

The authority of the Buddha, the omniscience of the Jina and the truth of Jainism

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1. It would seem that an attempt to justify truth claims of the teachings of the founder of one's religion should be one of the most important philosophical tasks of any religious-philosophical grouping in India, including the Jainas. The Buddhists, surprisingly, engaged in the enterprise of justifying (which involves an appeal to rational, intersubjectively verifiable argumentation) the truth and reliability of the Buddha's word in a *serious* way relatively late, i.e. after Dīnāga. Similarly, there are very few genuine arguments, i.e. either full-fledged and more or less complete in their logical structure, to justify the Jaina claims of the authoritativeness of the Jina's teaching. The advent of such attempts may reflect a certain historical change from the phase when various philosophical and religious systems of India engaged in debates at which primarily concrete theses (e.g. whether the world is transient or permanent, etc.) were discussed to a phase when also the credibility and veracity of the debaters' teachers and founders of respective systems of religion and philosophy were both rationally questioned and justified (which involved a debate on the criteria of the authoritative character [*āptatva*] of the original teachers or of the scripture), and not merely rejected or approved on the basis of one's systemic affiliation and one's belief. Such a change would mark the transition from a phase when the acceptance of reliability of the original teachers was based primarily on belief to a phase when the belief was either replaced or accompanied by the work of reason.

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The present paper analyses some of the stratagems applied by the Jainas to justify the reliability and truth of their system, which also entailed – as we shall see – the claim of the omniscience of the Jinās, the founders of their system. The paper also indicates some parallels between Jainism and Buddhism, especially post-Dīnāga's tradition, in this respect. I will also point out a range of flaws and serious and insurmountable inconsistencies in the Jainas' approach.

2. What once Kumārila Bhaṭṭa formulated very succinctly is what seems most relevant in this context and what some Jainas took quite seriously:

[The authority of a liberated teacher] cannot be established without [taking recourse to] his scripture, but the scripture cannot [be established] without [taking recourse to] his [existence].¹

That passage, occasionally quoted and discussed by some Jaina authors, reveals a serious paradox and logical flaw in any attempt to justify the authority and reliability of such a teacher. Kumārila neatly demonstrates the mutual dependence (**anyonyāśraya*) of the scripture, considered authoritative, and its author, likewise considered authoritative, each of these two *relata* deriving its reliability and veracity from the other *relatum*: a typical case of vicious circle.

Hemacandra-sūri (1088–1172) is one of such Jaina thinkers who were well aware of the logical flaw in any argument to prove the authority of the scripture from the authority of the teacher and *vice versa*, for he himself quotes Kumārila's passage referred to above in his auto-commentary on the *Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā* (PMiV 1.15, § 54). He was certainly not the only Jaina philosopher wary of the self-abortive nature of such an argument. That is probably why we do not normally find a simple circular argument of the sort that the authority of the Jina, the Victor, is founded on the Jaina scriptures, and the truth of the Jaina scriptures is founded on the authority, or omniscience, of the Jina, with some notable exceptions though.

Such a surprising case of a circular argument, the argument from scripture, is Haribhadra-sūri's *Śāstra-vārtā-samuccaya*, contained

¹ *na rte tad-āgamāt sidhyen na ca tenāgamo vinā* / MŚV 2.142ab

in a lengthy passage out of which I just highlight the following two verses, although the ideas are mentioned on a few other occasions there:

[594] The proof of [the existence / authority of] an [omniscient being] is through the scripture, because [the idea of] such [a person] is a result of scriptural injunction. Further, the scripture (the omniscient?)² is both intrinsically valid and eternal like [Vedic] revelation.

[626] To conclude, it is logically correct to establish as distinct righteousness and unrighteousness in this way on the basis of the scripture, the contents of which is everything, which has been revealed by the omniscient, not in any other way whatsoever.³

What reverberates in the whole passage and argument is the Mīmāṃsā concept of intrinsic validity (*svataḥ-prāmāṇya*) of cognition, developed especially in order to justify the authority of the *Vedas*, texts without an author (*apauruṣeya*), being a vital concept to establish the authority of the *Vedas* for Mīmāṃsā, completely lacking in Jainism though. The context for the query, however, is how to distinguish between good and evil, or right and wrong ('righteousness and unrighteousness,' *dharmâdharma*), which are the fundamental guidelines in human life. The guiding principle Haribhadra advocates to distinguish between good and evil is the scripture itself. But how much are the Jainas justified in their reliance on the scripture in his opinion, in other words, what endows the scripture with authority? Haribhadra's reply is quite straightforward: It is the Jina, the omniscient (*sarva-jñā*), whose all-embracing scope of knowledge is reflected in the all-encompassing character (*sarvârtha*) of the scripture. But how do we know that such an omniscient being exists *at all* and that that *particular* being is the Jina? It is simple: 'The proof of the existence / authority of an [omniscient being] is through the scripture.' What we have is a perfect *circulus vitiosus*:

² SVK, vol. 7, p. 44.7 takes *tasya* to be *sarva-jñasya*.

³ *āgamād api tat-siddhir yad asau codanā-phalam |
prāmāṇyaṃ ca svatas tasya nityatvaṃ ca śruter iva || ŚVS 594
sarva-jñena hy abhivyaktāt sarvârthād āgamāt parā |
dharmâdharma-vyavasthêyaṃ yujyate nānyataḥ kvacit || ŚVS 626*

The Jina is authoritative (P), because of the scripture (Q).

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The situation is represented in the following diagram (fig. 1):




Fig. 1

This line of reasoning, however, in its *explicit* formulation is luckily rather rare in Jaina philosophical literature, but not necessarily in Jaina religious literary output.

We do find it, though, quite often as taken for granted or in an implied form, also with authors who are generally wary of the risks of circularity. For instance, Hemacandra-sūri, referred to above, in the first step of his argument, asserts that the Jina's omniscience can be established through scripture:

Furthermore, the scripture itself the contents of which is proved through perception and inference is the proof (lit. cognitive criterion) of the existence of an agent who perceives extra-sensory [things]. ... Scriptural testimony, by demonstrating the doctrine of the [seven-fold] modal description proved through cognitive criteria in such a way, also demonstrates that the Arhat is omniscient;⁴

and a few lines later, he plainly assumes that the source of the scripture is the omniscient being himself (*sarva-jñôpajñas câgamah*):

Neither scriptural testimony could disprove [the existence of the omniscient being], because it is not possible that the scripture is without author (*apauruṣeya*), and if [the scripture] were [without author, there

⁴ PMIV 1.16 § 57 (p. 14): *kiṃca pratyakṣânumâna-siddha-saṃvādaṃ śāstram evâtīndriya-darśi-sadbhāve pramāṇam. ... iti diśā pramāṇa-siddhaṃ syād-vādaṃ pratipādayann āgamo 'rhatas sarvajñatām api pratipādayati.*

would be no problem], because no scripture can be presented which disproves [the existence of the omniscient being]. Moreover, how could *the scripture which is revealed by the omniscient* disprove his existence?⁵

Besides this argument from the scripture of patently circular character, we find other kinds of arguments which Jaina philosophers devised. Of all such arguments which serve to justify the truth of Jainism, or the authoritativeness of the Jina's teaching, I have come across, I would generally distinguish the following kinds: the argument from scripture, the argument from efficacy of the teaching, the argument from progression and the argument from potentiality, there being some more varieties though.

3. One of the earliest formulations of the argument from efficacy of the teaching is the opening verses of Kundakunda's *Pavayaṇa-sāra* (*Pravacana-sāra*, ca. 4th–5th century). Worth mentioning in passing is the fact that Kundakunda's argument in a eulogy to the Jina strikes a close resemblance to Diñnāga's opening verse of the *Pramāṇa-samuccaya*. It is difficult at this stage, however, to derive any conclusions of historical import, e.g. relative chronology of these two authors, from such parallelism. The verses read:

[1] Here, I render homage to Vardhamāna, the maker of the passage to moral law,⁶ who is venerated by the gods and demons, by humans and sovereigns, who has washed away the dirt of the destructive *karman*.
[2] And [I render homage to] all the remaining ford-makers (*tīrthaṃ-kara*) along with all the perfected beings of pure nature, and to the ascetics whose actions [are regulated by correct] knowledge, conation,

⁵ PMIV 1.17 § 62 (p. 17): *nāpy āgamas tad-bādhakas tasyāpauruṣeyasyā-sambhavāt, sambhave vā tad-bādhakasya tasyādarśanāt. sarva-jñōpajñās cāgamaḥ kathaṃ tad-bādhakaḥ?*

⁶ Compare the expression *dharma-tīrtha-kara* ('the makers of the passage to moral law') in LT 1:

*dharma-tīrtha-karebhyo 'stu syād-vāḍibhyo namo-namaḥ /
ṛṣabhādi-mahāvīrāntebhyaḥ svātmōpalabdhave //*

[I pay] earnest homage to those who are the makers of the passage to moral law, propounders of modal description, from Ṛṣabha to Mahāvīra – for the sake of the apprehension of [my] own self.

conduct, penance and energy. [3] I venerate all of them in their entirety as well as each of them individually, but also [I venerate] current saints [living] in the human region. [4–5] Having paid homage to the saints (sc. liberated souls), the perfected beings as well as to congregation leaders (direct disciples of the Jina), to classes of community instructors and to all monks with no exception, [and] having taken up the lifestyle the underlying basis of which are purified knowledge and conation, I embrace equilibrium whereby one attains liberation.⁷

Let us examine the structure of the reasoning behind the eulogy and pinpoint the crucial constituent elements present in the verses which not only were meant to reflect highly pious attitude and reverence on the part of Kundakunda but seem, as we will see, to have been employed in order to enunciate a hidden argument. The most conspicuous structural elements of the eulogy are the following:

- (1) Vardhamāna is the source ('the maker') of the teaching ('is a passage to') of moral law (*titthaṃ dhammassa kattāraṃ*) – Verse 1d.
- (2) The moral law revealed by Vardhamāna demonstrates the proper conduct for the humans – a general assumption (it is the very nature of *dharma* to indicate the proper behaviour according to most Indian thinkers).
- (3) Vardhamāna is unique inasmuch as his inner self is immaculate, because he removed all the destructive karmic matter (*dhoda-ghāi-kamma-malaṃ*), i.e. he practically applied the principles of his own teaching – Verse 1b.
- (4) Through his own life and complete removal of all the destructive karmic matter, Vardhamāna demonstrated the efficacy of his own teaching.

⁷ *esa surāsura-maṇus-iṃda-vaṃdidam dhoda-ghāi-kamma-malaṃ / paṇāmi vaḍḍhamāṇaṃ titthaṃ dhammassa kattāraṃ* // PSā 1. 1
sese puṇa titthakare sasavva-siddhe visuddha-sabbhāve / samaṇe ya nāṇa-daṃsaṇa-caritta-tava-vīriyāyāre // PSā 1.2
te te savve samagaṃ samagaṃ pattegam eva pattegam / vaṃdāmi ya vaṭṭaṃte arahamte māṇuse khetṭe // PSā 1.3
kiccā arahamtaṇaṃ siddhāṇaṃ taha ṇamo gaṇa-harāṇaṃ / ajjhāvaya-vaggāṇaṃ sāhūṇaṃ cēva ssavvesiṃ // PSā 1.4
tesiṃ visuddha-daṃsaṇa-nāṇa-pahāṇāsamaṃ samāsejja / uvasaṃpayāmi sammaṃ jatto ṇivvāṇa-saṃpattī // PSā 1.5

(5) There are other beings who are perfected (*sasavva-siddhe*) and of pure nature (*visuddha-sabbhāve*) who, just like Vardhamāna, are the paragons and set the example of correct conduct to ordinary humans (*ñāṇa-damṣaṇa-caritta-tava-vīriyāyāre*) – Verse 2.

(6) The proper conduct based on moral law (*dharma*) is the lifestyle (*āśrama*) the underlying basis of which are purified knowledge and conation (*visuddha-damṣaṇa-ñāṇa-pahāṇāsamaṃ*) – Verse 5a.

(7) This lifestyle, characterised by equilibrium, leads to liberation (*sammaṃ ... ñivvāṇa-sampattī*).

But there is something more to these verses than just a devout expression of Kundakunda's homage paid to the founders and promulgators of his religious tradition. If we analyse the structural links we will discover that they are internally logically organised to form an argument the overall structure of which turns out to be approximately as follows:

1. The authority of the Jina (*āptatva*), i.e. the cognitive validity (*prāmāṇya*) of the knowledge transmitted through his statements, establishes his teaching (**jina-vacana*).
2. The essence of the teaching constitutes its instrumentality in establishing a path to moral law (*dharma-tīrtha-karatva*).
3. The path establishes (reveals the essence of) the moral law (*dharma*).
4. The moral law establishes (sets as the human goal, *puruṣārtha*) liberation (*nirvāṇa, mokṣa*).
5. The liberation establishes (determines) a particular salvific kind of lifestyle (*āśrama*) to achieve the desired goal (*puruṣārtha-siddhi*).
6. The salvific kind of lifestyle (*āśrama*) establishes (leads to) purified knowledge and conation (*visuddha-darśana-jñāna*).
7. The purified knowledge and conation establishes (leads to) equilibrium, or inner restraint (*sāmya*).
9. The efficacy (**sāmarthya / puruṣārtha-siddhi*) of the equilibrium – expressed through 'equilibrium whereby one attains liberation' (*sammaṃ jatto ñivvāṇa-sampattī*; Skt.: *sāmyaṃ yato nirvāṇa-samprāptiḥ*) – establishes (sc. determines) the authority of the Jina (*āptatva*) inasmuch as it successfully leads to liberation.

Interestingly, Kundakunda's argument neither *directly* nor *explicitly* appeals to credibility or infallibility (*avisamvāditva*) of the Jina, something we would probably expect, and the term '*avisamvāditva*,' or any of its synonyms for that matter, does not directly feature in the passage. However, such an idea has to be assumed as an element of the argument to account for the reliability of the religious practice which the Jina advances. In fact, infallibility is intimately related to the idea of authority (*āptatva*) and is the latter's logical or semantic corollary: it is hardly possible to have *āptatva* (authoritative status) without *avisamvāditva* (infallibility). Therefore, we should add one more explicit link:

8. Infallibility (**avisamvāditva*) of the Jina both (1) is established by the efficacy of the religious practice and (2) itself establishes the authority of the Jina (*āptatva*).




Fig. 2

A complete argumentative structure, including minor intervening constitutive elements, can be depicted as in fig. 2 (the asterisk * marks expressions absent in the text, but logically necessarily implied). It is quite obvious from the above analysis that the argument cannot but be circular, either straightforwardly (as a true circle) or indirectly and implicitly (as an incomplete circle with some elements presupposed).

3. Let us now turn to the Buddhist tradition and compare Kundakunda's line of reasoning to an argument formulated within Buddhist circles by Dharmakīrti, an argument based, in his opinion, on a reasoning embedded in – or rather: inspired by – the five epithets of the Buddha ('the one who is (is like) a cognitive criterion' (*pramāṇa-bhūta*), 'the one who seeks the benefit for the world' (*jagad-dhītaiṣin*), 'a teacher' (*śāstrī*), 'a protector' (*tāyin*)) occurring in the salutatory verse (*maṅgala*) of Dignāga's *Pramāṇa-samuccaya*,⁸ and laid out in the *Pramāṇa-siddhi* ('Establishment of the cognitive criterion') chapter of the *Pramāṇa-vārttika*. As Ernst STEINKELLNER (2003: esp. 326–330)⁹ noted, these five epithets constitute a conceptual background for an argument developed by Dharmakīrti to prove the authority or infallibility (*avisamvāditva*) of the Buddha, an argument which presupposes a kind of 'meta-systematic circle,' albeit with a logical lacuna or gap not closed by Dharmakīrti. This 'meta-systematic circle' present in Dharmakīrti's work, as STEINKELLNER (2003: 328–329) phrases it, runs as follows, implicitly incorporating five building blocks:

[T]he "validity" (and, as implied, the "correctness") of cognitions consists of their "reliability" (*avisamvāditva*). Reliability depends on meaningful, i.e. successful human activity. "Success" (*siddhi*), meaningfulness, can-

⁸ On the analysis of the passage with respect to its links to Jaina tradition, see BALCEROWICZ (2008).

⁹ In his paper, STEINKELLNER also gives a brief résumé of a longer debate on the (alleged) circularity in Dharmakīrti's attempt to establish the authority of the Buddha between those who subscribed to the presence of such circular reasoning, i.e. VETTER (1964: 27), NAGATOMI (1980), STEINKELLNER (1982), and HAYES (1984), and those who rejected it, i.e. TILLEMANS (1993) and FRANCO (1999: 63–67).

not be determined without recourse to the “ultimate goal” (*puruṣārtha*) of all activity. Only the Buddha indicates this “ultimate goal,” and his authority in this regard is established through his teaching, which can be ascertained as authoritative in other respects by our own judgement. The main links of this “true circle,” therefore, are the following:

1. our ordinary valid cognitions (*pramāṇa*) establish the authority of the Buddha’s teaching (*buddha-vacana*),
2. the validity of our cognitions (*prāmāṇya*) is understood as their reliability (*avisamvāditva*),
3. reliability depends on successful activity (*puruṣārtha-siddhi*),
4. all human goals are determined by the “ultimate goal” (*nirvāṇa*),
5. the “ultimate goal” is indicated in the Buddha’s teaching (*buddha-vacana*);

and can be represented in the fig. 3, where the arrow connecting *puruṣārtha-siddhi* and *nirvāṇa* contains a gap (marked):




Fig. 3

The above does not necessarily have to imply that both arguments, laid down by Kundakunda and Dharmakīrti, were employed by their authors with full awareness of their either partial and implied or full circularity.

Interestingly, both of these arguments appear to have a similar basic structure, although Kundakunda’s argument seems to contain or entail more structural elements and has a slightly different order (each column begins and ends with the same step to indicate a circular linkage):

Kundakunda	Dharmakīrti
1. the Jina's authority (<i>āptatva</i>) / cognitive validity (<i>prāmāṇya</i>) [establishes...]	1. ordinary valid cognitions (<i>pramāṇa</i>) [establish...]
2. the Jina's teaching (<i>*jina-vacana</i>) [, which establishes...]	2. the authority of the Buddha's teaching (<i>buddha-vacana</i>) [, which establishes...]
3. its instrumentality in establishing a path to moral law (<i>dharmatīrthakaratva</i>) [, which establishes...]	
4. the moral law (<i>dharmā</i>) [, which establishes...]	
5. liberation (<i>nirvāṇa</i> , <i>mokṣa</i>) as the human goal (<i>puruṣārtha</i>) [, which establishes...]	3. liberation (<i>nirvāṇa</i>) [, which establishes...]
6. a particular salvific kind of lifestyle (<i>āśrama</i>) [, which establishes...]	
7. purified knowledge and conation (<i>viśuddha-darśana-jñāna</i>) [, which establish...]	
8. equilibrium, or inner restraint (<i>sāmya</i>) [, which establishes...]	
9. *the efficacy (<i>*sāmarthya</i> / <i>puruṣārtha-siddhi</i>) [, which establishes...]	4. successful activity (<i>puruṣārthasiddhi</i>) [, which establishes...]
10. *infallibility / reliability (<i>*avisamvāditva</i>) [, which establishes...]	5. infallibility / reliability (<i>avisamvāditva</i>) [, which establishes...]
1. the Jina's authority (<i>āptatva</i>) / cognitive validity (<i>prāmāṇya</i>) [, which establishes...]	6. the validity of our cognitions (<i>prāmāṇya</i>) [, which establishes...]
	1. ordinary valid cognitions (<i>pramāṇa</i>) [, which establish...]

Another difference is that Dharmakīrti's argument, the way it is presented by STEINKELLNER (2003), takes recourse to the validity of ordinary human perceptions, which moves the circularity embedded in the argument to a kind of meta-level, whereas Kundakunda's argument, under the current interpretation, seems to take recourse to the validity of Jina's words themselves, although it remains an open question in view of the simple fact that the above reconstruction is based on quite laconic verses.

It is possible though, due to the ambiguity of the phrasing, to construe Kundakunda's argument in such a way that his argument may take recourse to the validity (*prāmāṇya*) of ordinary observations and experiences of all those people who 'have taken up the lifestyle the underlying basis of which are purified knowledge and conation,' and such a reconstruction would assume more or less the following form:

The Jina's authority (*āptatva*), which entails cognitive validity (*prāmāṇya*), is the basis for his teaching (**jina-vacana*), which is, in turn, instrumental in establishing a path to moral law (*dharma-tīrtha-karatva*). The moral law (*dharma*) sets liberation (*nirvāṇa*, *mokṣa*) as the human goal (*puruṣārtha*) and a particular salvific kind of lifestyle (*āśrama*) to achieve it (*puruṣārtha-siddhi*). The pursuance of the path leads to purified knowledge and conation (*viśuddha-darśana-jñāna*), corollaries of equilibrium, or inner restraint (*sāmya*). This efficacy to achieve the human goal can be, at least partially, tested and verified directly in human experience: the living proof of the efficacy of the Jina's teaching is 'current saints [living] in the human region' (verse 3) and 'congregation leaders (direct disciples of the Jina), classes of community instructors and all monks with no exception' (verses 4–5) who manage to partially achieve the goals. The application of the path, i.e. the salvific kind of lifestyle (*āśrama*) indicated through the Jina's teaching, in the lives of the religious leaders, teachers, instructors and monks can be directly seen, observed and verified by the ordinary people through their ordinary valid cognitions (*pramāṇa*). And this establishes the efficacy (**sāmarthya* / *puruṣārtha-siddhi*) and infallibility or reliability (**aviśaṃvāditva*) of the Jina and his authority (*āptatva*).

Such a reconstruction would enhance the structural similarities between Kundakunda's and Dharmakīrti's arguments, and shift the

circularity of Kundakunda to meta-level. Probably we will never be able to unravel the exact structure of the argument underlying Kundakunda's verses, and the question whether he himself was well aware of the circular structure is also problematic. In any case, the second interpretation of Kundakunda's argument would enhance the vital role of the monastic community, which was the focal point of the religious thinking in Jainism. The monks, whether religious leaders, teachers, instructors or ordinary monks, not only set the religious example and rendered the religious practices of the Jinas meaningful, but they could also be taken recourse to as a paragon and criterion (*pramāṇa*) to measure the truth and reliability of the Jina's statements of salvific import, inasmuch as they were also believed to be the living proof of the successfulness of the path laid down by the Jinas, at least within certain limits.

Irrespective of the exact actual argumentative structure of Kundakunda's reasoning, Dharmakīrti's argument to prove the truth claim of the teachings of the founder of his religious tradition was therefore neither the first of its kind nor unique.

In fact, Kundakunda's above argument rests on two separate arguments, the first one taking recourse to the efficacy (first formulation) or to the empirical verifiability through ascetic lifestyle (second formulation), whereas the second argument, in a concealed form, is based on a gradation of asceticism and its success from mediocre performance of monks of the lowest rank via increasing achievements of more and more advanced monks up to the perfection of the Jina. Such a gradation or progression of certain quality is a typical element of another argument, as will be demonstrated below.

4. In fact, especially the second reading of Kundakunda's argument highlights another sub-argument embedded in it in a concealed form. This argument, at least in its full-fledged form, would make up the second kind of the justification of the truth of Jainism, or of the authoritativeness of the Jina's teaching. I would call it 'the argument from progression.' It is found in the opening verses of Samantabha-

dra's *Āpta-mīmāṃsā*, a post-Dharmakīrtian¹⁰ text. The full passage reads as follows, although crucial for our purposes are verses 4 and 5:

[1] Such superhuman powers as the adoration [on the part] of divine beings, moving in the sky, fly-whisk service [as a symbol of royal power], etc., are found also in magicians. It is not because of these that you [, the Jina,] are great in our [eyes]. [2] The divine excellence of the individual form, etc., be it internal or external, is something real [found] also in heavenly beings; [however] that [excellence] is found [also] in beings possessed of desire, etc. [3] And none of all main doctrinal points [taught] by [various] makers of the passage (sc. religious teachers) possesses authority because they are mutually contradictory. [Therefore] none [of them] could be a [true] preceptor.¹¹

[4] A complete destruction of defects and karmic veils is possible, because a completion [of gradual purification process] is [possible], just as a [complete] annihilation of both external and internal blemishes in particular cases with the help of respective causes.¹²

[5] Objects that are subtle, concealed [from sight] and distant are [always] directly perceptible to someone, because they are inferable, just as fire, etc., [is inferable from visible smoke] – such is a proof of the omniscient [Jina].

[6] Only you, being faultless, are such [an omniscient person], whose statements are contradicted neither by reasoning nor by scriptural testimony.¹³ There is no contradiction, [because] what is accepted by you [as a tenet of your teaching] is not sublated by what is well-proven.

[7] In the case of those who are alien to the nectar of your thought, who are advocates of the absolutist stand in every respect [and] who

¹⁰ See the brief remarks on assigning Samantabhadra to the turn of the 6th/7th centuries in BALCEROWICZ (2008: 52) and (2011: 19–20).

¹¹ Here, we should construe *nāsti* in accordance with 'the maxim of a crow's eyeball' (*kākākṣi-golaka-nyāya*), i.e. as operating in two statements: (1) *sarveṣāṃ āptatā nāsti*, and (2) *nāsti kaścīd eva bhaved guruḥ*. Such is also the way Akalaṅka takes it, see AṣṢ₂: *ata eva na kaścīt sarvajña ity uktam*.

¹² For the analysis of the verse, being a formulation of a proof of liberation, and its soteriological implications see BALCEROWICZ (2005).

¹³ That is a feature of a cognitive criterion, cf. NA 1ab: *pramāṇaṃ svaparābhāsi jñānaṃ bādha-vivarjitam* /

are consumed by the self-conceit of [their being] authoritative persons, what is accepted by them [only] is sublated by visible facts.¹⁴

In fact, verses 4 and 5 are formulations of two separate arguments, and I will first deal with the first of them, mentioned in verse 4.

On what basis can we trust the Jina and accept his teaching? The answer is: because he is omniscient. And how do we know that there is an omniscient being? The reply is provided precisely by the argument which I here call the argument from progression. The general structure of the line of reasoning to prove the authority of the Jina with the help of the argument from progression looks as follows:

- (1) The authority of the Jina rests on his omniscience.
- (2) Omniscience rests on the soul's essence which is by nature pure cognition, although it is temporarily tainted with karmic impurities.
- (3) Complete purification (i.e. omniscience) is possible.
- (4) Empirically we observe a progression: we can determine that cognitions can be gradated: some cognitions are purer than others.
- (5) The gradation reaches its completion in perfectly purified cognition, i.e. omniscience.

Steps 3–5 of this line of reasoning contain the argument from progression, and its formulation in verse 4 is rather straightforward:

¹⁴ *devâgama-nabho-yâna-câmarâdi-vibhûṭayaḥ /*
mâyâviṣv api dṛśyante nâtas tvam asi no mahân || ĀMī 1
adhyâtmaṃ bahir apy eṣa vighrahâdi-mahodayaḥ /
divyaḥ satyo divaukasu apy asti rāgâdimatsu saḥ || ĀMī 2
tīrtha-kṛt-samayānāṃ ca paraspara-virodhataḥ /
sarveṣāṃ âptatâ nâsti kaścīd eva bhaved guruḥ || ĀMī 3
doṣâvaraṇayor hânir niḥśeṣâsty atīśāyanāt /
kvacid yathâ sva-hetubhyo bahir antar mala-kṣayaḥ || ĀMī 4
sûkṣmântarita-dûrârthâḥ pratyakṣâḥ kasyacid yathâ /
anumeyatvato 'gny-âdir iti sarva-jña-saṃsthitih || ĀMī 5
sa tvam evâsi nirdoṣo yukti-śâstrâvirodhi-vāk /
avirodho yad iṣṭaṃ te prasiddhena na bādhyate || ĀMī 6
tvam-matâmṛta-bâhyānāṃ sarvathâikānta-vâdinām /
âptâbhimâna-dagdhānāṃ svêṣṭaṃ dṛṣṭena bādhyate || ĀMī 7

Thesis (*pratijñā*): There exists complete destruction of defects and karmic veils (*doṣāvaraṇayor hānir niḥśeṣāsti*),

Logical reason (*hetu*): Because there is a completion of progression, i.e. the end of the gradual purification process (*atiśāyanāt*),

Example (*dṛṣṭānta*): Like a complete annihilation of both external and internal blemishes in particular cases with the help of respective causes (*kvacid yathā sva-hetubhyo bahir antar mala-kṣayaḥ*).

Its structure, to be closer analysed further on, can be described as follows:

An invisible perfect condition *x* of a particular faculty *F* (e.g. liberation, omniscience, extra-sensory perception) is possible, because there can be a gradation of the respective faculty.

This is not a unique instance of the argument from progression, of which there are numerous examples, most focusing on the issue of proving the existence of omniscience or omniscient beings, who are necessarily authoritative. (Clearly, the argument as such could be used in other contexts too.) An example of this is provided in Hemacandra's *Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā*:

The proof of this [supernatural perception (sc. omniscience) follows] from the argument that there is completion of the culmination of understanding, and other [proofs].¹⁵

The term *atiśaya* (excellence, progression) is usually understood in this context in the sense of growth (e.g. SViṬ 539.21: *atiśayād vṛddheḥ*). The expression *prajñātiśaya-viśrānti*, lit. 'the termination of excellence (sc. progression) of understanding' or 'the limit of gradation of understanding,' refers to a situation in which a chain of entities, of which each subsequent entity has a higher volume than the one preceding it, finds its limit through reaching the understanding (knowledge) of unlimited scale. In other words, this is the level of understanding that is the climax of the progression of the quality of understanding, which is tantamount to perfection (perfect understanding). In his auto-commentary, Hemacandra supplies a brief elucidation in the same spirit:

¹⁵ PMi 1.16: *prajñātiśaya-viśrānty-ādi-siddhes tat-siddhiḥ*.

Progression [must have] its completion somewhere, because of culmination, just like the culmination of magnitude.¹⁶ Because of this argument, since it is proved that there is understanding with no higher limit, [we have] the proof of this absolute knowledge; because the proof of [the existence of] absolute knowledge depends on the same structure (*rūpa*) as the proof such [understanding with no higher limit].¹⁷

This can be expressed as follows: For every magnitude m_1 we can find a magnitude m_2 larger by one unit such that $m_2 = m_1 + 1$, until we reach magnitude m_i when no such progression is possible any more, viz. m_i can no longer be augmented by any degree or unit. In other words, just as the magnitude progresses from the smallest possible *aṇutva* size of atoms (*paramāṇu*) until it reaches the infinite expanse of the whole universe space (*loka*) as highest limit, similarly understanding can be augmented again and again until it reaches its absolute infinite expansion.

Hemacandra, by way of analogy, applies the argument from progression to the scope of our knowledge in the case of astronomy in order to demonstrate that such a progressive development of a natural faculty is a phenomenon routinely observed:

[Omniscience] is also established because otherwise the reliability of knowledge of astronomy would be inexplicable, as it has been demonstrated [by Akalaṅka in *The Determination of Correctness*]:

“If the cognition of absolutely imperceptible objects is not possible for humans, how can then the reliability of the knowledge of astronomy be accounted for? If it is accounted for by appeal to scripture, then [the scripture] becomes one more proof [for omniscience].”¹⁸

¹⁶ Viz. things progress from smallest atoms (*paramāṇu*) as the lowest limit to the space of the universe (*loka*) as highest limit.

¹⁷ PMiV 1.16 § 55 (p. 13): *tāratamyam kvacid viśrāntam, atīśayatvāt, parimāṇātīśayavad ity anumānena niratīśaya-prajñā-siddhyā tasya kevala-jñānasya siddhiḥ, tat-siddhi-rūpatvāt kevala-jñāna-siddheḥ.*

¹⁸ PMiV 1.16 § 55 (p. 14): *jyotir-jñānāvisaṃvādānyathānupapatteś ca tat-siddhiḥ, yad āha*

*dhīr atyanta-parokṣe `rthe na cet puṃsām kutaḥ punaḥ /
jyotir-jñānāvisaṃvādaḥ śrutāc cet sādhanāntaram //* [SVi 8.2, p. 526]

Knowledge of astronomy, which reaches out to most distant stellar objects, etc., features here as a most superior cognition which tops a series of ordinary cognitions of spatially limited range humans commonly possess, and is taken to visibly demonstrate that progressions exist which culminate in an allegedly complete realisation of a particular quality.

These two arguments, both having the same structure, one from gradual purification process and the other from culmination of understanding, were combined in one verse already by Akalaṅka Bhaṭṭa (ca 720–780), from whom Hemacandra-sūri apparently draws his inspiration:

One can prove the omnipresence (absolute extension) [of knowledge] by appeal to the progression of knowledge, like in the case of magnitude (from the smallest possible size of atoms to infinity). [One can prove] the clarity (purity) [of knowledge] by appeal to the destruction of defects and blemishes, as in the case of an eye with ophthalmic disorder (which can see again after the disease is eliminated).¹⁹

The argumentative structure was well-known among the Jainas, even prior to the Vaiśeṣika Praśastapāda, a good example being Kundakunda's *Pavayaṇa-sāra* and his proof of liberation in which he applies the same argument from progression, that rests on the idea of progressive development of a quality which eventually reaches a perfectly pure condition tantamount to liberation:²⁰

[45] Perfected souls (saints) [achieve their condition] as a result of merit (or: auspicious *karman*). Their activity is, however, a natural development, which is free from [inauspicious *karman* such as] confusion, etc., and therefore it is known as “resulting from the destruction [of *karman*]” (*kṣāyika*).²¹ [46] If the soul itself could not become either good or

¹⁹ *jñānasyâtīśayāt sidhyed vibhutvaṃ parimāṇavat /
vaiśadyaṃ kvacid doṣa-mala-hānes timirākṣavat* // SVi 8.8, p. 539

²⁰ Kundakunda also makes use of what we could call a reverse gradual development argument in his *Samaya-sāra* 222–223, in which the development towards perfection of the soul is compared to a conch which is step by step turning into black until it becomes completely black and dirty.

²¹ Cf. TSū 10.1: *moha-kṣayāj jñāna-darśanāvaraṇāntarāya-kṣayāc ca keva-*

bad by virtue of its own essential nature alone, there would be no mundane world (transmigration) for all the bodies endowed with a soul.²²

This argument from the removal of impurities, which is a version of the argument from progression, is extremely popular in Jaina writings. Often it is compounded with the metaphor of a gem, as in the following passage from Akalaṅka's *Aṣṭa-śatī*:

And in this way the complete destruction of defects, etc., is somehow capable of annihilating all [karmic] blemishes. Thus, why should a proof of a blemish-free condition not be possible? The expunction of dirt, etc., [in the case of a jewel] does not entail the destruction of the jewel, [and similarly the annihilation of *karman* does not destroy the soul], because it does not stand to reason that something really existent [such as the soul] could be totally annihilated.²³

If some particles of dirt or impurity can be removed from, say, a gem, the process can be continued until it reaches its consummation in a gem perfectly purified from all external impurities that have enveloped it so far. Similarly a soul, which is enveloped by karmic matter in analogous manner, can gradually remove these taints until a state of perfection, i.e. complete annihilation of the *karman*, is achieved.

lam. – 'Absolute knowledge [arises] from the destruction of [the *karman* called] confusion and from the destruction of the *karmans* obstructing and veiling [innate] cognition and perception/conation.'

²² *puṇṇa-phalā arahaṃtā tesim kiriyā puṇo hi odaiyā /
mohādihim virahiyā tamhā sā khāiga tti madā* // PSā 1.45
*jadi so suho va asuho ṇa havadi ādā sayam sahāveṇa /
saṃsāro vi ṇa vijjadi savvesim jīva-kāyāṇam* // PSā 1.46

Comp. also SSā 204 below.

²³ AṣṢ₁ 53.9–16 = AṣṢ₂ 4.7–9 (ad ĀMī 4): *tathā ca doṣāder hānir atīsayavati kutaścīn nivartayitum arhati sakalam kalaṅkam iti katham akalaṅka-siddhir na bhavet? na[†] maṇer malāder vyāvṛttiḥ kṣayaḥ, sato 'tyanta-vināśān-upapatteḥ.*

[†] Both editions [Nagin Shah follows AṣṢ₁] read no *na* (viz. *na bhavet? maṇeḥ...*), although the commentary makes it explicit that one should read the negation, see AṣS 53.15ff.: *pradhvaṃsābhāvo hi kṣayo hānir ihābhipretā. sā ca vyāvṛttir eva maṇeḥ kanaka-pāṣāṇād vā* (recte: *pāṣāṇāder vā*) *malasya kiṭṭāder vā. na punar atyanta-vināśaḥ. sa hi dravyasya vā syāt paryāyasya vā? na tāvad dravyasya nityatvāt...*

In other words, for every degree d_1 of impurity removal we can find degree d_2 of impurity removal such that the impurity removal is higher by one unit: $d_2 = d_1 + 1$, until we reach degree d_i when no higher degree of impurity removal is possible, viz. d_i can no longer be augmented, viz. the state of $d_i + 1$ is not possible: $\neg \exists j (d_j = d_i + 1)$. Such a state is taken to be a perfect state consisting in a complete removal of all impurities. However, granted that its inner logical structure remains intact (but it does not!), the argument hinges on an assumption that such a condition of perfect removal of all dirt is at all possible, which is in itself problematic and would require a separate proof.

Interestingly, one and the same argument can be developed, or phrased, either by way of augmentation of purity or by way of diminution of impurities:

- (1) from the state of robust impurity one progresses, through stages of increasingly more purified states, to the state of complete purity, or
- (2) from the state of robust impurity one progresses, through the stages of increasingly larger removals of defiled states, to the state of complete annihilation of dirt.

6. Another good instantiation of an attempt to prove the authoritative character of the Jina and his teachings by resorting, at least to certain extent, to the argument from progression, is provided in a concealed form by Vāḍideva-sūri in his *Pramāṇa-naya-tattvālokāṅkāra*. The latter's line of reasoning resembles that of the argument from efficacy of the teaching, in which the cognition of an authoritative person, the Jina, is compared to a summit of jewels inferable from the presence of empirically observable instances of jewels:

- [1] The scripture consists in immediate knowledge of things manifested through the statements of an authoritative person. [2] By way of metaphorical transference [the scripture] is statements of an authoritative person [*per se*]. [3] [It is demonstrated by the analogy:] There is indeed a deposit of jewels in this district, [so] there must be summits of jewels, etc., [somewhere].²⁴ [4] An authoritative person is the one who

²⁴ Cf. RĀV ad loc.: *vakṣyamāṇa-laukika-janakādi-lokōttara-tīrtha-karāḍy-*

knows the matter under discussion as it is and who describes it in accordance with his [correct] cognition. [5] For his statements are infallible. ... [12] To reveal objects is its (sc. the word's) nature, just like the lamp. [The word's] accuracy or inaccuracy follows the virtue or the vice of the person respectively.²⁵

It would be rather difficult to make heads and tails of the reason why the seemingly irrelevant insertion mentioning the deposit of jewels was at all introduced into the passage if we didn't know the argumentative role of the analogy. Interestingly, Vādideva-sūri equates the scripture, i.e. a collection of statements, with the authoritative person's knowledge acquired directly, without any mediation of senses or mind, which is intimated by 'immediate knowledge.' This whole argument seems to be straightforwardly circular, too, its main constitutive steps being the following:

- (1) A person is authoritative because he knows the matter and describes it in accordance with his knowledge.
- (2) To know the matter means to know it in accordance with truth.
- (3) He describes the matter in accordance with truth because his statements are infallible.
- (4) To use the statements which are infallible means to be an authoritative person.

The obvious problem of this and all the remaining arguments of this sort is the following: How do we know that a particular person is authoritative and knows the truth? The reply is: because of his statements which are infallible. But how do we know that his state-

apekṣayā krameṇôdāharaṇôbhayī. 'This is a pair of examples to [demonstrate] gradation by way of reference to ordinary ancestors, etc., as we know them (lit. "under discussion") and to ford-makers, etc., who are superior to the mundane world.'

²⁵ PNTĀA 4.1–5, 12: [1] *āpta-vacanād āvir-bhūtam artha-saṃvedanam āgama iti.* [2] *upacārād āpta-vacanam ca.* [3] *samasty atra pradeśe ratna-vidhānam santi ratna-sānu-prabhṛtaya iti.* [4] *abhidheyam vastu yathāvasthitam yo jānīte yathā-jñānam cābhidhatte sa āpta iti.* [5] *tasya hi vacanam avisaṃvādi bhavatīti.* [12] *artha-prakāśanatvam asya (śabdasya) svābhāvikaṃ pradīpavad yathārthāyathārthatve punaḥ puruṣa-guṇa-doṣāṃ anusarataḥ.*

ments are infallible? The reply again is: because he is authoritative. However, the closing remark of the whole passage seems to present a way out of the circularity by taking recourse to an external factor. This is indeed an interesting shift to be noted at the end of the argument towards a practically verifiable reliability of an authoritative person based on his virtue or vice (*puruṣa-guṇa-doṣa*): whether the statement is true or not depends on the qualification of the speaker, which could be taken either in the sense of moral virtue or dexterity to aptly communicate the truths one knows. Vāḍideva-sūri's gloss on the expression *puruṣa-guṇa-doṣa*²⁶ suggests, however, that the virtue or vice is to be taken primarily in the moral sense: the reliability and veracity of the teaching is rooted in the moral disposition of the teacher, and that can be socially observed and verified. To take the speaker's virtue (*puruṣa-guṇa*) in any other sense, especially in the sense of his dexterity to aptly communicate the truths he knows, would open an undesirable possibility that anyone arguing skilfully and rhetorically persuasively, albeit not necessarily in accordance with truth, would automatically be considered apt and claimed to possess the required virtue.

As long as the term *puruṣa-guṇa-doṣa* is therefore taken in the former sense of moral virtue, the risk of circularity is avoided, the problem of the validity of such an argument far from being solved though. What remains problematic in such a case is not the circularity of the argument itself but the question of the verifiability of the moral status of the speaker, viz. how can we know that a particular person is morally advanced to a maximum degree so that he is absolutely reliable and all his statements are true?

The above line of reasoning, coalesced here with the argument from progression, resembles the argument from efficacy of the teach-

²⁶ SVR ad PNTĀA 4.12, p. 71615–17: *tatra yadi puruṣa-guṇānāṃ prāmāṇya-hetutvaṃ nābhimanyate jaiminīyaiḥ, tarhi doṣāṇāṃ apy aprāmāṇya-nimittā mā bhūt.* – 'As for the [validity of the authoritative person], if it is not recognised by the Mīmāṃsakas that the virtues of the person are not the cause of the cognitive validity [of his speech], then likewise his vices cannot be the causative factors of the cognitive invalidity [of his speech].'

ing, but is in fact neither. The efficacy lies here not in the teaching of the Jina himself but in the moral virtue displayed by the teacher.

7. One of the flaws in this particular argument, the argument from progression, to prove omniscience and authoritative status of the spiritual teacher is that if it can prove anything at all it can only be that such an omniscient being is *in theory* possible. It does not prove that a *particular* person, let's say the Jina, is such an omniscient being who founds his authority on his omniscience.

The *structure* of the argument from progression closely resembles a number of proofs of god's existence, based on progression which terminates at a given point, which we find in Thomas Aquinas' *Summa Theologiae*²⁷ and a range of similar arguments, being in

²⁷ AQUINAS (1947: 25ff.): 'The first and more manifest way is the argument from motion. ... If that by which it is put in motion be itself put in motion, then this also must needs be put in motion by another, and that by another again. But this cannot go on to infinity, because then there would be no first mover, and, consequently, no other mover; seeing that subsequent movers move only inasmuch as they are put in motion by the first mover; as the staff moves only because it is put in motion by the hand. Therefore it is necessary to arrive at a first mover, put in motion by no other; and this everyone understands to be God.' ... 'The second way is from the nature of the efficient cause. In the world of sense we find there is an order of efficient causes. ... Now in efficient causes it is not possible to go on to infinity, because in all efficient causes following in order, the first is the cause of the intermediate cause, and the intermediate is the cause of the ultimate cause, whether the intermediate cause be several, or only one. Now to take away the cause is to take away the effect. Therefore, if there be no first cause among efficient causes, there will be no ultimate, nor any intermediate cause. But if in efficient causes it is possible to go on to infinity, there will be no first efficient cause, neither will there be an ultimate effect, nor any intermediate efficient causes; all of which is plainly false. Therefore it is necessary to admit a first efficient cause, to which everyone gives the name of God.' ... 'The third way is taken from possibility and necessity ... every necessary thing either has its necessity caused by another, or not. Now it is impossible to go on to infinity in necessary things which have their necessity caused by another, as has been already proved in regard to efficient causes. Therefore we cannot but postulate the existence of some be-

fact versions of the cosmological argument, moulded on two basic proofs of god's existence (from the prime mover and from the efficient cause) formulated by Aristotle in his *Physics* 254b–260a (VIII 4–6) and *Metaphysics* 1062a–1072a (XII 1–6), which served as inspiration for Christian and Muslim thinkers.

There are a few points of coincidence to mention, three being most conspicuous. First, both the argument from progression and all versions of the cosmological argument, such as from the prime mover or from the first cause (either temporally or logically prior), etc., rely on at least one empirical premise. In all versions of the cosmological arguments, on the one hand, as EVERITT (2004: 59) notices, “it might be, for example, simply the fact that the universe exists, or that it contains some things which depend on other things, or that it contains change, or that it displays orderliness. Other arguments ... invoke much more specific empirical premises, for example, concerned with the existence of religious experience or of morality. But cosmological arguments are arguments from the universe (or cosmos) in general,” and, henceforth, from empirical observation. In Jaina arguments from progression, on the other hand, the empirical premise is the fact that things or qualities can be gradated, from lower to higher, from less to more, from weaker to stronger, from less intense to more intense, etc. In other words, we empirically observe progressions, for instance we can apparently arrange cognitions and

ing having of itself its own necessity, and not receiving it from another, but rather causing in others their necessity.’ ... ‘The fourth way is taken from the gradation to be found in things. Among beings there are some more and some less good, true, noble and the like. But “more” and “less” are predicated of different things, according as they resemble in their different ways something which is the maximum, as a thing is said to be hotter according as it more nearly resembles that which is hottest; so that there is something which is truest, something best, something noblest and, consequently, something which is uttermost being; for those things that are greatest in truth are greatest in being, as it is written in *Metaphysics* ii. Now the maximum in any genus is the cause of all in that genus; as fire, which is the maximum heat, is the cause of all hot things. Therefore there must also be something which is to all beings the cause of their being, goodness, and every other perfection; and this we call God.’

acts of understanding in grades or ranks from less to more and more pure or from narrower to wider or from shallower to deeper; in the same manner, the power or range of sight (or the range of other senses) can be seen to be less or more extensive; similarly, a process of purification or removal of physical impurities proceeds gradually and leads to things cleaner and cleaner; likewise the destruction of *karman*, or of defects and karmic veils, can purportedly be observed to proceed in steps, etc. On the basis of such empirical or allegedly empirical observations of progressions, we conclude – wholly arbitrarily and a priori – that they must terminate somewhere.

The second point of coincidence lies in the reasoning structure consisting of two steps: the first being the actual argument making use of a progressively ordered series that terminates at a maximum which either can no longer be augmented or is of a qualitatively different and unique character not comparable to any members of the series preceding/following it (e.g. ‘each effect in a causally ordered structure must be preceded by its cause, which leads to the first cause’ or ‘in a series of cognitions there is one purer than the one preceding it, which leads to a perfectly purified cognition’), whereas the second step proceeds wholly a priori and does arguably not have any argumentative structure at all, viz. it merely equates the ‘maximum’ of the first step with a desired concept, be it god or omniscience (e.g. ‘the first cause is god’ or ‘the perfectly purified cognition is omniscience’). The a priori and unwarranted element in the equation is that the final element of the series, or the maximum, is tacitly accepted as endowed with or entailing additional qualities that do not feature in the first step of the argument at all, e.g. the first cause is endowed with eternality, omnipresence, omnipotence, infinite knowledge, omnibenevolence, love, personality, etc., or the perfectly purified cognition must necessarily involve the grasp of everything in all three times and in all possible aspects. Even if one could prove that there is a first cause of all world phenomena or that a state of a perfectly purified cognition exists, it is far from established that such a first cause is eternal, omnipresent, etc., or that such a cognition grasps absolutely everything in all aspects and in all three times. Why should it not be, respectively, a one-time material event

or a cognition which perfectly 'mirrors' just one particular thing in one particular point of time?

The third point of coincidence, perhaps the most striking, between the Jaina arguments for omniscience from progression and the cosmological arguments of the Aristotelian or Christian and Muslim traditions is the quantifier-shift fallacy.²⁸ The line of reasoning which expresses the fear of the idea of progression to infinity is well phrased in the following passage of the *Metaphysics* (994ab), and becomes paradigmatic:

[994a] But evidently there is a first principle, and the causes of things are neither an infinite series nor infinitely various in kind. For neither can one thing proceed from another, as from matter, ad infinitum (e.g. flesh from earth, earth from air, air from fire, and so on without stopping), nor can the sources of movement form an endless series (man for instance being acted on by air, air by the sun, the sun by Strife, and so on without limit). Similarly the final causes cannot go on ad infinitum, – walking being for the sake of health, this for the sake of happiness, happiness for the sake of something else, and so one thing always for the sake of another. And the case of the essence is similar. For in the case of intermediates, which have a last term and a term prior to them, the prior must be the cause of the later terms. For if we had to say which of the three is the cause, we should say the first; surely not the last, for the final term is the cause of none; nor even the intermediate, for it is the cause only of one. (It makes no difference whether there is one intermediate or more, nor whether they are infinite or finite in number.) But of series which are infinite in this way, and of the infinite in general, all the parts down to that now present are alike intermediates; so that if there is no first there is no cause at all. Nor can there be an infinite process downwards ... [994b] ... Further, the final cause is an end, and that sort of end which is not for the sake of something else, but for whose sake everything else is; so that if there is to be a last term of this sort, the process will not be infinite; but if there is no such term, there will be no final cause, but those who maintain the infinite series eliminate the Good without knowing it (yet no one would try to do anything if

²⁸ Cf. the criticisms taken from different angles in, e.g.: PLANTINGA (1967: 3ff.), MACKIE (1982: 87ff.), EVERITT (2004: 59ff.). Comp. the exposition of the cosmological argument in HICK (1971).

he were not going to come to a limit); nor would there be reason in the world; the reasonable man, at least, always acts for a purpose, and this is a limit; for the end is a limit. ... (transl. Ross 1908).

As indicated above, the structure of the proof, i.e. of the argument from progression, is fundamentally logically flawed. Let the symbol $\rightarrow$ stand for any kind of precedence (hierarchical, temporal, causal, etc.) so that ' $x \rightarrow y$ ' means ' x is superior in degree to y .'

Suppose we have a sequence of ordered pairs $x \rightarrow y$ such that

$$\forall y \exists x (x \rightarrow y),$$

viz. for any thing y there exists some other thing x such that x is superior in degree to y (or ' y is subordinate to x ').

Further, we assume that there is culmination, or highest possible degree of the quality:

$$\exists x \forall y (x \rightarrow y),$$

viz. 'there exists one thing x which is superior in degree to all y -s.'

In other words, we can order, for instance, a set of all possible white things from least white to most white in such a way that through the gradation we can reach the most perfect white (absolutely white), or we can find the most perfect being in the hierarchy of all entities in the world which is god, or we can order all acts of perception so that it will culminate in the most perfect perception (*sarva-jñāna*).

However, it is logically not permissible to interchange the places of the qualifiers, viz. the following shift is fallacious:

$$\forall y \exists x (x \rightarrow y) \Rightarrow \exists x \forall y (x \rightarrow y) .$$

Clearly, such a move constitutes a logical fallacy. Further, supposing that – even though there is nothing logically binding that would force us to accept a termination of a succession of elements (say, natural numbers) $x_1 \rightarrow x_2 \rightarrow x_3 \rightarrow \dots \rightarrow x_n$ and concede that no further augmentation of it is possible, viz. that no x_{n+1} is possible – a series of phenomena or events does have its end, it does not follow that the culmination of a series is necessarily somehow qualitatively different from all the elements that precede it (for instance, that at the end of the series of white things there exists a thing the whiteness

of which is qualitatively different from all the preceding whitnesses, not only quantitatively). To apply this refutation to the case of the Jaina argument from progression (for instance, a gradation of purer and purer cognitions which terminate in omniscience), one can *logically* admit a gradual quantitative augmentation (progression) of clearness of perception without necessarily any *qualitative* change of the final member of the series.

The argument from progression is logically flawed, although it is not circular like the previous argument, i.e. the argument from efficacy of the teaching.

Incidentally, there is an interesting difference to be noted in view of *necessity* either entailed or not entailed by the arguments. In the versions of the cosmological argument the antecedent (first cause, prime mover, etc.) to be inferred is of necessary character: in the argument from contingency, the range of contingent entities require the existence of a non-contingent being, which is necessary; in a causal chain or in the world of things undergoing movement, the first cause (which is not itself dependent on any other cause) or the unmoved mover (which is not itself dependent on any other mover), respectively, etc., is necessary in itself (*a se*).²⁹ The consequent can also be taken to be necessary also in another sense: without it the causal series or the series of things possessed of movement, or the range of contingent beings, etc., could possibly not exist, hence it turns out to be a required condition for all things in a given series (not necessarily for all the things in the world) to exist. However, no such necessity is ever involved in Jaina arguments from progression: omniscience is merely *possible*, not necessary, and the world can and does exist without any omniscient being, a belief that finds its expression in Jaina cosmology of the universe only occasionally inhabited by Tirthankaras (only 24 in each era).

8. Similar structure based on the idea of gradation of attributes or progression, albeit not phrased explicitly as an argument, can be

²⁹ See the discussion on necessity understood either as necessity *a se* or necessity *ab aliter* in PLANTINGA (1967: 8ff.).

found also in Buddhist works, e.g. with Dharmakīrti, at least with reference to the unique character of supernatural perception accomplished through meditation. It is intimated in the following *sūtra*:

*Yogin's cognition is produced by culmination of the intensity of contemplation of existing objects.*³⁰

In short, uninterrupted spiritual practice and meditation on real entities, which are understood by the commentators primarily as the four noble truths,³¹ leads to their culmination in the form of supernatural perception.

What at first seems like an innocuous definition of supernatural perception achievable to an adept of *yoga* does have a hidden argumentative structure and serves to prove that such a perception of a *yogin*, i.e. supernatural perception, is a case of genuine perception, viz. it is valid, because it is a cognitive criterion (*pramāṇa*). Clearly, one might rise a doubt as to how could possibly a cognition which does not depend on sense organs, etc., i.e. which does not possess basic features of perception proper, be a genuine kind of perception, *ergo* fulfil the criteria of a cognitive criterion (*pramāṇa*), the question being extremely relevant when it comes to the nature of the cognition of an adept of meditative practice who contemplates the four basic truths of Buddhism. If it were not a genuine kind of perception, all the resultant cognitions gained through meditation would be invalid, as explicitly expressed by Vinītadeva: 'And that is why, it is regarded as an instrument of valid perception.'³² In his gloss on the

³⁰ NB 1.11: *bhūtārtha-bhāvanā-prakarṣa-paryantajaṃ yogi-jñānaṃ cēti*.

³¹ See (1) NBT(Dh) 1.11, p. 67.3–4: ***bhūtaḥ*** *sadbhūto 'rthaḥ. pramāṇena dṛṣṭaś ca sadbhūtaḥ. yathā catvāry āryasatyāni*; (2) DhPr 1.11, p. 67.11–12: *anena bhūtārtha-śabdenātra satya-catustayaṃ vivakṣitam iti darśitam*; and (3) NBT(V)₁ 1.10, p. 108, in the translation of Mrinalkanti Gangopadhyaya: '[The expression *bhūtārtha* means literally], objects as they are in reality, i.e. "not opposite to what is their actual nature" (*aviparīta*) – [in other words], the four "noble truths" (*āryasatya*)'; NBT(V)₁ 1.10, p. 11: *bhūto 'viparīto 'rtha [iti bhūtārthaḥ]. catvāry āryasatyāni*; NBT(V)₂: *yang dag pa ni phyin ci ma log pa'i don te, 'phags pa'i bden pa bzhi po dag go*.

³² Translation of Mrinalkanti Gangopadhyaya, NBT(V)₁ 1.10, p. 108;

Nyāya-bindu passage, he further provides an explicit argument to prove the ‘pramāṇic’ status of supernatural perception a *yogin* can attain:

Here is the inferential form [of the argument]: the knowledge of the great *yogin*-s having their minds fixed, which relates to the past and the future objects is an instrument of valid cognition, because it is the cause of rightly indicating the nature of the innumerable past and future objects, as for instance, the knowledge of one possessed by a demon or a spirit. Whatever knowledge is not a real instrument of valid cognition is not the cause of rightly indicating the nature of innumerable past and future objects, as for instance, the knowledge of an insane person.³³

Such a manifestly argumentative vein transpires also from Durvekamiśra’s comment:

Just like one kind of cognition of one kind of [an object such as], say, a pot or cloth ,etc., which has not been meditated upon but is placed in the proximity is perception which grasps a very clear form [of the

NBT(V)₁ 1.10, p. 11: *tasmāt pratyakṣa-pramāṇatvam iṣyate*. NBT(V)₂: *de lta bas na mngon sum gyi tshad mar ’dod do*.

³³ Translation of Mrinalkanti Gangopadhyaya, NBT(V)₁, p. 108–109; NBT(V)₁, p. 11: *atra prayogaḥ – yogēśvarāṇām ekāgracittānām jñānaṁ bhūta-bhāvi-vastu-viśayakam pramāṇam ameya-bhūta-bhāvi-vastu-jāta-sya abhrāntōpadarśana-hetutvāt, bhūta-graha-viśeṣāviṣṭa-jñānavat. yan na prāmāṇikam tan nāmeya-bhūta-bhāvi-vastu-jātasyābhrāntōpadarśana-hetuḥ, yathōnmatta-jñānam. aprāpakasyāpy ameya-bhūta-bhāvi-vastu-jātasyābhrāntōpadarśana-hetutve ’yogyam apakārakam [api] pramāṇam syāt. dambha-mātrenāmeyasya [padārthasya] abhrāntōpadarśanam hi na sambhavati*. NBT(V)₂: *’dir sbyor ba ni sems rtse gcig pa lhag pa med pa thob pa rnal ’byor ba’i dbang phyug rnams kyi shes pas dngos po byung ba dang ’byung bar ’gyur ba’i yul dang ldan pa ni byung ba dang ’byung bar ’gyur ba’i dngos po dpag tu med pa dag ma nor bar ston pa’i rgyu yin pa’i phyir tshad ma yin te ’byung po dang gdon khyad par can babs pa’i shes pa bzhin no. gang dag tshad mar mi rung ba bzhin byung ba dang ’byung bar ’gyur ba’i dngos po dpag tu med pa dag ma nor bar ston pa’i rgyur yang mi ’gyur te, dper na smyon pa’i shes pa bzhin no. thob par byed pa med na byung ba dang ’byung bar ’gyur ba’i dngos po dpag tu med pa dag ma nor bar ston pa’i rgyu nyid du mi ’thad pa ni gnod par byed pa’i tshad ma’i don yin no. ’dod rgyal gyis ni bdag tu med pa ma nor bar ston mi srid do*.

object], in the same manner the cognition which grasps a very clear form of an object which is being meditated upon is *yogin's* [supernatural] perception.³⁴

The passage of the *Nyāya-bindu*, which at first glance does not look like an argument *sensu stricto*, reveals however the same inner structure as the argument from progression and supplies the nucleus of a proof of the validity of the *yogi-pratyakṣa*, which in its crudest form would assume the following formulation:

Supernatural perception is possible (or: is a genuine case of valid perception as cognitive criterion), because it can be achieved by completion (perfection) of practice (meditation).

Dharmottara explains that 'contemplation of (meditation on) an entity is a recurrent (lit. again and again) reflection on it,'³⁵ and emphasises progression that finally leads to supernatural perception, by emphatically dividing the process into three stages:³⁶ the completion (intensity) of contemplation (*bhāvanā-prakarṣa*), the apogee of the intensity (*prakarṣa-paryantāvasthā*) and, ultimately, *yogin's* perception (*yogi-pratyakṣa*) as the final stage:

The intensity of contemplation is the beginning of [the process in which] cognition [the contents of which is] the image of the object being contemplated represents [this object] in a clear way. The culmination of the intensity [in such a contemplation] is when the representation of [the object] in a clear way with ultimate intensity is almost complete. For as long as the representation of [the object] in a clear way is not absolutely complete, there is a progression of the intensity of such a

³⁴ DhPr 1.11, p. 68.16–18: *yathānyasyābhāvitasya nikaṣasthasya ghaṭa-gha(pa)ṭāda(de)r anya-jñānaṃ sphuṭatarākāra-grāhi pratyakṣam tad-vad bhāvyamānārtha-sphuṭatarākāra-grāhi yaj jñānaṃ tad yoginaḥ pratyakṣam.*

³⁵ NBT 1.11, p. 67.5: *bhūtasya bhāvanā punaḥ punaś cetasi viniveśanam.*

³⁶ Cf. NAGASAKI (1988: 349–350). For further description of the three stages see NBT(Dh) 1.11, pp. 68.4–69.2. However, Vinītadeva in his *Ṭīkā* distinguishes four stages: NBT(V)₁ 1.10, p. 10: *smṛty-upasthānôṣmagata-mūrdha-kṣantayah*; NBT(V)₂: *dran pa nye bar gzbag pa dang, dro bar gyur pa dang, rtze mo dang, bzod pa'i gnas skabs so*; cf. STCHERBATSKY (1930 II: 31, n. 2) and NAGASAKI (1988: 350–354).

[contemplation, i.e. the intensity can progress]. But when [it is] complete, then there is no progression of intensity [any more]. Therefore, the state prior to the state of complete [representation] is called the culmination of the intensity of the representation of [the object] in a clear way. Such a cognition which is produced by this culmination [of intensity and] which grasps a very clear form of the object that is being contemplated as if it were immediately present [in front of the contemplator] is *yogin's* perception.³⁷

Of particular interest in the present context is the description of the growth of intensity (*prakarṣa-gamana*) which advances by progression, i.e. in a sequence of states which are more and more intense: $x_1 \rightarrow x_2 \rightarrow x_3 \rightarrow \dots \rightarrow x_n$, until the intensity reaches its culmination. When this culmination point is fully completed (*sampūrṇa*), the progression is exhausted (*nāsti prakarṣa-gatiḥ*), viz. no x_{n+1} is possible any more. Such a condition, achieved through the culmination of progression, is qualitatively different from all the preceding stages. The adept achieves a novel cognitive state, in which he perceives 'all kinds of objects meditated upon – past, future, distant, obstructed (*sāntara*) and of an atomic magnitude.' And, as Vinītadeva argues, such a novel cognitive state, in being 'the cause of rightly indicating the nature of the innumerable past and future objects,' is comparable to the ultimate realisation of truth:

Or, for example, in the instructions of Lord Buddha, we find various prophecies – which are not contradicted – regarding the ten future signs (*bhāvidaśanimitta*), the attainment of truth (*satyopalabdhi*), Mātṛceṭa, Kālakṣaya, King Aśoka and countries like Āśāvana, Kashmir, etc.³⁸

³⁷ NBT(Dh) 1.11, p. 67.5–68.3: *bhāvanāyāḥ prakarṣo bhāvyamānārthābhāsasya jñānasya sphuṭābhatvārambhaḥ. prakarṣasya paryanto yadā sphuṭābhatvam īṣad asampūrṇaṁ bhavati. yāvad dhi sphuṭābhatvam aparipūrṇaṁ tāvat tasya prakarṣa-gamanam. sampūrṇaṁ tu yadā tadā nāsti prakarṣa-gatiḥ. tataḥ sampūrṇāvasthāyāḥ prāktany avasthā sphuṭābhatva-prakarṣa-paryanta ucyate. tasmāt paryantād yaj jātaṁ bhāvyamānasyārthasya sannihitasyēva sphuṭatarākāra-grāhi jñānaṁ yoginaḥ pratyakṣam.*

³⁸ Translation of Mrinalkanti Gangopadhyaya, NBT(V)₁, p. 109; NBT(V)₁, p. 12: *yathā vā bhagavataḥ śākya-siddher upadeśe bhāvi-daśa-nimitta-satyôpalabdhi-mātṛceṭa-kāla-kṣaya-rājāśokādy-āśāvana-kaśmīrādi-*

Of course, the above argument, encapsulated in the definition of supernatural perception, did not, in the Buddhist context, lead one to accept the existence of a divine being endowed with perfect qualities, like it was the case with the Jaina argument from progression, but merely to accept the possibility of the existence of supernatural perception, a preliminary step towards ultimate Buddhahood.

9. Among the verses from Samantabhadra's *Āpta-mīmāṃsā* quoted above, we come across a more interesting line of reasoning to prove the *necessity* of an omniscient being:

Objects that are subtle, concealed [from sight] and distant are [always] directly perceptible to someone, because they are inferable, just as fire, etc. [is inferable from perceived smoke] – such is a proof of the omniscient [Jina].³⁹

The argument is in fact enthymematic, inasmuch as one more premise is missing: everything which is inferable (*anumeya*) is directly perceptible (*pratyakṣa*). It hinges on an assumption, fundamental among Indian thinkers, that inference relates the logical subject P (*pakṣa*) to a quality S (*sādhya*) which is not directly perceived at a given moment on the basis of a quality H (*hetu*) which is directly perceived at a given moment and a relation (*vyāpti*) which is known to obtain between S and H. Clearly, the converse of the relation ('everything which is directly perceptible (*pratyakṣa*) is inferable (*anumeya*)') does not necessarily hold, i.e. there can be things which can be directly seen but one cannot establish any invariable connection between them and other things on the basis of which we could refer to them, whereas to have any valid inference both S and H have to be observed at least once either simultaneously or in a sequence and

deśāgamā aviparītā upalabhyante. NBT(V)₂: yang dper na bcom ldan 'das shā kya thub pa'i bstan pa la ma 'ongs pa'i ltaṣ bcu lung bstan pa bden par dmigs pa dang ma la sogs lung bstan pa dang dus 'gring bar lung bstan pa dang rgyal po mya ngan med la sogs pa lung bstan pa dang re ba'i tshal dang kha che la sogs pa'i yul phyin ci ma log par lung bstan pa dam bcas pa dmigs pa lta bu'o.

³⁹ *sūkṣmāntarīta-dūrārthāḥ pratyakṣāḥ kasyacid yathā / anumeyatvato 'gny-ādir iti sarva-jñā-saṁsthitih // ĀMī 5*

their (simultaneous or consecutive) co-occurrence cannot be coincidental.

Since the existence of objects which are subtle, concealed from our sight and are distant from us either in space or time (being past or future), *can* be inferred, and since everything which *can* be inferred *can* be perceived, these objects *must* be perceived by someone, ergo there *must* be someone who perceives them. I would call this line of reasoning the ‘argument from potentiality,’ or the argument from the potentiality of being perceived, to be exact.

This argument from potentiality finds its other formulations with certain modifications in the centuries to follow. Hemacandra, whose *Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā* alongside the auto-commentary hardly contains any new argument but recycles the ingenuity of his predecessors, makes use of the same idea, albeit with one significant difference:

Objects that are subtle, concealed [from sight] and distant remain [always] directly perceptible to someone, because they are cognisable in a valid way (*prameya*), like a pot.⁴⁰

He may have been aware of the enthymematic character of the original formulation (the transition from *anumeya* to *pratyakṣa*), or at least may have felt a bit uncomfortable about it, and that might be why he replaced ‘inferable’ with ‘cognisable’ (*prameya*), which comprises both ‘perceptible’ and ‘inferable.’

Interestingly, the argument (in both formulations) mixes up two modalities: (1) possibility, potentiality or probability and (2) necessity, or determination. The essential terms in the reasoning are the gerundives *anumeya* (Samantabhadra) / *prameya* (Hemacandra), on the one hand, and, on the other, *pratyakṣa*. Further, the crucial step in the line of reasoning is the equation ‘x *can* be perceived’ with ‘x *must* be perceived.’ Clearly, from ‘x *can* be perceived’ as such it is not necessity or actuality (‘x is actually perceived’) which follows but rather mere possibility or absence of necessity.

⁴⁰ PMiV 1.16 § 55 (p. 14): *sūkṣmāntarita-dūrārthāḥ kasyacit pratyakṣāḥ prameyatvād ghaṭavad iti.*

Such a step from possibility to actuality or necessity in this case could be accounted for by a common confusion of modalities in India. There are two basic grammatical structures in Sanskrit which express the modalities, and these are the gerundive (future passive participle), formed with the *kr̥tya* affixes, and optative (potential) mode formed with *liñ* suffixes; and their meanings basically overlap.⁴¹

The gerundive expresses necessity and possibility, but also obligation, since Vedic times and, as J.S. SPEIJER (1886: 277–278) rightly remarked long ago, the gerundives ‘signify not only that which one is *obliged* to do or what is *prescribed* to be done, but also what must happen *by necessity* or that which is *fit, expected, likely* to happen.’ Their meanings are roughly grouped in the following classes by Pāṇini:

- (a) command, i.e. instruction, ordinance, direction, urging, ordering (*praiṣa, preṣaṇa*; A 3.3.164 and Kāś ad loc.),
- (b) permission, consent / approval to follow desired action (*atisarga / kāmācārābhyanujñāna*; A 3.3.164 and Kāś ad loc.),
- (c) temporal appropriateness, i.e. proper time [for something] / the point of time which is the ground [to do something] (*prāpta-kāla / nimitta-bhūtasya kālasyāvasaraḥ*; A 3.3.164 and Kāś ad loc.),
- (d) respect, i.e. ‘[action carried out] with respect to a worthy, deserving [agent]’ / propriety, ‘fitness with regard to a worthy [person]’ (*arhe / arhatīty arhas tad-yogyaḥ*; A 3.3.169 and Kāś ad loc.),
- (e) necessity, i.e. action of necessity, something necessary, inevitable / necessary state, compulsion (*āvaśyaka / avaśyaṃ bhāvaḥ*; A 3.1.125 and A 3.3.170–171 and Kāś ad loc.),
- (f) being indebted, indebtedness (*ādhamarṇya*; A 3.3.170–171 and Kāś ad loc.),
- (g) possibility, i.e. in the sense of the verb ‘to be able’ (*śak*; A 3.3.171–172 and Kāś ad loc.).

⁴¹ See e.g. Hock (1985–86: 82–84).

Further, as it has been noted now and again, the gerundives are optatives (potentials) by default.⁴² Their meanings do not only overlap with those of the optatives but their functions present passive-like alternatives to the imperative and subjunctive modes, to the construction of the verb root *arh* with infinitive and to the future.⁴³

The optative mood formed with the *liṅ* suffixes of the *sarvadhātuka* type (as distinguished from *ardhadhātuka* type, i.e. benedictive or precativ), carries the following meanings:

- (a) command, i.e. injunction, ordinance, direction (*vidhi*; A 3.3.161),
- (b) possibility, or an action which is qualified with the verb ‘to be able,’ ‘to be capable to do something’ (*śak*; A 3.3.172),
- (c) expectation or hope (*āśaṃsā*; A 3.3.134),
- (d) probability, possibility (*sambhāvana*; A 3.3.155).

No doubt, when one and the same grammatical device can express both possibility and necessity, ambiguity may follow as long as the exact context is not determined.

Precisely such ambiguity plays a crucial role in the argument from potentiality, which runs through the following steps:

Premise: Objects which are subtle, concealed from sight and distant are inferable (*anumeya*; possibility: ‘can be inferred’; Samantabhadra), or cognisable (*prameya*; possibility: ‘can be cognised’; Hemacandra).

Step 2: Everything which is inferable (*anumeya*; possibility: ‘can be inferred’) or cognisable (*prameya*; possibility: ‘can be cognised’) is perceptible (*pratyakṣa*; possibility: ‘can be perceived’).

Step 3: These objects are perceived by someone (*pratyakṣa*; necessity: ‘must be perceived’ or actuality: ‘are’).

Conclusion: There must (actuality: ‘is,’ or necessity: ‘must be’) someone who perceives them, and that person is omniscient, the Jina.

A similar kind of argument is found also with Akalaṅka Bhaṭṭa, albeit styled rather as a kind of *reductio*:

⁴² JAMISON (1984), KIPARSKY (2005: 30–31); cf. WALLE (1993: 389ff.).

⁴³ WALLE (1993: 390).

If the cognition of a thing which is absolutely imperceptible is not possible, how is it possible that there is unanimity among people about, say, astronomy? If it is said: because of testimony, that furnishes another proof [of the existence of an omniscient being].⁴⁴

The *reductio* based on the argument from potentiality runs as follows:

Premise 1: Things which are absolutely imperceptible (e.g. subtle or distant) cannot be cognised.

Premise 2: People (e.g. astronomers) know of some things (e.g. celestial bodies, etc.) which are absolutely imperceptible to humans.

Premise 3: They have this knowledge supplied by someone or from the scripture.

Conclusion 1: Premise 1 has to be abandoned.

Conclusion 2: That 'someone' who provides the knowledge of imperceptible things must be omniscient.

Despite the fact that the *reductio* does contain the argument from potentiality explicitly, it is hidden in the transition from 'absolutely imperceptible' (*atyanta-parokṣa*) to the assumption that people do have knowledge about such seemingly imperceptible things (*jñānā-visaṃvāda*), namely they either infer their existence or obtain it through testimony, viz. they have access to it via another cognitive criterion (*pramāṇa*) which requires the existence of someone who *must* have a direct knowledge (*pratyakṣa*) of the imperceptibles, which are in fact perceptible to those who are capable of perceiving them.

As we have seen, the argument from potentiality is a clear case of equivocation, in which one and the same term *pratyakṣa* ('perceivable') is used in two different meanings which convey two different modalities: possibility ('can be perceived') and necessity ('must be perceived'), *ergo* the argument presents a logical fallacy.

Was such a confusion of modalities in the argument intentional? The reply could hardly be conclusive, but the very fact that the ge-

⁴⁴ *dhīr atyanta-parokṣe 'rthe na cet puṃsām kutaḥ punaḥ /
jyotir-jñānā-visaṃvādaḥ śrutāc cet sādhanāntaram* // SVi 8.2, p. 526

rundives and optatives functioned in an ambivalent manner could provide a fertile ground for such ambiguity.

There is one more problem with this argument, namely circularity. How do we know that there exist objects which are so subtle that we cannot perceive them (e.g. atoms or karmic matter), or are permanently concealed from *our* sight or are so distant that we can never see them, and we will never be able to know them directly, i.e. we will never have any 'direct cognitive access' to them? The answer would be, as Akalaṅka maintains: because we know of them from the statements of the omniscient, i.e. from scriptural testimony (*śruta*). How do the omniscients know these objects? Because they perceive them directly. How do we know that the omniscient perceive these things directly? Because they tell us.

It is difficult to say when such an argument was phrased for the first time, but its forerunner may be the following verse by Kunda-kunda:

All objects, along with their various qualities and modes, are established through the scripture. So, the ascetics know them all (*api*) with the help of the scripture, having seen them directly.⁴⁵

In other words, among all objects there are some which are perceptible to humans and others which are not. Since knowledge of them is possible they must be perceptible to someone, namely to an omniscient being who is the author of the scripture. Ascetics who follow the Jina's path first know of these objects from the scripture but then, with the growth of their spiritual practice, they can also perceive some of them directly.

The argument from potentiality presents an interesting parallel to George Berkeley's principle: *esse est percipi aut percipere*, albeit not based on extreme idealism. For Berkeley, the ultimate perceiver is the guarantor of the existence of entities whose existence depended on someone perceiving them: since 'to be is to be perceived or to perceive,' things exist as long as they are perceived, their existence

⁴⁵

*savve āgama-siddhā atthā guṇa-pajjaehiṃ cittehiṃ /
jāṇaṃti āgameṇa hi pecchittā te vi te samaṇā* // PSā 3.35

being contingent on someone observing them; since they are not always perceived by humans, they would cease to exist once nobody perceives them, which is not the case inasmuch as they are perennially perceived by god. For the Jainas, however, the omniscient is the guarantor of the truth of human knowledge of things whose existence is beyond human perception, inasmuch as knowledge of things depends on their being perceived.

10. An interesting variant of the argument from potentiality, beside a number of other arguments, is formulated by Haribhadra-sūri (ca 740–800) in his *Śāstra-vārtā-samuccaya*. In a sequence of verses he retorts to an objection, apparently made by a Mīmāṃsaka, that the existence of an omniscient being, and consequently the validity of Jaina teachings, cannot be proved by any of the existing six cognitive criteria (*pramāṇa*). In a passage that is a good summary of the present discussion on rational attempts to justify the truth claims of the Jaina teachings, he presents five consecutive arguments,⁴⁶ each appealing to a different cognitive criterion. The first of them is precisely the variant of the argument from potentiality:

[593] Both righteousness, etc. (i.e. unrighteousness), are directly perceptible because they are cognisable objects, like [material things] such as pots, etc. It is not the case that there is no inference [to prove an omniscient being]: there must be someone for whom all this is [cognisable].⁴⁷

In previously analysed formulations of the argument the omniscient Jina allegedly was the guarantor of our knowledge of objects which are extremely subtle, permanently concealed from our sight and beyond our reach, because *he* can perceive them directly and convey his knowledge to us through, say, the scripture. To the catalogue of the entities which are essentially imperceptible to humans, Haribhadra adds two more items: righteousness (*dharma*) and unrighteousness.

⁴⁶ One of them encapsulated in verse 594 has already been discussed above § 2.

⁴⁷ *dharmâdayo 'pi cādhyakṣā jñeya-bhāvād ghaṭâdivat /
kasyacit sarva evêti nânumānaṃ na vidyate //* ŚVS 593

teousness (*adharma*), in this context understood in the pan-Indian way: as the moral law and its opposite, not in the uniquely Jaina way of the principles of movement and rest. Haribhadra's interpretation adds a completely new dimension to the argument: the omniscient being who directly perceives two moral principles also directly knows what is good and what is wrong, and conveys his knowledge to humans through the scripture. In this sense, directly knowing good and wrong, he becomes in addition both the source and guarantor of all the morality and the ultimate moral instance without which humans would have no moral criteria to judge their conduct and the happenings in the world.

A variant which combines a few approaches is supposed to exemplify how presumption (*arthâpatti*) can be used to prove the existence of an omniscient being and, by implication, his authority:

[597] One accepts [the existence of an omniscient being] also through presumption based on the scripture which [provides] the knowledge of extra-sensory things [such as righteousness and unrighteousness, etc.]⁴⁸ [which would not be possible without an omniscient being]. Otherwise no confidence in extra-sensory things [such as righteousness, etc.] would arise for a person in the state of bondage.⁴⁹

In brief, the idea of presumption⁵⁰ is that we have to postulate the existence of an *x* without which *y* would not be possible; in this case:

⁴⁸ After SVK, vol. 7, p. 78.3: *atīndriya-gater dharmâdharmâdi-paricchedāt*. Yaśovijaya takes *atīndriya-gateḥ* as an adjectival attributive compound (*bahu-vrīhi*), characterising *śāstrāt*, both in the ablative. However, *atīndriya-gateḥ* could be the genitive, and in such case we could translate: 'through presumption concerning the knowledge of extra-sensory things [such as righteousness and unrighteousness, etc.] derived from the scripture [which would not be possible without an omniscient being].'

⁴⁹ *śāstrād atīndriya-gater arthâpattyâpi gamyate / anyathā tatra nāśvāśā chadma-sthasyôpajāyate || ŚVS 596*

⁵⁰ For its definition see, e.g., MŚV 5.7 (*arthâpatti-pariccheda*) 1 (p. 320):

pramāṇa-ṣaṭka-vijñāto yatrârtho nānyathā bhavet / adṛṣṭaṃ kalpayet anyam sâarthâpattir udāhrtā ||

A case [of reasoning] in which an object, which [is already] known

one has to postulate the existence of an omniscient being as an author of the scripture because the scripture that teaches about extra-sensory things (or alternatively: the knowledge of extra-sensory things derived from the scripture), especially – as Haribhadra believes – of righteousness (moral law), would not be possible without the existence of a being who knows these extra-sensory things (and such a being has to be, of course, omniscient); and it is an accepted fact that the scripture does provide full knowledge of extra-sensory things.

It is quite surprising to find yet another straightforwardly circular argument, this time based on analogy (*upamāna*):

[595] When one recognises an [omniscient being in one case] due to complete settlement of doubts in one's own heart, reasoning by analogy [can take place] as regards the recognition of other persons as such⁵¹ (i.e. omniscient), not as regards anything else and not in any other way.

Once we could find all the answers to our questions and doubts cleared by a person who apparently knows all the answers, *ergo* an omniscient being, we can easily conclude on any similar occasion that such a person must also be omniscient. The problem, however, remains how to determine omniscience in the first case.

The sequence of Haribhadra's arguments for the existence of an omniscient being, and by implication his authority, concludes with an argument based on the negative proof (*abhāva*), or absence as negative proof:

[597] Therefore, [the thesis] of the inapplicability of the quintuplet of the cognitive criteria to [prove the existence of] an [omniscient being] does not make sense.⁵² To say, "nevertheless [one should apply] a proof

through [any of] the six cognitive criteria, could not occur otherwise, [and on the basis of it] another unseen [object] is assumed, is called presumption.

⁵¹ *hṛd-gatâśeṣa-saṃśīti-nirṇayāt tad-grahe punaḥ /
upamānya-grahe tatra na cānyatrāpi cānyathā* // ŚVS 595

⁵² In other words, one cannot justifiably claim that it is not possible to prove the existence of an omniscient being with the help of the five cognitive criteria.

based on (lit. the validity of) absence [as negative proof as regards the existence of an omniscient being],” reveals the blindness of one’s thoughts.⁵³

In other words, the omniscient being is there to see, and if the opponent reasons that if there were an omniscient being we could see him, he demonstrates his blindness.

What links all of the arguments found in Haribhadra’s *Śāstra-vārtā-samuccaya* 593–597 and 626, i.e. those discussed just above as well as the one described in § 2, is that they primarily intent to prove the existence of an omniscient being and generally take it for granted that if someone is omniscient, he must by definition be authoritative.

11. There is still another peculiar argument based on presumption (*arthâpatti*) to be discussed. It is introduced by Akalaṅka Bhaṭṭa in his *Siddhi-viniścaya*, and we could call it the argument from the impossibility of inference:

Therefore, such a being who is a conscious subject, a knower and whose essence is apprehension, is – inasmuch as his impediments [to absolute knowledge] are dissolved – omniscient at every moment, a knower of all objects, because how else could the relation of invariable concomitance (*vyāpti*) be grasped, inasmuch as it is cognised without one coming into direct contact with it?⁵⁴

In other words, there must be an omniscient being, because otherwise the relation of invariable concomitance (*vyāpti*) could never be grasped and, implicitly, we would never be able to infer anything. Clearly, to know the relation of invariable concomitance, one would be required to know all the cases when it holds and all the cases when it does not, other solutions such as the models based on the relation of causality (*tad-utpatti*) and the relation of essential identity (*tādātmya*), etc., being unsatisfactory. However, suggests Akalaṅka,

⁵³ *pramāṇa-pañcakâvṛttir evaṃ tatra na yujyate /
tathâpy abhāva-prāmāṇyam iti dhy-āndhya-vijṛmbhitam* || ŚVS 597

⁵⁴ *tad ayaṃ cetano jñātā saṃvedanâtmā pratikṣaṇam /
tat-pratibandha-viśleṣe sarva-jñāḥ sarvârtha-dṛk* || SVi 8.37
anyathâprāpya-kāritvāt kuto vyāpti-graho yataḥ / SVi 8.38ab, p. 580

it is a solid fact that we do use *valid* invariable concomitances in our reasoning all the time, even though we grasp them without coming into direct contact with it. This means apparently that we derive our knowledge of invariable concomitances from a reliable source, and that source must be an omniscient being. Further, such an omniscient being is, incidentally, also capable of efficiently sharing his knowledge with humans and he is reliable.

There is more than one problem with this argument, but it suffices to mention three. The first is the circularity involved: The omniscient being knows all relations of invariable concomitance in a valid way. He is a source of our knowledge of relations of invariable concomitance on the basis of which we are capable of drawing inferences. Further, we can draw an inference to the effect that an omniscient being exists because we rely on an invariable concomitance that ‘whoever is omniscient knows all relations.’ We can reliably know of this invariable concomitance from... the omniscient being. The second is the assumption that all, or at least most of the inferences we draw are based on absolutely valid invariable concomitances. The third difficulty is that Akalaṅka’s reasoning would subordinate inference (*anumāna*) to, or subsume it under verbal cognition or scripture (*śabda*), because all invariable concomitances which play vital role in our reasoning would have to be derived from scripture. At first it would, perhaps, resemble the situation in which Dīnāga, in the fifth chapter of his *Pramāṇa-samuccaya*, treats testimony (*śabda*) as a variety of inference:

Verbal cognition is not an additional cognitive criterion, different from inference, because it names its object through [the procedure known as] “exclusion of the other” in the same way as [the inference: “x is impermanent, because it is produced”, determines its object to have the quality of “impermanence” on the basis of the already known quality of] “being produced,” etc.⁵⁵

⁵⁵ *na pramāṇāntaram śābdam anumānāt tathā hi tat /
kṛtakatvādivat svārtham anyāpohena bhāṣate* // PS 5.1

The original acc. to *Tattvasaṅgrahapañjikā* (ed. Shastri 1981) 539.22–23. Cf. the translation in: HAYES (1988: 300), HERZBERGER (1986: 145–146) and PIND (2009: 76).

That would not be such a surprising move in view of the fact that Akalaṅka treated inference (*anumāna*), verbal cognition, etc., as sub-varieties of indirect cognition (*parokṣa*), essentially different from direct cognition, or perception (*pratyakṣa*):

Perception is clear cognition, [divided] into primary and conventional, [whereas] indirect cognition [comprises all] remaining [types of] cognition. Thus, by way of summary, there are two cognitive criteria.⁵⁶

However, Akalaṅka's move would imply that ultimately all inferences have to be derived from scripture, and there could be no inference which is scripturally not attested: we could not validly infer anything unless we have already gathered that knowledge from a valid testimonial source: both an absurdity and a clear overlap of cognitive criteria (*pramāṇa*).

12. Let me return to the argument from progression, perhaps the type most uniquely Jain. It is not a coincidence, as I shall argue, that the Jainas employed this argumentative structure to prove the omniscience of the Jina and the infallibility of his teachings, whereas it has never been the case to my knowledge that the Buddhist argued in a similar vein to prove the wisdom (*prajñā*) of the Buddha and the truth of his Dharma.

As we know, the Jainas traditionally distinguished five kinds of cognition:⁵⁷ sensuous cognition (*mati*), testimonial cognition (*śruta*), clairvoyance (*avadhi*), telepathy (*manah-paryāya*), absolute knowledge (*kevala*). On numerous occasions, e.g. in the case of Umāsvāmin's *Tattvārtha-sūtra*, we can also see that these cognitions were traditionally arranged vertically according to their increasing purity. The most basic of all is sensuous cognition (*mati*), on which testimonial cognition (*śruta*) rests.⁵⁸ These two are cases of indirect cognition (*parokṣa*). Clairvoyance (*avadhi*), or non-sensory

⁵⁶ *pratyakṣaṃ viśadaṃ jñānaṃ mukhya-saṃvyavahārataḥ / parokṣaṃ śeṣa-vijñānaṃ pramāṇa iti saṅgrahaḥ ||* LT 3

⁵⁷ *Locus classicus* is TSū 1.9.

⁵⁸ TSū 1.20: *śrutaṃ mati-pūrvam*.

perception of distant objects is superior to them, at the same time being the lowest kind of direct cognition (*pratyakṣa*). Still superior is telepathy (*manaḥ-paryāya*), or reading in other people's minds: 'The difference between clairvoyance and telepathy lies in purity, range, possessor and scope.'⁵⁹ Further, there are two sub-varieties of telepathy arranged according to their purity: simple (*ṛju-matī*) and extensive (*vipula-matī*),⁶⁰ and even these are arranged hierarchically: 'The difference between these [two kinds of telepathy] is due to their purity and incessant character.'⁶¹ The culmination of this cognitive sequence is absolute knowledge (*kevala*), which apprehends all substances and all modes of all things, present, past and future.⁶² To say that absolute knowledge grasps all substances and modes not only indicates the range of this cognition but also implies its highest level of subtlety, because it must, by necessity, apprehend even the subtlest objects which cannot be perceived with the help of clairvoyance or telepathy. The hierarchy is explicitly and repeatedly indicated in numerous works, from early ones such as Kundakunda's *Samaya-sāra*:

Sensuous cognition, testimonial cognition, clairvoyance, telepathy, absolute knowledge are one and the same state. When that which is the ultimate is attained, there arises liberation;⁶³

and the *Pavayaṇa-sāra*:

Monks have scripture for eyes, all beings have their sense organs for eyes, whereas the divine beings have clairvoyance for eyes. However the liberated beings have eyes that see everything;⁶⁴

to much later ones, such as Hemacandra's *Pramāṇa-mīmāṃsā*:

⁵⁹ TSū 1.26: *viśuddhi-kṣetra-svāmi-viśayebhyo 'vadhi-manaḥ-paryāyayoḥ*.

⁶⁰ TSū 1.24: *ṛju-vipula-matī manaḥ-paryāyāḥ*.

⁶¹ TSū 1.25: *viśuddhy-apratipātābhyāṃ tad-viśeṣaḥ*.

⁶² TSū 1.30: *sarva-dravya-paryāyeṣu kevalasya*.

⁶³ *abhiṇi-sudōhi-maṇa-kevalaṃ ca taṃ hodi ekkam eva padaṃ / so eso paramaṭṭho jaṃ lahiduṃ ñivvudiṃ jādi* // SSā 204

⁶⁴ *āgama-cakkhū sāhū iṃdiya-cakkhūṇi savva-bhūdāṇi / devā ya ohi-cakkhū siddhā puṇa savvado-cakkhū* // PSā 3.34

Clairvoyance and telepathy are the gradations (sc. varieties of lower degrees) of the [absolute knowledge (*kevala*)].

[Commentary:] Absolute knowledge occurs when all karmic veils are dissolved completely. When there are gradations in the degree of such a dissolution of karmic veils, the dissolution being characterised by different kinds of destruction-cum-subsidence⁶⁵ of karmic veils, occasioned by this [process] there occurs clairvoyance, or clairvoyant cognition, and telepathy, or telepathic cognition, i.e. [two kinds of] primary, extra-sensory perception.⁶⁶

The hierarchical arrangement of five cognitions in Jainism reflects the idea of progression: the purity increases in the subsequent stages until it reaches its consummation in a cognitive state of absolute purity. Interestingly, the fivefold hierarchical classification of cognitions is one of the most ancient elements of Jaina epistemology, which means that the *idea* or main constituents of the argument from progression were somehow dormant right from the moment the classification was adopted by the Jainas.

As I have remarked elsewhere,⁶⁷ the fivefold classification of all cognitions into these five types was probably the earliest development in Jaina epistemological tradition preserved to us. These varieties, it seems, were accepted in Jainism from a very early point and the classification was there already at a relatively early canonical stage. Since the background for the classification was not epistemological but religious and doctrinal, the classification lacked consistence. What was important, however, in the vertical scheme of cognitions was that the increasing purity and subtlety of cognitions reflected the growing inner purity of the soul (*jīva*, *ātman*), which was understood not only as the cognitive subject proper but as the perceiving organ *per se*, or the 'living eye' (*akṣa*). Jaina litera-

⁶⁵ One of five karmic states.

⁶⁶ PMī 1.18 and PMīV 1.18 § 64 (p. 17): *tat-tāratamye 'vadhi-manaḥ-paryāyau ca. sarvathâvaraṇa-vilaye kevalam, tasyâvaraṇa-vilayasya tāratamya âvaraṇa-kṣayôpaśama-viśeṣe tan-nimittako 'vadhīr avadhi-jñānaṃ manaḥ-paryāyo manaḥ-paryāya-jñānaṃ ca mukhyam indriyâ-napekṣaṃ pratyakṣam.*

⁶⁷ BALCEROWICZ (forthcoming, § 2).

ture abounds in statements to that effect, and it suffices to mention here just a few examples that the soul is ‘made of cognition,’⁶⁸ ‘is co-extensive with cognition’⁶⁹ and is ‘a being who is a conscious subject, a knower and whose essence is apprehension,’⁷⁰ for ‘the one who cognises is cognition; the soul does not become a cogniser through cognition.’⁷¹ The soul played a pivotal role in Jaina ethics and soteriology: all actions, including cognitive activity, were ultimately performed by it, whereas the mind, speech and body alongside the sense organs were treated only as the soul’s instruments. The emphasis on soul being the perceiving organ was reflected in the terminology which the Jainas employed and which went against all Indian tradition, especially in using the term *parokṣa* to denote *sensory* perception, *pratyakṣa* being reserved for all cognitive activities performed by the soul directly without the mediation of senses and the mind.

Since the rudiments of the argument from progression for omniscience and for the authority of the omniscient being are also present in the early strata of *philosophical* writings of the Jainas, this cannot be a mere coincidence. Jaina thinkers either were inspired by the hierarchy of cognitions which had already been there in their system, or, which is less probable, while devising the fivefold hierarchy of cognitions, they accomplished it with the purpose to indicate that these five culminate in perfection. What was originally merely a religious image and a corollary of soteriological beliefs (the spiritual path is to culminate in perfection, including epistemic perfection) was later adopted and phrased as a formal argument.

It seems that for the Jainas, or generally for the majority of thinkers in India, the termination of a quality’s progression in order to avoid infinite sequence was at the same time an expression of the fear of infinity, both in terms of infinite cycle of rebirths in the mundane world (*saṃsāra*) and in terms of limited knowledge which

⁶⁸ PSā 1.26c: *ñāṇa-mayādo*.

⁶⁹ PSā 1.23a: *āḍā ñāṇa-pamāṇam*.

⁷⁰ SVi 8.37a, p. 580: *ayaṃ cetano jñātā saṃvedanātmā pratikṣaṇam*.

⁷¹ PSā 1.35ab: *jo jāṇadi so ñāṇam ṇa havadi ñāṇeṇa jṇago ādā /*

could expand infinitely without ever becoming conclusive, viz. without reaching its ultimate fulfilment or its final definitive shape. This resonates well with the idea of the impossibility of infinity and the problems it yields to the cognisability of the world enunciated by Aristotle:

Further, those who speak thus destroy scientific knowledge, inasmuch as it is not possible to have such scientific knowledge until one has reached what cannot be further analysed (lit. what is further indivisible). Also [ordinary] knowledge becomes impossible, for how is it possible to know things which are infinite in this way? ... Moreover, there can be nothing which is infinite, but if there could be, then at least the idea of something infinite is not infinite (sc. infinity can be comprehended). But if the kinds of causes were infinite in number, then it would not be possible to have knowledge; because we think we know [something] only when we have known the causes; but one cannot go through what is infinite by addition (i.e. can be infinitely augmented) cannot be gone through within [temporal] limits (i.e. in a finite time).⁷²

To know something means to know its essence as well as the causes and circumstances which determine the course of a particular thing. If things along with their causes and conditions bearing on their existence were infinite, they could never be fully known, our knowledge of them always being bound to be fragmentary and liable to continual process of verification and renewed correction, *ergo* never absolutely and finitely true. This led Aristotle to conclude that the world, being created by its prime cause and being put in motion by the first unmoved mover, must have a beginning and therefore can be satisfactorily investigated and fully known.

By not accepting that the world has a beginning and is therefore limited, the Jainas took a different path starting from the same prem-

⁷² Met 994b, 20–22, 26–31, p. 32: ἔτι τὸ ἐπίστασθαι ἀναιροῦσιν οἱ οὕτως λέγοντες, οὐ γὰρ οἷόν τε εἰδέναι πρὶν εἰς τὰ ἅτομα ἐλθεῖν· καὶ τὸ γινώσκειν οὐκ ἔστιν, τὰ γὰρ οὕτως ἄπειρα πῶς ἐνδέχεται νοεῖν; ... καὶ ἀπείρῳ οὐδενὶ ἔστιν εἶναι· εἰ δὲ μή, οὐκ ἄπειρόν γ' ἐστὶ τὸ ἀπείρῳ εἶναι. ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ εἰ ἄπειρά γ' ἦσαν πλήθει τὰ εἶδη τῶν αἰτίων, οὐκ ἂν ἦν οὐδ' οὕτω τὸ γινώσκειν· τότε γὰρ εἰδέναι οἰόμεθα ὅταν τὰ αἷτια γνωρίσωμεν· τὸ δ' ἄπειρον κατὰ τὴν πρόσθεσιν οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν πεπερασμένῳ διεξελεῖν.

ise. They do agree that one reaches definite knowledge once one has analysed the objects of one's knowledge; if the causal background and underpinnings of objects as well interrelations that obtain between the objects extend in an infinite sequence, also the knowledge has to be infinite. What may seem to be a paradox or undesirable consequence to us is not one in Jaina eyes. This is precisely the stance they take: things are indeed intricately interrelated through their modes and in their causal backgrounds, and by knowing one thing one should know everything, for without knowing all existents one could not even know one thing in detail:

[48] The one who does not know simultaneously [all] objects in their three temporal dimensions and in three worlds, cannot even know one thing along with its modes. [49] [Every single] substance is endowed with infinite modes, and there are innate kinds of substances. If one does not know [one single substance] simultaneously, how can one know them all? [50] The luminescent one (i.e. the Jina) simultaneously knows all the diversified reality, existing in three times, eternal and differentiated and everywhere. Indeed great indeed is [his] knowledge!⁷³

Thus, for the Jainas the infinite progression of causes, movements and relations does not culminate in the unmoved mover and prime cause in order to safeguard the possibility of definite knowledge of things. Instead, since the world is temporally infinite and neither caused nor moved, the infinite progression does not culminate in the ontological level of things, causes, movements and relations, but in the epistemic level with absolute perfect cognition, or omniscience, which terminates the progression of partial and limited cognitions which merely comprehend fragments of reality. Indeed, 'it is not possible to have knowledge until one has reached what cannot be further analysed,' provided knowledge is limited. When knowledge is

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*jo ña vijāṇadi juhavaṃ atthe tikkālige ti-huvaṇatthe /
 ñādum tassa ña sakkaṃ sapajjayaṃ davvam egam // PSā 1.48
 davvaṃ aṇaṃta-pajjayaṃ egam aṇaṃtāṇi davva-jādāṇi /
 ña vijāṇadi jadi jugavaṃ kidha do savvāṇi jāṇadi // PSā 1.49
 tikkāla-nicca-visamaṃ sayalaṃ savvattha saṃbhavaṃ cittaṃ /
 jugavaṃ jāṇadi joṇhaṃ aho hi ñāṇassa māhappaṃ // PSā 1.50*

believed to be without any limitation in its scope, the problem seems to disappear.

13. I would conclude that the idea of omniscience in Jainism was not only a vital component of Jaina soteriological enterprise, but it was from the outset an important theoretical device the role of which was to render Jaina teaching meaningful in debates with other schools. Without the Jina's claim to omniscience Jaina soteriology would argumentatively lose much of its convincing force and the Jainas would have found it much more difficult to validate truth claims of their religion. However, at the same time the demonstrative force of all these arguments was next to nil inasmuch as they all functioned as a post hoc justification for what the Jainas already believed: they could probably convince almost no one and anybody won by them was probably already convinced.

As it is usually the case in apologetic and religious literature, all the arguments to prove the authoritative character of the Jina and the Jina's teaching were logically not quite sound. Despite a range of logical flaws, such as circularity, quantifier-shift fallacy, equivocation or confusion of modalities (possibility and necessity), from which the argument from efficacy of the teaching, the argument from progression and the argument from potentiality suffered, they were repeated over the centuries in order to prove the authoritative character of the Jina and the Jina's teaching. The argument from efficacy of the teaching found its parallel in Buddhist literature; however two other arguments, from progression and from potentiality, remained uniquely Jaina.

Abbreviations and literature

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