāraṇo 'py ubhayavyāvṛtter niścayāyogāt / ubhayabahir-bhūtasyābhāvāt / ubhayor ekatra bhāve ca pratīśādhanaḥ bhāvāt pravṛttinivr̥tityoḥ saṁśayād eva saṁśayahetuḥ /*. See Iwata 2004: 116 and fn. 35; see also Iwata 2004: 111–112.

⁶⁶ NB_T_M 214,19–20/NB_T_S 76,3–4: *prāṇāḥ śvāsādaya ādir yasyonmeṣanimeṣādeḥ prāṇidharmasya sa prāṇādīḥ*.

⁶⁷ NB_T_M 214,20/NB_T_S 76,5: *ayam asādhāraṇaḥ saṁśayahetur upapāditavyaḥ*.

not possess a self, there is indeed no [third] group⁶⁸ (*rāśī*) where [things] like breath could be present, for the presence and the exclusion of a self include all [existing things]. And [second, because] the presence [of things like breath] in [any]one of these two is not ascertained, for [things] like breath are not established [to exist] in [anything] known as possessing a self or not possessing a self. Therefore, because [things] like breath, which are related to the living body [i.e., which are properties of the subject of the argument], are not established as being excluded from anything possessing a self or not possessing a self, they are not absent from any of them. Neither do [things like breath] have co-presence with them, because [things like breath] are not established [to exist] in that which is of one [of these two] nature[s]. Nor is there [any] ascertainment of [the fact that] these [things] lack co-presence and co-absence with that which possesses a self and that which does not possess a self, because the ascertainment of the non-existence of the one[, say co-presence,] is invariably connected to the ascertainment of the existence of the other[, say co-absence], for co-presence and co-absence have the nature of a mutual exclusion. Therefore, since co-presence and co-absence are doubtful, [such a logical reason] is inconclusive, because there is no ascertainment of [either] the [property] to be proved or the contradictory (*itara*) [one] through it.⁶⁹

⁶⁸ DhPr 216,21: *rāśiḥ prakāraḥ*.

⁶⁹ NB_M 3.96–108/NB_S 3.98–110: *anayor eva dvayo rūpayoḥ sandehe 'naikāntikaḥ // 98/96 // yathā sātmaḥ jīvaccharīraṃ prāṇādīmatvād iti // 99/97 // na hi sātmaṃ nirātmakābhyām anyo rāśir asti yatra prāṇādir varteta^a // 100/98 // ātmano vṛttivyavacchedābhyām sarvasaṅgrahāt // 101/99 // nāpy anayor ekaṭra vṛttiniścayaḥ // 102/100 // sātmatkatvena nirātmakatvena vā prasiddhe prāṇāder asiddheḥ^b // 103/101 // tasmā jīvaccharīrasambandhī prāṇādīḥ sātmaḥ anātmakāc ca sarvasmād vyāvṛttatvenāsiddhes tābhyām na vyatiricyate^c // 104/102 // na tātrānveti // 105/103 // ekātmāny apy asiddheḥ // 106/104 // nāpi sātmaḥ nirātmakāc ca tasyānvayavyatirekayor abhāvaniścayaḥ // 107/105 // ekābhāvaniścayaḥ yāpārabhāvaniścayanāntarīyakatvāt^d // 108/106 // anvayavyatirekayor anyonyavyavacchedarūpatvāt / ata^e evānvayavyatirekayoḥ sandehād anaikāntikaḥ // 109/107 // sādhyetarayor ato niścayābhāvāt // 110/108 // .[^a varteta em. (PVin 3 115,9; NB_M [vartate (varteta)]); NB_T_M 216,6/NB_T_S 76,19) : vartate Eds. ^b asiddheḥ NB_M (cf. PVin 3 115,11 and NB_T_M 217,9/NB_T_S 77,13) : asiddhis tābhyām na vyatiricyate NB_S. ^c āsiddhes tābhyām na vyatiricyate NB_M (cf. PVin 3 115,12 and NB_T_M 218,6/NB_T_S 77,20) : °āsiddhiḥ NB_S. ^d °nāntarīyakatvāt NB_M (cf. NB_T_S 79,1 and 2/NB_T_M 220,6 and 7) : °nāntarīyavatvāt NB_S. ^e NB_S ata (cf. PVin 3 116,1) : tata NB_M.]*

For references to the (shorter) parallel passage of PVin 3, see above, fn. 64, p. 136.

In this argument, Dharmakīrti no longer explicitly resorts to the two issues of mere non-perception as a method of ascertaining co-absence and the natural relation that must obtain between the *probans* and the *probandum*. As Iwata remarks, Dharmakīrti's claim that the over-exclusive logical reason is inconclusive relies on the excluded middle (*tertium non datur*): it is impossible that something real be neither possessed of a self nor lacking a self. But since the self is imperceptible, the alternative cannot be adequately construed and hence it cannot be decided whether breath occurs in things endowed with a self or in self-less things. In Iwata's explanation:

In the first ground Dharmakīrti points out that the reason "breathing, etc.," should necessarily be present either in some things that possess a self or in others that do not possess a self and that there is no third thing beside these two. The negation of the third thing indicates that the alternatives are exactly contradictory. In the second ground he states that it is impossible to determine in which of the two alternatives "breathing, etc." resides. From these two grounds he derives the conclusion that both the positive concomitance, i.e., "breathing, etc.," is present only in things that possess a self, and the negative concomitance, i.e., "breathing, etc.," is never present in things that do not possess a self, are doubtful.⁷⁰

2.2. AGAINST THE INFERABILITY OF THE SELF

2.2.1. *The Self's Imperceptibility and the Ātmavādin's Inference of the Self from Its Effects*

Dharmakīrti briefly develops a second line of argument against the self while criticizing *adarśanamātra* as the means to establish co-absence. It basically consists in accusing the Ātmavādin of inconsistency insofar as he admits that mere non-perception can prove non-existence in general but refuses to apply this proof to the self, which he regards as imperceptible.

As a matter of fact, many Ātmavādins – among whom several Naiyāyika authors – assert that the self is imperceptible and must therefore

⁷⁰ Iwata 2004: 120.

be inferred;⁷¹ and the Vaiśeṣikas explicitly argue that the self's non-perception is no evidence for the self's non-existence, since this non-perception is due to another cause, namely the self's subtlety (*saukṣmya*).⁷² Dharmakīrti ironically notes that by doing so, the Ātmavādin leaves himself wide open to the same criticism as the Materialist (*cārvāka*) – who happens to be a staunch opponent of *ātmavāda*⁷³: just as the Materialist contends that non-existence can be established through mere non-perception while regarding consciousness as an imperceptible power of material elements,⁷⁴ in the same way, the Ātmavādin sees non-perception as a proof of non-existence but nonetheless asserts the existence of an imperceptible self. Dharmakīrti takes this opportunity to criticize what may be viewed as the very foundation of the classic demonstration of the self, i.e., the inference of its existence

⁷¹ See, e.g., NBh 16,1–2, introducing NSū 1.1.10: *tatrātmā tāvat pratyakṣato na gṛhyate / sa kim āptopadeśamātrād eva pratipadyata iti / nety ucyate / anumānāc ca pratipattavya iti* /. “Among the [enumerated objects of knowledge], the self, to begin with, is not grasped through perception. [We answer the question] ‘Is it only known through the sole teaching of an authoritative [person]?’ [in the following way]: ‘No. [The self] can also be known through inference.’” However, the Naiyāyikas are not unanimous in this respect. See, e.g., Chakravarti 1982: 226, fn. 8, and Watson 2006: 131, fn. 25. Whereas Uddyotakara and Udayana defend the thesis according to which the self is perceived, Jayanta shares with the author of the NBh the opinion that the self is imperceptible.

⁷² See, e.g., PDhS 14,16–15,2 (quoted below, fn. 76, p. 140) and NK 176,10–12 ad loc.: *tatsadbhāve bādhakaṃ pramāṇaṃ nāsti pratyakṣānupalabdher anyathāsiddhatvāt sādhaṃ ca pramāṇam anumānam astīti pratipādayann āha tasyeti / pratyakṣopabaddhiyogya tāvirahaḥ sauṣmyam* /. “[Praśastapāda] states [the following sentence beginning with the word] *tasya* while showing that there is no means of valid cognition disproving the existence of the [self], because the non-perception [of the self] through direct perception is accounted for otherwise [than due to the self's non-existence, i.e., due to the self's subtlety], and because there is a means of valid cognition proving [that the self exists, namely] inference. Being subtle [means] lacking the capacity to be perceived.”

⁷³ The Cārvākas' critique of the *ātman* apparently consisted in a *dehātmavāda* (see, e.g., Bhattacharya 2009: 98, fn. 71), i.e., in arguing that “the so-called *ātman* [...] is nothing but another name for the body” (Namai 1976a: 31). On this critique see, e.g., NM_M II.267,9–13/NM_V II.201,24–202,1 (quoted below, fn. 99, p. 147), Namai 1976b: 62–69 and Bhattacharya 2009: 148–156.

⁷⁴ See below, fn. 99, p. 147, and 165, p. 170.

as an imperceptible cause assumed so as to account for a number of perceptible effects.

Admittedly, the modalities of the self's inference vary according to the interpretation given of the marks of the self enumerated in NSū 1.1.10 and VSū 3.2.4. Thus, as seen above, Vaiśeṣikas claim to infer the self as an agent from the existence of actions such as breathing,⁷⁵ and the statement that the self must be inferred as the agent of the action of perception is found both in Vaiśeṣika⁷⁶ and Naiyāyika⁷⁷ sources.

⁷⁵ See, e.g., PDhS 15,8–10 (quoted above, fn. 84, p. 24, and fn. 14, p. 120), NK 211,8–212,2 and VSV 28,16–18 (quoted above, fn. 14, p. 120).

⁷⁶ See, e.g., PDhS 14,16–15,2: *tasya sauṣṭmyād apratyakṣatve sati karaṇaiḥ śabdādya-upalabdhyānumitaiḥ śrotrādibhiḥ samadhigamaḥ kriyate / vāsyādīnāṃ karaṇānāṃ kartṛprayoḥyatvadarśanāt / śabdādiṣu prasiddhyā ca prasādhako 'numīyate /* "Because [the self] is not perceptible due to its subtlety, [we] know [it indirectly] through the instruments [of perception] such as the auditory organ and [the other sense organs, which are themselves] inferred from the perception of sound and so on, because [we] observe that instruments such as an axe must be used by an agent. And [the self] is inferred [as] the knower (*prasādhaka*) through the knowledge (*prasiddhi*) of sounds and so on." On the inference of the sense organs alluded to here, see below, fn. 92, p. 144, and 93, p. 145. Praśastapāda must have in mind VSū 3.1.2: *indriyārthaprasiddhir indriyārthebhyo 'rthāntaratve hetuḥ /* "The knowledge (*prasiddhi*) of the *indriyārthas* is a reason [for knowing] that [the self] is distinct from the *indriyārthas*." On the difficulties of this *sūtra* (notably the meaning of the compound *indriyārtha* and its various interpretations) see Oetke 1988: 303–319. VSV 25,6–7 (which analyzes the compound as a *dvandva*) explains: *grāhyāṇām arthānāṃ śabdādīnāṃ yeyam prasiddhis tayā ca śrotrādīnāṃ karaṇānāṃ / anayen-driyārthaprasiddhyaibhyo grāhyagrahaṇebhya indriyārthebhyah paro grahitātmā-numīyate /* "[We] know (*prasiddhi*) the apprehended objects such as sound, and through this [knowledge, we know] the instruments such as the auditory organ; [and it is] through this [very] knowledge of the sense organs and [their] objects that [we] infer [something] different from [both] these apprehended [things] and the [instrumental] apprehension [itself, i.e., from the sense organs and their objects; and this inferred entity is] the apprehender, the self." Cf. VSV 26,11 ad VSū 3.1.8: *indriyāṇi kartṛyoḥyāni karaṇatvād vāsyādivad iti /* "The sense organs must be used by an agent, because they are instruments, like an axe."

⁷⁷ See, e.g., NBh 16,5–20, which explains that the marks of the self mentioned in NSū 1.1.10 all involve a synthetic cognitive activity (*pratisandhāna*) that presupposes a single knowing agent (*jñātṛ*). On this argument see Oetke 1988: 254–259, Watson 2006: 141, fn. 58, Ratié 2011a: 66–69, and below, fn. 206, p. 181, and 207, p. 182. While commenting on NSū 3.1.1, the NBh develops an argument somewhat different but also based on the idea that cognitive activity involves a form of synthesis

Alternatively, the self is inferred as the substratum (*āśraya*) or the property-bearer (*guṇin*) in which this or that property (*guṇa*) must reside; this latter strategy is found both in Vaiśeṣika⁷⁸ and Naiyāyika⁷⁹ texts (and is mentioned in both Buddhist⁸⁰ and Brahmanical⁸¹ sources

(*anusandhāna*) that requires a single agent (we are capable of recognizing an object that has been perceived through the visual sense in the past and that is now perceived through the sense of touch, and the synthesis of various perceptual cognitions involved in this recognition shows that there is a unitary agent of these cognitions). On the latter argument see Oetke 1988: 260–268, Chakrabarti 1992, Preisendanz 1994: 163–187 and Ganeri 2000. See also NM_M II.293,7–8/NM_V II.220,1–2, which mentions the Vaiśeṣika argument according to which sense organs must be used by an agent: *kartṛprayojyatā khalu dṛṣṭā dātrādikaraṇajātasya / tvakśrotrādy api karaṇam tathaiva kartrā prayujyeta^a //*. [^a *prayujyeta* NM_M: *prayujyate* NM_V.] “Surely, [we] observe that what happens to be an instrument, such as a sickle, must be used by an agent; and exactly in the same way, the skin, ears and so on, which are instruments, must be used by an agent.”

⁷⁸ See, e.g., VSV 29,5 ad VSū 3.2.4: *sukhādayaś ca guṇisāpekṣāḥ / guṇatvāt / rūpavat /*. “And pleasure, etc., stand in need of a property-bearer, because [they] are properties, just as colour.” Cf. PDhS 16,3–4: *sukhaduḥkhecchādveṣaprayatnais ca guṇair guṇy anumiyate / te ca na śarīrendriyaguṇāḥ /*. “And [the self] is inferred [as] a property-bearer through the properties that are pleasure, pain, desire, aversion and effort; and these are not properties of the body or of the sense organs.”

⁷⁹ See, e.g., NBh 12,16–19 ad NSū 1.1.5 (quoted below, fn. 89, p. 143) and NV 64,12–13 ad NSū 1.1.10: *athaveccchādveṣaprayatnasukhaduḥkhaññānāny ātmano liṅgam ity anyathā varṇayanti / guṇā icchādayaḥ / guṇāś ca paratantrā bhavantīti nyāyaḥ /*. “Alternatively, [some] explain [the aphorism] ‘Desire, aversion, effort, pleasure, pain and cognitions are marks of the self’ otherwise. Desire, etc., are properties, and the principle [underlying this alternative explanation is] that properties are dependent [on something else].” After showing that the list of NSū 1.1.10 is indeed a list of properties, and that these properties cannot belong to the body, NV 64,17–18 concludes: *tatpratiṣedhāc cātmaguṇatvam iti pāriśeṣyāt siddha ātmeti /*. “And because [we] have negated that [the body may be the substance on which these properties are dependent, these properties must] be properties of the self; thus the self is established by [way of] elimination.”

⁸⁰ See, e.g., AKBh_{Pr} 475,22–23/AKBh_{LE} 148,11–12: *avaśyam ātmābhyupagantavyaḥ / smṛtyādīnāṃ guṇapadārthatvāt / tasya ca guṇapadārthasyāvaśyam^a dravyāśritatvāt / teṣāṃ cānyāśrayāyogād iti /*. [^a AKBh_{LE} *ca guṇapadārthasyāvaśyam* : AKBh_{Pr} *cārthād avaśyam*.] “[The Vaiśeṣika:] The self must necessarily be admitted, because memory, etc., belong to the category of properties, because [everything that belongs to] the category of properties must necessarily reside in a substance, and because there can be no other substratum [for these properties besides the self].”

that set out to criticize it). The two modalities of inference – that which rests on the necessity of an agent, and that which rests on the necessity of a substratum – are sometimes conflated,⁸² but most importantly, the marks may also be regarded as effects (*kārya*) that must be explained by assuming an imperceptible cause. Thus Candrānanda for instance explains that the self must be inferred as the cause (*nimitta*) of breath, etc.⁸³

Dharmakīrti denies any validity to such an inference on the grounds that the so-called marks of the self cannot be determined as effects of an imperceptible cause. Relying again on his definition of the ascertainment of an entity x as being an effect of an entity y through a series of perceptions and non-perceptions,⁸⁴ he argues that an imperceptible entity cannot be considered the cause of anything since the co-presence and the co-absence between this entity and its alleged effect cannot be determined through perception.⁸⁵

On the role of memory in the demonstrations of the self see, e.g., Ratié 2006 and Ratié 2011a: 62–80; see also below, §2.2.4.

⁸¹ See, e.g., ŚV *ātmavāda* 101, where the Vaiśeṣika answers the objection of his Buddhist opponent thus: *guṇatvād āśritatvaṃ hi sukhādeḥ syād rasādivat / ya āśritaḥ sa ātmā [...]* // “For pleasure, etc., since they are properties just as taste, etc., must reside [in some substratum]; and that in which [they] reside is the self.”

⁸² See, e.g., NK 177,8–10 ad PDhS 14,16–15,2 (quoted above, fn. 76, p. 140): *śabdādiṣu viṣayeṣu prasiddhir jñānaṃ tatrapī prasādhako jñātānumīyate / jñānaṃ kvacid āśritaṃ kriyātvāc chidikriyāvat / yatredam āśritaṃ sa ātmā /*. “The knower (*prasādhaka*) [i.e.,] the knowing agent (*jñātṛ*), is inferred with respect to knowledge (*prasiddhi*) [i.e.,] the cognition (*jñāna*) of objects such as sound. A cognition must reside in some [substratum], because it is an action, such as the action of cutting. That in which it resides is the self.”

⁸³ See VSV 29,14–16, quoted above, fn. 20, p. 124. Although the NBh and NV do not seem to present “desire, etc.” (the self’s marks enumerated in NSū 1.1.10) as effects, Jayanta does; see below, fn. 90, p. 144.

⁸⁴ See above, fn. 57, p. 132, and 58, p. 132, and PVT *Je* D38a6/P45b1–2, quoted below, fn. 103, p. 149.

⁸⁵ It should be noted that in the SAS, Dharmakīrti defends the thesis that the existence of other cognitive series is legitimately inferred, even in the idealistic perspective of the Vijñānavādins, from our perception of actions that we know not to have performed ourselves. In other words, Dharmakīrti acknowledges that although one cognitive series cannot be perceived by another (at least in the case of ordinary persons), we can infer the existence of other cognitive series from action regarded

The PVSV then anticipates an argument that the Ātmavādin could put forward in response to this attack:⁸⁶ although the self is imperceptible, it can be legitimately inferred through an inference of the *sāmānyato dṛṣṭam* type. This kind of reasoning is capable of establishing the existence of entities by nature imperceptible⁸⁷ since it shows that without the existence of these entities – conceived by analogy with other perceptible causes as some indeterminate⁸⁸ imperceptible cause – this or that particular phenomenon would remain inexplicable. It is often used to infer the self either as the substratum⁸⁹ or as the cause⁹⁰ of its

as their effect. See, e.g., the first verse of the treatise, the Sanskrit text of which is preserved in Rāmakaṇṭha's NPP 62,9–10 (see Kitagawa 1955: 3, fn. 8) and Abhinavagupta's ĪPVV II.110,1–2 (see Ratié 2007: 323, fn. 20, and Ratié 2011a: 591): *bud-dhipūrvām kriyām dṛṣṭvā svadehe 'nyatra tadgrahāt / jñāyate^a yadi dhīś cittamātre 'py eṣa nayaḥ samaḥ //*. [^a *jñāyate* NPP, *śes* 'gyur SAS : *kalpyate* ĪPVV.] "If, according to those who consider that objects exist outside of consciousness, one knows [the existence of] a cognition [belonging to another series] because after seeing that in one's own body, [one's own] action presupposes a cognition, one perceives [action] in some other [body,] the same method [is valid] in the [doctrine of] mind-only (*cittamātra*) as well." However, this should not be deemed contradictory to Dharmakīrti's assertion that the inference of an imperceptible self from action regarded as its effect is invalid. First, the inference defended by Dharmakīrti in the SAS does not regard a self understood as a permanent substratum of cognitions (and as such utterly imperceptible) but only a cognitive series (see Kitagawa 1955: 2–3) similar to that which is experienced through the mere self-awareness characterizing any cognition. Second, according to Dharmakīrti the causality relation is established in the case of the inference of other cognitive series (whereas it is not in the case of the inference of a permanent self) precisely because one apprehends through mere self-awareness the invariable concomitance of the momentary cognitive event consisting of a desire to act with the momentary cognition of one's action (on this causal relation in the SAS see, e.g., Inami 2001: 466–468, Katsura 2007: 412–421, Ratié 2007: 323–335 and Ratié 2011a: 590–606).

⁸⁶ See below, fn. 104, p. 149.

⁸⁷ On this type of inference see, e.g., Schuster 1972 and Nenninger 1994. On its use as a means to establish the existence of entities that are by nature always imperceptible (*nityaparokṣa*), see below, fn. 93, p. 145, and 104, p. 149. On its use in the controversy over the existence of *īśvara*, see Krasser 2002: 105; on its use in the controversy over the existence of objects external to consciousness, see Ratié 2011b.

⁸⁸ See below, fn. 96, p. 146, 107, p. 150, and 110, p. 150.

⁸⁹ The NBh and NV thus mention the *sāmānyato dṛṣṭam* inference as a means to establish the self as the substratum of the marks mentioned in NSū 1.1.10. See NBh 12,16–19 ad NSū 1.1.5: *sāmānyato dṛṣṭam nāma yatrāpratyakṣe liṅgaliṅginoh sam-*

marks; here it consists in showing that if some cause – i.e., the self – is not postulated so as to account for such phenomena as breath, etc., these phenomena remain unexplainable.⁹¹ Dharmakīrti mentions the paradigm of this type of inference, i.e., that of the sense organs (*indriya*),⁹² which, although they are bound to remain imperceptible, must be

bandhe kenacid arthena liṅgasya sāmānyād apratyakṣo liṅgī gamyate / yathecchādibhir ātmā / icchādayo guṇāḥ / guṇās ca dravyasaṁsthānāḥ / tad yad eṣāṁ sthānaṁ sa ātmeti /. “What [we] call the *sāmānyato dṛṣṭam* [inference] is that in which, while the relation between the mark and the possessor of the mark is imperceptible, the imperceptible possessor of the mark is understood from the general feature (*sāmānya*) [shared] with something [else] by the mark. For example: the self [is inferred] from desire, etc. Desire, etc., are properties; and properties reside in a substance; therefore their locus is the self.” Uddyotakara, while explaining how the inference of the self is an illustration of *sāmānyato dṛṣṭam*, specifies (NV 48,17) that the self is then inferred from the fact that desire, etc., which are properties, must reside in some substratum (*paratantrā icchādayo guṇatvāt / rūpavad iti /*. “Desire, etc., are dependent [on some other entity] because they are properties, just as colour.”).

⁹⁰ The NBh and NV merely present the marks of the self in NSū 1.1.10 as properties from which the self must be inferred as a substratum (see above, fn. 89, p. 143); however, Jayanta, while mentioning the inference of the self as the paradigm of the *sāmānyato dṛṣṭam* inference, specifies that this substratum is to be inferred from the marks regarded as effects – i.e., according to him the self is to be inferred as a particular type of cause, namely a substratum. See NM_M 1.351,5–6/NM_V 1.194,12–13: *icchādikāryaṁ dehādivilakṣaṇāśrayaṁ śarīrādiṣu bādhakapramāṇopapattau satyāṁ kāryatvād iti sāmānyatodṛṣṭasya kramah /*. “The method of [inference of] an [object] apprehended through a generality is as follows: an effect such as desire has a substratum distinct from the body, etc. [i.e., the self], because it is an effect, [and] given that arguments have been adduced against [the possibility that] the body, etc., [may be this substratum].”

⁹¹ Cf., e.g., VSV 29,14–16 (quoted above, fn. 20, p. 124), explaining *sāmānyato dṛṣṭāt* in VSū 3.2.9 (see above, *ibid.*). Note that the two examples of marks of the self given by Dharmakīrti are “breath, etc.” (*prāṇādi*, not explicitly mentioned here but see, e.g., fn. 113, p. 151) and “pleasure, etc.” (*sukhādi*).

⁹² The term “organ” might appear misleading insofar as the *indriya* of sight, for instance, is more than what we usually consider the visual organ (i.e., the visible body parts called “eyes”). According to Indian philosophers, we must assume the existence of some imperceptible entities (whether they are conceived as atoms or rays, and whether they are thought to enter into contact with their object or not: see Preisendanz 1989: 147–149) residing inside what we ordinarily call our visual organs, and the *indriyas* are precisely these imperceptible perceptual instruments. However, the rather common translation “sense faculties” does not seem relevant

inferred in order to account for the fact of perception.⁹³ The establishment of the *indriyas* through inference is thus put forward here so as to show that entities which stand beyond the perceptual range (and such is the case of the self) can validly be inferred as the causes of effects that would otherwise remain impossible to account for.⁹⁴

Dharmakīrti's reply to this argument is reminiscent of Vasubandhu's concise dismissal of the analogy between the inference of the sense organs and that of the self.⁹⁵ It consists in noticing that in the

either in so far as the sense faculties do not stand in need of any inference: seeing is knowing that one sees, and the Indian philosophers do not mean that we need to infer our sense faculties but rather, that we must infer the existence of the imperceptible instruments (*karaṇa*) that make these sense faculties possible (see below, fn. 93). Provided that one keeps in mind that etymologically, an organ is a bodily "instrument," and that sense organs are not limited to the perceptible body parts called "eye," "ear," etc., the translation "sense organs" therefore appears to us as the least unsatisfactory, given that the *indriyas* are the (bodily) instruments of perception.

⁹³ See below, fn. 104, p. 149. For another mention of the *indriyas*' inference by Dharmakīrti see, e.g., PVS 118,1–4, translated in Eltschinger 2007: 269 (see also *ibid.*: fn. 219–221). Cf., e.g., NM_M I.348,6–11/NM_V I.193,8–12: *sāmānyato dṛṣṭam tu yatra sambandhakāle 'pi liṅgisvarūpam apratyakṣam nityaparokṣam eva sāmānyato vyāptigrahaṇād anumīyate yathā śabdādyupalabdhya śrotrādi karaṇam / indriyāṇām atīndriyatvān na kadācit pratyakṣagamyatvam / atha ca cchedanādikriyāṇām paraśvadhādikaraṇapūrvakatvena vyāptigrahaṇāc chabdādyupalabdhikriyāṇām karaṇapūrvakatvam anumīyate /*. "As for the [inference called] *sāmānyato dṛṣṭam*, [it is the kind of inference] in which one infers, due to [one's] grasping an invariable concomitance on the basis of a generality, [something] whose nature as a mark possessor is imperceptible, always invisible, even at the time when the relation [between the mark and the mark possessor is established] – for instance, an instrument such as the auditory organ [is inferred] thanks to the perception of sounds, etc. Because sense organs are supersensible, [they] can never be directly apprehended. And yet, because one grasps the invariable concomitance of actions such as cutting with [the property of] presupposing instruments such as an axe, one infers that actions such as sound perception presuppose [some] instruments [i.e., the sense organs]." This inference is also alluded to, e.g., in PDhS 14,16–15,2 (see above, fn. 76, p. 140).

⁹⁴ Cf., e.g., NPP 9,1–2: *ata evendriyādir iva kāryāt so 'picchātmakād anumīyata iti naiyāyikāḥ /*. "The Naiyāyikas [contend] that for this very reason, [we] infer this [self] from [its] effect, i.e., desire, just as [we] infer the sense organs, etc." On this passage see Watson 2006: 128–130.

⁹⁵ See AKBh_{Pr} 461,7–12/AKBh_{LE} 36,7–12: *tatredam anumānam / sati kāraṇe kāraṇāntarasyābhāve kāryasyābhāvo dṛṣṭo bhāve ca punar bhāvas tadyathāṅkurasya / saty*

case of the inference of the sense organs, what is inferred is merely a cause in general, i.e., an entity conceived of as devoid of any particularity besides that of contributing in producing a particular effect that arises occasionally.⁹⁶ However, the Ātmavādin claims to infer much more than a cause in general accounting for phenomena such as breath or pleasure: what he intends to establish through this reasoning is the existence of an entity particularized as being a permanent agent and experiencer.⁹⁷ He thus infers much more than is legitimate,⁹⁸ so that his self cannot be said to be perceived even in a purely indirect way, through its alleged effect. And yet, according to the Ātmavādin's own position regarding non-perception, the self's imperceptibility should be enough to establish its nonexistence.

2.2.2. Dharmakīrti's Argument in PVSV 16,8–19: English Translation

Moreover: how [can the Ātmavādin and the Materialist accept] this very non-perception which [according to them] does not establish the nonexistence of

eva cābhāsaprāpte viṣaye manaskāre ca kāraṇe viṣayagrahaṇasyābhāvo dṛṣṭaḥ punaś ca bhāvo 'ndhabadhirādīnām anandhābadhirādīnām ca / atas tatrāpi kāraṇāntarasyābhāvo bhāvaś ca niścīyate / yac ca tatkāraṇāntaraṃ tad indriyam ity etad anumānam / na caivam ātmano 'stīti nāsty ātmā / "The inference of the [sense organs] is as follows: when, while a [certain] cause is present, another cause is absent, the effect is observed not to occur, whereas when [this other cause] is present, [the effect] occurs, e.g., a sprout. And when a [certain] cause [is present, namely, on the one hand,] the object that has appeared, and [on the other hand,] an act of attention, [we] observe that there is no apprehension of the object for [those who are] blind, deaf, etc., whereas [this apprehension] occurs for those who are neither blind nor deaf, etc. Therefore [we] ascertain the absence and presence of another cause for this [apprehension] too; and this other cause is the sense organ. Such is the inference [with respect to the sense organs]. Now, there is no such [inference] for the self; therefore there is no self."

⁹⁶ See below, fn. 106–107, p. 149–150. On this cause in general (*hetumātra*) or mere (indeterminate) cause (*kiñcinmātraṃ nimittam*), see Ratié 2011a: 458, fn. 200 and 201. Cf. Candrānanda's remark that the self, if it is inferred as a *sāmānyato dṛṣṭam*, is only inferred as "some cause" (*kenāpi nimittena*): see above, fn. 20, p. 124.

⁹⁷ See below, fn. 110–111, p. 150.

⁹⁸ The nondualist Śaivas later exploit precisely this line of argument to prove that the Sautrāntikas' inference of external objects is not valid (see Ratié 2011b, particularly fn. 44).

[things] such as the self and consciousness [as a potency] of earth,⁹⁹ [as] that which establishes the absence of the logical reason [from the dissimilar instances]? For the [Ātmavādin¹⁰⁰] who makes non-perception a means of valid cognition [enabling us to cognize the absence of the logical reason from the dissimilar instances], the doctrine of the self would be groundless because, since the self is imperceptible,¹⁰¹ ¹⁰²its effect[, which might serve as an

⁹⁹ PVSVT 73,25–27 (to be compared with PVT Je D38b7–39a1/P46a4–5, where the quotation is missing): *bhūtānām eva śaktiś caitanyam iṣyate cārvākaiḥ / bhūtasva-bhāvā ca mṛd iti / evaṃ mṛdaḥ khalv api caitanyam anupalabhyamānam apīcchan lokāyatikaḥ / yad āha – tebhyo bhūtebhyaś caitanyam madaśaktivad vijñānam iti /*. “The Cārvākas consider that consciousness is a power belonging to material elements only, and that earth consists of a material element. Thus the Lokāyatika considers that consciousness, although it is not perceived, surely belongs to earth; this is what he states in ‘Consciousness (*caitanyam* [...] *vijñānam*) arises from these elements, just as a power of intoxication [arises from a ferment and so on].” On the Bārhaspatya fragments “consciousness arises from these [elements]” (*tebhyas caitanyam /*) and “just as a power of intoxication [arises from a ferment and so on]” (*[kiṇvādibhyo] madaśaktivat /*), see Namai 1976a: 31–32, Namai 1976b: 39 (A4 and A5) and 52, Bhattacharya 2009: 79 (I.4 and I.5) and 121, fn. 49, and Franco 2011: 634^b–636^a. Cf. NM_M II.267,9–13/NM_V II.201,24–202,1: *na cātmasiddhau kiñcana liṅgam asti / jñānādiyogas tu bhūtānām eva pariṇāma viśeṣopapāditaśaktyatiśayajuṣām bhaviṣyati / yathā guḍapiṣṭādayaḥ prāgasatim api madaśaktim āsāditasurākārapariṇāmāḥ prapadyante tathā mṛdādyavasthāyām acetanāny api bhūtāni śarīrākārapariṇatāni caitanyam sprakṣyanti /*. “[The Cārvāka:] And there is no mark whatsoever [that could enable us] to establish the self. Rather, the association with cognitions and so on must belong to the material elements themselves, which possess an additional power brought about by a particular transformation. Just as molasses, flour and so on acquire an intoxicating power – although [this power] was previously absent – when undergoing a transformation into the aspect of liquor, in the same way, material elements, although they are unconscious [when] they are in the state of earth and so on, must reach consciousness when they are transformed into the aspect of the body.” The mention of *mṛt* by Dharmakīrti is most probably a reference to the first of the four material elements acknowledged by the Cārvākas (see Namai 1976b: 39, A2 and Bhattacharya 2009: 78, I.2 for the Bārhaspatya fragment *pṛthivy āpas tejo vāyur iti tattvāni /*. “The constituents of reality are: earth, water, fire, wind.”).

¹⁰⁰ According to the commentaries, Dharmakīrti has in mind “Vaiśeṣikas, etc.” See PVT Je D38a1–2/P45a4: *bye brag pa la sogs pa ’di’i bdag tu smra ba* (**vaiśeṣikāder asyātmavādinah*); see also PVSVT 72,22: *asya vaiśeṣikādeḥ*.

¹⁰¹ PVT Je D38a2–6/P45a5–b1: *’di ltar bdag mñon sum ma yin pa’i phyir bdag mñon sum du ni* (D : P om. *du ni*) *mi dmigs so // bdag ni tshu rol mthoñ ba’i dbaṅ po’i śes pa’i yul ma yin te / de ni rañ bžin bskal pa yin pa’i phyir ro // dbaṅ po’i śes pa’i mjug*

thogs su 'byuñ ba yid kyi mñon sum gañ yin pa de yañ dbaṅ po'i śes pa'i yul gyi de ma thag pa'i yul la dmigs pa yin no // rañ rig pa'i yañ ma yin te / de'i yul ni rañ gi ño bo yin pa'i phyir ro // gañ žig bdag ni ña'o sñam pa'i śes pa'i mñon sum yin no žes zer ba de yañ rnar (D : snar P) mi 'oñ ste / ña'o sñam pa'i śes pa ni rnam par rtog pa dañ bcas pa ñid kyi mñon sum ma yin pa'i phyir dañ / bdag skem mo sbom mo žes bya ba la sogs pas lus kyi gnas skabs la kun tu (P : du D) reg pa'i phyir te / bdag la ni skem pa la sogs pa (D : pa la P) ñid yod pa ma yin no //. “For, because the self is imperceptible, it (**ātman*) is not apprehended (**upa√labh-*) perceptually. The self is indeed not the object of a sensory cognition (**indriyajñāna viśaya?*) for [ordinary persons] of limited cognitive ability (**arvāgdarśin?*), for it is beyond [cognitive] reach on account of its [intrinsic] nature (**svabhāvaviprakṛṣṭa*). As for the mental perception (**mānasapratyakṣa*) that takes place immediately after (*mjug thogs su 'byuñ ba*) the sensory cognition, it relies (**ā√lamb-*?) on the object (**viśaya*) [that follows] immediately (**anantara*) the object of the sensory perception. And [the self can]not [be the object] of self-cognition (**svasaṃvitti?*) either, for its object is [cognition] itself. And to say that the self is perceptible (**pratyakṣa*) through the cognition ‘I’ (**aham iti pratyayaḥ?*) is not pleasant to hear (**karnasubhaga?*) either[, and this for two reasons: first,] because the cognition ‘I’, inasmuch as it is conceptual (**savikalpa?*), is not a [genuine] perception; and [second,] because [expressions] such as ‘I am thin’ (**krśo 'ham?*) [or ‘I am] thick’ (**sthūlo 'ham?*) pertain (**saṃ√sprś-*?) to bodily states (**śarīravasthā?*). And indeed, [being] thin does not belong to the self.” The argument of the “cognition ‘I’” (*aham iti pratyaya, aham-pratyaya, ahampratīti*, sometimes equated with *ahaṅkāra*) to which Śākyabuddhi is alluding here was used by Naiyāyikas (e.g., Uddyotakara) and Mīmāṃsakas (Śabara and Kumāṛila), and is criticized in Buddhist sources such as AKBh 9 and the TS(P). On this argument and its Buddhist critique see, e.g., Biarreau 1968: 113–125, Oetke 1988: 208–209, Taber 1990 and Ratié 2011a: 52–62. PVSVT 72,24 gives a much more concise commentary on the passage: *na pratyakṣeñātmana upalambhaḥ / nityaparokṣatvābhyupagamāt /*. “The self is not apprehended perceptually, since it is admitted that [it] is always imperceptible.”

¹⁰² PVT Je D38a6–7/P45b1–2: *mñon sum ma yin pa ñid kyi bdag la rañ bžin du gyur pa'i rtags kyañ med do // 'bras bu ma grub pa'i phyir 'bras bu'i rtags kyañ med de /*. “Because [the self] is not perceptible (**apratyakṣatvena*), there is no [inferential] mark that would consist in a nature (**svabhāvabhūta liṅga?*) regarding the self; and since [its] effect is not established, there is no [inferential] mark [consisting in] an effect (**kāryaliṅga*) either.” PVSVT 72,24–25: *atha syād ātmano 'numānam evopalambho 'sty evety ata āha – tatkāryetyādi /*. “[Dharmakīrti] states [the passage] beginning with *tatkārya*° so as [to answer the following objection]: ‘But let [us] admit that there is indeed an apprehension (*upalambha*) of the self that [consists] only [in] an inference.’”

inferential mark,] is unestablished.¹⁰³ ¹⁰⁴On the contrary (*tu*), one [can legitimately] say that [things] such as the sense organs¹⁰⁵ are [inferentially] established, for it is established that the effect consisting in a [sensory] cognition depends [on an additional cause] because it is occasional.¹⁰⁶ [In the case of

¹⁰³ Or should one read, with PVSVTib P414a7 (*bdag mñon sum ma yin pa'i phyir dan 'bras bu ma grub pa'i phyir ro //*): "Because the self is imperceptible [and] because its effect[, which might serve as an inferential mark,] is not established"? In any case, Śākyabuddhi and Karṇakagomin comment the passage in the following way. PVT Je D38a6/P45b1–2: *bdag mñon sum ma yin pa'i* (D : *sum yin pa la P*) *mñon sum dan mi dmigs pa bsgrubs* (D : *bsgrub P*) *pa 'bras bu dan rgyu'i dños po med do // de bas na rtags med pa'i phyir bdag ni rjes su dpag pa'i yul yañ ma yin no //*. "There is no causality relationship (**kāryakāraṇabhāva*) that could be established through perception (**pratyakṣa*) and non-perception (**anupalabdhi*) for an imperceptible (**apratyakṣa*) self. Therefore, since there is no [inferential] mark (**liṅga*), the self is not the object (**viṣaya*) of an inference (**anumāna*)." PVSVT 72,25–26: *apratyakṣa-tvād evātmanas tatkāryasvabhāvarūpasya liṅgasyāniścayān nānumānam upalam-bhaḥ* /. "Precisely because the self is imperceptible, one cannot ascertain an [inferential] mark [for it] that would consist either in its effect or in a nature; therefore there is no apprehension [of the self that would consist in] an inference."

¹⁰⁴ PVT Je D38a6–7/P45b2–3: *gal te mig la sogs pa mñon sum ma yin pa rnam ji ltar 'bras bu rnam par šes pas rjes su dpog ce na / dbaṅ po la sogs pa ni žes bya ba la sogs pa smos te /*. "[Dharmakīrti] states [the passage] beginning with **indriyāṇām* so as [to answer the following objection]: 'Just as one infers the visual sense organ, etc. (**cakṣurādi*), which are not perceptible (**apratyakṣa*), one will infer [the self] through the cognition (**vijñāna*) of [its] effect (**kārya*)." PVSVT 73,8–9: *yathā nitya-parokṣāṇām apindriyādīnām anumānam tathātmano bhaviṣyatīti ced āha – indriyā-ṇām ityādi /*. "[Dharmakīrti] states [the passage] beginning with *indriyāṇām* so as [to answer the following objection]: 'Just as there is an inference of the sense organs even though they are always imperceptible, in the same way, there must be [an inference] of the self [even though it is always imperceptible].'"

¹⁰⁵ According to Śākyabuddhi and Karṇakagomin, these things also include the "seeds of memory, etc." (PVT Je D38a7/P45b3–4 ≈ PVSVT 73,9: *ādiśabdāt smṛtibijādīnām /*). On *smṛtibija*, see below, fn. 203–204, p. 181.

¹⁰⁶ PVT Je D38b1–2/P45b4–5 = PVSVT 73,10–12: *tathā hi satsv api rūpālokamanaskā-reṣu nimilitālocanādyavasthāsu vijñānasyābhāvāt punaś conmilitālocanāvasthāsu bhāvād vijñānakāryaṃ kāraṇāntarasāpekṣaṃ sidhyati / tataḥ [...]* /. "To explain: since in states where the eyes (Tib. *mig*) are shut for instance, there is no [sensory] cognition even though a visible object, light and an act of attention are present, and since on the other hand, in states where the eyes are opened, there is [a sensory cognition], it is established that the effect [consisting in a sensory] cognition is dependent on some other cause [besides the visible object, light and the act of attention]. Therefore [...]" On this reasoning see, e.g., Ratié 2011b: 491–492.

the sense organs, etc., one simply infers] that something [more, subsequently called “sense organ,”] is the cause of this [effect consisting in a sensory cognition],¹⁰⁷ but not that [this cause is] so [and so, as the Ātmavādin does in the case of the self].¹⁰⁸ [And attempting to] demonstrate that an effect such as pleasure [can be explained] in the same way¹⁰⁹ (*evam*) does not promote the cause (*na* [...] *kañcid arthaṃ puṣṇāti*) [of the Ātmavādin], for [everyone] admits that [things like pleasure] possess some kind of indeterminate cause (*yena kenacit*).¹¹⁰ ¹¹¹And thus, there can only be non-perception of the self.

¹⁰⁷ PVT *Je* D38b2-3/P45b6-7 ≈ PVSVT 73,14-15: *etad uktaṃ bhavati /^a yat^b sāpekṣam idaṃ kādācitkam vijñānaṃ tat^c kim apy asya vijñānasya kāraṇam astīty anumīyate /^d tad eva cendriyam iti vyavahriyate /*. [^a PVT with no equivalent of *etad uktaṃ bhavati* /]. ^b Note PVT *gaṇ gi phyir* (**yataḥ*). ^c Note PVT *de'i phyir* (**tat[ah?]*). ^d Note PVT *žes bya ba'i rnam pa 'dis* (**ityevamprakāreṇa?*) instead of *ity anumīyate* /]. “This is what [Dharmakīrti] says [here]: since this [sensory] cognition is dependent [on something else as it is] occasional, one infers that there is some (*kim api*) [additional] cause of this [sensory] cognition; and this is what is called ‘sense organ.’”

¹⁰⁸ PVT *Je* D38b3/P45b7 ≈ PVSVT 73,15-16: *na tv evambhūtaṃ iti na rūpaviśeṣeṇa mūrttatvādinā yuktam indriyam anumīyata^a ity arthaḥ /*. [^a PVT has no equivalent of *yuktam indriyam anumīyate*.] “The meaning of ‘but not that it is so’ is, ‘[but] the sense organ is not legitimately inferred as having a particular form [i.e.,] as having the [property of] being material, etc.’”

¹⁰⁹ PVSVT 73,16-18: *evam iti yathā kādācitkavijñānakāryānyathānupapattyendriyānumānaṃ tathā sukhādikāryaṃ yasya sukhādi kāryaṃ^a tat kim apy astīty anumāne^b tac cātmasvarūpam iti prasādhitam /*. [^a *sukhādi kāryaṃ* em.: *sukhādikāryaṃ* Ed. ^b *anumāne* PVSVT_{MS}: *anumānena* Ed.] “[Attempting to demonstrate that an effect such as pleasure can be explained] in the same way’ [means arguing the following:] just as the inference of the sense organs is based on the impossibility of accounting for the effect [consisting in] an occasional [sensory] cognition otherwise [i.e., if one does not assume the existence of the sense organs], in the same way, the effect [consisting in] pleasure, etc., is proved [to be dependent on some additional cause] in an inference [according to which] there is something which possesses pleasure, etc., as its effect, and [according to which] this [something] has the nature of the self.” Note that the PVT (*Je* D38b4/P45b8) understands *sukhādikārya* as **ātmaṅga* (*bdag gi yon tan*), i.e., “property of the self.”

¹¹⁰ PVT *Je* D38b5/P46a1 = PVSVT 73,19-20 explain *yena kenacit* as *anirdiṣṭaviśeṣeṇa*, i.e., “of unknown/indeterminate specificity.”

¹¹¹ PVT *Je* D38b5-6/P46a1-2 = PVSVT 73,20-22: *na caivambhūta ātmā / nityakartṛbhoktr^atvādilaṣṇatvenābhyupagamāt / yataś ca yathābhyupagatasyātmano nāsti kāryaliṅgam / tathā ca sati [...]* / [^a The PVT analyzes *nityakartṛbhoktr^o* as a *dvan-dva* compound.] “And the self is not so [i.e., it is not just some kind of indeterminate cause], because [the Ātmavādin] considers that [it] is characterized [by the prop-

[Therefore,] why is the [Buddhist,] who discards the [self] by means of the [non-perception defined as the silence of both perception and inference,]¹¹² rejected [by the Ātmavādin] on the grounds that [mere] non-perception does not prove [the non-existence of the self]? How could [then non-perception, if it] does not prove [that the self does not exist], prove [that the logical reason] is absent [from the dissimilar instances]^{113?114}

erties of] being permanent, being an agent and being an experiencer, etc.; and since there is no [inferential] mark of the self considered in this way, [Dharmakīrti says 'thus,' i.e.,] since it is so."

¹¹² See PVSVT 73,22–23: *tasmāt tam ātmānaṃ tenānupalambhena pratyakṣānumāna-nivṛttilakṣaṇena pratyācakṣāṇaḥ* /. "Therefore [the Buddhist,] who discards the self by means of that [type of] non-perception defined as the silence of both perception and inference." Note also PVT Je D38b6/P46b2–3: *saṅs rgyas pa la sogs pas bdag med de mi dmigs pa'i phyir ro zes mi dmigs pa des bdag de sel ba* [...]/. "The Buddhist, etc., who discards the self by means of non-perception [by saying]: 'The self does not exist, because one does not perceive it.'"

¹¹³ PVT Je D38b6–7/P46a3–4 = PVSVT 73,24–25: *katham asādhanaṃ sad vipakṣād dhetoḥ prāṇādimattvāder vyatirekaṃ sādhayet* /. "How could [non-perception, if it] does not prove [that the self does not exist,] establish that the logical reason [i.e.,] possessing breath, etc., is absent from the dissimilar instances?"

¹¹⁴ PVSV 16,8–19 (together with PV 1.22): *kiṃ ca / ātmamṛccetanādīnāṃ yo 'bhāva-syāprasādhakaḥ / sa evānupalambhaḥ kiṃ hetvabhāvasya sādhanakaḥ // anupalambhaṃ cāsyā pramāṇayata ātmavādo nirālambaḥ syāt / apratyakṣatvād ātmanas tat°kāryāsiddheḥ / indriyāṇāṃ tu vijñānakāryasya kādācitkatvāt sāpekṣyasiddhyā prasiddhir ucyate / kim apy asya kāraṇam astīti / na tv evambhūtam iti / naivaṃ sukhādikāryaṃ prasādhitaṃ kañcid arthaṃ puṣṇāti / yena kenacit kāraṇavattvābhy-upagamāt / tathā cānupalambha evātmanaḥ syāt / taṃ tena pratyācakṣāṇaḥ kim iti prativyūḍho 'nupalambhasyāsādhanatvād iti / katham asādhanaṃ vyatirekaṃ sādhayet* /. "Note that PVSV_{Tib} P414a7 and PVT Je D38a6–7/P45b1–2 are without any equivalent of tat°.

2.3. THE REFUTATION OF THE SĀṆKHYA'S TELEOLOGICAL ARGUMENT FOR THE EXISTENCE OF THE SELF

2.3.1. *The Sāṅkhya's Teleological Argument*

In several of his works, Dharmakīrti mentions and criticizes another argument meant to establish the self's existence. According to the SK,¹¹⁵

the Person (*puruṣa*) exists, because composites (*saṅghāta*) are for the benefit of another [entity] (*parārtha*); because of [its] difference from the three qualities (*guṇa*), etc.; because of the [need of a] control [for the three qualities, etc.]; because of the existence of an experiencer (*bhokṭṛ*); and because of the activity aimed at [obtaining perfect] isolation (*kaivalya*).¹¹⁶

Later Sāṅkhya texts such as the GBh,¹¹⁷ the MV,¹¹⁸ the YD¹¹⁹ or the TK¹²⁰ explain the first reason mentioned in SK 17 in the following way:

¹¹⁵ As far as our knowledge goes, the SK is the most ancient extant Sāṅkhya text presenting the argument criticised by Buddhist authors. Note, however, that Vasubandhu, who may have been active at the latest during the first half of the fifth century CE, already criticised a similar argument (see below, §2.3.2). Moreover, both the NPSū and the NB (see below, fn. 134, p. 158, and 126, p. 155) obviously target an argument whose example was *śayanāsanādyaṅavat*, which does not appear in the SK. A likely candidate as the source of this argument is the *Śaṣṭitantra*.

¹¹⁶ SK 17: *saṅghātaparārthatvāt triḡuṇādiviparyayād adhiṣṭhānāt / puruṣo 'sti bhokṭṛbhāvāt kaivalyārtham pravṛtteś ca //*. The last argument apparently alludes to the Sāṅkhya principle according to which the activity of primordial nature is for the benefit of the Person in the sense that it has as its sole purpose the liberation (*vimokṣa*) of the Person. See, e.g., SK 56–57: *ity eṣa prakṛtikṛto mahadādiviśeṣabhūtaparyantaḥ / pratipurūṣavimokṣārtham svārtha iva parārtha ārambhaḥ // vatsavivṛddhinimittam kṣīrasya yathā pravṛttir ajñasya / puruṣavimokṣanimittam tathā pravṛttiḥ pradhānasya //*. "This [phenomenal world], from the [evolute called] the Great to the particular [great] elements, is produced by primordial matter for the benefit which is the liberation of each Person; this activity is for the benefit of another [i.e., the Person, although it] seems to be for [nature's] own benefit. Just as milk, which is unconscious, acts so as to (*nimitta*) make the calf grow, in the same way, primordial nature acts so as to free the Person."

¹¹⁷ GBh 20,9–15: *asti puruṣaḥ / kasmāt / saṅghātaparārthatvāt / yo 'yaṁ mahadādiviśeṣaṅghātaḥ sa puruṣārtha ity anumīyate 'cetanatvāt paryāṅkavat / yathā paryāṅkaḥ pratyekagātrotpalakapādapīṭhatūlīpracchādanapaṭopadhānasaṅghātaḥ parārtho na hi svārthaḥ / paryāṅkasya na hi kiñcid api gātrotpalādyavayavānām parasparam*

kṛtyam asti / ato 'vagamyate 'sti puruṣo yaḥ paryāṅke śete yasyārtham paryāṅkaḥ / tat parārtham idaṁ śarīraṁ pañcānāṁ mahābhūtānāṁ saṅghāto vartate / asti puruṣo yasyedaṁ bhogyam śarīraṁ bhogyamahadādisaṅghātarūpaṁ samutpannam iti / [^a *pratyekagātrotpalaka°* conj. : *pratyekam gātrotpalaka°* Ed.] “The Person exists. Why? ‘Because composites are for the benefit of another [entity].’ [We] infer that this composite consisting of [the evolutes of primordial matter called] the Great [i.e., the intellect], etc., is for the benefit of the Person, because it is unconscious, like a bed. For instance, a bed, which is a composite [made of various] elements [considered] one by one: *utpalaka* [?], feet, a support, a covering blanket [made of] cotton and a pillow, is for the benefit of another [entity]; for it is not for its own benefit, since the parts of the bed [i.e.,] the elements *utpala* [?], etc., that are [its] parts, do not produce anything for each other. From this [we] understand [that] there is a person who lies on the bed, for the benefit of whom the bed is. Therefore this body, which is a composite of the five great elements (*mahābhūta*), exists for the benefit of some other [entity; that is,] there is [indeed] a Person for whom this body is produced, [as this body is] an object of experience (*bhogyā*) [and] consists of a composite of [the evolutes called] the Great, etc., that are [in turn] objects of experience.”

¹¹⁸ MV 22,6–15: *asti puruṣaḥ / saṅghātaparārthatvāt / yataḥ saṅghātāś ca parārthaḥ / tasmād dhetoḥ / iha loke ye saṅghātāś te parārthā dr̥ṣṭāḥ paryāṅkarathasāraṇādāyaḥ / evaṁ gātrāṇāṁ mahadādīnāṁ saṅghātaḥ samudāyaḥ parārtha eva / paryāṅkarathādayaḥ kāṣṭhasaṅghātāḥ / gr̥hādayaḥ kāṣṭheṣṭakādisaṅghātāḥ / na hi te rathagr̥haparyāṅkādayaḥ kim api svārtham sādhayanti / na vā parasparārthāḥ / kim tv asty asau devadattādir yo 'smin paryāṅke śete rathena gacchati gr̥he nivasatīti / evam amī mahadādayaś cakṣurādayo na svārthā na ca parasparārthāḥ / kim tu parārthāḥ / yaś cāsau paraḥ sa cātmā / tasmād anumīmahe 'sti puruṣo yasyārthe cakṣurādisaṅghātaḥ śarīram utpannam iti /* “The Person exists, for the reason [stated in the stanza:] ‘Because a composite is for the benefit of another [entity].’ In this world, [we] observe that [things] that are composites, such as a bed, a chariot, a house, etc., are for the benefit of another [entity]. In the same way, the composite [i.e.,] the combination of the parts [consisting of the evolutes called] the Great, etc., is indeed for the benefit of another [entity]. Beds, chariots, etc., are composites [made] of wood; houses, etc., are composites [made] of wood, bricks, etc. For these – chariots, houses, beds, etc. – do not produce anything for their own benefit, nor do they [produce anything] for each other. Rather, there is an [individual], e.g., Devadatta, who lies in the bed, drives the chariot [and] inhabits the house. In the same way, the eyes, etc., which [consist of the evolutes called] the Great, etc., are not for their own benefit, nor are they for the benefit of each other; rather, they are for the benefit of another [entity]. And this other [entity] is the self. Therefore we infer that there is a Person for whose benefit the composite [consisting of] the eyes, etc., [i.e.,] the body, is produced.”

¹¹⁹ YD 168,5–7: *iha saṅghātāḥ parārthā dr̥ṣṭāś tadyathā śayanāsanarathasāraṇādāyaḥ / asti cāyaṁ śarīralakṣaṇaḥ saṅghātaḥ / tasmād anenāpi parārthena bhavita-*

the body or the bodily organs (often simply referred to as *caḥṣurādi*, “the eyes, etc.”) are for the benefit of another [entity] because they are composed (*saṃhata*) or are composites. To justify the necessity for composites of being for the benefit of another entity, they give examples of composites such as beds and seats, the existence of which is not an end in itself since it is not for their own benefit (*svārtha*), and which do not exist for the benefit of each other (*parasparārtha*) but for that of the individuals who use them. Beds and seats are therefore for the benefit of another entity; accordingly, the eyes, etc., which are composites, must be for the benefit of another entity, and this other entity must be the self (which is *asaṃhata*, “uncomposed”). As noted by Watson, although some modern scholars have understood the Sāṅkhya inference as an argument “from design,” it does not endeavour to prove the existence of the self as the designing author of the composites that exist for its sake.¹²¹ It is therefore a teleological argument in the sense that it claims to establish the existence of an uncomposed entity from the mere fact that composites always exist for the sake of an entity distinct from them. The idea is mentioned and criticized in Buddhist texts such as (at least) one of Vasubandhu’s lost works,¹²² Dignāga’s PSV, the NPSū, works by Dharmakīrti and his commentators or the TS(P); but it

vyam / yo 'sau paraḥ sa puruṣaḥ / tasmād asti puruṣaḥ /. “In this [world, we] observe that composites are for the benefit of another [entity], as a bed, a seat, a chariot, a house, etc. Now, this composite defined as the body exists; therefore it too must be for the benefit of another [entity]. This other [entity] is the Person – therefore the Person exists.”

¹²⁰ TK 120,11–14: *puruṣo 'sty avyaktāder vyatiriktaḥ / kutaḥ / saṅghātaparārthatvāt / avyaktamahadahāṅkāraprabhṛtayaḥ parārthāḥ / saṅghātātāt / śāyanāsanādyaṅgavat / sukhaduḥkhamohātmatayāvyaktādayaḥ sarve saṅghātāḥ /*. “There is a Person [that is] distinct from the unmanifest, etc. – Why? – ‘Because composites are for the benefit of some other [entity]’: the unmanifest, the Great, the sense of ego (*ahāṅkāra*), etc., are for the benefit of another [entity], because they are composites, like utensils such as a bed, a seat, etc. All [things] such as the unmanifest are composites, because they consist of pleasure, pain and delusion [i.e., the three qualities *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*].”

¹²¹ See Watson 2006: 195–196.

¹²² See below, §2.3.2 and fn. 139, p. 159.

also appears in a variety of texts that belong neither to the Sāṅkhya nor to the Buddhist tradition.¹²³

2.3.2. The Refutation of the Argument as Proving the Contrary of the Intended Thesis

The Sāṅkhya argument is mentioned in PV 4, PVin 3 and NB 3 while Dharmakīrti endeavours to defend Dignāga's assertion that a thesis in an inference for others (*parārthānumāna*) must be that which is intended (*iṣṭa*) by its proponent.¹²⁴ There the Sāṅkhya proof of the self is adduced as a mere example of an ambiguously formulated argument¹²⁵ where the actually intended thesis must be understood from the context of the discussion (*prakaraṇa*), since the SK for instance only states that the eyes, etc., must be for the benefit of some other entity without specifying that this other entity is the self.¹²⁶ But while doing so,

¹²³ See, e.g., NV 326,7–11 (quoted below, fn. 148, p. 162) and ŚV *anumānapariccheda* 105–106 (quoted below, fn. 149, p. 163). The argument also appears in non-Brahmanical contexts, e.g., in the Śaivasiddhānta, and it is exploited along with its Buddhist refutation by Rāmakaṇṭha: see Watson 2006: 192–202. Note that it is also mentioned by the Śaiva nondualist Utpaladeva, albeit in the context of his dualistically oriented *Īśvarasiddhi*: see Taber 1986: 110 and Ratié forthc.: fn. 28.

¹²⁴ PS 3.2ab. For a detailed analysis of this discussion, see Tillemans 2000: 50–67 and Iwata 2007a and 2007b.

¹²⁵ On the examples of such arguments mentioned by Dharmakīrti, see Iwata 2007a and 2007b.

¹²⁶ PV 4.29cd: *anukto 'pīcchayā vyāptaḥ sādhyā ātmārthavan mataḥ //*. “Even though not [explicitly] stated, what is pervaded by the [proponent's] intention is held to be the *sādhyā*, as in [the Sāṅkhya's argument that the eyes, etc., are] for the benefit of the self (*ātman*).” Translation Tillemans 2000: 48. Cf. PVV 425,2–3: *tato 'nuktam apy ātmārthatvam saṅghātātvaḥ cakṣurādeḥ sāṅkhyasya sādhyam //*. “Therefore, although [it] is not [explicitly] stated, what is to be proved (*sādhyā*) for the Sāṅkhya is that the eyes, etc., are for the benefit of the self, because they are composites.” Cf. also PVV 425,6–8: *ātmārthavat / yathātmāsti na veti vivāde tatsādhanārthaṁ sāṅkhyena parārthāś cakṣurādayaḥ saṅghātātvaḥ chayanāsanādyāṅgavad ity uktasya sādhanasyātmārthatvam anuktam api sādhyam icchāviśayatvāt //*. “[This is what Dharmakīrti means by stating] ‘As in [the Sāṅkhya's argument that the eyes, etc., are] for the benefit of the self’: for instance, in the dispute [concerning the question] whether there is a self or not, in the argument formulated in the Sāṅkhya in order to demonstrate the [point in dispute, i.e.:] ‘The eyes, etc., are for the benefit of another [entity], because they are composites, just as utensils such as a bed, a seat,

Dharmakīrti explains how the actually intended thesis of the Sāṅkhya is illegitimate: there is no co-presence (*anvaya*) of the property to be proved (i.e., being for the benefit of the self,) and the logical reason (i.e., being a composite,) in the examples presented (i.e., the bed, etc.), as such composites are seen to be for the benefit of another composite, and not for that of an uncomposed entity such as the so-called Person of the Sāṅkhya. (According to Dharmottara, this is precisely the reason why the Sāṅkhyas ambiguously state that the eyes, etc., are for the benefit of another entity instead of clearly saying that they are for the benefit of the self.¹²⁷) As a consequence, the logical reason refutes the Sāṅkhya's very intention (*iṣṭaghātakṛt*, *iṣṭavighātakṛt*).

etc., what is to be proved, although [it is] not [explicitly] stated, is the fact that [they] are for the benefit of the self, because it is the object of [the Sāṅkhya proponent's] intention." PVin 3 12,1–3: *katham idānīm aśrūyamāṇaḥ sādhyatvenēṣṭa iti gamyate / prakaraṇāt / yathā saṃhatānām pārārthye sādhyā ātmārthatvam / tad anukṭam apīchayā vyāptam sādhyam iti darśanārtham iṣṭagrahaṇam /*. "[Objection:] Now, how do [we] know that [a property] is intended as that which is to be proved [although we] do not hear [it since it is not explicitly stated by its proponent]? [Answer:] From the context of the discussion. For instance, [the property of] being for the benefit of the self when one wishes to prove that composites are for the benefit of another [entity]: although what is to be proved is not stated, it is pervaded by the [proponent's] intention; this is what [the word] 'intended' conveys [in the definition of the inference for others]." NB_M 3.45–47/NB_S 3.47–49: *iṣṭa iti yatrā-rthe vivādena sādhanam upanyastam tasya siddham icchatā so 'nukto 'pi vacanena sādhyah / tadadhikaraṇatvād vivādasya / yathā parārthāś cakṣurādayaḥ saṅghātatvāc chayanāsanādyāṅgavad iti / atrātmārthā ity anukṭāv apy ātmārthatā sādhyā / tena noktamātram eva sādhyam ity uktam bhavati /*. "[The following] is what is expressed [by the word] 'intended' [in the definition of the inference for others]. Although the point with respect to which [someone] presents a demonstration while intending to establish this [demonstration] because of a dispute may not be explicitly stated, it is that which is to be proved, because this [point] is the basis of the dispute. For example, in: 'The eyes, etc., are for the benefit of another [entity], because they are composites, just as utensils such as a bed, a seat, etc.,' although it is not stated that [the eyes, etc.,] are for the benefit of the self, what is to be proved is [precisely that they] are for the benefit of the self. Therefore what is to be proved is not merely what is [explicitly] stated." See Iwata 2007b: 276–279.

¹²⁷ See NB_T_M 181,3–5/NB_T_S 58,5–6: *śayanāsanādiṣu hi puruṣopabhogāṅgeṣv ātmārthatvenānvayo na prasiddhaḥ / saṅghātatvasya pārārthyamātreṇa tu siddhaḥ / tataḥ parārthā ity uktam /*. "For the co-presence [of the logical reason 'being composed' and of the property to be proved] 'being for the benefit of the self' is not well established in utensils [instrumental in] a person's enjoyment, such as beds and seats; whereas [the co-presence] of [the reason] 'being composed' with [the prop-

The Sāṅkhya's proof of the self had already been used by Dignāga (PSV ad PS 3.22d) as an illustration of an argument that disproves the property (meant) to be proved.¹²⁸ Thus Dignāga explains:

For example, that particulars [such as the sense organs] are composites proves both that [these] are for the benefit of another [entity] and that [this] other [entity] is a composite.¹²⁹

In his introductory prose to PS 3.27, he goes on asking:

But how should the [kind of] contradictory [logical reason called] *iṣṭavi-ghātakṛt* be explained?¹³⁰

After explaining that this is a logical reason for the reverse (*viparyāsa-hetu*) of the property (meant) to be proved, he adds later in his commentary:

But if it is so, this [logical reason] is contradictory because it proves the contrary of the *pārārthya* [as it is] specified [by the Sāṅkhya opponent, i.e., being for the benefit of the self].¹³¹

Dignāga further explains:

For [the Sāṅkhya opponent] admits that composite [entities such as the sense organs] are for the benefit of another [entity that is] not a composite [viz. the self/Person] [...]. Now, the fact that this [other entity] is not a composite is established neither through perception nor through inference, because its [very] existence is not established.¹³²

And he concludes:

erty] 'being for the benefit of another [entity]' is established – therefore [the Sāṅkhyas only] say that [the eyes, etc.] are 'for the benefit of another [entity].'

¹²⁸ PSV ad PS 3.22d₂ (PSV_K P131b7, PSV_V P49a7): **sādhyabādhakasāadhanam*.

¹²⁹ PSV ad PS 3.22d₂ (PSV_K P131b7, PSV_V P49a7): **tad yathā bhedānām saṅghātātvaṃ pārārthyam ca sādhayati / saṅghātātvaṃ ca parasyāpi /*.

¹³⁰ PSV ad PS 3.27 (PSV_K P133b1, PSV_V P50b3): **yat tarhi ya iṣṭaviḥghātakṛd viruddhaḥ sa katham vaktavyaḥ*.

¹³¹ PSV ad PS 3.27 (PSV_K P133b4, PSV_V P50b6): **evam tarhi viśiṣṭapārārthyaviparyaya-sāadhanād viruddha eṣaḥ*.

¹³² PSV ad PS 3.27 (PSV_K P133b4, PSV_V P50b6): **tathā hi saṅghātānām asaṅghātapārārthyam iṣṭam [...] na ca tasyāsaṅghātātvaṃ pratyakṣeṇānumānena vā siddham tatsattvasiddheḥ*.

[It is] undoubtedly a reason for the reverse [of the property meant to be proved].¹³³

In other words, the Sāṅkhya argument entails a contradictory reason (*viruddhahetu*) insofar as it shows that the eyes, etc., must be for the benefit of another composite¹³⁴ rather than for the supposedly uncomposed self assumed by the Ātmavādin.

Now, we can be fairly certain that Dignāga's critique relied on earlier arguments put forward by Vasubandhu against the Sāṅkhya proof. In both PV 4 and PVin 3, Dharmakīrti himself specifies that this criticism had already been put forward by others before him while giving the following quotation:

If the *ātman* is [what is meant by] "another" (*para*), [then] this [*ātman*] is not established [in the example].¹³⁵

¹³³ PSV ad PS 3.27 (PSV_K P133b4, PSV_V P50b6): **asaṃśayaṃ viparyāśahetuḥ*.

¹³⁴ See, e.g., NPSū 13: *dharmaviśeṣaviparītasādhano yathā parārthāś cakṣurādayaḥ saṅghātātvaṃ chayanāsanādyaṅgavad iti / ayaṃ hetur yathā pārārthyaṃ cakṣurādīnāṃ sādhayati tathā saṃhatatvam api parasya sādhyadharmaviśeṣaviparītaṃ sādhayati / ubhayatrāvyabhicārāt /*. "[There is a kind of fallacious logical reason] that proves the contrary of the particular property [meant to be proved], for instance in: 'The eyes, etc., are for the benefit of another [entity] because they are composites, just as utensils such as a bed or a seat.' This reason [i.e., 'because they are composites'], while proving that the eyes, etc., are for the benefit of another [entity], proves that this other [entity] is composed, which is the reverse of the particular property that is to be proved, because these two[being for the benefit of another entity and being a composite,] do not deviate from one another." Cf. NPT 40,12–14: *tathā caivam api vaktuṃ śakyata eva – saṃhataparārthāś cakṣurādayaḥ saṅghātātvaṃ chayanāsanādyaṅgavad iti / śayanāsanādyaṅgāni hi saṃhatasya karacaroṇogrīvādimata evārthaṃ kurvanti nānyasya / tathopalabdher iti /*. "And thus [this] can be said just as well: 'The eyes, etc., are for the benefit of another composite [entity], because they are composites, just as utensils such as a bed or a seat.' For utensils such as a bed or a seat are for the benefit of [something] composed that possesses hands, feet, thighs, a neck, etc., and for nothing else, because [we] observe that such is the case."

¹³⁵ PV 4.32c: *ātmā paraś cet so 'siddhaḥ*. Translation Tillemans 2000: 55. PVin 3 13,4–5: *yad āha – ātmā paraś cet so 'siddha iti / tasyaiva ceṣṭasya vighātakṛdviruddhaḥ /*. "This has been said: 'If the self is [what is meant by] 'another,' [then] this [self] is not established [in the example].' And the [logical reason] of this intended [thesis] is contradictory [as it] refutes precisely the [intended thesis]."

Dharmottara and Manorathanandin identify the author of the quotation as Vasubandhu.¹³⁶ According to Tillemans, the passage might be borrowed from Vasubandhu's *Vādaśāstra* or *Vādaśāstrā*.¹³⁷ But the lost *Paramārthasaptatikā*, which is written in verse and in which Vasubandhu criticised the Sāṅkhya teacher Vindhyavāsin,¹³⁸ seems to be a much more likely candidate as a source of Dignāga's and Dharmakīrti's polemics. According to Watanabe's reconstruction, Vasubandhu's verse was as follows:

If the self is [what is meant by] "another," [then] this [self] is not established [in the example]; if [it means another] composite[, then something like a sense organ] is for the benefit of that [i.e., another composite; and if] internal (*āntara*) composites [such as the mind and mental factors were adduced as the logical reason,] then, as [in the case where the self is what is meant by "another"], they could not be for the benefit of another [entity understood as an entity distinct from composites].¹³⁹

Leaving *pādas* b to d provisionally out of consideration,¹⁴⁰ let us briefly focus on the meaning of the beginning of the verse according to Dharmakīrti. PV 4.32 states:

This [viz. being for the benefit of the *ātman*] also has the fault that there is no co-presence (*anvaya*) [of the property to be proved (*sādhya*) and the reason] in the example. As [Vasubandhu] has explained: "If the *ātman* is

¹³⁶ PVinT Dze D17a3/P20a2–3 (see Tillemans 2000: 55, fn. 194): *slob dpon dbyig gñen gyis ci skad du gñan gyi don zes bya ba 'dir gal te pha rol po bdag gñan gyi sgras brjod par 'dod na bdag de ni ma grub pa'o zes bśad pa yin no //*. "The master Vasubandhu has said that if, in the [statement] 'for the benefit of another,' the [Sāṅkhya] opponent means the self with the word 'another,' [then] this self is not established [in the example]." PVV 426,10–11: *yathoditam ācāryavasubandhunā / parārthāś cak-ṣurādaya ity atra paraś cet so 'siddho dṛṣṭānta iti /*. "As the master Vasubandhu has said: 'In [the argument:] 'The eyes, etc., are for the benefit of another [entity],' if the self is what is meant by 'another,' [then] this [self] is not established in the example."

¹³⁷ Tillemans 2000: 55 (as noted *ibid.*, fn. 194, the fragment is not found in Frauwallner 1933 and 1957).

¹³⁸ See, e.g., Frauwallner 1959: 809, Mejer 1999: 107–110 and Mejer 2008: 120, fn. 2.

¹³⁹ Watanabe 2008: 64: *ātmā paraś cet so 'siddhaḥ saṅghātaś cet tadarthakaḥ / saṅghātā āntarā evaṃ tathā na syuḥ parārthakāḥ //*.

¹⁴⁰ See below, §2.3.3.

[what is meant by] ‘another’ (*para*), then this [*ātman*] is not established [in the example].” In that case [the reason] would refute what is intended (*iṣṭaghātakṛt*).¹⁴¹

Thus in NB 3, Dharmakīrti illustrates the *iṣṭavighātakṛt* type of contradictory reason in the following way:

[An] example [of contradictory reason that refutes what is intended is:] ‘The eyes, etc., are for the benefit of another [entity], because they are composites, as utensils such as a bed or a seat. [The logical reason] is contradictory, because it proves the contrary of what is intended by the [Sāṅkhya proponent, namely] being for the benefit of another [entity] that is not composed.’¹⁴²

Neither Dignāga nor Dharmakīrti explains why the logical reason adduced by the Sāṅkhya proves the contrary of what he intends to prove, viz. the fact that being a composite entity implies being for the benefit of another *composite* entity. In this connection, Dharmottara provides the following explanation. According to him, the reason why they are necessarily for the benefit of another composite is that they must be regarded as causal factors in the production of that for whose benefit they are; but what is produced is necessarily composed (*saṃhata*):

The Sāṅkhya [proponent] who claims that the self exists, when urged by the Buddhist to answer the question: “Why is that?” states this argument (*pramāṇa*) in order to establish the self. From this [context we know that] what is to be proved [in his argument] is the fact that the eyes, etc., provide a help (*upakāra*) to the self which is uncomposed. But this [logical] reason is pervaded with the contrary [of what the argument is aimed at establishing], because that [entity] x that provides a help to [another entity] y is the producer of y; and that which is being produced, whether simultaneously or gradually, is composed. Therefore what [the argument] establishes is [only] that the eyes, etc., which are for the benefit of another [entity], are for the

¹⁴¹ PV 4.32: *ananvayo 'pi dṛṣṭānte doṣas tasya yathoditam / ātmā paraś cet so 'siddha iti tatteṣṭaghātakṛt* //. Translation Tillemans 2000: 55.

¹⁴² NB_M 3.87–88/NB_S 3.90–91: *yathā parārthās cakṣurādayaḥ saṅghātatvāc chayanā-sanādyāṅgavad iti / tadīṣṭāsaṃhatapārārthyaviparyayasādhanād viruddhaḥ* /.

benefit of another *composed* [entity, but not that they are for the benefit of an uncomposed self].¹⁴³

Dharmottara thus points out the very basis of the Buddhist criticism of the teleological argument: from the Buddhist perspective, existing for the sake of something else can only mean having a causal role in the production of that thing, and being causally produced can only mean being composed. The Sāṅkhya leaves itself open to the Buddhist assault all the more since the teleological argument is stated in such a way that the Person (*puruṣa*), understood as a pure, uncomposed and inactive consciousness, ends up being equated with empirical individuals (*puruṣa*) that the Sāṅkhya itself regards as composed entities.¹⁴⁴

This criticism is in turn found in the works of Sāṅkhya authors¹⁴⁵ who endeavour to defend the argument formulated in SK 17 by show-

¹⁴³ NBT_M 212,12–15/NBT_S 74,4–8: *ātmāstīti bruvāṇaḥ sāṅkhyaḥ kuta etad iti paryanuyukto bauddhenedam ātmanaḥ siddhaye pramāṇam āha / tasmād asaṃhatasyātmāna upakāraṇatvaṃ sādhyam cakṣurādīnām / ayam tu hetur viparyayaḥ / yasmād yo yasyopakāraḥ sa tasya janakaḥ / janyamānaś ca yugapat krameṇa vā bhavati saṃhataḥ / tasmāt parārthāś cakṣurādayaḥ saṃhataparārthā iti siddham /*.

¹⁴⁴ See, e.g., GBh 20,9–15 (quoted above, fn. 117, p. 152), where this ambiguity is obvious, as Gauḍapāda mentions that the bed is for the benefit of the person (*puruṣa*) who lies on it, or MV 22,6–15 (quoted above, fn. 118, p. 153) where Māṭhara specifies that a bed, a chariot or a house are for the individual, “e.g., Devadatta, who lies in a bed, drives a chariot [and] inhabits a house.” Compare with, e.g., YD 168,15–16 (quoted below, fn. 146, p. 162), where perceptible individuals such as Devadatta are presented as composed entities in contrast with the imperceptible Person. See also Iwata 2007b: 280 on this Sāṅkhya “trick.”

¹⁴⁵ See, e.g., YD 168,8–11 (following the explanation of the teleological argument, see above, fn. 119, p. 153): *āha – na saṅghātārthatvopalabdheḥ / śayanādayo hi saty api parārthatve saṅghātārthāḥ / yadi ca tair atideśaḥ kāryakaraṇasaṅghātasya kriyate prāptam asya tadvat saṅghātārthatvam / evaṃ puruṣaviparītārthasiddhiprasaṅgaḥ / athaitad anīṣṭam na tarhi cakṣurādayaḥ parārthāḥ /* “[The Buddhist] replies: [This is] not [the case], because [we] observe that [composites] are for the benefit of [other] composites, since even if a bed, etc., are for the benefit of another [entity], they are for the benefit of [another] composite. And if through them [we] make an analogical reasoning (*atideśa*, lit. “transposition”) concerning a composite consisting in the body and the sense organs (*kāryakaraṇa*), it follows that this [composite] is likewise for the benefit of a composite. Thus [this reasoning] leads to the establishment of an entity that is contrary to the Person; but this is not what [you] intend [to do], so [you must rather admit that] the eyes, etc., are not for the benefit of another [entity].” Cf. TK 120,14–16 (following the explanation of the teleological

ing, e.g., that the Person must be uncomposed because it is imperceptible¹⁴⁶ or that the Buddhist position leads to an infinite regress.¹⁴⁷ It is also mentioned by Brahmanical authors such as Uddyotakara¹⁴⁸ and

argument, see above, fn. 120, p. 154): *syād etat / śayanāsanādayaḥ saṅghātāḥ saṃhataśārīrādyarthā dṛṣṭā na tv ātmānam prati parārthāḥ / tasmāt saṅghātāntaram eva paraṃ gamayeyur na tv asaṃhatam ātmānam iti /*. “Suppose the following be urged: [We] observe that a bed, a seat, etc., which are composites, are for the benefit of the body, etc., which [in turn] are composites; but they are not for the benefit of another [entity if this is meant] with respect to the self. Therefore [these examples] may lead us to understand [the existence] of another [entity] that is nothing but another composite, but not an uncomposed self.”

¹⁴⁶ In the YD, the reply to the Buddhist objection, too long to be quoted here in full, mainly consists in showing that the Person must be uncomposed because it is not directly perceived, “for if it were composed, like [an empirical individual such as] Devadatta, this Person would be directly perceived” (YD 168,15–16: *sati hi saṅghātātve devadattādivad ayaṃ puruṣaḥ pratyakṣata evopalabhyeta /*).

¹⁴⁷ Vācaspatimiśra answers the Buddhist objection by interpreting the words that follow the argument in SK 17 as a complement of this argument (on the disagreement between the SK commentators in this respect see, e.g., Watson 2006: 192, fn. 211), and by resorting to a reasoning based on infinite regress probably borrowed from Uddyotakara’s NV (quoted below, fn. 148; note that Vācaspatimiśra refers to his own NVTṬ in the same passage, TK 120,23). See TK 120,16–19: *ata āha – triguṇādiviparyayāt / ayaṃ abhiprāyaḥ / saṅghātāntarārthatve hi tasyāpi saṃhatatvāt tenāpi saṅghātāntarārthatvena bhavitavyam evaṃ tena tenety anavasthā syāt /*. “[It is] due to this [objection that the SK’s author] says: ‘Because of [its] difference from the three qualities.’ Here is the [author’s] intention: for if [composites] were for the benefit of another composite, since this [second composite] would in turn be a composite, there should be a [third composite] being for the benefit of another composite, [and] in the same way there should be a [fourth, and] a [fifth]: there would be an infinite regress.” In TK 120,28–29, Vācaspatimiśra concludes (after stating that the three qualities are composed): *tasmād ācāryeṇa triguṇādiviparyayād iti vadatāsaṃhataḥ paro vivakṣitaḥ / sa cātmeti siddham /*. “Therefore the master, by stating ‘because of [its] difference from the three qualities,’ means that the ‘other’ is not composed; and this [other, uncomposed entity is] the self – this is [now] established.” The TK (and the YD?) thus seem to play on a second possible meaning of the first words of SK 17, *saṅghātāparārthatvāt*, which can be taken to mean “because composites are for the benefit of another [entity],” but also, if interpreted as a (Buddhist) *pūrvapakṣa*, “because [composites] are for the benefit of another composite.”

¹⁴⁸ The Buddhist objection is stated in NV 326,7–8: *parārthās cakṣurādayaḥ saṅghātātvaḥ chayanāsanādivad iti / saṅghātāḥ saṅghātāntarārthā iti cet /*. “[The Sāṅkhya argues as follows:] ‘The eyes, etc., are for the benefit of another [entity], because

Kumārila¹⁴⁹ (who present it as the standard Buddhist refutation of the reasoning put forward in SK 17), and Uddyotakara in particular sets out to defend the Sāṅkhya argument, notably by accusing the Buddhist of inconsistency (since he asserts that composites must be for the benefit of other composites while denying reality to composites)¹⁵⁰ and by arguing that an uncomposed entity must be assumed in order to avoid infinite regress.¹⁵¹

[they] are composites, just as a bed, a seat, etc.' [Here, the Buddhist objects:] 'Composites are for the benefit of another composite.'

¹⁴⁹ After presenting the argument in *ŚV anumānapariccheda* 105ab, Kumārila explains (ibid., 105cd–106): *śayane saṅghapārthyam bhautikavyāptahetuke // ātmānam prati pārthyam asiddham iti bādhanam / asaṃhataparārthatve drṣṭe saṃhatatāpi ca //*. "In [the example, i.e.,] a bed, where the reason ['being a composite'] is pervaded with [the property of being] a material entity, [we find a property of] being for the benefit of another [entity] that is [itself] a composite; [therefore the property of] being for the benefit of another [entity] is not established [if this is meant] with respect to the self – this is the refutation. And whereas [the Sāṅkhya] sees the [property of] being for the benefit of another [entity as the property of being for the benefit of] an uncomposed [entity, this other entity must] be composed." Cf. NR 270,27–28: *saṃhatarūpavastvantarapārthyasādhanāt prakṛtyatirikatāmapārārthyam abhimataṃ na sidhyet / ato na śiṣādhayīṣitātmāsiddhir iti //*. "Because it establishes [the property of] being for the benefit of another [entity, viz.] another entity the nature of which is composed, the intended [property to be proved, viz.] being for the benefit of another [entity understood as] a self distinct from primordial matter, cannot be established; therefore there is no demonstration of the self as [the Sāṅkhya] wishes to establish [it]."

¹⁵⁰ See NV 326,8–11: *atha manyase satyaṃ saṅghātāḥ parārthā bhavanti te tu saṅghātāntarārthāḥ / yathā śayanādaya iti / na / saṅghātasyābhyupagame virodhāt / na hi rūpādiskandhavyatiriktam saṅghātam bhavantaḥ pratipadyante / na cāsati saṅghātāntare saṅghātānam saṅghātāntarārthatā sidhyati / atha pratipadyate vyāhatam bhavati //*. "But if you consider that it is true that composites are for the benefit of another [entity], but that they are for the benefit of another composite [and not for that of the uncomposed entity that the self is supposed to be], just as a bed, etc., [are for the benefit of another composite, your position is] not [sound], because it is contradictory [for you] to admit [the very existence of] a composite. For you [Buddhists] do not admit any composite over and above constituents such as corporeality; and if there is no other [entity apart from the constituents that would be] a composite, [you can] not establish that composites are for the benefit of other composites! But if [you] admit [the existence of such a composite over and above the constituents], there is a contradiction."

¹⁵¹ See NV 327,2–5: *yac cāpi bhavān saṅghātāntaram pratipadyate / tatrāpy anivṛttam saṅghātatvam iti tenāpi saṅghātāntarārthena bhavitavyam iti / evaṃ cānavasthā /*

2.3.3. *The Refutation of the Argument as Being Useless*

In PVin 3 and PV 4, Dharmakīrti, after explaining how the Sāṅkhya's intended thesis is refuted, also expounds what absurd consequences follow if one takes a thesis independently of its proponent's actual intention: either the demonstration establishes something that its author does not intend to establish, or it is useless because it establishes something that is already admitted.¹⁵² As an illustration of the latter case¹⁵³ he mentions again the assertion that the eyes, etc., are for the benefit of some other entity: if we merely take into account what the argument explicitly states, it is useless because it only establishes that the eyes, etc., have a causal efficacy with respect to some other entity that is not particularized by the property of being uncomposed, which

na caināṃ śaktaḥ kaścit pratipādayitum iti yad eṣā nivartate tad asaṃhatam / athā-saṃhatam naivāsti / asaṃhatānabhyupagame saṅghātānupapatter vyāghātaḥ / na hi kadācid asaṃhatapratīṣedhe saṅghātaḥ sidhyatīti / "Besides, in that which you regard [as] another composite [for the benefit of which the eyes, etc., are], the [property of] being a composite does not disappear; therefore this too must be for the benefit of another composite, and thus there is an infinite regress. And since nobody can justify this [infinite regress], that which puts an end to this [infinite regress] is [necessarily] uncomposed. [Objection:] But there is no uncomposed [entity. Answer:] Refusing to acknowledge [the existence of] an uncomposed [entity] is contradictory [for you], because of the impossibility of [the very existence of] a composite [according to you]; for no composite is established if one denies [the existence of] an uncomposed entity." For a critical assessment of Uddyotakara's defence of the Sāṅkhya argument, see Oetke 1988: 379–381 and Watson 2006: 201, fn. 239. The argument of infinite regress is exploited in the TK (see above, fn. 147, p. 162).

¹⁵² PV 4.33: *sādhanaṃ yadvivādena nyastaṃ tac cen na sādhyate / kiṃ sādhyam anyathāniṣṭaṃ bhaved vaiphalyam eva vā //* "Suppose that when a *sādhana* is presented because of a dispute about a certain [proposition], that [proposition] is [nonetheless] not being proved. Then what is being proved? Otherwise [if the proposition in dispute were not the *sādhyā*], then either [the *sādhyā*] would be something unintended, or [the *sādhana*] would be completely superfluous." Translation Tillemans 2000: 57. See also PVin 3 13,6–8, closely similar to PV 4.33.

¹⁵³ On the illustration of the former case (viz. an argument aimed at showing that a word has a meaning before its connection with a conventional meaning, which, when taken regardless of the proponent's intention, ends up showing that a word has a meaning due to external factors), see Iwata 2007a.

the Buddhists too gladly admit (since they acknowledge that the sense organs contribute to the production of cognitions).¹⁵⁴

In the same way, [if the Sāṅkhya's *sādhya* merely consists in what is explicitly stated, i.e., being for the benefit of another entity, then] the eyes, etc., although they are established to be for the benefit of another [entity] because they are composites, are not [established to be] for the benefit of the self since the [general property of] being for the benefit of another [entity] is not [further] specified. Since [we Buddhists too] accept that these [eyes, etc.] have causal efficacy with regard to another [entity, viz. cognition, that is itself] composed, the argument is [simply] useless.¹⁵⁵

Jinendrabuddhi's explanation of *pāda* b in Vasubandhu's stanzas arrives at the same conclusion:

If the word "other" indicates a composite [made] of eyes, etc., such as Caitra, [then] the eyes, etc., too are established to be for the benefit of that for which the bed, the seat, etc., are; i.e., [they too are] for the benefit of [another] composite. This establishes that composites are for the benefit of [other composites. But] because the [Buddhist] opponent too acknowledges that the eyes, etc., are for the benefit of the group of the mind and mental factors, what [the argument] proves is [already] established (*siddhasādhya*).¹⁵⁶

¹⁵⁴ See PVV 427,1–3: *athaveṣṭasya sādhyatvābhāve parārthāś caḥsurādayaḥ saṃhata-tvād ity atrātmārthatvasyāsaṃhatapārārthyasyāsādhyatvāt / jñāna hetutvena saṃhata-pārārthyē^a baudhenāpīṣṭe sādhanavaiphalyaṃ eva vā syāt //*. [^a *saṃhata-pārārthyē* conj. : *saṃhata-pārārthyasya* Ed.] "Alternatively, if what is intended [by the proponent of a thesis] is not what is to be proved, in this [proposition]: 'The eyes, etc., are for the benefit of another [entity] because [they] are composed,' what is to be proved is not that [the eyes, etc.] are for the benefit of the self [or] that they are for the benefit of some uncomposed [entity]. Therefore the argument can only be useless, since the Buddhist too admits that [they] are for the benefit of a composed [entity] insofar as [they] are causes of a cognition."

¹⁵⁵ PVin 3 13,10–14,2: *tathā parārthāś caḥsurādayaḥ saṅghātatvāt siddhā api pārārthyā-viśeṣe nātmārthāḥ / saṃhataparārthakriyopagamād eṣāṃ sādhanavaiphalyaṃ //*.

¹⁵⁶ PST_{MS B} 137b1–3 (PST_{Tib} D175b5–176a2/P201a2–6; the passage is also quoted in Watanabe 2008: 65, fn. 12): *atha caḥsurādisaṅghātaś caitrādikaḥ paraśabdenopalakṣito yadarthāḥ śayanāsanādayaś caḥsurādayo 'pi tadarthāḥ sidhyanti / saṅghātārthā ity arthaḥ / anena saṅghātānāṃ tadarthatā siddhā / pareṇāpi caḥsurādīnāṃ cittacaitta kalāpārthatvābhyupagamāt siddhasādhyaṭā /*.

According to Jinendrabuddhi, Vasubandhu's Sāṅkhya opponent now attempts to save his logical reason "being a composite" from being contradictory by specifying it through the additional property of being internal (*āntaratva*).¹⁵⁷ Vasubandhu replies that internal composites such as the mind and mental factors (*cittacaitta*), which belong to the Buddhist explanation of mental machinery, are also for the benefit of composite entities inasmuch as they are for their mutual benefit (*parasparārthaka*). Such is Dignāga's elaboration on Vasubandhu's answer (which he quotes in his commentary on PS 3.27¹⁵⁸):

In this regard, [the properties attributed to] the eyes, etc., [namely] "being a composite" together with "being internal," which are presented as the [logical] reason, are refuted because [they] do not possess the [threefold] characteristic of a logical reason. To explain: these two [properties] are not established [to exist together] in the similar instances [i.e., in that which is for the benefit of the self], and because, on the contrary, they are [both] established in the dissimilar instances, i.e., in that which is for the benefit of each other, they are included in the first [kind of] contradictory [reason].¹⁵⁹

However, note that according to Dharmakīrti, the dilemma regarding the way the term "other" should be interpreted is not exactly that

¹⁵⁷ See PST_{MS B} 137a4–5 (PST_{Tib} D175b2–3/P200b6–7): *bhavatu kevalasya saṅghāta-tvasya viruddhatvam / yadā tv āntaratvasahitaṃ prayujyate yad āśaṅkyācāryavasubandhunā saṅghātā āntarā evaṃ tathā na syuḥ parārthakā ity uktam / tadā katham tasya viruddhatvam /* "Let us admit that [the property of] being a composite is contradictory on its own (*kevala*). However, if [it is] accompanied with [the property of] being internal – which the master Vasubandhu, who has anticipated [this objection], expresses in 'In the same way, the *internal* composites [too, such as the mind and mental factors,] are [for the benefit of another composite]; thus they cannot be for the benefit of another [entity understood as an entity distinct from composites]' –, then how could this [reason] be contradictory?"

¹⁵⁸ See PSV_K P134a6–8, PSV_V P51a6–8.

¹⁵⁹ PSV ad PS 3.27 (Watanabe 2008: 66, fn. 16; see PSV_K P134a6–8, PSV_V P51a6–8): *tatra saṅghātatvam āntaratvasahitaṃ cakṣurādīnāṃ hetutvenopanyastaṃ hetulakṣaṇāyogān niśiddham / tathā hy ubhayaṃ sapakṣe 'siddhaṃ vipakṣe tu parasparārthake siddhatvād viruddhe pūrvaka evāntarbhūtam /* Some Sāṅkhya texts allude to this property of being for the benefit of each other and deny that such may be the case in the examples they adduce (see, e.g., GBh 20,9–15, quoted above, fn. 117, p. 152, or MV 22,6–15, quoted above, fn. 118, p. 153). See also TSP_K 117,17–24/TSP_S 107,3–7 (quoted below, fn. 163, p. 168), where an argument similar to Vasubandhu's is used to refute the objection of an Ātmavādin.

found in the fragment of Vasubandhu: in the PVin the alternative is not (or at least, not immediately) between the meaning “self” and the meaning “composite,” but rather, between the meaning “self,” understood as an entity that has the particularity (*viśeṣa*) of being uncomposed, and the meaning “other” in general, devoid of any particularity – in which case one is entitled to consider that composites are included within this general class of entities. In this respect the TS(P)’s analysis of the Sāṅkhya argument is particularly interesting. It enumerates three possible interpretations of the Sāṅkhya argument:¹⁶⁰ (1) the argument demonstrates that the eyes, etc., are for the benefit of another entity that is altered by them insofar as it receives some additional property from them – in which case what is proved is already admitted by the Buddhists, who acknowledge that the eyes, etc., contribute to the production of a cognition;¹⁶¹ (2), it demonstrates that the

¹⁶⁰ TSP_K 117,10–11/TSP_S 106,23–24: *ādheyātīśayo vā paro 'bhipreto bhavet yadvānā-dheyātīśayarūpatvād avikāry atha vā sāmānyena pārārthyamātram avicāritarama-ñīyaṃ sādhyata iti trayo vikalpāḥ* /. “[In the Sāṅkhya’s argument,] ‘the other’ [for the benefit of which the eyes, etc., are] may mean either ‘[something] that can receive some additional property’ [from them], or ‘[something] unchanging because its nature cannot [receive] any additional property,’ or again, [what this argument] demonstrates [may be] the mere fact, pleasant [as long as it is left] unexamined, that [the eyes, etc.,] are for the benefit of some other [entity] in general – these are the three options.”

¹⁶¹ TS 307–308: *pārārthyam cakṣurādīnāṃ yat punaḥ pratipadyate / śayyāsanādivat tena saṅghātātvena hetunā* // *ādheyātīśayārthatvaṃ yady eṣāṃ upapādyate / iṣṭa-siddhir yad iṣṭās te 'smābhir jñānopakāriṇaḥ* //. “The [Sāṅkhya] demonstrates that eyes, etc., are for the benefit of another [entity] through the [logical] reason consisting in [their] being composites, as a bed, a seat, etc. If what they [thus] prove is the fact that [eyes, etc.,] are for the benefit of another [entity] that can receive an additional property [from them, they only] establish what [we already] admit, since we admit that the [eyes, etc.,] contribute to [producing] a cognition.” Cf. TSP_K 117,11–13/TSP_S 106,24–27: *tatra prathamapakṣe siddhasādhyatā / yatas te cak-ṣurādayo 'smābhir vijñānopakāriṇa iṣṭāḥ / cakṣuḥ pratītya rūpāṇi cōtpadyate tac ca-kṣurvijñānaṃ yāvat kāyaṃ pratītya spraṣṭavyāni cōtpadyate kāyavijñānaṃ iti vaca-nāt* /. “In the first hypothesis among these [three], that which is to be proved is [in fact already] established, since we admit that the eyes, etc., help [produce] a cognition; because it is said [in the Buddhist scriptures]: ‘This visual cognition arises in dependence on the eye and visible [objects, etc.,] up to bodily cognition[, which] arises in dependence on the body [i.e., skin,] and tactile [objects].’” This quotation is often found in Buddhist sources (see, e.g., ŚrBhū 66,4–5 and AKBh_{Pr} 31,11–12); see, e.g., SN IV.67–69: *dvayam bhikkhave paṭicca viññāṇaṃ sambhoti / [...] cakkhuñca*

eyes, etc., are for the benefit of some unchanging entity – in which case the example is empty of what is to be proved (since beds, etc., are not for the benefit of such an unchanging entity), so that the logical reason (“because they are composites”) establishes the contrary of what the Sāṅkhya is trying to prove (since composites are only seen to be for the benefit of other composites);¹⁶² (3), it demonstrates that the eyes, etc., are for the benefit of some unspecified other entity – in which case the demonstration is useless, since the eyes, etc., are already admitted to have a causal role with respect to thought (*citta*).¹⁶³ The second

paṭicca rūpe ca uppajjati cakkhaviññāṇaṃ / [...] sotañ ca paṭicca saddecupphajjati sotaviññāṇaṃ / [...] ghāṇaṇ ca paṭicca gandhe cupphajjati ghāṇaviññāṇaṃ / [...] jivhañ ca paṭicca rase ca uppajjati jivhaviññāṇaṃ / [...] kāyañ ca paṭicca phoṭṭhabbe cupphajjati kāyaviññāṇaṃ / “O monks, a [sensory] cognition arises in dependence on two [things] [...] In dependence on the eye and a visible thing there arises an eye-cognition [...] In dependence on the ear and a sound there arises an ear-cognition [...] In dependence on the nose and a smell there arises a nose-cognition [...] In dependence on the tongue and a taste there arises a tongue-cognition [...] In dependence on the body [i.e., the skin,] and a tactile thing there arises a body-cognition.”

¹⁶² TS 309: *avikāryupakāritvasādhane sādhyasūnyatā / drṣṭāntasya calasyaiva yuktās te 'py upakāriṇaḥ //* “But in case [the argument is meant] to prove that they help some unchanging [entity], the example is devoid of what is to be proved, [since] these [eyes, etc.] can rightly [be considered to] help only a changing [entity].” Cf. TSP_K 117,13–17/TSP_S 106,28–33: *atha dvitīyaḥ pakṣas tadā viruddhatā hetor ity ādarśayann āha avikāryupakāritvetyādi / avikāriṇo nityasyopakāritvam avikāryupakāritvam / tasya cakṣurādīnāṃ sādhanē sati drṣṭānte sādhyaviparyayeṇaiva hetor vyāptatvād viruddhatā / yatas te śayanādayas calasyānityasyaivopakāriṇo yuktāḥ / avikāriṇy atisāyasyādhātum aśakyatvāt /* “But if [you adopt] the second hypothesis, then the [logical] reason is contradictory. [Śāntarakṣita] shows this when stating [the verse] beginning with *avikāryupakāritva*°. ‘Being of help to something unchanging’ [means] being of help to something permanent. If [this argument] demonstrates this with respect to the eyes, etc., since the [logical] reason is pervaded by the contrary of what is to be proved in the example, it is contradictory, because beds, etc., can legitimately [be said to] help only an [entity] that is changing [i.e.] impermanent, since no additional property can be brought to an unchanging [entity].”

¹⁶³ TS 310: *sāmānyena tu pārārthyam yady eṣāṃ samprasādhyaṭe / tathāpi sādhanam vyartham siddhās cittopayoginaḥ //* “But if [what] they show [with this argument] is that [the eyes, etc.] are for the benefit of another [entity] in general, even so, this argument is useless, [since the eyes, etc.] are [already] established to help [produce] the mind (*citta*) [i.e., a cognition].” Cf. TSP_K 117,17–24/TSP_S 107,3–7: *atha sāmānyenā dheyātīśayādivikalpam^a apāsya pārārthyamātram sādhyata iti tṛtīyaḥ pakṣaḥ / tadāpi siddhasādhyaṭā / cittopakāritvena cakṣurādīnāṃ iṣṭatvāt / atha cit-*

interpretation obviously corresponds to the first option mentioned by Vasubandhu (“If the *ātman* is [what is meant by] ‘another’ [...]”) and formulated by Dharmakīrti with respect to the actually intended thesis of the Sāṅkhya. The first and the third are at first sight quite similar since in both cases it proves something that the Buddhists already admit. They do differ though, insofar as the first apparently corresponds to Vasubandhu’s second member of the alternative (“if it means [another] composite [...]”) whereas the third TS(P) interpretation corresponds to Dharmakīrti’s statement that if one understands the argument according to what it explicitly says, i.e., as meaning that the eyes are for the benefit of some unspecified other entity (and not for the benefit of an entity particularized by the property of being uncomposed), the argument becomes useless.

tam api sādhyadharmitvenābhyupagamyate yathā naiyāyikair abhyupagatam / evam api bhavatām neṣṭasiddhiḥ / cittavyatirekeṇātmano 'niṣṭatvāt / nāpi naiyāyikānām abhimatārthasiddhiḥ / parasparopakāritvena cakṣurādīnām paropakāritvasyeṣṭatvāt^b / pārvāravād āpekṣikatvāt paratvasya / cittasya cānekakāraṇakṛtopakāropagraheṇotpatteḥ saṅghātatvaṃ kalpitam asty eveti hetor api na siddhiḥ / [a Note TSP_{Tib} P264b4: *bya ba'i khyad par dañ bya ba'i khyad par ma yin pa'i rnam par rtog pa*, i.e., *ādheyātīśayānā dheyātīśayavikalpa. ^b TSP_K *nāpi [...]* °eṣṭatvāt : TSP_S om. *nāpi [...]* °eṣṭatvāt.] “But if [we] eliminate the options [according to which what the argument proves is that the eyes, etc., are for the benefit of a changing entity] that can receive an additional property and [for the benefit of an unchanging entity] that cannot receive any additional property,^a [what] is demonstrated [by this argument is] the mere fact that [the eyes, etc.,] are for the benefit of another [entity] in general – this is the third hypothesis. In that case too, what is to be proved is [in fact already] established, because the eyes, etc., are admitted to help [produce] the mind [i.e., a cognition]. But if [you reply] that [you] admit the mind as well to be the property-bearer of what is to be proved [along with the eyes, etc., which must be proved to be for the benefit of some other entity], as the Naiyāyikas admit it, even so, you do not establish what you intend [to establish], since [you Sāṅkhyas] do not accept the self to be distinct from the mind. Nor does [this] establish the point acknowledged by the Naiyāyikas, [because the fact that [factors such as] the eyes are of help to another [entity] is [to be] accepted in the [mere] sense of being of help to each other, since ‘being other’ is relative (*āpekṣika*), as the further and nearer ends [of something]. And that the mind is a composite is indeed [to be] assumed on the grounds that it arises by benefitting from the help of various causes (*anekakāraṇakṛta*); therefore the reason is not established either.” ^a Translated on the basis of the Tibetan version.

2.3.4. Dharmakīrti's Critique of the Sāṅkhya's Argument in PVSV 16,20–27: Once Again on Non-Perception

The PVSV criticism of the Sāṅkhya argument is quite different, and so is the context. Dharmakīrti has just accused a (Naiyāyika) Ātmavādin and a Cārvāka of inconsistency since they admit the epistemic validity of mere non-perception as a means to establish absence when it suits them and reject it when it does not.¹⁶⁴ Thus the Naiyāyika uses it to establish the self's absence in things that are without breath but refuses to draw from the self's imperceptibility the conclusion of its nonexistence. Similarly, the Cārvāka uses non-perception as a means of valid cognition when refuting the Buddha's omniscience but he refuses to apply it to consciousness that he claims to be a product of material elements.¹⁶⁵ Dharmakīrti then accuses a Sāṅkhya proponent of self-contradiction: on the one hand, this third character acknowledges the

¹⁶⁴ See above, §2.2.2.

¹⁶⁵ PVSV 16,19–20: *mṛdaḥ khalv api kaścic caitanyam anupalabhyamānam apīcchann adarśanād vacanāder vyāvṛttim āha* /. "And although someone [i.e., the Cārvāka,] admits [the existence of] a consciousness [arising] from earth even if it is not perceived, he [nonetheless] asserts the exclusion of speech and so on [in all omniscient beings] on the grounds that [it] is not perceived." Cf. PVT Je D39a1–2/P46a5–6 = PVSVT 73,27–29: *tata evāpramāṇakāt [...] adarśanād vacanāder asarvajñatvādisā-dhanāya liṅgatvenopanītasya vipakṣād vyāvṛttim āha* /. "On the grounds of this very non-perception [which he holds] not to be a means of valid cognition [in the other case], he asserts the exclusion of speech and so on, which [he] presents as marks for establishing that there is no omniscience, etc., from the dissimilar instances [i.e., omniscient persons]." On this argument see, e.g., TS_K 3240/TS_S 3239: *yadā copadiśed ekaṃ kiñcit sāmānyavaktṛvat / ekadeśajñagītaṃ tan na syāt sarvajñabhāṣitam* //. "And should [the alleged omniscient Buddha] teach [even] a single thing as an ordinary speaker, this would be the discourse of someone knowing [only] a part [of what is to be known]; it would not be the speech of an omniscient." Cf. TSP_K 843,8–10/TSP_S 1019,13–16: *na hy avitarkā vacanapravṛttir astīti savikalpaceto 'vasthite-naivānena dharmo deśanīyaḥ / tataś cāsyām avasthāyām bālapaṇḍitayor aviśeṣād asarvajña evāsāv iti tadbhāṣitam asarvajñabhāṣitam eva syāt* /. "For the activity of speaking is not devoid of reasoning (*vitarka*); therefore he must teach the *dharmā* while being in a state where his thought is conceptual; and therefore, in this state, 'because there is no difference between a child and a learned one, he cannot be omniscient' [i.e.,] his speech must be the speech of [someone] who is not omniscient." Cf. fragment BSū 54 of Bṛhaspati in Namai 1976b: *lokavyavahāraṃ prati sa-dṛśau bālapaṇḍitau*. "With respect to worldly transactions, the child and the learned are similar."

invisible presence of curd in milk in the form of a potentiality (*śakti*);¹⁶⁶ on the other hand, he asserts the absence of composition in entities that are not for the benefit of another entity, and his assertion is solely based on the fact that we do not see that these entities are composites. This latter idea is the very foundation of the teleological argument since, as Dharmakīrti notices, the absence (*vyatireka*) of the property of being composed in that which is not for the benefit of another entity guarantees that every composite is for the benefit of another entity; and the YD for instance explicitly states that the Person must be uncomposed for the reason that contrary to composed entities, we do not perceive it:

For if it were composed, like [an empirical individual such as] Devadatta, this Person would be directly perceived.¹⁶⁷

While taking this opportunity to criticize the Sāṅkhya conception of transformation and the notion of potentiality that it involves,¹⁶⁸ Dharmakīrti once more emphasizes the inconsistency of the Ātmavādin, who admits the nonexistence of an entity on the grounds of its imperceptibility only insofar as it suits his agenda:

And another one [i.e., a Sāṅkhya, although he admits the existence of] curd etc., [which are invisible] in milk, etc., [asserts] the absence [of the property of being a composite] in [entities] that are not for the benefit of another [entity] on the grounds that one does not perceive [their] being composites. For what necessity is there in this [assertion] that composed [entities] should necessarily be for the benefit of another entity?¹⁶⁹ [The Ātmavādin: But] there

¹⁶⁶ On the notion of potentiality in Sāṅkhya, see Frauwallner 1953: 391. In PVinT (*Tshe* D125b3–5/P147a5–8), Dharmottara distinguishes two currents within Sāṅkhya, namely that of the “proponents of the thesis according to which [transformation] is a manifestation” (*abhivyaktivādin*) and that of the “proponents of the thesis according to which [transformation] is another state” (*avasthāntaravādin*), and he specifies that the former propound the notion of potentiality while the latter refuse it (see Watanabe 2011: 561, fn. 21).

¹⁶⁷ YD 168,15–16 (see above, fn. 146, p. 162).

¹⁶⁸ For other passages targetting the Sāṅkhya notion of transformation in Dharmakīrti’s works, see Watanabe 2011.

¹⁶⁹ PVṬ Je D39a3–4/P46a8–b1 ≈ PVSṬ 74, 11–13: *na cādarśanamātreṇāsya hetor vyāptiḥ sidhyati / ko hy atra niyamaḥ saṅghātair avāśyaṃ parārthair bhavitavyaṃ yataḥ saṅghātatvāc cakṣurādīnāṃ pārārthasiddhyātmārthatvaṃ sāṅkhyasya sidh-*

is indeed a perception of curd and so on in milk and so on: it is an inference from the fact that [curd, etc.] could not arise from [milk, etc., if milk, etc.] did not have [this] potentiality (*aśakta*) [in them beforehand].¹⁷⁰ [Answer:] But what is this potentiality? Is it the entity itself [i.e., curd, etc.] or something else?¹⁷¹ If it is the [entity] itself, [this potentiality present in the milk] should be perceived exactly in the same way [as curd, etc., when it becomes manifest and milk disappears,] because there [can be] no difference [between the objects of these two perceptions].¹⁷² [But] if [this potentiality is] something dis-

yet /. [^a Note that PVT reads *gañ gis na*, i.e., **yena* instead of *yataḥ*.] “Besides, [it is] not [the case that] the pervasion of this logical reason is established through mere non-perception. For what necessity is there in this [assertion that] composites should necessarily be for the benefit of another [entity], so that the Sāṅkhya may establish that the eyes, etc., are for the benefit of the self through the demonstration that [they] are for the benefit of another [entity] due to [their] being composites?”

¹⁷⁰ PVT *Je* D39a5-b1/P46b3-6 ≈ PVSVT 74,15-20: *anumānam cāhāśaktāḍ anutpatter iti / yadi hi kṣīrāḍau dadhyāḍīśaktir na syāt tato 'śaktāt kṣīrāḍer dadhyāḍi notpad-yeta / prayogas tu yad yajjanane na śaktaḥ na tasya tata utpattir yathā śālibījād yavāṅkurasya / utpadyate ca dadhyāḍiḥ kṣīrāḍibhyas tasmāḍ asti dadhyāḍīśaktiḥ kṣīrāḍāv iti kāryahetupratirūpako vaidharmyaprayogaḥ / śaktir^a eva ca dadhyāḍi / kāryakāraṇayor abhedād iti manyate /*. [^a *śaktir* em. (PVSVT_{MS}, PVT) : *śakter* Ed.] “And [the objector] says that [this] inference is [drawn] from the fact that [curd, etc.] could not arise [from milk, etc., if milk, etc.] did not have this potentiality [in them beforehand]. For if the potentiality of curd, etc., did not exist in milk, etc., then curd, etc., could not arise from milk, etc., [as milk, etc., would be] devoid of this potentiality. As for the [formal] application[, it is as follows]: ‘An x that is not capable of producing a y does not give rise to y – for instance, a seed of rice [does not give rise] to a sprout of barley. Now milk, etc., do give rise to curd, etc.; therefore there is indeed a potentiality of curd, etc., in milk, etc.’ So it is a reasoning through dissimilarity that counterfeits an [inference through] effect as a [logical] reason. And curd, etc., are the potentiality itself, since there is no difference between the effect and its cause – so thinks [the Sāṅkhya opponent].” On the *satkāryavāda*, see also fn. 13, p. 41.

¹⁷¹ PVT *Je* D39b1/P46b6-7 ≈ PVSVT 74,20-21: *athetyāḍi siddhāntavādī / yo 'sau dadhyāḍiko bhāvaḥ paścād upalabhyate kiṃ sa eva bhāvaḥ śaktir utānyad eva kiñcid dadhyāḍer arthāntaram* /. “In ‘But [...],’ the Buddhist (*siddhāntavādin*) [replies]: This entity which [is called] potentiality, is it the same as the entity which is curd, etc., [and] which is perceived afterwards [instead of the milk]? Or is it some other thing that is distinct from curd, etc.?”

¹⁷² PVT *Je* D39b1-2/P46b7 ≈ PVSVT 74,21-22: *tathaiveti niṣpannarūpa^a dadhyāḍivat kṣīrāvasthāyām^b upalabhyeta viśeṣābhāvāt* /. [^a PVT without equivalent of *°rūpa*. ^b *kṣīrāḍyavasthāyām* em. (PVT) : *kṣīrāvasthāyām* Ed.]. “[It should be perceived] ‘ex-

tinct [from curd, etc.], how can this [i.e., curd, etc.] exist when a distinct thing [i.e., this potentiality,] exists? Rather, [when the Sāṅkhya says that curd, etc., are in milk, etc., due to the latter's capacity to produce milk,] it must be a mere metaphor (*upacāra*). This is their [i.e., the Sāṅkhya Ātmavādin's] inconsistency [i.e., discarding non-perception as a means of valid cognition and nonetheless making use of it]^{173,174}

2.4. ON MEMORY: PV 2.267–269

In PV 2.258–266, Dharmakīrti polemicizes against a likely Śaiva opponent in whose views one can secure final liberation from all impurities (*mala*) through ritual initiation (*dīkṣā*).¹⁷⁵ Dharmakīrti closes his critique by demonstrating that the self can be of no help in the initiatory process.¹⁷⁶ Whatever the polemical context, PV 2.267–269 can be re-

actly in the same way' – i.e., [when] in the state of milk for instance, [this potentiality] should be perceived [exactly] as [when it] takes on the form of curd, etc., because there is no difference between the objects [of these two perceptions]."

¹⁷³ According to PVT *Je* D39b3–4/P47a1–2 ≈ PVSVT 74,23–25: *dadhyādijananasāmarthyāt kṣīrādau dadhyādīty upacāramātram syāt / anupalambham apramāṇikṛtya punas tasyaiva pramāṇikaraṇam ayam parasparavyāghāta eṣām ātmavādinām^a ity upasaṃhārah //*. [^a *ātmavādinām* em. (PVT) : *ātmādivādinām* Ed.] "It must be a mere metaphor [when the Sāṅkhyas say] that curd, etc., are in milk, etc., due to [milk's] capacity to produce curd, etc. Having discarded non-perception as a means of valid cognition, nonetheless [they] make this very [non-perception] a means of valid cognition. [With this Dharmakīrti] sums up [the meaning of the verse by pointing out that] this is the Ātmavādin's inconsistency."

¹⁷⁴ PVS 16,20–27: *dadhyādikaṃ cāparaḥ kṣīrādiṣv aparārtheṣu saṅghātāt vādarśanād vyatirekam / ko hy atra niyamaḥ saṃhatair avaśyaṃ parārthair bhavitavyam iti / asty evopalambho dadhyādīnām kṣīrādiṣv anumānam / aśaktān anutpatteḥ / atha keyaṃ śaktiḥ / sa eva bhāva utānyad eva kiñcit / sa eva cet tathaivopalabhyeta viśeṣābhāvāt / anyac cet katham anyabhāve tad asti / upacāramātram tu syād ity ayam eṣām parasparavyāghātaḥ /*

¹⁷⁵ See Sanderson 2001: 10–11, fn. 7 and Eltschinger forthc. a (§1.3.2).

¹⁷⁶ Note, for a transition to the issue of the self, PVP D114a3–4/P132a7–8: *gal te bdag kyañ 'di la ñe bar sbyor ba yod pa de ltar na de ci'i phyir lhag mar byas pa yin ze na / gañ gis na 'jug pa dañ ldan pa dañ ldog pa dañ ldan pa de tsam ñid ni bdag gi ño bo yin no //*. "[Objection:] If the self is also involved (**upa√yuj-*) in this [(soteric) process?], then why does it remain? For the nature of the self is nothing but possessing action (**pravṛtti?*) and abstaining [from action] (**nivṛtti?*)." The meaning of this passage remains obscure to us.

garded as a self-contained series of arguments against the self. In several respects, this important section testifies to Dharmakīrti's indebtedness to Vasubandhu: on the one hand, those of his arguments that question the causality of permanent entities echo the KSP's critique of a permanent self (as well as yet older Yogācāra Buddhist arguments against a permanent creator God);¹⁷⁷ on the other hand, his critique of the self as the only possibility to account for the continuity seemingly at work in memory and karmic retribution apparently presupposes Vasubandhu's arguments against both the Pudgalavādin and the non-Buddhist Ātmavādins in AKBh 9. Interestingly enough, PV 2.269 is likely to provide us with Dharmakīrti's only allusion to the vexed problem of memory in the context of an explicit critique of the self.

Basing himself on PVSV 174,14–16,¹⁷⁸ Devendrabuddhi introduces Dharmakīrti's argument as follows:

There is no self (**na kaścid ātmā*) that would provide its help (**upakāraka?*) either by being the controlling agent (**adhiṣṭhātṛ*) or the inherence cause (**samavāyikāraṇa*), or [by] any other [kind of] contribution (**upayoga?*), so that (**yena*) one could admit to say that it provides its help.¹⁷⁹

Here is Dharmakīrti's first assault against the self as a cause:

Since [something] permanent [i.e., a permanently efficacious¹⁸⁰ self,] does not depend [on any cooperating factor], it is contradictory that [its effect] be produced in succession,¹⁸¹ [as] the [causal] action of [something] whose nature [remains] the same when it produces and when it does not produce [an effect

¹⁷⁷ See Yoshimizu 1999. As we shall see below, PV 2.267–269 presupposes Dharmakīrti's arguments against *īśvara* as they can be found, e.g., in PV 2.21 and 23.

¹⁷⁸ See above, fn. 81, p. 20.

¹⁷⁹ PVP D114a4–5/P132a8–b2: *byin gyis rlob pa po ñid dam 'phrod pa 'du ba can gyi rgyu ñid dam ñe bar sbyor ba gzan 'ga' žig gis phan 'dogs par byed pa'i bdag cuñ zad yod pa ma yin na gañ gis na de yañ 'dir ñe bar sbyor ba can du brjod par 'dod par 'gyur /.*

¹⁸⁰ According to PVP D114a5/P132b1 (*dños po rtag pa rtag tu nus pa*).

¹⁸¹ PVP D114a5/P132b2: *de mañ du dpyad zin to //*. “[And] this has [already] been often examined.” See below, fn. 183, p. 175.

is contradictory], and [as it is contradictory that] the cause and [its] result are one [and the same].¹⁸²

Dharmakīrti's critique entails three successive steps, all of which presuppose the following premise: if it is of a productive or causally efficient nature, a permanent entity does not depend on cooperating factors (*sahakārin*, the presence and hence co-efficiency of which are occasional [*kādācitka*], i.e., spatio-temporally limited) in order to bring about its effect.

As Devendrabuddhi remarks, the first step of Dharmakīrti's argument – the fact that a permanent entity such as God or the self cannot produce anything in succession (*krameṇa*) – permeates Dharmakīrti's arguments against a creator God (*īśvara*), the Mīmāṃsaka conception of authorless (*apauruṣeya*) and permanent Vedic words as well as his proofs of momentariness (*kṣaṇikatva*, especially in the so-called *sattvā-numāna*).¹⁸³ As far as the issue of the self is concerned, however, Dharmakīrti's argument is reminiscent of Vasubandhu's critique of the causality of a permanent self in the KSP,¹⁸⁴ even in not taking into consideration the second term of the usual alternative, i.e., the hypothesis of a causal efficiency producing its effect at one time, all at once, “simultaneously” (*yaugapadyena*).¹⁸⁵

¹⁸² PV 2.267–268a: *nityasya nirapekṣatvāt kramotpattir virudhyate / kriyāyām akriyāyām ca kriyā ca sadṛśātmanah // aikyaṃ ca hetuphalayoḥ [...]* //.

¹⁸³ On Dharmakīrti's arguments against *īśvara*, see Nagatomi 1967, Jackson 1986, Krasser 1999, Krasser 2002: II.19–55, Kapstein 2004 (and, for antecedents, see Chemparathy 1968 and Yoshimizu 1999: 242–243, fn. 23). On Dharmakīrti's arguments against the manifestation of permanent Vedic words, see Yoshimizu 1999: 238, fn. 20, and Eltschinger 2007: 189–196. On Dharmakīrti's proofs of momentariness, see above, fn. 92, p. 26.

¹⁸⁴ See above, fn. 96, p. 28.

¹⁸⁵ Note, e.g., PVin 2 80,1–6 (quoted above, fn. 92, p. 26). Sumatiśīla (KST D96a3–b6/P109b1–110a8) explains as follows Vasubandhu's silence about the *yaugapadyena* hypothesis: *de la cig car bya ba mi byed par ni gsal ba ñid de / cig car de la rag lus pa'i 'bras bu mi snañ ba'i phyir ro //*. “Among these [alternatives], it is very clear that the [self] cannot produce an effect simultaneously, since no effect that depends on it is seen to be simultaneous.” Translation (modified) Yoshimizu 1999: 240, fn. 22. See also Yoshimizu's remarks on Sumatiśīla's explanation in Yoshimizu 1999: 237, fn. 19.

As for the second step of Dharmakīrti's argument, according to Devendrabuddhi,¹⁸⁶ it echoes PV 2.21:

Provided that (*yadā*) the entity [called "God," when it is] not a cause [i.e., before it creates], is [of] the very same [nature] as [when it is] a cause [i.e., in the state of creating], due to which [differentiation] do [you] accept it [as] a cause? [And you] do not accept [it] as not [being] a cause.¹⁸⁷

Lastly, Devendrabuddhi explains the third step of Dharmakīrti's argument as follows:

Thus: the active state of a permanent self is the cause, whereas its state of experiencing is the effect. [But there can be] no difference between these two states, because [otherwise] permanence would be lost. [In this way,] that which has the nature of the cause of this very [effect] is the effect, [and] in this sense it is contradictory that the cause and the effect do not differ.¹⁸⁸

According to Dharmakīrti, a permanent self can be neither a cause nor an agent. Or if it is, then its active state (the cause) must be the same as its experiencing state (the effect).

In order to escape Dharmakīrti's critique, the Ātmavādin now suggests a new argument. In Devendrabuddhi's words:

¹⁸⁶ PVP D114a6–7/P132b3–4: *mi byed pa'i dus las khyad par med pa'i phyir phyis kyañ 'di byed pa 'gal bar 'gyur ro źes / ji ltar dños de rgyu yin pa / de ltar de ñid gañ gi tshe / rgyu min de ni gañ gis 'gyur // źes bya ba'i skabs su bśad zin to //*. "Since there is no difference with the time when it does not produce [its effect] (**akriyākālād viśeṣābhāvāt*), it is contradictory that it may produce it afterwards (**paścāt*). [And this] has [already] been stated on the occasion of PV 2.21." Note also PVT Ñe D146a4/P180b4: *'bras bu byed pa'i dus dañ 'bras bu mi byed pa'i dus dag tu bdag ñid mtshuñs pa yin no źes bya ba'i don to //*. "The [intended] meaning (**artha*) [of PV 2.267cd] is: the self is the same at the time when it produces [its] effect and at the time when it does not produce [its] effect."

¹⁸⁷ PV 2.21: *yathā tat kāraṇaṃ vastu tathaiva tad akāraṇaṃ / yadā tat kāraṇaṃ kena mataṃ neṣṭam akāraṇaṃ //*.

¹⁸⁸ PVP D114a7–b1/P132b5–6: *de ltar na bdag rtag pa'i byed pa'i gnas skabs gañ yin pa de ni rgyu yin žiñ de ñid kyi loñs spyod pa'i gnas skabs gañ yin pa de 'bras bu yin na gnas skabs 'di ñid la khyad par med pa yin te / rtag pa ñid ñams pa'i phyir ro // de ñid kyi rgyu'i rañ bžin gañ yin pa de 'bras bu yin pa de ltar na rgyu dañ 'bras bu tha dad pa med pa 'gal ba yin no //*.

Suppose the following be urged (**syād etat*): The agent (**kartṛ*) and its result (**tatphala?*) are different from the self, so [that] what [we accept] is established.¹⁸⁹

Here is Dharmakīrti's reply:

If [one admitted that] the two of them [viz. agency and experience] are distinct from the [self, then the self's] being an agent and an experiencer would be lost. Moreover, [its] capacity [as a cause] is not ascertained (*na sīdhyati*).¹⁹⁰

The Ātmavādin opponent wishes to demonstrate that the self is both an agent and the experiencer of the results of its agency. Now if, in order to escape Dharmakīrti's arguments, he admits that agency and experience are distinct from the self (so that the cause and the effect can themselves be different), then he must admit that this independent self is neither an agent nor an experiencer. While explaining the (rather obscure) last *pāda* of PV 2.268, Devendrabuddhi again refers back to a stanza belonging to Dharmakīrti's polemic against an eternal creator God:

[That something permanent that is not a cause may get involved in a causal] operation is also ill-founded without a difference in nature. And since a permanent [God] is never absent (*avyatirekin*), [its] capacity [as a cause] is difficult to be found out.¹⁹¹

Devendrabuddhi explains *pāda* d as follows:

[An entity's] being a cause (**hetutā?*) is not [ascertained] merely because it produces something (**vastu*) but because, for example, x exists when y exists and x is absent when y is absent even though [all of] x's capable causes [that are] other than y are present. Thus one can show without any doubt that x is an effect of y [and] then establish that y is its cause. But God, because it is eternal, lacks such an absence, [and] thus it is not established that it obeys co-

¹⁸⁹ PVP D114b2/P132b7: *de ltar ni 'gyur mod kyi / bdag las byed pa dañ de'i 'bras bu gžan yin pa de ltar na 'dod pa la sgrub pa ñid yin no že na /*.

¹⁹⁰ PV 2.268bd: *vyatireke tatas tayoh / kartṛbhokṛtvahāniḥ syāt sāmārthyam ca na sīdhyati /*.

¹⁹¹ PV 2.23: *svabhāvabhedenā vinā vyāpāro 'pi na yujyate / nityasyāvyatirekitvāt sāmārthyam ca duranvayam /*.

presence (**anvaya*) and co-absence (**vyatireka*) with the entities [that are supposed to be its effects]. Therefore, how [can it be] a cause?¹⁹²

As for PV 2.269, Devendrabuddhi introduces it as follows:

[The target of PV 2.269 is] the [following] claim (**yad api [...] uktam*) [of the Ātmavādin]: if there is nothing unitary (**yadi na kaścid eko 'sti?*) [such as the self], then (**tadā*) that which is [perceptually] experienced (**anubhūta*) by one [person must] be remembered (**smṛta*) by another, or what is seen (**dṛṣṭa*) by one [person must] be recognized (**pratyaabhijñāta*) by another, or [the action] performed (**kṛta*) by one [person must] be experienced (**anubhūta*) by another.¹⁹³

Or, in Manorathanandin's words:

Objection: If there is no self, then as a result, it should be the case that one [person] perceives and performs the action, [and that] another one remembers and enjoys the result, and thus [there would be] an absurdity. [Against this, Dharmakīrti] states [PV 2.269].¹⁹⁴

These arguments, which form the classical answer of both the Pudgalavādins and the Ātmavādins to the Buddhist charge against the self,¹⁹⁵ recur throughout AKBh 9.¹⁹⁶

And the [undesirable] consequences [put forward by our opponents as invalidating our position¹⁹⁷ – namely that] memory, the experience [of pleasure

¹⁹² PVP D12b2–4/P14a2–4: *dños po la byed^a pa tsam gyis rgyu ñid ma yin gyi 'on kyañ dper na 'di ni 'di yod na 'gyur la / de las gžan pa'i nus pa de'i rgyu dag yod du zin kyañ de med na med par 'gyur ba'i phyir / de ltar na the tshom med par de'i 'bras bu ñid du bstan par 'gyur ba de'i tshe / de'i rgyur grub par 'gyur ro // 'di 'dra ba'i ldog pa ni rtag pa ñid kyi phyir dba'ñ phyug la yod pa ma yin pa de ltar na dños po rñams la de'i rjes su 'gro ba dañ ldog pa'i rjes su byed pa grub pa med pa'i phyir ji ltar na rgyu yin /.^a byed em. : med P, yod D.*

¹⁹³ PVP D114b7–115a1/P133a6–8: *gañ yañ gal te gcig 'ga' žig kyañ yod pa ma yin pa de'i tshe gžan gyis ñams su myoñ ba gžan gyis dran pa 'am / gžan gyis mthoñ ba gžan gyis ño šes pa 'am / gžan gyis byas pa gžan gyis myoñ ba ma yin no // [...] žes brjod pa /.*

¹⁹⁴ PVV 102,6–7: *nanu yady ātmā nāsti tadānyenānubhūtaṃ karma ca kṛtam anyañ smarati bhuñkte phalam iti syāt tathā cātīprasaṅga ity āha [...] /.*

¹⁹⁵ For the use of this type of argument by Ātmavādins see, e.g., Oetke 1988: 468; for its use by Pudgalavādins see above, Chapter 1, §1.1.3.4.3.

¹⁹⁶ See below, fn. 211, p. 184.

and pain as karmic retribution], etc., [would belong to] another [person than the one who perceived, acted, etc.,¹⁹⁸ in the first place –] do not invalidate [our arguments], for [according to us] there is no one to remember something [previously perceived], because [what is] remembered [i.e., remembrance,]¹⁹⁹ arises [indirectly] from [perceptual] experience [alone].²⁰⁰

Like his opponent's counter-arguments, Dharmakīrti's answer is strongly reminiscent of Vasubandhu's rebuttal of similar objections in AKBh 9. Given that Dharmakīrti's answer is elliptic, that his ideas regarding memory (*smṛti*, *smaraṇa*) and recognition²⁰¹ (*pratyabhijñāna*) are under-studied and that his commentators' explanations are scarce,²⁰² the best thing one can do for now is to interpret PV 2.269cd

¹⁹⁷ According to PVP D115a2/P133a8 (*gžan gyis gnod pa can du brjod pa gañ yin pa de*).

¹⁹⁸ PVP D115a1/P133a7–8: *sogs pa smos pas ni gžan the tshom za bar gyur pa la gžan gyis ñes pa yin no //*. "The word 'etc.' (**ādīśabdāt*) [covers such cases as:] one would ascertain what another was in doubt about."

¹⁹⁹ According to PVP D115a3/P133b2 (*dran pa ñid dran pa yin te*) and PVV 102,12 (*smṛtir eva smṛtaṁ tasyodbhavaḥ*).

²⁰⁰ PV 2.269: *anyasmaranābhogādiprasaṅgāś ca na bādhakāḥ / asmṛteḥ kasyacit tena hy anubhūteḥ smṛtodbhavaḥ //*.

²⁰¹ Note that *pratyabhijñā(na)* is an important concept in the framework of Dharmakīrti's version of the *apoha* theory, where it is synonymous with words such as *nīś-caya*, "(perceptual) judgment/ascertainment" and *adhyavasāya*, "determination (as)." On *pratyabhijñā(na)* as ascertainment, see, e.g., Katsura 1993, Kellner 2004 and Eltschinger 2010b: 403–404 (§5c). While there can be no doubt that Dharmakīrti's account of identification or ascertainment in the PVSV has an important bearing on the issue of memory and cannot differ significantly from Dharmakīrti's elaborations in PV 3.503cd–531, any account of memory in Dharmakīrti's thought must await the results of current research on PV 3.

²⁰² PVP D115a3/P133b2: *ñams su myoñ ba gsal bas nus pa phyi ma phyi ma ches śin tu ba'ia yid kyi rnam par śes pa bskyed pa'i sgo nas physis rkyen ji lta ba bzin du dran pa skyed par byed do // gañ gi phyir de ltar ñams su myoñ ba las dran pa skyed ba de bas na gcig 'ga' žig ñams su myoñ ba ñid dran par byed pa ma yin no // 'dir dños po'i rkyen yin na yañ byed pa po la ltos pa ma yin te / śña phyir gyur pa'i 'du byed rñams la rnam pa 'ga' žig la sgro btags pa la 'jug pa de ltar na de las dños po'i rañ bzin grub pa ma yin no //*. [^a To be read *ches śin tu byuñ ba'i?*] "A vivid (**spaṣṭa*, **sphuṭa*, **pa-tu?*) [perceptual] experience (**anubhūti?*), due to [the fact that it] generates a mental cognition (**manovijñāna*) that produces[?] a [reproductive] capacity which [in turn produces a] subsequent [reproductive capacity, etc.] (**uttarottaraśakti?*), later generates a memory according to conditions (**yathāpratyayam*). Since, in this way,

against the background of parallel passages in AKBh 9. But let us first consider the following excerpt of Dharmakīrti's PVin 1:

[Objection:] But how [is it] now [that human] practice [is] due to perception, which [according to you] does not consist in [a conceptual] ascertainment [but in the mere awareness of an object]? For it is while [conceptually] ascertaining [i.e., identifying something.] as 'this [brings pleasure' or 'this brings suffering]' that one acts in order to obtain what is instrumental in [securing] pleasure and to avoid what is instrumental in [provoking] suffering. [Answer:] This is not a fault [on our part], because [human] practice, [which arises] from a desire for perceived [things that occurs] immediately upon perceiving them, is [made possible] due to memory, which arises through the capacity of [a former perceptual] awareness (*saṃvid*). Even though perception is a bare vision of the object, [human] practice, [which arises] from a desire and [its] opposite [i.e., aversion.] regarding perceived things immediately upon perceiving them, is [made possible] due to memory, which arises through the capacity of [a former perceptual] experience [and] synthetically connects (*pratisandhāyin*) [the presently perceived object with the object previously] experienced. It is indeed a property of what is real that[, provided it is] vivid, a [previous perceptual] experience imprints (*ādhatte*) a seed of memory. Due to the perception of something similar [to what has been perceived previously], this [seed of memory] awakens(/is actualized); [thereu-

a memory arises from [perceptual] experience, it is not the case that a certain [agent that would be] unitary (**eka*) causes [one] to remember what has been [perceptually] experienced [before]. Here, although something real [i.e., perceptual experience.] is the condition [of the memory's arising, the causal process] does not depend on an agent (**kartṛ*): one superimposes a certain aspect (**ākāra*) on the conditioning factors (**saṃskāra*) that arise in succession (**pūrvāpara*?). Thus, a real nature (**vastuvabhāva*?) [such as a self] is not established through it." On *manovijñāna* and *mānasapratyakṣa*, see Stcherbatsky 1993: 309–339; see also PVin 2 19,3–20,7 (and Vetter 1966: 59–63 for a German translation; note Vetter 1966: 104, fn. 36) and NB 1.9 (and Stcherbatsky 1993: 26–28 for an English translation): *svaviṣayānantaraviṣayasahakāriṇendriyajñānena samanantarapratyayena janitaṃ tan manovijñānam* /. "A mental [perceptual] cognition is that [cognition which is] generated by a sensory cognition [functioning here as this mental cognition's] condition [in quality of homogenous and] immediate antecedent, [a sensory cognition] whose cooperating [factor] is the object^a that follows immediately its own object [i.e., this sensory cognition's own object]." ^a Or: which cooperates with the object (Dharmottara [NB_TM 58,4/NB_TS 10,11] clearly interprets the compound as a *bahuvrīhi*).

pon] the impregnation of desire develops and, due to it, action [can take place].²⁰³

In this oft quoted passage, Dharmakīrti explains that human practice arises from a desire that presupposes memory and presents memory as originating from a past perceptual awareness (*anubhava*, *saṃvid*) via the subsequent “awakening” (*prabodha*) of a seed of memory (*smṛtibīja*) imprinted (*āhita*) by this past perception itself²⁰⁴ and subsisting in the subsequent series of momentary cognitions. In Dharmakīrti’s views, this seed of memory becomes actualized due to one’s perceiving something similar (*tādṛśadarśana*) to the object of the past perception.

In several respects this explanation seems to echo one of the most important arguments developed by the commentators of NSū 1.1.10²⁰⁵ so as to support their Ātmavāda, and it is tempting to read the passage as being meant at least in part as an implicit refutation of this argument. Thus according to Pakṣilasvāmin, human practice occurs through a desire (*icchā*) that rests on our capacity to synthetically apprehend (*pratisandhāna*) both the object perceived as a cause of pleasure in the past and the object perceived now,²⁰⁶ and action involves an effort to

²⁰³ PVin 1 18,5–19,2 (together with PVin 1.18): *katham tarhīdānīm anīścayātmanah pratyakṣād vyavahārah / nīścinvan hīdantayā sukhaduḥkhasāadhanayoḥ prāptiparihārāya pravartate / nāyaṃ doṣaḥ / yasmāt taddṛṣṭāv eva dṛṣṭeṣu saṃvitsāmarthyabhāvinah / smaraṇād abhilāṣeṇa vyavahārah pravartate // arthālocanamātre ‘pi pratyakṣe ‘nubhavasāmarthyabhāvino ‘nubhūtapratisandhāyinaḥ smaraṇāt taddṛṣṭāv eva dṛṣṭeṣv abhilāṣetarābhīyāṃ vyavahāro bhavati / vastudharmo hy eṣa yad anubhavaḥ paṭiyān smṛtibījam ādhatte / tādṛśadarśanād asya prabodho ‘bhilāṣavāsanāvivṛttir ato vṛttiś ca /*. Dharmottara’s lengthy commentary is found in PVinT Dze D82b2–86a3.

²⁰⁴ PVin 1 19,1–2 is the source of Manorathanandin’s (PVV 102,13–14) commentary on PV 2.269: *vastudharmo hy eṣa yad anubhavaḥ paṭiyān smaraṇabījādhānadvāreṇa smaraṇam janayati /*. “It is indeed a property of what is real that [provided it is] vivid, a [perceptual] experience generates a memory by imprinting a seed of memory.”

²⁰⁵ See, e.g., Kellner 2001: 504, according to which the description in PVin 1.18 “bears a not insignificant resemblance to precursors in Pakṣilasvāmin’s *Nyāyabhāṣya* and Patañjali’s *Mahābhāṣya*.”

²⁰⁶ See above, fn. 77, p. 140, and NBh 16,5–7: *yajjātīyasyārthasya sannikarṣāt sukham ātmopalabdhanvān tajjātīyam evārthaṃ paśyann upādātum icchati / seyam ādātum*

obtain something or to get rid of it that can occur only provided that one remembers the pleasure or pain experienced upon perceiving a particular object.²⁰⁷ While Dharmakīrti acknowledges this, his explanation of memory shows that human practice and the capacity to recollect that it involves can be accounted for without having recourse to the notion of a permanent and unitary self, since memory requires nothing more than a trace left in a series of momentary and heterogeneous cognitions.

Now, this explanation of memory is the one Vasubandhu develops at length against a Pudgalavādin opponent in AKBh 9. The key-passage occurs in the framework of the critique of the Pudgalavāda:

[Objection:] But if a self does not exist in any way, how is it that, thoughts being momentary, one remembers or recognizes an object that has been perceived a long time before? [Answer: Remembrance and hence recognition arise] from a particular thought the cause (*anvaya*, gl. *hetu* AKVy) of which is a [perceptual] notion of the object [that will later be that] of memory. [Ques -

icchaikasyānekārthadarśīno darśanapratisandhānād bhavati līṅgam ātmanaḥ /. “The self, which has [formerly] experienced pleasure from the contact with an object of a certain sort [and] now sees an object of the same sort, desires to obtain it. This very desire to obtain [an object, which arises] from the synthesis (*pratisandhāna*) of the [past and present] perceptions belonging to a unitary perceiver [who apprehends] various objects, is a mark of the self.” According to NBh 16,8, the same is true of aversion, which drives us away from objects that we consider causes of pain: *evam ekasyānekārthadarśīno darśanapratisandhānād duḥkhaḥetau dveṣaḥ* /. “In the same way, aversion[which arises] from the synthesis of the [past and present] perceptions belonging to a unitary perceiver [who apprehends] various objects[is a mark of the self].”

²⁰⁷ NBh 16,8–10: *yajjātīyo 'syārthaḥ sukhahetuḥ prasiddhas tājātīyam arthaṃ paśyan ādātum prayatate / so 'yaṃ prayatna evam anekārthadarśīnaṃ darśanapratisandhātāram antareṇa na syāt* /. “[Someone] makes an effort so as to obtain an object upon seeing it [if] this [object is] of the same sort as an object that this [person already] knows [to be] a cause of pleasure; [and] in the same way, this very effort could not take place without a perceiver of various objects [who is also] the synthesizer (*pratisandhātṛ*) of these perceptions.” NBh 16,12–13 specifies that the cause of this knowledge is memory while explaining how pleasure and pain are also marks of the self: *sukhaduḥkhasmṛtyā cāyaṃ tatsāadhanam ādadānaḥ sukham upalabhate / duḥkham upalabhate sukhaduḥkhe vedayate* /. “And this [person] experiences – [i.e.,] becomes aware of – pleasure and pain while obtaining what is instrumental in [producing] these [present pleasure and pain] thanks to the memory of some [past] pleasure and pain.”

tion: But] of what kind is the particular thought from which memory arises immediately? [Answer: From a thought] inclined toward the [object or associated] with notions, etc.,²⁰⁸ that are either similar or related [to this object; and it is a thought] whose force is not impaired by [problems] such as a modification of the basis [i.e., an illness], sorrow and [mental] distraction. For a particular thought that does not have this [perceptual notion of the object] for its cause is not capable of generating this memory even though it may be of this sort [i.e., inclined toward the object, possessing similar or related notions, etc., and of unimpaired force]; and a [particular thought] of another sort [i.e., one that is not inclined toward the object, etc., and is of impaired force,] is not capable of generating this memory [either] although it [may have] this [(perceptual) notion of the object] for its cause. But in the case where the two [conditions are found], it is capable [of generating it]. So this is how memory occurs, since one does not observe that another [kind of thought] has [this] capacity.²⁰⁹

For memory to arise, two sets of conditions that pertain to memory's immediate cause – called a “particular thought” by Vasubandhu – must be instantiated. (1) First, this thought *must* be, through a process that we will consider below, the end-product of a previous perceptual awareness of the object upon which memory bears (*pace* momentariness). (2) Second, this thought must meet two further sub-sets of conditions: (2a) this thought must be characterized by *at least one* of the following features: (2a1) being inclined toward or focusing on the object (say the actual fire in the case of fire); (2a2) being associated with a notion, a former resolution, an intentness or a perceptual habitus,

²⁰⁸ AKVy 711,7–8: *ādīgrahaṇena prañidhānanibandhābhyāsādīgrahaṇam* /. “The word ‘etc.’ includes [factors] such as habitus based (?*nibandha*) on a [former] resolution.”

²⁰⁹ AKBh_{Pr} 472,16–22/AKBh_{LE} 122,1–9: *yadi tarhi sarvathāpi nāsty ātmā katham kṣaṇikeṣu citteṣu cirānubhūtasāthasya smaraṇam bhavati pratyabhijñānam vā / smṛtviṣayasāñjñānvayāc cittaviśeṣāt / kīdṛśāc cittaviśeṣād yato 'nantaram smṛtir bhavati / tadābhogasadrśasambandhisāñjñādimato 'nupahataprabhāvād āśrayaviśeṣaśokavyākṣepādibhiḥ / tādrśo 'pi hy atadanvayacittaviśeṣo na samarthas tāṃ smṛtiṃ bhāvayitum tadanvayo 'pi cānyādrśo na samarthas tāṃ smṛtiṃ bhāvayitum / ubhayathā tu samartha ity evaṃ smṛtir bhavaty anyasya^a sāmartyādarśanāt* /. [^a *anyasya* AKBh_{LE}: *anyasyām* AKBh_{Pr}.] See *Kośa* V.274–276 and Duerlinger 2008: 96–97 and 238–244. For an overview of Abhidharmic conceptions of recollection, see Cox 1992: 85–87.

etc.,²¹⁰ that bears similarity with the object (say a notion of heat in the case of fire); (2a3) being associated with a notion related to the object (say smoke in the case of fire); (2a4) being associated with a former resolution (*prañidhāna*, AKVy); (2a5) being associated with (perceptual) habitus (*abhyāsa*, AKVy). (2b) Besides, its causal capacity (*prabhāva*) must be impaired by *none* of the following factors: (2b1) illness (*vyādhi*, AKVy), (2b2) sorrow, (2b3) mental distraction, (2b4) magical action (*karman*, AKVy) and (2b5) formulas (*vidyā*, AKVy).

Provided all these conditions are instantiated, memory arises. But what about the process leading from the initial perceptual thought (*upalabdhicitta*) to the “particular thought” responsible for the rise of memory and then to the mnesic thought (*smṛticitta*) itself? As hinted at by Manorathanandin, this process, which Vasubandhu describes as an evolution or, better, a (series of) transformation(s) of the series (*santatipariṇatī*), is to be accounted for in terms of seeds (*bīja*).²¹¹ What does this process consist of? Vasubandhu spells this out in a passage that provides us with clues regarding the second aspect of the problem at stake, viz. the explanation of the relationship between past action (*karman*) and (the experience of) its results (*phala*):²¹²

²¹⁰ See above, fn. 208, p. 183.

²¹¹ See above, fn. 204, p. 181, and AKBh_{Pr} 472,22–26/AKBh_{LE} 124,1–7: *katham idānīm anyena cetasā dṛṣṭam anyat smarati / evaṃ hi devadattacetasā dṛṣṭam yajñadattacetatḥ smaret / na / asambandhāt / na hi tayorḥ sambandho 'sty akāryakāraṇabhāvād yathaikasantānikayoḥ / na ca brūmo 'nyena cetasā dṛṣṭam anyat smaratiṭy api tu darśanacittāt smṛticittam anyad utpadyate / santatipariṇatyā yathoktam iti ka evaṃ sati doṣaḥ / smaraṇād eva ca pratyabhijñānaṃ bhavati /*. “[Objection: But] how is it, now, that one [mind] remembers what has been seen by another mind? For in this case (*evam*), Yajñadatta’s mind would remember what has been seen by Devadatta’s. [Answer:] No, [it is not so,] because there is no [causal] relation [between their two minds]. Indeed, there is no relation between [their] two [minds], because there is no causality relationship [between them] as there is [one] between [minds] belonging to one [and the same] series. Moreover, we do not claim that one [mind] remembers what has been seen by another, but [that] another, mnesic thought arises from a perceptual thought, [and this] due to a transformation of the series, as was said [before]. Therefore, what is the fault [on our side] if it is so? And it is from memory that recognition arises.” See *Kośa* V.274–276 and Duerlinger 2008: 96–97 and 238–244.

²¹² AKBh_{Pr} 477,7–9/AKBh_{LE} 158,1–5: *katham asaty ātmani vinaṣṭāt karmaṇa āyatyāṃ phalotpattiḥ / ātmany api sati katham vinaṣṭāt karmaṇa āyatyāṃ phalotpattiḥ /*

As for ourselves, however, we do not claim that the result arises subsequently from an action [that is already] destroyed, but from a particular transformation of its series, as the sprout from the seed, as it is said [in ordinary language] that the result arises from the seed. And [here,] neither [is it meant that] this [result] arises from a seed [that is already] destroyed, nor [that it arises] immediately [after the seed]. Rather, [it arises] from a particular transformation of its series [i.e.,] from the last stage [which consists in] the flower [and is] realized through a succession that comprises the sprout, the stalk and the leaf. [The Ātmavādin:] But [if] the [result] is realized by the flower, why do [we] say [that it is] the result of the seed? [Vasubandhu:] Because the [causal] capacity imprinted by the [seed] indirectly accrues to the flower. If [the capacity of the flower] were not preceded by the [capacity of the seed, the flower] would not be capable of generating a result of that kind [i.e., similar to the seed]. Similarly, it is said that the result arises from the action. And neither does it arise from an action [that is already] destroyed nor [does it arise] immediately [after the action], but from a particular transformation of its series. [The Ātmavādin:] But what is the series, what is the transformation, what is the particularity [of the last phase of transformation]? [Vasubandhu:] The series [consists in] the stream, which originates from an action, of each successive thought, and this [series]'s arising [ever] differently is [its] transformation. And that [transformation, i.e., that new phase] which is capable of generating the result immediately is [called] a particular transformation because it is distinguished [in this regard] with regard to the other[, preceding] transformations.²¹³

tadāśritād dharmādharmāt / yathā kaḥ kimāśrita ity uktottaraiṣā vācocyuktiḥ / tasmād anāśritād eva dharmādharmād bhavatu / "[The Ātmavādin:] If there is no self, how [can] a result arise later from an action [that is already] destroyed? [Vasubandhu: But] even if there is a self[, as you contend], how [can] a result arise later from an action [that is already] destroyed? [The Ātmavādin:] From merit and demerit, which rest on the [self as qualities of a substance. Vasubandhu:] This is vain rhetoric (*vācocyukti*), to which [we have already] answered, for example [while asking:] 'What rests on what?' [So] let us admit [that the result arises] from merit and demerit which do not rest [on the self]." On *nairātmya* and the relation between action and its result in the AKBh, see also Sanderson 1994.

²¹³ AKBh_{Pr} 477,9–20 / AKBh_{LE} 158,5–160,5: *naiva tu vyaṃ vīṣṭāt karmaṇa āyatyāṃ phalotpattiṃ brūmaḥ / kiṃ tarhi / tatsantatipariṇāmaviśeṣād bījaphalavat / yathā bījāt phalam utpadyate ity ucyate / na ca tad vīṣṭād bījād utpadyate / nāpy anantaram eva / kiṃ tarhi / tatsantatipariṇāmaviśeṣād anīkurakāṇḍapattrādi-*

As it is accounted for by Vasubandhu and Dharmakīrti, the process does not require any agent, subject or substratum responsible for the continuity between perception and memory or between acts and their (eschatological) experience. Acts and perceptual experiences simply plant seeds²¹⁴ that gradually transform themselves up to the point where the conditions are met for them to produce their result.

*kramaniṣpannāt puṣpāvasānāt / tat punaḥ puṣpān niṣpannam kasmāt tasya bījasya phalam ity ucyate / tadāhitam hi tat paramparayā puṣpe^a sāmāthyam / yadi hi tatpūrvakam^b nābhaviṣyat tattādṛśasya phalasyotpattau na samartham abhaviṣyat / evaṃ karmaṇaḥ phalam utpadyata ity ucyate / na ca tad vinaṣṭāt karmaṇa utpadyate nāpy anantaram eva / kiṃ tarhi / tatsantatipariṇāmaviśeṣāt / kā punaḥ santatiḥ kaḥ pariṇāmaḥ ko viśeṣaḥ / yaḥ karmapūrva uttarottaracittaprasavaḥ^c sā santatis tasyā anyathotpattiḥ pariṇāmaḥ / sa punar yo 'nantaram phalotpādana-samarthaḥ so 'ntyapariṇāmaviśiṣṭatvāt pariṇāmaviśeṣaḥ /. [^a paramparayā puṣpe AKBh_{LE} (Tib. *brgyud pas*) : parayā puṣpe AKBh_{Pr}. ^b tatpūrvakam AKBh_{LE} : tatpūrvikān AKBh_{Pr}. ^c prasavaḥ AKBh_{LE} : °pravasaḥ AKBh_{Pr}.] See *Kośa* V.295–296 and Duerlinger 2008: 108 and 293–296.*

²¹⁴ AKBh_{Pr} 64,5–7: *kiṃ punar idaṃ bījaṃ nāma / yan nāmarūpaṃ phalotpattau samartham sāksāt pāramparyeṇa vā / santatipariṇāmaviśeṣāt / ko 'yaṃ pariṇāmo nāma / santater anyathātvam / kā ceyaṃ santatiḥ / hetuphalabhūtās traiyadhvikāḥ saṃskārāḥ /*. “[Question:] But what is it that [you] call a ‘seed’? [Answer: A seed] is a name-and-form that is capable of giving rise to a result in a direct or an indirect manner due to a particular transformation of the series. [Question:] What is it that [you] call a ‘transformation’? [Answer: A transformation] is the fact that the series is otherwise. [Question:] And what does this series consist of? [Answer: The series consists of] the conditioning factors that are [successively] causes and results [and] belong to the three times [i.e., past, present, future].” See *Kośa* I.185.