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Self, No-Self, and Salvation

Dharmakīrti's Critique of the Notions of Self and Person

Vincent Eltschinger and Isabelle Ratié

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VINCENT ELTSCHINGER, ISABELLE RATIÉ

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Foreword

Dharmakīrti (550–650 CE?)[1] is arguably, of all Indian Buddhist thinkers, the one who has exerted the most decisive impact on Indian philosophy as a whole. Strangely enough, his contribution to the Buddhist intellectuals' heated polemics against both their coreligionists' personalism (*pudgalavāda*) and the non-Buddhists' (but also certain Buddhists') self (*ātman*) has never been made the object of the systematic study it deserves. The Buddhist doctors' polemic against the Vātsīputrīyas' and Sāṃmitīyas' *pudgala* is now fairly well documented: the arguments put forward in the VK, the KV, MSA(Bh), the TSi, the AKBh, the MHK, the MAV and the TS(P) have been studied or at least translated and/or summarized by La Vallée Poussin, Stcherbatsky, Schayer, Sastri, Iida, Oetke, Duerlinger, Huntington, Eltschinger and Kishi.[2] As for Dharmakīrti's polemic against the *pudgalavāda*, it has only recently received scholarly attention.[3] The situation is quite pitiable when it comes to the Buddhist intellectuals' polemics against the outsiders' *ātman*: whereas the arguments put forward by early Mādhyamikas (Nāgārjuna, Āryadeva) and Yogācāras (YBhū, Vasubandhu's KSP and AKBh) have already been investigated to a certain extent,[4] the same cannot be said of the controversy as it is reflected in the works of Dignāga, Dharmapāla, Dharmakīrti, Bhāviveka, Śāntarakṣita/Kamalaśīla, Karṇakagomin and Śaṅkaranandana. Dignāga's *Nyāya-*, *Vaiśeṣika-* and *Sāṅkhya-parīkṣā*s (which are likely to have contained arguments

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[1] On the dates of Dharmakīrti, see Krasser 2011; for the state of the art before Krasser's new chronology, see, e.g., Eltschinger 2007: 25–28.

[2] See below, Chapter 1, §1.1.3.7.

[3] See Eltschinger/Ratié 2010, and below, Chapter 1, §1.2.

[4] On Nāgārjuna's MMK, see Vetter 1982; on Āryadeva's CŚ, Chapter 10, see Lang 1986: 95–103; on (the pseudo-)Āryadeva's ŚŚ, Chapter 2, see Tucci 1929: 19–37; on YBhū 129,6–137,8, see Shukla 1967; on Vasubandhu's arguments in the KSP, see Yoshimizu 1999; on Vasubandhu's arguments against Sāṅkhya and Vaiśeṣika in AKBh 9, see, e.g., Sanderson 1995, Duerlinger 2003a: 96–111 and 238–298, and Mejor 1999.

against these schools' views on the *ātman*/*puruṣa*) as well as Karṇakagomin's *Nairātmyasiddhi* are lost;[5] the Chinese of Dharmapāla's commentary on CŚ 10 is still awaiting a translator; Śāntarakṣita's and Kamalaśīla's extensive *Ātmaparīkṣā* in the TS(P) has hardly been studied in the West so far;[6] Śaṅkaranandana's *Dharmālaṅkāra*, the second Chapter of which is entitled "A Proof of Selflessness" (*Nairātmyasiddhi*), has only recently resurfaced in the Tibetan Autonomous Region and remains unedited.[7] And while Dharmakīrti's identification of the false view of a self or "personalistic" false view with ignorance/nescience has been made the object of several studies,[8] nothing similar can be said regarding his many arguments against the self. To be sure, Iwata, Tillemans and Watanabe have analyzed some occurrences of his critique of the Sāṅkhyas' teleological argument; Iwata and Ono have dedicated important studies to his critique of the Naiyāyikas' *vyatirekin* argument; Vetter's translation of PV 2.131cd–285 includes PV 2.220–256 as well as PV 2.267–269, where Dharmakīrti criticises the Naiyāyika soteriology and polemicizes against the Ātmavādins' view of recollection as providing a strong argument in favour of the self. However, Dharmakīrti's writings include many more arguments and critical allusions to the self. Maybe due to most specialists' understanding of Dharmakīrti as a disembodied and axiomatically neutral logician, this philosopher's overall attitude and arguments regarding the *pudgala* and the self have never been presented in a systematic, historically as well as religio-philosophically contextualized study. The present book aspires to fill this important need and is meant as a humble continuation of Oetke's *'Ich' und das Ich* (1988), to which many pages of this study are indebted.

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[5] On Dignāga's *Parīkṣā*s, see Hattori 1968: 9. Karṇakagomin refers his audience back to his own *Nairātmyasiddhi* in PVSVṬ 32,21, 81,16, 82,8, 92,6, 95,26.

[6] For a systematic treatment of the *Ātmaparīkṣā* Chapter of the TS(P) in Japanese, see the references to Naito's numerous publications in Steinkellner/Much 1995: 61–62. For partial Western translations, see Schayer 1931–1932, Sferra 2004 and Kapstein 2009.

[7] The authors have undertaken a diplomatic and critical edition of Śaṅkaranandana's *Dharmālaṅkāra*, Chapter 2, and are planning to publish it, together with an English translation and study, in the not too distant future.

[8] See below, Introduction, §§0.1.1–2 and fn. 7, p. 4.

It includes three chapters: 1. Dharmakīrti's polemics against his coreligionists' *pudgalavāda*; 2. Dharmakīrti's critique of the non-Buddhists' arguments in favour of a self or in disfavour of the Buddhists' (then mainly Vasubandhu's) accounts of selflessness; 3. Dharmakīrti's arguments (mainly) against the Nyāya's crypto-Buddhist but *ātman*-centered soteriology. About one half of the arguments composing Chapter 2 recur in several works of Dharmakīrti (PVSV, PVin 2 and 3, NB) and have already received sustained scholarly attention: in this case, we have tried our best to present the doctrinal background of these arguments and to sum up Dharmakīrti's critique as expounded in the available secondary literature. Although Vetter's notes on PV 2.220–256 already contain many insightful remarks, we thought it might be worth providing these stanzas with an English translation, a doctrinal introduction, a running commentary and numerous footnotes taking into consideration Devendrabuddhi's and Śākyabuddhi's commentaries as well as the religio-philosophical ideas of his Brahmanical opponents. As for Dharmakīrti's critique of Buddhist personalism, we have allowed ourselves to reproduce, with a new introduction and a few adaptations, a previously published joint contribution of ours.[9] These three chapters are preceded by an introduction attempting to capture Dharmakīrti's general attitude regarding the self, to provide his critique of the self with a religio-philosophical meaning, and to deal with all those remarks by Dharmakīrti – critical or not – that found no place in either of the three parts.

An additional remark is called for concerning Chapter 1. Before dealing with Pudgalavāda Buddhism and Dharmakīrti's critique of his coreligionists' "person," we have devoted considerable attention to the *tathāgatagarbha* or *buddha*-nature strand of Indian Mahāyāna. And this we have done in spite of the fact that the (at least prima facie) substantialist leaning of this tradition has never been made the explicit target of "mainstream" philosophers, and even less so by Dharmakīrti. This addition has no other justification than our wish to call attention to the fact – or let us say the strong hypothesis – that Dharmakīrti, like Vasubandhu before him, elaborated his ideas on self and selflessness in an environment in which Buddhist attempts to relativize selflessness

[9] See Eltschinger/Ratié 2010.

and resort to an enduring personality principle are likely to have been in far greater number than is generally recognized.

Neither of us knows enough Chinese to investigate the important materials supplied by the the ŚŚ, VK, the Mahāyānist MPSū, the TSi, the TDK, the SNŚ and the DPŚ. We have relied on English and French translations in La Vallée Poussin 1925, Tucci 1929, Venkataramanan 1953, Yamamoto 1973, Sastri 1978, Liu 1982 Fujii 1991 and 1993, Priestley 1999, Walser 2005, Miyamoto 2007, Lusthaus 2009, contenting ourselves with providing references to the Taisho edition and quoting the Sanskrit text of the TSi as recontructed by Sastri (1975).

Needless to say, writing a book *à quatre mains* is a major challenge. Two authors who pursue different scientific interests and have different scholarly backgrounds might translate and interpret somewhat differently the same source materials, and this is bound to happen when two alleged specialists of distinct (albeit related) fields – i.e., on the one hand, Dharmakīrti and Buddhist studies, and on the other hand, Śaiva nondualism and Brahmanical conceptions of the self – come to work together. Moreover, we have different styles and writing habits (although both of us obviously have a certain leaning toward endless footnotes!). But in spite (or maybe because) of our different backgrounds and perspectives (and also in spite of the tendency to work in solitude that usually affects both of us), we took immense pleasure in working together and intend to pursue this collaboration in the future.

Vincent Eltschinger has supplied the first draft translation of almost all the Dharmakīrti materials mentioned in this book and is responsible for all translations from the Tibetan. For her part, Isabelle Ratié has provided the first draft translation of nearly all the non-Buddhist materials mentioned in the footnotes, introductory sections and running commentaries. Not only have we shared the task of interpreting the gathered materials; we have also discussed together all the aspects of this work (including all translations and interpretations, as well as the overall structure to be given to this study), so that we assume equal responsibility for the entire book.

It is our pleasant duty to thank Shoryu Katsura and Toshikazu Watanabe for putting at our disposal their provisional reconstruction of Dignāga's PS 3 as well as their edition of the PSṬ thereon; Kyo Kano, for sending us an article on Dharmakīrti's critique of the self that was

still unpublished at that time; Robert Kritzer, for sending us unpublished teaching materials; Helmut Krasser, for the many materials he has made available to us and for his help in technical matters; Johannes Bronkhorst, who provided insightful remarks on several of the materials alluded to here; Tina Draszcyk, Berthe Jansen and Birgit Kellner, for their help in interpreting two difficult passages; Masamichi Sakai and Jonathan Silk, for providing many quotations with their exact references in the Taisho *Tripiṭaka*; the editors of the *Indogaku Chibettogaku Kenkyu*, for allowing us to reproduce significant parts of a previous publication. Michael Ravenscroft deserves heartfelt thanks for carefully reading the manuscript and improving our English; and our debt to him and Pamela Ravenscroft goes far beyond what language and science will ever be able to reach. Last but not least, the authors wish to express their deepest gratitude to those who took the trouble to read and thus significantly improve (parts of) an earlier draft of our manuscript: Hugo David, Harunaga Isaacson, Ernst Steinkellner, John Taber, Toshikazu Watanabe.

Vienna – Leipzig – Leiden
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Introduction

Dharmakīrti's Attitude toward the Self

More systematically and radically than Dignāga, Dharmakīrti embodies the early medieval Buddhist intellectuals' turn toward apologetics on behalf of Buddhism as a whole and against the growing hostility of the brahmanical *élites*.[1] And as his provocative identification of the false view of a self[2] (*ātmadṛṣṭi*) with nescience[3] (*avidyā*) most clearly testifies, Dharmakīrti was a staunch adversary of the self. Indeed, the word *ātman* occurs with relative frequency in his works. However, most of these occurrences pertain to statements regarding selflessness (*nairātmya*) as the only possible way to liberation, or, equivalently, to the belief in a self as the root-cause of defilements, rebirth and suffering. In other words, *arguments* against the self or the person are surprisingly rare in the works of such an uncompromising proponent of selflessness – at least in comparison with works of other noted Buddhist scholars such as Vasubandhu, Candrakīrti, Śāntarakṣita, Kamalaśīla and Śaṅkaranandana, whose writings generally include at least one independent section dedicated to the refutation of the *ātman* and/or the

---

[1] The present introduction aims at depicting Dharmakīrti's general attitude toward the self (especially the belief in a self as the hallmark of nescience) and providing his critique with a religio-philosophical meaning. It mainly deals with those of Dharmakīrti's allusions to the self that have not found their place in the body of this study due to their lack of argumentative value or isolated character.

[2] When *ātman* occurs in such compounds as *ātmadṛṣṭi* we have generally translated it as "a self" rather than "the self" since the latter translation might misleadingly induce the reader to think that *ātmadṛṣṭi* is a misconception of the self understood as a real entity, instead of conveying the idea that *ātmadṛṣṭi* is precisely the false view that there *is* such a thing as a self. Unfortunately we could not achieve complete consistency in this respect, as the context in which such compounds appear sometimes calls for a definite article that sounds more natural in English.

[3] See below, §§0.1.1–2.

pudgala. Moreover, several among his arguments *apparently* exhaust themselves in merely presenting as paradigmatic instances of logical fallacies the proofs of the self put forward by Naiyāyika, Vaiśeṣika and Sāṅkhya opponents.

The reason(s) why Dharmakīrti did not, contrary to Vasubandhu or Śāntarakṣita, criticise these proofs in a systematic manner, remain(s) shrouded in mystery. Did he hold Vasubandhu to have provided a sufficiently extensive and convincing treatment of the issue? But why, then, did Dharmakīrti not answer Uddyotakara's counterarguments, as he did on the issues of language and universals? Why did Dharmakīrti overlook the flagship among the Buddhist as well as non-Buddhist Ātmavādins' arguments, viz. that of the self as the only possible way to account for the synthesis or coordination (*pratisandhāna*) of cognitions? Whatever the answers to these questions,[4] a systematic study of Dharmakīrti's arguments reveals that his critique nearly covers the entire range of his opponents' proof strategies. But it also reveals that Dharmakīrti's polemics against the self does by no means reflect a disinterested and religiously uncommitted search for truth.

First, his critique must be located in the context of the Buddhist epistemologists' self-representation (and, probably, self-legitimation) as those Buddhists who, by defeating the non-Buddhists' misleading and soteriologically harmful epistemological views, make the path to liberation *possible*.[5] Second, Dharmakīrti's arguments must be read against the background of his anthropological and epistemological elaborations on scriptural authority: should a given treatise present as inferable things that are *not*, as the Veda and Brahmanical religio-philosophical *śāstra*s do, this treatise ought to be rejected as unreliable and hence not eligible as a scriptural basis for the religious endeavours

[4] Dharmakīrti was certainly well aware of the fact that claiming the notion of a self to be the most congenial sign of nescience, i.e., a wrong notion (*viparyāsa*), was not enough to *refute* it. That, contrary to Vasubandhu before him or Śāntarakṣita after him, he did not deem useful to refute all the Buddhist and non-Buddhist attempts to prove the existence of a self, might be due to his conviction that the proof of momentariness (*kṣaṇikatva*), and especially what would become the *sattvānumāna* from PVin 2 onward, was a sufficient argument against a permanent self. See below, §0.2.2.

[5] See Krasser 2005, Eltschinger 2005: 154–162, Eltschinger forthc. b (§2.2).

of practically rational persons (*prekṣāvatpuruṣa*). Third, one should not lose sight of the fact that numerous Buddhist sources, including epistemological ones, can be interpreted as holding the critique of the self to be instrumental in the eradication of at least one – admittedly benign – form of the personalistic false view (*satkāyadṛṣṭi*), which Dharmakīrti equates with nescience and therefore with the cause of suffering. Fourth, Dharmakīrti's arguments culminate in a long section of PV 2 aimed at demonstrating that any variant of *ātmavāda* makes liberation impossible. In other words, the Buddhist critique of the self is religiously and soteriologically committed in that it is instrumental in a rational person's choice of a reliable religio-philosophical system capable of fulfilling his/her expectations as to elevation (*abhyudaya*) and *summum bonum* (*niḥśreyasa*). And since the only soteriologically reliable path is Buddhism – which alone prescribes selflessness as the means toward liberation –,[6] the critique of the self is apologetically committed too.

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[6] Cf. AKBh$_{Pr}$ 461,1–4/AKBh$_{LE}$ 34,1–8: *kiṃ khalv ato 'nyatra mokṣo nāsti / nāsti / kiṃ kāraṇam / vitathātmadṛṣṭiniviṣṭatvāt / na hi te skandhasantāna evātmaprajñaptiṃ vyavasyanti / kiṃ tarhi / dravyāntaram evātmānaṃ parikalpayanti / ātmagrāhaprabhavāś ca sarvakleśā iti /*. "[Objection:] But isn't there any liberation outside the[a] [teaching of the Buddha]? [Answer:] There isn't. – Why? – Because the [outsiders] stick to the erroneous view of a self, for [contrary to us,] they do not consider the designation 'self' [to refer] merely to the series of the constituents; rather, they conceive the self as an independent substance. Now, all [the] defilements [which are responsible for bondage] originate from the belief in a self[, and this is the reason why there is no means of liberation outside selflessness as prescribed by the Buddha]." [[a] *ataḥ* is to be understood against the background of AK 8.43, especially *śāsanaṃ muneḥ*.] Cf. also AK, antepenultimate and ultimate stanzas (AKBh$_{Pr}$ 478,14–21/AKBh$_{LE}$ 168,1–8): *ity etāṃ suvihitahetumārgaśuddhāṃ buddhānāṃ pravacanadharmatāṃ niśāmya / andhānāṃ vividhakudṛṣṭiceṣṭitānāṃ tīrthyānāṃ matam apavidhya yānty anandhāḥ // imāṃ hi nirvāṇapuraikavartinīṃ tathāgatādityavaco'ṃśubhāsvatīm / nirātmatām āryasahasravāhitāṃ na mandacakṣur vivṛtām apīkṣate //*. "Those who are not blind proceed by observing that the [fundamental] law [inherent] in the teaching of the *buddha*s is unobjectionable (*śuddha*) thanks to a well ordained path of [argumentative] reasons and by rejecting the doctrine of blind outsiders [such as Kapila and Ulūka] who were prompted by various evil false views. For the weak-eyed [outsider or personalist] fails to see, even [though it is] manifest, this selflessness which is the only path to the city of *nirvāṇa*, which is radiant due to the rays which are the words of the sun[-like] Tathāgata [and] which is conveyed by thousands of noble ones." On the city of *nirvāṇa*, see below, fn. 374, p. 282.

0.1. DHARMAKĪRTI'S ACCOUNT OF THE BELIEF IN A SELF AS NESCIENCE

0.1.1. According to Dharmakīrti, nescience/ignorance/delusion (*avidyā*, *ajñāna*, *moha*) basically consists in erroneous perception (*mithyopalabdhi*), pseudo-perception (*pratyakṣābhāsa*), concealment (*saṃvṛti*) and conceptuality (*vikalpa*), which all superimpose unreal aspects (*abhūtākāra*) onto the real.[7] And Dharmakīrti calls "personalistic false view" that part of nescience which, superimposing a fictitious self and that which is believed to belong to this self (*ātmīya*), gives rise to all defilements (*kleśa*) and commits living beings to action and rebirth.[8] Dharmakīrti equates the personalistic false view with nescience in several sections of his PV.[9] The identification of *satkāyadarśana* with nescience occurs first in PV 1.222:

> The birth of all kinds of defects[10] is due to the personalistic false view [i.e., to the clinging to the self and what belongs to the self, and] this [false view of a self] is [nothing but] nescience.[11]

Its identity with ignorance is stressed in Dharmakīrti's commentary on the same stanza:

> All defects are born of the personalistic false view, and it is this [false view] that is called "ignorance" [in our doctrinal system].[12]

As for equating the personalistic belief with delusion, it is done at least twice in PV 2:

---

[7] On Dharmakīrti's views regarding *avidyā*, see Vetter 1990: 22–26, Franco 2001: 289–300, Eltschinger 2009b and 2010c. The present section is but an adaptation of §§1.3 and 2.1 of the latter two essays. On Dharmakīrti's identification of nescience to conceptuality, see especially Eltschinger 2009b: 41–62.

[8] On the *satkāyadṛṣṭi*, see Rahder 1932, *Kośa* IV.15–17, fn. 3, and *Traité* II.737, fn. 3. See also below, fn. 26, p. 7.

[9] For a hypothesis and detailed references regarding Dharmakīrti's likely sources for these identifications, see Eltschinger 2009b: 70–76.

[10] On the nature of these *doṣa*s see below, fn. 67, p. 203.

[11] PV 1.222ac$_1$: *sarvāsāṃ doṣajātīnāṃ jātiḥ satkāyadarśanāt / sāvidyā* [...] //.

[12] PVSV 111,19–20: *satkāyadarśanajāḥ sarvadoṣāḥ / tad eva cājñānam ity ucyate* /.

> Delusion is the root[-cause] of defects, and this [delusion] consists in the belief in a [personal] being.[13]
>
> All the impurities have this [delusion] as [their] root[-cause], and this [delusion] is the personalistic false view.[14]

0.1.2. Dharmakīrti was well aware of the fact that his interpretation of nescience as the false view of a self could incur criticism from many of his coreligionists, even though he was by no means the first Buddhist scholar to interpret it in this manner. Whereas his general understanding of nescience in terms of erroneous cognition was closely in line with Vasubandhu's position, his identification of a false view (*dṛṣṭi*) with nescience could be rejected on the grounds that Vasubandhu held the false view to be *associated* (*samprayukta*) with nescience and not *identical* with nescience;[15] consequently, this identification could easily be found guilty of contradicting Buddhist scriptures (*āgamavirodha*). Dharmakīrti was thus compelled both to explain how something can be said to be associated with itself and to account for such a loss of the meaning of "associated" (*samprayuktārtha*). He seems to have entrusted (hypothetical) followers and/or commentators with the task of answering these questions of a more dogmatic character. His exegetical justification for this identification occurs in the following stanza:

> Delusion is presented as the [principal] cause of defects [in one *sūtra*, and] in another one, it is the personalistic false view, because [defects] are eliminated when the [personalistic false view] is eliminated.[16]

In his commentary,[17] Dharmakīrti argues that if the Buddha has taught delusion to be the cause of defilements in one *sūtra*, and the persona-

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[13] PV 2.196ab$_1$: *mohaś ca mūlaṃ doṣāṇāṃ sa ca sattvagrahaḥ* [...] /.

[14] PV 2.212cd: *tanmūlāś ca malāḥ sarve sa ca satkāyadarśanam* //.

[15] See AK 3.29c.

[16] PV 1.223 (leaving *ata eva* untranslated): *moho nidānaṃ doṣāṇām ata evābhidhīyate / satkāyadṛṣṭir anyatra tatprahāṇe prahāṇataḥ* //. Note also PV 2.214: *vyākhyeyo 'tra virodho yas tadvirodhāc ca tanmayaiḥ / virodhaḥ śūnyatādṛṣṭeḥ sarvadoṣaiḥ prasidhyati* //. "The contradiction [with scripture] which [seems to ensue] on this point has to be explained. However, since [the perception of emptiness] is contradictory to this [personalistic false view], it is established that the perception of emptiness contradicts all the defects [too], which are born of this [personalistic false view]." On °*maya*, see below, fn. 41, p. 10.

listic false view in another one, he could only have the same primary cause (*pradhāna[hetu]*) in mind, because in both cases he is pointing out the factor that, when eliminated, leads to the elimination of the defilements, i.e., the "material" cause (*upādāna*). In other words, "delusion" and "personalistic false view" are synonymous. How do the commentators with this type of doctrinal background explain away the contradiction with the scripture that seems to ensue from this identification? What does "associated" mean in the Abhidharmic statement "nescience is associated with the false view(s)" if nescience and the personalistic false view are one and the same thing?[18] According to Devendrabuddhi, "associated" points here to a relationship between the parts and the whole (*ekadeśaikadeśibhāva*); Śākyabuddhi explains it as being like the relationship between the body and its limbs (*aṅgāṅgibhāva*).[19] According to Prajñākaragupta, "associated" refers to a relationship between universal and specific instance (*sāmānyaviśeṣabhāva*).[20] Nescience and the personalistic false view stand in the same kind of relationship as a forest and *palāśa*-trees (*Butea frondosa*) in the expression: "The forest has *palāśa*-trees" (*palāśayuktaṃ vanam iti*), or the body and limbs such as hands in the expression: "The body has [limbs] such as hands" (*pāṇyādiyuktaṃ śarīram iti*).[21] The apparent contradiction with scripture can then be explained away easily: the statement that nescience is associated with the personalistic false view means that nescience, considered as a whole, a body or a universal, possesses the personalistic false view considered as a part, a member/limb, or a specific instance.[22] As Prajñākaragupta concludes, "by mentioning [that the personalistic false view is] a specific instance,

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[17] See PVSV 111,23–112,5, Dunne 2004: 372–373, Eltschinger 2007: 236–239.

[18] See PVP D92b7–93a1/P107a7–8, PVA 146,14–16 and PVV 85,15–17.

[19] See PVP D93a1/P107a8–b1 and PVṬ *Ñe* D137a5/P169a6; see also PVA 146,14 and PVV 85,16–17.

[20] See PVA 146,20; see also PVV 85,20.

[21] For *palāśayuktaṃ vanam iti*, see PVP D93a1–2/P107b1, PVA 146,20, PVV 85,20, Vibh. 85, fn. 10. For *pāṇyādiyuktaṃ śarīram iti*, see PVP D93a2/P107b1 and Vibh. 85, fn. 10. The second example obviously does not fit together with the explanation of "associated" as *sāmānyaviśeṣabhāva*, hence its disappearance in the PVA and PVV.

[22] See PVP D93a3/P107b2–3, PVṬ *Ñe* D137a5–7/P169a6–b1, PVA 146,21.

nescience consisting in this [i.e., a false view,] is pointed out as being primarily the cause [of defilements]."[23] Or, according to Manorathanandin, "[Dharmakīrti's] aim [in defining nescience as the personalistic false view] is to show that nescience consisting in a false view is primarily the cause of defilements."[24] As we can see, although Dharmakīrti was by no means the first Buddhist intellectual to connect *avidyā* with *ātmadṛṣṭi* and the like or to define the former by means of the latter, he may have been the first to develop an exegetical strategy to justify an equation that could easily be taken, at least among the Ābhidharmikas, as unorthodox.

0.1.3. Various terms refer to this kind of nescience in Dharmakīrti's writings: "personalistic false view" (*satkāyadṛṣṭi*, °*darśana*), "false view of a self" (*ātmadarśana*), "belief in/adhesion to a self" (*ātmagraha, ātmābhiniveśa*), and "false view of/belief in a [substantial] living being" (*sattvadṛṣṭi*, *sattvadarśana*, *sattvagraha*).[25] According to Yogācāra and Sautrāntika definitions, the personalistic belief consists in regarding the five constituents to which one clings (*upādānaskandha*) either as a self (*ātmataḥ*) or as one's own (*ātmīyataḥ*, i.e., as belonging to the self).[26] People who are deluded by this false view hold a basically transient (*sat* < *sīdati*) collection or cluster to be both permanent (*nityasañjñā*) and unitary (*piṇḍasañjñā*). In his account of the future Buddha's philosophical reflections on the eve of his career, Dharmakīrti presents the cause of suffering (*duḥkhahetu*) in the following way:

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[23] PVA 146,21–22: *evaṃ viśeṣābhidhānena tatsvabhāvāvidyā nidānabhūtā prādhānyena nirdiṣṭā* /.

[24] PVV 85,20–21: *dṛṣṭisvabhāvāvidyā prādhānyena kleśahetur ity upadarśanam* [...] *prayojanam* /.

[25] For the various designations of nescience in Dharmakīrti's works (especially in PV 2), see Vetter 1990: 23.

[26] That *satkāya* should be interpreted as the five *upādānaskandha*s is obvious from the definitions adduced in the *Maulī Bhūmiḥ* of the *Yogācārabhūmi* (see Ahn 2003: 62, and for a German translation, Ahn 2003: 169–172), AS 7,8 (see Ahn 2003: 170, fn. 27, and for a German translation, Ahn ibid.), PSk 9,12–13 (for a French translation, see Dantinne 1980: 15), $TrBh_B$ *14,14–16/$TrBh_L$ 23,12–14, $AKBh_{Pr}$ 281,20–21 on AK 5.7.

> The cause [of suffering, i.e., of rebirth,] is attachment bearing upon the conditioning factors, [an attachment that is] due to the belief in the self and what [supposedly] belongs to the self.[27]

According to Devendrabuddhi, craving proceeds from one's adhering to the painful conditioned factors that are intrinsically free from the self and one's own, under the aspects of the self and one's own.[28] This is tantamount to saying that defilements such as craving only occur once unreal aspects have been superimposed on *dharma*s, specifically on the five constituents to which one clings, which lack these aspects entirely. While commenting on another passage, Devendrabuddhi claims that defilements such as desire (another equivalent for attachment and craving) proceed from one's superimposing aspects such as "permanent," "pleasurable," "self" and "one's own" on the impermanent, painful, selfless and empty constituents.[29] A huge number of passages presenting the same idea could be adduced here: the personalistic belief is responsible for one's superimposing contrary aspects such as self and one's own on the selfless and empty constituents.[30] As Dharmakīrti himself has it, "desire [arises] from the superimposition of another [i.e., unreal] nature onto something (*dharma*) that does not have this nature."[31] PV 2.270 provides us with Dharmakīrti's most significant statement as to how craving takes place once unreal aspects have been ascribed to reality:

> Having[, due to ignorance,[32]] superimposed sixteen unreal aspects, viz. "lasting," "pleasant," "mine," "I," etc., onto the four [nobles'] truths,[33] one craves [for what is pleasurable to the self].[34]

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[27] PV 2.135ac$_1$: *ātmātmīyagrahakṛtaḥ snehaḥ saṃskāragocaraḥ / hetuḥ* [...] //. *sneha* = *tṛṣṇā* according to PVP D56a7/P64a4 and PVṬ *Ñe* D117b3–4/P143b7; Śākyabuddhi (PVṬ *Ñe* D117b4/P143b7–8) explains *gocara* as **viṣaya*.

[28] See PVP D56b1/P64a5–6.

[29] See PVP D60b2–3/P69a4–5.

[30] See, e.g., PVP D88a4–5/P101b4 and PVP D88a6/P101b5–6.

[31] PV 2.196ab: *ātmāntarasamāropād rāgo dharme 'tadātmake* /.

[32] According to PVP D116a1/P134b2 (*sgro btags nas ni mi śes pa'i phyir*).

[33] At least according to the Vaibhāṣikas, each of the four nobles' truths is to be successively contemplated under four different aspects: the truth of suffering, under the aspects "impermanent," "painful," "empty" and "selfless"; the truth of origin, under

According to Devendrabuddhi and Śākyabuddhi, nescience, i.e., the false view of a self, has one grasp aspects that are contrary to the real ones, i.e., it makes one superimpose an "I" onto what is selfless and a "mine" onto what is empty.[35] But nescience is also responsible for deluded persons taking momentary things to be lasting (*sthira*) or even unchangeably permanent (*kūṭasthanitya*),[36] or holding intrinsically painful things to be pleasurable, i.e., not to be under the sway of cankers

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the aspects of "(distant/material) cause" (as a seed), "arising," "(serial) causation" and "(joint) condition"; the truth of cessation, under the aspects of "cessation," "calm," "excellent" and "salvation"; the truth of the path, under the aspects of "path," "fitness," "access" and "conducive to release." See AKBh$_{Pr}$ 343,16–19 on AK 6.17c$_1$, PVP D62a3–7/P71a1–6 and Wayman 1980. The AKBh records a lengthy discussion pertaining to four different ways of interpreting these sixteen aspects (see AKBh$_{Pr}$ 400,1–401,17 on AK 7.13a, *Kośa* V.30–39, Pruden 1988–1990: IV.1110–1116). According to the fourth exegetical pattern, each of these aspects aims at counteracting (*pratipakṣa*) a particular false view. The aspects *anitya*, *duḥkha*, *śūnya* and *anātman* counteract the false views of permanence, pleasurableness, one's own, and self; the aspects of *hetu*, *samudaya*, *prabhava* and *pratyaya* contradict the false views of the absence of a cause, of a unique cause such as God or primordial matter (according to AKVy 628,30–31), of an evolution of being, and of an intelligent creation; the aspects *nirodha*, *śānta*, *praṇīta* and *niḥsaraṇa* oppose the false views that release does not exist, that release is painful, that the bliss of *dhyāna*s is the most excellent, and that liberation, because it is subject to falling again and again, is not definitive; as for the aspects *mārga*, *nyāya*, *pratipad* and *nairyāṇika*, they respectively counteract the false views that there is no path, that this is a wrong path, that there is another path, and that the path is subject to retrogression (see AKBh$_{Pr}$ 401,11–17, *Kośa* V.38–39, Pruden 1988–1990: IV.1115–1116). The explanations provided by Dharmakīrti's commentators are too scarce to allow us to determine which interpretation, if any, they favoured. Devendrabuddhi and Śākyabuddhi content themselves with listing the four aspects superimposed on each of the last three truths (see PVP D115b6–7/P134a8–b2 and PVṬ *Ñe* D147b3–5/P182a8–b2).

[34] PV 2.270: *sthiraṃ sukhaṃ mamāhaṃ cetyādi satyacatuṣṭaye / abhūtān ṣoḍaśākārān āropya paritṛṣyati //*.

[35] See PVP D115b3–4/P134a4, PVP D115b6/P134a7–8 and PVṬ *Ñe* D147a1–2/P181b3–5.

[36] See PVP D115b4/P134a5–6 (to be compared with Vibh. 102, fn. 1) and PVṬ *Ñe* D147a6–7/P182a2–3.

(*sāsrava*) or dependent on causes (*hetuparatantra*) in each of their successive moments (*pratikṣaṇam*).[37]

0.1.4. According to Dharmakīrti and his commentators, the personalistic false view is the (principal) cause (*nidāna*), the origin (*yoni*, *prabhava*), or the root (*mūla*) of all (kinds of) defects (*doṣa*), defilements (*kleśa*, *upakleśa*) or moral impurities (*mala*).[38] Among the expressions denoting the fact that defilements such as desire originate from the false view of a self, one also encounters "cause" (*kāraṇa*, alone or with preceding *utpatti*°, *pradhāna*°; *hetu*[39]), "arising" (*jāti*, *utpatti*[40]) and suffixal elements such as °*pūrvaka*, °*maya*,[41] °*hetuka*, °*ja*, °*mūla*, or °*kṛta*. Defilements originate from the personalistic false view (*satkāyadarśanaja*, *'jig tshogs su lta ba'i raṅ bźin*), (causally) presuppose the false view of a self or the adherence to the self and one's own (*bdag tu lta ba sṅon du soṅ ba can*, *ātmātmīyābhiniveśapūrvaka*), arise from the false view of a self (*bdag tu lta ba las byuṅ ba*), or have nescience for their cause (*avidyāhetuka*).[42] They are all based on the beliefs in "I" and "mine" (*ṅar 'dzin pa daṅ ṅa yir 'dzin pa dag la gnas pa*) and arise in dependence on a mind that complies with the false view of a self and one's own (*bdag daṅ bdag gir lta ba'i rjes su 'brel ba'i sems la ltos nas* [...] *'gyur ba*).[43]

0.1.5. As we have seen, the belief in a self and what belongs to the self is the cause of suffering, i.e., attachment bearing on the conditioning factors. In other words, nescience is the cause of craving (*tṛṣṇā*), which is

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[37] See PVP D115b5/P134a6. *duḥkha(bhūta)* is regularly explained as *sāsrava* in the PVP; see, e.g., PVP D57b7/P66a1 and PVP D58a3/P66a5.

[38] E.g., PV 2.197a (*doṣa*), PV 1.222a (*sarvāsāṃ doṣajātīnām*), PV 2.214d (*sarvadoṣa*), PVSVṬ 401,24–25 and PVP D91a2/P105a5 (*sarvakleśa*), PVP D60a2–3/P68b4 (*ñon moṅs pa daṅ ñe ba'i ñon moṅs*, **kleśopakleśāḥ*), PV 2.212c (*malāḥ sarve*).

[39] E.g., PVSVṬ 50,28 (*kāraṇa*), PVSVṬ 401,29 and PVP D91a2/P105a5 (*utpattikāraṇa*), PVSVṬ 402,23–24 (*pradhānakāraṇa*), PVSVṬ 401,21 (*hetu*).

[40] E.g., PV 1.222b (*jāti*), PVSVṬ 401,22 and 26 (*utpatti*).

[41] Rendered in Tib. as *raṅ bźin (can)*. Note PVṬ *Ñe* D137b3/P169b6: *raṅ bźin ni ṅo bo ñid dam rgyu yin no //.* "**maya* [points] either [to] the nature (**rūpa*) or [to] the cause (**hetu*)."

[42] Respectively PVSV 111,19, PVP D93b1/P108a1 (on *raṅ bźin*, see above, fn. 41), PVP D60a2–3/P68b4, PVSV 8,20, PVP D93a5/P107b5, PVSVṬ 401,24 and 25.

[43] Respectively PVP D93b1–2/P108a1–2 and PVP D67b4/P77a6–7.

nothing but the traditional sequence of dependent origination, where both nescience and craving function as the cause of suffering: as defilements, they both give rise to other defilements (e.g., *tṛṣṇā→upādāna*) and to actions (*kriyā*, e.g., *avidyā→saṃskāra*, or *upādāna→bhava*), the latter being in turn responsible for new foundations (*vastu*) of existence (e.g., *saṃskāra→vijñāna*, or *bhava→jāti*).[44] Insofar as they give rise to actions leading to new existential foundations, nescience and craving[45] are the two causes of (re)birth (*[punar]janman*) and transmigration (*saṃsāra*),[46] which are the hallmarks of suffering.[47] Whereas Devendrabuddhi simply defines suffering as (re)birth (*skye ba'i mtshan ñid can gyi sdug bsṅal*), Dharmakīrti characterizes it as the constituents undergoing transmigration (*duḥkhaṃ saṃsāriṇaḥ skandhāḥ*).[48] It is hardly surprising, then, that according to Dharmakīrti, "as long as (s)he adheres to a self, the [person who experiences craving remains] in *saṃsāra*."[49] According to Devendrabuddhi, for whom "the personalistic false view is the cause of the connection (**pratisandhi*) to a new existence (**punarbhava*)," [50] "the [person] who is under the sway of the false view of a self has the notion of pleasure (**sukhasañjñā*) with regard to suffering [and] will be connected to a new existence." [51] The link between the false view of a self, attachment and rebirth can be summarized as follows:

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[44] See AK 3.27 and AKBh$_{Pr}$ 134,26–135,3, *Kośa* II.69, Pruden 1988–1990: II.407.

[45] See PVP D56a6/P64a3, PVP D57b3/P65b4, PVP D115b6/P134a8, PVP D116a1/P134b3, PVP D115b2/P134a2–3, PVP D58b1/P66b4.

[46] For definitions of *saṃsāra*, see PVP D62b3–4/P71b2–3 (to be compared with PVV 62,11–12), PVP D95b6/P110b3 (together with PVṬ *Ñe* D138b6–7/P171a7–8), TSP$_K$ 184,21–22/TSP$_Ś$ 230,8–9 (unidentified quotation).

[47] See PVṬ *Ñe* D148a1/P182b6. Suffering is also defined in terms of *duḥkhatātraya* in PVP D62b4/P71b3–4 (together with PVṬ *Ñe* D120b5–7/P147b5–7). On the three types of painfulness, see below, Chapter 3, §3.3.7.

[48] Respectively PVP D56a6/P64a3 and PV 2.146c.

[49] PV 2.218cd (leaving *tena* untranslated): *tenātmābhiniveśo yāvat tāvat sa saṃsāre //*.

[50] PVP D85a6–7/P98a3–4: *'jig tshogs lta ba yaṅ srid par ñiṅ mtshams sbyor ba'i rgyur gyur pa*. See also PVP D85b5/P98b2–3.

[51] PVP D85a6/P98a3: *gaṅ la bdag tu lta ba yod pa de ni sdug bsṅal la bde ba'i 'du śes can yin te / yaṅ srid par mtshams sbyor bar 'gyur ro //*.

> Thus when there is adherence to a self, a multitude of defects such as attachment to one's own (**ātmīyasnehādidoṣa*) arise, and attachment to a self causes [one] to take a [new existential] place (**sthāna*).[52]

0.1.6. Let us now consider the genealogy of defilements from the personalistic false view. As we shall see, Dharmakīrti provides a coherent picture of the sequence *avidyā–(ṣaḍāyatana–sparśa–vedanā–)tṛṣṇā–upādāna–bhava–jāti*, although some items in his account have no explicit equivalent in the traditional twelve-membered chain of dependent origination. In Dharmakīrti's opinion, the false view of a self may be held directly responsible for the rise of at least three factors: the notion of otherness, the belief in one's own, and attachment/craving. In an interesting statement, Dharmakīrti points out:

> Once [the notion of] the self exists, the notion of the other (*parasañjñā*) [arises, and] from this distinction between the self and the other [are born] grasping and aversion; bound to these two, all the defects arise.[53]

Devendrabuddhi accounts as follows for the genealogy of otherness:

> As long as the thought adheres to a self (**ātmeti*), [it has] the notion of a self (**ātmasañjñā*), and once this [notion] exists, all that [the thought] does not grasp in this way is [held to be] other.[54]

In another statement, Dharmakīrti declares that "the [false] view of a self generates the belief in one's own (*ātmīyagraha*)."[55] Persons deluded by the false view of a self regard the constituents of being both as a self and as belonging to the self, but this feeling of property may well be extended beyond the constituents and range over parts of the world that have been posited as other than the self. The personalistic belief is responsible for yet another factor, which is variously termed "desire" (*rāga*), "craving" (*tṛṣṇā*), "grasping" (*parigraha*) or "attachment" (*sne-*

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[52] PVP D58a7–b1/P66b3–4: *de ltar na bdag tu mṅon par źen pa yod na bdag gir chags pa la sogs pa'i skyon gyi tshogs 'jug par 'gyur źiṅ / bdag tu chags pas kyaṅ gnas yoṅs su len par byed do //*.

[53] PV 2.219 (*āryā* metre): *ātmani sati parasañjñā svaparavibhāgāt parigrahadveṣau / anayoḥ sampratibaddhāḥ sarve doṣāḥ prajāyante //*.

[54] PVP D95b7/P110b4–5: *ji srid du blo bdag ces mṅon par źen pa de srid du bdag tu 'du śes pa daṅ de yod na de ltar mi 'dzin pa gaṅ yin pa de thams cad gźan yin no //*.

[55] PVSV 111,18: *ātmadarśanam ātmīyagrahaṃ prasūte /*.

ha), and clearly corresponds to the eighth link of dependent origination, i.e., craving. In spite of this functional equivalence, these terms seem not to be necessarily synonymous, for Dharmakīrti is likely to have introduced a causal sequence between them, thus splitting the traditional eighth link into two. If this is correct, from the false view of a self arises first attachment or love for the self and one's own, and then craving for the things that are regarded as beneficial or pleasurable to the self. This can be seen in the following stanza:

> He who sees a self has a constant attachment for this [self, thinking of it as] "I." Because of [this] attachment [for the self,] he craves for the pleasures [of this self, and his] thirst conceals [from him] the defects [of the things he deems conducive to these pleasures].[56]

Here, both Devendrabuddhi and Manorathanandin interpret "attachment" as "attachment for the self."[57] Whereas attachment regards the self (but bears upon the conditioning factors), craving regards the pleasures (*sukha*) of the self,[58] i.e., the things that are deemed conducive to these pleasures,[59] or impure (*sāsrava*) things that are (deemed) favourable (*anugrāhaka*) in that they are conducive to the pleasures (of the self).[60] Besides the frequent occurrence of expressions such as *ātmasneha*,[61] *ātmātmīyasneha*[62] or even **satkāyasneha*,[63] Devendrabuddhi's definition of *sneha* is worth noticing:

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[56] PV 2.217 (*āryā* metre): *yaḥ paśyaty ātmānaṃ tatrāsyāham iti śāśvataḥ snehaḥ / snehāt sukheṣu tṛṣyati tṛṣṇā doṣāṃs tiraskurute //*. Śākyabuddhi interprets *doṣa* as "birth, ageing and death" (**jātijarāmaraṇa*, PVṬ *Ñe* D138b1/P170b8).

[57] See PVP D95a6/P110a2 and PVV 87,3.

[58] PVP D95a6/P111a2: *bdag gi bde la sred 'gyur*.

[59] PVV 87,3–4: *sukhasādhanatvenādhyavasitānāṃ vastūnām*.

[60] See PVP D95b1/P111a4–5 and PVSVṬ 402,8.

[61] See, e.g., PVP D58a1–2/P66a3.

[62] See PVP D57b3/P65b4. Attachment for the self and what belongs to the self is said to regard the object that is clung to as the self and one's own (*ātmātmīyatvābhiniviṣṭe viṣaya ātmātmīyasnehaḥ*, PVSVṬ 401,26–27).

[63] See, e.g., PVP D90b5/P104b7.

> [We call] "attachment" an inclination for the self and one's own which presupposes the [afore-mentioned delusion].[64]

According to Dharmakīrti, attachment for the self and what belongs (or ought to belong) to the self is in turn the cause of hostility (*pratigha*) and aversion (*dveṣa*):

> Indeed, he who, without grasping (*parigraha*), sees that there is neither I nor mine, is not attached to anything and, [being so] devoid of attachment, is not averse to anything [either], for there is no [aversion] regarding that which does not hinder the self or one's own, nor regarding that which opposes the [said] hindrance.[65]

One can show hostility or aversion only for that which hinders (*uparodha*) or harms (*pīḍā*) what has been taken as the self and one's own:[66]

> Aversion [arises] with regard to that alone which offers opposition (*pratikūlavartin*) by its hostility to that upon which the attachment for the self and one's own bears (*viṣayabhūta*). Therefore, there is no aversion without attachment for the self and one's own.[67]

And in Dharmakīrti's eyes, that which is other than the self gives rise to aversion only insofar as it opposes love for the self and one's own, but arouses craving as soon as it is regarded as pleasurable to the self. Craving for the pleasures of the self and that which is conducive to them generally implies one's running around in search of pleasure. This is indeed the Vaibhāṣika definition of the ninth link of dependent origination, appropriation or clinging (*upādāna*),[68] which Dharmakīrti obviously has in mind in PV 2.218ab:

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[64] PVP D60a2/P68b2–3: *de sṅon du soṅ ba can gyi bdag daṅ bdag gir źen pa ni chags pa'o* //. See also PVP D94b7/P109b4–5.

[65] PVSV 111,15–17: *na hi nāhaṃ na mameti paśyataḥ parigraham antareṇa kvacit snehaḥ / na cānanurāgiṇaḥ kvacid dveṣaḥ / ātmātmīyānuparodhiny uparodhapratighātini ca tadabhāvāt /.*

[66] See PVSVṬ 402,12 and PVP D60a2/P68b3.

[67] PVSVṬ 402,13–15: *ātmātmīyasnehaviṣayabhūtavirodhena yaḥ sthitaḥ pratikūlavartī tatraiva dveṣaḥ / tasmān nātmātmīyasneham antareṇa dveṣa iti /.*

[68] See AK 3.23cd.

> Seeing [but desirable] qualities [to the things that he deems pleasurable to the self], he craves [for them, thinking of them as having to become] "mine," and clings (*upā√dā-*) to the means [that are conducive] to them.[69]

But Dharmakīrti also holds attachment to the self to be the cause of the three different kinds of craving that the oldest layers of Buddhist canonical literature have made responsible for rebirth (*paunarbhavika*): craving for (future) existence (*bhavatṛṣṇā*), craving for sensual pleasures (*kāmatṛṣṇā*), and craving for non-existence/annihilation (*vibhavatṛṣṇā*).[70] According to him, craving for sensual pleasures is to be interpreted as the actions (*pravṛtti*) of living beings to secure what they hold to be pleasurable (*sukhāpti*), whereas craving for annihilation refers to those of their actions that aim at avoiding suffering (*duḥkhānāpti*). This matches again perfectly with the Vaibhāṣika account of the tenth link of dependent origination, viz. *bhava* (literally "existence"), which is to be understood as the "action which results in future existence" (*bhaviṣyadbhavaphalaṃ karma*): *bhava* refers to the actions resulting in rebirth which are accumulated by those who run around (under the sway of craving) in order to quench their thirst.[71] In these stanzas, Dharmakīrti brings together both meanings of *bhava*, i.e., action to secure the pleasures of the self and the (future) existence to which they inevitably lead:

> The cause [of suffering] is the longing for [re]existence, because human beings reach a specific [existential] place [and condition] due to [their] hope of obtaining it. The [afore-mentioned longing for existence] is [called] the desire for [re]existence. And since a living being [only] acts with the desire to obtain pleasure and avoid suffering, these two [i.e., craving for pleasure and craving for the avoidance of suffering,] are regarded as the desire for sensual pleasures and the desire for annihilation. And since attachment to the self is the cause [of it, this dual action] pertains to everything for [the living being] who has the notion of [something] pleasurable with regard to [something] unplea-

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[69] PV 2.218ab (*āryā* metre): *guṇadarśī paritṛṣyan mameti tatsādhanāny upādatte /*.

[70] For references to canonical *loci* by Dharmakīrti's commentators, see PVP D79b3–4/P91a7–8, PVA 134,33–135,2 and PVV 74,10–11. For their Pali equivalent, see Vetter 1990: 87, fn. 1.

[71] See $AKBh_{Pr}$ 132,19–21 and AK 3.24ab.

surable. Therefore, craving is the basis of existence [i.e., the cause of bondage].[72]

0.2. THE "SPECULATIVE" FORM OF THE PERSONALISTIC BELIEF AND THE FUNCTION OF PHILOSOPHY

0.2.1. Buddhist treatises such as the YBhū and the AKBh regard the personalistic false view as twofold. The one we have considered so far corresponds to the *satkāyadṛṣṭi* in its innate or natural (*sahaja*) form, which afflicts (nearly) all sentient beings including animals such as wild beasts and birds. And since the innate personalistic belief can only be eliminated by the path of mental cultivation (*bhāvanāheya*), only *buddha*s, *śrāvaka*s/*arhat*s and *pratyekabuddha*s have rid themselves of it. The other form of the personalistic false view is of a theoretical, "speculative" (*vi-* or *pari-kalpita*) nature, and can be eliminated by the path of vision (*darśanaheya*). In its speculative form, the *satkāyadṛṣṭi* characterizes the outsider (*anyatīrthya, tīrthika*) intellectuals elaborating philosophical views concerning the self. Such is the YBhū's account of the twofold *satkāyadṛṣṭi*:

> What does the personalistic false view consist of? – We call "personalistic false view" the false view of, the adhesion (**abhiniveśa*) to and the mentalization (*sems la 'jog pa*) of a self and what [supposedly] belongs to [this] self (**ātmātmīyadṛṣṭi*) regarding the [five] constituents to which one clings (**upādānaskandha*). And one ought to know (**veditavya*) that this [personalistic false view] is twofold (**dvi[vi]dha*): innate (**sahaja*) and speculative (**parikalpita*). Among them (**tatra*), the innate [personalistic false view] is that of all the immature ordinary persons (**bālapṛthagjana*) and up to wild animals (**mṛga*) and birds (**pakṣin*). As for the speculative [personalistic false view], it must be seen (**draṣṭavya*) as that of the outsiders (**anyatīrthya*).[73]

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[72] PV 2.183a$_2$–185: *hetur bhavavāñchā parigrahaḥ / yasmād deśaviśeṣasya tatprāptyāśākṛto nṛṇām // sā bhavecchāptyanāptīcchoḥ pravṛttiḥ sukhaduḥkhayoḥ / yato 'pi prāṇinaḥ kāmavibhavecche ca te mate // sarvatra cātmasnehasya hetutvāt sampravartate / asukhe sukhasañjñasya tasmāt tṛṣṇā bhavāśrayaḥ //.*

[73] VinSg 112b6–113a1 (as quoted in Kritzer 2005: 293): *'jig tshogs la lta ba gaṅ źe na / ñe bar len pa'i phuṅ po dag la bdag gam bdag gir ba lta ba daṅ / mṅon par źen pa daṅ sems la 'jog pa gaṅ yin pa de ni 'jig tshogs la lta ba źes bya'o // de 'aṅ rnam pa gñis su rig par bya ste / lhan cig skyes pa daṅ kun brtags pa'o // de la lhan cig skyes*

According to Yaśomitra, the personalistic belief in its speculative form characterizes Ātmavādins such as Kapila and Ulūka, the founders of the religio-philosophical systems of Sāṅkhya and Vaiśeṣika.[74] That Dharmakīrti acknowledged the distinction between the innate and speculative forms of the *satkāyadṛṣṭi* can easily be substantiated.[75] Śākyabuddhi accounts for this distinction as follows:

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pa ni byis pa so so'i skye bo thams cad daṅ tha na ri dags daṅ bya rnams kyi yaṅ yin no // kun brtags pa ni gźan mu stegs can rnams kyi yin par blta bar bya'o //. On this distinction, see also PrSVy IIIv5 (Muroji 1991: 83; *sahajātmadṛṣṭi*) and PrSVy IIIv6–7 (Muroji 1991: 81; *parikalpitātmadṛṣṭi*), AKBh$_{Pr}$ 290,19–20 (*sahajā satkāyadṛṣṭir avyākṛtā / yā mṛgapakṣiṇām api vartate / vikalpitā tv akuśaleti pūrvācāryāḥ /*; see Kritzer 2005: 292); see also LASū 117,17–118,13 and ASBh 62,3–4. As Prajñākaragupta rightly points out, the (innate) *satkāyadṛṣṭi* is nothing but defiled ignorance/delusion (see PVA 145,12–13, together with stanza 886). On *mṛgapakṣin*, see also VP 2.149–150.

[74] AKVy 463,17–18: *yātmavādibhiḥ kapilolūkādibhir vikalpitā /*. Note that the Sāṅkhya and the Vaiśeṣika are the only non-Buddhist schools criticised in AKBh 9. Interestingly enough, these are also the exclusive target of Āryadeva's ŚŚ according to its commentary by Vasu(bandhu?) (both translated into Chinese by Kumārajīva in 404, Tucci 1929: xiv): "Kapila, Ulūka and others say that the *ātman* and the *dharma*s exist. Kapila says: 'From the primeval matter (*pradhāna*) in the beginning, the intellect (*buddhi*) arises. From the intellect arises the *ahaṅkāra*; from *ahaṅkāra* arise the five subtle elements (*sūkṣmabhūta*); from the five subtle elements arise the five material elements (*mahābhūta*); from the five *mahābhūta*s arise the eleven organs of senses. The *ātman* is the controlling agent (*adhiṣṭhātṛ*), has the characteristics of being eternal and intelligent. He is indifferent (*udāsīna* or *madhyastha*). He eternally remains and is neither destroyed nor perishes. He comprehends all the *dharma*s. Those who can understand these twenty-five principles obtain liberation. Those who do not understand these cannot get rid of the *saṃsāra*.' Ulūka says: 'Really there is an *ātman* eternal; because of the characteristics of breathing out (*prāṇa*), inspiration (*apāna*) (*nimeṣa*), *unmeṣa* vitality *āyuḥ* [sic], and so on; therefore it is known that there is an *ātman*. And again, because (of the necessity of the existence of) a place where desire and hatred, joy and sorrow, and the intelligence might adhere, the *ātman* is really existent.'" Translation Tucci 1929: *19–*20 (quoted without the Chinese characters). On the Vaiśeṣika position, see below, §0.2.2. and fn. 82, p. 20.

[75] PV 2.199ad$_1$: *satkāyadṛṣṭer vigamād ādya evābhavo bhavet / mārge cet sahajāhāner na* [...] //. "[Objection:] Non-[re]existence (*abhava*) [i.e., liberation from *saṃsāra*,] should occur [already] on the initial path [i.e., on the path of vision], for the false view of a self[, which is the cause of the connection to a new birth,] ceases [at that time. Answer:] No, because [at that time] one does not rid oneself of the innate [false view of a self]." See also PV 2.200 and PVP D85b1–2/P98a5–7.

> The speculative [personalistic false view] arises from [one's] thinking about (**cint-*?) [religio-philosophical] treatises (**śāstra*), etc. As for the innate [personalistic false view], it arises from a beginningless impregnation (**anādivāsanā*) [...] The one that arises from a beginningless impregnation can only be eliminated by the path of [mental] cultivation.[76]

Now, a Buddhist philosopher is certainly not in a position to uproot the innate *satkāyadṛṣṭi* in any other mental stream (something even *buddha*s cannot do). But what he *can* do, and is actually concerned with, is to refute the various expressions of the speculative personalistic belief, which leads the world astray. And together with the Naiyāyikas and the Buddhist personalists, Yaśomitra's Sāṅkhyas and Vaiśeṣikas are precisely the target of Dharmakīrti's arguments against the self. This is what the present book is about.

0.2.2. According to the conclusive stanza of PV 1, the belief in an eternal self that would be the agent of good and bad deeds is one of the five marks of complete stupidity:[77]

> [Believing in the] authority of the Veda, claiming something [permanent] to be an agent,[78] seeking merit in ablutions, taking pride in one's caste, and undertaking penance to remove sin, these are the five signs of complete stupidity devoid of any discrimination.[79]

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[76] PVṬ *Ñe* D131b6–7/P162a7–b1: *kun tu brtags pa ni bstan bcos sems pa la sogs pa'i sgo nas byuṅ ba'o // lhan cig skyes pa ni thog ma med pa'i bag chags las byuṅ ba'o //* [...] *thog ma med pa'i bag chags las byuṅ ba de ni bsgom pa'i lam ñid kyis spaṅ bar bya ba ñid yin* [...] *//*.

[77] Complete stupidity, i.e., being devoid of any rational knowledge (*nyāyānusārijñānarahita*), of any knowledge deriving from the force of the means of valid cognition (*pramāṇabalaṃ vijñānam*; PVṬ *Ñe* D70b5–6/P85a7–8 = PVSVṬ 619,5–7).

[78] Our interpretation of *kasyacit kartṛvādaḥ* is based on Śākyabuddhi's, who understands *kasyacit* as **ātmāder nityasya* (PVṬ *Ñe* D70a5/P84b6), thus taking *kartṛ* as "agent" (see below, fn. 80–81, p. 19–20, PV 1.332a and PVSV 174,14–16) and supplying a °*tva*. Note, however, that Karṇakagomin interprets *kasyacit* as *naiyāyikādeḥ* (PVSVṬ 618,18), and *kartṛ* as "creator" (*īśvaras tattvādīnāṃ karteti*; PVSVṬ 618,18). According to the latter interpretation, *kasyacit kartṛvādaḥ* rather means "someone's claiming that there is a creator [God]."

[79] PV 1.340: *vedaprāmāṇyaṃ kasyacit kartṛvādaḥ snāne dharmecchā jātivādāvalepaḥ / santāpārambhaḥ pāpahānāya ceti dhvastaprajñāne pañca liṅgāni jāḍye //*. Translation Eltschinger/Krasser/Taber 2012: 77–78. Having shown, throughout the

Dharmakīrti holds the claim that something permanent is an agent to be rooted in the Veda itself:

> [The Veda says that] a permanent soul is the agent [of action].[80]

This he explains as follows in his commentary:

> The Veda declares that a soul (*puṃs*) which neither loses its former nature nor assumes a new one [i.e., which is permanent,] is successively the agent of [good and bad] deeds and the experiencer of the fruits of [those] deeds: [it is supposedly the experiencer] due to being the inherence cause [of pleasant

PVSV, that the outsiders only talk nonsense (*ayuktābhidhāyitva*), Dharmakīrti concludes the work by pointing out, in a merely indicative way (*diṅmātram*), the five principal signs of their stupidity (*jāḍya*; compare PVṬ *Ñe* D70a2–3/P84b1–2 with PVSVṬ 618,12–13). That Dharmakīrti alludes to only five signs is a synecdoche (**upalakṣaṇa*), for the signs of the outsiders' stupidity are innumerable (**aprameya*; PVṬ *Ñe* D70b6/P85a8–b1, to be compared with PVSVṬ 619,7–8). For explanations regarding each of the five marks, see Eltschinger/Krasser/Taber 2012, fn. 170–174, pp. 77–78.

[80] PV 1.332a: *nityasya puṃsaḥ kartṛtvam.* As Hugo David kindly informs us, the idea that the Veda rather than the Upaniṣads proper teaches the existence of a permanent self is not specific to Dharmakīrti and recurs in Kumārila's writings. This is especially the case of ŚV *sambandhākṣepaparihāra* 102–104, where Kumārila criticises Sāṅkhya ideas on gnosis and liberation: *jñānaṃ mokṣanimittaṃ ca gamyate nendriyādinā / na ca sāṅkhyādivijñānān mokṣo vedena codyate // ātmā jñātavya ity etan mokṣārthaṃ na ca coditam / karmapravṛttihetutvam ātmajñānasya lakṣyate // vijñāte cāsya pārārthye yāpi nāma phalaśrutiḥ / sārthavādo bhaved eva na svargādeḥ phalāntaram //*. "That [discriminating] knowledge is the cause of liberation is not understood by means of the senses[, inference], etc.; nor is it prescribed by the Veda that liberation comes from [discriminating] knowledge [of the self as it is taught] by Sāṅkhya, etc. When it is said that the self is to be known, this is not prescribed for the purpose of liberation. It is indicated [rather] that knowledge of the self is the cause of carrying out [ritual] acts [such as *jyotiṣṭoma*, which bear fruit beyond the present life]. Given that it is for the sake of something else [i.e., the ritual acts], the declaration of its fruit is an *arthavāda*. There is no other fruit [of ritual acts] than heaven, etc." Translation Taber 2007: 178 (slightly modified). As Taber (2007: 160) comments, "only on the basis of an understanding that the self survives the body would one undertake actions whose consequences are to be enjoyed in another world." The passage referred to is likely to be adapted from BĀU 2.4.5. On Kumārila's doctrines of (supreme) self and liberation in the ŚV, the *Tantravārttika*, the *Ṭupṭīkā* and the *Bṛhaṭṭīkā*, see Mesquita 1994, Taber 2007 and Yoshimizu (Kiyotaka) 2007.

> and unpleasant sensations,] and [the agent] due to assuming the control [of bodily actions], etc. And this has repeatedly been shown to be incorrect.[81]

Although it does not adduce any argument against the self, this passage deserves closer examination.

Here, Dharmakīrti is more likely to criticise Vaiśeṣika (and Naiyāyika) ideas than the Veda itself. Consider the Vaiśeṣika's classic statement regarding the inference of the self:

> The marks of the self are breathing up and down, closing and opening [the eyes], life, the movements of the mental organ, and the transformations of the other sense organs; pleasure and pain; desire and aversion; and effort.[82]

Now, Praśastapāda seems to divide these inferential marks into two categories: those that allow one to infer the self as a controlling agent (*adhiṣṭhātṛ*), and those that are the marks of a property-possessor (*guṇin*), i.e., an inherence cause.[83] Here are Praśastapāda's remarks as regards the first inference:

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[81] PVSV 174,14–16: *apracyutānutpannapūrvāpararūpaḥ pumān kartā krameṇa karmaṇāṃ karmaphalānāṃ ca bhoktā samavāyikāraṇādhiṣṭhānabhāvādinety āha vedaḥ / tac cāyuktam ity āveditaprāyam /*. For Karṇakagomin's (PVSVṬ 611,7–12) and Śākyabuddhi's (PVṬ *Ñe* D64b3–6/P77b1–5) diverging commentaries on this passage, see Eltschinger/Krasser/Taber 2012, fn. 135, pp. 65–68.

[82] VSū 3.2.4: *prāṇāpānanimeṣonmeṣajīvanamanogatīndriyāntaravikārāḥ sukhaduḥkhaicchādveṣau prayatnaś cety ātmaliṅgāni /*. On this *sūtra* see, e.g., Preisendanz 1994: 263–274 and Oetke 1988: 319–322 and 334–340.

[83] The concept of inherence cause (*samavāyikāraṇa*) is at home in Vaiśeṣika, as is the description of the self as a *samavāyikāraṇa*. On *samavāyikāraṇa* in general, see VSū 1.1.14 and DPŚ 91 (Miyamoto 2007: 26); on *samavāya* and *samavāyikāraṇa* in connection with the self, see VSū 10.1 and especially DPŚ 10 (Miyamoto 2007: 10): **ka ātmā / yo buddhisukhaduḥkhecchādveṣaprayatnasaṃskāradharmādharmāṇāṃ samavāyikāraṇaṃ jñānotpādanalakṣaṇaṃ sa evātmā /*. "What is the self? The self is that which is the inherence cause of cognition, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, effort, residual traces, merit and demerit, [and that which is] characterized as producing cognition." Read in the light of Devendrabuddhi's, Śākyabuddhi's and Manorathanandin's commentaries, PV 2.63–72 presents interesting materials in connection with the critique of the Vaiśeṣika conception of the self and its function as a *samavāyikāraṇa* (on this passage and the identity of Dharmakīrti's opponent[s], see Franco's detailed discussion in Franco 1994 and 1997: 133–155). These stanzas occur right in the middle of Dharmakīrti's lengthy polemics against the Materialist's reduction of the mind (*citta*, *caitanya*) to a property (*dharma*) of the four material

elements (*[mahā]bhūta*). Here, the Materialist attempts to prove that the relationship which obtains between the elements and the mind is one of support and supported (*āśrayāśrayibhāva*, also *ādhāryādhārabhāva*): the material elements are the support while the mind (or: cognition) is the supported entity. Dharmakīrti opens this new part of his critique on the following six stanzas (PV 2.63–68, translated on the basis of Devendrabuddhi's and Śākyabuddhi's commentaries [PVP D31b4–33a6/P35b5–37b3, PVṬ *Ñe* D101b5–103a5/P124a8–126a4]): *anāśrayāt sadasator nāśrayaḥ sthitikāraṇam / sataś ced āśrayo nāsyāḥ sthātur avyatirekataḥ // vyatireke 'pi taddhetus tena bhāvasya kiṃ kṛtam / avināśaprasaṅgaḥ sa nāśahetor mato yadi // tulyaḥ prasaṅgas tatrāpi kiṃ punaḥ sthitihetunā / ā nāśakāgamāt sthānaṃ tataś ced vastudharmatā // nāśasya saty abādho 'sāv iti kiṃ sthitihetunā / yathā jalāder ādhāra iti cet tulyam atra ca // pratikṣaṇavināśe hi bhāvānāṃ bhāvasantateḥ / tathotpatteḥ sa hetutvād āśrayo 'yuktam anyathā // syād ādhāro jalādīnāṃ gamanapratibandhataḥ / agatīnāṃ kim ādhārair guṇasāmānyakarmaṇām //*. "For neither what exists nor what does not exist [can] have a support. Objection: No, [for] a support is the cause of the duration of an [already] existing [thing, and hence existing things do have a support. Answer: This agent of an entity's duration can]not [be] the support [of an already existing entity] because this [duration] is not distinct from the agent of duration. [And] even if [duration] were distinct [from the agent of duration, it would have to be] the cause of this [duration]. What does [then] this [agent of duration] cause to the entity [itself, so that it can be regarded as its support]? [Moreover,] it [would] follow that [the supported entity, i.e., the mind,] would not be destroyed [at any time. And] if one accepts that this [destruction] is due to a cause of destruction, the same [undesirable] consequence [will follow] in the case of this [cause of destruction] as well. What [then] can be the use of a cause of duration? [Objection: The entity] lasts thanks to this [agent of duration] until it meets with an agent of destruction. [Answer: But then,] destruction being the [very] nature of the entity, this [destruction will be] unobstructible. Therefore, what can be the use of a cause of duration? Objection: [There is a support,] just as [there is] a sustainer[, like a vessel,] of [really existing things] such as water. [Answer:] But [exactly] the same [as before is to be replied] in this case! For if [real] entities[, which have the property of arising in ever different locations,] perish at every [single] moment, [it is not because it causes water to continue to exist that] this [vessel] is a sustainer[, but] because it is the cause of [the fact that] the series of the entity arises like this [i.e., in the same place as its sustainer. Being a sustainer] cannot be otherwise. [Moreover, a vessel for instance] could [possibly] be the sustainer of [things] like water[, which have the property to flow], because it prevents [them] from moving, [but then,] what about the sustainers of qualities, universals and actions, which are [entirely] devoid of motion?" After this rather dry row of arguments against the *āśrayāśrayibhāva* as a model for the relationship between body and mind (but also against Vaiśeṣika models of the relations obtaining between the categories), Dharmakīrti concludes as follows (PV 2.69): *etena samavāyaś ca samavāyi ca kāraṇam / vyavasthitatvaṃ jātyāder nirastam anapāśrayāt //*. "With this [refutation of the *āśrayāśrayibhāva*], inherence, the inherence

cause and the fixity of [things] like classes are [*ipso facto*] discarded, because [as we have just shown,] there [can] be no support(/substratum)." In other words, Vaiśeṣika ontology relies on relations that do not stand criticism, for according to both Devendrabuddhi (PVP D33a6–7/P37b4) and Śākyabuddhi (PVṬ *Ñe* D103a5–6/P126a5), inherence amounts to nothing but an *āśrayāśrayibhāva* between things that are established inseparately, such as substances and qualities (*apṛthaksiddha*, *ayutasiddha*; PVṬ *Ñe* D103a5/P126a4–5, Vibh. 36, fn. 1; cf. PDhS 86,2–3: *ayutasiddhānām ādhāryādhārabhūtānāṃ yaḥ sambandha ihapratyayahetuḥ sa samavāyaḥ* /. "Inherence is the [necessary] condition for the cognition 'here' regarding things that are established inseparately [and] stand in a relationship of sustainer and sustained." Translation Franco 1997: 318). Now if the *āśrayāśrayibhāva* is dismissed, the Vaiśeṣika conception of the self as the *samavāyikāraṇa* of its qualities pleasure, pain and cognition is bound to crumble, and such is the purport of the commentators' explanations on PV 2.69. According to Devendrabuddhi (PVP D33a7/P37b4), Śākyabuddhi (PVṬ *Ñe* D103a6/P126a5–6) and Manorathanandin (PVV 36,6–7), Dharmakīrti's allusion to the inherence cause targets (pseudo-)entities such as the non-Buddhists' *ātman* in their relationship with pleasure, pain (**sukhaduḥkhādi*, PVṬ) and cognitions (*buddhyādi*, PVV). The gist of the critique appears in PV 2.65c: things (such as the Vaiśeṣika qualities of the self or the Materialist's mind) possessing a permanent support (the self or the material elements) will have no end. (For explanations of *jātyāder vyavasthitatvam*, see PVP D33a7/P37b4, PVṬ *Ñe* D103a7/P126a6–7 and PVV 36,7–8; according to PVP D33a7–b1/P37b5–6, "etc." refers to relationships such as the *dharmadharmin* relation, the mind's dependence on the material elements, etc.; interestingly enough, Śākyabuddhi finds his "Vaibhāṣika coreligionists" [*raṅ gi sde pa bye brag tu smra ba rnams*] guilty of the same kind of error). In PV 2.70–72, Dharmakīrti summarizes the previous discussion as follows (translated according to PVP D33b2–34a2/P37b7–38a8 and PVṬ *Ñe* D103b1–104a2/P126a8–b1–127a3): *parato bhāvanāśaś cet tasya kiṃ sthitihetunā / sa vinaśyed vināpy anyair aśaktāḥ sthitihetavaḥ // sthitimān sāśrayaḥ sarvaḥ sarvotpattā ca sāśrayaḥ / tasmāt sarvasya bhāvasya na vināśaḥ kadācana // svayaṃ vinaśvarātmā cet tasya kaḥ sthāpakaḥ paraḥ / svayaṃ na naśvarātmā cet tasya kaḥ sthāpakaḥ paraḥ* //. "[To sum up:] if an entity owed its destruction to [something] else[, then it would last as long as the cause of its destruction is not present; under such circumstances], what would be the use of an [extraneous] cause of its duration [that would serve no purpose]? And were this [entity] to perish [by itself,] without [the intervention of] other [entities, then it would perish in any case, and] the [alleged] causes of [its] duration [would] lack any efficacy. [Moreover,] all that which possesses a support possesses duration, and all that which arises possesses a support. Therefore, no entity [would] ever perish. If [an entity] is of a transient nature in itself[, then, since it does not depart from this nature, it will perish by itself; under such circumstances,] which other [entity could] cause it to continue to exist? [But] if [this entity] is not of a transient nature in itself[, then it will last by itself; under such circumstances,] which other [entity could] cause it to continue to exist?" According to Devendrabuddhi, Śākyabuddhi, Manorathanandin and Vibhūti-

candra (see the references below), PV 2.71 must be interpreted at least partly as a critique of Ātmavādin (especially Vaiśeṣika) conceptions, and this along the same line of argument as above: if cognition, pleasure and pain have the permanent self as their support (or *samavāyikāraṇa*), then they should never cease to exist (the objection of course applies to the Materialist who holds the four material elements to be permanent: if the mind is a property of the elements, then it should last forever [see PVP D33b7/P38a5–6 and Vibh. 37, fn. 2]). PVP D33b5–7/P38a3–5 makes explicit the complex structure of PV 2.71 as follows: *dṅos po 'ga' źig skye ba daṅ ldan pa gaṅ yin pa de ni kun rten bcas yin par 'dod pa des na / re źig bdag la brten pa'i bde ba la sogs pa* (D : P *pa'i*) *gaṅ dag yin pa'i rten rtag pa de dag ni rtag tu gnas par byed pa daṅ ma bral ba'i phyir 'jig pa med pa ñid yin no //*[a] *gaṅ dag gi* (D : P *gis*) *yaṅ mi rtag pa ñid rten yin na de'i yaṅ gźan daṅ de'i yaṅ gźan* (P : D *gźan ma*) *yin pa de ltar na / rdul phra rab rtag pa'i bar du*[b] *rten yin pa'i phyir rtag tu gnas pa ñid du 'gyur ro*[c] //. [[a] Cf. PVV 36,20–21: *tatra yo nāma kaścin nityāśrayo yathā sukhādir ātmāśritaḥ sarvaḥ sa nityaṃ sthitimān syāt sthāpakaḥ sadā sthiteḥ /.* [b] Cf. Vibh. 36, fn. 6: *yo nāmānityāśrayas tasyāpy anyo yāvan nityāḥ paramāṇava ity āha /.* [c] Cf. Vibh. 37, fn. 1: *iti nityam eva sthitiḥ.*] "It is accepted that all entities that have arising possess a support, [and] thus: to begin with (**tāvat*), those [entities] that possess a permanent support (**nityāśraya*) – [like] pleasure, etc. (**sukhādi*), which rely on the self (**ātmāśrita*?) – [will] not perish, because they are never without [something] that causes [them] to last (**sthāpaka*). As for those [entities that, like pots,[a]] possess an impermanent support (**anityāśraya*), this [impermanent] support also has another [entity] for its support, and the [latter] another, and so [on] up to the permanent atoms (**paramāṇu*); therefore, [they too] will always continue [to exist]." [a] According to PVṬ *Ñe* D103b6/P126b6–7 (*gaṅ dag gi źes bya ba ni gzugs la sogs pa'i'o //*). [b] Note PVṬ *Ñe* D103b6–104a1/P126b7–127a1 (to be compared with PVV 36,22–37,2, translated in Franco 1997: 320–321): *de'i yaṅ gźan daṅ de'i yaṅ gźan yin pa źes bya ba ni re źig bum pa'i yan lag can gyi tha ma'i gyo mo rten yin źiṅ de dag gi yaṅ raṅ ñid kyi rtsom pa yin la de dag gi yaṅ raṅ ñid rtsom pa po gźan yin pa de ltar na yan lag can rdul gñis kyi bar du'o // de'i yaṅ rdul phra rab rtag pa'i bar du rten yin no // de bas na re źig rdul gñis pa ni rtag tu gnas pa yin źiṅ / de'i stobs kyis des brtsams daṅ / bum pa la sogs pa'i yan lag can gyi* (P : D *gyis*) *mthar thug pa'i bar du'o //*. "'This [impermanent] support also has another [entity] for its support, and the [latter] another,' i.e.: to begin with (**tāvat*), the last gross part (Tib. *gyo mo* probably = Skt. *kapāla*, pot-half?) of the whole (**avayavin*) consisting in a pot is a support; this [support] too has [a support, i.e., the parts] which aggregate [so as to constitute] it (**svātmany ārambhakaḥ/svārambhakaḥ*?), and the latter, another [i.e., the parts that in turn] aggregate [so as to constitute] it, and so [on,] up to the atomic dyad (**dvyaṇuka*), and this [atomic dyad] in turn has the permanent atoms (**paramāṇu*) [for its] support. Therefore, first the atomic dyad lasts forever, and thanks to it, [the wholes] resulting from the aggregation of the [parts] (**tadārabdha*?), and [this] up to, finally, the whole [that consists in] a pot, etc. (**ghaṭadyavayavin*)." The translation of this passage is tentative.

> [The self] is inferred [as] the body's controlling agent endowed with effort from the undertaking [of action] and abstaining [from it], which inhere in the body [and] are suitable for obtaining what is useful and rejecting what is harmful, just as a charioteer [is inferred] from the action of the chariot. And [the self is also inferred thus] through breath, etc.[84]

As for his views regarding the second inference, they are as follows:

> And [the self] is inferred [as] a property-possessor from the properties that are pleasure, pain, desire, aversion and effort.[85]

Thus, whereas the first inference (→*adhiṣṭhātṛ*) seems to be concerned with the self as an agent inasmuch as it presides over bodily actions, the second one (→*guṇin*, i.e., *samavāyikāraṇa*[86]) seems to deal with the self as an experiencer inasmuch as it experiences pleasure and pain, but also – and this has eschatological consequences – merit and demerit (*dharmādharma*).[87] In other words, the self is an agent in that it controls bodily action, and an experiencer in that it is the inherence cause of pleasant and unpleasant sensations as well as merit and demerit.[88] And according to Karṇakagomin's commentary on PVSV 174,14–16, the doctrine alluded to by Dharmakīrti is summarized in Śāntarakṣita's TS as follows:

> However, others admit that the self is the substratum of desire, etc., while not consisting of consciousness by itself, that it is permanent and omnipresent, that it is the agent of acts [both] good and bad, and the experiencer of the fruit of these [acts, and finally] that it is conscious due to its association with consciousness, but not by nature. Its connection with cognition, effort, etc., is

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[84] PDhS 15,8–10: *śarīrasamavāyinībhyāṃ ca hitāhitaprāptiparihārayogyābhyāṃ pravṛttinivṛttibhyāṃ rathakarmaṇā sārathivat prayatnavān vigrahasyādhiṣṭhātānumīyate prāṇādibhiś ceti /*. See Oetke 1988: 279 (arguments no. 3 and 4).

[85] PDhS 16,3–4: *sukhaduḥkhecchādveṣaprayatnaiś ca guṇair guṇy anumīyate /*. See Oetke 1988: 280 (argument no. 9). To be compared with NSū 1.1.10: *icchādveṣaprayatnasukhaduḥkhajñānāny ātmano liṅgam /*. "The marks of the self are desire, aversion, effort, pleasure, pain [and] cognitions."

[86] See VSū 1.1.5 and VSū 1.1.14.

[87] See PDhS 16,7–8 and DPŚ 10, quoted above, fn. 83, p. 20.

[88] Interestingly enough, the author of the commentary on Āryadeva's ŚŚ seems to be already familiar with this twofold division of VSū 3.2.4. See above, fn. 74, p. 17.

called its agency; whereas the inherence of the awareness of pleasure, pain and so on [in the self] is [its] being an experiencer.[89]

In his short rebuttal of these conceptions (PVSV 174,16), Dharmakīrti declares that the agency of permanent entities has already been refuted several times.[90] This, however, raises an interesting question.

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[89] TS 171–173: *anye punar ihātmānam icchādīnāṃ samāśrayam / svato 'cidrūpam icchanti nityaṃ sarvagataṃ tathā // śubhāśubhānāṃ kartāraṃ karmaṇāṃ tatphalasya ca / bhoktāraṃ cetanāyogāc cetanaṃ na svarūpataḥ // jñānayatnādisambandhaḥ kartṛtvaṃ tasya bhaṇyate / sukhaduḥkhādisaṃvittisamavāyas tu bhoktṛtā //*. Here is Prajñākaramati's introduction to TS 171–172, which he also quotes ($BCAP_{Sh}$ 327,7–13/$BCAP_{LVP}$ 295,17–23): *tatra naiyāyikās tāvan nityaṃ[a] sarvagataṃ pratiprāṇibhinnam acetanaṃ[b] cetanāyogāt tu cetanaṃ sukhādiguṇādhāraṃ śubhāśubhakarmakartāraṃ tatphalopabhoktāraṃ paralokinaṃ cātmānam icchanti / naiyāyikavad vaiśeṣikā api / tad uktam /*. [[a] *nityaṃ* $BCAP_{LVP}$: *nitya°* $BCAP_{Sh}$. [b] *pratiprāṇibhinnam acetanaṃ* $BCAP_{LVP}$: *pratiprāṇibhinnacetanaṃ* $BCAP_{Sh}$.] "In this regard, first of all the Naiyāyikas admit that the self is permanent, omnipresent, distinct according to each living being, not conscious [by nature] and yet conscious because of [its] association with consciousness; [it is] the substratum of the properties that are pleasure, etc., the agent of actions [whether] good or bad, the experiencer of the fruit of these [actions], and it transmigrates to another world. As the Naiyāyikas, the Vaiśeṣikas too [admit this]; this has been said [in the following two stanzas]." As we can see, both Śāntarakṣita and Prajñākaramati hold these ideas to be common to Naiyāyikas and Vaiśeṣikas. On the self as *adhiṣṭhātṛ*, see also ŚV *ātmavāda* 76 (Oetke 1988: 434), SK 17b$_{2c}$, and the Sāṅkhya *pūrvapakṣa* quoted above, fn. 74, p. 17.

[90] All the non-Buddhist schools targetted by Dharmakīrti acknowledge the permanence (*nityatā*) of the self. For Mīmāṃsā, see ŚV *ātmavāda* 7ac$_1$ and 20–21 (Oetke 1988: 425); for Sāṅkhya, see SK 3d; for Vaiśeṣika, see DPŚ 95 (Miyamoto 2007: 27) and PDhS 3,15–17; for Nyāya, see NSū 3.1.18–26. Note that certain Buddhist Pudgalavādins (Haimavatas?) who were neither Vātsīputrīyas nor Sāṃmitīyas admitted the permanence of the *pudgala*. See, e.g., the following excerpt from the SNŚ (463c23–25): "In the opinion of these schools, the Buddha spoke of attaining the unshakeable happiness [in *parinirvāṇa*] and so the person is eternal. Since the person attains the unshakeable happiness and has no aggregates, the person dwells beyond the possibility of knowledge; therefore the person is eternal." Translation Priestley 1999: 41. Note that according to the Vātsīputrīyas and the Sāṃmitīyas, "the *pudgala* is neither eternal nor subject to annihilation, since it is neither the same as the aggregates nor different from them" (Priestley 1999: 41). That Dharmakīrti was alluding here to the two *vināśitvānumāna*s ("inference [of momentariness in the sense] of [causeless] annihilation") of his PVSV (98,4–100,24 and 141,17–150,5) is very unlikely (on the *vināśitvānumāna*, see Steinkellner 1968: 363–369 and Rospatt 1995: 178–195). Indeed, the *vināśitvānumāna* type of the proof of

Śākyabuddhi and Karṇakagomin explain that this idea has already been discarded by the *śāstrakāra* himself – Dharmakīrti – and by his coreligionists (*svayūthya*).[91] Now, *the* argument against the causal efficacy of permanent entities is the so-called inference of momentariness from the mere fact of existence (*sattvānumāna*), which Dharmakīrti introduces first in PVin 2, i.e., *after* the PVSV.[92] Does, then, Dharmakīrti refer to earlier remarks of his discarding the agency of permanent entities, to ideas elaborated by his coreligionists, or to both? Be it with regard to the Vaiśeṣika's universals (*sāmānya*) or to the Mīmāṃsā's notion of a Vedic sound (*śabda*), Dharmakīrti emphasizes time and again,

momentariness (*kṣaṇikatva, kṣaṇabhaṅgitva*), which was developed for purely intra-Buddhistic needs (see Sakai 2010: 23–24), only demonstrates that whatever is produced (*kṛtaka*) by causes and conditions (*hetupratyaya*) is not only impermanent (*anitya*), but also necessarily momentary (*kṣaṇika*). This proof is, however, incapable of proving that whatever *exists* (*sat*) – including that which is not empirically seen to be subject to annihilation (*vināśa*) – is momentary. And this is the task of the *sattvānumāna*. To wit: to exist amounts to be causally efficient (*arthakriyāsamartha*; see, e.g., PV 1.166ab and PV 3.3ab); now, momentary entities alone are causally efficient, for a non-momentary (*akṣaṇika*) entity (say, the self) is incapable of bringing about an effect either gradually (*krameṇa*) or at one time (*yaugapadyena*); therefore, non-momentary entities do not exist. On the *sattvānumāna*, see below, and fn. 92.

[91] See PVṬ *Ñe* D64b6/P77b6–7 and PVSVṬ 611,17.

[92] PVin 2 80,1–6: *na hi tasyākṣaṇikasyārthakriyā sambhavati / kramayaugapadyavirodhāt / akramaḥ / anapekṣasya kartuḥ svasattāmātreṇa kṣepāyogāt / prāg akartuḥ paścād api svabhāvāparāvṛtteḥ / apekṣāyāṃ coktam / nāpi yugapatkriyā / tatsvabhāvasya paścād apy akriyāyogāt / tad ayaṃ bhāvo nivṛttasarvasāmarthyaḥ sattālakṣaṇam atipatati* /. "For such a non-momentary [thing] cannot have any causal efficacy, since [its efficacy] is contradictory [whether it is regarded as occurring] gradually or simultaneously. [It can]not [be efficacious] gradually, because [if it is] an agent that does not depend [on cooperative causes but acts] due to its mere existence, [it] cannot remain [inefficacious; but if it is] not an agent previously, [it cannot become an agent] later either, since no change [can occur] in its nature; and [we] have [already] explained [that it is impossible as well] if [it] depends on [other cooperative causes]. Nor is it efficacious simultaneously, since the nature of this [once efficacious entity] cannot be[come] inefficacious later. Therefore this [pseudo-]entity that is devoid of any efficacy does not fit with the definition of existence." Translation (modified) Yoshimizu 1999: 234–235. See also HB II.145, n. 107, Steinkellner 1968: 373, Oetke 1993: 27, Rospatt 1995: 162, fn. 362. On the development of the *vināśitvānumāna* into the *sattvānumāna*, see Steinkellner 1968 and Sakai 2010: 22–43; on the structure of Dharmakīrti's *sattvānumāna*, see Oetke 1993. See also above, fn. 90, p. 25, in fine.

in the PV, that permanent entities like these cannot produce anything without undergoing *change*, i.e., without *ipso facto* losing their permanence.[93] This is likely to be at least one among Dharmakīrti's intentions in PVSV 174,16. However, as pointed out first by Nagatomi and demonstrated by Yoshimizu,[94] the basic structure of Dharmakīrti's *sattvānumāna* is already to be found in early Sarvāstivāda, Sautrāntika and Yogācāra texts, especially in the context of the refutation of a permanent God's creation. But in the same important contribution, Yoshimizu has also drawn attention to an interesting passage of Vasubandhu's KSP, where a proof strategy that clearly foreshadows Dharmakīrti's *sattvānumāna* is used *in order to refute a permanent self*.[95] This passage, which Dharmakīrti may well have had in mind, runs as follows:

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[93] On the negation of the permanent Vedic words' efficiency in PV 1 and PVSV, see PVSV 117,15–16, PV 1.252cd (together with PVSV 131,16–21), PVSV 136,13–16; on that of the permanent universal, see PVSV 73,7–11; more generally, see Eltschinger 2007: 189–196. On Dharmakīrti's refutation of the permanent Vedic words' causal efficiency in PVin 2 67,6–9, see Steinkellner 1979: 67–68 and Yoshimizu 1999: 234–235, fn. 11. A somewhat similar argument can be found in the MPPU (149a12–14): "Si l'Ātman était éternel, il ne pourrait éprouver ni douleur (*duḥkha*) ni bonheur (*sukha*). Pourquoi? Quand la douleur survient, on s'attriste, et, quand le bonheur arrive, on se réjouit. Mais ce qui est modifié (*vikṛta*) par la tristesse et la joie n'est pas éternel." Translation *Traité* II.742.

[94] See Nagatomi 1967: 64–69 and Yoshimizu 1999: 231–243. On early Yogācāra (YBhū, ŚrBhū) refutations of a permanent God, see Chemparathy 1968 and Yoshimizu 1999: 242–243, fn. 23.

[95] Note that the issue of the causality of permanent entities had already been touched upon in the MSA(Bh)'s critique of the *pudgala*. Suffice it to quote here MSA 18.99–100: *akartṛtvād anityatvāt sakṛnnityapravṛttitaḥ / darśanādiṣu yatnasya svayambhūtvaṃ na yujyate / tathāsthitasya naṣṭasya prāgabhāvād anityataḥ / tṛtīyapakṣābhāvāc ca pratyayatvaṃ na yujyate //*. "Because the [*pudgala*] would no [longer] be an agent, because [its exertion] is impermanent, [and] because [exertion] would occur [all] at once [and] permanently, [this *pudgala*'s] effort in order to see [visible things], etc., cannot be self-arisen. Neither a [*pudgala*] that [always] remains as it is nor a perishable [*pudgala*] can be the [causal] condition [of the exertion aimed at producing seeing, etc., and this for three reasons:] because [this exertion] does not exist before[, hence cannot be due to a permanent cause]; because [this *pudgala*] would [*ipso facto*] be impermanent; and because there is no third hypothesis [i.e., the hypothesis of a *pudgala* that would be neither permanent nor impermanent]." On these stanzas and Vasubandhu's commentary, see Eltschinger 2010a: 320–322. See also below, Chapter 1, §1.2.3, and fn. 201, p. 110.

> If certain consciousnesses (*rnam par śes pa*, **vijñāna* [i.e., the six kinds of consciousnesses]) depend on the [self], how do you think the self is their basis? If you say that the arising [of these consciousnesses depends on the self], why [would they] arise gradually (*rim gyis*, **krameṇa*), since no differentiation occurs in the self? If you say that [they arise gradually] since [the self] depends on other cooperative causes (*lhan cig byed pa'i rgyu*, **sahakārihetu*), how do you understand that [the self, which is] other than these [cooperative causes], has the ability to make these [consciousnesses arise]? [Rather, the cooperative causes must have this ability.] If, then, you say that the lasting existence (*'dug pa*, **sthiti*) [of these consciousnesses] depends on the [self], what [sort of] lasting existence is possible with regard to these [consciousnesses] that cannot remain after having arisen and [yet] do not fall [i.e., are not unstable] (*ltuṅ ba ma yin pa*)?[96]

As we can see, this is exactly the kind of critique that, anticipating the universalisation of the argument in PVin 2, Dharmakīrti might have referred to in PVSV 174,16. Besides, Dharmakīrti himself alludes several times to the causality of permanent entities in the context of an argument against a permanent self:[97]

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[96] KSP D143b3–5/P166b4–6, as quoted in Yoshimizu 1999: 236–237, fn. 18: *rnam par śes pa rnams ci źig de la rag lus na / gaṅ gis na bdag de'i rten du rtog / gal te skye ba yin no źe na / bdag la ni khyad par du 'gyur ba med na / ci'i phyir rim gyis 'byuṅ / gal te lhan cig byed pa'i rgyu gźan la ltos pa'i phyir ro źe na / de dag las gźan pa la de skyed pa'i nus pa yod par ji ltar khoṅ du chud / 'on te 'dug pa źig de la rag las pa yin no źe na / skyes nas mi gnas pa dag daṅ / ltuṅ ba ma yin pa dag la 'dug pa ci źig yod / de bas na rten de 'dra ba'i rdzas ni mi 'dod do //*. Translation (modified) Yoshimizu 1999: 236. As Yoshimizu (1999: 235–236) makes clear, the KSP accepts the existence of a seventh *vijñāna*, the *ālayavijñāna* which it defines as the receptacle of the seeds of all *dharma*s (*chos thams cad kyi sa bon gyi gźi*; see Schmithausen 1987: II.275, fn. 138). Vasubandhu's argument is directed against an Ātmavādin opponent claiming that the self (**ātman*) is the basis of the six consciousnesses, not the *ālayavijñāna* (KSP D143a7/P166a7–8: *'o na ci'i phyir bdag gi rdzas ñid rnam par śes pa drug gi rten du mi 'dod ce na /*. "Why, then, don't you accept the very substantial [existence] of the self [*bdag*, **ātman*] as the basis of the six consciousnesses?" Translation Yoshimizu 1999: 236). For an analysis of this passage, see Yoshimizu 1999: 235–243. For Sumatiśīla's commentary on this passage, see Yoshimizu 1999: 239–241, fn. 22.

[97] As PVP D86a6/P99a6 testifies: *gźan yaṅ bdag ñid kyi 'chiṅ ba daṅ thar pa ni yod pa ma yin no //*. "Moreover, a [permanent] self has neither bondage nor liberation."

> [There can be neither bondage nor liberation for something permanent.] Being the cause of the arising of suffering is [what we call] "bondage": [since what is permanent is devoid of the capacity to bring about anything,[98]] how [could this belong] to [something] permanent? [And] being the cause of the non-arising of suffering is [what we call] "liberation": how [could this belong] to [something] permanent?[99]

And as we shall see, the causality of supposedly permanent entities forms the background of two among the arguments that will be dealt with in detail below: first, Dharmakīrti's symmetric claim that the *pudgala* can be the agent neither of bondage nor of liberation;[100] second, his claim that the very permanence of the self contradicts its being an agent of psychophysical actions and an experiencer of their results.[101]

0.2.3. In the inference, "Whatever exists (*sat*, i.e., is causally efficacious) is momentary (*kṣaṇika*)," demonstrating that a non-momentary entity such as the self cannot produce an effect either gradually or at one time (i.e., lacks causal efficacy) served to negate the possibility that a non-momentary entity may exist. In technical terms, this demonstration is a (means of) valid cognition negating/excluding (the presence of the logical reason) in the contrary (of the property to be proved) (*[sādhya]viparyaye bādhakapramāṇam*, VN 2,1 and 6). In other words, none of the dissimilar instances can be considered to exist, and this is the function of Dharmakīrti's *sattvānumāna*.[102] Consider, now, the following inference: "Whatever is produced (*kṛtaka*) is selfless (*nirātmaka*)."[103] How to establish that nothing of what can be assumed as a

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98 According to PVP D86a7/P99a7 (*'ga' źig la yaṅ nus pa med pa'i phyir*).

99 PV 2.202: *duḥkhotpādanahetutvaṃ bandho nityasya tat kutaḥ / aduḥkhotpādahetutvaṃ mokṣo nityasya tat kutaḥ //*. Note PVP D86b2–3/P99b2–3: *de dag ni raṅ gi sde pa bstan bcos mdzad pa gźan gyis maṅ du bśad zin pa'i phyir ma spros so //*. "Since the [impossibility, for permanent entities, to bring about their effect] has [already] been dealt with extensively by other coreligionists (**svayūthya*) who have authored treatises (**śāstrakāra*) [on that topic?], we won't expatiate [upon it here]."

100 See below, Chapter 1, §1.2.3. This argument follows immediately upon PV 2.202 (see above, fn. 99).

101 See below, Chapter 2, §2.4.

102 See above, §0.2.2.

103 See PVṬ *Ñe* D17a7–b1/P19a6–7: *gaṅ byas pa de ni bdag med pa ñid yin no źes bya ba la sogs pa'i sbyor ba la byas pa ñid la sogs pa'i gtan tshigs kyis bdag med pa ñid*

dissimilar instance (i.e., entities provided with a self, *sātmaka*) exists? This is what Dharmakīrti seems to be up to in a rather intricate passage of his PVSV on PV 1.291. To put it briefly, Dharmakīrti attempts to show that the Ātmavādins' self does not meet the conditions required of a self, i.e., owing its existence to itself alone (*svato bhāvaḥ*, as the Mādhyamika would say), and not to something else (*parato bhāvaḥ*). In other words, the non-Buddhists' self lacks independence or autonomy (*svātantrya*).[104] And why so? Because its control over both action (*kriyā*) and experience (*bhoga*), i.e., its being an agent and an experiencer, ruins its autonomy by making it dependent (*paravaśa*) on a series of causes that enable it to act and experience (e.g., as regards action: desire, which in turn depends on an object previously experienced as pleasurable, etc.; and as regards experience, the object experienced, as well as the internal organ that grasps it, etc.). In other words, the self is *produced* anew by every successive phase of its action and experience. Thus as it is defined by the Ātmavādins, the self turns out to be simply… selfless (*nirātman*). And if even the self is selfless in that it is produced, it can be safely concluded that the logical reason "being produced" is pervaded by the property "selflessness." Here is the passage under consideration:

> [But it is] not so [in the case of] selflessness, etc., [i.e., selflessness, etc., are not a mere absence,][105] because [they] are a specific nature [of real things].

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rtogs pa [...] //. "In the argument (**prayoga*): 'What[ever] is produced is selfless' (**yat kṛtakaṃ tan nirātmakam eva*?), one cognizes selflessness (**nairātmya*) through a [logical] reason (**hetu*) such as 'being produced' (**kṛtakatva*)."

[104] On the self's lack of autonomy, see *Traité* II.743, where *svātantrya* is meant in a moral rather than ontological sense. The locus classicus regarding the self's lacking autonomy and hence not being a genuine self is SN III.66–68 (*Anattalakkhaṇa Sutta*, traditionally held to be the Buddha's second discourse); see also MN I.230–231 (*Cūḷasaccaka Sutta*). On these passages, see Collins 1982: 97. Note PVSVṬ 274,9–10: *ātmaśabdo 'pi kvacid arthe svatantrasya khyāpanāya kṛtaḥ.* "As for the word 'self' (*ātmaśabdo 'pi*), it is coined in order to express [something] autonomous with regard to a certain effect." Note also PVSVṬ 274,13–14: *tathā hi svatantreṇātmādinā yo 'dhiṣṭhitaḥ sa sasvāmikaḥ parair iṣyate* /. "For [our Ātmavādin] opponents admit that what is controlled by an autonomous self, etc., possesses a ruler/owner."

[105] I.e., are not **viraha*mātralakṣaṇāḥ (PVṬ *Ñe* D17a1/P18b6), or *viraharūpāḥ* (PVSVṬ 548,17–18).

> Indeed, the self[106] [that you acknowledge is] not independent in the control over [good and bad] deeds and the experience [of their pleasant and unpleasant results,[107] and hence] is selfless (*nirātman*), for [being a genuine] self is characterized by independence with regard to the [appropriation of deeds and experience]. Therefore selflessness, [which is] a [real] nature, is not the mere absence of a self [that is nothing, like a hare's horn]. Otherwise, [i.e., if selflessness were the mere absence of a self, it would be totally indeterminate.[108] Now,] since [a logical reason] such as "being produced [by causes and conditions]"[109] could not [apply] to [something] indeterminate, there would be no proof of selflessness through it. [But there is one, and this is the reason why the Buddhist does not accept selflessness to be the mere absence of a self[110].][111]

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106 Here, Dharmakīrti is playing on the two meanings of *ātman* as "self" and "(intrinsic) nature" (see PVṬ *Ñe* D17a2–3/P18b7–8 = PVSVṬ 548,20: *ātmā svabhāvaḥ*, and [ad *nirātmā*] PVṬ *Ñe* D17a3/P18b8 = PVSVṬ 548,20: *svabhāvaparyāyo 'trātmaśabdaḥ* /).

107 Śākyabuddhi and Karṇakagomin interpret *asvatantra* as *paravaśa* (PVṬ *Ñe* D17a2–3/P18b7–8 = PVSVṬ 548,20; on *vaśa* [Pali *vasa*], see MN I.231), with a locative case relationship to *kriyābhogādhiṣṭhāna* (*tatra*). *adhiṣṭhāna* is explained as *svīkāra* ("appropriation," PVṬ *Ñe* D17a2/P18b7 = PVSVṬ 548,19–20), with a genitive case relationship to *kriyābhoga* (*tayoḥ*). Karṇakagomin interprets *kriyā* as *śubhāśubhakaraṇam* (PVSVṬ 548,19). As for *bhoga*, it is explained as *sukhaduḥkhānubhava* (PVṬ *Ñe* D17a2/P18b7 = PVSVṬ 548,19; note, e.g., TK 144,1: *sukhaduḥkhānubhavo hi bhogaḥ*.).

108 According to PVṬ *Ñe* D17a6/P19a4–5 = PVSVṬ 548,25–26 (*anyathā yadi nivṛttimātraṃ nairātmyaṃ syāt tadā niḥsvabhāvatvān nirupākhyam eva tad bhavet* /). On the indeterminacy of the self, see also MPPU 148c28–149a3: "[L]a vraie nature (*bhūtasvabhāva*) de l'Ātman ne peut être établie avec précision (*niyama*); on ne peut pas établir s'il est éternel (*nitya*) ou transitoire (*anitya*), autonome (*svatantra*) ou non-autonome (*asvatantra*), actif (*kāraka*) ou inactif (*akāraka*), matériel (*rūpin*) ou immatériel (*arūpin*), et autres caractères (*nimitta*) de ce genre. Là où il y a caractère (*nimitta*), il y a réalité (*dharma*), mais, sans caractère, pas de réalité. Puisque l'Ātman n'a pas de caractère, nous savons qu'il n'existe pas." Translation *Traité* II.740.

109 Here, *ādi* ("such as") refers to logical reasons such as "following immediately upon effort" (*prayatnānantarīyakatvādi*, PVṬ *Ñe* D17a6–7/P19a5 = PVSVṬ 548,27–28). These logical reasons are properties of real things (*vastudharma*).

110 According to PVṬ *Ñe* D17a7–b1/P19a7 (*de bas na saṅs rgyas pa ni med pa tsam gyis bdag med pa la sogs pa bdag med par mi 'dod do* //) and PVSVṬ 549,6 (*iṣyate ca / tasmān na bauddhasyātmaviraha mātraṃ nairātmyam* /). For the first part of Śākyabuddhi's explanation, see above, fn. 103, p. 29.

The passage is also interesting because Dharmakīrti specifies what selflessness is *not*, i.e., the mere absence of a self. In other words, here he is addressing the reproach that in the Nairātmyavāda perspective, one has to realize what turns out to be a mere non-entity. He argues that on the contrary, from the Buddhist point of view, realizing selflessness means becoming aware of an essential feature of reality.[112] In order to explain why it is so, Dharmakīrti points out the Ātmavādin's fundamental mistake: his opponent believes in a self understood as a substance, i.e., as a permanent, unchanging and independent entity that he presents as the substratum of experience and karmic results.[113] Contrary to the Ātmavādin's self, the Buddhist selflessness is nothing like a mere non-entity such as a hare's horn (in which case nothing could be proved about it as it would remain perfectly indeterminate apart from its being non-existent): it is an essential component of reality.[114]

0.2.4. But let us turn back to Dharmakīrti's critique of the Veda. As we shall see below,[115] Dharmakīrti's main charge against the self is that it cannot be validly inferred, and that all the proofs put forward by the Veda as well as his Sāṅkhya, Vaiśeṣika, Naiyāyika and Pudgalavādin opponents can be shown to be fallacious. In other words, one cannot conclude to the existence of a self on the basis of an inference functioning by force of something real (*vastubalapravṛtta*) or, better, of an inference that does not depend on scripture (*anāgamāpekṣa*). Thus, these religio-philosophical systems cannot be elected as reliable bases for the rational human beings' religious practice. Dharmakīrti spells this out in a famous passage in which he presents the threefold method al-

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111 PVSV 154,12–16: *naivaṃ nairātmyādayaḥ / svabhāvaviśeṣāt / kriyābhogādhiṣṭhānāsvatantro hy ātmā nirātmā / tatsvātantryalakṣaṇatvād ātmanaḥ / tad rūpaṃ nairātmyaṃ nātmanivṛttimātram / anyathā nirupākhye kṛtakatvādyayogān na tato nairātmyasiddhiḥ syāt /*.

112 See above, fn. 33, p. 8, Eltschinger 2009a: 200–207, Eltschinger 2010b: 410–411 and Eltschinger 2010c: 50–55.

113 See above, §0.2.2.

114 See PVP D108b4–5/P126a2–3 ad PV 2.252 (quoted below, fn. 342, p. 274).

115 See below, Chapter 2, §2.2.

lowing one to hypothesize a treatise's reliability (*avisaṃvāda*) and hence scripturality (*āgamatā*):[116]

> A [treatise]'s reliability consists in the fact that neither perception nor the two kinds of inference invalidate the empirical and transempirical things [that are] their [respective] objects. [A treatise's] not being invalidated by perception consists [first] in the fact that the things it holds to be perceptible are indeed such [i.e., perceptible], as [the five *skandha*s, i.e., colours] such as blue, [affective sensations such as] pleasure and pain, [ideation consisting in one's] grasping the characteristics [of things, conditioning factors] such as desire, and cognitions[, which are perceived by sensory perception and self-awareness. Second, a treatise's not being invalidated by perception consists] in the fact that the [things] it does not hold to be such [i.e., perceptible,] are [indeed] imperceptible, as [pseudo-constituents] such as pleasure, which [the Sāṅkhya erroneously takes to] combine in the form of sounds, etc., and [categories] such as substances, motions, universals and connections[, which the Vaiśeṣika erroneously takes to be perceptible]. Similarly, [a treatise's not being invalidated by inference] consists [first] in the fact that the [things] it holds to be the objects of an inference that does not depend on scripture are really such [i.e., inferable], as the four nobles' truths, [and second] in the fact that the [things it holds to be] uninferable are really such [i.e., uninferable], as the self, [God,] etc. [And this type of invalidation is] also [relevant] concerning the inference that depends on scripture[, which consists in identifying internal contradictions within a treatise]: for example, once it is admitted that demerit has the nature of [defilements] such as desire and the [corporeal and verbal acts] that originate from them, one does not prescribe [things] such as ablutions and fire oblation in order to remove it [i.e., demerit, because they cannot annihilate its cause].[117]

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[116] On the threefold analysis (*parīkṣātraya*) and Dharmakīrti's strategies for scriptural evaluation, see Tillemans 1993: 9–15, Keira 2006, Eltschinger 2007: 92–114 and Krasser 2012.

[117] PV 1.215 and PVSV 108,20–109,3: *pratyakṣeṇānumānena dvividhenāpy abādhanam / dṛṣṭādṛṣṭārthayor asyāvisaṃvādas tadarthayoḥ // pratyakṣeṇābādhanaṃ pratyakṣābhimatānām arthānāṃ tathābhāvaḥ / yathā nīlādisukhaduḥkhanimittopalakṣaṇarāgādibuddhīnām / atathābhimatānāṃ cāpratyakṣatā / yathā śabdādirūpasanniveśināṃ sukhādīnāṃ dravyakarmasāmānyasaṃyogādīnāṃ ca / tathānāgamāpekṣānumānaviṣayābhimatānāṃ tathābhāvaḥ / yathā caturṇām āryasatyānām / ananumeyānāṃ tathābhāvaḥ / yathātmādīnām / āgamāpekṣānumāne 'pi yathā*

This passage is closely connected to the one in which Dharmakīrti blamed the Veda for claiming a permanent self to be the agent of psychophysical actions and the experiencer of their eschatological results.[118] For a treatise (e.g., the Veda) that wrongly claims uninferable entities like the self or God to be inferable must be discarded as unreliable. Once again, one should be wary of regarding this criticism as pertaining merely to issues of logic and epistemology, for as Dharmakīrti himself declares:

> The [ordinary] person [who wishes to engage in action] cannot live without resorting to scriptural authority[, and this for two reasons: first], because [this person] learns (*śravaṇa*) [from scripture what] great benefits or misfortunes[, such as heaven or hell, can be expected from his] engaging in or abstaining from certain [intentions such as violence], whose results [remain completely] imperceptible [to him]; and [second,] because [this person] does not see any contradiction to the existence of these [desirable and undesirable results].[119]

In other words, ordinary persons of limited cognitive capacity (*arvāgdarśin*) have no other possibility than to rely on scripture while engaging in action. But to opt for a scripture, they have to resort to reason(ing) (*yukti*) and test the available treatises as to whether those of their statements bearing on empirical – i.e., perceptible and inferable – things stand critical analysis. The critique of the self is thus concerned with the very possibility, for ordinary persons, of engaging in an eschatologically and soteriologically successful practice.

0.2.5. Most of the arguments against the self and the *pudgala* that will be dealt with in the present book fall under this heading, i.e., are aimed at showing that the proofs (*sādhana*) put forward by the Ātmavādins are fallacious. Two among these proofs are paradigmatic instances of logical fallacies and recur throughout Dharmakīrti's works. First, the

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rāgādirūpaṃ tatprabhavaṃ cādharmam abhyupagamya tatprahāṇāya snānāgnihotrāder anupadeśaḥ /. On this passage, see Yaita 1987: 7–8, Dunne 2004: 362–363, Eltschinger 2007: 105–109 and 221–223 (fn. 23–27), and Moriyama forthc.

118 See above, §0.2.2.

119 PVSV 108,2–5: *nāyaṃ puruṣo 'nāśrityāgamaprāmāṇyam āsituṃ samarthaḥ / atyakṣaphalānāṃ keṣāñcit pravṛttinivṛttyor mahānuśaṃsāpāyaśravaṇāt tadbhāve virodhādarśanāc ca /*.

so-called *(kevala)vyatirekin*, a Naiyāyika argument that can be formulated as follows: "This living body possesses a self, because it possesses breath, etc." Dharmakīrti's critique of this pseudo-proof appears in the PVSV, PVin 2, PVin 3 and NB 3.[120] Second, a Sāṅkhya argument to the effect that "[things] like the sense organs are for the benefit of another [(i.e., uncomposed) entity], because they are composite [entities]." Dharmakīrti's critique, which can be found in the PVSV, PV 4, PVin 3 and NB 3, is strongly indebted to Vasubandhu and Dignāga.[121] Third, the Vaiśeṣikas' and Naiyāyikas' repeated claims to the inferability of the self, which Dharmakīrti undermines in the PVSV by showing that, contrary to the sense organs, an imperceptible self can be inferred neither on the basis of a logical reason consisting in an essential property (*svabhāvahetu*) nor on the basis of a logical reason consisting in an effect (*kāryahetu*).[122] Fourth, the Buddhist Pudgalavādins' recourse to effect as a logical reason in order to establish their *pudgala*, an argument Dharmakīrti criticises in the PVSV in a way that improves on Vasubandhu's strategy in the AKBh.[123] Fifth, the Naiyāyikas' and the Vaiśeṣikas' recourse to memory (*smṛti*, *smaraṇa*) as providing an argument in favour of the self, which Dharmakīrti criticises, here again in the footsteps of Vasubandhu's AKBh and probably against Pakṣilasvāmin, in PV 2.[124]

0.2.6. However, Dharmakīrti's most significant contribution to the critique of the self is arguably his thirty-seven-verses long critique of (mainly) Nyāya soteriology, where he shows that the Ātmavādin must renounce all hope of achieving liberation through the cultivation of suffering (*duḥkhabhāvanā*) applied to what supposedly belongs to the self (e.g., cognition, sense organs, etc.) as long as he does not abandon the self. For as we have seen,[125] the idea of "one's own" (*ātmīya*) or "mine" (*mama[kāra]*) is the natural and necessary outcome of the false

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120 See below, Chapter 2, §2.1.

121 See below, Chapter 2, §2.3.

122 See below, Chapter 2, §2.2.

123 See below, Chapter 1, §§1.2.1–2.

124 See below, Chapter 2, §2.4.

125 See above, §0.1.

view of a self: how could one, then, show detachment (*vairāgya*)[126] toward what belongs to the self as long as one believes in (*graha*) and hence is attached to (*sneha*) the self?[127]

How is this "soteriological" argument to be connected in its overall meaning with those reviewed above? Dharmakīrti's critique of Nyāya soteriology occurs in PV 2.220–256. These stanzas belong to his examination (*parīkṣā*, *vicāra*) of the Buddha as a protector (*tāyin*) of the suffering sentient beings (PV 2.146–279): according to him, the Buddha has become (like) a means of valid cognition (*pramāṇabhūta*) because he teaches the four nobles' truths *or* the path toward salvation in a reliable manner.[128] More specifically, PV 2.220–256 occurs right in the middle of Dharmakīrti's examination of the truth of the path (*mārgasatya*, PV 2.205–279). In other words, the critical appraisal of concurrent religious paths serves as a reason for assessing their respective authority (*prāmāṇya*) in soteriologically relevant matters. In these stanzas, Dharmakīrti shows that someone who desires liberation (*mumukṣu*) cannot achieve salvation through the Buddhist-like but *ātman*-centered soteriology of the Nyāya. And this is enough to demonstrate that the Nyāya lacks authority since it fails to identify and teach what is expedient for one to secure final release. In this regard, PV 2.220–256 pursues the same ambition as the previous arguments: the critical evaluation of the sixth-century Indian philosophical systems as religious paths.

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126 See below, fn. 1, p. 187.

127 See below, Chapter 3.

128 On Dharmakīrti's interpretation of the epithet *pramāṇabhūta*, see Krasser 2001. On the structure(s) of PV 2, see Franco 1997: 15–43.

Chapter 1

Dharmakīrti against the *pudgala*

1.1. Two Buddhist Versions of the Self and the Person

1.1.1. Introduction

Be it through textbooks or introductory courses, most of us have once been taught that one of the hallmarks of Indian Buddhism was its way of addressing human existence and at times reality itself as empty and selfless. To be sure, there is still no such thing as a consensus concerning the historical Buddha's position on the self (provided he ever had one), and several scholars contend that the Buddhist denial of a self – a "metaphysical shipwreck" – only came about over time in the writings of self-appointed representatives of "orthodoxy" as a form of *trahison des clercs*.[1] Whatever the case may be, most scholarly introductions depict the monastic intellectual elites as predominantly committed to the doctrine of selflessness and as uncompromisingly defending it against a set of (pseudo-)Buddhist sectarian denominations labelled as "personalist" (*pudgalavādin*, so called because of their acceptance of an enduring and nearly substantial subject of experience, rebirth and liberation). What these introductions generally fail to emphasize, however, is that at least according to the statistics provided by the Chinese scholar and pilgrim Xuanzang (who travelled to and in India in 629–645), one of these denominations, the Sāṃmitīyas, represented about one third (70,000) of the total amount (220,000) of Buddhist monks and institu-

[1] See, e.g., Bhattacharya 1973 and Hulin 2008 ("metaphysical shipwreck" in Bhattacharya 1973: 75; for the sources of this expression [Barth, (C.A.F.) Rhys Davids], see Bhattacharya 1973: 75–76, fn. 8). For an overview and (more) balanced assessment of the canonical materials, see Collins 1982: 65–115 and Schmithausen 2000. For a short historiographical survey, see Collins 1982: 7–12.

tions in seventh-century northern India.[2] And if this, provided it is true, does certainly not prove that all Sāṃmitīya monastics assented to personalism, it at least suggests that they belonged to a sect whose Abhidharma(-like) scriptures made the existence of the "person" one of its most significant doctrinal features. This is not the all of it, however. To the testimony of Xuanzang, the Mahāyānists formed another third of the whole monastic community (the remaining third being constituted by [Mūla]sarvāstivādins, Sthaviras and Mahāsāṅghikas). Now, the least one can say is that many Mahāyānistic scriptures (*sūtra*s and *śāstra*s alike) testify to a certain partiality for substantialist accounts of human existence, reality, salvation and buddhahood. As pointed out by Seyfort Ruegg and Bhattacharya, this is the case of the MSA(Bh) and several *sūtra*s.[3] But the remark applies especially well to the movement(s) that, in scriptures such as the TGSū, the Mahāyānist MPSū, the ŚMDSNSū and the LASū, and in corpora such as the RGV(V), advocated the soteric presence of a *buddha* nature/element or embryo of a *tathāgata* within all sentient beings.[4] In other words, the Buddhist scholars and practitioners who showed reservations about the strongest versions of selflessness and/or subscribed to "substantializing" doctrines might well have been in much higher number than is generally recognized, something which, taken together with other alleged "heresies" (doctrines akin to *satkāryavāda*, *sphoṭa* and *apauruṣeyatā*, attitudes towards caste, ethics and permanence, etc., not to speak of Buddhist "tantric" symbols and practices), raises fairly interesting questions regarding issues of orthodoxy and heterodoxy – and the non-emic applicability of such concepts – within Indian Buddhism (and Buddhism as a whole).[5] Symmetrically, those in an intellectual position to

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[2] See below, §1.1.3.1.

[3] See Seyfort Ruegg 1969: 370–377 and Bhattacharya 1973: 3–7; see also below, fn. 44, p. 57.

[4] The issue of the self in the *tathāgatagarbha* traditions of India, Tibet, China, Japan and Thailand is dealt with extensively in Williams 2009: 103–128.

[5] Or, to put it with Williams (2009: 124), "[o]ne issue is how legislative the teachings of not-Self and dependent origination, or the Mādhyamika idea of emptiness, are for Buddhist identity" (note also Williams 2009: 125 on "the legislative claim of the centrality of the not-Self doctrine for Buddhist identity"). As we shall see, this was already at stake in *sūtra*s connected with the *tathāgatagarbha* such as the ŚMDSNSū (see King 1995) and the LASū (see below, §1.1.2.1), and proved to be es-

defend what they (and, more often than not, we and their non-Buddhist challengers) held to be the Buddhist doctrinal orthodoxy regarding the self (Ābhidharmikas such as Vasubandhu, and the Buddhist epistemologists along their line), might have been but a minority (albeit an influential one) within Buddhist institutions.

1.1.2. The "Immanence of the Absolute,"[6] or the tathāgatagarbha as the True Self of Living Beings

1.1.2.1. There can be no point in attempting to outline here the historical development and doctrinal standpoint(s) of the tradition(s) commonly referred to as the *tathāgatagarbha* or *buddha*-nature strand of Indian Mahāyāna Buddhism.[7] The term *tathāgatagarbha* itself – maybe first a *bahuvrīhi* compound soon to be used as a *tatpuruṣa* referring to a separate entity – points to the idea, developed first in different sets of similes,[8] of an "inherent buddhahood" (Zimmermann 2002: 13), i.e., that all sentient beings possess, own or contain a *tathāgata*, have a

pecially relevant in the "mainstream" scholiasts' polemics against Buddhist personalism (see below, §1.1.3.1 and fn. 57, p. 65). But this is not without contemporary counterparts, as can be seen in the Japanese debates over the "Critical Buddhism" movement (see the discussions in King 1995: 15–17, Zimmermann 2002: 82–84 and Williams 2009: 122–125) or the Thai polemics around the Dhammakaya movement (see Williams 2009: 125–128).

[6] Seyfort Ruegg 1989: 44 and 46, Zimmermann 2002: 64.

[7] On the *tathāgatagarbha*, see Seyfort Ruegg 1969: 245–408, Liu 1982, Brown 1991, Zimmermann 2002: 11–92 and Williams 2009: 103–128 (= Chapter 5). As most authors emphasize, the Indian *buddha*-nature movement(s) never developed into (a) philosophical school(s) or "along scholastic lines" (King 1995: 1) in the way early Yogācāra or Madhyamaka did, and can even be shown to have been reluctant to Abhidharma-like argumentation. This might provide *one* reason why its/their dogmatically problematic assertions regarding permanence and the self, contrary to the Pudgalavādins', were apparently never made the target of sustained criticism on the part of "mainstream" Buddhist scholiasts.

[8] Concerning the similes as they can be found in the TGSū (and, though in a reorganized form, in the RGV[V]), note the following remark by Zimmermann (2002: 35): "Generally speaking, it is the notion that a precious element, pure in nature, but hidden and unsuspected, truly exists, and while it is covered with impurities, its nature remains unaffected." On the similes in the Mahāyānist MPSū, see Yamamoto 1973: 181–186 and Liu 1982: 77–82; in the RGV(V), see Seyfort Ruegg 1969: 253–257; see also Brown 1991: 125–134.

fully awakened *buddha* as their essence.[9] Or, according to other, possibly slightly later interpretations, all living beings are believed to possess an "embryo," a "germ" (*bīja*) or even the "[causal] element"[10] (*dhātu*) of a *tathāgata*. In both cases, this (embryo/germ of a) *tathāgata*, though basically unchangeable, is enwrapped, covered and polluted by the filth of purely adventitious, accidental (*āgantuka*) impurities (*mala*) and defilements (*kleśa*). Provided a full-fledged *tathāgata* is already present in the living beings, the path toward salvation amounts to the gradual manifestation or revelation of this inner nature through a process of purification of the impurities,[11] so that "becoming a *buddha* does not involve an essential transformation or generative causal act by which a gap between the state of being hindered by mental de-

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[9] For an analysis of the compound in the TGSū, see Zimmermann 2002: 41–46. The core teaching of this *sūtra* appears in the following passage (quoted in RGVV 73,11–12): *eṣā kulaputra dharmāṇāṃ dharmatā / utpādād vā tathāgatānām anutpādād vā sadaivaite sattvās tathāgatagarbhā iti /*. "Son of good family, the True Nature (*dharmatā*) of the *dharma*s is this: whether or not *tathāgata*s appear in the world, all these sentient beings contain at all times a *tathāgata*." Translation Zimmermann 2002: 40; for a similar statement in the MPSū (524a28–b1), see Liu 1982: 66. As pointed out by Zimmermann (2002: 40) in the context of the TGSū, a *tatpuruṣa* analysis of *this* passage would require the translation of *tathāgatagarbhāḥ* as "store(s) of a *tathāgata*" (but by no means "embryo[s] of a *tathāgata*"). Note, however, the following remark by Zimmermann (2002: 45): "As attested by the prevailing use of the word *tathāgatagarbha* in other writings, and in the *Ratnagotravibhāgavyākhyā* itself, as a *tatpuruṣa* compound (the "embryo of a *tathāgata*" as a separate entity), a tendency towards a grammatically non-adjectival use of the term was inherent from earliest times. The title of the *sūtra* further stimulated such an independent understanding, and with the appearance of the concept of *buddhadhātu* in the Mahāyānist *Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra* as more or less a synonym for *tathāgatagarbha*, the temptation to interpret this latter as a *tatpuruṣa* probably proved irresistible."

[10] Note RGVV 72,10: *tat(= tathāgatatva)prāptaye hetus tathāgatadhātur iti / hetvartho 'tra dhātvarthaḥ /*. "The cause of one's obtaining this [state of a *tathāgata*] is the *tathāgata*-element. Here the meaning of 'element' is that of 'cause.'"

[11] On this "theory of revelation/manifestation," see Zimmermann 2002: 13–14, 64, 81 ("theory of manifestation of buddhahood over one of pure causation"), and below, fn. 13, p. 41. Note also Zimmermann 2002: 67: "[T]he Pāśupata doctrine of *abhivyakti*, which latter concept, namely liberation as the manifestation of the innate Śiva's perfections through the removal of impurities (*mala*), is strikingly similar."

filements and that of perfect awakening is bridged."[12] In case the *tathāgatagarbha* is conceived as residing in sentient beings in an embryonic form, the salvational process will consist in the gradual maturation/ripening, or even causation, of the germinal *tathāgata*.[13] Whatever the case may be, *all* living beings have the *potential* to, and actually *will* become perfectly awakened *buddha*s, a conception that is likely to derive from, and to provide justification for, the *ekayāna* doctrine put forward in the SDPSū.[14] Now, what is of utmost interest to us

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[12] Zimmermann 2002: 62.

[13] In either of their two main forms, the *tathāgatagarbha* teachings bear overtones of a doctrine similar to the Sāṅkhyas' *satkāryavāda* (the doctrine according to which the effect pre-exists in its cause, i.e., according to which nothing can be produced that does not already exist before). One of the nine similes of the TGSū (Zimmermann 2002: 63) "affirms the imperishability of the seed, and the fact that the result (*kārya*), namely the tree, is already contained in the seed. It emphasizes that seed and tree are of the same nature [...] The assertion by the authors of the *TGS[ū]* that the seed already bears the tree within itself certainly accords well with their 'theory of revelation' [...] What is decisive for them is the essential oneness of seed and tree. Nothing new has to be added; the complete tree is already found in the seed." See also Zimmermann 2002: 80 and Liu 1982: 70–77 and 83–86. For other examples of Buddhist *satkāryavāda*, see Seyfort Ruegg 1989: 138–141; for an early Buddhist reference to Vārṣagaṇya as a representative of *satkāryavāda*, see Seyfort Ruegg 1963; for early Buddhist critiques of *satkāryavāda* (as entailing eternalism), see Schoening 1995: I.285–287. The Mahāyāna MPSū also contains an interesting passage on (and against) *satkāryavāda* and similar ideas; see Yamamoto 1973: 193–195.

[14] According to the *ekayāna* teaching, there is only one vehicle, i.e., the Mahāyāna, the vehicle to buddhahood (and no distinct *śrāvaka* or *pratyekabuddha* paths). See Seyfort Ruegg 1969: 175–243 and SDPSū 40,13–15: *ekam evāhaṃ śāriputra yānam ārabhya sattvānāṃ dharmaṃ deśayāmi yad idaṃ buddhayānam / na kiñcic chāriputra dvitīyaṃ vā tṛtīyaṃ vā yānaṃ saṃvidyate* //. "With reference to only one vehicle, Śāriputra, I teach the *dharma* for living beings, namely, the vehicle of the *buddha*s. Śāriputra, there is not any second or third vehicle." Translation Zimmermann 1998: 157. According to Zimmermann (2002: 77), "the *TGS[ū]* can be understood as a text that subsequently provided a theory for the great assertion put forward in its popular predecessor, the *Saddharmapuṇḍarīkasūtra*, namely that all living beings will attain buddhahood. Thus while the *Saddharmapuṇḍarīkasūtra*, in a religious environment where it was probably not always heartily welcomed, announced that all living beings would eventually attain buddhahood, the *TGS[ū]*, in a successive step, adopted as its task that of working out a justification for this assertion." Note also Zimmermann 2002: 80: "The story of the *bodhisattva* Sadāparibhūta [in SDPSū 19, VE/IR] shows that the time for such an assertion may not

is the fact that this hidden (embryo of a) *tathāgata*[15] has been repeatedly described not only as permanent (*nitya*), enduring/stable (*dhruva*), peaceful (*śiva*) and eternal (*śāśvata*),[16] but also as the sentient be-

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have been ripe yet – a conclusion supported by descriptions in the *Saddharmapuṇḍarīkasūtra* of other harsh reactions towards its own propagators from the side of non-Mahāyāna followers. The *TGS[ū]*, in this point, was apparently not held back by any related consideration, zealously promulgating as it did the message of a universal buddhahood present in all living beings." On the relation between these two *sūtra*s, see also Zimmermann 2002: 15, 76, 91; see also Zimmermann 1998: 155–165 (and 1998: 159–161 concerning the story of Sadāparibhūta).

[15] See the excerpt of the ŚMDSNSū quoted in RGVV 45,20–46,4. These epithets can also qualify, e.g., the immaculate buddhahood (*amalaṃ buddhatvam*, RGV 2.29) and the (Tathāgata's) *dharma*-body (*dharmakāya*, RGVV 54,12–15).

[16] Analogous descriptions occur already in the Mahāyānist MPSū (513a3–4: "How do *bodhisattva*s know the *buddha*-nature? The *buddha*-nature has six aspects. What are these six? [They are:] first, to be eternal, second, to be pure, third, to be real, fourth, to be virtuous, fifth, to be discerned in the future [by everyone], and sixth, to be true." Translation Liu 1982: 67; on the undestructibility of the *buddhadhātu*, see also Yamamoto 1973: 185 and 186; on its eternity and immutability, see also Yamamoto 1973: 192; on its unproductedness, see also Yamamoto 1973: 195) and the ŚMDSNSū (281a4–6, quoted in RGVV 46,2–4): *na punar bhagavaṃs tathāgatagarbho jāyate vā jīryati vā mriyate vā cyavate votpadyate vā / tat kasmād dhetoḥ / saṃskṛtalakṣaṇaviṣayavyativṛtto bhagavaṃs tathāgatagarbho nityo dhruvaḥ śivaḥ śāśvataḥ /*. "But, Lord, the *tathāgatagarbha* is not born, does not get old, does not die, does not pass away to become reborn. What is the reason? The Tathāgata, Lord, is beyond the realm with the characteristic of the conditioned. The *tathāgatagarbha* is permanent, steadfast, peaceful, eternal." Translation (modified) Wayman/Wayman 1990: 104–105; see also Seyfort Ruegg 1969: 363. Note also RGV 1.80–82: *na jāyate na mriyate bādhyate no na jīryate / sa nityatvād dhruvatvāc ca śivatvāc chāśvatatvataḥ // na jāyate sa nityatvād ātmabhāvair manomayaiḥ / acintyapariṇāmena dhruvatvān mriyate na saḥ // vāsanāvyādhibhiḥ sūkṣmair bādhyate na śivatvataḥ / anāsravābhisaṃskāraiḥ śāśvatatvān na jīryate //*. "Le [*dhātu*] ne naît ni ne meurt, il n'est pas attaqué, et il ne dépérit pas grâce à sa permanence, sa stabilité, sa tranquillité, et son éternité. En raison de sa permanence il ne naît pas dans des existences mentales; en raison de sa stabilité il ne meurt pas par transformation inconcevable; en raison de sa tranquillité il n'est pas attaqué par les maladies subtiles que sont les Imprégnations; et en raison de son éternité il ne dépérit pas à cause des conformations sans impuretés." Translation Seyfort Ruegg 1969: 363. Note also RGV 2.29: *acintyaṃ nityaṃ ca dhruvam atha śivaṃ śāśvatam atha praśāntaṃ ca vyāpi vyapagatavikalpaṃ gaganavat / asaktaṃ sarvatrāpratighaparuṣasparśavigataṃ na dṛśyaṃ na grāhyaṃ śubham api ca buddhatvam amalam //*. "La bouddhaté immaculée est impensable, permanente, stable, tranquille, et éternelle; elle est apaisée, compénétrante et exempte de conceptualisation différen-

ings' innermost or supreme self (*[param]ātman*). In other words, as early as the TGSū (which, however, never makes use of *ātman* and related terms), the *tathāgatagarbha* teachings "must be attributed a position within a strand of Buddhism which does not conceal its favor for the concept of a positive continuous subject."[17] This is the case in the Mahāyānist MPSū, which, at least as far as its first part is concerned, is replete with statements to the effect that the *tathāgatagarbha* or the *buddhadhātu* is nothing but the true self.[18] This is also the case of the ŚMDSNSū and the RGV(V), where the notion of a perfection of self (*ātmapāramitā*) characterizing the *buddha*-nature plays a key doctrinal

ciatrice, à l'instar de l'espace vide; sans attachement et partout exempte du contact grossier en tant que sans résistance, elle n'est ni visible ni saisissable, et elle est bonne." Translation Seyfort Ruegg 1969: 362.

[17] Zimmermann 2002: 15. According to Zimmermann (2002: 81), "that the *TGS[ū]* is not an isolated case of a relatively early Mahāyāna work propagating a positive, enduring constituent in living beings is shown, for example, by the rewording of the verses of the *Gaganagañjasūtra* in the oldest stratum of the *Ratnagotravibhāga*. There it is the mind's innate nature (*cittaprakṛti*) which is compared to 'space,' being described as 'luminous,' 'without cause and condition,' and 'without origination and destruction.'" Note also Zimmermann 2002: 83: "[T]he *TGS[ū]* seems to continue a tradition in Indian Buddhism which was based on a positive use of the concept of 'person' and was not committed to a one-sided denial of a self. From early times on, it seems, this positive strand co-existed with the majority of schools which categorically rejected the existence of a self."

[18] On the doctrine(s) of the self in the Mahāyāna MPSū, see Liu 1982: 71 and 77–78, Fujii 1991, Fujii 1993 and Williams 2009: 108–109. Note the following excerpts from section 8.12: "The Buddha said: 'O good man! 'Self' means *tathāgatagarbha*. Every being has the *buddha*-nature. This is self. Such a self is, since the very beginning, under cover of innumerable illusions. This is why man cannot see it." Translation Yamamoto 1973: 181. "The nature of self is none but the undisclosed storehouse of the Tathāgata. Such a storehouse can never be broken, put to fire, or made away with." Translation Yamamoto 1973: 185. "The true self of the *buddha*-nature is like the diamond which cannot be crushed out." Translation Yamamoto 1973: 186. "The nature/ Of the three refuges is that of self. If one knows/ Clearly that the nature of self has the *buddha*-nature,/ Such a one well enters the undisclosed house./ One who knows of self and what belongs to self/ Comes already out of the world." Translation Yamamoto 1973: 187. "The nature of self and the *buddha*-nature/ Do not differ." Translation Yamamoto 1973: 189. "O good man! The true self about which the Tathāgata speaks today is the *buddha*-nature." Translation Yamamoto 1973: 200.

and exegetic role.[19] And such a teaching can also be found in at least one stanza from the *Sagāthaka* of the LASū:

> And the embryo(/essence) of a *tathāgata* is [only] to be cognized through [one's] personal cognition; it is the [true] self [and] is characterized by purity; it is beyond the domain of the reasoners.[20]

1.1.2.2.1. To the best of our knowledge, neither did the Buddhist scholiasts ever criticise this identification as the outcome of a substantialist heresy nor did the non-Buddhists unmask it as a Buddhist recognition of the self. As pointed out by Zimmermann (2002: 83, fn. 175), however, the LASū contains at least one important statement to the effect that the proponents of the *buddha*-nature were aware of the risk of being accused of siding with the allodoxes. Those advocating the *buddha*-nature consequently felt compelled to provide hermeneutic strategies in order to neutralize such (at least potential) reproaches.[21] Here is the famous passage presenting Mahāmati's question to the Buddha:

> Then the *bodhisattva*, the great being Mahāmati said the following to the Blessed One: "But in a *sūtra*-passage, the Blessed One has expounded the *tathāgatagarbha*. And [there] you have, so it is said (*kila*), presented this [*tathāgatagarbha*] as [being] pure of all eternity due to [its] naturally radiant purity; [there,] the Blessed One has presented [this *tathāgatagarbha*] as the bearer of the thirty two characteristics [of a great being], as contained in the body of all sentient beings, as enwrapped in the cover of the [five] constituents, [eighteen] elements and [twelve sensory] bases – just as a jewel of great price and value is enwrapped in a polluted cover –, as overpowered by desire,

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[19] See below, §1.1.2.3.

[20] LASū 10.746: *pratyātmagatigamyaś ca ātmā vai śuddhilakṣaṇaḥ / garbhas tathāgatasyāsau tārkikāṇām agocaraḥ //*. Needless to say, this stanza is liable to several interpretations. Note also LASū 10.760: *yathā hi garbho garbhiṇyāṃ[a] vidyate na ca dṛśyate / ātmā hi tadvat skandheṣv ayuktijño na paśyati //*. [a] *garbhiṇyāṃ* em. : *garbhiṇyā* Ed.] "For, just as an(/the) embryo exists in a pregnant woman but is not [directly] perceived, the self [exists] in the constituents, [although] he who does not know [the right ways of] reasoning (*ayuktijña*) does not see [it]." Note that according to the LASū, the *tathāgatagarbha* is to be equated with the *ālayavijñāna* (see, e.g., LASū 221,12–13: *tathāgatagarbhasaṃśabdita ālayavijñāne*; LASū 222,9–10: *ālayavijñānasaṃśabditas tathāgatagarbhaḥ*); see Brown 1991: 179–185.

[21] On these hermeneutic strategies regarding the self, see Seyfort Ruegg 1989: 17–55 (= Chapter 1).

> aversion and delusion and polluted by the filth of [false] imagination, as permanent, enduring, peaceful and eternal. In which sense (*katham*), then, O Blessed One, does this doctrine of the *tathāgatagarbha* differ from the outsiders' doctrine(s) of the self? [For,] O Blessed One, the outsiders too teach (a) doctrine(s) of the self [which present(s) it] as an agent [that is] permanent, devoid of qualities, all-pervading [and] imperishable."[22]

Thus according to Mahāmati, the *tathāgatagarbha* doctrine spelt out in other *sūtra*s (one may think here of the ŚMDSNSū and the MPSū) comes very close to the outsiders' *ātman* theory in construing the *buddha*-nature as a bearer of – and maybe an agent behind – psychophysical reality, as the locus of auspicious qualities, as naturally pure and radiant in spite of its being wrapped up in and polluted by adventitious defilements, and as permanent, enduring and eternal. Here is the Buddha's suggestive reply to Mahāmati's question:

> The Blessed One said: "O Mahāmati, my teaching of the *tathāgatagarbha* does indeed differ from the outsiders' doctrine(s) of the self. Rather, O Mahāmati, the *tathāgata*s teach [that] the meaning of words (*padārtha* : *tshig gi don*) such as 'emptiness,' 'tetralemma,' '*nirvāṇa*,' 'non-origination,' 'signless' and '*unfocused*' is the *tathāgatagarbha*, O Mahāmati; [and in so doing,] the *tathāgata*s, *arhat*s [and] perfectly awakened ones teach something (*gocara*) nonconceptual and non-phenomenal (*nirābhāsa*) by means of (*mukhopadeśena*) the *tathāgatagarbha* so that the immature [beings] may get rid of the state of being terrified by selflessness. But the *bodhisattva*s, the great beings which belong to the future and the present should not, O Mahāmati, take this [*tathāgatagarbha*] for the self. For example, O Mahāmati, a potter produces various

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[22] LASū 77,13–78,4: *atha khalu mahāmatir bodhisattvo mahāsattvo bhagavantam etad avocat / tathāgatagarbhaḥ punar bhagavatā sūtrāntapāṭhe 'nuvarṇitaḥ / sa ca kila tvayā prakṛtiprabhāsvaraviśuddhyādiviśuddha eva varṇyate / dvātriṃśallakṣaṇadharaḥ sarvasattvadehāntargato mahārghamūlyaratnaṃ malina[a]vastra[b]pariveṣṭitam iva skandhadhātvāyatanavastra[b]veṣṭito rāgadveṣamohābhibhūtaparikalpamalamalino[c] nityo dhruvaḥ śivaḥ śāśvataś ca bhagavatā varṇitaḥ / tat katham ayaṃ bhagavaṃs tīrthakarātmavādatulyas tathāgatagarbhavādo na bhavati / tīrthakarā api bhagavan nityaḥ kartā nirguṇo vibhūr avyaya ity ātmavādopadarśanaṃ kurvanti /.* [[a]] °*ratnaṃ malina*° em. : °*raktamalina*° Ed. [[b]] °*vastra*° em. (Tib. *gos*) : °*vastu*° Ed. [[c]] *rāgadveṣamohābhibhūtaparikalpamalamalino* em. (Tib. *'dod chags daṅ źe sdaṅ daṅ gti mug gis zil gyis non pa yoṅs su rtog pa'i dri mas dri ma can du gyur pa*) : *rāgadveṣamohābhūtaparikalpamalamalino* Ed.] This passage is quoted by Candrakīrti in MAV 196,12–197,5.

vessels out of a single mass of earth particles (*paramāṇu*), [and this] by means of [his] hands, art, stick, water, thread and effort. In the same way, O Mahāmati, the *tathāgata*s teach this very selflessness of the *dharma*s, which is beyond all the characteristics of conceptual construction, either by teaching the embryo [of a *tathāgata*] or by teaching selflessness, as the potter [does], by way of various lexical and phonetic modalities conforming to insight and skill in means. For this reason, O Mahāmati, the teaching of the *tathāgatagarbha* differs from the outsiders' teaching of the self. Thus by teaching the *tathāgatagarbha*, [the *tathāgata*s] teach (°*upadeśena nirdiśanti*) the *tathāgatagarbha* in order to attract the outsiders who adhere to the doctrine(s) of the self. How indeed could they quickly awaken to the supreme perfect awakening, [those persons] whose thought (*āśaya*) has fallen into the false view [consisting in] the erroneous concept of the self [and] who possess a thought that has fallen from the domain of the three [doors to] liberation? It is for this purpose, O Mahāmati, that the *tathāgata*s, *arhat*s [and] perfectly awakened ones teach the *tathāgatagarbha*. Therefore, this [teaching of theirs] differs from the outsiders' doctrine(s) of the self. And hence, O Mahāmati, you ought to follow selflessness which is [nothing but] the *tathāgatagarbha* in order to go beyond the outsiders' false view(s)." Then, on this occasion, the Blessed One spoke the following stanza: "The person, the series, the constituents, the conditions, the atoms, matter, God, the agent, [all those] are conceived as mind-only."[23]

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[23] LASū 78,5–79,9: *bhagavān āha / na hi mahāmate tīrthakarātmavādatulyo mama tathāgatagarbhopadeśaḥ / kiṃ tu mahāmate tathāgatāḥ śūnyatābhūtakoṭinirvāṇānutpādānimittāpraṇihitādyānāṃ mahāmate padārthānāṃ tathāgatagarbhopadeśaṃ kṛtvā tathāgatā arhantaḥ samyaksambuddhā bālānāṃ nairātmyasantrāsapadavivarjanārthaṃ[a] nirvikalpaka[b]nirābhāsagocaraṃ tathāgatagarbhamukhopadeśena deśayanti / na cātra mahāmate 'nāgatapratyutpannair bodhisattvair mahāsattvair ātmābhiniveśaḥ kartavyaḥ / tad yathā mahāmate kumbhakāra ekasmān mṛtparamāṇurāśer vividhāni bhāṇḍāni karoti hastaśilpadaṇḍodakasūtraprayatnayogāt / evam eva mahāmate tathāgatās tad eva dharmanairātmyaṃ sarvavikalpalakṣaṇavinivṛttaṃ vividhaiḥ prajñopāyakauśalyayogair garbhopadeśena[c] vā nairātmyopadeśena vā kumbhakāravac citraiḥ padavyañjanaparyāyair deśayante / etasmāt kāraṇān mahāmate tīrthakarātmavādopadeśatulyas tathāgatagarbhopadeśo na bhavati / evaṃ hi mahāmate tathāgatagarbhopadeśam ātmavādābhiniviṣṭānāṃ tīrthakarāṇām ākarṣaṇārthaṃ tathāgatagarbhopadeśena nirdiśanti[d] / katham vatābhūtātmavikalpadṛṣṭipatitāśayā vimokṣatrayagocarapatitāśayopetāḥ kṣipram anuttarām abhisambodhim abhisambudhyerann iti / etadarthaṃ mahāmate tathāgatā arhantaḥ samyaksambuddhās tathāgatagarbhopadeśaṃ kurvanti / ata etan na bha-*

1.1.2.2.2. Ordinary persons and outsiders alike stick to erroneous conceptions of the self and are at odds with the apparently nihilistic doctrine of selflessness. Both in order to alleviate their fear of selflessness and to attract them to (Mahāyāna) Buddhism, the *buddha*s teach the purposedly substantialist doctrine of the *tathāgatagarbha*. In other words, the *tathāgatagarbha* dispensation is nothing but a rhetorical device reflecting skill in means and designed primarily to proselytize (*ākarṣaṇa*) the non-Buddhists. Such was also Bhāviveka's and Candrakīrti's overall interpretation of the *buddha*-nature teachings.[24] Paradigmatic instances of this proselytic concern are already to be found in some of the Mahāyānist MPSū's own statements regarding the *tathāgatagarbha* teaching, most notably in a dialogue between the Buddha and (the) six allodox masters:

> What is called "self" is the *tathāgata*. Why is it so? The [*buddha*-]Body (*sku*) being infinite is free from the blemish of doubt, and it neither acts nor grasps, so that it is said to be "permanent." In virtue of non-production and non-cessation (*anutpāda*, *anirodha*) it is said to be "blissful" (*sukha*). In virtue of the absence of the impurities of *kleśa* it is said to be "very pure" (*pariśuddha*, *viśuddha*). In virtue of the absence of ten marks, it is said to be "Empty"

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vati tīrthakarātmavādatulyam / tasmāt tarhi mahāmate tīrthakaradṛṣṭivinivṛttyarthaṃ tathāgatanairātmyagarbhānusāriṇā[e] ca te bhavitavyam / atha khalu bhagavāṃs tasyāṃ velāyām imāṃ gāthām abhāṣata / pudgalaḥ santatiḥ skandhāḥ pratyayā aṇavas tathā / pradhānam īśvaraḥ kartā cittamātraṃ vikalpyate //. [[a]] °*vivarjanārthaṃ* em. (Editor's variant in fn. 4, p. 78) : °*vivarjitārthaṃ* Ed. [[b]] Note Tib. *rnam par mi rtog pa'i gnas* (**nirvikalpakapada*?) for *nirvikalpaka*° Ed. [[c]] Note Tib. *de bźin gśegs pa'i sñiṅ por bstan pa* (**tathāgatagarbhopadeśena*) for *garbhopadeśena* Ed. [[d]] Note Tib. *blo gros chen po de ltar de bźin gśegs pa rnams kyi mu stegs byed bdag tu smra ba la mṅon par źen pa rnams draṅ ba'i phyir de bźin gśegs pa'i sñiṅ por bstan pas de bźin gśegs pa'i sñiṅ po ston te /.* [[e]] *tathāgatagarbhanairātmyānusāriṇā* em. (Tib. *de bźin gśegs pa'i sñiṅ po bdag med pa'i rjes su 'jug pa*) : *tathāgatanairātmyagarbhānusāriṇā* Ed.] This passage is quoted by Candrakīrti in MAV 197,5–198,10.

[24] After quoting the LASū passages considered above (see fn. 22, p. 45, and fn. 23, p. 46), Candrakīrti explains (MAV 198,13–16) that *sūtra* texts such as these, although they are interpreted by the Vijñānavādins as of definitive meaning (*nītārtha*), contain in fact explicit statements to the effect that they ought to be understood as being of an intentional meaning (*neyārtha*); on this point, see Seyfort Ruegg 1989: 27–28. For a similar strategy in Bhāviveka's TJ (169a7–b6), see Seyfort Ruegg 1989: 28 and 40; for a brief discussion of, and references to, Tsoṅ kha pa's and Bu ston's attitudes, see respectively Williams 2009: 113 and Seyfort Ruegg 1989: 22–23, fn. 9.

(*śūnya*). Consequently, the *tathāgata* is permanent, blissful, self, very pure, Empty and without marks. – The *tīrthikas* [then] said: "If the *tathāgata* is Empty because he/it is permanent, blissful, self, very pure, and without marks, this is indeed so! And knowing that the *dharma* taught by Gautama is also not Empty (*stoṅ pa ma yin pa*), we accept and retain it." Many *tīrthikas* then took to religion in the Teaching of the Buddha with their minds full of faith.[25]

At an earlier point, the same MPSū records the following dialogue between allodox wandering ascetics and the Buddha:

"If only Gautama did not teach a nihilistic view (*ucchedadṛṣṭi*), we would accept instruction and the discipline (*śīla*) from him." – [The Buddha thereupon observes:] "I then knew the thoughts of these wandering ascetics (*parivrājakas*) [...] I said to them: 'Why do you think that I teach a nihilistic view?' – The wandering ascetics answered: 'Gautama, in all the *sūtras* you have said that there is no self in all living beings. If you thus say that no self exists, how can that not be a nihilistic view? If no self exists, who will bind himself by discipline and who will infringe it?' – Bhagavat replied: 'I have not said that no self exists in all living beings. If I have always said that the *buddha*-nature (*saṅs rgyas kyi raṅ bźin*) exists in all living beings, is this very *buddha*-nature then not the self? Thus I do not teach a nihilistic theory. If, because one does not see the *buddha*-nature of all sentient beings, one asserts the not permanent, the not self, the not blissful, and the not very pure, it is said that one teaches nihilism.'" Then, after the ascetics had heard the explanation that this *buddha*-nature is self, they all produced the thought (*citta*) directed toward supreme and perfect Awakening (*anuttarasamyaksambodhi*). And having at that moment entered religious life (*parivraj*-), they exerted themselves on the path of Awakening (*bodhimārga*) [...] This *buddha*-nature

[25] MPSū *Ñu* 151b2–5: *gaṅ bdag ces bya ba de ni de bźin gśegs pa yin no // de ci'i phyir źe na / sku mtha' yas pa the tshom gyi dra ba med pa / mi byed mi len pa'i phyir rtag pa źes bya / mi skye mi 'gog pa'i phyir bde ba źes bya / ñon moṅs pa'i dri ma med pa'i phyir yoṅs su dag pa źes bya / mtshan ñid bcu med pa'i phyir stoṅ pa źes bya ste / de bas na de bźin gśegs pa ni rtag pa daṅ bde ba daṅ bdag daṅ yoṅs su dag pa / stoṅ pa / mtshan ma med pa'o // mu stegs can gyis gsol ba / gal te de bźin gśegs pa rtag pa daṅ bde ba daṅ bdag daṅ yoṅs su dag pa daṅ mtshan ma med pa'i phyir stoṅ na lta / gau ta mas gsuṅs pa'i chos kyaṅ stoṅ pa ma yin par rig ste / de bas na bdag cag gis spyi bos blaṅs te bzuṅs su gzuṅ ṅo źes gsol nas de'i tshe mu stegs can tshad med pa rnams saṅs rgyas kyis bstan pa la dad pa'i sems kyis rab tu byuṅ ṅo //*. Translation Seyfort Ruegg 1989: 22.

> is not in reality *ātman*, and it is for the sake of sentient beings that a self is spoken of. Whereas in virtue of the existence of causes and conditions the Tathāgata has spoken of not-self (*bdag med pa*) as self, in reality there is no self. Though he has spoken thus, this was no untruth either. It is because of the existence of causes and conditions that it is said that the self is not-self. Whereas self exists in reality, it is with a view to the world of living beings (*loka*) that it has been said that there is no self. But that was no untruth. The *buddha*-nature is not-self (*bdag med de*); and if the Tathāgata has spoken of "self," this is because a designation has been employed (*btags pa yin pa'i phyir*).[26]

Whatever their historical relevance, these narratives and dialogues would seem to give weight to Zimmermann's hypothesis that in the TGSū,

> [o]ne of the authors' goals may have been to widen the circle of Mahāyāna followers by announcing that non-Mahāyāna Buddhists and even non-Budd-

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[26] MPSū *Ñu* 96b6–97a8: *gal te gau ta ma 'di chad par lta ba mi ston na bdag cag de la luṅ daṅ tshul khrims mnod do źes smras so* // [...] *kun du rgyu de dag gi bsam pa mkhyen nas kun du rgyu de dag la 'di skad ces bka' stsal to* // *ci'i phyir ṅa la chad par lta ba ston pa yin no sñam du sems* / *kun du rgyu de dag gis gsol ba* / *gau ta ma khyod kyis mdo sde kun las sems can thams cad la bdag med do źes bśad de* / *de ltar bdag med do źes bśad na ci'i phyir chad par lta ba ma yin* / *gal te bdag med na gaṅ gis tshul khrims sdom źiṅ gaṅ gis tshul khrims bśig par 'gyur* / *bcom ldan 'das kyis bka' stsal pa* / *des ni sems can thams cad la bdag med do źes ma bśad do* // *ṅas ni rtag tu sems can thams cad la saṅs rgyas kyi raṅ bźin yod do źes bśad na saṅs rgyas kyi raṅ bźin de ñid bdag ma yin nam* / *don de lta bas na ṅa chad par lta ba mi ston te* / *sems can thams cad kyi saṅs rgyas kyi raṅ bźin ma mthoṅ bas rtag pa med pa daṅ bdag med pa daṅ bde ba med pa daṅ yoṅs su dag pa med de* / *gaṅ de skad du smra ba de ni chad par lta ba ston pa źes bya'o* // *de'i tshe kun du rgyu de dag saṅs rgyas kyi raṅ bźin ñid bdag yin no źes bśad pa thos nas thams cad bla na med pa yaṅ dag par rdzogs pa'i byaṅ chub tu sems bskyed de* / *de'i mod la rab tu byuṅ nas byaṅ chub kyi lam la nan tan byed par gyur to* // [...] *saṅs rgyas kyi raṅ bźin yaṅ dag par na bdag ma yin te* / *sems can kyi phyir bdag ces bśad do* // [...] *rgyu daṅ rkyen yod pa'i phyir de bźin gśegs pas bdag med pa la bdag tu bśad mod kyi yaṅ dag par na bdag med do* // *de ltar bśad mod kyi brdzun pa yaṅ ma yin no* // [...] *rgyu daṅ rkyen yod pas bdag la bdag med par 'chad de yaṅ dag par na bdag yod kyaṅ 'jig rten gyi phyir bdag med par bśad mod kyi yaṅ brdzun pa ma yin no* // *saṅs rgyas kyi raṅ bźin ni bdag med de* // *de bźin gśegs pas bdag ces bśad pa ni btags pa yin pa'i phyir ro* //. Translation Seyfort Ruegg 1989: 22–23. On this passage, see also Williams 2009: 108 and Liu 1982: 87–88.

hists were in possession of the *buddha*-nature. In this way, they could count on facilitating their conversion to Mahāyāna.[27]

At any rate, the *tathāgatagarbha* literature displays sufficient evidence to the effect that the proponents of the doctrine(s) (1) were aware of its/their similarity with the non-Buddhists' theories of a self, (2) tried their best in order to neutralize this suspicion (3) by discarding these accounts (see below, §1.1.2.5, and fn. 47, p. 60) and/or (4) by presenting the *tathāgatagarbha* dispensation as an expedient device. And as we shall see below (§1.1.2.3.1), they also worked out a complex reinterpretation of the four wrong notions (*viparyāsa*).

1.1.2.2.3. Moreover, as noted by Zimmermann again, the TGSū remains entirely silent on emptiness, a fact that accords well with its substantialist leaning. Now, if most of the *tathāgatagarbha* scriptures do in fact elaborate on *śūnyatā*, and at that in a very original way,[28] they also consistently present emptiness and selflessness as mere *upāya*s designed to bring one's excessive clinging to (false conceptions of) the self, false

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[27] Zimmermann 2002: 76. Note also Zimmermann 2002: 15: "One of the motives could thus have been to attract to religious practice hitherto neglected segments of the Buddhist community, or even groups from outside it."

[28] On the conceptions of emptiness to be found in *tathāgatagarbha* (and, at least partly, early Yogācāra) literature (later to give rise to the so-called *gźan stoṅ*, "other-empty," see first Williams 2009: 112–115), see Seyfort Ruegg 1969: 319–328. The most characteristic features of the *tathāgatagarbha* notion of emptiness are encapsulated in RGV 1.154–155: *nāpaneyam ataḥ kiñcid upaneyaṃ na kiñcana / draṣṭavyaṃ bhūtato bhūtaṃ bhūtadarśī vimucyate // śūnya āgantukair dhātuḥ savinirbhāgalakṣaṇaiḥ / aśūnyo 'nuttarair dharmair avinirbhāgalakṣaṇaiḥ //*. "Nothing is to be taken away from it, nothing is to be added to it. The real must be seen as it really is, [and] the one who sees the real is liberated. The [*tathāgata*-]element is empty of [those *dharma*s that] are adventitious [and] characterized as separable, [but] it is not empty of [those] supreme *dharma*s [that are] characterized as inseparable." On this passage, see also Seyfort Ruegg 1969: 313, King 1995: 9 and Williams 2009: 111. In short (Williams 2009: 111), "[t]he real meaning of emptiness [...] is that one thing lacks another. What remains, as with the Yogācāra, is really there. In this sense the *buddha*-nature is indeed empty. It is empty of adventitious defilements which simply do not exist at all from the point of view of its own innate purity. On the other hand, the *Ratnagotravibhāga* states that the *tathāgatagarbha* is not empty in the sense that it is itself 'like an illusion.' This suggests that the *tathāgatagarbha* is not (on the Mādhyamika model) empty of its own intrinsic existence." See also King 1995: 10.

views and defilements to quiescence. In other words, if the *tathāgata-garbha* teachings are meant as an expedient device aimed at proselytizing the substantialist non-Buddhists, emptiness and selflessness aim at diverting the "converted" from false conceptions of, and excessive attachment to the self, as well as the concomitant defilements. One of the earliest witnessess to this attitude is the Mahāyānist MPSū, in which the following assertion is found:

> All common mortals continuously and one after the other abide in wrong views. In order to cut off wrong views from them, the Tathāgata shows and speaks about no-self.[29]

Elsewhere, the same text claims:

> To save beings, he [= the Tathāgata, VE/IR] gives them the law of no-self. Having thus practised the Way, the beings make away with the mind that clings to self and gain *nirvāṇa*. All this is to make away with the wrong concept of the people, to show them the way and make them stand above, to show them that they stick to self, that what goes in the world is all false and not true, and make them practise no-self and purify their own self.[30]

A similar doctrine appears in the RGV:

> Having thus said that every knowable [thing], wherever it occurs, is in every respect empty [and] similar to a cloud, a dream or a magical creation, why do the *buddha*s say, in this [connection], that there is a *buddha*-element in every living being? [This they have] said so that those who possess the five defects [consisting in having] a dejected mind, despising inferior living beings, be-

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[29] Translation Yamamoto 1973: 200.

[30] Translation Yamamoto 1973: 182. Note also: "One with wisdom discriminates things and does not say that all are non-eternal. Why? Because man possesses the seed of the *buddha*-nature. When no-self is talked about, common mortals say that there must not be self in the Buddhist teaching. One who is wise should know that no-self is a temporary existence and is not true. Knowing thus, one should not have doubt. When the undisclosed *tathāgatagarbha* is stated as empty and quiet, common mortals will think of ceasing and extinction." Translation Yamamoto 1973: 192. And further: "O World-honoured One! The unholy common mortals possess the nature of common mortals and they say that they possess a self." Translation Yamamoto 1973: 199.

> lieving(/grasping) unreal [things], negating real factors and [having] excessive attachment to the self, may get rid of them.[31]

As we can see, *sūtra* and *śāstra* are in close agreement: emptiness and selflessness must be regarded as provisional means designed to cure false views (*dṛṣṭi*) and wrong notions (*viparyāsa*). But as our sources make clear, *śūnyatā* and *nairātmya* ought, first, not to be clung to, and second, to be reversed/inverted so that one may gain access to the true characteristics of the absolute. We are thus facing a situation in which *both* the substantialist *tathāgatagarbha* teaching *and* selflessness are seen as *upāya*s. This reflects King's "doctrinal tensions" as they find expression in the ŚMDSNSū: on the one hand, the *tathāgatagarbha* is denied the status of a self conceived according to the model of the outsiders';[32] on the other hand, it is believed and taught to be characterized by an *ātmapāramitā*.[33]

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[31] RGV 1.156–157: *śūnyaṃ sarvaṃ sarvathā tatra tatra jñeyaṃ meghasvapnamāyākṛtābhaṃ / ity uktvaivaṃ buddhadhātuḥ punaḥ kiṃ sattve sattve 'stīti buddhair ihoktam // līnaṃ cittaṃ hīnasattveṣv avajñābhūtagrāho bhūtadharmāpavādaḥ / ātmasnehaś cādhikaḥ pañca doṣā yeṣāṃ teṣāṃ tatprahāṇārtham uktam //*. See also Seyfort Ruegg 1969: 262 and 317, and Williams 2009: 111–112; see also RGV 2.57, where *nairātmya* is regarded as an *upāya*, and the *Dhāraṇīśvararājasūtra* quoted in RGVV 3,15–16 (see Seyfort Ruegg 1969: 317–318, fn. 1).

[32] ŚMDSNSū (281b4–6): "Lord, the *tathāgatagarbha* is neither self nor sentient being, nor soul, nor personality. The *tathāgatagarbha* is not the domain of beings who fall into the belief in a real personality." Translation Wayman/Wayman 1990: 106; see also King 1995: 3. For the Tibetan text and the broader context of this passage, see below, fn. 49, p. 62.

[33] ŚMDSNSū (280a6–b1, quoted in RGVV 31,2–4): *bcom ldan 'das sems can rnams de bźin gśegs pa la dad pas rtag par 'du śes pa daṅ bde bar 'du śes pa daṅ bdag tu 'du śes pa daṅ gtsaṅ bar 'du śes pa'i sems can dag ni bcom ldan 'das phyin ci log tu 'gyur ba ma lags te / bcom ldan 'das sems can de dag ni yaṅ dag pa'i lta ba can du 'du 'gyur ba lags so // de ci'i slad du źe na / bcom ldan 'das de bźin gśegs pa'i chos kyi sku ñid rtag pa'i pha rol tu phyin pa daṅ bde ba'i pha rol tu phyin pa daṅ bdag gi pha rol tu phyin pa daṅ gtsaṅ ba'i pha rol tu phyin pa lags pa'i slad du'o //*. "When sentient beings have faith in the Tathāgata and those sentient beings conceive [him] as permanent, pleasurable, self, and pure, they do not go astray. Those sentient beings have the right view. Why so? Because the *dharmakāya* of the Tathāgata has the perfection of permanence, the perfection of pleasure, the perfection of self, the perfection of purity." Translation (modified) Wayman/Wayman 1990: 102; see also King 1995: 3. To be compared with the ŚMDSNSū passage of RGVV 31,2–4, quoted below, fn.

1.1.2.3.1. In order to understand this, we have to take a closer look at a very interesting doctrine that can be found in the Mahāyānist MPSū,[34] the ŚMDSNSū and the RGV(V). Relying on the *sūtra* (MPSū) materials, Fujii refers to this doctrine as the "double denial of the four illusions" (1993: 29), while Seyfort Ruegg calls it the theory of the "contrecarrants par inversion de l'erreur quadruple" (*caturvidhaviparyāsa[viparyaya]pratipakṣa*, RGV 1.36, RGVV 30,10).[35] Let us consider first the following excerpt from the ŚMDSNSū:

> [Ordinary] living beings, O Blessed One, are in error (*viparyasta*) with regard to the five constituents which are clung to when [they] cling to them, [for] they identify the impermanent as permanent, the painful as pleasurable, the selfless as self, [and what is] bad as good. [But,] O Blessed One, all the *śrāvaka*s and *pratyekabuddha*s are no less in error with regard to the Tathāgata's *dharma*-body, which remains uncognized (*adṛṣṭapūrva*) through(/because of) [their] knowledge of emptiness [and is] the object of an omniscient's knowledge [only]. Those living beings, O Blessed One, would not be in error who, true sons of the Blessed One, would identify [the Tathāgata's *dharma*-body] as permanent, self, pleasurable [and] good; these, O Blessed One, would see correctly. – Why? – [Because,] O Blessed One, the very *dharma*-body of the *tathāgata*s possesses the perfection of the permanent, the perfection of the pleasurable, the perfection of the self, [and] the perfection of the good. Those living beings who see the Tathāgata's *dharma*-body in this way, O Blessed One, see [it] correctly. [And] those who see [it] correctly are the true sons of the Blessed One.[36]

36, p. 53. On the *ātmapāramitā*, see also Brown 1991: 81–90 (and more generally 72–100 on the *tathāgatagarbha* doctrine of the four *pāramitā*s).

34 See Fujii 1993.

35 On the four wrong notions/misconceptions (*viparyāsa*), see, e.g., AKBh$_{Pr}$ 283,5–7, Conze 1962, Seyfort Ruegg 1969: 377–380.

36 ŚMDSNSū (280a4–b3, quoted in RGVV 30,19–31,6): *viparyastā bhagavan sattvā upātteṣu pañcasūpādānaskandheṣu / te bhavanty anitye nityasañjñinaḥ / duḥkhe sukhasañjñinaḥ / anātmany ātmasañjñinaḥ / aśubhe śubhasañjñinaḥ / sarvaśrāvakapratyekabuddhā api bhagavan śūnyatājñānenādṛṣṭapūrve sarvajñajñānaviṣaye tathāgatadharmakāye viparyastāḥ / ye bhagavan sattvāḥ syur bhagavataḥ putrā aurasā nityasañjñina ātmasañjñinaḥ sukhasañjñinaḥ śubhasañjñinas te bhagavan sattvāḥ syur aviparyastāḥ / syus te bhagavan samyagdarśinaḥ / tat kasmād dhetoḥ / tathāgatadharmakāya eva bhagavan nityapāramitā sukhapāramitātmapāramitā śubhapāramitā / ye bhagavan sattvās tathāgatadharmakāyam evaṃ paśyanti te*

As we can see, the *śrāvaka*s and the *pratyekabuddha*s are as mistaken with regard to the characteristics of the unconditioned as the ordinary living beings are with regard to the true features of the conditioned. In other words, the *śrāvaka*s' and *pratyekabuddha*s' views on reality (impermanence, emptiness, selflessness, painfulness), which are traditionally held to lead to salvation and are contrary to those of the ordinary living beings, are themselves to be counteracted in order to match ultimate reality.[37] The RGVV spells it out in a very systematic way:

> Identifying (*sañjñā*) an impermanent thing such as corporeality as being permanent (*nityam iti*), a painful [thing] as being pleasurable, a selfless [thing] as being a self, [and] a bad [thing] as being good, this is [what we] call the four wrong notions (*caturvidho viparyāsaḥ*). [Now,] since it is the contrary of these [four wrong notions], the right notion (*aviparyāsa*) itself is fourfold. – What [do these] four [right notions consist of]? – Identifying this very thing, corporeality, etc., as [being] impermanent, painful, selfless, and bad, this is [what we] call the contrary of the four wrong notions. But with reference to the Tathāgata's *dharma*-body, which is characterized as permanent, etc., [we] regard (*abhipreta*) as wrong notions these very [four right notions] whose counterpart (*pratipakṣa*) constitutes (*vyavasthāpita*) the fourfold (*caturākāra*) perfection of(/in) good qualities of the Tathāgata's *dharma*-body, i.e., perfection of the permanent, perfection of the pleasurable, perfection of the self, [and] perfection of the good.[38]

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samyak paśyanti / ye samyak paśyanti te bhagavataḥ putrā aurasāḥ [...] /. See also Seyfort Ruegg 1969: 269 and 365–366, and Bhattacharya 1973: 5–6.

[37] Note Seyfort Ruegg 1969: 311 (following RGVV 74,5–76,17): "Suivant la RGVV (1.153) les facteurs qui entravent la compréhension (*adhigama*) de la Réalité sont la chute dans la vue personnaliste (*satkāyadṛṣṭi*), l'attachement à l'erreur (*viparyāsa*), et la perturbation de l'esprit par (la vue spéculative, *dṛṣṭi*, relative à) la *śūnyatā*; ainsi les personnes ordinaires engouées de la *satkāyadṛṣṭi*, les *śrāvaka* et les *pratyekabuddha* attachés aux notions de l'impermanence, du non-soi, de la douleur, et de l'impur, et les jeunes *bodhisattva* qui ne connaissent pas encore le véritable sens profond de la Vacuité n'arrivent pas – temporairement – à comprendre la Réalité."

[38] RGVV 30,11–18: *yā rūpādike vastuny anitye nityam iti sañjñā / duḥkhe sukham iti / anātmany ātmeti / aśubhe śubham iti sañjñā / ayam ucyate caturvidho viparyāsaḥ / etadviparyayeṇa caturvidha evāviparyāso veditavyaḥ / katamaś caturvidhaḥ / yā tasminn eva rūpādike vastuny anityasañjñā / duḥkhasañjñā / anātmasañjñā / aśubhasañjñā / ayam ucyate caturvidhaviparyāsaviparyayaḥ / sa khalv eṣa nityādila-*

The "double denial of four illusions" consists, then, in rejecting both the outsiders' and the *śrāvaka*s/*pratyekabuddha*s' conceptions of reality as erroneous. Note that this does not amount to reverting to the ordinary persons' wrong notions, for, as we shall see below, the true characterization of the absolute as a self has nothing in common with the outsiders' speculations on the *ātman*.

1.1.2.3.2. As we have seen, the Tathāgata's body of the law is characterized by four perfections of(/in) good qualities (*guṇapāramitā*) – permanent, pleasurable, self, good. Now, the realization (*adhigama*) of these perfections, which amounts to the purification of one's *tathāgatadhātu*, is the result (*phala*) of four kinds of cultivation (*bhāvanā*) that are presented as the four properties (*dharma*) of a *bodhisattva*'s soteric practice and as counteracting the characteristic attitudes and wrong notions of four kinds of persons – *icchantika*s[39] (*śuciviparyāsa*), outsiders (*ātmaviparyāsa*), *śrāvaka(yānika)*s (*sukhaviparyāsa*), and *pratyekabuddha(yānīya)*s (*nityaviparyāsa*). By cultivating faithful conviction (*adhimukti*) in the Mahāyānistic law (*mahāyānadharma*), a *bodhisattva* counteracts the delight (*abhirati*) in the impure (*aśuci*) *saṃsāra* that is characteristic of the *icchantika*s (who are hostile to the *mahāyānadharma*) and realizes the *śubhapāramitā* (RGVV 31,8–10). By cultivating the perfection of insight (*prajñāpāramitā*), a *bodhisattva* counteracts the delight of believing in an unreal self (*asadātmagraha*) that is characteristic of the outsiders (*anyatīrthya*, who see a self in the five constituents that are clung to – *pañcasūpādānaskandheṣv ātmadarśinām*), and realizes the *ātmapāramitā* (RGVV 31,10–16). By cultivating psychic concentrations, a *bodhisattva* counteracts delight in the mere cessation of saṃsāric suffering (*saṃsāraduḥkhopaśamamātra*) that is characteristic of the *śrāvaka*s (who are afraid of suffering in *saṃsāra* – *saṃsāraduḥkhabhīru*) and realizes the *sukhapāramitā* (RGVV 31,16–32,2). Finally, by cultivating great compassion (*mahākaruṇā*), a *bodhisattva* counteracts delight in loneliness (*asaṃsargavihā-*

kṣaṇaṃ tathāgatadharmakāyam adhikṛtyeha viparyāso 'bhipreto yasya pratipakṣeṇa caturākārā tathāgatadharmakāyaguṇapāramitā vyavasthāpitā / tad yathā nityapāramitā sukhapāramitātmapāramitā śubhapāramiteti /. See also Seyfort Ruegg 1969: 365 and Bhattacharya 1973: 5.

[39] On the *icchantika*s or "no-hopers" (Williams 2009: 107), "decadents" (Williams 2009: 98), see Seyfort Ruegg 1969: 75–76, Liu 1984 and Karashima 2006.

ra), which is characteristic of the *pratyekabuddha*s (who are indifferent to the good of ordinary living beings – *sattvārthanirapekṣa*) and realizes the *nityapāramitā* ("because from the origin of *saṃsāra*, he is constantly and uninterruptedly attached to [his] eagerness for the good of [all] living beings"[40]).

1.1.2.4. The reversal of the wrong notions that are characteristic of the *śrāvaka*s and the *pratyekabuddha*s (*nairātmya* → *ātman*) does not amount to a return to, or a recognition of, the outsiders' views on the self. Consider the following passage from the RGVV:

> All the outsiders indeed regard a thing such as corporeality, which does not have this nature, as a self. But this thing is invariably (*sarvakālam*) not a self, for it is contradicted by the definition of the self as it is recognized by these [outsiders]. On the contrary, the Tathāgata has reached the other(/opposite) shore of the selflessness of all factors thanks to [his] objective knowledge. And since this selflessness is not contradicted by the definition of the self as he perceives it, it is invariably admitted to be the self, for it is selflessness that is called the self, as one says "fixed on account of non-fixation."[41]

As we have seen, the outsiders regard the self as existing in the constituents, i.e., take real things (*vastu*) such as corporeality to be the self, and speculate on its nature and even its size.[42] Now according to the

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[40] RGVV 32,2–5: *satatasamitam ā saṃsārāt sattvārthapaligodhapaliguddhatvāt*[a] /. [[a] °*paligodhapaliguddhatvāt* em. (Schmithausen 1971: 143) : *phaligodhapariśuddhatvāt* Ed.] On *paligodha* and *paliguddha*, see BHSD 337b s.v.

[41] RGVV 31,12–16: *sarve hy anyatīrthyā rūpādikam atatsvabhāvaṃ vastv ātmety upagatāḥ / tac caiṣāṃ vastu yathāgraham ātmalakṣaṇena visaṃvāditatvāt*[a] *sarvakālam anātmā / tathāgataḥ punar yathābhūtajñānena sarvadharmanairātmyaparapāram abhiprāptaḥ / tac cāsya nairātmyam ātmalakṣaṇena*[b] *yathādarśanam avisaṃvāditvāt*[c] *sarvakālam ātmābhipreto nairātmyam evātmeti*[d] *kṛtvā / yathoktaṃ sthito 'sthānayogeneti* /. [[a] *visaṃvāditatvāt* em. (Schmithausen 1971: 143) : *visaṃvāditvāt* Ed. [b] *ātmalakṣaṇena* em. (Bhattacharya 1973: 6, fn. 5) : *anātmalakṣaṇena* Ed., Tib. [c] To be read *avisaṃvāditatvāt* (see Schmithausen 1971: 143)? [d] *ātmeti* em. (Schmithausen 1971: 143) : *ātmani* Ed.] On this passsage, see also Seyfort Ruegg 1969: 366–367, Seyfort Ruegg 1989: 24–25 and Bhattacharya 1973: 6; on *(su)sthito 'sthānayogena* ("standing by way of no standing," Williams 2009: 112), see Seyfort Ruegg 1969: 367, fn. 1 and Bhattacharya 1973: 6, fn. 6.

[42] Note Fujii 1993: 29: "[T]he *sūtra* says the past *anātmanvāda* [sic] was only an *upāya* to eliminate the wrong thought about the *ātman* which is common in the ordinary world, but in the fact the *ātman* exists originally. Then what is difference

RGVV, this does not even conform to these outsiders' versions of the self (which may be tentatively held to include properties such as permanence and all-pervasiveness[43]). Rather, what *does* conform to the true definition of the self is nothing but selflessness.[44] But does such a

between the *ātman* the *sūtra* asserts and the one non-buddhist philosophers assert? The *sūtra* says that the *ātman* the Buddha preaches is not like the ordinary thought, for example, the *ātman* is like a poppy seed or largeness of one's thumb and so on." According to MSAVBh *Tsi* D177a6/P208b1–2, although the living beings (**sattva*) cultivate the view of a self (**ātmadṛṣṭi*) and are only familiar with the self through its name (**nāmamātra*), they cannot reach liberation (**mokṣa*; **apavarga*; **nirvāṇa*) because they do not really see the self, which has the size of a thumb (**aṅguṣṭhamātra*) or the size of a mustard-seed (**sarṣapamātra*). The Blessed One has taught the *pudgala* so that the living beings, by seeing this tiny self, may achieve liberation. Sthiramati alludes here to Upaniṣadic speculations about the size of the *ātman*: *aṅguṣṭhamātra* in *Kaṭha Upaniṣad* 4.12; *sarṣapa* in *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad* 3.14.3. For a similar discussion in the context of the polemic against the Pudgalavādin, see *Traité* II.744 and fn. 1; on *sarṣapa*, see also Venkataramanan 1953: 189.

[43] See above, fn. 22, p. 45.

[44] Note that the MPSū and the RGV(V) are by no means the only Buddhist texts emphasizing the identity or at least correlation between selflessness and the self (see Seyfort Ruegg 1969: 370–377). This is notoriously the case of MSA 9.23: *śūnyatāyāṃ viśuddhāyāṃ nairātmyātmāgralābhataḥ / buddhāḥ śuddhātmalābhitvād gatā ātmamahātmatām //*. "In pure emptiness(/once emptiness has been purified), [the *buddha*s] obtain the supreme self [consisting] of selflessness; therefore, since they obtain a pure self, the *buddha*s reach the greatness of the self." See also Seyfort Ruegg 1969: 371 and Bhattacharya 1973: 4. MSABh 38,1–4 ad loc.: *tatra cānāsrave dhātau buddhānāṃ paramātmā nirdiśyate / kiṃ kāraṇam / agranairātmyātmakatvāt[a] / agraṃ nairātmyaṃ viśuddhā tathatā sā ca buddhānām ātmā svabhāvārthena tasyāṃ viśuddhāyām agraṃ nairātmyam ātmānaṃ buddhā labhante śuddham / ataḥ śuddhātmalābhitvād buddhā ātmamāhātmyaṃ prāptāḥ* […] /. [[a] Note MSAVBh *Mi* D119a4: *bdag med pa'i mchog thob pa'i phyir*.] "And here is taught the *buddha*s' supreme (*parama*) self in the undefiled element. – Why [is this self supreme]? – Because it consists (*ātmaka*) in the supreme (*agra*) selflessness. The supreme selflessness is [nothing but] the pure (*viśuddha*) thusness, and this [pure thusness] is the self of the *buddha*s in the sense of their own-being. [And] once it is purified (*viśuddha*), the *buddha*s obtain the supreme selflessness, [their] pure (*śuddha*) self. Therefore, because they obtain [their] pure self, the *buddha*s reach the greatness of the self." See also Seyfort Ruegg 1969: 371 and Bhattacharya 1973: 4. According to Sthiramati (MSAVBh *Mi* D119a4–5), "supreme selflessness" is to be understood as including both *pudgalanairātmya* and *dharmanairātmya*. Note also Sthiramati's (MSAVBh *Mi* D119a5–7) explanation of "self": *bdag ces bya ba'i sgra 'di ni skabs gcig tu mu stegs pas yoṅs su brtags pa'i bdag ñid la yaṅ bya bar 'dren te / 'di ltar bdag daṅ*

teaching amount to a positive or "kataphatic" (Seyfort Ruegg) description of the absolute? Certainly not, granting the RGV's definition of the four *guṇapāramitā*s:

> Indeed, the [Tathāgata's *dharma*-body] is pure (*śuci*) because it is naturally pure (*śuddha*) [and] because of the elimination of the impregnations; it is the supreme self because [in it] the [conceptual] proliferation [positing] self and selflessness has come to complete quiescence; it is pleasurable because of the cessation of the mental constituents and their causes; [finally,] it is permanent because of the penetration into the equality of *saṃsāra* and *nirvāṇa*.[45]

In other words, the purpose of the RGV(V) might well be, not to hypostasize selflessness, but to account for the absolute in a paradoxical or apophatic way: far from substituting a positive (supreme) self to selflessness, the RGV(V) seems to "indicate" the absolute as transcending the purely conceptual distinction between self and selflessness, thus emphasizing non-duality (*advaya*, beyond conceptually constructed dichotomies) and the middle way (*madhyamā pratipat*).[46]

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sems can daṅ srog ces bya ba la sogs pa'o // bdag ces bya ba'i sgra 'di ni skabs gcig tu chos kyi raṅ bźin la yaṅ bya bar 'dren te / me ni dro ba'i mtshan ñid ces bya ste / dro ba'i raṅ bźin źes bya ba'i don to // sa sra ba'i bdag ñid ces bya ba bśad na / sra ba'i raṅ bźin źes bya ba'i don to // 'di'i skabs bdag ces bya ba'i sgra raṅ bźin gi don du draṅ ste / saṅs rgyas rnams ni bdag med pa'i raṅ bźin du gyur pas bdag gi mchog thob pa źes bya'o //. "The word 'self' [can] be employed in the sense of the self that is postulated (**parikalpita*) by the outsiders, as [in] 'self,' '[substantial] living being' (**sattva*), 'life principle' (**jīva*), etc. [But] the word 'self' [can] also be employed in the sense of the nature (**svabhāva*?) of the factors (**dharma*): 'Fire has heat for [its] characteristic (**uṣmalakṣaṇa*?)' means that it has heat for [its] nature (**uṣmasvabhāva*?). [In the same way,] to say that earth consists in solidity (**kharātmaka*?) means that it has solidity for [its] nature (**kharasvabhāva*?). In the present context, 'self' has the meaning of 'nature' (**svabhāvārtha*): since they partake of the nature of selflessness, the *buddha*s obtain the supreme self." On the characteristics/natures of the four great elements, see below, fn. 95–96, p. 74.

[45] RGV 1.37–38: *sa hi prakṛtiśuddhatvād vāsanāpagamāc chuciḥ / paramātmātmanairātmyaprapañcavyupaᵃśāntitaḥ // sukho manomayaskandhataddhetuvinivṛttitaḥ / nityaḥ saṃsāranirvāṇasamatāprativedhataḥ //*. [ᵃ °*vyupa*° em. (Schmithausen 1971: 143) : °*kṣaya*° Ed.] See also Seyfort Ruegg 1969: 250–251 and 369.

[46] Regarding the Mahāyānist MPSū, note Fujii 1993: 29: "Thus the *sūtra* asserts the *ātman* positively, but at the same time takes cautions against the view leading to one extreme, namely, *ātman-vāda* or *anātman-vāda*. So the *sūtra* explains an identity between *ātman* and *anātman*. The *sūtra* says the *ātman* is nothing but the

1.1.2.5. The *tathāgatagarbha* literature bears strong overtones of a substantialist account of human nature, salvation, and the absolute. The *buddha*-nature is regularly described in terms of (supreme) self; key Buddhist concepts such as emptiness and selflessness either play a marginal role, or are relegated to mere expedient devices, or reworked so as to allow for seemingly positive descriptions of the absolute; the most prominent *sūtra*s and *śāstra*s of this tradition do not hesitate to claim for a relativization, and more often than not an *Aufhebung*, of the traditional Buddhist doctrine of the four wrong notions. But by defin-

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anātman and the *anātman* is also nothing but the *ātman*, and by transcending the two extremes one can realize the middle path." Note also the Mahāyānist MPSū's (526a2–6) interesting use of the tetralemma in this connection: "Good sons! The *buddha*-nature is matter, non-matter, and neither matter nor non-matter. It is with marks, without marks, and neither with marks nor without marks. It is one, not one, and neither one nor not one. It is neither permanent, nor impermanent, nor neither permanent nor impermanent. It is being, non-being, and neither being nor non-being. It is finite, infinite, and neither finite nor infinite. It is cause, effect, and neither cause nor effect." Translation Liu 1962: 69. Note also Seyfort Ruegg 1969: 369: "Cette notion des *pāramitā* dont le *dharmakāya* se 'constitue' (*prabhāvita*) est donc remarquable puisqu'elle paraît aboutir elle aussi à une conception positive et quasi substantialiste de l'Absolu. Mais il ne semble pas que ces *pāramitā* soient des attributs concrets qualifiant un absolu hypostasié et substantiel puisqu'elles se posent par un procédé d'inversion qui contrecarre la méprise consistant à traiter le *dharmakāya* comme un quelconque *dharma* mondain; et elles se présentent par conséquent simplement comme le contraire de ce qui, sur le plan mondain, a constitué la méprise quadruple [...] Dans ces conditions, il serait difficile de soutenir que le *paramātman* du RGV (1.37) est un *ātman* existant en soi comme une entité, car il répond précisément à la tranquillité (*śāntí*) qui résulte de l'épuisement du développement discursif consistant en la dichotomie du soi et du non-soi (1.37). Et si l'on a parlé d'un tel *paramātman* 'en faisant du *nairātmya* un soi' (*nairātmyam ātmani kṛtvā* [see above, fn. 41*d*, p. 56, VE/IR]), cette façon de parler – comme l'énoncé antiphrastique de la Prajñāpāramitā 'fixé sous le rapport de la non-fixation' (*susthito 'sthānayogena*) – est employée précisément parce qu'elle tient au paradoxe; c'est d'ailleurs ainsi qu'elle fait ressortir la nature vraiment inexprimable de l'Absolu incomposé (*asaṃskṛta*), qu'on regarde, dans le 'discursus', comme le contraire du composé (*saṃskṛta*)." Note also Seyfort Ruegg 1969: 376: "De ces considérations il semble ressortir qu'il n'est pas question, dans les textes faisant état du *nitya* et de l'*ātman*, d'un enseignement de tendance nécessairement substantialiste ou quasi vedântique qui, en se donnant pour supérieur à l'enseignement bouddhique fondamental de l'impermanence et du *nairātmya*, chercherait à se substituer à celui-ci, mais bien plutôt d'un procédé servant à 'indiquer' la Réalité inexprimable." On the middle way, see also below, §1.1.2.5.

ing the (supreme) self in terms of selflessness, both *sūtra* and *śāstra* sources seem to advocate a paradoxical and apophatic approach to the absolute rather than a purely substantialist one. Whatever the case may be, however, it seems nearly certain that the proponents of the *tathāgatagarbha* did not hold the strongest and allegedly "definitive" versions of emptiness and selflessness to provide a satisfactory account of human experience and the unconditioned. In order to make their point, they developed new conceptions of the relationships between conditioned and unconditioned reality, trying to show that true descriptions of the latter were beyond the mere negation of ordinary views concerning the former. In so doing, they endeavoured to conceptualize their *buddha*-nature in such a way that it could be true to the old Buddhist ideal of the middle way between annihilationism (*ucchedavāda*) and eternalism (*śāśvatavāda*), viz. negating or affirming (the positive existence of) a self, and even provided arguments for it:

> If what is called "self" were an eternally permanent (*kūṭasthanitya*) *dharma*, there would be no freedom from suffering (*duḥkha*). And if what is called "self" did not exist, pure religious conduct (*brahmacarya*) would be of no avail [...] It is to be known that the *buddha*-nature is the middle way (*madhyamā pratipat*) altogether free from the two extremes (*antadvaya*) [...] Non-duality is reality: by nature self and not-self are without duality (*gñis su med pa*). The Lord Buddha has thus affirmed that the meaning of the *tathāgatagarbha* is unfathomable [...] In the *Prajñāpāramitā-Sūtra* also I have already taught that self and not-self are without duality by characteristic.[47]

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[47] MPSū *Ju* 126b1–2, 126b8–127a1, 128a3, 128a6: *ci ste bdag ces bya ba ther zug du rtag pa'i chos yin na ni sdug bsṅal daṅ bral bar mi 'gyur ro // gal te bdag ces bya ba med na ni tshaṅs par spyod pa dag phan 'dogs med par 'gyur ro //* [...] *saṅs rgyas kyi raṅ bźin ni lam dbu ma mtha' gñis daṅ yoṅs su bral ba yin par rig par bya'o //* [...] *gñis su med pa ñid ni yaṅ dag pa ñid do // de bźin gśegs pa'i sñiṅ po'i don ni de ltar dpag tu med* [...] *saṅs rgyas bcom ldan 'das kyis yoṅs su bsdags pa* [...] *ṅas sṅon 'phags pa śes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa chen po'i mdo las kyaṅ bdag daṅ bdag med pa'i mtshan ñid kyis gñis su med par bstan to //*. Translation Seyfort Ruegg 1989: 23–24. Note also MPSū *Ñu* 92a1–2: *thams cad stoṅ par mthoṅ la / stoṅ pa ma yin pa mi mthoṅ ba ni lam dbu ma źes mi bya / thams cad bdag med pa'i bar du mthoṅ la bdag mi mthoṅ ba ni lam dbu ma źes mi bya'o // lam dbu ma źes bya ba ni saṅs rgyas kyi raṅ bźin no //*. "When one sees that all is Empty, failure to see the non-Empty will not be called the Middle Way. When one sees all up to [the limit of] non-self, failure to see the self will not be called the Middle Way. What is called 'Middle Way'

As Seyfort Ruegg has it,

> for the canonical texts teaching the *tathāgatagarbha* and *buddha*-nature, the middle way eschewing both eternalism and nihilism remained valid. And the affirmation of an absolute or *ātman* opposed to *anātman* or *nairātmya* in a dichotomously conceptualized binary pair (*vikalpa*) based on discursive proliferation (*prapañca*) would, therefore, be no more acceptable than the purely nihilistic position of a dogmatic denial of the absolute.[48]

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is *buddha*-nature." Translation Seyfort Ruegg 1989: 24. On the middle way, see also RGVV 34,20–35,2: *anityāḥ sarvasaṃskārā iti ced bhagavan paśyeta sāsya syād ucchedavṛttiḥ / sāsya syān na samyagdṛṣṭiḥ / nityaṃ nirvāṇam iti ced bhagavan paśyeta sāsya syāc chāśvatadṛṣṭiḥ / sāsya syān na samyagdṛṣṭiḥ /*. "If [someone] saw that all conditioned [factors] are impermanent, this [person], O Blessed One, would [fall into] the false view of annihilationism [and thus] would not have the right view. [But] if [someone] saw that *nirvāṇa* is permanent, this [person] would [fall into] the false view of eternalism [and thus] would not have the correct view." Needless to say, any account of the middle way between extremes is bound to neutralize both views, and this is something the MPSū does not fail to do, as the following excerpt (MPSū *Ñu* 151a7–b2) testifies concerning *śāśvatavāda*: *ston pa drug gis gsol ba / gau ta ma gal te bdag med na sus dge ba daṅ mi dge ba byed par 'gyur / bcom ldan 'das kyis bka' stsal pa / gal te bdag ces bya ba des byed na rtag pa źes bya bar ruṅ ṅam / de ste rtag pa yin na / res 'ga' ni dge ba byed la / res 'ga' ni mi dge ba byed / gal te dge ba daṅ mi dge ba byed pa'i dus yod na / ci ste bdag ni mtha' yas źes smra / gal te bdag gis byed pa źig yin na / ci'i phyir mi dge ba'i chos spyod / da ltar bdag de byed pa yin / śes pa yin na ci'i phyir sems can la bdag med pa the tshom skye bar 'gyur / de lta bas na mu stegs can gyi chos la ni ṅes par bdag med do //*. "The six [*tīrthika*-]masters asked: 'Gautama, if the self (*ātman*) does not exist, who will do good and evil?' – Bhagavat replied: 'If what is called 'self' does [it], can one say [of this 'self,' as the *tīrthikas* do] that it is 'permanent' (*nitya*)? And if it is permanent, does it sometimes do good and sometimes evil? If there is a moment when it does both good and evil, will it be said that the self is 'infinite'? If it is the self that acts, why does it do something evil? If it is the self that acts, and if [this self] is knowledge, how is it that doubt arises about the non-existence of the self? Hence, as concerns the *tīrthika* doctrine, the self certainly does not exist." Translation Seyfort Ruegg 1989: 21. For arguments against the self in the MPSū, see Yamamoto 1973: 182–183.

[48] Seyfort Ruegg 1989: 41; see also Seyfort Ruegg 1989: 25–26. On the middle way in the Mahāyānist MPSū, see Liu 1982: 73–74, quoting MPSū 572b18–23: "Thus, [we maintain that with respect to sentient beings,] the *buddha*-nature is neither existent nor non-existent, [or] is both existent and non-existent. Why do we say that the *buddha*-nature is existent? Because all [sentient beings] will have it [in the future]. Since sentient beings will continue [to pass from one life to another] without

Now, the same applies *mutatis mutandis* to the Buddhist personalists, for whom selflessness does not provide a satisfactory account of human experience (memory, rebirth, moral responsability, salvation, etc.),[49] and who also endeavoured, though with different hermeneutic

interruption like the flame of a lamp until they achieve the most perfect enlightenment, we say that [with respect to sentient beings, the *buddha*-nature] is existent. Why do we say that the *buddha*-nature is non-existent? We say that [the *buddha*-nature with respect to sentient beings] is non-existent, because all sentient beings do not yet have [the excellence of] being eternal, blissful, personal and pure, characteristic of all *buddhadharma*s. The union of [the two aspects of] existence and non-existence is the middle way."

[49] In spite of their substantialist leaning, the proponents of the *buddha*-nature seem to have been much less inclined than the Pudgalavādins to shape their *tathāgatagarbha* along lines echoing the non-Buddhists' *ātman* (on this point, see below, §1.1.3.5 and fn. 112, p. 82). Two reasons at least can be adduced in order to account for this difference. First, the (early) exponents of the *buddha*-nature were almost certainly not Abhidharma scholars concerned with harmonizing their teachings with traditional dogmatic systems (and even less so with demonstrating their tenets). Second, and contrary to the *pudgala*, the *tathāgatagarbha* is not aimed primarily at accounting for those psychophysical, ethical and eschatological functions and events that were, in the opinion of the Buddhist Personalists as well as the non-Buddhists, left unanswered by the *skandhamātra* doctrine; rather, the *buddha*-nature is designed to justify universal salvation and provide an account of the unconditioned. However, one should be wary of overestimating this distinction, for early *tathāgatagarbha* literature also supplies texts suggesting that the *buddha*-element "fulfils several of the requirements of a Self in the Indian tradition" (Williams 2009: 108). Let us quote here but two witnesses to this tendency. According to the ŚMDSNSū (281a8–b6), "if there were no *tathāgatagarbha*, there would be neither aversion towards suffering nor longing, eagerness, and aspiration towards *nirvāṇa*. What is the reason? Whatever be these six perceptions (**vijñāna*), and whatever be this [other] perception, these seven natures (**dharma*) are unfixed (**asthita*?), momentary (**kṣaṇika*?), and lack experience of suffering (**duḥkhānubhava*?); hence these natures are unfit for aversion towards suffering or for longing, eagerness, and aspiration towards *nirvāṇa*. Lord, the *tathāgatagarbha* has ultimate existence without beginning or end, has an unborn and undying nature, and experiences suffering; hence it is worthy of the *tathāgatagarbha* to have aversion towards suffering as well as longing, eagerness, and aspiration towards *nirvāṇa*. Lord, the *tathāgatagarbha* is neither self (**ātman*) nor sentient being (**sattva*), nor soul (**jīva*), nor personality (**pudgala*). The *tathāgatagarbha* is not the domain (**gocara*) of beings who fall into the belief in a real personality (**satkāyadṛṣṭipatita*)." (*gal te de bźin gśegs pa'i sñiṅ po ma mchis na ni sdug bsṅal la skyo ba daṅ mya ṅan las 'das pa la 'dod ciṅ don du gñer ba daṅ smon pa yaṅ ma mchis par 'gyur ro // de ci'i slad du źe na / bcom ldan 'das rnam par śes pa drug po gaṅ lags pa*

(e.g., selflessness as an *upāya*), argumentative (refutation of both the self and selflessness) and dogmatic strategies, to transcend the traditional dichotomy between *saṃskṛta*- and *asaṃskṛta-dharma*s by creating a third category – the *avaktavya* – for their "person." According to them, this was the price to pay in order to be true to the middle way as it had been indicated by the Buddha's refusal to answer the questions of Vacchagotta/Vatsa(sa)gotra.[50]

'di dag daṅ bcom ldan 'das 'di ltar chos bdun po 'di dag ni mi gnas pa daṅ skad cig pa daṅ sdug bsṅal rnams myoṅ ba ma lags pas chos de dag ni sdug bsṅal la skyo ba daṅ mya ṅan las 'das pa la 'dod ciṅ don du gñer ba smon par mi rigs so // bcom ldan 'das de bźin gśegs pa'i sñiṅ po ni thog ma daṅ tha ma ma mchis pa'i mthar mchis pa daṅ mi skye ba daṅ mi 'gag pa'i chos ciṅ sdug bsṅal myoṅ ba lags pas / de bcom ldan 'das de bźin gśegs pa'i sñiṅ po de ni sdug bsṅal la yaṅ skyo ba daṅ mya ṅan las 'das pa la yaṅ 'dod ciṅ don du gñer ba daṅ smon par 'os so // bcom ldan 'das de bźin gśegs pa'i sñiṅ po bdag ma lags / sems can ma lags / srog ma lags / gaṅ zag ma lags te / bcom ldan 'das de bźin gśegs pa'i sñiṅ po ni sems can 'jig tshogs la lta bar ltuṅ ba dag [...] *[gi] spyod yul ma lags so //*. Translation Wayman/Wayman 1990: 105–106; the Sanskrit reconstructions in brackets are ours.) In this passage, the *vijñāna*s are sharply contrasted with the permanent *tathāgatagarbha*: because of their transient character, the former are not in a position to store experience of suffering or aspiration to the cessation of suffering. In other words, something is needed in order to bridge or synthetize these purely momentary perceptions, and this function of the *buddha*-nature is reminiscent of both Pudgalavādin and Ātmavādin doctrines. In the LASū (220,2–5), the *bodhisattva* Mahāmati asks the following question to the Buddha: "May the Blessed One, may the Sugata teach me about the existence and the cessation of the [five] constituents, the [eighteen] elements and the [twelve sensory] bases. [For] if there is no self, what is it that exists, or what is it that ceases? And(/now) the immature [living beings], who rely on existence and cessation, do not know *nirvāṇa* because they fail to understand the exhaustion of suffering." (*deśayatu me bhagavān deśayatu me sugataḥ skandhadhātvāyatanānāṃ pravṛttinivṛttim / asaty ātmani kasya pravṛttir vā nivṛttir vā bālāś ca pravṛttinivṛttyāśritā duḥkhakṣayānavabodhān nirvāṇaṃ na prajānanti /*.) For the Buddha's lengthy answer, see LASū 220,9–221,1.

[50] Note that the *avyākṛtavastu*s (see below, fn. 61, p. 66) were also resorted to by the proponents of the *buddha*-nature, as the Mahāyānist MPSū (596c–597b, see Liu 1982: 82–83) testifies. And this they seem to have done in exactly the same spirit as the Pudgalavādins.

1.1.3. On Pudgalavāda Buddhism

1.1.3.1. According to Bareau, the Vātsīputrīya sect branched off from the Sthavira group of early Buddhism some time during the first half of the third century BCE.[51] Around the turn of the Common Era, the Vātsīputrīya movement gave rise to four sub-sects: the Bhadrayānīyas, the Dharmottarīyas, the Ṣaṇṇagarikas (or Ṣaṇḍagirikas) and the Sāṃmitīyas (or Sāṃmatīyas).[52] Except for the Ṣaṇṇagarikas, these sub-sects are attested epigraphically from the second century CE on: in Mathurā and Sārnāth (Sāṃmitīyas, respectively second and fourth century CE), in Karle and Junnar (Dharmottarīyas, second century CE), in Nāsik and Kanheri (Bhadrayānīyas, second century CE).[53] While the history and ideas of the first three sub-sects are shrouded in mystery, it seems very likely that the Sāṃmitīyas gained prominence and eventually eclipsed even the mother-sect, the Vātsīputrīyas.[54] And if the testimony of the Chinese pilgrims Xuanzang and Yijing is to be trusted, by the seventh century CE, the Sāṃmitīyas had become by far the numerically most important group among the few surviving non-Mahāyānist denominations (Sarvāstivādins, Sthaviras). Their area of influence extended from the lower Indus to the lower Ganges with nearly hegemonic strongholds in Sindh (about 100 monasteries and 10,000 monks), Mālava (about 100 monasteries and 20,000 monks) and, most importantly perhaps, Valabhī, where a huge monastic complex (*vihāramaṇḍala*) and intellectual centre flourished from the beginning of the sixth century onwards under Maitraka patronage.[55] Interestingly enough, certain among the doctrines of this important Buddhist denomination

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[51] See Bareau 1955: 33 and 114.

[52] For a legendary account of this schism, see Bareau 1955: 122–123, Priestley 1999: 36–37 and Lusthaus 2009: 285.

[53] See Bareau 1955: 36. For references, see Bareau 1955: 122, fn. 2–3, 127, fn. 4, and 128, fn. 4.

[54] Note Yaśomitra's (AKVy 699,3) explanation of *vātsīputrīya*: *vātsīputrīyā āryasāṃmatīyāḥ*.

[55] See Bareau 1955: 36 and 121–122. All in all, the Sāṃmitīya sect amounted to about 65,000 monks and 1,000 monasteries (16,000/500 for the Sarvāstivādins, 20,000/200 for the Sthaviras), only next to the Mahāyānists (about 70,000 monks). Granting that the total amount of monks was 220,000, the Sāṃmitīyas formed about one third of the entire community.

have been regarded consistently by most other Buddhist groups (or, to put it more cautiously, by most institution-based and non-tantric Buddhist scholiasts and philosophers) as a *heresy* – a deviation – known as "personalism" (*pudgalavāda*).[56] In other words, whatever the representativity of personalism within the Sāṃmitīya monastic communities, the most powerful among the non-Mahāyānist denominations was deemed heretic by most of its coreligionists.[57] During centuries, from Devaśarman to Kamalaśīla, the intellectual elite of most other groups and/or schools (Theravādins, Vaibhāṣikas, Mādhyamikas, Yogācāras, Sautrāntikas, "epistemologists," etc.) shaped ever more sophisticated arguments against the Vātsīputrīya and/or Sāṃmitīya Pudgalavāda. But what did these Buddhist personalists – apparently a contradiction in terms – believe?[58]

1.1.3.2. Although what the historical Buddha actually taught seems to remain out of scholarly reach, it is notorious that Śākyamuni has been

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[56] On this translation, see Collins 1982: 162 and Chau 1984: 7. Note that the expressions "Pudgalavādin/Pudgalavāda" (in much the same way as "Hīnayāna" and "Śrāvakayāna") refer neither to an institutional sect nor to a doctrinal school, but rather to the representatives of a set of doctrines based on the notion of *pudgala* and always through the lenses of their opponents. To the best of our knowledge, no Indian Buddhist thinker has ever used this rather deprecative label as a self-designation. On the uses of *puggala* in the Pali canon, see Collins' insightful remarks in Collins 1982: 160–165.

[57] If the term is appropriate at all under such circumstances, for the Buddhists of all persuasions who thought of themselves as "orthodox" (i.e., non-Pudgalavādins) held contradictory opinions on the question whether the Pudgalavādins were Buddhists or not. "Coreligionists" (*svayūthya*) appears in MSAVBh (*Tsi* D163a1–4/P191b2–6; see Eltschinger 2010a: 307–308, fn. 53), MAV 244,8 and 286,12, and "Buddhist" (*bauddha*) in MSAVBh (*Tsi* D166a6–7/P195a8–b2; see Eltschinger 2010a: 314, fn. 72) and AKVy 699,4–5. But to authors such as Vasubandhu, Śāntarakṣita, Kamalaśīla and Prajñākaramati, the Pudgalavādins are at best "pseudo-Buddhists" (*saugataṃmanya*) and "outsiders from within" (*antaścaratīrthika*). See $AKBh_{Pr}$ 472,13–15/$AKBh_{LE}$ 120,2–5, TS 336 and $BCAP_{Sh}$ 328,28–329,1; see also the texts discussed in *Kośa* V.228. The YBhū's (129,7, see below, fn. 111, p. 79) deserves closer inspection.

[58] On the doctrines of the Pudgalavādins, see Venkataramanan 1953, Bareau 1955: 114–130, Chau 1984, Chau 1987, Priestley 1999, Walser 2005: 199–208, Lusthaus 2009. On their literature, see Venkataramanan 1953, Bareau 1955: 115 and 122, Chau 1984: 7–8, Chau 1987: 34–35 and 43–44, Buswell 1999, Lusthaus 2009: 278–285. Priestley 1999: 43–52 (= Chapter 3) provides the best overview to date.

ascribed various and at times contradictory views on the self, ranging from Upaniṣadic to pragmatic, agnostic and even nihilist theses.[59] The extant Pali and Chinese canons as well as many Sanskrit quotations repeatedly show the Buddha in dialogue with the ascetic wanderer Vacchagotta/Vatsa(sa)gotra.[60] According to these accounts, the Buddha refused to commit himself on a set of ten or fourteen points including the question whether the soul (*jīva*) is the same as or different from the body – let us say the five constituents (*skandha*) – and which came to be known as the "unsettled(/unanswered) matters" (*avyākṛtavastu*).[61] The texts in our possession account for the Buddha's silence in various ways: as reflecting the Buddha's "pragmatic" stance (as the simile of the arrow would testify to),[62] as emphasizing the middle way between eternalism and annihilationism[63] and dismissing the question as irrelevant (as the similes of the son of a barren woman or the hair of a tortoise suggest).[64] According to these testimonies, the Buddha's silence *could* be interpreted as suggesting that the soul is neither identical to nor distinct from the body/constituents, thus seemingly leaving the door open for the existence (whatever this may mean) of a self.[65] Now,

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[59] See above, fn. 1, p. 37.

[60] See, e.g., MN I.483–489 (no. 72, *Aggivacchagottasutta*), MN I.489–497 (no. 73, *Mahāvacchagottasutta*), SN IV.391–395 (no. XLIV, x, §7, *Moggallāna*), SN.IV 395–397 (no. XLIV, x, §8, *Vaccha*), SN IV.398–400 (no. XLIV, x, §9, *Kutūhala-sālā*), SN.IV 400–401 (no. XLIV, x, §10, *Ānanda*), SN IV.401–402 (no. XLIV, x, §11, *Sabhiya*); see also MN I.427–432 (no. 63, *Cūḷamālunkyasutta*).

[61] On the *avyākṛtavastu*s, see SN IV.374–403, AKBh$_{Pr}$ 292,8–294,4 (*Kośa* IV.43–48), *Traité* I.153–161 and 423, Collins 1982: 131–139, Oetke 1994 and Walser 2005: 205–207; for other references, see May 1959: 277–278, fn. 1015. In the specific context of the polemic against Pudgalavāda, see especially AKBh$_{Pr}$ 469,9–471,19/ AKBh$_{LE}$ 98,1–114,3 (*Kośa* V.262–270), MAV 250,16–252,2 and Venkataramanan 1953: 168 and 175–176.

[62] See MN I.429–430.

[63] See SN IV.400–401.

[64] On the *vandhyāputra*, see AKBh$_{Pr}$ 292,19–20; on the hair of a tortoise, see AKBh$_{Pr}$ 469,12/AKBh$_{LE}$ 98,5; see also AKBh$_{Pr}$ 469,20–21/AKBh$_{LE}$ 100,3–4 (the mango tree) and Collins 1982: 132–133.

[65] This seems to be the point made by the Pudgalavādin in TSi$_{*Skt}$ 91,17–20: *nāsty ātmeti bhavato vacanam ayuktam / kasmāt / caturṣu vyākaraṇeṣu caturthaṃ sthāpanīyaṃ vyākaraṇam* [...] / *yadi paramārthato nāsty ātmā na syād idaṃ sthāpanīyaṃ vyākaraṇam* /. "Your claim that the self does not exist is ill-founded. – Why? –

following the doxographers Vasumitra, Bhavya and Vinītadeva, this coincides with the most provocative thesis of the Vātsīputrīya and Sāṃmitīya sects: "The *pudgala* is neither the same [as] nor different [from] the *skandha*s."[66] As suggested by Priestley, the Vātsīputrīyas are likely to have traced their ancestry (and lineage?) back to Vacchagotta/Vatsa(sa)gotra, whom Chinese sources also refer to as Vātsīputra, and who was ordained as a monk by the Buddha himself before reaching the status of *arhat* still during the latter's lifetime.[67] And we would even go so far as to hypothesize that the basic views of the Pudgalavādins regarding the self were meant to conform to a specific interpretation of the Buddha's silence. Whereas most Buddhist schools took it to involve the irrelevance of a question addressing something as nonexistent as the son of a barren woman, it might be that the Vātsīputrīyas and the Sāṃmitīyas interpreted it as pointing to the existence of an ontologically indeterminate *pudgala*. And according to Harivarman's Pudgalavādin,

> The Buddha [only] claimed that there is no self so as to discard the wrong view of those outsiders [who] postulate that there is a self that is [something] over and above the five constituents, permanent [and] characterised as indestructible.[68]

1.1.3.3. Did the Pudgalavādins really claim, as most of their opponents would like them to do, that the *pudgala* ultimately exists, i.e., that it exists as a substantial, independent entity? First, the earliest extant sources (the VK and the KV) do not resort to the dichotomy between

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[Because] among the four [types of] questions, the fourth is [the one that is] to remain unanswered. If the self did not exist ultimately, this question would not remain unanswered." See also Walser 2005: 206.

66 Lusthaus 2009: 284; see also Bareau 1955: 115 (Vātsīputrīya), to be compared with Bareau 1955: 123 (Sāṃmitīya). On the relationship between this doctrine and the problem of the whole and its parts, see Bronkhorst 1992: 69–71.

67 See Priestley 1999: 34–36.

68 TSi$_{*Skt}$ 91,14–15: *pañcaskandhavyatirikto nityo 'vināśilakṣaṇo 'sty ātmeti tīrthikāḥ parikalpayanti / teṣāṃ mithyādṛṣṭivyavacchedāya bhagavān āha nāsty ātmeti /*. See also TSi$_{*Skt}$ 93,18–20. This "cathartic" and "upāyic" interpretation of selflessness echoes similar accounts in the *tathāgatagarbha* tradition. See above, §1.1.2.2.

"designational" (*prajñaptisat*) and "substantial" (*dravyasat*).[69] Second, it seems that the Pudgalavādins' replies to their opponents changed in the course of time. More precisely, the Buddhist personalists are likely to have never abandoned the idea of a "true and ultimate" (*saccikaṭṭha-paramaṭṭha*) self,[70] but to have oscillated and probably evolved in their reply strategies:[71] they would have answered that the *pudgala* exists neither substantially nor designatively;[72] or, that it is substantial;[73] or, that the *pudgala* is strictly designational,[74] thus claiming that something can be at the same time "true and ultimate" and purely designational; and however strange this may look from a "mainstream"

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[69] On the distinction between *dravyasat* and *prajñaptisat*, see Lusthaus 2009: 276–278. The Pudgalavādin of the KV (1.1.149, 150, 152) clearly claims that his *puggala* (really) exists (*saccikaṭṭha*, *vijjamāna*, *atthi*), and so does the one of the VK (see La Vallée Poussin 1925: 358).

[70] The interchangeability of the terms "person" (*pudgala*), "self" (*ātman*), "soul" (*jīva*) and "being" (*sattva*) is clear from passages such as VK 542c24 (see Priestley 1999: 81–82), SNŚ 463a13, 463a18 and 19, 465a25, 465b4 (see Priestley 1999: 82), and 464a10 (see Priestley 1999: 83). Note also TSi$_{*Skt}$ 94,4: *ātmā ca pudgalaḥ /. saccikaṭṭhaparamaṭṭha* according to KV 1.1.1.

[71] Priestley 1999: 87–88: "That they abandoned the one and adopted the other need not imply any real alteration in their understanding of the *pudgala*; they may simply have decided that its nature could be indicated more effectively by describing it as substantial. The change in their doctrine (if in fact there was one) may represent no more than a modification of their strategy for its exposition and defence."

[72] See AKBh$_{Pr}$ 461,19/AKBh$_{LE}$ 40,1.

[73] As might be hypothesized from their opponents' statements, such as MSA 18.92 (see Eltschinger 2010a: 305 and 307–311), MHK 3.92 (see Iida 1980: 175), MAV 6.146 (see Huntington 1992: 175) and TS 349.

[74] As testified by SNŚ 462b11–15 (see Priestley 1999: 84–85), and especially 465b5–10, which is worth quoting here: "Now, we reply, the synonyms [...] 'self' and so on are accepted. As the Buddha said to the *tīrthika*s, 'Although the self exists, it is conceptual; the self is not substantial. The self is spoken of on the basis of the existing impure aggregates.' With regard to the *dharma*s that go and come, the Buddha spoke of the self, but it is not a substantial self. As the Buddha said, 'According to whatever formations [...] it is based on it receives its name.' Therefore the Buddha spoke of a conceptual self." Translation Priestley 1999: 85.

Buddhist perspective, this seems to mirror their position.[75] According to Priestley,

> [a]s a conceptual entity it cannot be determined as either the same as the five aggregates or different from them, but as "true and ultimate" it is non-illusory and directly perceptible, and (we might add) has real functions as the agent of its karma and the subject of perception and recollection.[76]

Or, to put it otherwise,

> [t]hey maintain that it is "true and ultimate" in the special sense that its existence and functions are not reducible to those of its constituents; its relation to the five aggregates is indeterminate because, although it is not reducible to them, neither is it independent of them. The *pudgala* or self of each individual is thus single, a unity formed by a particular combination of the five aggregates and persisting through all the changes of its impermanent constituents: it is the author of its own deeds and continues as the enjoyer of their results.[77]

What about the cognizability of this ontologically hybrid *pudgala*, then? The Pudgalavādins are likely to have claimed that the person was accessible to all of the six cognitions (*vijñāna*), be it in an indirect manner only[78] – a claim dismissed by the "orthodox" scholiasts by

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[75] Note SNŚ 464b22: "Since the insubstantial can exist, this assertion that the insubstantial and the non-existent are both alike nonexistent though spoken of as existent is difficult to accept." Translation Priestley 1999: 96. Priestley (1999: 96) adds: "The position of the SNŚ, then, seems to be that the *pudgala* or self is conceptual and insubstantial, and yet is something that exists."

[76] Priestley 1999: 88. Note also Priestley 1999: 98: "The criterion for being 'true and ultimate' seems to be causal efficiency." On the Pudgalavādins' and especially the Sāṃmitīyas' understanding of *karman*, see Walser 2005: 199–200.

[77] Priestley 1999: 101. Note also Lusthaus 2009: 280: "The *pudgala* is on the one hand merely a linguistic construction. On the other hand, it involves something in everyone's experience about which we can say nothing definitively coherent. It is unreal (merely nominal), but experientially, even soterically, effective."

[78] According to TSi$_{*Skt}$ 92,12–14 (*bhavatāṃ śāsana ātmā ṣaḍvijñānair vijñāyate* /). Note also TSi$_{*Skt}$ 92,15: *ātmā ṣaḍvijñānavijñeyaḥ*. According to the Vātsīputrīya/Sāṃmitīya of AKBh 9 (AKBh$_{Pr}$ 463,10–14/AKBh$_{LE}$ 52,1–7, *Kośa* V.238), the *pudgala* is grasped by all the six *vijñāna*s, but in an indirect manner. On the *manovijñāna*, see *Kośa* V.242–243, fn. 3 and, in the context of the perceptibility of the *pudgala*, AKBh$_{Pr}$ 467,1–2/AKBh$_{LE}$ 80,2–3 (*Kośa* V.252) and AKBh$_{Pr}$ 463,10ff./AKBh$_{LE}$ 52,1ff.

pointing to the fact that it was cognizable to none of the six cognitions, whose objects are strictly distinct and delimitated.[79] It is not unlikely that the Pudgalavādins were pressed to renounce this dogmatically difficult position and advocated the existence of a seventh cognition (referred to maybe as **sattvavijñāna*),[80] or even attempted to include the cognition of the *pudgala* into mind-cognition.[81]

(*Kośa* V.238ff.). See also *Traité* II.735–736 and fn. 1. On the cognizability of the *pudgala*, see also below, fn. 150, p. 97.

[79] See La Vallée Poussin 1925: 370–376.

[80] VK 543c21–544a28; see La Vallée Poussin 1925: 367–369. The Pudgalavādin claims that the Buddha did in fact know this seventh cognition but refrained from revealing or promulgating it. Was, then, the Buddha ignorant of this seventh *vijñāna* (and thus not omniscient), or did he indulge in *ācāryamuṣṭi*? Here is the dialogue between the Pudgalavādin and the Śūnyatāvādin (VK 544a17–28): "Je n'accuse pas Bhagavat d'ignorance, je ne l'accuse pas de faire le maître qui ferme la main. Bhagavat connaît de son savoir de Bouddha, mais il ne proclame pas. En effet, il a dit dans le *sūtra* de la forêt des *śiṃśapā*s (*Saṃyutta* V.437): '*bhikṣu*s, jusqu'au nombre complet des feuilles des forêts de *śiṃśapā*s de cette grande terre, j'ai directement connaissance de ces *dharmas*. Quoique je les sache de mon savoir de Bouddha, je ne les dis pas aux autres.' C'est ainsi que Bhagavat, connaissant la septième connaissance, ne la proclame pas. Le Śūnyatāvādin doit demander: Le *sūtra* de la forêt de *śiṃśapā*s ne contient-il pas une conclusion? Bhagavat, en fait, continue et dit: 'Les *dharmas* [que je n'enseigne pas] ne sont pas utiles au salut, au bien, au *dharma*, à la vie religieuse (*brahmacarya*), ils ne produisent pas l'intelligence (*abhijñā*), la *bodhi*, le *nirvāṇa*.' A supposer qu'existe votre *pudgala*, il n'est pas utile au salut, au bien, au *dharma*, à la vie religieuse, il ne produit pas l'intelligence, la *bodhi*, le *nirvāṇa*: il est sans emploi. Donc le *pudgala* n'existe pas." Translation La Vallée Poussin 1925: 369. It is tempting to hypothesize that such a canonical statement (SN V.437–438 [no. LVI, ix, 32, *Simsapā*]) formed the background of Dharmakīrti's emphasis on (what was to become) the *upayuktasarvajñatā* by contrast with the *sarvasarvajñatā* (knowing the exact number of insects [*kīṭasaṅkhyā*]); see PV 2.29–33.

[81] See MSABh 155,23–26: *upalabdhir hi nāma buddhyā pratipattiḥ / na ca pudgalaṃ buddhyā na pratipadyante pudgalavādinaḥ / uktaṃ ca bhagavatā / dṛṣṭa eva dharma ātmānam upalabhate prajñāpayatīti / kathaṃ nopalabdho bhavati /*. "[The Pudgalavādin:] But what is called 'perception' [also consists in] a cognition by the intellect (*buddhi*). Now, it is not the case that [we] Pudgalavādins do not cognize the *pudgala* through the intellect. Moreover, the Blessed One has said: 'In this very life, [the living being] perceives an *ātman*, designates [an *ātman*].' How [then can the *pudgala* be said] not [to be] perceived?" According to MSAVBh *Tsi* D164a1–4/P192b3–7, one cannot claim that only (**kevalam*) that which is cognized (**√dṛś-*) by the (corporeal) sense organs exists as a real substance (**dravyasat*), for there are things existing as real substances which, though they are not perceived by the

1.1.3.4.1. According to Vasumitra's doxographical account, "[t]he *pudgala* is neither the same [as] nor different from the *skandha*s. It is a *prajñapti* dependent on the *skandha*s, *āyatana*s, and *dhātu*s."[82] The personalists actually developed a sophisticated account of the *pudgala* as a designation. Note, first, that according to Harivarman's TSi, the (or some) Pudgalavādins expanded the traditional dichotomy between conditioned (*saṃskṛta*) and unconditioned (*asaṃskṛta*) factors in order to accommodate their *pudgala*:

> The *dharma*s which may be known are called the five categories of *dharma*s: the past, future, present, uncreated and inexpressible *dharma*s. The self is in the fifth [category of *dharma*s].[83]

(corporeal) sense organs, are cognized by the intellect (**buddhi*), like the mind and the mental factors (**cittacaitta*). Therefore, "perceived" (**upalabdha*) can also refer to things that are grasped by mental cognition (**manovijñāna*). According to the Pudgalavādin, then, insofar as the *pudgala* is made perceptible (**pratyakṣīkṛta*) by the intellect, it is grasped by perception (**pratyakṣapramāṇa*) and therefore exists as a real substance. On the cognizability of the self, note also YBhū 131,9–12 (YBhū$_{Tib}$ 77a4–6): *kaccid icchasi yāsau sattvabuddhiḥ sā pratyakṣārthagrāhikānumānārthagrāhikā veti / sacet pratyakṣārthagrāhikā tena rūpādayaḥ skandhā eva na sattvaḥ pratyakṣa iti na yujyate / saced ānumānikārthagrāhikā tena bāladārakāṇām apy anabhyūhya sahasā pravartata iti na yujyate /*. "Do you accept that this [very] notion of a [substantial] living being grasps an object of perception(/a perceptible object), or that it grasps an object of inference? If it grasps an object of perception(/a perceptible object), then it is impossible, for only the constituents, corporeality, etc., not a [substantial] living being, are perceptible. [But] if it grasps an inferential object, then it is impossible, for [this substantial living being] occurs undeductively [and] immediately (*anabhyūhya sahasā* : *ma brtags par 'phral la 'jug par*) down to young children (*bāladāraka* : *byis pa chuṅ ṅu*)."

[82] SBhUC 16c14–15. Translation Lusthaus 2009: 284.

[83] TSi$_{Ch}$ 260c9f. (TSi$_{*Skt}$ 95,1–2: *jñeyadharmā yad uta pañcadharmakośāḥ – atītā anāgatāḥ pratyutpannā asaṃskṛtā avaktavyā iti / ātmā pañcamadharmāntargataḥ /*). Translation Priestley 1999: 79, who also quotes (ibid.) MPPU 61a24f.: "The *pudgala* is included in a fifth, inexpressible category of *dharma*s." This doctrine might have a forerunner in KV 1.1.225–226: *puggalo saṅkhato ti / na h'evaṃ vattabbe* [...]/ *puggalo asaṅkhato ti / na h'evaṃ vattabbe* [...]/ *puggalo n'eva saṅkhato nāsaṃkhato ti / na h'evaṃ vattabbe* [...]/ *puggalo n'eva saṅkhato nāsaṅkhato ti / āmantā / saṅkhatañ ca asaṅkhatañ ca ṭhapetvā atth'aññā tatiyā koṭīti / na h'evaṃ vattabbe* [...]/ *saṅkhataṃ ca asaṅkhataṃ ca ṭhapetvā atth'aññā tatiyā koṭīti / āmantā* [...]/ *aññaṃ saṅkhataṃ aññaṃ asaṅkhataṃ aññe puggalo ti / na h'evaṃ vattabbe* [...]/ *khandhā saṅkhatā nibbānaṃ asaṅkhataṃ puggalo n'eva saṅkhato nāsaṅkhato ti / āmantā /*.

According to the two Chinese versions of the TDK and the SNŚ, this inexpressible *pudgala* is liable to three *prajñapti*s.[84] Or, to put it otherwise, there are three kinds of persons according to three different modes of designating them: the *pudgala* as appropriating the present constituents, the *pudgala* as engaged in temporality, and the *pudgala* once freed from appropriation, i.e., experiencing *nirvāṇa*. According to the TDK_S, these three modes of designation respectively dispell the false view of the sentient being as nonexistent (but also as existent, TDK_K), annihilationism (*ucchedavāda*) and eternalism (*śāśvatavāda*).[85]

1.1.3.4.2. First, the *pudgala* as conceived or designated according to appropriation (*upādāna-* or *upādāya-prajñapti*)[86] refers to the person as appropriating (as internal, TDK_K), due to past karmic forces (*saṃskāra*) and fetters (*saṃyojana*, TDK_K), the present constituents (*skandha*), the eighteen sensory elements (*dhātu*) and the twelve sensory

"[I]s the person conditioned? – Nay, that cannot truly be said [...] Is the person unconditioned? – Nay, that cannot truly be said [...] Is he neither? – Nay, that cannot truly be said [...] I repeat my question. – Yes. Apart from the conditioned or the unconditioned, is there another, a third alternative? – Nay, that cannot truly be said [...] I repeat my question. – Yes [...] Are then the conditioned, the unconditioned, the person, entirely different things? – Nay, that cannot truly be said [...] Are the aggregates conditioned, Nibbāna unconditioned, the person neither conditioned nor unconditioned? – Yes." Translation Aung/Rhys Davids 1915: 54–55. Note also VK 545b13–19: "Le Pudgalavādin dit: 'Le Pudgala existe [...]' Le Śūnyatāvādin demande: Le Pudgala, faut-il dire qu'il est *saṃskṛta*, qu'il est *asaṃskṛta*? S'il est *saṃskṛta*, on peut dire du Pudgala, comme des autres *saṃskṛta*s, qu'il naît, dure, se transforme, périt; s'il est *asaṃskṛta*, on peut dire du Pudgala, comme des autres *asaṃskṛta*s, qu'il ne naît pas [...] – Bhagavat a dit: 'Bhikṣu, je dis qu'il y a deux choses, le *saṃskṛta*, l'*asaṃskṛta*: en dehors du *saṃskṛta* et de l'*asaṃskṛta*, il n'y a pas autre chose.' Donc il n'y a pas de Pudgala." Translation La Vallée Poussin 1925: 369.

[84] The present section is based on TDK_S 24a29–b7 as translated in Priestley 1999: 56–57 and Lusthaus 2009: 280–281, TDK_K 10a3–29 as translated in Priestley 1999: 57–60 and Lusthaus 2009: 281–283, and SNŚ 466a28–c27 as translated in Priestley 1999: 63–66. On these three *prajñapti*s, see Venkataramanan 1953: 182–195, Chau 1984: 9–11, Chau 1987: 35–39, Priestley 1999: 53–80 (= Chapter 4), Walser 2005: 200–203 and Lusthaus 2009: 280–283.

[85] See TDK_S 24a29–b8 and Walser 2005: 203 and 207.

[86] For a discussion of the Indic original, see Priestley 1999: 71–72 and Walser 2005: 324, fn. 34.

bases (*āyatana*).[87] The SNŚ takes this modality as viewing the (concept of the) person as dependent on its basis:

> So it is to be understood that the person [based on] the five aggregates and the twelve spheres in any of the five destinies, or with *asura*s and the intermediate existence, seven destinies, and in the present existence whether *kalala*, *arbuda*, *ghana*, *peśin* or *praśākhā*, as newborn, child, youth, middle aged, or old,[88] with a mind determined as good or bad, following the rules or transgressing the rules, is called on the basis of the above *dharma*s, and all of the above whether combined or not combined, the person conceived (or designated) according to the basis.[89]

According to the Pudgalavādins, the designation of a person is based on the five constituents (*skandhān upādāya*),[90] a relation that, at least as early as the KV, was explained by resorting to the image of the tree (*rukkha*) and the shadow (*chāyā*):

> Just as the designation of the shadow is based on the tree, in exactly the same way, the designation of a person is based on corporeality [and the four other constituents].[91]

But at least from the TDS and the SNŚ, this image seems to have been replaced by that of fire (*agni*) and fuel (*indhana*):

> As the Buddha explained when he spoke to Pāpaya, "Whatever the formations on whose basis it is expressed, from those its name is established." This is called *upādāyaprajñapti*, as in the example of fire.[92]

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[87] Here, the TDK_K (10a9, see Priestley 1999: 57–60) adds that the appropriated factors and the *pudgala* are neither the same nor different: "If the living being and the body were the same, [the living being] would be impermanent and [of the nature of] suffering. If they were different, it would be permanent and without suffering." Translation Priestley 1999: 58. Moreover, if it were impermanent, there could be no interest in the fruit of religious life; but if it were permanent, one would not engage in religious life.

[88] On this tenfold division of embryonic life (*garbhāvasthā*, items 1–5) and post-embryonic life (*jātāvasthā*, items 6–10), see $AKBh_{Pr}$ 85,12–13 (*Kośa* I.255–256) and AKVy 198,32–34.

[89] SNŚ 466b22–26. Translation Priestley 1999: 64–65.

[90] See, e.g., $AKBh_{Pr}$ 461,19–20/$AKBh_{LE}$ 40,3–4, quoted below, fn. 135, p. 88, and §1.2.2.

[91] KV 1.1.189: *yathā rukkhaṃ upādāya chāyāya paññatti / evaṃ eva rūpaṃ upādāya puggalassa paññatti* /. See also KV 1.1.171–172.

Or:

> The Buddha furthermore explained, "Whatever the formations upon which it depends, from those it receives its name, as a fire receives its name on the basis of its fuel."[93]

This image is attested and criticised as early as the TSi and the MSA.[94] How should we account for these comparisons? Four aspects can be thought of. First, the shadow cannot be said to be identical to or distinct from the tree; in the same way, fire cannot be said to be the same as or other than fuel[95] (something that the non-Pudgalavādins repeatedly challenge[96]). Second, the shadow and the fire can be said to

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[92] SNŚ 466b4–6. Translation Priestley 1999: 165.

[93] SNŚ 467a23f. Translation Priestley 1999: 165.

[94] On the TDS' statements regarding fire and fuel, see Priestley 1999: 166. On this analogy, see SNŚ 466b4–6, quoted above (see also Chau 1987: 35, Venkataramanan 1953: 182), SNŚ 467a23f., quoted above, TSi$_{*Skt}$ 94,9–10, MSA 18.95, MSABh 156,13–24 and MSAVBh *Tsi* D167a2–b1/P196a7–b6 (Eltschinger 2010a: 314–316 and fn. 76–82), AKBh$_{Pr}$ 461,24–462,24/AKBh$_{LE}$ 40,9–48,5 (*Kośa* V.234–237), and especially AKBh$_{Pr}$ 462,1–4/AKBh$_{LE}$ 42,2–6, Duerlinger 1982, Cousins 1995: 88, Buswell 1999: 360, Priestley 1999: 165–186 (= Chapter 11), Walser 2005: 203–204. Cousins (1995: 88) argues that the fire-fuel analogy, which does not occur in the earliest extant sources, might have been borrowed by "later Pudgalavādins" from Nāgārjuna's MMK, Chapter 10. See also below, §1.2.1.1 and fn. 149, p. 97.

[95] According to MSAVBh *Tsi* D167a2–b1/P196a7–b6, fire and fuel exist as real substances (**dravyasat*) but are not distinct things, for once fire has arisen from fuel, they are no longer distinct things; and if they were distinct things, fire could arise even in the absence of fuel; but since one does not observe that fire arises in the absence of fuel, they are not distinct things. Nor are fire and fuel one and the same thing, for fuel is the cause of fire and does not have heat for its nature (**uṣṇatā-svabhāva*), whereas fire is the effect of fuel and has heat for its nature; and if they were one and the same thing, then, as one would not burn oneself when touching (*[sam]√spṛś-*) fire, one would burn oneself when touching fuel.

[96] See, e.g., MSABh 156,17–18: *teṣāṃ ca bhinnaṃ lakṣaṇam ity anya evāgnir indhanāt* /. "Now, since their characteristics are distinct, fire is simply other than fuel." See Eltschinger 2010a: 315, fn. 77. See also AKBh$_{Pr}$ 462,14/AKBh$_{LE}$ 44,13: *tayor api siddham anyatvaṃ lakṣanabhedāt* /. "Even [so,] these two, [fire and fuel,] are established to be [mutually] other, because they have different characteristics." As explained by TSi$_{*Skt}$ 94,10–11, MSABh 156,17, AKBh$_{Pr}$ 462,12–14/AKBh$_{LE}$ 44,11–13 and AKVy 700,21–24, fire consists in the element fire (*tejodhātu*) while fuel consists in the remaining three elements (*śeṣāṇi bhūtāni*, MSABh 156,17), i.e., water (*ap*, think of sap or oil), earth (*pṛthivī*, think of wood) and wind (*vāyu*, think of gaz).

exist, albeit in a less determinate way as the tree and the fuel. Third, there is no more shadow without tree than there is fire without fuel (something the non-Pudgalavādins would qualify[97]), which seems – fourth – to point to a causality relationship between the causes that are the tree and the fuel and the effects that are the shadow and the fire. To sum up, y is not reducible to x; y exists; y does not exist without x; and y is caused by x.

1.1.3.4.3. The Pudgalavādins' second mode of designation corresponds to the person as conceived according to the past, i.e., on the basis of past constituents, bases and elements (TDK_S), or to "approach" (TDK_K), or to "transition" (SNŚ) – the latter two referring to the person in the

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Now, these elements have different characteristics. According to MSAVBh *Tsi* D167b5–6/P197a3–5 (see also MSAVBh *Tsi* D168a2–4/P196b2–4), fire has heat for its characteristic (**uṣṇatālakṣaṇa*), whereas earth, water and wind have respectively for their characteristics solidity (**kharalakṣaṇa*), fluidity (**snehalakṣaṇa*) and mobility (**īraṇālakṣaṇa*). See AK 1.12cd, $AKBh_{Pr}$ 8,18–25 and *Kośa* I.22–23; see also above, fn. 44, p. 57. This idea seems to find an echo in PVSV 147,12 (see below, fn. 180 and 181, p. 104) although Dharmakīrti's main argument is much more encompassing (see below, fn. 149, p. 97).

[97] On the existence of fire in the absence of fuel, see MSABh 156,20–21: *vinā punar indhanenāgnir astīti katham idaṃ vijñāyate / upalabdheḥ* [= MSA 18.95d_1] / *tathā hi vāyunā vikṣiptaṃ dūram api jvalat paraiti / athāpi syād vāyus tatrendhanam iti /*. "[The Pudgalavādin:] But how is it known that fire [also] exists without fuel? [Answer:] Because one perceives [that fire can exist without fuel], for [when it is] flung by the wind, [fire can] even go a long way while [still] ablaze. [The Pudgalavādin:] But in this case, the wind [itself] might [well] be the fuel!" This is reminiscent of SN IV.399: *seyyathāpi vaccha aggi sa-upādāno jalati no anupādāno / evam eva khvāham vaccha sa-upādānassa upapattim paññāpemi no anupādānassā ti / yasmim pana bho gotama samaye acci vātena khittā dūram pi gacchati / imassa pana bhavaṃ gotamo kim upādānasmim paññāpetī ti / yasmiṃ kho vacccha samaye acci vātena khittā dūram pi gacchati / tam ahaṃ vātupādānam vadāmi vāto hissa vaccha tasmiṃ samaye upādānaṃ hotī ti /*. "Just as, Vaccha, a fire with fuel blazes up, but not without fuel, even so, Vaccha, do I declare rebirth to be for what has fuel, not for what is without fuel. – But, master Gotama, at the time when a flame, flung by the wind, goes a very long way, as to fuel what says the master Gotama about this? – At the time when a flame, Vaccha, flung by the wind goes a very long way, I declare that flame to be supported by the wind. At that time, Vaccha, the wind is the fuel." Translation Woodward 1972: 280–281. The Buddha explains next that in the case of rebirth, craving is the fuel.

past, (and/or) in the future, (and/or) in the present,[98] as in the following expressions: "In the past, I was King Kuśa," "In the future you will have the name Ajita," "In the present I am a prominent merchant."[99] This second kind of *prajñapti*, which points to the person "who has not yet appropriated [...] or who has already appropriated" the constituents (TDK_K), refers to that which underlies the rebirth stories (*jātaka*) of the (future) Buddha[100] and

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[98] The problems pertaining to this second kind of designation are nearly insuperable. First, whereas the TDK_S has it refer to the past only, both the TDK_K and the SNŚ have it refer to the three times. According to Priestley (1999: 73), "[t]he only obvious explanation is that the doctrine initially recognized only conception according to the past and was later expanded when it was noticed that the person could also be conceived according to future and present. Perhaps the original intention was to explain and justify the Buddha's references to his own previous existences [...] With the expansion of the doctrine to include conception according to future and present, a more general term for these three forms of temporal conception of the person would have to be found. In the *Sì ēhánmù chāojiě* [= TDK_K, VE/IR] it was 'conception according to approach'; in the SNŚ, 'conception according to transition.'" Do these two Chinese expressions, *fāngbian* (方便) and *dù* (度) respectively, render one and the same Indic original? According to Priestley, this original might be either *upāya* (see Priestley 1999: 73) or, more probably, *upacāra* (see Priestley 1999: 74–75). Note, in this connection, Lusthaus' (2009: 281) translation as "heuristics for metaphorical devices." Note also that the SNŚ (466b27–28, see Priestley 1999: 63–66) seems to take "transition" at its face value: "What is the person conceived (or designated) according to transition? At the time when it is passing over to another existence, it is described by the Buddha as 'a being in transition.'" Translation Priestley 1999: 65.

[99] According to Lusthaus 2009: 283; to be compared with Priestley 1999: 58–59.

[100] The *Jātaka*s (i.e., *Jātaka* I.42, King Mahāsudarśana) are indeed resorted to by Harivarman's Pudgalavādin in TSi_{*Skt} 90,20–91,4. Note thesis no. 3 of the Vātsīputrīyas (according to Vasumitra and Bhavya): "*dharma*s, if apart from the *pudgala*, cannot move on from a previous lifetime to a subsequent lifetime. On the basis of the *pudgala*, one can say there is transference (*saṅkrānti*)." Translation Lusthaus 2009: 284; see also Bareau 1955: 116. However, as the SNŚ strongly insists, the *pudgala* is *never* (until the *nirupadhiśeṣanirvāṇa*) without a set of *skandha*s, and this is the reason why the Pudgalavādins strongly advocated the existence of intermediate existence (*antarābhava*). See thesis no. 33 of the Vātsīputrīyas (according to Vasumitra) in Bareau 1955: 119, and thesis no. 10 of the Sāṃmitīyas (according to the KV) in Bareau 1955: 124. Note also Venkataramanan 1953: 187 (and 195): "Therefore leaving the body of the five *skandha*s, when all that is extinct, the person moves on from this life to another. Hence it is said that there is the person who

> explains (i) how personal continuity, being an uninterrupted flow of psycho-physical phenomena, not only flows in the present, but has its source in the past and continues to flow into the future, and (ii) how personal karmic responsability is possible, such that Buddhism is no longer susceptible to the charge that it is nihilistic and immoral.[101]

Chau's statement cannot be accepted without qualification, however, for the Pudgalavādins, in keeping with what they thought had been the Buddha's attitude, proved rather cautious about issues of moral responsibility and personal identity in *saṃsāra*. Consider the following excerpt from the KV:

> Does (a person or) soul run on (or transmigrate) from this world to another and from another world to this? – Yes. Is it the identical soul who transmigrates from this world to another and from another world to this? – Nay, that cannot be truly said [...] Then, is it a different soul who transmigrates? – Nay, that cannot be truly said.[102]

A similar dialogue occurs in the VK on the question whether the transmigrating *pudgala* is the same or different, say, in its successive destinies (*gati*) as a hungry ghost (*preta*) and as an animal (*tiryagyoni*), or whether the stream-enterer (*srotaāpanna*) is the same as or different from the one who obtains the fruit of this condition.[103] Consider, then, the following dialogue of the KV:

> Is he who does the acts the same as he who experiences the effect? – Nay, that cannot truly be said [...] I repeat my question. – Yes. Then, are happiness and misery self-caused? – Nay, that cannot truly be said [...] Is the doer a different [person] from the enjoyer [of the effect]? – Nay, that cannot truly be said [...] I

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leaves the five *skandha*s of this state (viz.) *upapattibhava* and takes up the five *skandha*s of the *antarābhava*."

101 Chau 1984: 11, to be compared with Chau 1987: 37. See below, §1.1.3.5.

102 KV 1.1.158: *puggalo sandhāvati asmā lokā paraṃ lokaṃ parasmā lokā imaṃ lokan ti / āmantā / so puggalo sandhāvati asmā lokā paraṃ lokaṃ parasmā lokā imaṃ lokan ti / na h'evaṃ vattabbe* [...]/ *aññ̃o puggalo sandhāvati asmā lokā paraṃ lokaṃ parasmā lokā imaṃ lokan ti / na h'evaṃ vattabbe* /. Translation Aung/Rhys Davids 1915: 26.

103 See La Vallée Poussin 1925: 359–360.

> repeat my question. – Yes. Then, are happiness and misery caused by another? – Nay, that cannot truly be said.[104]

Here again, a similar passage can be traced in the VK.[105] Thus on the issue of the identity of the agent (*kattar*, *kartṛ*) of deeds and the experiencer (*paṭisaṃvedin*, *bhoktṛ*) of pleasant and unpleasant results, the Pudgalavādins seem to have remained true to what they regarded as the Buddha's attitude, i.e., did not commit themselves beyond claiming that they were neither the same nor different.

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[104] KV 1.1.212: *so karoti so paṭisaṃvedetīti / na h'evaṃ vattabbe* [...]/ *so karoti so paṭisaṃvedetīti / āmantā / syaṃ kataṃ sukhadukkhan ti / na h'evaṃ vattabbe* [...]/ *añño karoti añño paṭisaṃvedetīti / na h'evaṃ vattabbe* [...]/ *añño karoti añño paṭisaṃvedetīti / āmantā / paraṃ kataṃ sukhadukkhan ti / na h'evaṃ vattabbe* /. Translation Aung/Rhys Davids 1915: 47–48. This refers back to canonical passages such as SN II.22: *kiṃ nu kho bho gotama sayaṅkataṃ sukhadukkhanti / mā hevaṃ timbarukāti bhagavā avoca / kiṃ pana bho gotama parakataṃ sukhadukkhanti / mā hevaṃ timbarukāti bhagavā avoca* /. "Now then, Master Gotama, is pleasure and pain brought about by one's self? – Not so verily, Timbaruka, said the Exalted One. Well then, are they brought about by another? – Not so verily, Timbaruka, said the Exalted One." Translation Rhys Davids/Woodward 1972: 17–18. SN II.20: *sa karoti so paṭisaṃvediyatīti kho kassapa ādito sato sayaṅkataṃ dukkhanti iti vadaṃ sassatam etam pareti / añño karoti añño paṭisaṃvediyatīti kho kassapa vedanābhitunnassa sato paraṅkataṃ dukkhanti iti vadam ucchedam etam pareti / ete te kassapa ubho ante anupagamma majjhena tathāgato dhammaṃ deseti / avijjāpaccayā saṅkhārā / saṅkhārapaccayā viññāṇaṃ* /. "'One and the same person both acts and experiences [the results]': this, Kassapa, which you called at first 'suffering self-wrought,' amounts to the Eternalist theory.' 'One acts, another experiences [the result]': this, Kassapa, which to one smitten by the feeling occurs as 'suffering caused by another,' amounts to the Annihilationist theory.' To you, Kassapa, the Tathāgata, not approaching either extreme, teaches the Norm by a middle [way]: conditioned by ignorance activities come to pass, conditioned by activities consciousness." Translation Rhys Davids/Woodward 1972: 16.

[105] VK 542c24ff. See La Vallée Poussin 1925: 364–366. Here is the position of the Pudgalavādin before the debate starts: "Il y a un moi (*ātman*), un être (*sattva*), un vivant (*jīva*), un être qui naît (*jantu*), un être qui se nourrit (*poṣa*), un mâle (*puruṣa*), un *pudgala*. Parce qu'il y a un *pudgala*, on fait des actions ou agréables à sentir [dans leur rétribution] (*sukhavedanīya*), ou désagréables à sentir, ou ni-désagréables-ni-agréables à sentir. Ayant fait des actions agréables à sentir, on éprouve des sensations agréables; ayant fait des actions désagréables à sentir, on éprouve des sensations désagréables; ayant fait des actions ni-désagréables-ni-agréables à sentir, on éprouve des sensations ni-désagréables-ni-agréables." Translation La Vallée Poussin 1925: 364.

1.1.3.4.4. Let us add a few words concerning the third kind of designation, viz. the *pudgala* conceived according to cessation:

> When that has ended, with no [further] appropriating, no seizing as another or oneself, [the one who is] at rest without remainder, having passed over from here to the further bank, is conceived (or designated) according to cessation.[106]

This mode is seen at work in statements such as: "The Fortunate One has attained *parinirvāṇa*,"[107] "appropriation is exhausted," "no [further] appropriation [will occur],"[108] "There is no further case of his taking up the aggregates."[109] The *pudgala* as designated by cessation points to the end of appropriation. Its purpose is

> to demonstrate that the Tathāgata or an arahant after attaining the *nirvāṇa* without remainder (*nirupadhiśeṣanirvāṇa*) [...] is the liberated person *par excellence* [referred to as *uttama*° or *paramapuriso*], dwelling in beatitude.[110]

1.1.3.5. As we have seen, the Pudgalavādins are likely to have resorted to the self in order to account for *functions* that, in their opinion, could not be explained satisfactorily in terms of the mere constituents, bases and elements, i.e., were felt not to be reducible to the existential basis.[111] What are these functions? The MSABh presents us with the following Pudgalavādin objection:

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[106] TDK_K 10a18–20, translation Priestley 1999: 59. Here again, the TDK_K (10a23–24, see Priestley 1999: 57–60) adds: "If he were different [from the aggregates], he could not have attained *parinirvāṇa*; if he were not different, he could not have attained *parinirvāṇa*." Translation Priestley 1999: 59.

[107] Priestley 1999: 56.

[108] Lusthaus 2009: 283.

[109] Priestley 1999: 66.

[110] Chau 1984: 11.

[111] The *ātmavāda* section of the YBhū's *savitarkādibhūmi* (see Shukla 1967: 36–37) contains a very interesting series of objections against (a strong version of) selflessness. Although the Ātmavādin is presented here inter alia as *ito bāhyas tīrthyaḥ* (YBhū 129,7), there are good reasons to believe that he is a Buddhist Pudgalavādin. The passage starts with a definition of *ātmavāda* (YBhū 129,6–9 [$YBhū_{Tib}$ 76a7–b1]): *ātmavādaḥ katamaḥ / yathāpīhaikatyaḥ śramaṇo vā brāhmaṇa evandṛṣṭir bhavaty evaṃvādī / tadyathā / ito bāhyas tīrthyaḥ / satyataḥ sthitita ātmā vā sattvo vā jīvo vā poṣo vā pudgalo vetyādi / sa kasmād evandṛṣṭir bhavaty evaṃvādī /.*

"What does the doctrine of self consist of? – For example, in this [world], an ascetic or a *brāhmaṇa* has such a view, holds such a discourse, i.e., [is] an outsider who is exterior to the [Buddhist religion]: a self, a [substantial] living being, a life principle, an individual, or a person really (*satyatas*) [exists], steadily (*sthititas*) [exists]. – Why does this [person] have such a view, hold such a discourse?" As an answer, the author(s) of the passage suggest(s) that the doctrine of self stems from both scripture (*āgama*) and reason(ing) (*yukti*, YBhū 129,9 [YBhū$_{\text{Tib}}$ 76b1]). The reasons adduced for it are as follows (YBhū 129,11–130,14 [YBhū$_{\text{Tib}}$ 76b2–77a5]): *dvābhyāṃ kāraṇābhyām / abuddhipūrvaṃ ca sati sattvabuddhipravṛttyupalabdhitaḥ / buddhipūrvaṃ ca ceṣṭopalabdhitaḥ / tasyaivaṃ bhavati / sa ced ātmā na syāt pañcabhir ākāraiḥ pañcavidhavastudarśane saty ātmabuddhir na pravarteta / rūpākṛtiṃ dṛṣṭvā rūpabuddhir eva pravarteta na sattvabuddhiḥ / sukhaduḥkhāvadīrṇaṃ saṃskāraṃ dṛṣṭvā vedanādibuddhir eva pravarteta*[a] */ na sattvapatitocchritabuddhiḥ / nāminaṃ nāmasambaddhaṃ saṃskāraṃ dṛṣṭvā sañjñābuddhir eva pravarteta / na kṣatriyo vā brāhmaṇo vā vaiśyo vā śūdro vā buddhadatto*[b] *vā guṇamitro veti sattvabuddhiḥ / śubhāśubhaceṣṭāsambaddhaṃ saṃskāraṃ dṛṣṭvā saṃskārabuddhir eva pravarteta / na bālapaṇḍitasattvabuddhiḥ / viṣaye vijñānānuvṛttiṃ*[c] *dṛṣṭvā cittabuddhir eva pravarteta / nāhaṃ paśyāmītyevamādisattvabuddhiḥ / yataś caivam abuddhipūrvam eṣu pañcasu vastuṣu pañcākārā sattvabuddhir eva pravartate na saṃskārabuddhiḥ / tasmād abuddhipūrvaṃ tāvad*[d] *asya dṛṣṭvā sattvabuddhipravṛttye*[e]*upalabdhita evaṃ bhavaty asty ātmeti / tasyaivaṃ bhavati / sa ced ātmā na syān na saṃskāreṣu buddhipūrvā ceṣṭopalabhyeta / ahaṃ cakṣuṣā rūpāṇi drakṣyāmi paśyāmi dṛṣṭavān / na vā drakṣyāmītyevam* [...] *yathā darśana evaṃ śrotraghrāṇajihvākāyamanaḥsu veditavyam / evaṃ kuśalakarmābhisaṃskāre kuśalakarma*[f]*nirvṛttāv akuśalakarmābhisaṃskāre 'kuśalakarmanirvṛttāv ityevamādikā buddhipūrvā ceṣṭā nopalabhyeta / na caiṣā saṃskāramātre yujyate / tasmād evaṃ bhavaty asty ātmeti //*. [[a] *vedanābuddhir eva pravarteta* em. (Tib.) : *sañjñābuddhir eva pravarteta na sattvapatitocchritabuddhiḥ / vedanādibuddhir eva pravarteta* / Ed. [b] *buddhadatta* em. (Tib.; YBhū 135,8–12) : *brahmadatta* Ed. [c] Note Tib. *'jug pa*, **(pra)vṛtti*? [d] Tib. with no equivalent of *tāvat*. [e] °*pravṛtty*° em. (Tib. *'jug pa*) : °*praty*° Ed. [f] Note Tib. *dge ba'i chos*, **kuśaladharma*.] "For two reasons: [first,] because one observes that the notion of a [substantial] living being occurs unconsciously (*abuddhipūrvam*) with regard to a real (*sat*) [thing/event], and [second,] because one observes [that] a [given cognitive or ethical] behaviour (*ceṣṭā*) [is made] consciously (*buddhipūrvam*) [i.e., entails an 'I' awareness. Regarding the first reason,] it occurs to the [person given to reason(ing)] in the following way. If the self did not exist, the fivefold (*pañcabhir ākāraiḥ*) notion of a self would not occur upon perceiving the [following] five [real] things. [To wit:] (1) When one perceives the [physical] shape (*ākṛti*) of [something] corporeal (*rūpa*), only the notion of [this] corporeal [thing] would occur, not the notion of a [substantial] living being. (2) When one perceives a conditioning factor involving (*avadīrṇa* : *g.yo ba*) pleasure or pain, only the notion of an [affective] sensation, etc., would occur, not the saddened or exalted notion of the [substantial] living being (*sattvapatitocchritabuddhi* : *sems can la dams pa*? *daṅ mthos pa'i blo*) [who experiences it]. (3) When one perceives a condi-

tioning factor with a [specific] name [and] connected with a [specific] name, only the notion of [this verbal] designation would occur, not the notion of the [substantial] living being [who bears it] in the form: [he is] a *kṣatriya*, a *brāhmaṇa*, a *vaiśya*, a *śūdra*, [the person named] Buddhadatta or Guṇamitra. (4) When one perceives a conditioning factor connected with a meritorious or demeritorious behaviour, only the notion of [this] conditioning factor would occur, not the notion of a stupid or a wise living being. (5) When one perceives the occurrence of the [bare] cognition (*vijñāna*) of an object, only the notion of the [cognizing] mind (*citta*) would occur, not the notion of a [substantial] living being [acting as a cognizer] in the form 'I perceive.' And since it is so, [it is] only the fivefold notion of a [substantial] living being [that] occurs unconsciously with regard to these five [real] things, not the notion of a [mere impersonal] conditioning factor. Therefore the [person given to reason(ing)], seeing [it] first because (s)he observes that the notion of a [substantial] living being occurs unconsciously [with regard to something real], thinks that the self exists. [And second,] this occurs to him/her as follows: If the self did not exist, one would not observe, regarding the conditioning factors, a conscious[ly personal] behaviour in forms such as: 'I shall see, I see, I have seen [these] visible [things] through [my] eyes (*cakṣuṣā*),' or: 'I shall not see [them].' Note that [this occurs] with audition (*śrotra*), olfaction (*ghrāṇa*), taste (*jihvā*), tactile (*kāya*) and mental (*manas*) [cognition] just as it [does] with vision (*darśana*). In the same way, one would not observe a conscious[ly personal] behaviour such as '[I have] done a good action' (?*kuśalakarmanirvṛttau*) when a good action has been performed, or '[I have] done a bad action' when a bad action has been performed. Now, such a conscious[ly personal] behaviour is impossible if there are only [impersonal] conditioning factors[, and no self]. Therefore, it occurs to the [person given to reason(ing)] that the self exists." According to this passage, the notion of a self (*ātmabuddhi*, *sattvabuddhi*) arises both unconsciously (*abuddhipūrvam*) and consciously (*buddhipūrvam*). It arises unconsciously when, upon perceiving a real thing or event (*vastu*), we grasp (different modalities of) a living being instead of the bare constituent (*skandha*) which, according to the normative Buddhist scheme, is supposed to be responsible for this apprehension. Now according to the (Buddhist) Ātmavādin, this would not be the case if the self did not really exist. As for the notion of a self that arises consciously, it is the one involved in our cognitive and ethical activities, which entail personal awareness and moral responsibility. In other words, the constituents alone do not provide a satisfactory account of social interaction, cognition and ethics, which all imply the notion of a living being, of self and other(s). The YBhū passage ends with the following remarks (YBhū 136,9–137,7 [YBhū$_{\text{Tib}}$ 81a6–b4]): *api tu pāramārthikam ātmalakṣaṇaṃ vakṣyāmi / dharmeṣv ātmaprajñaptiḥ / sa tebhyo 'nyānanyatvenāvaktavyo mā bhūd asya dravyasattvam iti / teṣāṃ vā dharmāṇām ātmalakṣaṇatvam / sa punar anityalakṣaṇaḥ / adhruvalakṣaṇaḥ / anāśvāsikalakṣaṇaḥ / vipariṇāmalakṣaṇaḥ / jātidharmalakṣaṇaḥ / jarāvyādhimaraṇadharmalakṣaṇaḥ / dharmamātralakṣaṇaḥ / duḥkhamātra*[a]*lakṣaṇaḥ / tathā hy uktaṃ bhagavatā / ita ime bhikṣo dharmā ātmānityas te bhikṣo ātmādhruvo 'nāśvāsiko vipariṇāmadharmako bhikṣo ātmety evamādi / api ca*[b] *caturbhiḥ*

> The *pudgala*, which is the seer, [and this] up to the cognizer, the agent, the experiencer, the knower and the one who liberates himself, does simply exist.[112]

In other words, the Buddhist personalist seeks to establish an agent (*kartṛ*) of cognitions, an experiencer (*bhoktṛ*) of the pleasant and unpleasant results of good and bad deeds, and a person partaking in liberation (*moktṛ*). The *pudgala* as an agent of deeds and an experiencer of their fruit appears as early as the VK and the KV, as we have seen.[113] Its being a knower of the *dharma*s is recorded in the *Vibhāṣā* and the AKBh.[114] And the *Vibhāṣā* also presents the *pudgala* as providing a basis for recollection.[115] To sum up:

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kāraṇaiḥ saṃskāreṣu sattvaprajñaptir veditavyā / sukhasaṃvyavahārārtham / lokānuvṛttyartham / sarvathā sattvavastu nāstīty uttrāsaprahāṇārthaṃ ca / ātmani paratra ca vyapadeśato guṇasattvadoṣasattvasampratyayotpādanārthaṃ ca /. [[a]] °*mātra*° with no Tib. equivalent. [[b]] *api ca* em. (Tib.) : *api* Ed.] "Moreover, I am going to state the ultimately valid definition of the self: [it is nothing but] the designation of the factors as self. [Now] this [self] can/must not be described as either different or the same as these [factors] lest it exist as a [real] substance. Or, it is these [very] factors that are the definition of the self. And this [self] is characterized as impermanent, non-enduring, unreliable, [subject to] change, having the property of being born, of ageing, illness and death, [and] of [consisting of] the factors and suffering only. For the Blessed One has said: 'Therefore, O monk (Tib. *dge sloṅ dag*), these factors are your (Tib. *khyod kyi*) self[, and it is] impermanent; your self, O monk (Tib. *dge sloṅ*), is non-enduring [and] unreliable; [your] self, O monk, is subject to change (*vipariṇāmadharmaka*),' and so on. Furthermore, note that the designation of the conditioning factors as self owes to four reasons: [first,] in order to facilitate [linguistic] transactions (*sukhasaṃvyavahārārtham* : *tha sñad la bde bar bya ba*); [second,] in order to comply with the [usage of the] ordinary world(/beings); [third,] in order to eliminate the terror [inpired by the fact] that something like a [substantial] living being (*sattvavastu*) exists in no way; and [fourth,] in order to arouse certainty(/confidence) (*sampratyaya*) in the presence of good qualities and defects by pointing [them] out in [one's] self and other [persons]."

112 MSABh 156,24–157,2: *asty eva pudgalo ya eṣa draṣṭā yāvad vijñātā kartā bhoktā jñātā moktā ca* /. Sthiramati (MSAVBh *Tsi* D168b4–7/P198a5–b2) characteristically takes this objection as of non-Buddhist provenance (see Eltschinger 2010a: 317, fn. 83). To be compared with YBhū 134,20 (*sa bhoktā vā kartā vā moktā veti*), 135,2–3 (*moktā kartā moktātmeti*), 134,4 (*draṣṭrādilakṣaṇaḥ*) and 130,18–19 (*rūpādiṣu viṣayagrāhaka ātmā*).

113 See above, §1.1.4.3 and fn. 102–105, pp. 77–78.

114 *Vibhāṣā* 42c19ff. Note thesis no. 15 of the Vātsīputrīyas: "La personne (*pudgala*) connaît (*jānāti*) les choses (*dharma*)." Translation Bareau 1955: 118. This seems to be at stake in VK 543b7–9: "Le Pudgalavādin dit: Il y a un *ātman*, un *sattva*, un *jīva*,

> Thus the *pudgala*, with its three designations, is an ineffable (*avaktavya*) that avoids the two extremes: annihilation (*uccheda*) and eternity (*śāśvata*). The *pudgala* is the agent of knowledge, memory, the rebirth process, the ripening of actions (*karmavipāka*), and, after eliminating its obstacles, dwells in beatitude.[116]

But, strange as it may look on account of their being constantly blamed for indulging in the false view of the self, the Pudgalavādins clearly had

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un *jantu*, un *poṣa*, un *puruṣa*, un *pudgala*. Parce qu'il y a un Pudgala, relativement aux *dharma*s vus, entendus, sentis, connus, il y a acquisition, recherche, considération mentale." Translation La Vallée Poussin 1925: 366.

115 *Vibhāṣā* 55a18–21. These three features appear in the personalist's objection of MPPU 148b14–18: "2e Argument. – S'il n'y a pas d'*ātman* intérieur (*adhyātma*), [étant donné que] la connaissance des couleurs naît et périt d'instant en instant (*kṣaṇotpannaniruddha*), comment distingue-t-on et connaît-on la couleur bleue (*nīla*), jaune (*pīta*), rouge (*lohita*) ou blanche (*avadāta*)? 3e Argument. – S'il n'y a pas d'*ātman*, et puisque les connaissances humaines actuelles (*pravṛttivijñāna*), naissant et périssant toujours à nouveau, disparaissent avec la vie du corps, qui donc a partie liée avec les actes – péchés (*āpatti*) ou mérites (*puṇya*)? Qui endure la douleur (*duḥkha*) ou le bonheur (*sukha*)? Qui est libéré (*vimukta*)?" Translation *Traité* II.736–737.

116 Chau 1984: 11. SNŚ 465a17–465b1: "Now we reply, the Buddha said that there is the concept (or designation) of the person; therefore this is its concomitant. If non-self were really the non-existence of the self, there could not be any killing of a living being or one who kills or anyone who is killed. Neither would there be theft, and so also for sexual misconduct, lying and drinking intoxicants. Neither would there be any doer or any deed, or any consequences [...] Thus the Four Noble Truths also would not exist. If the Four Noble Truths did not exist, there would also be no Buddha teaching the Four Noble Truths. If there were no Buddha, there would also be no Saṅgha. Thus if the person did not exist, the Three Jewels and the Four Truths would also be non-existent. But such statements are utterly unreasonable. Thus if the person did not exist, the above errors would be established and further errors would also be produced. But if the person exists, if the self exists, there are errors as stated above. One should understand truly according to the *sūtra*s spoken by the Buddha. Therefore in reality the self exists." Translation Priestley 1999: 85–86; see also Chau 1987: 42–43 and Venkataramanan 1953: 177–178. The passage left untranslated by Priestley is as follows (in Chau's translation): "[S']il n'y avait pas d'acte, de résultat, il n'y aurait ni naissance, ni mort. Mais les êtres vivants, à cause des actes et de leurs résultats, transmigrent dans le cycle de la naissance et de la mort (*saṃsāra*). S'il n'y avait ni naissance, ni mort, il n'y aurait pas de cause (*hetu*) de la naissance et de la mort. S'il n'y avait pas de cause, il n'y aurait pas de cessation de cause. S'il n'y avait pas de cessation de cause, il n'y aurait pas d'orientation vers la voie (*mārga*)."

their own version of this *dṛṣṭi*. According to the SNŚ, the view of the self consists in one's taking either one or all constituents as the self; the view of a separate self consists in one's holding the appropriating self to be different from the appropriated constituents. But to consider that there is no self, i.e., to regard the self as merely another name for the constituents, is no less a false view.[117]

1.1.3.6. According to most of the rare extant Vātsīputrīya/Sāṃmitīya sources, the doctrine of the *pudgala* was meant to provide a satisfactory account of Buddhism as a middle way between the extremes of eternalism and annihilationism. This seems at least to be the meaning of the personalists' statement to the effect that the *pudgala* cannot be said to be either the same as or distinct from the five aggregates. For if the *pudgala* is the same as the *skandha*s, it will be as conditioned and hence momentary as they are, and one can no longer account for recollection, continuity and moral responsibility. But if the *pudgala* is independent from the *skandha*s, it will be as eternal and unconditioned as the non-Buddhists' *ātman*, and then any relationship with psychophysical reality and need for religious life will be lost. By claiming that their *pudgala* was neither an eternal and independent entity nor something purely impermanent reducible to the psychophysical constituents, the Pudgalavādins expected not only to provide the middle way with a doctrinal foundation, but also to disclose the rationale behind the Buddha's refusal to answer the question whether the soul is identical to or different from the body. Whether their attempt accounted better than mere dependent origination for the middle way is a question that was solved in the most uncompromising way by their coreligionists.

1.1.3.7. Whatever the historical circumstances of their rise, the Buddhist personalist sects had to face sustained criticism on the part of self-proclaimed orthodox Sthaviras(/Theras) and Sarvāstivādins from a very early date. Indeed, both the KV and Devaśarman's VK[118] reflect a

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[117] See Priestley 1999: 64 and 67 and Walser 2005: 202. Note also TSi$_{*Skt}$ 92,18–19: *bhavān āha – nāsty ātmetīyaṃ mithyādṛṣṭir iti* /.

[118] The relevant section of the KV is 1.1, pp. 2–69. For a translation, see Aung/Rhys Davids 1915: 8–63; for a summary, see McDermott 1996: 266–272; see also Collins 1982: 178–182. The relevant section of the VK is 537a27–547c5. For a translation,

lively and already well formed controversy in terms and arguments whose close similarity already stroke La Vallée Poussin.[119] What is striking about the KV and the VK is their lack of any hint at the non-Buddhists' accounts of the self. In other words, the polemical scope of these early testimonies is purely intra-Buddhistic; the polemic rests on shared dogmatic, terminological and scriptural assumptions. Here, the Pudgalavādin is always brought, through scripturally- and dogmatically-based arguments, to contradict the word of the Buddha. No less interestingly, several among the issues that were to become key components of the later controversies against the non-Buddhists are already present: is the supposedly transmigrating *pudgala* one and the same in two successive destinies, say as a *preta* and as a human being? Is the one who acts the same as the one who experiences the fruit of action? Is there an agent of cognitions, sensations and actions? How is the *pudgala* to be cognized? In other words, certain Buddhists labelled as personalists did not await the non-Buddhist Ātmavādins in order to assume a somehow real person behind the flux of momentary psychophysical events. Nor did their opponents wait for the hot disputes against the non-Buddhists in order to shape arguments against these elaborations. And in spite of Sthiramati's statements to the contrary,[120] the same can be assumed of the chronologically next significant anti-personalist tracts, YBhū 129,6–136,4, MSA 18.92–103 and MSABh 154,27–160,6.[121] Even a rapid glance at the extant Pudgalavāda

see La Vallée Poussin 1925: 358–376; for a summary, see Potter 1996: 369–374 and Willemen/Dessein/Cox 1998: 200–201.

[119] See La Vallée Poussin 1925: 345 and *Kośa* I.xxxiv–xxxv ("le pudgalaskandhaka présente avec Kathāvatthu, i, 1, des analogies étroites qui vont jusqu'à l'identité des formules"), and Frauwallner 1964: 92. According to McDermott (1996: 265, summarizing Bareau's views as expressed in the typescript [Paris 1951] of the latter's French translation of the *Dhammasaṅgaṇi*), "Bareau thinks that some verses of the work [KV, VE/IR] or its prototype may have been read at Pāṭaliputta during Aśoka's reign, and that *Kathāvatthu* and *Vijñānakāya* may stem from the same prototype." On the relationship between the KV and the VK, see Bronkhorst 1993b, where Bronkhorst shows that, contrary to the VK's, the controversy as it is reflected in the KV is certainly no more than a purely scholastic exercise with no real confrontation. See also Watanabe 1983: 154–208.

[120] See above, fn. 112, p. 82.

[121] See Eltschinger 2010a and Kishi 2011. YBhū 129,6–137,8 might have inspired the author(s) of the MSA(Bh). On the *ātmavāda* section of the YBhū, see Shukla 1967.

sources is enough to make sure that these texts' polemics are purely intra-Buddhistic. The same remark applies to the nearly contemporary MPPU[122] and to Harivarman's TSi,[123] which rely on the same scriptural sources – those advocated by the Pudgalavādins – and analogous arguments. One can certainly argue that the "orthodox" or "mainstream" Buddhists never lost sight of the fact that their Pudgalavādin opponents came dangerously close to the outsiders' accounts of the self, and often resorted to the latter as a criterion or "limit-case" in assessing their "coreligionists'" degree of orthodoxy. But just as numerous Mahāyānasūtras simply mention the outsiders' views although they target the Śrāvakayānists alone (found guilty of misunderstanding the law and/or to indulge in mundane, purely institutional affairs), these sources seem never to take the *tīrthika*s' conceptions into consideration. The non-Buddhists' *ātman* seems to first enter the scene in the first decades of the fifth century CE: with Vasubandhu's *Paramārthasaptatikā* (directed against the views of the Sāṅkhya master Vindhyavāsin), of which at least one stanza targetted a Sāṅkhya argument in favour of the self,[124] with AKBh 9, the last section of which is dedicated to a critical examination of Sāṅkhya and Vaiśeṣika views on the self,[125] and with a commentary on Āryadeva's ŚŚ ascribed to Vasu(bandhu?), where the Sāṅkhya and the Vaiśeṣika *alone* are criticised.[126] But as was to be expected from the sixth-century Buddhist philosophers' conspicuous shift in polemical targets and ambitions,[127] things changed with Dignāga and those indebted to him. As far as our knowledge goes, Dignāga contented himself with criticising the Sāṅkhya argument already criticised in the *Paramārthasaptatikā*;[128] Dharmapāla turned his polemic against the outsiders' self; Dharmakīrti, who devoted several

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122 MPPU 148b3–150a25; see *Traité* II.735–750.

123 TSi_{Ch} 259c8–260c26 (translated into Chinese by Kumārajīva in 412 CE) and TSi_{*Skt} 90,17–95,15 (= section 35); see Sastri 1978: 69–74.

124 On the *Paramārthasaptatikā*, see below, fn. 138, p. 159.

125 On AKBh 9, see, e.g., Stcherbatsky 1970, *Kośa* V.230–302, Duerlinger 1982, 1989a, 1989b, 2003a and 2009, Oetke 1988: 195–242, Mejor 1999, Anacker 1999, Kapstein 2001: 77–111 and Goodman 2009.

126 See above, fn. 74, p. 17.

127 See Eltschinger 2010b: 398–400 and 432–433, Eltschinger forthc. b (§2.2).

128 See above, fn. 124, p. 86.

arguments to the refutation of Naiyāyika, Vaiśeṣika and Sāṅkhya conceptions, criticised his coreligionists' *pudgala* without explicitly mentioning it;[129] as for Bhāviveka, he had no more than three verses to dedicate to the *pudgala*;[130] Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla confine their critique of the Pudgalavāda to the concluding section of their nearly all-inclusive *Ātmaparīkṣā*.[131] Here again, the only exception is Candrakīrti's MAV, the sixth chapter of which contains a long and learned but, let us say, not very innovative critique of the *pudgala*.[132] Let us now turn to Dharmakīrti's original contribution against Buddhist personalism.

1.2. CONTEXT AND ARGUMENTS OF DHARMAKĪRTI'S CRITIQUE

1.2.1. The Immediate Context and Doctrinal Background of PVSV 147,2–148,5

1.2.1.1. To the best of our knowledge, Dharmakīrti alludes nowhere explicitly to the *pudgala*. How to make sure, then, that PVSV 147,2–148,5 is directed against the (or at least one version of the) Pudgalavāda? Let us distinguish here between external and internal criteria. External criteria exhaust themselves in the fact that Dharmakīrti's commentators Śākyabuddhi and Karṇakagomin are unanimous in regarding this passage as a piece of polemic against the *pudgala*. Besides their introductory objection,[133] both of them consistently explain Dharmakīrti's anaphoras (*tad*, etc.) as referring either to the *pudgala* or the *skandha*s

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[129] See below, §§1.2.2–3, and Eltschinger/Ratié 2010.

[130] MHK 3.90–93; see Iida 1980: 173–175.

[131] TS 336–349, TSP_K 125,16–131,9/$TSP_Ś$ 159,16–166,18; see Schayer 1931–1932 and Naito 1985.

[132] MAV 244,1–288,9 (and especially vv. 146–151); see Tauscher 1981: 36–39, Fenner 1983: 19–22 and Huntington 1992: 171–177; for a general presentation of the MAV's critique of the self, see Fenner 1983. This is reminiscent of Candrakīrti's strategy while criticising the "naturalization" of the caste-classes. In his CŚV ad CŚ 4.21–23 (see Eltschinger 2012: 71–81), the Mādhyamika scholar presents an "old-style" critique based on traditional, mainly canonical arguments, but shows no awareness of the renewal of the problematic in the hands of Kumārila and Dharmakīrti.

[133] See below, fn. 162, p. 102.

(quite often: *rūpādi*). Among the internal criteria, let us mention first that significant parts of Dharmakīrti's terminology are reminiscent of traditional discussions about the *pudgala*. Thus the word *avācya* (PVSV 147,6, 7, 15, 148,4), highly characteristic – especially in the context of the treatment of identity (*tattva*) and otherness (*anyat[t]va*) –, clearly echoes the Pudgalavādins' *avaktavya/avācya*;[134] so does the allusion to *upādāna* (PVSV 147,23), which is to be interpreted in a sense closer to the notion of *upādāyaprajñapti* ("designation-on-the-basis-of") than to that of *upādāna* as "material cause" found in the Abhidharmic theory of causality.[135] Moreover, the opponent's recourse to causality (PVSV

[134] On the Pudgalavādins' thesis that the *pudgala* cannot be said (*avaktavya*, *avācya*) to be either the same as or other than the constituents (or that it is inexpressible insofar as it cannot be described either in terms of identity or otherness with respect to the *skandhas*), see above, §1.1.3.4; see also, e.g., Chau 1984: 11, Chau 1987: 42, Chapter 4 in Priestley 1999 and Lusthaus 2009: 279–280, MSA 18.93ab (stating that the *pudgala* is *ekatvānyatvato 'vācyaḥ*: see below, fn. 147, p. 96; see also MSA 18.94–95), MSAVBh *Tsi* D163a1–4/P191b2–6 (quoted in Eltschinger 2010a: 307, fn. 53), AKBh$_{Pr}$ 464,4/AKBh$_{LE}$ 58,3: *atha rūpapudgalavat tadupalabdhyor apy anyānanyatvam avaktavyam*. "But if [the Pudgalavādin replies that] just as visible shape and the *pudgala* [cannot be said to be other than or identical to each other], their [respective] perceptions as well cannot be said (*avaktavya*) to be other than or identical to [each other]." On the meaning of *rūpa* in this context, see below, fn. 182, p. 105. The idea is found again in TS 337: *skandhebhyaḥ pudgalo nānyas tīrthadṛṣṭiprasaṅgataḥ / nānanyo 'nekatādyāpteḥ sādhvī tasmād avācyatā //*. "The *pudgala* is neither other than the constituents – for [otherwise] the outsiders' [false] view [of a permanent self] would ensue – nor the same [as them], for [otherwise its] multiplicity would follow; as a consequence, [its] being inexpressible (*avācyatā*) [in terms of identity or otherness with regard to the constituents] is well [established]." See also below, fn. 147, p. 96.

[135] On the probable meaning of *upādāna/upādāya* (both as "basis"/"on the basis of" and as "appropriation"/"after appropriating") in *pudgalavāda*, see above, §1.1.3.4.2 and, e.g., Chau 1987: 36, Cousins 1995: 89, Priestley 1999: 71–72. AKBh$_{Pr}$ 461,19–20/AKBh$_{LE}$ 40,3–4 ascribes to the Pudgalavādin the assertion that the *pudgala* is designated on the basis of (*upādāya*) the constituents: *ādhyātmikān upāttān vartamānān skandhān upādāya pudgalaḥ prajñapyate / tad idam andhavacanam anunmīlitārthaṃ na budhyāmahe / kim idam upādāyeti /*. "[Objection:] The *pudgala* is designated on the basis of the constituents that are internal, appropriated [as belonging to oneself and] existing [when the *pudgala* is designated. Answer: As for us,] we do not understand this obscure statement the meaning of which [you have] not made clear: what does this [mean], 'on the basis of'?" (Cf. PVSV 147,23: *ko 'yam upādānārthaḥ /*. "[But] what is the meaning of 'basis'?") The greater part of the *pudgala* critique in the AKBh is then devoted to the refutation of this thesis (see,

147,5–12) as a means of demonstrating that a certain entity (the effect) cannot be said to be either identical to or different from another one (the cause) is certainly reminiscent of the MSA(Bh)'s and the AKBh's lengthy digressions on the relationship between fuel (*indhana*, etc.) and fire (*agni*, etc.), an explanatory metaphor frequently resorted to in extant Pudgalavāda literature.[136] We take it for granted, then, that PVSV 147,2–148,5 is to be interpreted as a critique of the (or a version of the) Pudgalavāda. Yet the passage shows significant differences with respect to previous attempts to refute personalism.[137] A brief summary of its context and structure may be of help in understanding how Dharmakīrti's strategy in the *pudgala* controversy departs from that of his predecessors.

1.2.1.2. The discussion over the *pudgala* occurs in the context of the inference of the fact that things perish at every single moment (*vināśitvānumāna*).[138] While explaining the reason of this inference, i.e., the fact that things' destruction is spontaneous or causeless (*ahetuka*), Dharmakīrti specifies that stating this reason does not amount to seeing destruction as a property which would come to belong to the perishing entity. When saying that a thing's destruction is causeless (a formula seemingly implying that the thing and its destruction are ontologically distinct), the proponent of causeless destruction only makes use of an artificial distinction so as to make clear that there is no cause for destruction,[139] for the use of an expression such as "the x of y" does

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e.g., the quotations of the AKBh below, fn. 150, p. 97, where both *upādāya* and *upādāna* appear).

136 On the fuel-fire metaphor, see above, §1.1.3.4.2, and fn. 94, p. 74, and below, fn. 149, p. 97.

137 For instance the KV, the VK, the TSi and the MSABh devote much of the discussion over the *pudgala* to the examination of the exegetical problems (various levels of contradiction with scripture) that a personalistic doctrine entails (on the *yukti*/*āgama* structure of the MSABh argument, see Eltschinger 2010a: 298) and so does the AKBh (from $AKBh_{Pr}$ 464,25/$AKBh_{LE}$ 64,1 onwards it mainly deals with scriptural matters), whereas this aspect of the problem is conspicuously absent in PVSV 147,2–148,5 (but also, interestingly enough, in YBhū 129,6–136,8).

138 On this inference see Eltschinger 2010b: 423–424 (§12b).

139 PVSV 145,11–20 (together with PV 1.276): *kathaṃ tarhīdānīm ahetuko vināśo bhavatīty ucyate / naśyan bhāvo 'parāpekṣa iti tajjñāpanāya sā / avasthā'hetur uktāsyā bhedam āropya cetasā // na bhāvo jāto 'parasmān nāśaṃ pratilabhate / tathābhū-*

tasyaiva svayaṃ jāter ity aparāpekṣadharmāntarapratiṣedhārthaṃ tatsvabhāvajñāpanenārthāntaram iva dharmiṇo dharmaṃ cetasā vibhajya tanmātrajijñāsāyāṃ svabhāva eva tathocyate / tad etan mandabuddhayaḥ kvacit tathādarśanād ghoṣamātravipralabdhā nāśaṃ guṇaṃ tasya ca bhāvam āropya sahetukam ahetukaṃ vāpratiṣṭhitatattvayā bhāvacintayātmānam ākulayanti /. "[Objection:] Now[, if there is nothing called 'destruction'], then in what sense do [you] say that destruction is causeless? [Answer:] An entity does not depend on [anything] else [i.e., a cause of destruction,] while perishing. Therefore in order to indicate this [i.e., the fact that it does not depend on a cause of destruction, we] say [that] this state [of destruction] is without a cause. [And this we do] after having [erroneously] construed through [conceptual] thought a [purely artificial] distinction between this [state of destruction and the destroyed entity itself] (PV 1.276). An entity, once produced, does not receive [its] destruction from [anything] else [i.e., from any cause of destruction], for it is produced itself as being exactly such [i.e., as possessing a transient nature]. Thus when one wishes to know just this [i.e., when one wonders whether the destruction of an entity comes from something else or not],[a] by indicating the [transient] nature of this [entity] in order to negate a distinct property [i.e., destruction,] that [would] depend on [something] else, it is [in fact nothing but this] nature that [we] describe in those terms (*tathā*), [but this we do] after distinguishing through [conceptual] thought a property [i.e., destruction,] from a property-bearer as if [this property were] something [really] distinct [from it. And] this is precisely what (*tad etat*)[b] dull-witted [people erroneously] construe (*āropya*) as a [distinct] property [consisting in] destruction, [subsequently construing] its existence as well [and its being] either with or without a cause, [as these people are] led astray by the mere words[: 'The entity's destruction occurs'] because they have seen, in a certain [other] case [i.e., in such words as 'the king's servant,'[c] that it is] so, [i.e., that such a statement refers to two distinct entities. In so doing] they perplex themselves with [idle] ontological considerations (*bhāvacintā*) of unfounded truth." [a] According to PVṬ *Je* D323a5/P395a6–7 ≈ PVSVṬ 521,28–29: *bhāvasyānyasmāt kiṃ vināśo bhavati na veti*. *veti* em. (PVṬ *'gyur ram 'on te*) : *ceti* Ed. [b] Note PVṬ *Je* D323a6/P395a8–b1 ≈ PVSVṬ 521,31–522,10: *tad etad* [...] *bhāvād* avyatiriktaṃ nāśitvaṃ tattvato vyavasthāpitam. *bhāvād* em. (PVṬ *dṅos po las*) : *abhāvād* Ed. "Precisely that destruction that has been determined as not being really distinct from the [perishing] entity [itself]." [c] PVṬ *Je* D323a7/P395b2 = PVSVṬ 522,12–13: *rājñaḥ puruṣa ityādau vyatirekavibhakti*prayoge tathādarśanāt sambandhinor vibhāgadarśanāt /*. *Note PVṬ *tha dad pa'i rten can rnam par dbye ba*, "case-endings that possess a distinct basis." "Because they have seen, in a use of the case-endings [conveying] a distinction, such as 'the king's servant,' [that it is] so [i.e., that there is] a distinction between the two correlates." On the use of the genitive *vyatirekavibhakti* when there is no real difference, see below, fn. 140, p. 91.

not necessarily imply that x and y are distinct real entities.[140] The opponent objects that Dharmakīrti, who has repeatedly stated that an

[140] PVSV 32,18–33,5 (together with PV 1.60): *nanu ca vācyaviśeṣābhāvāt saṅketabhedo 'py ayukto dvayor ekābhidhānāt / tathā ca vyatirekiṇyā vibhakter ayogas tasyā bhedāśrayatvāt / dvayor ekābhidhāne 'pi vibhaktir vyatirekiṇī / bhinnam artham ivānveti vācye leśaviśeṣataḥ // na vai śabdānāṃ kācid viṣayasvabhāvāyattā vṛttir icchāto vṛttyabhāvaprasaṅgāt / te yathā vyatirikte 'vyatirikte vā prayoktum iṣyante tathā niyuktās tam artham apratibandhena prakāśayanti / tena gaur gotvam ityekārthābhidhāne 'pi kasyacid viśeṣasya pratyāyanārthaṃ kṛte saṅketabhede vyatiriktārthā vibhaktir arthāntaram ivādarśayantī pratibhāty anarthāntare 'pi tathāprayogadarśanābhyāsāt / na tāvatā sarvatra bhedaḥ / anyatrāpi puruṣecchāvaśāt pravṛttasya pratibandhābhāvāt / yathaikaṃ kvacid ekavacanena khyāpyate tadaviśeṣe 'pi gauravādikhyāpanārthaṃ bahuvacanena /*. "Objection: Since the [thing] signified [by the two words 'property' and 'property-bearer'] is the same, even a distinct convention is improper, for these two [words] refer to one [and the same thing]. And thus[, since the property and the property-bearer are not distinct things according to you], a [genitive] case-ending conveying a distinction[a] is improper, because [the use of] this [case-ending] presupposes (°*āśraya*) a [real] distinction. [Answer:] Even though the [two words expressing the property and the property-bearer] refer to one [and the same thing], the [genitive] case-ending, which [usually] conveys a distinction, shows (*anveti*, gl. *darśayati*) the object as [if it were] distinct because of the slight difference [brought] into the signified [by a distinct convention, and not because of any real difference]. (PV 1.60) The reference of words is certainly never (*na* [...] *śabdānāṃ kācid* [...] *vṛttiḥ*) based on the [intrinsic] nature of the [external] objects, for it would follow that reference would not be [made] arbitrarily. These [words are] employed in the way one wishes to use [them, be it] with regard to [something] distinct[, as when one says: 'The king's servant,'] or with regard to [something that is] not distinct[, as when one says: 'It is the self that is the seer of the self,' and they] manifest this object without any restriction (*apratibandhena*). Therefore, even though the [two words] 'cow' [for the property-bearer and] 'cowness' [for the property] refer to one [and the same] thing, when a specific convention is made in order to make known a certain difference,[b] the [genitive] case-ending whose object is [usually] distinct appears and [*ipso facto*] presents [the property] as [if it were] something different [from the property-bearer] although it is not something different; [and this occurs] because of [our] habit of observing [the genitive case-ending] being used in this way [i.e., when there is a real distinction. But] for all this [i.e., due to the mere use of this case-ending], there is not a [real] distinction in every case, because there is nothing to prevent a [word conveying a distinction from being] used according to human arbitrariness in another case as well [i.e., when there is no real difference]. For example, one [thing] is expressed in a certain [context] with the singular [*tvam*, and in another context] with the plural [*yūyam*] in order to express respect, etc., even though [this thing] does not differ with regard to its [oneness]." [[a] Note PVSVṬ

entity x is subjected to the alternative between identity and otherness with respect to an entity y,[141] must admit that destruction is either distinct from the entity that perishes (but then destruction should be perceived as a distinct entity, which is not the case) or identical to it (but then nothing can happen to this entity that is destruction itself): whatever the case, how can the entity ever perish?[142] Dharmakīrti an-

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146,11: *vyatirekiṇyā iti vyatirekābhidhāyinyā gor gotvam iti ṣaṣṭhyā* / ("'conveying a distinction,' i.e., a genitive indicating a distinction in the form: 'the cow's cowness'") and PVSVṬ 146,15: *vibhaktir vyatirekiṇī vyatirekasya vācikā ṣaṣṭhī* / ("a case-ending conveying a distinction [i.e.,] a genitive expressing distinction"). *ᵇ* PVSVṬ 146,25–26: *agovyāvṛttinimittasya gotvasya prakāśanārtham* / *agovyāvṛttimātraṃ gotvaśabdena pratipādyam ity evaṅkṛte (saṅketabhede)* [...] /. "When a specific convention is made as follows: with a view to manifesting that cowness is the criterion of the exclusion of [one thing] from non-cows, the mere exclusion [of this thing] from non-cows must be indicated by the word 'cowness.'"] On the issues of the genitive case-ending and distinction/non-distinction in the context of the refutation of the *pudgala*, see also MAV 6.143 (Huntington 1992: 174–175).

141 PVSV 75,21–22: *svabhāvo hi svabhāvān na tattvam anyatvaṃ vā laṅghayati* / *rūpasyātadbhūtasyānyatvāvyatikramāt* /. "[And] indeed, a [real] nature [x] does not avoid being either identical to or other than a [real] nature [y], for a [real] nature [x] that is not y does not elude being other [than y]." PVSV 117,18–20: *vastu* [...] *niyamena* [...] *bhedābhedau nātivartate* / *rūpaṃ hi vastu* / *tasyātattvam evānyattvam ity uktam* /. "Necessarily, a [real] entity [x] does not transgress [the alternative between] distinction and non-distinction, for a [real] entity is a nature. [Now, we have already] said [above in PVSV 75,21–22] that otherness is nothing but x's not being y." PVSV 118,23–24: *na ca bhedābhedau muktvā vastuno 'nyā gatiḥ* / *tasya rūpalakṣaṇatvāt* / *rūpasya caitadvikalpānativṛtteḥ* /. "And for a [real] entity [x], there is no other possibility than being distinct or not [from an entity y], because this [real entity] is defined as a nature, and because a nature does not escape this alternative [between distinction and non-distinction]." PVSV 144,11: *tasmāt sato rūpasya tattvānyattvāvyatikramāt* /. "Therefore [it is so] because a [really] existing nature [x] does not escape [the alternative between] being identical to or other than [y]." See also PVSV 64,3–7.

142 PVSV 145,21–25 (together with PV 1.277ab): *svato 'pi bhāve 'bhāvasya vikalpaś ced ayaṃ samaḥ* / *nanv aparabhāvitve 'pi vināśasya svata eva bhāvasya bhavato 'yaṃ tattvānyattvavikalpas tulyaḥ* / *tadā kim arthāntarabhāve bhāvo na dṛśyate* / *anarthāntaratve 'pi tad eva tad bhavati* / *tan na kiñcid asya jātam iti kathaṃ vinaṣṭo nāma* /. "[Objection:] Even if [one admits with you that] non-existence [i.e., destruction,] exists by itself [i.e., is causeless, you have to face] the same alternative [between identity and otherness] (PV 1.277ab). But even if [destruction] is not due to [anything] else, [you have to face] the same alternative as to whether an entity's destruction existing only by itself is the same [as the entity itself] or other [than it].

swers that in fact the alternative between identity and otherness only applies to the arising of something real possessed of a distinct nature. As a consequence it cannot concern destruction itself, for the proponent of causeless destruction does not assert the existence of a distinct property called "destruction" but only the fact that the entity itself does not exist.[143] Destruction only appears to be endowed with a nature of

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Then if [this causeless destruction] exists as something distinct, why don't [we] perceive this [distinct] entity?[a] [But] again, in case [this causeless destruction] is not something distinct, it is the [entity itself, say a pot,] that is what [is called 'destruction']. Therefore since nothing happens to the [entity], how [can it be called] 'destroyed' [at all]?" [[a] PVṬ *Je* D323b5/P396a2: *ci'i phyir mi snaṅ ste / snaṅ ba ñid du 'gyur ro /*. "Why don't [we] perceive this entity? [We] should perceive [it]."] Here does *bhāvaḥ* refer to destruction (which should be perceived if it is a distinct entity) or to the entity such as the pot (which remains unaffected by destruction if destruction is something distinct from it, so that it should be perceived)? The interpretation of *tan na kiñcid asya jātam iti* depends on the answer given to this question. In the first hypothesis, this conclusion concerns *anarthāntaratve 'pi tad eva tad bhavati*. In the second hypothesis, it concerns both members of the alternative.

143 PVSV 145,25–146,1 (together with PV 1.277cd): *nanv atra / na tasya kiñcid bhavati na bhavaty eva kevalam ity uktam / na hy ayaṃ vināśo 'nyo vā kaścid bhāvasya bhavatīty āha / kiṃ tarhi / sa eva bhāvo na bhavatīti / yadi hi kasyacid bhāvaṃ brūyāt / na bhāvo 'nena nivartitaḥ syāt / tathā ca bhāvanivṛttau prastutāyām aprastutam evoktaṃ syāt / na hi kasyacid bhāvena bhāvo na bhūto nāma / tadā na bhūto yadi svayaṃ na bhavet /*. "[Answer:] But haven't [we] said in this regard: this [entity] possesses no [particular property called 'destruction,' be it distinct or not from itself]: it simply does not exist (PV 1.277cd). For the [proponent of causeless destruction] does not say that destruction or any other [property like continued existence and transformation][a] belongs to the entity, but rather that it is the entity itself that does not exist. For if he stated[, with the word 'destruction,'] the existence [i.e., the rise,][b] of a certain [property], the [existence of this property][c] would not make the entity cease to exist (*nivarteta*). And thus, since the cessation of the entity is the subject under discussion, [he] would only be stating [something] irrelevant [by positing another distinct thing],[d] for an entity [can]not be said not to exist [merely] because of the existence of something [else]. Then [an entity can only be said] not to exist if it itself does not exist.[e]" [a] According to PVṬ *Je* D323b7–324a1/P396a6–7 = PVSVṬ 523,6–7 (*anyo vā sthityanyathātvādiko dharmaḥ*). [b] According to PVṬ *Je* D324a1–2/P396a8 = PVSVṬ 523,10 (*bhāvam utpādam*). [c] Against PVṬ *Je* D324a2/P396a8 = PVSVṬ 523,10 (*anena vādinā*). [d] According to PVṬ *Je* D324a2/P396b1 ≈ PVSVṬ 523,12 (*arthāntarasyānyasya vidhānād* aprastutam.* *Note PVṬ *brjod pa'i phyir* for *vidhānāt*). [e] The text of the PVSV is not well established here: (1) PVSV_{Tib} D346b3/P509a7–8 reads: *'jig pa źes bya ba* (**na bhūto nāma*?), which echoes the reading of the MS A (*svayaṃ na bhūto nāma bhavet /*).

its own when we say that it *is* causeless, but the activity (*vyāpāra*) expressed by any verbal root[144] (i.e., here, the activity consisting in existing) can only belong to an entity endowed with functionalities, so that destruction cannot be considered the real agent of the verb "to be." Thus when we say that a hare's horn *is* a non-existence, far from asserting the hare's horn existence, we actually intend to deny the existence of the hare's horn; accordingly, the statement "destruction *is* causeless" is not the affirmation that destruction exists as a real entity but the negation of its having a cause. Dharmakīrti concludes that only a real entity x (i.e., only an entity possessing a nature of its own, which is not the case of destruction) is subjected to the alternative between identity and otherness with respect to y.[145]

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(2) PVSV$_{\text{Tib}}$ D346b3/P509a8 and PVṬ *Je* D324a3/P396b2 read: *gaṅ gi tshe* (**yadā*).
(3) PVSV$_{\text{Tib}}$ D346b3/P509a8 reads: *yod pa med pa* (**na bhavati*?), clearly more satisfactory than *bhavet*.

144 See, e.g., Cardona 1974.

145 PVSV 146,11–147,2 (together with PV 1.278ab): *tasmād yasya nāśo bhavatīty ucyate sa svayam eva na bhavatīty uktaṃ syāt / na vai ghoṣasāmyād viṣayāntaradṛṣṭo vidhiḥ sarvatra yojanām arhati / na hi gardabha iti nāmakaraṇād bāleyadharmā manuṣye 'pi saṃyojyāḥ / tathā na caitrasya putro bhavatīty atra dṛṣṭo vidhir nāśe 'pi virodhāt / evaṃ cābhidhāne 'pi prayojanam āveditam eva / ataḥ / bhāve hy eṣa vikalpaḥ syād vidher vastvanurodhataḥ / bhāvo 'vaśyaṃ bhavantam apekṣate / sa ca svabhāva eva / niḥsvabhāvasya kvacid vyāpāre samāveśābhāvāt / vyāpāra iti hi tathābhūtasvabhāvotpattiḥ / sā niḥsvabhāvasya kathaṃ syāt / katham idānīṃ bhavaty abhāvaḥ śaśaviṣāṇam ityādivyavahāraḥ / na vai śaśaviṣāṇaṃ kiñcid bhavatīty ucyate / api tv evam asya na bhavatīti bhāvapratiṣedha eva kriyate / api ca / vyavahartāra evaitad evaṃ vyāpāravad iva samāropyādarśayanti prakaraṇena kenacit / na tu tat tathā / sarvārthavivecanaṃ hi tatra tattvaṃ na kasyacit samāveśaḥ / na khalv evaṃ vināśo vastuni tadbhāvāt / asāv api yadi vaktṛbhir evaṃ khyāpyate na tu svayaṃ tathā tadā na kiñcid bhavatītīṣṭam eva / tasmāt svayaṃ bhavan svabhāvo vikalpadvayaṃ nātivartate tattvam anyattvam iti /*. "Therefore one must say that it is the [entity] the destruction of which is said to 'exist' that does not exist itself. It is certainly not the case that, on the grounds of a [mere] similarity in wording, the affirmation (*vidhi* : *bya ba*) observed in another case [such as: 'Caitra's son'] can be applied to every case [i.e., to 'the thing's destruction' too]. Indeed, the properties of an ass (*bāleya*) cannot be applied to a human being as well [merely] on the grounds that [a certain person] is named 'Gardabha (= ass)'; in the same way, the affirmation (*vidhi* : *bya ba*)[a] which is observed in the [statement]: 'Caitra's son *exists*' (*caitrasya putro bhavatīti*) [does] not [apply] to [the case of] destruction as well,[b] because it is contradictory. And although the [verbal] expression is [grammatically] the same (*evam*), [its real] purpose (*prayojana* : *dgoṅs pa*) has been presented

[above].[c] Therefore: this alternative [between identity and otherness] can [only] concern the [coming into] existence [of something real], because activity (*vidhī*) necessarily belongs (*anurodha*) to something real (PV 1.278ab). [Coming into] existence necessarily requires [something] that comes into existence, and this [can] only [be] a nature, for that which lacks a nature does not engage in any activity (*vyāpāra*). For [what we call] an 'activity' is [nothing but] the arising of such a nature; [but] how could this [arising] pertain to [something] that lacks a nature [i.e., destruction]? [Objection:] Now, [if that which lacks a nature does not engage in any activity,] how [do you explain] a usage such as 'a hare's horn *is* a non-existence'? [Answer:] One certainly does not say that a hare's horn *is* something; rather, [when] thus [stating that a hare's horn *is* a non-existence,] one simply negates the existence of this [hare's horn by saying] that [it] does not exist. Moreover, it is the speakers who, according to the context [of discussion such as: '*Is* the hare's horn non-existence or is it not?' erroneously] construe and present this [hare's horn] thus [i.e., as the agent of existence in the sentence: 'The hare's horn is a non-existence'] as if it had an activity; but it is not so.[d] Being devoid of [the nature of] any object is the true nature of this (*tatra*) [hare's horn, and] nothing [unreal] engages in [an activity such as coming into existence.[e] But our opponent] certainly does not [admit] destruction [to be] such [i.e., characterized as void of the nature of any object, like a hare's horn or the son of a barren woman], because [according to him] this [property] exists [i.e., arises,] in the entity. Even though (*yadi* [...] *tu*) the [ordinary] speakers present this very [destruction that our opponent considers thus] in the same way [as having an activity when they say that it 'exists,' they] do acknowledge that it iself is not so [i.e., that it does not have arising as a property],[f] [and] therefore that it is nothing. Therefore if it exists by itself [i.e., in a non-superimposed way,][g] the nature [of an entity] cannot escape these two [mutually] exclusive options (*vikalpadvaya*), i.e., [either] identity [or] otherness." [a] PVSVṬ 525,23: *vidhir arthāntarasya putrasya vidhānam* /. "Affirmation, i.e., the position of a son who is something distinct." In spite of the Tibetan rendering of *vidhi* as *bya ba* (a usual equivalent of Skt. *vyāpāra*), here the meaning of *vidhi* seems more likely to be "affirmation," although from the next verse onwards it obviously means *vyāpāra* (in the sense of the grammatical agent's activity). [b] PVSVṬ 525,24: *na bhāvasya nāśo bhavatīty atrāpi bhāvād vyatireko nāśo vidheyaḥ* /. "In the [statement:] 'There is a destruction of the entity' as well, destruction is not to be posited as distinct from the entity [itself]." Note that PVṬ *Je* D325a6/P397b7 explicitly refers here to the genitive (**ṣaṣṭhī*) case-endings (*de ltar na nag pa'i bu źes bya ba'i ṅag 'di la tha dad pa'i rten can gyi drug pa [*vyatirekavibhaktiṣaṣṭhī] sbyar ba dag*). [c] I.e., in PVSV 145,16–17 according to PVṬ *Je* D325a5/P398a2–3 = PVSVṬ 525,28–29. [d] I.e., pseudo-things like a hare's horn or the son of a barren woman (*vandhyāsuta* in PVṬ *Je* D325b3/P398b2–3 = PVSVṬ 526,23) do not have a *vyāpāra* (**vyāpāravat* PVṬ *Je* D325b6/P398b6, *vyāpārayukta* PVSVṬ 526,30) simply because of linguistic usage (*vyavahāramātreṇa*, PVṬ *Je* D325b6/P398b6 = PVSVṬ 526,29). [e] Note PVṬ *Je* D325b6/P398b7–8: [...] *gyi dṅos por gyur pa'i bya ba 'ga' źig daṅ ldan pa ni ma yin no* //. "But it does not have any real activity." [f] As a justification for this, PVṬ *Je*

1.2.1.3.1. The Pudgalavādin enters the stage at this point,[146] objecting that the *pudgala* is not subjected to this alternative since it is neither the same as nor other than the constituents.[147] It is not identical to them because its nature is distinct from theirs, but it is not other than them because it is causally related to them and because otherness is a mere lack of relation (*apratibandha*). Dharmakīrti criticizes his opponent's notion of causality (which entails that a cause and its effect are neither identical nor mutually other) while relying on his own analysis of relation (according to which a relation can be either of identity or of causality, the latter obtaining between entities that have distinct natures).[148] He then puts forward his own definition of otherness as the fact that two natures remain unmixed. As a consequence, if, as the Pudgalavādin contends, the *pudgala* and the constituents do not have the same nature, there can be no relation between them (except a causality relation that the Pudgalavādin cannot accept since it concerns entities that are mutually other) and they have distinct properties, so that they must be mutually other. The opponent attempts to rescue the

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D326a2/P399a3 = PVSVṬ 527,13 add: *nīrūpatvād asya /*. ཉ According to PVṬ *Je* D326a3/P399a4 = PVSVṬ 527,15 (*svayam anadhyāropitenākāreṇa*).

146 See below, fn. 162, p. 102.

147 On the Pudgalavādins' contention that the *pudgala* is neither the same as nor other than the constituents, see, e.g., Bareau 1955: 115 (Vātsīputrīya), Chau 1987: 40, Chapter 4 in Priestley 1999 and Eltschinger 2010a: 294. The thesis is presented in the following way in MSA 18.93: *ekatvānyatvato 'vācyas tasmād doṣadvayād asau / skandhātmatvaprasaṅgāc ca taddravyatvaprasaṅgataḥ //*. "This [*pudgala*] cannot be said (*avācya*) to be either one [and the same] with or distinct from the [basis of its designation, i.e., from the five constituents], because of the two faults [that would ensue]: for [if the constituents and the *pudgala* were one and the same,] the constituents would be the self, and [if the constituents and the *pudgala* were distinct,] the [*pudgala*] would be a [real] substance." See Eltschinger 2010a: 330; see also AKBh$_{Pr}$ 462,3–4/AKBh$_{LE}$ 42,5–6: *na cānyaḥ skandhebhyaḥ śakyate pratijñātuṃ śāśvataprasaṅgāt / nāpy ananya ucchedaprasaṅgāt /*. "And this [*pudgala*] cannot be asserted [to be] other than the constituents, because [if it were other than them its] eternity would ensue; nor [can it be asserted to be] the same, because [then its] annihilation would ensue." See also above, §§1.1.3.4.1–2, and fn. 134, p. 88.

148 On the two types of relation acknowledged by Dharmakīrti, i.e., identity (*tādātmya*), which concerns two conceptually extracted properties of one and the same entity, and causality (*tadutpatti*), which regards two distinct entities, see Eltschinger 2010b: 414–415 (§10c) and below, fn. 151, p. 98.

thesis of a relation between the constituents and the *pudgala* by explaining that this relation does not lie in a causal connection between them but in some sort of invariable connection between their respective cognitions. Dharmakīrti replies by showing that there is no such connection and by arguing that the *pudgala*, which is not known through a distinct cognition but, according to the Pudgalavādin himself, "on the basis" of the constituents, has no nature of its own: if it did it would necessarily appear in a distinct way as an object of cognition.

1.2.1.3.2. Dharmakīrti thus follows the gist of the MSABh or AKBh arguments insofar as he too attacks the Pudgalavādin's contention that the *pudgala* is designated on the basis of the constituents by showing that the causal relation assumed between the constituents and the *pudgala* does not stand critical examination[149] and that the *pudgala* is not perceived on the basis of the constituents.[150] However, he does so with ar-

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[149] Both the MSABh and the AKBh criticize the view that causally related elements can be said neither to be identical nor to be mutually other: they endeavour to show that in fact an effect and its cause are mutually other, most notably because they have different characteristics (see above, fn. 96, p. 74). This idea seems to find an echo in PVSV 147,12 (see below, fn. 180 and 181, p. 104) but Dharmakīrti's main argument is much more encompassing: instead of merely pointing out the distinct characteristics of fire and fuel (or those of the *pudgala* and the *skandha*s), he shows that the Pudgalavādins' thesis, which equates the causality relation with inexpressibility in terms of identity or otherness, ends up diluting the very notion of causality to the point that everything can be considered a causal condition while nothing can be said to be other than anything else.

[150] The MSA(Bh) rejects the *pudgala*'s existence as a substantially existing (*dravyasat*) nature on the grounds of its not being perceived (see MSA 18.92: *prajñaptyastitayā vācyaḥ pudgalo dravyato na tu / nopalambhād viparyāsāt saṅkleśāt kliṣṭahetutaḥ //*. "The *pudgala* must be said to exist as a [mere] designation, but not as a [real] substance, because one does not perceive [it] (*nopalambha*), because [our pseudo-perception of the *pudgala*] is [nothing but] a wrong notion, because it is a pollution, because [the personalistic false view] is the cause of [that which is] defiled." Translation Eltschinger 2010a: 305; on the form *nopalambha*, see Conze 1967 s.v.). The AKBh, examining the relation between the awareness of the constituents and that of the *pudgala*, points out that the designation (*prajñapti*) *pudgala* rests either on the perception of the constituents (but then the unperceived *pudgala* is nothing but a designation for the perceived constituents) or on the perception of the *pudgala* itself (but then the *pudgala* differs from the constituents since it can be perceived by itself). See $AKBh_{Pr}$ 463,3–6/$AKBh_{LE}$ 50,1–5: *yadā ca pudgalaḥ prajñapyate kiṃ tāvat skandhān upalabhya prajñapyata āhosvit pudgalam / yadi*

guments that appear profoundly renewed insofar as they rest on important innovations of his own system: while his criticism of the relation between the *pudgala* and the constituents rests on his definition of the so-called natural relation (*svabhāvapratibandha*),[151] his analysis of

tāvat skandhāṃs teṣv eva pudgalaprajñaptiḥ prāpnoti / pudgalasyānupalambhāt / atha pudgalaṃ katham asya skandhān upādāya prajñaptir bhavati / pudgala eva hi tasyā upādānaṃ prāpnoti /. "And when the *pudgala* is designated, is it designated when perceiving the constituents or the *pudgala* [himself]? On the one hand, if [it is designated when perceiving] the constituents, then the designation *pudgala* concerns only these [constituents], since the *pudgala* is not perceived (*anupalambha*); on the other hand, [if it is designated when perceiving] the *pudgala*, how could the [*pudgala*] be designated on the basis of (*upādāya*) the constituents [as the Pudgalavādin claims]? For then the basis (*upādāna*) of this [designation] concerns the sole *pudgala*." See also AKBh$_{Pr}$ 463,25–464,2/AKBh$_{LE}$ 56,8–13: *atha rūpāṇy upalabhamānaḥ pudgalam upalabhate / kiṃ tayaivopalabdhyopalabhata āhosvid anyayā / yadi tayaiva / rūpād abhinnasvabhāvaḥ pudgalaḥ prāpnoti / rūpa eva vā tatprajñaptiḥ / idaṃ ca rūpam ayaṃ pudgala iti*[a] *katham idaṃ paricchidyate*[b] */ athaivaṃ na paricchidyate / katham idaṃ pratijñāyate rūpam apy asti pudgalo 'py astīti / upalabdhivaśena hi tasyāstitvaṃ pratijñāyeta*[c] */*. [[a] AKBh$_{LE}$ *iti* : AKBh$_{Pr}$ om. *iti*. [b] AKBh$_{LE}$ *paricchidyate* : AKBh$_{Pr}$ *gamyate*. [c] AKBh$_{LE}$ *pratijñāyeta* : AKBh$_{Pr}$ *pratijñāyate*.] "If [the opponent explains that] one perceives the *pudgala* when perceiving visible things (*rūpa*), does one perceive [the *pudgala*] through the same perception [as that of the visible things] or through another one? If [it is] through the same [perception], the *pudgala* must have the same nature [as the visible things], or [rather,] the designation [*pudgala*] only regards the visible things, and [thus] how could [we] make this distinction: 'This is the visible thing, this is the *pudgala*'? Now if [we] cannot make such a distinction, how could [we] admit that both the visible thing and the *pudgala* exist? For it is due to perception (*upalabdhi*) that the existence of this [*pudgala*] could be admitted." On the cognizability of the *pudgala*, see above, §1.1.3.3.

151 Thus Dharmakīrti's opponent considers that related entities cannot have natures that are completely alien to each other; accordingly, in PVSV 147,3–4 he defines the otherness of two given entities as a lack of relation between their natures (*svabhāvāpratibandha*). However, according to Dharmakīrti, relation cannot be understood as the merging or mixture (*miśrībhavana*) of the relata's natures: real entities remain unmixed with one another (see, e.g., SP 5: *tau ca bhāvau tadanyaś ca sarve te svātmani sthitāḥ / ity amiśrāḥ svayaṃ bhāvās tān miśrayati kalpanā //*. "And the two [so-called related] entities as well as [their relation, which is supposedly] distinct from [them,] all rest in themselves; as a consequence, entities remain unmixed [*amiśra*] in themselves: it is conceptual thought that mixes them."). According to Dharmakīrti, otherness is precisely this fact that entities' natures do not merge or their mutual exclusiveness (*parasparam ananugamaḥ*, PVSV 147,8–9; cf. PVSVṬ 528,15–16, which explains it as *amiśrībhavanam*: see below, fn. 174, p. 103).

the *pudgala*'s alleged perception, which shows that the *pudgala* is no real entity, rests on his elaboration of the notion of *anupalabdhi*[152] and more importantly, on the equation between existence and functionality (*arthakriyā*)[153] and on the idea that any existing entity must have the minimal efficacy consisting in producing a cognitive appearance of itself:[154] the *pudgala* is not a real entity precisely because it is devoid of such a power.

1.2.1.3.3. Here the Pudgalavāda's critique is instrumental in establishing Dharmakīrti's own version of the identity principle (according to which a real entity x must be either the same as or other than a real entity y), or rather, it is instrumental in establishing that this principle only applies to real entities (so that the opponent of the causeless destruction thesis cannot claim that destruction must be subjected to the alternative between identity and otherness with respect to the perishing entity). However, it is worth noting that the TSP adopts the reverse strategy: there the *pudgala*'s ontological status is no longer used to establish the scope of the identity principle; rather, it is the scope of the identity principle that determines the *pudgala*'s ontological status. Thus Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla endeavour to show that because the identity principle only applies to real entities, the *pudgala*, which escapes the alternative between identity and otherness with respect to

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Indeed, Dharmakīrti acknowledges one relation besides that of pure and simple identity, namely, the causality relation, but he shows that the natures involved in it remain heterogenous (see Eltschinger 2010b: 414–415 [§10c]. The Pudgalavādin, by claiming that the *pudgala* is related with the constituents, is thus confronted with the very alternative between identity and otherness that his *pudgala* supposedly escapes: either the *pudgala*'s relation with the constituents is one of pure and simple identity, or it is one of causality (and therefore of otherness). In order to get away from this alternative he has to acknowledge the lack of relation (*apratibandha*) between the *pudgala* and the constituents, but by doing so he is doomed to accept their otherness since he himself defines otherness as *apratibandha* (PVSV 147,12; see below, fn. 179, p. 104).

152 See Eltschinger 2010b: 416–419 (§10e) and below, fn. 186, p. 106.

153 See Eltschinger 2010b: 402–403 (§5b). Cf. TS 347ab, quoted below, fn. 211, p. 113.

154 PVSV 149,27–150,2: *jñānamātrārthakriyāyām apy asāmarthye vastv eva na syāt / tathā hi tallakṣaṇaṃ vastv iti vakṣyāmaḥ /*. "If [something] lacks the ability to perform the functionality that is a mere cognition, it is no real entity at all; for we will say that a real entity has as its characteristic this [functional efficacy]." See, e.g., Yoshimizu 1999: 145 and 149.

the constituents, cannot be a real entity.[155] Saying that only a real entity cannot escape the alternative between identity and otherness is tantamount to claiming that something that cannot be stated in terms of identity or otherness can only be unreal or is a pseudo-entity (*avastu*), and such is (one among) the Buddhist epistemologists' criteria for the old Abhidharmic distinction between "substantially real" (*dravyasat*) and "designatively real" (*prajñaptisat*) so constantly at stake in all the traditional accounts of the *pudgala* controversy.[156] How to establish the pervasion (*vyāpti*) between the two properties *tattvānyatvāvācyatva* and *avastutva*? This is what Śāntarakṣita is up to in TS 338–342. The argument is formulated as follows in TS 338a_2d:

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[155] Candrakīrti had already adopted a somewhat similar strategy (on this strategy, see Duerlinger 1984: 264 and 270). Candrakīrti spells out the anti-Personalist's classic argument as follows (MAV 6.147): *gaṅ phyir gzugs las sems brjod med mi rtogs // dṅos yod brjod med rtogs pa ma yin ñid // gal te bdag 'ga' dṅos por grub gyur na // sems ltar grub dṅos brjod du med mi 'gyur //*. "[The difference or identity of] mind with respect to form is not conceived of as inexpressible, and in fact, no existing (*vastusat*) is considered inexpressible. It follows that if the self is an established entity, then, like 'mind,' which is [also] an established entity, [its difference or identity with respect to psychophysical aggregates] would not be inexpressible." Translation Huntington 1992:175. The full version of the argument in contraposed form appears in MAV 6.148: *gaṅ phyir khyod bum dṅos por ma grub pa'i // ṅo bo gzugs gaṅ phuṅ po las brjod med 'gyur te // raṅ gis yod par grub par rtogs mi bya //*. "According to our opponent, a jug is not by nature an established entity precisely because [its difference or identity] with respect to form, for example, is inexpressible. Likewise, the relationship of the self to the psychophysical aggregates is also inexpressible, and therefore one ought not conceive of the self as intrinsically existent." Translation Huntington 1992: 175.

[156] Note TSP_K 127,17/$TSP_Ś$ 115,15: *evaṃ tāvad avācyatvābhyupagame prajñaptisattvam pudgalasya prāptam iti pratipāditam /*. "Thus, it has been shown first that if one accepts that the *pudgala* cannot be said [to be either identical to or different from the constituents,] it follows that it [only] exists as a designation." On Vasubandhu's distinction between *dravyasat* and *prajñaptisat*, see Katsura 1976; on the Pudgalavādins' understanding of *prajñapti*, see above, §§1.1.3.3–4. Surviving evidence regarding theories of the *pudgala* indicates that the Pudgalavādins themselves regarded the *pudgala* as a *prajñapti* (see, e.g., Chau 1987: 42–43, Buswell 1999: 354, Lusthaus 2009 and Eltschinger 2010a: 294–295).

> A real *pudgala* does not exist, because it cannot be said to be either identical to or other than [another entity], like a water-lily in the sky.[157]

Kamalaśīla reformulates his master's argument in the following "formal" application (*prayoga*):

> [*Vyāpti*:] Whatever cannot be said to be either the same as or other than a [given] entity is not a [real] entity, like a water-lily in the sky. [*Pakṣadharmatā*:] Now, the *pudgala* cannot be said [to be either the same as or other than another entity. The logical reason involved in the present argument] is the non-perception of the pervader.[158]

According to TSP_K 126,17/$TSP_Ś$ 114,22, TS 340–342 are aimed at demonstrating this pervasion:

> Since the alternative between difference and identity has a [real] entity as its basis, the [pseudo-things] that are without a nature [of their own] are not [to be] designated as identical to or other than [other things], etc., but [this is] not [the case of] a [real] entity. For the negation [to which one resorts when saying:] "[x] is not y [i.e., does not have y for its nature]" entails (°*vat*) [the affirmation of] another entity. [Therefore] one obviously states [its] otherness with regard to y.[159] And to negate that [x] does not have y for its nature amounts to saying that [x] is identical [to y]. Therefore a [real] entity [x] does not transgress [the alternative between] identity and difference with regard to a [real] entity [y].[160]

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[157] TS 338a_2d: *pudgalo naiva vidyate pāramārthikaḥ / tattvānyatvādyavācyatvān nabhaḥkokanadādivat //*.

[158] TSP_K 126,14–15/$TSP_Ś$ 114,19–20: *yad vastunaḥ sakāśāt tattvānyatvābhyāṃ vācyaṃ na bhavati na tad vastu / yathā gagananilanam / na bhavati ca vācyaḥ pudgala iti vyāpakānupalabdhiḥ /*.

[159] According to TSP_K 127,7–8/$TSP_Ś$ 115,5 (*svabhāvāntaravidhinānatarīyakatvād vastuno vastvantarabhāvaniṣedhasya /*). According to TSP_K 127,5/$TSP_Ś$ 115,3, this answers the question: *kathaṃ punar gatyantarābhāvaḥ /*.

[160] TS 340–342: *bhedābhedavikalpasya vastvadhiṣṭhānabhāvataḥ / tattvānyatvādyanirdeśo niḥsvabhāveṣu yujyate // na vastuni yad etad dhi tan neti pratiṣedhanam / tad vastvantaravat tasmād vyaktam anyatvam ucyate // atadbhāvaniṣedhaś ca tattvam evābhidhīyate / nātikrāmati tad vastu tattvaṃ bhedaṃ ca vastunaḥ //*. Kamalaśīla concludes (TSP_K 127,16/$TSP_Ś$ 115,13–14): *iti siddhā vyāptir maulasya hetoḥ //*. "Thus, the principal reason's pervasion is established."

As a consequence, the *pudgala* is not a real entity. Equivalently, the *pudgala* is nothing but an entity of designation, which coincides perfectly with the MSA(Bh)'s and Vasubandhu's conclusions.

1.2.2. PVSV 147,2–148,5:[161] Annotated Translation

[162]A [certain real] nature [x]'s being other [than y] is nothing but its not being y, [163]for visible shape's (*rūpa*) and taste's being reciprocally other, too, is nothing else [than each one's not being the other one]. [164] Objection: [Although x does not have the nature of y, still it cannot be said to be other than y, for] otherness [actually] consists in [their] natures' lacking a [mutual] relation (*pratibandha*).[165] [Answer:] What does this so-called relation [between x and y] consist of, so that [x] would be neither this [i.e., of the nature of y,] nor of a nature other [than y]? Objection: [This relation consists in x's] being born (*janman*)

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[161] Śākyabuddhi's and Karṇakagomin's commentaries appear in PVṬ *Je* D326a4–*Ñe* 1b3/P399a6–*Ñe* 1b5 and PVSVṬ 527,18–530,22.

[162] Introduction, PVṬ *Je* D326a4–5/P399a6–7 ≈ PVSVṬ 527,18–20: *rūpādiskandhasvabhāvaḥ pudgalo na bhavaty atha ca[a] rūpādibhyo nānyaḥ / tasmāt[b] tattvānyattvam ativartata eva svabhāva iti cet / tan na / yasmāt* [...] /. [[a] Note PVṬ *de lta na yaṅ* (**tathāpi*?). [b] *tasmāt* em. (PVṬ *de bas na*) : *tasma* Ed.] "Objection: The *pudgala* does not have as its nature the constituents such as corporeality, and yet it is not other than corporeality, etc. Therefore it is the case that a [real] nature escapes [the alternative between] identity and otherness. [Answer:] This is not [the case], because [...]." On the Pudgalavādin's thesis that the *pudgala* is neither the same as nor other than the constituents, see above, §1.1.3.4, fn. 134, p. 88 and 147, p. 96.

[163] Introduction, PVṬ *Je* D326a5/P399a8 = PVSVṬ 527,21: *yadi pudgalo 'pi na skandhasvabhāvas tadā skandhebhyo 'nya eva / yataḥ* [...] /. "If the *pudgala* itself does not have the constituents as its nature, then [it can] only [be] other than the constituents, because [...]."

[164] Conclusion, PVSVṬ 527,22–23: *atatsvabhāvatvam evānyattvam / tac ca pudgale 'py astīti so 'pi skandhebhyo 'nya eveṣṭavyaḥ /*. "[x's] being other [than y] is nothing but [its] not having y as its nature. Now, since this is the case of the *pudgala* too, [you] have to admit that it is [simply] other than the constituents."

[165] Conclusion, PVṬ *Je* D326a6–7/P399b1–2 = PVSVṬ 527,24–26: *sa ca pratibandhaḥ pudgalasya skandheṣv asti / tato 'tatsvabhāvatve 'pi nānyattvaṃ skandhebhyo pudgalasyeti /*. "Now, there is a [mutual] relation between the *pudgala* and the constituents. Therefore even though the *pudgala* does not have the constituents as its nature, it is not other than them."

[of y].[166] [Answer: If it were because x is the effect of y that it could not be said to be either y or other than y, then] no cause and no effect[167] could [ever] be said [to be either identical with or other than] one another; and so[168] everything [would be] somehow[169] [causally] useful (*upayogin*) to everything, therefore[170] nothing would be other than anything. And thus even [someone using the word] "inexpressibility" (*avācyatā*)[171] [defined in the afore-mentioned way] would merely express a causality relation with another word without [conveying] a different meaning.[172] [173][As for ourselves] however, we define (*brūmaḥ*) otherness as the exclusiveness (*ananugama*) of [two real] natures [i.e., as the fact that they do not mix with each other[174]]. Now,

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[166] Conclusion, PVṬ *Je* D326b1–2/P399b4 ≈ PVSVṬ 528,10: *evaṃ sati kāryatvāt skandhebhyaḥ pudgalasya tattvānyattvenāvācyatvam iṣṭam /.* "This being the case, since [the *pudgala*] is an effect [of the constituents, we] admit that the *pudgala* cannot be said to be either the same as or other than the constituents." (Note that the PVṬ treats this as the conclusion of the objection whereas the PVSVṬ seems to understand it as the beginning of Dharmakīrti's rebuttal). On the Pudgalavādins' contention that the constituents and the *pudgala* stand in a causal relation comparable to that of fuel and fire, see above, §1.1.3.4.2, fn. 136, p. 89, and 149, p. 97.

[167] Note that $PVSV_S$ 527,7, $PVSV_{Tib}$ D346b6/P510b1 and PVṬ *Je* D326b2/P399b5 read *sarvakāryakāraṇānāṃ* (*rgyu daṅ 'bras bu thams cad*), against PVSVṬ 528,11 (*sarvakāraṇānāṃ*) and according to Gnoli (*a silentio*), MSS A and B. We have read: *sarvakāryakāraṇānāṃ*.

[168] Explanation, PVṬ *Je* D326b2/P399b6 = PVSVṬ 528,11: *tathā ceti kāryatvād avācyatve.* "And so, i.e., if [it is] because [the *pudgala*] is an effect [of the constituents that it] cannot be said [to be either identical to or other than them]."

[169] Explanation, PVṬ *Je* D326b2–3/P399b6–7 ≈ PVSVṬ 528,12: *kathañcid iti sākṣāt pāramparyeṇa ca.*[a] [[a] PVṬ reads **vā*.] "'Somehow,' i.e., in a direct or indirect manner."

[170] Explanation, PVṬ *Je* D326b3/P399b7 = PVSVṬ 528,12–13: *iti sarvatra kāryakāraṇabhāvāt.* "Therefore [i.e.,] because a causality relation [would thus obtain] with respect to everything."

[171] See above, §1.1.3.4, fn. 134, p. 88, and 147, p. 96.

[172] On this refutation of the opponent's view of causal relation, see above, fn. 149, p. 97.

[173] Introduction, PVṬ *Je* D326b4/P400a1 = PVSVṬ 528,15: *anyattvaṃ tu na niṣiddham / yasmāt* [...] /. "But [according to us, their] otherness is not discarded [for all that], because [...]."

[174] PVṬ *Je* D326b4–5/P400a1–2 = PVSVṬ 528,15–16 explain *parasparam ananugamam* as *amiśrībhavanam.*

since [all entities] possessing a [real] nature are mutually [exclusive, they] have to be [mutually] other. [175]And [between entities that are not identical,[176]] no[thing] except the natural relation consisting in causality [can be] called a "relation," for it is not contradictory that [something which is causally] independent[177] [from something else] may deviate [from the latter].[178] [Both] because of this [lack of relation[179]] and because [x and y have] distinct properties [i.e., inexpressibility-as and expressibility-as respectively,[180] x and y] are [simply] other.[181]

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[175] Introduction, PVṬ *Je* D326b5–6/P400a3–4: *gal te skye ba'i mtshan ñid can gyi rag lus pas phuṅ po dag las gaṅ zag gźan ñid du yod pa ni ma yin mod kyi 'on kyaṅ rag lus pa gźan ñid du yod do źe na* /. "Objection: [True,] it is not thanks to a relation defined as causality (**janmalakṣaṇapratibandha*) that the *pudgala* is other than the constituents; there are, however, other [kinds of] relations."

[176] The causality relation (*tadutpatti*) is the only one possible in the case of discrete entities, and the only one left open for the Pudgalavādin, for whom an identity-type (*tādātmya*) relation is ruled out by his insistence on the fact that the *pudgala* cannot be said to be the same as the constituents. See Eltschinger 2010b: 414–415 (§10c), and above, fn. 151, p. 98.

[177] Explanation, PVṬ *Je* D326b7/P400a5 ≈ PVSVṬ 528,19: *anāyattasya tadutpattyā tatrāpratibaddhasya.* "Independent [i.e.,] not related to y through causality."

[178] On this reasoning see above, fn. 151, p. 98.

[179] According to PVṬ *Je* D327a1/P400a7 ≈ PVSVṬ 528,20, *tataḥ* provides the first of two reasons: *tato 'pratibandhāt[a] pudgalasya skandhebhyo 'nyattvam* /. [[a] PVṬ reads **yathoktād apratibandhāt.*] "Because of the [afore-mentioned$_{PVṬ}$] lack of relation, the *pudgala* is other than the constituents." See above, fn. 151, p. 98.

[180] See PVSVṬ 528,20–21: *tathā hy avācyatvaṃ pudgalasya dharmaḥ skandhānāṃ tu parasparaṃ vācyatvam iti dharmabhedaḥ* /. "To explain: the *pudgala* has the property of being inexpressible (*avācyatva*) [in terms of identity or otherness] whereas the constituents [have the property of] being expressible (*vācyatva*) [in these terms] with respect to one another, so [the *pudgala* on the one hand and the constituents on the other hand] have distinct properties." Cf. TSP$_K$ 127,27/TSP$_Ś$ 115,25 (following the statement that two real entities determined as having mutually contradictory properties are distinct from each other): *vācyatvāvācyatvādiparasparaviruddhadharmādhyāsitau ca skandhapudgalau.* "Now, the constituents and the *pudgala* have mutually contradictory properties such as expressibility and inexpressibility."

[181] Explanation, PVṬ *Je* D327a2–3/P400a8–b2: *'di la yaṅ sbyor ba gñis su 'gyur te / gaṅ źig gaṅ la rag lus pa med pa de ni de las gźan pa yin te / rta las ba laṅ* (D : *laṅ daṅ* P) *lta bu'o // phuṅ po dag la gaṅ zag kyaṅ rag lus pa med pa źes bya ba ni raṅ bźin gyi gtan tshigs so // gaṅ źig gaṅ las chos tha dad pa de ni de las gźan yin te / dper na rta las ba laṅ lta bu'o // phuṅ po dag las gaṅ zag kyaṅ chos tha dad pa yin no źes bya ba*

Objection: The relation [between x and y] is a matter (*kṛta*) of cognition[, not of causality]. Suppose the following be urged (*syād etat*): Because x, the cognition of which is invariably connected to the cognition of y, necessarily appears [in cognition] when y is cognized[, their relation is a matter of cognition, and due to this cognitional relation], x cannot be said [to be other than y] although it does not have the nature of y.[182] [To this, let us answer as follows:] No, [the cognition of x is not invariably connected to the cognition of y,] because x is devoid of [any]

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ni raṅ bźin gyi gtan tshigs ñid do //. "And there are two [formal] applications in this [connection: (1)] An x that is not related to a y is other than y, as a cow with regard to a horse. Now, the *pudgala* is not related to the constituents. [The logical reason involved here] is a *svabhāvahetu*. [(2)] An x whose properties differ from y's is other than y, as a cow with regard to a horse. Now, the *pudgala* has properties different from y's. [The logical reason involved here] is a *svabhāvahetu*."

[182] Explanation, PVṬ *Je* D327a6–7/P400b6–8: *gzugs la sogs pa gzuṅ ba ñid kyis kyaṅ gaṅ zag kyaṅ gzuṅ ba yin te / de ni mig la sogs pa'i rnam par śes pas śes par bya ba ñid yin pa'i phyir ro // de bas na gzugs la sogs pa rtogs pa med na mi 'byuṅ ba yaṅ* (P : D om. *yaṅ*) *gaṅ zag rtogs pa yin pa de ltar na gaṅ zag phuṅ po'i raṅ bźin ma yin du zin kyaṅ phuṅ po dag las gźan ñid du brjod par bya ba ma yin źe na /*. "It is [indeed] due to [our] grasping of [objects] such as visible things that the *pudgala* too is grasped,[a] for this [*pudgala*] can be cognized (**jñeya*?) through a visual cognition, etc.[b] Therefore, the cognition of the *pudgala* is invariably connected with the cognition of [objects] such as visible things. [And] thus, although the *pudgala* does not have the nature of the constituents,[c] it cannot be said to be other than the constituents.[d]" [[a] To be compared with PVSVṬ 528,26–27: *tathā hi rūpaśabdādigrahaṇenaiva pudgalagrahaṇam iṣyate /*. "For [you] accept that [it is] due to [our] grasping of [objects] such as visible things and sounds [that] the *pudgala* is grasped." [b] To be compared with PVSVṬ 528,27: *cakṣurādivijñānavijñeyatvāt pudgalasyeti /* (where *pudgalasya* is simply substituted for **(t)asya*). [c] = PVSVṬ 528,29: *askandhasvabhāvam api /*. [d] = PVSVṬ 528,28: *skandhebhyo 'nyatvenāvācyam*.] How to interpret *gzugs* = *rūpa* in this explanation? The commentators' allusion to *cakṣurvijñāna* as well as Karṇakagomin's reference to *śabda* suggest that the objects (*viṣaya*) of the different sensory cognitions are meant (cf. the shift of meaning of the term *rūpa* in the AKBh when the discussion moves to the *pudgala* as an object of knowledge, *jñeya*, from $AKBh_{Pr}$ 463,1/$AKBh_{LE}$ 48,6 onwards). Remember, however, that these *viṣaya*s are instances of the *rūpaskandha* (as *dhātu*s/*āyatana*s no. 1–5). Thus, the *pudgala* would be cognized when one cognizes (through *indriyapratyakṣa*) visible things, sounds, etc., i.e., objects belonging to the realm of corporeality, and/or when one cognizes (through *svasaṃvedanapratyakṣa*) affective sensations (*vedanāskandha*), perceptual identifications (*saṅjñāskandha*), cognitions (*vijñānaskandha*), etc. On the cognizability of the *pudgala*, see above, §1.1.3.3 and fn. 150, p. 97.

nature of its own (*svayam*) [i.e., independently of the nature of y,] for its nature is nothing but that which appears [in cognition in the form of y, and this for two reasons: [183]first] because if x were endowed with a nature [of its own, i.e., if it were not simply of the nature of y], then it would appear (*pratibhāsaprasaṅga*) [separately in cognition], as [does] y;[184] [and second,] because [something] perceptible[185] does not exist if it does not appear [in cognition].[186] [And] since even if [x] were [held to be] imperceptible, the cognition [still] would not have this form [i.e., the aspect of x],[187] what is it the cognition of[, and] related to what?[188]

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[183] Introduction, PVṬ *Je* D327b1/P401a3 ≈ PVSVṬ 529,10: *athārūpādisvabhāvaḥ pudgalaḥ / tadā* […] /. "If the *pudgala* does not have the constituents as its nature, then […]."

[184] Conclusion, PVṬ *Je* D327b2/P401a4 ≈ PVSVṬ 529,11: *na ca pratibhāsate[a] / tato nāsty eva pudgalaḥ* /. [[a] PVṬ reads **pṛthak pratibhāsate*.] "Now, it does not appear [separately$_{PVṬ}$]. Therefore the *pudgala* simply does not exist."

[185] Explanation, PVṬ *Je* D327b2–3/P401a4–5: *snaṅ du ruṅ ba ste dmigs pa'i mtshan ñid kyir gyur pa*. "Perceptible, i.e., for which the [causal] characteristics for a perception have been attained (**upalabdhilakṣaṇaprāpta*)." On *upalabdhilakṣaṇaprāpta*, see Eltschinger 2010b: 416–419 (§10e).

[186] Explanation, PVṬ *Je* D327b3/P401a5: *'dis ni gaṅ zag med par bsgrub pa'i phyir raṅ bźin mi dmigs pa bśad pa yin no* //. "With this, [Dharmakīrti] resorts (**ukta*) to the non-perception of a thing/nature (**svabhāvānupalabdhi*) in order to demonstrate that the *pudgala* does not exist." On *svabhāvānupalabdhi*, see Eltschinger 2010b: 416–419 (§10e).

[187] Explanations. (1) PVṬ *Je* D327b3/P401a6: *de'i ṅo bo śes pa ste gaṅ zag gi raṅ bźin 'dzin pa'i śes pa ma yin pa.* "The cognition would not have this form, i.e., the cognition would not grasp the nature of the *pudgala* (**pudgalasvabhāvagrāhaka*?)." (2) PVSVṬ 529,13: *na tadrūpaṃ jñānaṃ na pudgalākāraṃ jñānam.* "The cognition would not have this form, i.e., the cognition would not have the *pudgala* as its mode of apprehension."

[188] Conclusion, PVṬ *Je* D327b4/P401a7 = PVSVṬ 529,14–15: *na rūpādijñānanānta rīyakaṃ pudgalajñānam ity arthaḥ / tathā ca na jñānakṛtaḥ pratibandha iti bhāvaḥ* /. "The cognition of the *pudgala* is not invariably connected to the cognition of [constituents] such as corporeality: this is the meaning. And thus, the relation is not a matter of cognition: this is [Dharmakīrti's] idea." Here Dharmakīrti's reply rests on the principle that if the *pudgala* were a real entity endowed with a nature of its own it would necessarily produce a distinct cognitive appearance of itself (see above, fn. 154, p. 99).

[189]Moreover (*ca*), if the [perceptual] cognition of a [real entity] x depends on [something else, say] y, it is certainly not the case that the nature of x ceases to appear (*pratibhāsa eva naśyati*) [in cognition when y appears], as [the nature] of [colours] such as blue, the cognition of which depends on light[, does not cease to appear when light appears in cognition].[190] Or what does x's close connection (*pratyāsatti*) to y[191] consist of, so that x itself is [also] manifest (*pratyupatiṣṭhate*) when one cognizes y [although this y] lacks x's own nature? For [if it were] so there would an absurdity.[192] Objection: [This close connection consists in] the fact that [the x] that is being cognized has y for its basis (*upādāna*).[193] [Answer: But] what is the meaning of "basis"? [First,] a causality relation [between x and y can]not [be intended] since it is not accepted. Or, if one accepts [a causality relation between x and y, still one does not necessarily perceive x when one perceives y, for] the effect and the cause do not manifest (*pratyupasthāpana*) a cognition of

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189 Introduction, PVṬ *Je* D327b4–5/P401a7–8 = PVSVṬ 529,16: *rūpādyāyattapratītitvād eva pṛthak pudgalo na pratibhāsata iti cet* /. "Objection: It is because [its] cognition depends on [constituents] such as corporeality that the *pudgala* does not appear separately [in cognition]."

190 Explanation, PVSVṬ 529,19–20: *yathā nīlādīnām ālokapratibaddhajñānānām āloke pratibhāsamāne 'pi svapratibhāso na naśyati / ālokavyatirekeṇa teṣāṃ pratibhāsanāt / tadvat pudgalasyāpi syāt* /. "For example, the own [cognitive] appearance of [colours] such as blue, the cognition of which is related to light, does not cease when light appears [in the cognition], because these [colours] appear distinctly from light [in the cognition]. Now, the *pudgala* too should likewise have [a distinct appearance when light appears]."

191 As testified by PVSV$_{Tib}$ D347a4/P511a1 (*de la ni* [P : D om. *ni*] *don de ñe ba gaṅ yin* /) and the commentaries (PVṬ *Je* D327b6/P401b3: *phuṅ po de la gaṅ zag ces bya ba'i don de ñe ba ste 'brel pa gaṅ yin* /. PVSVṬ 529,21: *kā vā tasya pudgalasya pratyāsattiḥ sambandhas tatra skandhe* /), *tatra* (PVSV 147,21) belongs to this sentence. We have read: *kā vā tasya pratyāsattis tatra / yat* [...] /.

192 Explanation, PVṬ *Je* D327b7–328a1/P401b4–5 ≈ PVSVṬ 529,24–26: *apratibaddhe pratibhāsamāne yadi niyamena pudgalaḥ pratibhāseta / tadā yasya kasyacit pratibhāsane 'nyo 'py atyantāsambaddhaḥ pratīyeta[a] ity arthaḥ* /. [[a] *pratīyeta* em. (PVṬ *rtogs pa ñid du 'gyur ro*): *pratīyata* Ed.] "If the *pudgala* necessarily appeared when [something] unrelated [to it appears], then, when whatever appears [in cognition], all [things] other [than that, although] utterly unconnected [to it], would appear: this is the meaning."

193 On this term see above, §1.1.3.4.2, and fn. 135, p. 88.

each other [in a reciprocal way].[194] Objection: It is the cognition [of x, not x itself,] that is invariably related to y[, and their] close connection [consists in this invariable relation. Answer:] Has it not been [already] said [above] that this very [invariable relation of a cognition] is impossible in the absence of a relation [between x and y themselves]? [195]Now, [we have already] said [many times] that [there is] no relation between [things] that are not effect and cause [of one another. What has been said,[196] i.e., that] "[an x] the cognition of which is invariably related to the cognition of y, etc.," [this] also would be [true] provided there were a cognition of x [distinct from y. Now, there is no such cognition,] because there is no cognition of that x which does not appear in cognition in its own form, independently (*asaṃsargeṇa*) of [anything] heterogenous (*asvarūpa*). And for want of such a [cognition], defining the nature of an object [such as x] as inexpressible [as being identical to or other than y] is illegitimate (*na sidhyati*). A really existing [thing] must therefore be possessed of either identity or otherness[, for there is no other possibility for a real entity].[197]

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[194] Explanation, PVSVṬ 529,30–530,10: *yathā kāryāt kāraṇapratītis tathā na kāraṇāt kāryapratītir bhavatīty arthaḥ /*. "Contrary to the cognition of the cause through the effect[, which is legitimate], there is no cognition of the effect through the cause." On this point, see Eltschinger 2010b: 415–416 (§10d).

[195] Introduction, PVṬ *Je* D328a4–5/P402a2–3 = PVSVṬ 530,15: *akāryakāraṇayor api pudgalarūpādyoḥ pratibandho bhaviṣyatīty ata āha* [...]. "[Dharmakīrti] says [what follows] in order to [meet the present objection]: Although they [do] not [enter a relation of] effect to cause, the *pudgala* and [constituents] such as corporeality will [certainly] have a relation."

[196] According to PVṬ *Je* D328a5/P402a4 ≈ PVSVṬ 530,17 (*yatpratipattināntarīyakaṃ yajjñānam ity api yad ucyate* [...]), in PVSV 147,13–15.

[197] PVSV 147,2–148,5: *atattvam eva svabhāvasyānyattvam / na hi rūparasayor apy anyad eva parasparam anyattvam / svabhāvāpratibandho 'nyattvam iti cet / ko 'yaṃ pratibandho nāma yena sa ca na syāt / nānyasvabhāvaś ca / janmeti cet / sarvakāryakāraṇānāṃ[a] parasparam avācyatā syāt / tathā ca sarvaḥ sarvasya kathañcid upayogīti na kaścit kutaścid anyaḥ syāt / evaṃ cāvācyatety api kāryakāraṇabhāva eva śabdāntareṇoktaḥ syāt / nārthabhedaḥ / svabhāvānanugamam[b] tv anyattvaṃ brūmaḥ / sa ca svabhāvavatāṃ[c] parasparam asty evety[d] anyattvam eva / na ca tajjanmalakṣaṇāt svabhāvapratibandhād anyaḥ pratibandho nāma / anāyattasya vyabhicārāvirodhāt / tato dharmabhedāc cānyattvam / jñānakṛtaḥ pratibandha iti cet / syād etat / yatpratipattināntarīyakaṃ yajjñānaṃ tadgatau niyamena tatpratibhāsanāt tad atadrūpam apy avācyam iti / na / tasya niḥsvabhāvatvāt svayam / sa eva hi tasya svabhāvo yaḥ pratibhāti / svabhāvavattve 'sya tadvat pratibhāsapra-*

1.2.3. On PV 2.202–204

Dharmakīrti's second argument against the *pudgala* occurs at the very end of his treatment of the truth of cessation (*nirodhasatya*) in PV 2. Here, as in PVSV 147,2–148,5, Dharmakīrti does not allude to the *pudgala* in any explicit way, so that this interpretation relies on the immediate context (a discussion of the *satkāyadṛṣṭi* and the eschatological consequences of one's adhering to a self),[198] on terminology (*avācya* in PV 2.203a and c) and on the (almost) unanimous explanation of these stanzas as a critique of the Pudgalavāda by his successors (Devendrabuddhi, Śākyabuddhi, Śāntarakṣita, Kamalaśīla, Manorathanandin).[199]

It is well-known that, at least from Vasubandhu onwards, the Yogācāra intellectuals developed a model of causality that denied permanent entities such as God or the self any functionality and therefore any real existence, for only impermanent entities can bring about an ef-

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saṅgāt / apratibhāsamānasya ca dṛśyasyābhāvāt / adṛśyatve 'pi na tadrūpaṃ jñānam iti kasya kimāyattā pratipattiḥ / na ca yad yadāyattapratītikaṃ tasya svabhāvapratibhāsa eva naśyati / prakāśāyattapratītīnām iva nīlādīnām / kā vā tasya pratyāsattis tatra /[e] *yat tasminn anātmarūpe pratīyamāne sa svayaṃ pratyupatiṣṭhate / atiprasaṅgo hy evaṃ syāt / pratīyamānasya tadupādānateti cet / ko 'yam upādānārthaḥ / na kāryakāraṇabhāvo 'nabhyupagamāt / abhyupagame vā na kāryakāraṇe 'nyonyapratītipratyupasthāpane / pratīter eva tannāntarīyakatā pratyāsattir iti cet / nanu saivāsati pratibandhe na yuktety ucyate / nākāryakāraṇayoḥ kaścit pratibandha iti coktam / yatpratipattināntarīyakaṃ yajjñānam ity api tajjñāne sati syāt / na hi yo vijñāne svarūpeṇāsvarūpāsaṃsargeṇa na pratibhāsate tasya kiñcij jñānam / tadabhāvān na sidhyaty*[f] *avācyatālakṣaṇam artharūpasya / tad bhavatā vastutas tattvānyatvabhājā bhavitavyam /.* [a] See above, fn. 167, p. 103. [b] *svabhāvānanugamam* PVSV$_{MS}$: *svabhāvānanugamaṇam* Ed. [c] *svabhāvavatāṃ* : *svabhāvatām* Ed. [d] *evety* : *eva ity* Ed. [e] See above, fn. 191, p. 107. [f] *na sidhyaty* : *na sidhyati* Ed.

198 On Dharmakīrti's views regarding *satkāyadṛṣṭi = avidyā*, see Introduction, §0.1. On PV 2.200–201 and Dharmakīrti's views on the *pratītyasamutpāda*, see Eltschinger 2009a: 173–175 and Eltschinger 2010c: 28–48.

199 Here as elsewhere, Prajñākaragupta is an exception, as is testified to by his introduction to PV 2.203. PVA 141,8–9: *athāpi syāt – na nitya ātmā pūrvoktadoṣān nāpy anityo 'prekṣāpūrvakriyāprasaṅgāt / ato nityatvānityatvābhyām avācyaḥ / tad api na yuktam /*. "But if [the following] were [urged]: 'The self is neither permanent, because of the afore-mentioned fault, nor impermanent, because an irrational action would follow; therefore it cannot be said to be either permanent or impermanent' – this too is incorrect."

fect.[200] To put it briefly, a permanent entity, the causal capacity of which is complete and unimpeded and therefore does not depend on the circumstantial intervention of a cooperating factor, can bring about an effect neither gradually (*krameṇa*) nor simultaneously (*yaugapadyena*). It cannot bring it about gradually, because nothing prevents this entity from producing its effect entirely at once. But it cannot bring about its effect at one time only, since if it is permanent, no change can occur in its nature and it cannot become inactive once it has started producing. Provided that these authors' criterion for existence is functionality, only impermanent entities can be regarded as existent, whereas permanent entities, which do not meet this requirement, are held to be nonexistent.

Interestingly enough, the issue of the causality of permanent entities had already been touched upon in the MSA(Bh)'s critique of the *pudgala*. Suffice it to quote here MSA 18.99–100:

> Because the [*pudgala*] would no [longer] be an agent, because [its exertion] is impermanent, [and] because [exertion] would occur [all] at once [and] permanently, [this *pudgala*'s] effort in order to see [visible things], etc., cannot be self-arisen. Neither a [*pudgala*] that [always] remains as it is nor a perishable [*pudgala*] can be the [causal] condition [of the exertion aimed at producing seeing, etc., and this for three reasons:] because [this exertion] does not exist before[, hence cannot be due to a permanent cause]; because [this *pudgala*] would [*ipso facto*] be impermanent; and because there is no third hypothesis [i.e., the hypothesis of a *pudgala* that would be neither permanent nor impermanent].[201]

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[200] See above, Introduction, §0.2.2, and below, Chapter 2, §2.4; see also Yoshimizu 1999.

[201] For the Sanskrit of MSA 18.99–100, see above, fn. 95, p. 27. On these stanzas and Vasubandhu's commentary, see Eltschinger 2010a: 320–322. We are not aware of any parallel argument in Vasubandhu's AKBh. Note also YBhū 132,1–3: *kaccid icchasy anityaś ceṣṭāhetur nityo veti / saced anityaḥ savikāra ātmā ceṣṭata iti na yujyate / sacen nityo nirvikāras tena nirvikāraś ceṣṭata iti na yujyate /*. "Do you accept the cause of action (*ceṣṭā*) [i.e., the self,] as impermanent or permanent? If it is impermanent, it undergoes change, [and] it is impossible that [such] a [changeable] self acts. [But] if it is permanent, it is unchangeable, [and] therefore it is impossible that [something] unchangeable acts."

Now, the causality of permanent entities also provides the doctrinal background of PV 2.202, a stanza most likely to be interpreted as targetting a permanent self:[202]

> [There can be neither bondage nor liberation for something permanent.] Being the cause of the arising of suffering is [what we call] "bondage": [since what is permanent is devoid of the capacity to bring about anything,][203] how [could this belong] to [something] permanent? [And] being the cause of the non-arising of suffering is [what we call] "liberation": how [could this belong] to [something] permanent?[204]

But at least according to Devendrabuddhi and Manorathanandin, Dharmakīrti's target in the next stanza has shifted to the Pudgalavādin (which Manorathanandin takes to be a Vaibhāṣika[205]): if only impermanent entities are able to perform functionalities, then the *pudgala*, which cannot be said to be impermanent according to the personalist opponent, is no more able than the permanent self to act as a cause of bondage or liberation.[206] And such is indeed the intent of the objection that opens Devendrabuddhi's commentary on PV 2.203:

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[202] As PVP D86a6/P99a6 testifies: *gźan yaṅ bdag ñid kyi 'chiṅ ba daṅ thar pa ni yod pa ma yin no* //. "Moreover, a [permanent] self has neither bondage nor liberation."

[203] According to PVP D86a7/P99a7 (*'ga' źig la yaṅ nus pa med pa'i phyir*).

[204] PV 2.202: *duḥkhotpādanahetutvaṃ bandho nityasya tat kutaḥ / aduḥkhotpādahetutvaṃ mokṣo nityasya tat kutaḥ* //. Note PVP D86b2–3/P99b2–3: *de dag ni raṅ gi sde pa bstan bcos mdzad pa gźan gyis maṅ du bśad zin pa'i phyir ma spros so* //. "Since the [impossibility, for permanent entities, to bring about an effect] has [already] been dealt with extensively by other coreligionists (**svayūthya*) who have authored treatises (**śāstrakāra*) [on that topic], we shall not expatiate [upon it here]."

[205] PVV 80,17–19: *syād etat / na nityasya hetutvam / bandhamokṣau ca yuktāv iti / nityatvānityatvābhyām avācyasya pudgalasya tau bhaviṣyata iti manvānaṃ vaibhāṣikaṃ praty āha* [...] /. "Suppose the following be urged: [Something] permanent is not [their] cause, and [thus] bondage and liberation are justified. Both will belong to a *pudgala* that cannot be said to be either permanent or impermanent. Against a Vaibhāṣika who thinks in this way, [Dharmakīrti] says [...]." Note, however, that Vācaspatimiśra also ascribes *pudgalavāda* to the Vaibhāṣikas in his NVTṬ (456,18–19: *so 'yaṃ vātsīputrāṇāṃ* [sic] *vaibhāṣikānāṃ siddhāntaḥ* /).

[206] That the *pudgala* would not be able to experience bondage (or *saṃsāra*) and liberation is also the focus of Bhāviveka's MHK 3.90: *na pudgalaḥ saṃsarati mucyate naiva tattvataḥ / prajñapyatvād yathā veśma vācyatvād vāpi gandhavat* //. "Neither does the *pudgala* really transmigrate nor is it really liberated, because it is [merely]

> Let us admit that [something] permanent [like the outsiders' self] has neither bondage nor liberation. [As for ourselves,] however, [our position is not flawed] since we acknowledge that the *pudgala*, which cannot be said to be either permanent or impermanent, [experiences] bondage and liberation.[207]

Dharmakīrti's answer runs as follows:

> For that which cannot be said to be impermanent [can]not [be] the cause of anything, [so that] even in the case of [something] that cannot be said [to be impermanent], bondage and liberation cannot be experienced in any way.[208]

While explaining Dharmakīrti's stanza, Devendrabuddhi discards the Pudgalavādin's objection as follows:

> This is not the case, for there [can] be no [real] entity lacking one of the two aspects, since [the two properties of being] permanent and [being] impermanent are defined as mutually contradictory. [This is] because, for a [real] entity, being excluded (**vyavaccheda*?) from one [of these two] is invariably connected to possessing the other one, and possessing one [of these two] is invariably connected to being excluded from the other one. Now, this *pudgala* can be either momentary or non-momentary. To begin with, if it is non-momentary, then it is permanent, because such is the state of [that which] exceeds [one single] moment. Therefore it would be contradictory if [something] permanent could not be said to be permanent.[209]

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to be designated[, but not ultimately real], like a house, and also (*vāpi*) because it can be expressed, like a smell." See also Iida 1980: 173. The YBhū and MSA (see, e.g., MSA 18.96–100 and Eltschinger 2010a: 306) already set forth arguments to the effect that the *pudgala* cannot be an agent (*kartṛ*), hence not an agent of liberation (*moktṛ*). On the notions of *kartṛ*, *draṣṭṛ* and *moktṛ*, etc., see above, fn. 112, p. 82.

207 PVP D86b3/P99b3–4: *gal te rtag pa la* (P : *las* D) *'chiṅ ba daṅ thar pa yod pa ma yin pa de ltar ni 'dod pa ñid yin mod kyi / rtag pa daṅ mi rtag pa ñid du brjod du med pa'i gaṅ zag bciṅs pa daṅ thar par khas len pa'i phyir ro źe na /*.

208 PV 2.203: *anityatvena yo 'vācyaḥ sa hetur na hi kasyacit / bandhamokṣāv avācye 'pi na vidyete kathañcana //*.

209 PVP D86b3–6/P99b4–7: *de ni ma yin te / gñi ga'i rnam pa* (P : *par* D) *ma yin pa'i dṅos po med pa'i phyir ro // rtag pa daṅ mi rtag pa dag ni phan tshun spaṅs te gnas pa'i mtshan ñid can yin pa'i phyir ro // dṅos po la gcig rnam par gcad* (D : *bcad* P) *pa daṅ yoṅs su gcod pa dag ni de las gźan yoṅs su gcod pa daṅ rnam par gcad pa med na mi 'byuṅ ba ñid yin pa'i phyir ro // gaṅ zag de yaṅ skad cig ma 'am skad cig ma ma yin par 'gyur graṅ na / re źig gal te skad cig ma ma yin pa de'i tshe skad cig ma las*

However, the most detailed treatment of this stanza (to be more precise, of PV 2.203ab) is to be found in Kamalaśīla's commentary on TS 347, which is much indebted to Devendrabuddhi's above-quoted explanation of PV 2.203. Kamalaśīla introduces his master's stanza as follows:

> It is not only because it cannot be said to be either identical to or other than [the constituents] that one shows that the *pudgala* is not a [real] entity; it is also because [the *pudgala*] cannot be said to be impermanent that [it] is a non-entity. In order to show this, [Śāntarakṣita] states [TS 347].[210]

As we can see, this statement provides us with an interesting transition between Dharmakīrti's two lines of argument, i.e., between the critique of the *pudgala* as *tattvānyatvāvācya* and the critique of the *pudgala* as *anityatvenāvācya* – and here as in the previous argument, the notion of *arthakriyā* plays a pivotal role. Śāntarakṣita spells this out as follows:

> Moreover, the capacity to [perform] functionalities is the [only] definition of existence, [and this capacity] is limited to momentary [things] only. Thus [something] that cannot be said [to be momentary] is not a [real] entity.[211]

Let us now quote Kamalaśīla's explanation in full:

> Indeed, the definition of existence, [i.e.,] the nature of a [real] entity, amounts to this only: the capacity to [perform] functionalities, because not being a [real] entity is defined as [being] devoid of any [functional] efficacy. Therefore being a [real] entity is indirectly defined as the efficacy in [performing] functionalities. Now, this functionality is limited to momentary [things] only.

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phyi ma'i gnas skabs ñid yin pa'i phyir rtag pa yin no // de bas na rtag pa ni rtag pa ñid du brjod par bya ba ma yin no źes bya ba 'gal lo //. In the parallel passage of the TSP (see below, fn. 213, p. 115), *tyāga* and *parigraha* correspond to the PVP's *rnam par gcad pa* and *yoṅs su gcod pa*. Now if **vyavaccheda* can be interpreted in the sense of *tyāga*, the same cannot be said of **pariccheda* and *parigraha*. The meaning of *pariccheda(ka)* remains obscure. Of course, one cannot rule out the hypothesis that the Sanskrit manuscript(s) used by the Tibetan translators already read *pariccheda* instead of *parigraha* (due to scribal error).

210 TSP_K 128,13–14/$TSP_Ś$ 116,6–7: *na kevalaṃ tattvānyatvābhyām avācyatvād avastu pudgalo 'yam iti pratipāditam / ito 'py anityatvenāvācyatvād evāvastv iti pratipādayann āha* [...] /.

211 TS 347: *arthakriyāsu śaktiś ca vidyamānatvalakṣaṇam / kṣaṇikeṣv eva niyatā tathā'vācye na vastutā //*.

[Śāntarakṣita's] implicit idea is: it implies (*vyāpta*) momentariness. [And this is] because it is contradictory that [something] permanent [may perform] a functionality either gradually or at one time. As a consequence, the *pudgala* is not a [real] entity [if it] cannot be said to be momentary in this way, because in this case one negates momentariness, which is implied by [functionality], as one negates a [property] such as being a *śiṃśapā* when one negates [the property of] being a tree. As [Dharmakīrti has] said [in PV 2.203ab]: "For that which cannot be said to be impermanent [can]not [be] the cause of anything." Suppose the following be urged: If the *pudgala* were permanent, then it would be contradictory for it to [perform] a functionality either gradually or simultaneously. [But] insofar as (*yāvatā* [...] *ataḥ*) it [cannot be said] to be permanent any more than it can be said to be impermanent, its efficacy in [performing] a functionality is not contradictory at all. [We reply:] This is incorrect, for an entity lacking both aspects cannot be a [real] particular (*svalakṣaṇa*), because [the properties of being] permanent and impermanent are defined as mutually contradictory (*anyonyavṛttiparihārasthita*), since, for a [certain real] entity, lacking (*tyāga*) one aspect is invariably connected to possessing the other one, [and] possessing (*parigraha*) [one aspect is invariably connected to] lacking [the other one]. Indeed, we do not refuse the application of the word *avācya* to the *pudgala*, because nobody can negate [something that, like any other verbal designation, is] based on mere free will, but this [*pudgala*] is [unfortunately] presented here as having the nature of an entity. Does the nature of this entity called *pudgala* always exist or not? If it [always] exists, then it is simply permanent, for what is called "permanent" is nothing else; rather, one calls "permanent" a nature that lasts forever [and] does not perish, as [Dharmakīrti has] said [in PV 2.204ab]: "Wise [people] call 'permanent' that nature which does not perish."[212] But in the hypothesis that [its nature] does not [always] exist, then again it is simply impermanent, because [being] impermanent is defined as [having] a nature that does not last. As a consequence, since there is no other possibility than [being] momentary or non-momentary, and since it is contradictory that [something] non-momentary [may perform] a functionality either gradually

[212] PV 2.204: *nityaṃ tam āhur vidvāṃso yaḥ svabhāvo na naśyati / tyaktvemāṃ hrepanīṃ dṛṣṭim ato sa nitya ucyatām //*. "Once they have got rid of the embarrassing false view [that superimposes a *pudgala* whose nature is neither permanent nor impermanent], wise [people] call 'permanent' that nature which does not perish. Therefore this [*pudgala* whose nature does not perish] must be called 'permanent.'"

> or at one time, existence, which is defined as the efficacy in [performing] functionalities, implies momentariness. It is therefore established that one negates existence when one negates momentariness.[213]

As we can see from the immediate context and the purport of PV 2.202–204, Dharmakīrti's critique of the *pudgala* has obvious soteriological implications, for giving credence to the existence of such a pseudo-entity threatens one's progression along the Buddhist path toward salvation. First and foremost, Pudgalavāda is nothing but a characteristic instance of *satkāyadṛṣṭi* (in its *parikalpita*, "speculative" form, the one eliminated with the *darśanamārga*, the "path of vision"[214]), i.e., nescience (*avidyā*), the very origin of suffering according to Dharmakīrti. And by negating the impermanence of the *pudgala*, the Pudgalavādin also denies it any functionality, i.e., deprives it of any agency over transmigration and liberation.

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[213] TSP_K 128,17–129,8/$TSP_Ś$ 116,10–29: *idam eva hi vidyamānatvalakṣaṇaṃ vastusvabhāvo yad utārthakriyāsu śaktiḥ / sarvasāmarthyaviralakṣaṇatvād avastutvasyeti sāmarthyād arthakriyāsāmarthyalakṣaṇam eva vastutvam avatiṣṭhate / sā cārthakriyā kṣaṇikeṣv eva niyatā / kṣaṇikatvenaiva vyāpteti yāvat / nityasya kramayaugapadyābhyām arthakriyāvirodhāt / atas tathā kṣaṇikatvenāvācye pudgale vastutā nāsti / tatra tadvyāpakasya kṣaṇikatvasya nivṛtter vṛkṣatvanivṛttau śiṃśapātvādinivṛttivad iti / yathoktam – anityatvena yo 'vācyaḥ sa hetur na hi kasyacid iti*[a] */ syād etat – yadi pudgalo nityaḥ syāt tadā tasya kramayaugapadyābhyām arthakriyāvirodhaḥ syāt / yāvatā yathāsāv anityatvenāvācyas tathā nityatvenāpīty ato 'rthakriyāsāmarthyam asyāviruddham eveti /* [b]*tad asamyak / na hy ubhayākāravinirmuktaṃ vastu svalakṣaṇaṃ yuktam / nityānityayor anyonyavṛttiparihārasthitalakṣaṇatvāt / vastuny ekākāratyāgaparigrahayos tadaparākāraparigrahatyāganāntarīyakatvāt*[b] */ na hy asmābhir avācyaśabdaniveśanaṃ pudgale pratiṣidhyate / svatantrecchāmātrādhīnasya*[c] *kenacit pratiṣeddhum aśakyatvāt kintv idam iha vasturūpaṃ nirūpyate / kim asau pudgalākhyasya vastunaḥ svabhāvaḥ sarvadāsty āhosvin nāstīti / yady asti tadā nitya evāsau / na hi nityo nāmānya eva kaścid api tu yaḥ svabhāvaḥ sadāvasthāyī na vinaśyati sa nitya ucyate / yathoktam – nityaṃ tam āhur vidvāṃso yaḥ svabhāvo na naśyatīti*[d] */ atha nāstīti pakṣas tadāpy anitya evāsau / anavasthāyisvabhāvalakṣaṇatvād anityasya / ataḥ kṣaṇikākṣaṇikavyatirekeṇa gatyantarābhāvād akṣaṇikasya ca kramayaugapadyābhyām arthakriyāvirodhāt kṣaṇikatvenārthakriyāsāmarthyalakṣaṇaṃ sattvaṃ vyāptam iti pudgale kṣaṇikatvanivṛttau sattvanivṛttiḥ siddhā /.* [a] = PV 2.203ab. [b] Cf. PVP D86b3–6/P99b4–7, quoted above, fn. 209, p. 112. [c] °*ādhīnasya* $TSP_Ś$: °*ānītasya* TSP_K. [d] = PV 2.204ab.

[214] On the distinction between *sahajā* ("innate") and *vi-* or *pari-kalpitā satkāyadṛṣṭiḥ*, see Introduction, §0.2.1, and Eltschinger 2009a: 172–173.

1.3. CONCLUSION

To the best of our knowledge, Dharmakīrti remained entirely silent on the *buddha*-nature. To be more precise, if *tathāgatagarbha* patterns of thought are discernible in his works (most conspicuously in PV 1.221, PVSV 110,23–111,10 and PV 2.208ab[215]), Dharmakīrti seems never to criticise this strand of Indian Mahāyāna Buddhism on account of its strong substantialist overtones – and the same applies to Vasubandhu and the whole Buddhist epistemological tradition. What Dharmakīrti does criticise is Buddhist personalism. However, his arguments are brief and implicit, so that their identification *as* targetting Buddhist Pudgalavāda owes much to his commentators' explanations, to terminology and to context. Note also that, in stark contrast with his "mainstream" predecessors' controversy, Dharmakīrti never touches upon issues of scriptural exegesis and heterodoxy. Thus whereas the KV, the VK, (the YBhū,) the MSA(Bh), the TSi and the AKBh directed lengthy arguments against their "coreligionists'" personalism (leaving the non-Buddhists' *ātman* mostly out of consideration) and made scriptural exegesis an important if not dominant issue, Dharmakīrti concentrated his arguments on the non-Buddhists' versions of the self and (therefore) left the ground of the traditional *yukti*-cum-*āgama* method of argumentation. We may surmise that here, as in his critique of the outsiders' self, Dharmakīrti strongly relied on his predecessors' critiques and spared himself the trouble of repeating them. But Dharmakīrti is also to be credited for the development of an entirely new line of argument against the *pudgala*, one that was consonant with his own elaborations on causal efficiency and the two types of relation. Here as elsewhere, Dharmakīrti's focus and methodology most certainly reflect a polemical agenda directed against the non-Buddhists as well as a strong concern with leaving internecine quarrels as implicit as possible.

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[215] On PV 1.221/PVSV 110,23–111,10, see Eltschinger 2007: 232–235; on PV 2.208ab, see Seyfort Ruegg 1969: 437, Franco 1997: 88–89 and Eltschinger 2005: 184–197. In the present state of our understanding, however, we are inclined to believe that if *tathāgatagarbha* structures and terminology do appear in these passages, Dharmakīrti's way of interpreting them frontally contradicts the *tathāgatagarbha* teachings as they can be found, e.g., in the Mahāyānist MPSū, the ŚMDSNSū and the RGV(V).

Chapter 2

Dharmakīrti against Ātmavādin Arguments

2.1. Against the So-Called vyatirekin

2.1.1. The Context of PVSV 12,26–13,11: A Critique of Non-Perception as a Means to Establish Co-Absence (vyatireka).

Dharmakīrti's first argument against the *ātman* occurs very early in the PVSV and targets the Naiyāyikas' *(kevala)vyatirekin*, an allegedly valid logical reason (*hetu*) that possesses (only) co-absence, i.e., is absent wherever the property to be proved (*sādhya*) is absent (*nivṛtti*, *abhāva*, etc.). The argument recurs in almost the same form towards the end of PVin 2.[1] In both the PVSV and PVin 2, it is part of Dharmakīrti's lengthy critique of his Buddhist and non-Buddhist predecessors' view that mere non-perception (*adarśanamātra*) is the method to be followed in order to establish co-absence.[2] In Dharmakīrti's opinion, problematic logical reasons (*hetvābhāsa*, lit. "pseudo-reasons") such as the *(kevala)vyatirekin* and the over-exclusive (*asādhāraṇa*) logical reason would

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[1] PVin 2 95,11–96,5; see Steinkellner 1979: 124–126.

[2] See Steinkellner 1966 and Katsura 1992. As PSV ad PS 5.34 (see Katsura 1992: 226 and fn. 14) as well as Dharmakīrti's own statements in PV 4.207 and PVin 3 117,12–14 (see Ono 1999: 308–309) testify, Dignāga is very likely to have recognized mere non-perception as a proper method for establishing the absence of the logical reason in the dissimilar instances. According to Katsura (1992: 227), Īśvarasena "must have inherited the idea of mere non-perception from Dignāga. However, he gave it the status of a valid means of cognition (*pramāṇa*); thus he admitted a third type of *pramāṇa* in addition to Dignāga's perception (*pratyakṣa*) and inference (*anumāna*). By doing so, I think, Īśvarasena believed that he could firmly establish co-absence (*vyatireka*) and the pervasion between two items, so that he could remove the hypothetical and inductive nature of Dignāga's logic." See also Ono 1999: 303–304 and fn. 9.

turn out to be proper logical reasons if mere non-perception were a proper method of ascertainment (the same applies *mutatis mutandis* to the inference possessing a remainder [*śeṣavadanumāna*]).[3] But Dharmakīrti's critique of the *(kevala)vyatirekihetu* permeates his whole work, for it can be found again in PV 4.205ff., PVin 3 115,7–124,5 and NB_M 3.96–108/NB_S 3.98–110, viz. in the context of his reinterpretation of Dignāga's "wheel of logical reasons" (*hetucakra*).[4] Note that while these passages provide important materials for the exegesis of the PVSV and PVin 2 argument, they also reflect different philosophical preoccupations[5] and, as far as PVin 3 and NB 3 are concerned, develop a new line of argument against the *(kevala)vyatirekin*.[6] But in all cases, Dharmakīrti's aim is to demonstrate that only a natural relation (*svabhāvapratibandha*) between the *probandum* and the *probans* allows us to ascertain both co-presence and co-absence.[7]

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[3] On the *śeṣavadanumāna*, see PVSV 12,15–25 (and PVin 2 95,1–10; Steinkellner 1979: 122–124); on the *asādhāraṇahetu*, see PVSV 14,1–5 (and PVin 2 96,12–15; Steinkellner 1979: 128), Ono 1999: 305, and below, fn. 5.

[4] On Dignāga's *hetucakra*, see Frauwallner 1959: 162–164; on Dharmakīrti's reinterpretation, see, e.g., Ono 1999 and Iwata 2002.

[5] Whereas the PVSV and the PVin 2 arguments are directed against the *(kevala)vyatirekin* as such, the arguments to be found in PV 4, PVin 3 and NB 3 deal with the so-called over-exclusive (inconclusive) logical reason (*asādhāraṇ[ānaikāntik]ahetu*, a logical reason that occurs only in the subject [*dharmin*] of the proof and lacks both co-presence and co-absence [*anvayavyatireka*]). Dignāga's example of an over-exclusive logical reason was "because it is audible" (*śrāvaṇatvāt*) in the proof that sound is permanent (*śabdo nityaḥ*). In PV 4, PVin 3 and NB 3, Dharmakīrti has changed this example into "because it possesses breath, etc." (*prāṇādimattvāt*) in the proof that the living body possesses a self (*jīvaccharīraṃ sātmakam*). As shown by Ono (1999: 307), however, *śrāvaṇatvāt* and *prāṇādimattvāt* have the same logical structure and entail the same fallacy according to Dharmakīrti's system. On this, the reasons for Dharmakīrti's modification and its consequences, see Ono 1999 and Iwata 2004.

[6] See below, §2.1.5.

[7] On the *svabhāvapratibandha*, see above, Chapter 1, §§1.2.1.3.1–2, fn. 148, p. 96, fn. 151, p. 98, and below, §2.1.4. See also, among many other studies, Steinkellner 1974, Katsura 1992: 224–225 and Eltschinger 2010b: 414–415 (§10c).

2.1.2. The (kevala)vyatirekihetu and the Inference of the Self

Given the way Dharmakīrti presents his opponent's thesis, and particularly the inference that his opponent adduces as an example of valid logical reason – i.e., "this living body is not without a self because [if it were,] it would follow that it would not have breath, etc. (*prāṇādi*)" –, the target here is most probably Uddyotakara's defence of the *vyatirekihetu*. Thus in the NV (where mere non-perception is apparently accepted as a valid means of establishing co-absence),[8] this logical reason is defined in the following way:

> [A logical reason] having [only] co-absence (*vyatirekin*) is [a reason] which, pervading the intended [object of the inference] while there is no similar instance (*sapakṣa*), is not present in dissimilar instances (*vipakṣa*) – for example: "This living body is not without a self because [if it were,] it would follow that it would not have breath, etc."[9]

The sources of this passage are still shrouded in mystery. It has been assumed that the *vyatirekihetu*'s defence found in the NV was borrowed by Uddyotakara from an earlier Naiyāyika work, but its actual authorship remains unclear.[10] In any case, the inference of the self put

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[8] See Ono 1999: 309; see also above, fn. 2, p. 117.

[9] NV 43,11–12 ad NSū 1.1.5: *vyatirekī vivakṣitavyāpitve sati sapakṣābhāve sati vipakṣāvṛttiḥ / yathā nedaṃ jīvaccharīraṃ nirātmakam aprāṇādimattvaprasaṅgād iti /*. On this passage as the object of Dharmakīrti's criticism see, e.g., Prets 1999: 333–334, Kano 2001: 410 and Iwata 2004: 118, fn. 39. On Uddyotakara's definition of the *vyatirekihetu* see Okazaki 1995 and 2003. For other mentions of this example by Uddyotakara see, e.g., NV 53,4–5 ad NSū 1.1.5, NV 88,12–13 ad NSū 1.1.23, NV 116,10–17 ad NSū 1.1.35 (see below, fn. 19, p. 123), NV 116,20–117,3 ad NSū 1.1.35 (see below, fn. 19, p. 123).

[10] According to Steinkellner (1979: 125, fn. 479), Uddyotakara's typology of logical reasons was first stated by another, so far unknown Naiyāyika, since Uddyotakara's analysis of the term "threefold" (*trividha*) in NSū 1.1.5 as meaning *anvayavyatirekihetu*, *anvayahetu* and *vyatirekihetu* is presented as that of another Naiyāyika, and since after presenting his own version of the wheel of logical reasons, he states that a heterodox teacher of the school (*ekāntavādin*) acknowledges (as Uddyotakara himself does) two kinds of *anvayin* and one kind of *vyatirekin* as valid reasons. However, as shown in Prets 1999: 334–335, both arguments seem doubtful (it is uncertain whether Uddyotakara "shares the view of someone else or advocates his own" when stating this interpretation of the term *trividha*; besides, the term *ekāntavādin* may not refer here to another Naiyāyika but to "somebody who teaches

forward here – which might have as its original basis the Upaniṣadic association of breath with the self[11] – is not alluded to in the list of marks (*liṅga*) of the self enumerated in NSū 1.1.10, where *prāṇa* is not found.[12] The term does appear however in the corresponding list of the VS:

> The marks of the self are breathing up and down (*prāṇāpāna*), closing and opening [the eyes], life, the movements of the mental organ and the transformations of the other sense organs; pleasure and pain; desire and aversion; and effort.[13]

Vaiśeṣikas such as Praśastapāda or Candrānanda interpret the presence of *prāṇāpāna* in VSū 3.2.4 as meaning that the self can be inferred as an agent endowed with effort (*prayatna*) from the observation of the particular action of breathing;[14] but the argument might in fact be

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universal propositions," and in any case the *ekāntavādin* is not presented as the proponent of the inference from *prāṇādi* but only as someone for whom there are two kinds of *anvayin* and one kind of *vyatirekin*). On the NV's unknown Naiyāyika sources, see Oberhammer 1962.

11 On this association (and sometimes equation) see, e.g., Olivelle 1998: 23, BĀU 4.4.4, ChU 3.14.2–3, etc.

12 NSū 1.1.10: *icchādveṣaprayatnasukhaduḥkhajñānāny ātmano liṅgam /.* "The marks of the self are desire, aversion, effort, pleasure, pain [and] cognitions." On the ways in which the self is established through its marks in Vaiśeṣika and/or Nyāya, see, e.g., Chakravarti 1982, Oetke 1988: Part II, Watson 2006: Chapter 1 and Ratié 2011a: 62–80.

13 VSū 3.2.4: *prāṇāpānanimeṣonmeṣajīvanamanogatīndriyāntaravikārāḥ sukhaduḥkha icchādveṣau prayatnaś cety ātmaliṅgāni /.* On this *sūtra* see, e.g., Preisendanz 1994: 263–274. The presence of *prāṇādi* in it had already been noted in connection with the *vyatirekihetu* example in Steinkellner 1979: 125, fn. 479. For allusions to these items by the Buddhist epistemologists, see below, fn. 32, p. 127 (PVSVṬ 62,24–25) and 66, p. 136 ($NBṬ_M$ 214,19–20/$NBṬ_S$ 76,3–4).

14 See PDhS 15,8–10, quoted above (Introduction, fn. 84, p. 24). Praśastapāda adds (PDhS 15,10–12): *katham / śarīraparigṛhīte vāyau vikṛtakarmadarśanād bhastrādhmāpayiteva /.* "How [is the self inferred from breath as the body's controlling agent endowed with effort]? [Answer: We infer the self thus] because [we] observe an altered action in the air [that is] absorbed in the body, as [in the case] of a leathern bag that has been filled with air." Cf. NK 211,8–212,2, which explains *prāṇādi-* as the *prāṇāpāna-* of VSū 3.2.4 (the *sūtra* is quoted in NK 211,6–7): *katham iti praśnapūrvakaṃ prāṇāpānayor liṅgatvaṃ darśayati śarīraparigṛhīta iti / vāyus tiryaggamanasvabhāvaḥ śarīraparigṛhīte ca vāyau prāṇāpānākhye vikṛtaṃ svabhāva-*

much earlier, since it is apparently already criticized in the MP, where the character called Nāgasena argues that breathing up and down are rather activities that belong to the body.[15] The ŚBh for instance mentions a criticism of this Buddhist counterargument that, according to

viparītaṃ karmordhvagamanam adhogamanaṃ ca dṛśyate / tasmāt prayatnavān vigrahasyādhiṣṭhātānumīyate yas tathā vāyuṃ prerayati / anyathāsya vikṛtatvāsambhavāt / bhastrādhmāpayiteveti dṛṣṭāntaḥ / śarīraṃ prayatnavadadhiṣṭhitam icchāpūrvakavikṛtavāyvāśrayatvād bhastrāvat /. "[With the sentence] 'in the [air that is] absorbed by the body [...],' [Praśastapāda] shows how breathing up and down are marks [of the self, as an answer] to the question just asked: 'How?' Air has as its nature to move horizontally; now, [we] observe an action, [namely] a movement upwards and a movement downwards, in the air called 'breathing up' and 'breathing down' [that is] absorbed by the body, [and this action is] 'altered' [i.e.,] changed in its nature. Therefore [we] infer a controlling agent of the body that is endowed with effort and prompts the air in such a way, because otherwise the alteration of this [action] would be impossible. The [inference's] example is [given in] 'as [in the case] of a leathern bag that has been filled with air.' [To wit:] the body is controlled by [something] endowed with effort, because [it] is the locus of the altered air, which [must have been] preceded by a will [to alter it], just as [in the case of] a leathern bag." Cf. VSV 28,16–18: *tiryakpavanasya vāyor dehasthitasya yat prāṇāpānakarma tat prayatnakāryam / śarīraparigṛhītavāyuviṣayatve sati vikṛtatvād bhastrāparigṛhītavāyukarmavat /.* "When air, which [usually moves] horizontally, resides in the body, its action [consisting of] breathing up and down is the effect of an effort, because when [the action] concerns the air that is absorbed by the body, it is altered, as [in the case] of the action of the air absorbed by a leathern bag." The same argument is found again, e.g., in the NM, where Jayanta, after defending the inference of the self from the marks mentioned in NSū 1.1.10, adds (NM_M II.293,5–6/NM_V II.219,24) that "nonetheless, regarding this [self] there is a great deal of additional reasons" (*tatra tv asti hetunivaho bahur anyaḥ*), among which the following (NM_M II.293,13–14/NM_V II.220,5–6): *prāṇādimārutānām antaścalatāṃ calācalagatīnām / sahajanijakarmavikṛtau kāraṇam anumīyate kiñcit //.* "A certain [controlling entity] is inferred as the cause of the alteration of the natural and characteristic action of the airs that are breathing up, etc., which circulate inside [the body] and which keep moving [up and down]." Cf. GBhV II.220,20: *sahajanijakarmavikṛtau / sahajaṃ yan nijaṃ karma tiryaggatilakṣaṇaṃ tasya vikṛtir ūrdhvam adhaś ca gatiḥ /.* "'The alteration of the natural and characteristic action' [means] the alteration [i.e.,] the movement up and down, of [air's] natural [and] characteristic action, which is characterized as a horizontal movement." See also NR 505,6–9, quoted below, fn. 18, p. 122.

[15] See MP 30,27–31,9, where Nāgasena concludes (31,8–9): *n'eso jīvo / assāsapassāsā nām'ete kāyasaṅkhārā ti /.* "This is not the life-principle; in-breathing and out-breathing are bodily activities." Translation Horner 1969: 41; see also Collins 1982: 184 (and for the same passage in Chinese sources, Demiéville 1924: 101–102).

Kumārila, does not belong to Śabara himself,[16] and that Pārthasārathimiśra explicitly ascribes to the "Vaiśeṣikas, etc."[17] According to the Ātmavādin portrayed by Śabara, the action of breathing does not belong to the body itself because the former does not last as long as the latter, as can be observed in the case of a corpse, so that a breathing agent other than the body must be inferred.[18]

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[16] Kumārila explains that the arguments adduced in this passage of the ŚBh do not belong to Śabara himself and that he only mentions them with a view to refute them before putting forward his own, superior proof of the self. See ŚV *ātmavāda* 92ab: *parair abhigatān pūrvam ātmahetūn nirasyati* /. "[Śabara] first eliminates the reasons [for acknowledging] the self that are admitted by others."

[17] See NR 504,6–7: *bhāṣyakāreṇa prāṇādibhir enam upalabhāmaha iti vaiśeṣikādisammatā hetava upanyastāḥ* /. "The author of the *Bhāṣya* [now] brings forward the reasons acknowledged by the Vaiśeṣikas, etc., in 'we perceive it through breath, etc.'" See also Biardeau 1968, in which the author examines the whole passage devoted to the *ātman* in Śabara's commentary on Jaimini's *sūtra* 1.1.5 and notices (1968: 111) that "en fait les arguments du Mīmāṃsaka en totalité reprennent les thèmes succintement exposés dans les *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* III 2 4–21."

[18] See ŚBh 72,4–73,2 (Śabara is explaining that it is not the body itself that possesses the sacrificial paraphernalia [*yajñāyudha*] but the entity to whom the body belongs): *āha ko 'sāv anyo nainam upalabhāmahe / prāṇādibhir enam upalabhāmahe / yo 'sau prāṇity apānity unmeṣati*[a] *nimeṣatītyādiceṣṭitavān / so 'tra śarīre yajñāyudhīti / nanu śarīram eva prāṇity apāniti ca / na / prāṇādayaḥ śarīraguṇavidharmāṇo 'yāvaccharīrabhāvitvāt / yāvac charīraṃ tāvad asya guṇā rūpādayaḥ / prāṇādayas tu saty api śarīre na bhavanti / sukhādayaś ca svayam upalabhyante na rūpādaya iva śarīraguṇāḥ pareṇāpīti / tasmāc charīraguṇavaidharmyād anyaḥ śarīrād yajñāyudhīti* /. [[a] *unmeṣati* conj. : *ucchvasiti* ŚBh, Frauwallner 1968: 50.] "[The objector] says: 'What is this other [entity to which the body supposedly belongs]? [For] we do not perceive it.' [Answer:] We perceive it through breath, etc. That which possesses motion (*ceṣṭitavān*), i.e., that which breathes up, breathes down, opens and closes the eyes (*unmeṣati nimeṣati*) and so on, is that which, in the body, possesses the sacrificial paraphernalia. [Objection:] But it is the body that breathes up and down. [Answer:] No. Breath, etc., are properties that differ from the properties of the body, because they do not exist as long as the body [exists]: the properties of the body, such as [its] colour, [last] as long as the body, whereas breath, etc., no [longer] exist even though the body [still] exists. And pleasure, etc., are perceived by oneself [only], contrary to colour, etc., which, as properties of the body, [are perceived] by other [people] as well. Therefore, due to the fact that these properties differ from the properties of the body, [we know that what] possesses the sacrificial paraphernalia is other than the body." Cf. NR 505,6–9, where the explanation of how breathing up and down are marks from which one can infer the existence of the self is reminiscent of Candrānanda's and Praśastapāda's (see

However, when stating the inference of the self from *prāṇādi*, Uddyotakara does not mention action as the basis of the reasoning, nor the idea that breathing cannot belong to the body itself and is therefore related to a substance different from the body. Rather, as is made clear in Uddyotakara's commentary ad NSū 1.1.35, the inference that he has in mind rests on the mere fact that in the debate over the existence of an enduring self, all parties acknowledge at least the invariable concomitance between the absence of breath, etc., and the absence of self (since even the Buddhists, who deny the existence of the self, admit that what is devoid of breath is devoid of self). It is from this universally acknowledged invariable concomitance between the absence of breath and the absence of self that the presence of the self is inferred in the living body from the presence of *prāṇa* in it (which, in Western logic, sounds like a formally invalid argument): the absence of the self is excluded from the living body on the grounds that there is no absence of *prāṇa* in the living body.[19]

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above, fn. 14, p. 120): *mā bhūd dehadharmaḥ / tathāpi katham ātmaliṅgatvam / vāyor hy ūrdhvādhogativiśeṣaḥ prāṇāpānaśabdābhyām ucyate / sa ca vāyudharmaḥ katham ātmaliṅgam ucyate, tiryaggamanaśīlasya vāyor nākasmād ūrdhvādhogatiḥ sambhavatīti taddhetuprayatno 'numīyate / prayatnaś ca guṇatvād guṇinam anumāpayati / sa cātmeti /.* "Let us admit [then] that [breathing up and so on] are not properties of the body; nonetheless, how are [they] marks of the self? [Answer:] The air's particularity of moving up and down is expressed through the words 'breathing up' and 'breathing down.' [Objection:] And this property of air, why is it called a mark of the self? [Answer:] Because [since] air has as its nature to move horizontally, it cannot move up or down without any [particular] cause [prompting it to do so]; therefore an effort which is the cause of these [movements] is inferred, and effort, since it is a property, makes [us] infer a property-bearer – and this is the self."

[19] See NV 116,10–17: *udāharaṇaṃ tu nedaṃ nirātmakaṃ jīvaccharīram aprāṇādimattvaprasaṅgād iti / yadubhayapakṣasampratipannam aprāṇādimat tat sarvaṃ nirātmakaṃ dṛṣṭam / na cedam aprāṇādimad bhavati / tasmān nedaṃ nirātmakam iti / so 'yam avītaḥ parapakṣapratiṣedhāya bhavatīti / tāv etau vītāvītahetū lakṣaṇābhyāṃ pṛthagabhihitāv iti / tatra svarūpeṇārthapariccheda katvaṃ vītadharmaḥ / avītadharmaḥ punaḥ parapakṣapratiṣedhenaiva pravartata iti / ekasya vidhīyamāno 'rtha itarasya pratiṣidhyamānaḥ /.* "Rather, the [right] example [regarding the proof described by NSū 1.1.35 as *tathā vaidharmyāt*] is: 'This living body is not without a self because [if it were,] it would follow that it would not have breath, etc.' [We] observe that whatever is acknowledged by both parties as not having breath, etc., is selfless. Now, this [living body] is not without breath, etc.; therefore

In this respect it should be noted that VSū 3.2.9 answers in the following way the objection according to which the self, if it is only postulated as an indeterminate cause accounting for the marks of the self, is merely scriptural (*āgamika*,[20] a word that also appears in Dhar-

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it is not selfless. This is the indirect (*avīta*) [logical reason], which is aimed at refuting the opponent's thesis. These two logical reasons, direct (*vīta*) and indirect, are distinguished [here] through their [respective] characteristics. Among these [two], the property of the direct [reason] is the fact that it determines its object through its own form, whereas the property of the indirect [reason] functions through the mere refutation of the opponent's thesis; the object of the former is asserted [while] the [object] of the latter is negated." See also NV 116,20–117,3: *yadi cāvyabhicārād dhetur arthaṃ pratipādayati / tadācodyam etat katham avītaḥ pratipādaka ity avītasyāpi vyatirekāvyabhicāritvāt pratipādakatvam iti / katham / yāvad aprāṇādimat tat sarvaṃ nirātmakaṃ dṛṣṭam iti / aprāṇādimattvaṃ ca jīvaccharīrān nivartate / tasmāt tadavyabhicāri nirātmakatvam api nivartsyatīti /.* "And if the logical reason demonstrates the object because of invariability (*avyabhicāra*), then there is no point in objecting this: 'How can the indirect [reason] demonstrate?' because the indirect [reason] too demonstrates due to the invariability of co-absence. [We answer the question] 'how?' [in the following way:] Because [we] see that whatever is without breath, etc., is selfless; now, being without breath, etc., is excluded from the living body; therefore selflessness as well, which does not deviate (*avyabhicārin*) from [not having breath, etc.,] must be excluded [from the living body]." On the distinction between *vīta* and *avīta*/*āvīta* reasons (which seems to have first appeared in the Sāṅkhya, although Franco has challenged this view), see Frauwallner 1958: 228, 264–265 and 268–269, Franco 1999, Kano 2001: 409, Okazaki 1995: 3 and Okazaki 2006.

[20] See VSū 3.2.7: *sāmānyato dṛṣṭāc cāviśeṣaḥ /.* "[Objection:] And because [the self is inferred as] that which is apprehended as a generality (*sāmānyato dṛṣṭam*), there is no distinction." VSV 29,14–16 explains: *prāṇādīnāṃ nirnimittānāṃ sukhādīnāṃ cānāśritānām anutpattir ata eṣāṃ kenāpi nimittenāśrayeṇa bhāvyam ity ato 'pi sāmānyato dṛṣṭād ākāśādīnām anirāsād aviśeṣas teṣām api hetutvasambhavāt /.* "[In the reasoning:] 'Breath, etc., [if they were] without a cause, and pleasure, etc., [if they did] not reside in a substratum, could not arise, therefore they must have some cause [and] substratum,' since space for instance is not excluded from this [cause and substratum] apprehended as a [mere] generality, 'there is no distinction' [between space and this cause and substratum that you claim to be the self], because [space, etc.,] can be causes as well." VSū 3.2.8 concludes: *tasmād āgamikam /.* "Therefore [this] is [merely] scriptural." VSV 29,19 explains: *ātmāstīti pravādamātram ity arthaḥ /.* "The meaning is: this [assertion] that the self exists is a mere opinion." On the meaning of *pravāda* see, e.g., PVSVṬ 616,13–14, which glosses *pravādeṣu* in PVSV 175,22 as *siddhānteṣu*, and VP 1.8 (with VPV 30–35), where *pravāda* is used in the similar sense of a mere opinion that has not been ration ally

makīrti's critique[21]):

> It is not [merely] scriptural, because of the *vyatireka* of the word "I."[22]

The word *vyatireka* in this *sūtra* has been interpreted in various ways by modern scholars, the words *aham iti śabdasya vyatirekāt* being diversely understood as meaning "given that the word 'I' [means] something more [than the body],"[23] or "because of the restricted use of the word I,"[24] or "because [it is] distinguished [from others (i.e., other substances, VE/IR)] by the word 'I,'"[25] or again "because of the distinction of the word 'I' [from other words]."[26] Oetke for instance considers that the reasoning presupposes a metaphysical principle regarding the nature of speech, i.e., the idea that each word reveals a particular object.[27] In any case, posterior Vaiśeṣika authors interpret the *sūtra* as meaning that the affirmation of the self's existence is not merely scriptural because breath, etc., require a cause or a substratum and because breath, etc., are only ascribed to that which the word 'I' denotes and not to any other substance: while we can say "I have breath," we do not say "earth has breath."[28] In other words, the Vaiśeṣikas emphasize that breath,

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justified. On *sāmānyato dṛṣṭam*, see below, fn. 89, p. 143, 90, p. 144, 93, p. 145, and 96, p. 146.

21 On Dharmakīrti's assertion that his opponent's self is "scriptural[ly established], not inferential[ly]" (*āgamikatvam* [...] *nānumeyatvam*), see below, fn. 46, p. 129.

22 VSū 3.2.9: *aham iti śabdavyatirekān nāgamikam /.*

23 Biardeau 1968: 116 ("Étant donné que le terme 'je' [exprime] quelque chose de plus [que le corps]").

24 Schuster 1972: 343.

25 See Honda 1990: 141.

26 Oetke 1988: 321 ("wegen der Verschiedenheit des Wortes 'ich' [von anderen Wörtern]"). Preisendanz 1994: 229 gives a similar interpretation.

27 See Oetke 1988: 323–324 on this "'sprachphilosophische' Doktrin" according to which "jedes Wort einen Gegenstand bezeichnet"; see also Preisendanz 1994: 229.

28 See VSV 29,22–23: *aham itiśabdena kṣityādibhinnātmadravyaviṣayeṇaikādhikaraṇyād ahaṃ prāṇādimān ahaṃ sukhavān iti / tasmāt prāṇādiliṅgatvān nāgamikam /.* "Since in [such expressions as:] 'I have breath, etc., I have pleasure,' [the words 'breath,' etc.,] are co-referential (*aikādhikaraṇya*) with the word 'I' – which denotes a substance distinct from [all other substances] such as earth –, [and] since breath, etc., are marks [of the self], this [assertion that the self exists] is not [merely] scriptural." Cf. PDhS 16,6–7: *tathāhaṃśabdenāpi pṛthivyādiśabdavyatirekād iti /.* "Similarly, [the self] is also [inferred] due to the word 'I,' because of the co-absence

etc., are legitimate marks of the self because nobody attributes the property of having breath to that which cannot be designated as "I," and this *vyatireka* of the word "I" might be seen as the basis of the co-absence presented by Uddyotakara between what is devoid of self and what is devoid of breath, etc. Thus, when stating that his opponent's self is only scriptural because he distinguishes what is selfless and what is not "according to [mere] acceptance," Dharmakīrti might also have in mind this Vaiśeṣika reasoning according to which the mere linguistic use of the "I" enables us to distinguish what is selfless and what is not.

2.1.3. Dharmakīrti's Argument in PVSV 12,26–13,11: English Translation[29]

Moreover, [if the absence of the logical reason from the dissimilar instances were determined through non-perception,] the [logical reason] that possesses [only] co-absence (*vyatirekin*) would be a [valid] logical reason as well (PV 1.18c). [An example of a logical reason that possesses only co-absence is:] this living body is not without a self because [if it were,] it would follow that it would not have breath, etc.[30] [31]One does not perceive breath, etc.,[32] in the

(*vyatireka*) [of this word] with words such as 'earth.'" See also NK 218,8–11 ad loc.: *yo yasyārthasya vācakaḥ sa tacchabdena samānādhikaraṇo dṛṣṭo yathā dravyaṃ pṛthivīti / ahaṃśabdasya tu pṛthivyādivācakaiḥ śabdaiḥ saha vyatirekaḥ samānādhikaraṇatvābhāvaḥ / ahaṃ pṛthivy aham udakam iti prayogābhāvāt / tasmān nāyaṃ pṛthivyādiviṣayaḥ /*. "[We] observe that [a designation] that denotes an object [x] is co-referential with the word [for x] – for example, the word 'substance' [is co-referential with the word] 'earth.' But the word 'I' is co-absent with words denoting earth and so on [i.e.,] it has no co-referentiality with them, because of the absence of such uses as: 'I am earth,' 'I am water.' Therefore this [word 'I'] does not designate [substances other than the self] such as earth."

[29] For references to the parallel in PVin 2 and Steinkellner's translation, see above, fn. 1, p. 117, and below, fn. 46, p. 129; for a partial translation of the passage, see Ono 1999: 305–306.

[30] PVṬ *Je* D31a7/P37b2: *sbyor ba ni gson po'i lus ni bdag daṅ bcas pa yin te / srog la sogs pa daṅ ldan pa'i phyir ro źes bya ba /*. "The formal application (**prayoga*) [here is as follows]: the living body possesses a self, because it possesses breath, etc." PVSVṬ 62,22–23: *prāṇādimattvāc ca sātmakam / ayaṃ ca hetuḥ sātmake kvacin na dṛṣṭo nirātmakebhyaś ca vyāvṛtta iti sādhyanivṛttau nivṛttidharmā vyatirekī kathyate /*. "And [thus the living body] possesses a self, because it possesses breath, etc. Now, [according to our opponent,] this logical reason is not perceived in any[thing]

[things that,] like pots, are selfless, [be they] visible or invisible;[33] therefore by [thus] excluding the [non-possession of breath, etc., in the living body and hence selflessness], one can know [that] the self [exists in the living body].[34] [35][However, we reply the following:] Since the non-perception of [something] imperceptible (*adṛśyānupalambha*) [like the self] does not [allow one to] establish the non-existence [of this self in things like pots], the selflessness of [things] like pots is not established; therefore breath, etc., are not excluded [from that which is selfless].[36] [37]Objection: Since [the Buddhists] admit [self-

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possessing a self and is excluded from the [things that are] selfless. Thus [he] calls *vyatirekin* a [logical reason] that has the property of being absent when the [property] to be proved is absent."

[31] According to PVṬ *Je* D31a7–b1/P37b2–3, the following is stated by the opponent after he has made mere non-perception a means of valid cognition (**adarśanamātraṃ pramāṇīkṛtya*). On *adarśanamātra* as a means of valid cognition, see above, fn. 2, p. 117.

[32] PVṬ *Je* D31b1–2/P37b3–4 = PVSVṬ 62,24–25: *prāṇādyadarśanāt prāṇāpānonmeṣanimeṣādarśanāt* /. "Because one does not perceive breath, etc., [i.e.,] because one does not perceive breathing up, breathing down, closing and opening [the eyes]." See above, fn. 13, p. 120.

[33] PVṬ *Je* D31b2/P37b4–5 = PVSVṬ 62,25–26: *dṛṣṭeṣu svabhāvānupalambhenaivādarśanaṃ prāṇādīnām upalabdhilakṣaṇaprāptatvāt / adṛṣṭeṣv api tajjātīyatayā* /. "In the [case of] visible [things], the non-perception [of breath, etc.,] is due to the non-perception of a thing (*svabhāvānupalambha*), because breath, etc., have attained the [causal] characteristics for a perception (*upalabdhilakṣaṇaprāpta*), [and it is so] in [the case of] invisible [things] too, because they are of this sort [too]." PVSVṬ 62,26 adds: *tena nairātmyaṃ prāṇādyabhāvena vyāptam* /. "Therefore selflessness is pervaded by the absence of breath, etc."

[34] Translated according to PVSVṬ 62,27–28 (*jīvaccharīre tu tannivṛttyā prāṇādimattvābhāvanivṛttyā nairātmyasya nivṛtter ātmagatiḥ syāt* /), which is closer to Uddyotakara's own explanation (see above, fn. 19, p. 123) than PVṬ *Je* D31b2–3/P37b5–6: *de las log pas źes bya ba ni bdag med pa de las srog la sogs pa ma mthoṅ ba tsam gyis log pas gson po'i lus la bdag yod par rtogs par 'gyur ro* //. Translated according to Śākyabuddhi's interpretation, the sentence would be: "Therefore, by [thus] excluding [breath, etc.,] from that [which is selfless], one can know [that] the self [exists in the living body]."

[35] According to PVṬ *Je* D31b3/P37b6 = PVSVṬ 62,28, the opponent now asks Dharmakīrti how he can hold the logical reason "because it possesses breath, etc.," to be a cause of doubt (*saṃśayahetu*). On this point, see Iwata 2004: 124.

[36] PVṬ *Je* D31b4–5/P37b8: *bum pa la sogs pa las srog la sogs pa log tu zin kyaṅ / 'on kyaṅ bdag med pa las log go źes bya ba ni med do źes bya ba'i tha tshig go* //. "The [intended] meaning is that although breath, etc., are excluded from [things] like

lessness], it is established [that things like pots are selfless. Answer:] Now [if the Buddhists' acceptance is authoritative,[38]] how [is it that you attempt] to prove [the existence] of a self [in the living body]?[39] [40]And how [is it that] the proof of selflessness, [which is] not authoritative (*apramāṇika*) [according to you as regards the living body, applies] to [something] other [than the living body, i.e., to things like pots]?[41] Moreover, [our opponent] distinguishes according to [mere] acceptance [a living body that is endowed] with a self and [things like pots that are] selfless, and then claims [that the logical reason, namely possessing breath, etc.,] is conclusive [regarding the self] due to the absence [of breath, etc., only] in those [things that are selfless; in so doing,] he can [only] acknowledge that the self is scriptural[ly established], not inferential[ly].[42] As a consequence, since the absence of a self [remains] unestablished in spite of the fact that one does not perceive [it in things like pots, breath, etc., can be excluded from no selfless thing at all, and thus breath, etc., are simply inconclusive].[43] [44][And] even if breath, etc., were absent in a

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pots, yet they are not excluded from [things that are] selfless." PVSVṬ 62,30–63,9: *prāṇādyabhāvena sandigdhasya nairātmyasyāpy asiddhir iti yāvat* /. "The [intended] meaning is that selflessness, which is doubtful, is not established either through the absence of breath, etc."

37 On the Ātmavādin's claim that selflessness is accepted by both parties, see above, fn. 19, p. 123.

38 According to PVṬ *Je* D31b5/P38a1–2 = PVSVṬ 63,11 (*yadi bauddhābhyupagamaḥ pramāṇam*).

39 PVṬ *Je* D31b6/P38a2 = PVSVṬ 63,11–12: *tad api bauddhena nirātmakam iṣṭam* /. "[For] this [living body] too is accepted by the Buddhist as selfless."

40 PVṬ *Je* D31b6/P38a2–3 ≈ PVSVṬ 63,12–13: *jīvaccharīre nairātmyābhyupagamo 'pramāṇikas tato 'syātmā sādhyata iti / yady evam* [...] /. "[The Ātmavādin opponent holds] the acceptance of the living body's selflessness not [to be] authoritative; therefore, the self is demonstrated for him. If so [...]." Instead of *tato 'syātmā sādhyate*, the PVṬ reads: *de'i phyir 'di ni bdag med par mi 'dod do źe na* /. "Therefore, [he] does not accept that this [living body] is selfless."

41 PVṬ *Je* D31b7/P38a3–4 ≈ PVSVṬ 63,14: *na hi bauddhasyābhyupagamaḥ kvacit pramāṇaṃ kvacin neti* /. "For the Buddhist's acceptance [can]not [be] authoritative here[, but] not there."

42 See above, fn. 20, p. 124, and 22, p. 125.

43 According to PVṬ *Je* D32a3/P38a8 = PVSVṬ 63,19–20 (*nāsti kutaścin nirātmakāt prāṇāder nivṛttir ity agamakatvam* /). It may be tempting to read *ātmano nivṛttyasiddhiḥ* rather than *ātmano nivṛttyasiddheḥ*, which looks utterly elliptical, but

certain [visible pot] when [a self] is absent, [yet] the absence [of breath, etc.,] in all [of them] would not be established for want of a relation [between breath and the self]; therefore [breath, etc.,] are inconclusive [as a logical reason][45].[46]

2.1.4. Explanations (Mainly Based on PV 4 and PVin 3)

Uddyotakara attempted to play down Dignāga's doctrine of the three characteristics (*trairūpya*) of a valid logical reason by claiming that logical validity, i.e., a logical reason's conclusiveness (*gamakatva*, *aikāntikatva*), does not necessarily imply that all three conditions be instantiated.[47] In other words, the *(kevala)vyatirekin* is valid insofar as it meets the first and the third requirements by being a property of the subject of the proof (*pakṣadharmatā*) and being absent wherever the

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PVSV$_{Tib}$ P418a8, PVṬ *Je* D32a3/P38a8 (both *bdag ldog pa ma grub pa'i phyir*), PVSV$_S$ 63,4, PVSVṬ 63,19 (*ātmano nivṛttyasiddheḥ*) seem to rule out this possibility.

[44] PVṬ *Je* D32a3–4/P38b1 = PVSVṬ 63,20–21: *evaṃ[a] tāvan naivātmanaḥ kutaścin nivṛttiḥ siddhā / abhyupagamya tūcyate /*. [[a] *evaṃ* em. (Tib. *de ltar na*) : *etat* Ed.] "Thus, so far (*tāvat*) it has been established that the self [can]not [be] excluded from anything. But, [provisionally] accepting [that it can, Dharmakīrti] says [the following]."

[45] PVṬ *Je* D31a5/P38b3 = PVSVṬ 63,23: *sandigdhavyatirekitvād agamakatvam /*. "[The logical reason 'breath, etc.,'] is inconclusive, because its possessing co-absence is doubtful."

[46] PVSV 12,26–13,11 (together with PV 1.18c) ≈ PVin 2 95,11–96,5: *kiṃ ca / vyatireky api hetuḥ syāt / nedaṃ nirātmakaṃ jīvaccharīram aprāṇādimattvaprasaṅgād iti / nirātmakeṣu ghaṭādiṣu dṛṣṭādṛṣṭeṣu prāṇādyadarśanāt / tannivṛttyātmagatiḥ syāt[a] / adṛśyānupalambhād abhāvāsiddhau ghaṭādīnāṃ nairātmyāsiddheḥ prāṇāder anivṛttiḥ / abhyupagamāt siddham iti cet / katham idānīm ātmasiddhiḥ / parasyāpy apramāṇikā kathaṃ[b] nairātmyasiddhiḥ / abhyupagamena ca sātmakānātmakau vibhajya tatrābhāvena gamakatvaṃ kathayatāgamikatvam ātmani pratipannaṃ syān nānumeyatvam / tasmād adarśane 'py ātmano nivṛttyasiddheḥ / tannivṛttau kvacin nivṛttāv api prāṇādīnām apratibandhāt / sarvatra nivṛttyasiddher agamakatvam /*. [a] PVin 2 95,12–13 reads: *nirātmakānāṃ ghaṭādīnāṃ dṛṣṭādṛṣṭānāṃ prāṇādyabhāvena vyāptes tannivṛttau vyāpyanivṛtter ātmagatiḥ syāt /*. "Da die gesehenen und nicht gesehenen seelenlosen (Dinge) wie Topf usw. durch das Fehlen von Atem usw. umfaßt sind, würde sich, weil das Umfaßte (die Seelenlosigkeit) beim Fehlen dieses (Fehlens von Atem usw.) fehlt, die Erkenntnis ergeben, daß [der Gegenstand, der lebendige Körper] eine Seele hat." Translation Steinkellner 1979: 125–126. [b] *kathaṃ* with no equivalent in PVin (but see PVin$_{Tib}$ 42*,31: *ji ltar*).

[47] See above, §2.1.2, and Prets 1999: 333–336. On *trairūpya* see, e.g., Katsura 1985.

property to be proved is absent (*vipakṣe 'sattvam*). Now according to Dharmakīrti, co-absence *cannot* be ascertained because the self does not meet the conditions for a perception (*anupalabdhilakṣaṇaprāpta*), i.e., is (radically) imperceptible (*adṛśya*, *atyantaparokṣa*) or beyond cognitive reach (*viprakṛṣṭa*) for ordinary, non-enlightened living beings.[48] Thus, the basic problem faced by the *(kevala)vyatirekin* is that the scope of the similar and dissimilar instances (*sapakṣa*, *vipakṣa*) is uncertain: what does possess a self, and what not? Indeed, whereas the non-perception of something perceptible allows one to conclude to its absence *hic et nunc*, the non-perception of something imperceptible (*adṛśyānupalabdhi*) does not allow one to treat this imperceptible thing as nonexistent, be it linguistically, cognitively or practically.[49] Dharmakīrti himself spells this out as follows in PV 4 and PVin 3:

> And one knows that breath, etc., [which fulfil the conditions for perception,] exist or do not exist by perceiving [them] somewhere [i.e., in a living body]. If one could similarly perceive the self [somewhere], one could know that it exists or does not exist [there].[50]

Or, equivalently:

> It is indeed by perceiving [them] somewhere that one knows that breath, etc., exist [there] or not. But [it is] not so [in the case of] the self. Therefore one does not know whether it exists or not.[51]

As a consequence,

> because [the self] is beyond cognitive reach, the occurrence or the absence of the self [in this or that thing] is not established; therefore, [the occurrence or

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[48] On the acknowledgement of the self's imperceptibility by most Ātmavādins, see below, fn. 71, p. 139.

[49] On the distinction between *dṛśya-* and *adṛśya-anupalabdhi*, see, e.g., Katsura 1992: 228–231 and Eltschinger 2010b: 416–419 (§10e); see also Tillemans 1999 and Ono 1999: 309–310.

[50] PV 4.212: *prāṇādeś ca kvacid dṛṣṭyā sattvāsattvaṃ pratīyate / tathātmā yadi dṛśyeta sattvāsattvaṃ pratīyeta[a] //*. [*[a] pratīyeta* em. (Tib. *rtogs par 'gyur*) : *pratīyate* Ed.] See Ono 1999: 310, fn. 26.

[51] PVin 3 118,10–11: *prāṇādayo 'pi hi kvacid darśanād eva sadasataḥ pratīyante / na caivam ātmeti na tasya sadasattva pratītiḥ //*. See Ono 1999: 310, fn. 26.

> the absence] of breath, etc., [is not established] either in the [things that possess or do not possess a self].[52]

And since this cannot be known, neither co-presence nor co-absence can be ascertained, because one cannot ascertain that breath, etc., are only present where the self is present. As Iwata has it,

> [i]n the above-mentioned refutation of the Naiyāyikas' claim of the mere negative concomitance, Dharmakīrti does not resort to the argument that since the reason "breathing, etc." belongs only to the subject of inference, it is absent from both similar and dissimilar instances. The basis for his refutation is that since similar instances include a self, which is beyond the sphere of cognition, it is impossible to ascertain whether the reason is present in them or not. In other words, he reduces the uncommon [*asādhāraṇa*, VE/IR] reason to the reason that is doubtful with regard to both the positive and negative concomitance.[53]

But the reason why neither co-presence nor co-absence can be ascertained is that the two properties lack both types of natural relation, viz. identity (*tādātmya*) and causality (*tadutpatti*).[54] This is Dharmakīrti's claim at the very beginning of his discussion of the over-exclusive logical reason in PV 4:

> [We] call "invariable relation" the fact that the exclusion [of the logical reason from the dissimilar instances] is conclusive. And this [conclusiveness does] not [occur] in the case of [logical reasons, such as "breath, etc.," that are] not related [to the property to be proved]. It is because of this [relation] that co-presence is warranted[, not by means of mere non-perception]. For the [the logical reason's] possessing co-absence can [only] be established if [it is] established [that the *probandum*] is identical [with the *probans*] or is the cause [of the latter]. Therefore, in the [case of an over-]specific [logical reason], neither co-absence nor co-presence [is established].[55]

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[52] PVin 3 116,10–11: *viprakarṣād ātmano vṛttivyatirekāsiddhes tatra prāṇādīnām api*/. See also Iwata 2004: 123.

[53] Iwata 2004: 124.

[54] See Iwata 2004: 125.

[55] PV 4.205–206: *aikāntikatvaṃ vyāvṛtter avinābhāva ucyate* / *tac ca nāpratibaddheṣu tata evānvayasthitiḥ* // *svātmatve hetubhāve vā siddhe hi vyatirekitā* / *sidhyed ato viśeṣe na vyatireko na cānvayaḥ* //. See also Ono 1999: 308.

Now, the type of natural relation that obtains between breath and the self cannot be one of identity, as Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla make clear by pointing out that the Ātmavādin himself ascribes to breath properties (such as impermanence, non-omnipresence and corporeality) that are contrary to those that he attributes to the self.[56]

Since obviously breath and the self are distinct, the only type of natural relation that can obtain between them is that of causality. In Dharmakīrti's system, the ascertainment of causality relies on a complex empirical procedure involving several perceptions and non-perceptions.[57] Now, the reason why this method of ascertaining causality does not apply to the inference of the self is – once again – that the self is radically imperceptible (*atyantaparokṣa*):

> One could know their relation through perception and non-perception, but these [perception and non-perception] are not established for [something] radically imperceptible [such as the self].[58]

Dharmakīrti spells this out in PV 4:

> Objection: The absence of [the logical reason] breath, etc., pervades [the absence of the property to be proved, namely] selflessness. Therefore [the logical reason] breath, etc., must be absent when [the property to be proved,] the self, is absent. [Answer:] This is not [the case], because the absence of the one [i.e., the self,] is not [necessarily] related (*ayoga*) to the absence of the other one [breath, etc.]. Objection: Then [breath, etc., will be either] identical [to the self or] born from it. [Answer:] This is not [the case either, for this relation] is [only] established if one perceives this [breath, etc.,] when one perceives the

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[56] TSP_K 89,11–13/$TSP_Ś$ 82,32–33 (together with TS 209ab): *tayor ātmaprāṇādikayor na tādātmyalakṣaṇaḥ sambandho 'sti svabhāvabhedābhyupagamāt / tathā hy anityā avyāpino mūrttāś ca prāṇādayaḥ / tadviparītas tv ātmā /*. "Between these two [i.e.,] the self [on the one hand] and breath, etc., [on the other hand,] there is no relation characterized as identity, because it is admitted that they differ in nature. [And] indeed, [according to you, things] like breath are impermanent, non-omnipresent and corporeal, whereas the self [has properties that are] contrary to [all] this." The text is quoted in full below, fn. 63, p. 135. On the attempt by some Ātmavādins to show that breath is not merely corporeal, see above, fn. 18, p. 122.

[57] On the determination of causality, see, e.g., Kajiyama 1963, Inami 1999, Lasic 1999 and Lasic 2003; see also below, fn. 103, p. 149.

[58] PVin 3 118,7–8: *upalambhānupalambhābhyāṃ hi tayoḥ pratibandhaṃ jānīyāt / tau cātyantaparokṣasya na sidhyataḥ /*. See also Iwata 2004: 126–127.

> self, and if one does not cognize [the self] when one does not cognize [breath, etc.]. Now, [these] perception and non-perception are not established for [the self, which is] radically imperceptible.[59]

As a consequence,

> [a logical reason such as "breath, etc.," is a cause of doubt] because [the self can]not [be] established through [breath, etc., which are] something different [from it but] are not [its] effects. [And] indeed, a causality relationship between [things] like breath and the self is not established, because this [causality relationship] rests on the perception [of breath, etc., whenever one perceives the self,] and the non-perception [of the self whenever one perceives breath, etc.]. Therefore it is not the case that [the self] exists when [breath, etc., which are] not related [to it], exist. Therefore there is [only] doubt.[60]

As Ono nicely puts it, "[t]he reason why so-called 'pure negative' logical reason is fallacious is, paradoxical as it may be, that it does not have negative concomitance in Dharmakīrti's sense."[61]

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[59] PV 4.208–210: *prāṇādyabhāvo nairātmyavyāpīti vinivartane / ātmano vinivarteta prāṇādir yadi tac ca na // anyasya vinivṛttyānyavinivṛtter ayogataḥ / tadātmā tatprasūtaś cen naitad ātmopalambhane // tasyopalabdhāv agatāv agatau ca prasidhyati / te cātyantaparokṣasya dṛṣṭyadṛṣṭī na sidhyataḥ //*. See also Ono 1999: 309.

[60] PVin 3 116,11–13: *arthāntarād akāryabhūtād asiddheś ca / na hi kāryakāraṇabhāvaḥ prāṇādīnām ātmanaś ca sidhyati / tasyopalambhānupalambhāśrayatvāt / tena nāpratibaddhasya bhāve bhāva iti saṃśayaḥ /*. See Iwata 2004: 126; note also PVin 3 117,8–12: *sa cātmapratibandhas tādātmyatadutpattibhyām anyo nāstīty uktam / te ca darśanena vinā na sidhyataḥ / tan nātmāvinābhāvī prāṇādiḥ / tata eva nātmanivṛttāv asya nivṛttir api / yato vyatirekīty ucyate / na hy apratibaddhaḥ kasyacin nivṛttau niyamena nivartate / tasmād viśeṣasya na vyatireko nānvayaḥ /*. "And [we have already] said that [breath's] relation to the self [can]not be other than identity or causality. Now, these two [types of relation] are not established without perception[, but the self is imperceptible].[a] Therefore breath, etc., have no [ascertained] invariable relation to the self[, and] this is the reason why those [breath, etc.,] are not absent when the self is absent [simply] because one says that they possess coabsence. Indeed, [x] is not necessarily absent when a certain [y to which x is] not related is absent. Therefore, the [over-]specific [logical reason] has neither coabsence nor co-presence." [[a] According to PVinṬ *Tshe* D155b4–5: *de'i bdag ñid daṅ de las 'byuṅ ba de dag kyaṅ gaṅ la mthoṅ ba yod pa de ñid la 'grub la / bdag ni mthoṅ ba med pa de'i phyir /*.] See Ono 1999: 308, fn. 22.

[61] Ono 1999: 308.

In the TS(P), Śāntarakṣita and Kamalaśīla give a synthetic account of Dharmakīrti's criticism that is worth quoting by way of conclusion:[62]

> Moreover, if a [natural] relation were established between breath, etc., and the self, then this conclusion [would] be sound; otherwise, [it is] inconsistent, [for] when the son of a barren woman is missing, it does not follow as a consequence that the living body [is devoid of breath, etc. And] indeed, the consequence you draw in the case of the absence of breath, etc., [functions] similarly. For if a certain relation characterized either as identity or as causality were established between breath, etc., and the self, then it would be rational to conclude that breath, etc., are absent in the body when the self is lacking. For otherwise, the conclusion that the one (*anya*) is absent when [the other one, which is] not related [to it], is absent, would be inconsistent, because of its absurdity. [And] indeed, breath, etc., [which are] not related to it, are not [necessarily] absent when the son of a barren women is absent. Therefore, when someone draws the [following] conclusion: "It follows that breath, etc., which are not related to it, are absent when the son of a barren woman is absent, as [in] a pot," [this conclusion] is inconclusive. In the same way, your own conclusion to the effect that breath, etc., are absent when the self is absent is strictly inconclusive. Here the meaning is: because a [natural] relation [between them] is unestablished. In order to [answer the following objection:] "But how [is it] that a [natural] relation [between them] is unestablished?", [Śāntarakṣita] says: First, [the relation that obtains] in this [case] is not [one of] identity, because it is acknowledged that both of them differ [in nature]. But [there is] no causality relation [between them], because [if there were,] it would follow [that breath, etc., would be produced] at one time. Therefore how [can] breathing up and down (*prāṇāpāna*), etc., which are de-

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[62] The passage answers the following objection in TSP_K 82,6–11/$TSP_Ś$ 76,26–31 (together with TS 184): *punaḥ sa eva vyatirekiṇaṃ hetum ātmasiddhaye prayuktavān – nedaṃ nirātmakaṃ jīvaccharīram aprāṇādimattvaprasaṅgād ghaṭādivad iti / tad darśayati – prāṇādibhir viyuktaś ca jīvaddeho bhaved ayam / nairātmyād ghaṭavat tasmān naivāsty asya nirātmatā //*. "But the same [author][a] has used the logical reason that [supposedly] possesses [only] co-absence in order to prove [the existence of] the self: 'This living body is not selfless, because [if it were,] it would follow that it would not possess breath, etc., like a pot.' [Śāntarakṣita] presents this [argument in the next stanza]: 'Moreover, this living body would be devoid of breath, etc., because [it would] be selfless, like a pot. Therefore, it is not selfless." [[a] *sa* most likely refers back to Uddyotakara (mentioned in TSP_K 81,9/$TSP_Ś$ 76,1).] On this passage see Kapstein 1989.

void of [any] relation to the [self], be absent from the body when the self is absent [from it]? […] Between these two [i.e.,] the self [on the one hand,] and breath, etc., [on the other hand,] there is no relation characterized as identity, because it is admitted that they differ in nature. [And] indeed, [according to you, things] like breath are impermanent, non-omnipresent and corporeal, whereas the self [has properties that are] contrary to [all] this. Moreover, [there is] no [relation] characterized as causality [between the self and breath, etc.,] because [if there were,] it would follow that breath, etc., would [be produced] at one time since they would have a complete cause [independent of any cooperating factor, i.e., a permanent self]. Now, there is no other [type of] relation except these [two, viz. identity and causality]. Therefore how [can] breath, etc., which are devoid of [any] relation [to a self], be absent from the body (*tanoḥ śarīrāt*) specified by life [when the self is supposedly absent]? […] One must consider that this renders null and void those [things] that, like desire, aversion, effort, pleasure, pain and cognition, are presented by the opponents as [inferential] marks of the self, because they have no relation [with the self. Here,] the formal application [is as follows]: Whatever is not related to x does not make x known, as a crane[?] (*balāka*), etc., does not make sesamum, etc., known. Now, breath, etc., are not related to the self. [The logical reason involved in the argument is] the non-perception of the pervader.[63]

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[63] TSP_K 88,22–89,19/$TSP_Ś$ 82,16–83,7 (together with TS 207–210): *prāṇādīnāṃ ca sambandho yadi siddhaḥ sahātmanā / bhavet tadā prasaṅgo 'yaṃ yujyate 'saṅgato 'nyathā // na vandhyāsutaśūnyatve jīvaddehaḥ prasajyate / prāṇādivirahe hy evaṃ tavāpy etat prasañjanam // yadi hi prāṇādīnām ātmanā saha tādātmyalakṣaṇas tadutpattilakṣaṇo vā kaścit sambandhaḥ siddho bhavet tadātmanivṛttau śarīre prāṇādinivṛttiprasaṅgo yuktimān bhavet / anyathā hy apratibaddhasya nivṛttāv anyanivṛttiprasaṅgo 'saṅgata eva syād atiprasaṅgāt / na hi vandhyāputranivṛttau tadasambaddhānāṃ prāṇādīnāṃ nivṛttir bhavati / tasmād yathā vandhyāsūnunivṛttau[a] tadasambaddhānāṃ prāṇādīnāṃ nivṛttiḥ prāpnoti ghaṭādivad iti kenacit prasaṅgāpādanaṃ kriyamāṇam anaikāntikaṃ bhavati / evaṃ tavāpy etad ātmanivṛttau prāṇādinivṛttiprasañjanam anaikāntikam eva / sambandhāsiddher iti bhāvaḥ / kathaṃ punaḥ sambandhāsiddhir ity āha – na tāvad iha tādātmyaṃ bhedāṅgīkaraṇāt tayoḥ / kāryakāraṇatā nāpi yaugapadyaprasaṅgataḥ // tad ātmano nivṛttau hi tatsambandhavivarjitāḥ / kim amī vinivartante prāṇāpānādayas tanoḥ //* […] *tayor ātmaprāṇādikayor na tādātmyalakṣaṇaḥ sambandho 'sti svabhāvabhedābhyupagamāt / tathā hy anityā avyāpino mūrttāś ca prāṇādayaḥ / tadviparītas tv ātmā / nāpi tadutpattilakṣaṇaḥ / prāṇādīnām avikalakāraṇatvena yaugapadyaprasaṅgāt / na caitadvyatirekeṇa sambandhāntaram asti / tasmāt sambandharahitāḥ prāṇāda-*

2.1.5. Dharmakīrti's Argument in PVin 3 and NB 3

Both in PVin 3 and NB 3,[64] Dharmakīrti further develops against the *vyatirekin* a line of argument initiated in the context of his discussion of Dignāga's example of an over-exclusive logical reason (*asādhāraṇ[ānaikāntik]ahetu*), viz. "because it is audible" (*śrāvaṇatvāt*). He explains this reason's inconclusiveness as follows:

> The over-exclusive [logical reason *śrāvaṇatvāt*] is a cause of doubt too, for [both its] occurrence [in the similar instances] and [its] absence [from the dissimilar instances] are doubtful[, and this for two reasons: first] because, since no[thing] can remain outside the two[, viz. being permanent or being impermanent, this logical reason] cannot be ascertained as lacking in both [of them; and second,] because there is no demonstration of the cognition that it exists in one of the two.[65]

Applied to the *vyatirekin*, this argument runs as follows:

> When these two characteristics [i.e., the presence of the logical reason in the similar instances and its absence in the dissimilar instances] are doubtful, [the logical reason is also] inconclusive, as [it is the case in the following argument:] "The living body possesses a self, because it is endowed with [things] like breath.[66]"[67] [This over-exclusive logical reason is inconclusive for two reasons: first, because] apart from what possesses a self and what does

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yaḥ kim iti tanoḥ śarīrāj jīvanaviśiṣṭād vinivartate / [...] *etenecchādveṣaprayatnasukhaduḥkhajñānādīni yāny ātmaliṅgatvena parair uktāni tāni pratiṣiddhāni draṣṭavyāni* / *sambandhāsiddheḥ* / *prayogo ye yatra na pratibaddhās te tasya gamakā na bhavanti yathā tilāder balākādayaḥ* / *na pratibaddhāś ca prāṇādaya ātmanīti vyāpakānupalabdhiḥ* /. [a] *vandhyāsūnunivṛttau* em. (TSP$_K$, TSP$_{Tib}$ D198b6) : *vandhyāsūnunivṛttau tadasambaddhānivṛttau* TSP$_Ś$.

[64] See PVin 3 115,9–116,2 (see Iwata 2004: 119–121 and Ono 1999: 310, fn. 27) and NB$_M$ 3.96–108/NB$_S$ 3.98–110 (quoted below, fn. 69, p. 137).

[65] PVin 3 45,10–46,1: *asādhāraṇo 'py ubhayavyāvṛtter niścayāyogāt* / *ubhayabahirbhūtasyābhāvāt* / *ubhayor ekatra bhāve ca pratītisādhanābhāvāt pravṛttinivṛttyoḥ saṃśayād eva saṃśayahetuḥ* /. See Iwata 2004: 116 and fn. 35; see also Iwata 2004: 111–112.

[66] NBṬ$_M$ 214,19–20/NBṬ$_S$ 76,3–4: *prāṇāḥ śvāsādaya ādir yasyonmeṣanimeṣādeḥ prāṇidharmasya sa prāṇādiḥ*.

[67] NBṬ$_M$ 214,20/NBṬ$_S$ 76,5: *ayam asādhāraṇaḥ saṃśayahetur upapāditavyaḥ*.

not possess a self, there is indeed no [third] group[68] (*rāśi*) where [things] like breath could be present, for the presence and the exclusion of a self include all [existing things]. And [second, because] the presence [of things like breath] in [any]one of these two is not ascertained, for [things] like breath are not established [to exist] in [anything] known as possessing a self or not possessing a self. Therefore, because [things] like breath, which are related to the living body [i.e., which are properties of the subject of the argument], are not established as being excluded from anything possessing a self or not possessing a self, they are not absent from any of them. Neither do [things like breath] have co-presence with them, because [things like breath] are not established [to exist] in that which is of one [of these two] nature[s]. Nor is there [any] ascertainment of [the fact that] these [things] lack co-presence and co-absence with that which possesses a self and that which does not possess a self, because the ascertainment of the non-existence of the one[, say co-presence,] is invariably connected to the ascertainment of the existence of the other[, say co-absence], for co-presence and co-absence have the nature of a mutual exclusion. Therefore, since co-presence and co-absence are doubtful, [such a logical reason] is inconclusive, because there is no ascertainment of [either] the [property] to be proved or the contradictory (*itara*) [one] through it.[69]

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[68] DhPr 216,21: *rāśiḥ prakāraḥ*.

[69] NB_M 3.96–108/NB_S 3.98–110: *anayor eva dvayo rūpayoḥ sandehe 'naikāntikaḥ* // 98/96 // *yathā sātmakaṃ jīvaccharīraṃ prāṇādimattvād iti* // 99/97 // *na hi sātmakanirātmakābhyām anyo rāśir asti yatra prāṇādir varteta*[a] // 100/98 // *ātmano vṛttivyavacchedābhyāṃ sarvasaṅgrahāt* // 101/99 // *nāpy anayor ekatra vṛttiniścayaḥ* // 102/100 // *sātmakatvena nirātmakatvena vā prasiddhe prāṇāder asiddheḥ*[b] // 103/101 // *tasmāj jīvaccharīrasambandhī prāṇādiḥ sātmakād anātmakāc ca sarvasmād vyāvṛttatvenāsiddhes tābhyāṃ na vyatiricyate*[c] // 104/102 // *na tatrānveti* // 105/103 // *ekātmany apy asiddheḥ* // 106/104 // *nāpi sātmakān nirātmakāc ca tasyānvayavyatirekayor abhāvaniścayaḥ* // 107/105 // *ekābhāvaniścayasyāparabhāvaniścayanāntarīyakatvāt*[d] // 108/106 // *anvayavyatirekayor anyonyavyavacchedarūpatvāt / ata*[e] *evānvayavyatirekayoḥ sandehād anaikāntikaḥ* // 109/107 // *sādhyetarayor ato niścayābhāvāt* // 110/108 //. [[a] *varteta* em. (PVin 3 115,9; NB_M [*vartate (varteta)*]; $NBṬ_M$ 216,6/$NBṬ_S$ 76,19) : *vartate* Eds. [b] *asiddheḥ* NB_M (cf. PVin 3 115,11 and $NBṬ_M$ 217,9/$NBṬ_S$ 77,13) : *asiddhis tābhyāṃ na vyatiricyate* NB_S. [c] °*āsiddhes tābhyāṃ na vyatiricyate* NB_M (cf. PVin 3 115,12 and $NBṬ_M$ 218,6/$NBṬ_S$ 77,20) : °*āsiddhiḥ* NB_S. [d] °*nāntarīyakatvāt* NB_M (cf. $NBṬ_S$ 79,1 and 2/$NBṬ_M$ 220,6 and 7) : °*nāntarīyavatvāt* NB_S. [e] NB_S *ata* (cf. PVin 3 116,1) : *tata* NB_M.] For references to the (shorter) parallel passage of PVin 3, see above, fn. 64, p. 136.

In this argument, Dharmakīrti no longer explicitly resorts to the two issues of mere non-perception as a method of ascertaining co-absence and the natural relation that must obtain between the *probans* and the *probandum*. As Iwata remarks, Dharmakīrti's claim that the over-exclusive logical reason is inconclusive relies on the excluded middle (*tertium non datur*): it is impossible that something real be neither possessed of a self nor lacking a self. But since the self is imperceptible, the alternative cannot be adequately construed and hence it cannot be decided whether breath occurs in things endowed with a self or in selfless things. In Iwata's explanation:

> In the first ground Dharmakīrti points out that the reason "breathing, etc.," should necessarily be present either in some things that possess a self or in others that do not possess a self and that there is no third thing beside these two. The negation of the third thing indicates that the alternatives are exactly contradictory. In the second ground he states that it is impossible to determine in which of the two alternatives "breathing, etc." resides. From these two grounds he derives the conclusion that both the positive concomitance, i.e., "breathing, etc.," is present only in things that possess a self, and the negative concomitance, i.e., "breathing, etc.," is never present in things that do not possess a self, are doubtful.[70]

2.2. AGAINST THE INFERABILITY OF THE SELF

2.2.1. The Self's Imperceptibility and the Ātmavādin's Inference of the Self from Its Effects

Dharmakīrti briefly develops a second line of argument against the self while criticizing *adarśanamātra* as the means to establish co-absence. It basically consists in accusing the Ātmavādin of inconsistency insofar as he admits that mere non-perception can prove non-existence in general but refuses to apply this proof to the self, which he regards as imperceptible.

As a matter of fact, many Ātmavādins – among whom several Naiyāyika authors – assert that the self is imperceptible and must therefore

[70] Iwata 2004: 120.

be inferred;[71] and the Vaiśeṣikas explicitly argue that the self's non-perception is no evidence for the self's non-existence, since this non-perception is due to another cause, namely the self's subtlety (*saukṣmya*).[72] Dharmakīrti ironically notes that by doing so, the Ātmavādin leaves himself wide open to the same criticism as the Materialist (*cārvāka*) – who happens to be a staunch opponent of *ātmavāda*[73]: just as the Materialist contends that non-existence can be established through mere non-perception while regarding consciousness as an imperceptible power of material elements,[74] in the same way, the Ātmavādin sees non-perception as a proof of non-existence but nonetheless asserts the existence of an imperceptible self. Dharmakīrti takes this opportunity to criticize what may be viewed as the very foundation of the classic demonstration of the self, i.e., the inference of its existence

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[71] See, e.g., NBh 16,1–2, introducing NSū 1.1.10: *tatrātmā tāvat pratyakṣato na gṛhyate / sa kim āptopadeśamātrād eva pratipadyata iti / nety ucyate / anumānāc ca pratipattavya iti /*. "Among the [enumerated objects of knowledge], the self, to begin with, is not grasped through perception. [We answer the question] 'Is it only known through the sole teaching of an authoritative [person]?' [in the following way]: 'No. [The self] can also be known through inference." However, the Naiyāyikas are not unanimous in this repect. See, e.g., Chakravarti 1982: 226, fn. 8, and Watson 2006: 131, fn. 25. Whereas Uddyotakara and Udayana defend the thesis according to which the self is perceived, Jayanta shares with the author of the NBh the opinion that the self is imperceptible.

[72] See, e.g., PDhS 14,16–15,2 (quoted below, fn. 76, p. 140) and NK 176,10–12 ad loc.: *tatsadbhāve bādhakaṃ pramāṇaṃ nāsti pratyakṣānupalabdher anyathāsiddhatvāt sādhakaṃ ca pramāṇam anumānam astīti pratipādayann āha tasyeti / pratyakṣopalabdhiyogyatāvirahaḥ saukṣmyam /*. "[Praśastapāda] states [the following sentence beginning with the word] *tasya* while showing that there is no means of valid cognition disproving the existence of the [self], because the non-perception [of the self] through direct perception is accounted for otherwise [than due to the self's non-existence, i.e., due to the self's subtlety], and because there is a means of valid cognition proving [that the self exists, namely] inference. Being subtle [means] lacking the capacity to be perceived."

[73] The Cārvākas' critique of the *ātman* apparently consisted in a *dehātmavāda* (see, e.g., Bhattacharya 2009: 98, fn. 71), i.e., in arguing that "the so-called *ātman* [...] is nothing but another name for the body" (Namai 1976a: 31). On this critique see, e.g., NM_M II.267,9–13/NM_V II.201,24–202,1 (quoted below, fn. 99, p. 147), Namai 1976b: 62–69 and Bhattacharya 2009: 148–156.

[74] See below, fn. 99, p. 147, and 165, p. 170.

as an imperceptible cause assumed so as to account for a number of perceptible effects.

Admittedly, the modalities of the self's inference vary according to the interpretation given of the marks of the self enumerated in NSū 1.1.10 and VSū 3.2.4. Thus, as seen above, Vaiśeṣikas claim to infer the self as an agent from the existence of actions such as breathing,[75] and the statement that the self must be inferred as the agent of the action of perception is found both in Vaiśeṣika[76] and Naiyāyika[77] sources.

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[75] See, e.g., PDhS 15,8–10 (quoted above, fn. 84, p. 24, and fn. 14, p. 120), NK 211,8–212,2 and VSV 28,16–18 (quoted above, fn. 14, p. 120).

[76] See, e.g., PDhS 14,16–15,2: *tasya saukṣmyād apratyakṣatve sati karaṇaiḥ śabdādyupalabdhyanumitaiḥ śrotrādibhiḥ samadhigamaḥ kriyate / vāsyādīnāṃ karaṇānāṃ kartṛprayojyatvadarśanāt / śabdādiṣu prasiddhyā ca prasādhako 'numīyate /.* "Because [the self] is not perceptible due to its subtlety, [we] know [it indirectly] through the instruments [of perception] such as the auditory organ and [the other sense organs, which are themselves] inferred from the perception of sound and so on, because [we] observe that instruments such as an axe must be used by an agent. And [the self] is inferred [as] the knower (*prasādhaka*) through the knowledge (*prasiddhi*) of sounds and so on." On the inference of the sense organs alluded to here, see below, fn. 92, p. 144, and 93, p. 145. Praśastapāda must have in mind VSū 3.1.2: *indriyārthaprasiddhir indriyārthebhyo 'rthāntaratve hetuḥ /.* "The knowledge (*prasiddhi*) of the *indriyārthas* is a reason [for knowing] that [the self] is distinct from the *indriyārthas*." On the difficulties of this *sūtra* (notably the meaning of the compound *indriyārtha* and its various interpretations) see Oetke 1988: 303–319. VSV 25,6–7 (which analyzes the compound as a *dvandva*) explains: *grāhyāṇām arthānāṃ śabdādīnāṃ yeyaṃ prasiddhis tayā ca śrotrādīnāṃ karaṇānām / anayendriyārthaprasiddhyaibhyo grāhyagrahaṇebhya indriyārthebhyaḥ paro grahītātmānumīyate /.* "[We] know (*prasiddhi*) the apprehended objects such as sound, and through this [knowledge, we know] the instruments such as the auditory organ; [and it is] through this [very] knowledge of the sense organs and [their] objects that [we] infer [something] different from [both] these apprehended [things] and the [instrumental] apprehension [itself, i.e., from the sense organs and their objects; and this inferred entity is] the apprehender, the self." Cf. VSV 26,11 ad VSū 3.1.8: *indriyāṇi kartṛyojyāni karaṇatvād vāsyādivad iti /.* "The sense organs must be used by an agent, because they are instruments, like an axe."

[77] See, e.g., NBh 16,5–20, which explains that the marks of the self mentioned in NSū 1.1.10 all involve a synthetic cognitive activity (*pratisandhāna*) that presupposes a single knowing agent (*jñātṛ*). On this argument see Oetke 1988: 254–259, Watson 2006: 141, fn. 58, Ratié 2011a: 66–69, and below, fn. 206, p. 181, and 207, p. 182. While commenting on NSū 3.1.1, the NBh develops an argument somewhat different but also based on the idea that cognitive activity involves a form of synthesis

Alternatively, the self is inferred as the substratum (*āśraya*) or the property-bearer (*guṇin*) in which this or that property (*guṇa*) must reside; this latter strategy is found both in Vaiśeṣika[78] and Naiyāyika[79] texts (and is mentioned in both Buddhist[80] and Brahmanical[81] sources

(*anusandhāna*) that requires a single agent (we are capable of recognizing an object that has been perceived through the visual sense in the past and that is now perceived through the sense of touch, and the synthesis of various perceptual cognitions involved in this recognition shows that there is a unitary agent of these cognitions). On the latter argument see Oetke 1988: 260–268, Chakrabarti 1992, Preisendanz 1994: 163–187 and Ganeri 2000. See also NM_M II.293,7–8/NM_V II.220,1–2, which mentions the Vaiśeṣika argument according to which sense organs must be used by an agent: *kartṛprayojyatā khalu dṛṣṭā dātrādikaraṇajātasya / tvakśrotrādy api karaṇaṃ tathaiva kartrā prayujyeta*[a] //. [[a] *prayujyeta* NM_M : *prayujyate* NM_V.] "Surely, [we] observe that what happens to be an instrument, such as a sickle, must be used by an agent; and exactly in the same way, the skin, ears and so on, which are instruments, must be used by an agent."

[78] See, e.g., VSV 29,5 ad VSū 3.2.4: *sukhādayaś ca guṇisāpekṣāḥ / guṇatvāt / rūpavat /.* "And pleasure, etc., stand in need of a property-bearer, because [they] are properties, just as colour." Cf. PDhS 16,3–4: *sukhaduḥkhecchādveṣaprayatnaiś ca guṇair guṇy anumīyate / te ca na śarīrendriyaguṇāḥ /.* "And [the self] is inferred [as] a property-bearer through the properties that are pleasure, pain, desire, aversion and effort; and these are not properties of the body or of the sense organs."

[79] See, e.g., NBh 12,16–19 ad NSū 1.1.5 (quoted below, fn. 89, p. 143) and NV 64,12–13 ad NSū 1.1.10: *athavecchādveṣaprayatnasukhaduḥkhajñānāny ātmano liṅgam ity anyathā varṇayanti / guṇā icchādayaḥ / guṇāś ca paratantrā bhavantīti nyāyaḥ /.* "Alternatively, [some] explain [the aphorism] 'Desire, aversion, effort, pleasure, pain and cognitions are marks of the self' otherwise. Desire, etc., are properties, and the principle [underlying this alternative explanation is] that properties are dependent [on something else]." After showing that the list of NSū 1.1.10 is indeed a list of properties, and that these properties cannot belong to the body, NV 64,17–18 concludes: *tatpratiṣedhāc cātmaguṇatvam iti pāriśeṣyāt siddha ātmeti /.* "And because [we] have negated that [the body may be the substance on which these properties are dependent, these properties must] be properties of the self; thus the self is established by [way of] elimination."

[80] See, e.g., $AKBh_{Pr}$ 475,22–23/$AKBh_{LE}$ 148,11–12: *avaśyam ātmābhyupagantavyaḥ / smṛtyādīnāṃ guṇapadārthatvāt / tasya ca guṇapadārthasyāvaśyaṃ*[a] *dravyāśritatvāt / teṣāṃ cānyāśrayāyogād iti /.* [[a] $AKBh_{LE}$ *ca guṇapadārthasyāvaśyaṃ* : $AKBh_{Pr}$ *cārthād avaśyaṃ*.] "[The Vaiśeṣika:] The self must necessarily be admitted, because memory, etc., belong to the category of properties, because [everything that belongs to] the category of properties must necessarily reside in a substance, and because there can be no other substratum [for these properties besides the self]."

that set out to criticize it). The two modalities of inference – that which rests on the necessity of an agent, and that which rests on the necessity of a substratum – are sometimes conflated,[82] but most importantly, the marks may also be regarded as effects (*kārya*) that must be explained by assuming an imperceptible cause. Thus Candrānanda for instance explains that the self must be inferred as the cause (*nimitta*) of breath, etc.[83]

Dharmakīrti denies any validity to such an inference on the grounds that the so-called marks of the self cannot be determined as effects of an imperceptible cause. Relying again on his definition of the ascertainment of an entity x as being an effect of an entity y through a series of perceptions and non-perceptions,[84] he argues that an imperceptible entity cannot be considered the cause of anything since the co-presence and the co-absence between this entity and its alleged effect cannot be determined through perception.[85]

On the role of memory in the demonstrations of the self see, e.g., Ratié 2006 and Ratié 2011a: 62–80; see also below, §2.2.4.

[81] See, e.g., ŚV *ātmavāda* 101, where the Vaiśeṣika answers the objection of his Buddhist opponent thus: *guṇatvād āśritatvaṃ hi sukhādeḥ syād rasādivat / ya āśritaḥ sa ātmā* […] //. "For pleasure, etc., since they are properties just as taste, etc., must reside [in some substratum]; and that in which [they] reside is the self."

[82] See, e.g., NK 177,8–10 ad PDhS 14,16–15,2 (quoted above, fn. 76, p. 140): *śabdādiṣu viṣayeṣu prasiddhir jñānaṃ tatrāpi prasādhako jñātānumīyate / jñānaṃ kvacid āśritaṃ kriyātvāc chidikriyāvat / yatredam āśritaṃ sa ātmā* /. "The knower (*prasādhaka*) [i.e.,] the knowing agent (*jñātṛ*), is inferred with respect to knowledge (*prasiddhi*) [i.e.,] the cognition (*jñāna*) of objects such as sound. A cognition must reside in some [substratum], because it is an action, such as the action of cutting. That in which it resides is the self."

[83] See VSV 29,14–16, quoted above, fn. 20, p. 124. Although the NBh and NV do not seem to present "desire, etc." (the self's marks enumerated in NSū 1.1.10) as effects, Jayanta does; see below, fn. 90, p. 144.

[84] See above, fn. 57, p. 132, and 58, p. 132, and PVṬ *Je* D38a6/P45b1–2, quoted below, fn. 103, p. 149.

[85] It should be noted that in the SAS, Dharmakīrti defends the thesis that the existence of other cognitive series is legitimately inferred, even in the idealistic perspective of the Vijñānavādins, from our perception of actions that we know not to have performed ourselves. In other words, Dharmakīrti acknowledges that although one cognitive series cannot be perceived by another (at least in the case of ordinary persons), we can infer the existence of other cognitive series from action regarded

The PVSV then anticipates an argument that the Ātmavādin could put forward in response to this attack:[86] although the self is imperceptible, it can be legitimately inferred through an inference of the *sāmānyato dṛṣṭam* type. This kind of reasoning is capable of establishing the existence of entities by nature imperceptible[87] since it shows that without the existence of these entities – conceived by analogy with other perceptible causes as some indeterminate[88] imperceptible cause – this or that particular phenomenon would remain inexplicable. It is often used to infer the self either as the substratum[89] or as the cause[90] of its

as their effect. See, e.g., the first verse of the treatise, the Sanskrit text of which is preserved in Rāmakaṇṭha's NPP 62,9–10 (see Kitagawa 1955: 3, fn. 8) and Abhinavagupta's ĪPVV II.110,1–2 (see Ratié 2007: 323, fn. 20, and Ratié 2011a: 591): *buddhipūrvāṃ kriyāṃ dṛṣṭvā svadehe 'nyatra tadgrahāt / jñāyate[a] yadi dhīś cittamātre 'py eṣa nayaḥ samaḥ //*. [[a] *jñāyate* NPP, *śes 'gyur* SAS : *kalpyate* ĪPVV.] "If[, according to those who consider that objects exist outside of consciousness,] one knows [the existence of] a cognition [belonging to another series] because after seeing that in one's own body, [one's own] action presupposes a cognition, one perceives [action] in some other [body,] the same method [is valid] in the [doctrine of] mind-only (*cittamātra*) as well." However, this should not be deemed contradictory to Dharmakīrti's assertion that the inference of an imperceptible self from action regarded as its effect is invalid. First, the inference defended by Dharmakīrti in the SAS does not regard a self understood as a permanent substratum of cognitions (and as such utterly imperceptible) but only a cognitive series (see Kitagawa 1955: 2–3) similar to that which is experienced through the mere self-awareness characterizing any cognition. Second, according to Dharmakīrti the causality relation is established in the case of the inference of other cognitive series (whereas it is not in the case of the inference of a permanent self) precisely because one apprehends through mere self-awareness the invariable concomitance of the momentary cognitive event consisting of a desire to act with the momentary cognition of one's action (on this causal relation in the SAS see, e.g., Inami 2001: 466–468, Katsura 2007: 412–421, Ratié 2007: 323–335 and Ratié 2011a: 590–606).

[86] See below, fn. 104, p. 149.

[87] On this type of inference see, e.g., Schuster 1972 and Nenninger 1994. On its use as a means to establish the existence of entities that are by nature always imperceptible (*nityaparokṣa*), see below, fn. 93, p. 145, and 104, p. 149. On its use in the controversy over the existence of *īśvara*, see Krasser 2002: 105; on its use in the controversy over the existence of objects external to consciousness, see Ratié 2011b.

[88] See below, fn. 96, p. 146, 107, p. 150, and 110, p. 150.

[89] The NBh and NV thus mention the *sāmānyato dṛṣṭam* inference as a means to establish the self as the substratum of the marks mentioned in NSū 1.1.10. See NBh 12,16–19 ad NSū 1.1.5: *sāmānyato dṛṣṭaṃ nāma yatrāpratyakṣe liṅgaliṅginoḥ sam-*

marks; here it consists in showing that if some cause – i.e., the self – is not postulated so as to account for such phenomena as breath, etc., these phenomena remain unexplainable.[91] Dharmakīrti mentions the paradigm of this type of inference, i.e., that of the sense organs (*indriya*),[92] which, although they are bound to remain imperceptible, must be

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bandhe kenacid arthena liṅgasya sāmānyād apratyakṣo liṅgī gamyate / yathecchādibhir ātmā / icchādayo guṇāḥ / guṇāś ca dravyasaṃsthānāḥ / tad yad eṣāṃ sthānaṃ sa ātmeti /. "What [we] call the *sāmānyato dṛṣṭam* [inference] is that in which, while the relation between the mark and the possessor of the mark is imperceptible, the imperceptible possessor of the mark is understood from the general feature (*sāmānya*) [shared] with something [else] by the mark. For example: the self [is inferred] from desire, etc. Desire, etc., are properties; and properties reside in a substance; therefore their locus is the self." Uddyotakara, while explaining how the inference of the self is an illustration of *sāmānyato dṛṣṭam*, specifies (NV 48,17) that the self is then inferred from the fact that desire, etc., which are properties, must reside in some substratum (*paratantrā icchādayo guṇatvāt / rūpavad iti /*. "Desire, etc., are dependent [on some other entity] because they are properties, just as colour.").

[90] The NBh and NV merely present the marks of the self in NSū 1.1.10 as properties from which the self must be inferred as a substratum (see above, fn. 89, p. 143); however, Jayanta, while mentioning the inference of the self as the paradigm of the *sāmānyato dṛṣṭam* inference, specifies that this substratum is to be inferred from the marks regarded as effects – i.e., according to him the self is to be inferred as a particular type of cause, namely a substratum. See NM_M I.351,5–6/NM_V I.194,12–13: *icchādikāryaṃ dehādivilakṣaṇāśrayaṃ śarīrādiṣu bādhakapramāṇopapattau satyāṃ kāryatvād iti sāmānyatodṛṣṭasya kramaḥ /*. "The method of [inference of] an [object] apprehended through a generality is as follows: an effect such as desire has a substratum distinct from the body, etc. [i.e., the self], because it is an effect, [and] given that arguments have been adduced against [the possibility that] the body, etc., [may be this substratum]."

[91] Cf., e.g., VSV 29,14–16 (quoted above, fn. 20, p. 124), explaining *sāmānyato dṛṣṭāt* in VSū 3.2.9 (see above, ibid.). Note that the two examples of marks of the self given by Dharmakīrti are "breath, etc." (*prāṇādi*, not explicitly mentioned here but see, e.g., fn. 113, p. 151) and "pleasure, etc." (*sukhādi*).

[92] The term "organ" might appear misleading insofar as the *indriya* of sight, for instance, is more than what we usually consider the visual organ (i.e., the visible body parts called "eyes"). According to Indian philosophers, we must assume the existence of some imperceptible entities (whether they are conceived as atoms or rays, and whether they are thought to enter into contact with their object or not: see Preisendanz 1989: 147–149) residing inside what we ordinarily call our visual organs, and the *indriya*s are precisely these imperceptible perceptual instruments. However, the rather common translation "sense faculties" does not seem relevant

inferred in order to account for the fact of perception.[93] The establishment of the *indriya*s through inference is thus put forward here so as to show that entities which stand beyond the perceptual range (and such is the case of the self) can validly be inferred as the causes of effects that would otherwise remain impossible to account for.[94]

Dharmakīrti's reply to this argument is reminiscent of Vasubandhu's concise dismissal of the analogy between the inference of the sense organs and that of the self.[95] It consists in noticing that in the

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either in so far as the sense faculties do not stand in need of any inference: seeing is knowing that one sees, and the Indian philosophers do not mean that we need to infer our sense faculties but rather, that we must infer the existence of the imperceptible instruments (*karaṇa*) that make these sense faculties possible (see below, fn. 93). Provided that one keeps in mind that etymologically, an organ is a bodily "instrument," and that sense organs are not limited to the perceptible body parts called "eye," "ear," etc., the translation "sense organs" therefore appears to us as the least unsatisfactory, given that the *indriya*s are the (bodily) instruments of perception.

[93] See below, fn. 104, p. 149. For another mention of the *indriya*s' inference by Dharmakīrti see, e.g., PVSV 118,1–4, translated in Eltschinger 2007: 269 (see also ibid.: fn. 219–221). Cf., e.g., NM_M I.348,6–11/NM_V I.193,8–12: *sāmānyato dṛṣṭaṃ tu yatra sambandhakāle 'pi liṅgisvarūpam apratyakṣaṃ nityaparokṣam eva sāmānyato vyāptigrahaṇād anumīyate yathā śabdādyupalabdhyā śrotrādi karaṇam / indriyāṇām atīndriyatvān na kadācit pratyakṣagamyatvam / atha ca cchedanādikriyāṇāṃ paraśvadhādikaraṇapūrvakatvena vyāptigrahaṇāc chabdādyupalabdhikriyāṇāṃ karaṇapūrvakatvam anumīyate /*. "As for the [inference called] *sāmānyato dṛṣṭam*, [it is the kind of inference] in which one infers, due to [one's] grasping an invariable concomitance on the basis of a generality, [something] whose nature as a mark possessor is imperceptible, always invisible, even at the time when the relation [between the mark and the mark possessor is established] – for instance, an instrument such as the auditory organ [is inferred] thanks to the perception of sounds, etc. Because sense organs are supersensible, [they] can never be directly apprehended. And yet, because one grasps the invariable concomitance of actions such as cutting with [the property of] presupposing instruments such as an axe, one infers that actions such as sound perception presuppose [some] instruments [i.e., the sense organs]." This inference is also alluded to, e.g., in PDhS 14,16–15,2 (see above, fn. 76, p. 140).

[94] Cf., e.g., NPP 9,1–2: *ata evendriyādir iva kāryāt so 'pīcchātmakād anumīyata iti naiyāyikāḥ /*. "The Naiyāyikas [contend] that for this very reason, [we] infer this [self] from [its] effect, i.e., desire, just as [we] infer the sense organs, etc." On this passage see Watson 2006: 128–130.

[95] See $AKBh_{Pr}$ 461,7–12/$AKBh_{LE}$ 36,7–12: *tatredam anumānam / sati kāraṇe kāraṇāntarasyābhāve kāryasyābhāvo dṛṣṭo bhāve ca punar bhāvas tadyathāṅkurasya / saty*

case of the inference of the sense organs, what is inferred is merely a cause in general, i.e., an entity conceived of as devoid of any particularity besides that of contributing in producing a particular effect that arises occasionally.[96] However, the Ātmavādin claims to infer much more than a cause in general accounting for phenomena such as breath or pleasure: what he intends to establish through this reasoning is the existence of an entity particularized as being a permanent agent and experiencer.[97] He thus infers much more than is legitimate,[98] so that his self cannot be said to be perceived even in a purely indirect way, through its alleged effect. And yet, according to the Ātmavādin's own position regarding non-perception, the self's imperceptibility should be enough to establish its nonexistence.

2.2.2. Dharmakīrti's Argument in PVSV 16,8–19: English Translation

Moreover: how [can the Ātmavādin and the Materialist accept] this very non-perception which [according to them] does not establish the nonexistence of

eva cābhāsaprāpte viṣaye manaskāre ca kāraṇe viṣayagrahaṇasyābhāvo dṛṣṭaḥ punaś ca bhāvo 'ndhabadhirādīnām anandhābadhirādīnāṃ ca / atas tatrāpi kāraṇāntarasyābhāvo bhāvaś ca niścīyate / yac ca tatkāraṇāntaraṃ tad indriyam ity etad anumānam / na caivam ātmano 'stīti nāsty ātmā /. "The inference of the [sense organs] is as follows: when, while a [certain] cause is present, another cause is absent, the effect is observed not to occur, whereas when [this other cause] is present, [the effect] occurs, e.g., a sprout. And when a [certain] cause [is present, namely, on the one hand,] the object that has appeared, and [on the other hand,] an act of attention, [we] observe that there is no apprehension of the object for [those who are] blind, deaf, etc., whereas [this apprehension] occurs for those who are neither blind nor deaf, etc. Therefore [we] ascertain the absence and presence of another cause for this [apprehension] too; and this other cause is the sense organ. Such is the inference [with respect to the sense organs]. Now, there is no such [inference] for the self; therefore there is no self."

[96] See below, fn. 106–107, p. 149–150. On this cause in general (*hetumātra*) or mere (indeterminate) cause (*kiñcinmātraṃ nimittam*), see Ratié 2011a: 458, fn. 200 and 201. Cf. Candrānanda's remark that the self, if it is inferred as a *sāmānyato dṛṣṭam*, is only inferred as "some cause" (*kenāpi nimittena*): see above, fn. 20, p. 124.

[97] See below, fn. 110–111, p. 150.

[98] The nondualist Śaivas later exploit precisely this line of argument to prove that the Sautrāntikas' inference of external objects is not valid (see Ratié 2011b, particularly fn. 44).

[things] such as the self and consciousness [as a potency] of earth,[99] [as] that which establishes the absence of the logical reason [from the dissimilar instances]? For the [Ātmavādin[100]] who makes non-perception a means of valid cognition [enabling us to cognize the absence of the logical reason from the dissimilar instances], the doctrine of the self would be groundless because, since the self is imperceptible,[101] [102]its effect[, which might serve as an

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[99] PVSVṬ 73,25–27 (to be compared with PVṬ *Je* D38b7–39a1/P46a4–5, where the quotation is missing): *bhūtānām eva śaktiś caitanyam iṣyate cārvākaiḥ / bhūtasvabhāvā ca mṛd iti / evaṃ mṛdaḥ khalv api caitanyam anupalabhyamānam apīcchan lokāyatikaḥ / yad āha – tebhyo bhūtebhyaś caitanyaṃ madaśaktivad vijñānam iti /*. "The Cārvākas consider that consciousness is a power belonging to material elements only, and that earth consists of a material element. Thus the Lokāyatika considers that consciousness, although it is not perceived, surely belongs to earth; this is what he states in 'Consciousness (*caitanyaṃ* [...] *vijñānam*) arises from these elements, just as a power of intoxication [arises from a ferment and so on].'" On the Bārhaspatya fragments "consciousness arises from these [elements]" (*tebhyaś caitanyam /*) and "just as a power of intoxication [arises from a ferment and so on]" ([*kiṇvādibhyo*] *madaśaktivat /*), see Namai 1976a: 31–32, Namai 1976b: 39 (A4 and A5) and 52, Bhattacharya 2009: 79 (I.4 and I.5) and 121, fn. 49, and Franco 2011: 634[b]–636[a]. Cf. NM_M II.267,9–13/NM_V II.201,24–202,1: *na cātmasiddhau kiñcana liṅgam asti / jñānādiyogas tu bhūtānām eva pariṇāmaviśeṣopapāditaśaktyatiśayajuṣāṃ bhaviṣyati / yathā guḍapiṣṭādayaḥ prāgasatīm api madaśaktim āsāditasurākāraparipariṇāmāḥ prapadyante tathā mṛdādyavasthāyāṃ acetanāny api bhūtāni śarīrākārapariṇatāni caitanyaṃ sprakṣyanti /*. "[The Cārvāka:] And there is no mark whatsoever [that could enable us] to establish the self. Rather, the association with cognitions and so on must belong to the material elements themselves, which possess an additional power brought about by a particular transformation. Just as molasses, flour and so on acquire an intoxicating power – although [this power] was previously absent – when undergoing a transformation into the aspect of liquor, in the same way, material elements, although they are unconscious [when] they are in the state of earth and so on, must reach consciousness when they are transformed into the aspect of the body." The mention of *mṛt* by Dharmakīrti is most probably a reference to the first of the four material elements acknowledged by the Cārvākas (see Namai 1976b: 39, A2 and Bhattacharya 2009: 78, I.2 for the Bārhaspatya fragment *pṛthivy āpas tejo vāyur iti tattvāni /*. "The constituents of reality are: earth, water, fire, wind.").

[100] Acording to the commentaries, Dharmakīrti has in mind "Vaiśeṣikas, etc." See PVṬ *Je* D38a1–2/P45a4: *bye brag pa la sogs pa 'di'i bdag tu smra ba* (**vaiśeṣikāder asyātmavādinaḥ*); see also PVSVṬ 72,22: *asya vaiśeṣikādeḥ.*

[101] PVṬ *Je* D38a2–6/P45a5–b1: *'di ltar bdag mṅon sum ma yin pa'i phyir bdag mṅon sum du ni* (D : P om. *du ni*) *mi dmigs so // bdag ni tshu rol mthoṅ ba'i dbaṅ po'i śes pa'i yul ma yin te / de ni raṅ bźin bskal pa yin pa'i phyir ro // dbaṅ po'i śes pa'i mjug*

thogs su 'byuṅ ba yid kyi mṅon sum gaṅ yin pa de yaṅ dbaṅ po'i śes pa'i yul gyi de ma thag pa'i yul la dmigs pa yin no // raṅ rig pa'i yaṅ ma yin te / de'i yul ni raṅ gi ṅo bo yin pa'i phyir ro // gaṅ źig bdag ni ṅa'o sñam pa'i śes pa'i mṅon sum yin no źes zer ba de yaṅ rnar (D : *snar* P) *mi 'oṅ ste / ṅa'o sñam pa'i śes pa ni rnam par rtog pa daṅ bcas pa ñid kyis mṅon sum ma yin pa'i phyir daṅ / bdag skem mo sbom mo źes bya ba la sogs pas lus kyi gnas skabs la kun tu* (P : *du* D) *reg pa'i phyir te / bdag la ni skem pa la sogs pa* (D : *pa la* P) *ñid yod pa ma yin no //*. "For, because the self is imperceptible, it (**ātman*) is not apprehended (**upa√labh-*) perceptually. The self is indeed not the object of a sensory cognition (**indriyajñānaviṣaya*?) for [ordinary persons] of limited cognitive ability (**arvāgdarśin*?), for it is beyond [cognitive] reach on account of its [intrinsic] nature (**svabhāvaviprakṛṣṭa*). As for the mental perception (**mānasapratyakṣa*) that takes place immediately after (*mjug thogs su 'byuṅ ba*) the sensory cognition, it relies (**ā√lamb-*?) on the object (**viṣaya*) [that follows] immediately (**anantara*) the object of the sensory perception. And [the self can]not [be the object] of self-cognition (**svasaṃvittī*?) either, for its object is [cognition] itself. And to say that the self is perceptible (**pratyakṣa*) through the cognition 'I' (**aham iti pratyayaḥ*?) is not pleasant to hear (**karṇasubhaga*?) either[, and this for two reasons: first,] because the cognition 'I,' inasmuch as it is conceptual (**savikalpa*?), is not a [genuine] perception; and [second,] because [expressions] such as 'I am thin' (**kṛśo 'ham*?) [or 'I am] thick' (**sthūlo 'ham*?) pertain (**saṃ√spṛś-*?) to bodily states (**śarīrāvasthā*?). And indeed, [being] thin does not belong to the self." The argument of the "cognition 'I'" (*aham iti pratyaya*, *ahampratyaya*, *ahampratīti*, sometimes equated with *ahaṅkāra*) to which Śākyabuddhi is alluding here was used by Naiyāyikas (e.g., Uddyotakara) and Mīmāṃsakas (Śabara and Kumārila), and is criticized in Buddhist sources such as AKBh 9 and the TS(P). On this argument and its Buddhist critique see, e.g., Biardeau 1968: 113–125, Oetke 1988: 208–209, Taber 1990 and Ratié 2011a: 52–62. PVSVṬ 72,24 gives a much more concise commentary on the passage: *na pratyakṣeṇātmana upalambhaḥ / nityaparokṣatvābhyupagamāt /*. "The self is not apprehended perceptually, since it is admitted that [it] is always imperceptible."

102 PVṬ *Je* D38a6–7/P45b1–2: *mṅon sum ma yin pa ñid kyis bdag la raṅ bźin du gyur pa'i rtags kyaṅ med do // 'bras bu ma grub pa'i phyir 'bras bu'i rtags kyaṅ med de /*. "Because [the self] is not perceptible (**apratyakṣatvena*), there is no [inferential] mark that would consist in a nature (**svabhāvabhūtaliṅga*?) regarding the self; and since [its] effect is not established, there is no [inferential] mark [consisting in] an effect (**kāryaliṅga*) either." PVSVṬ 72,24–25: *atha syād ātmano 'numānam evopalambho 'sty evety ata āha – tatkāryetyādi /*. "[Dharmakīrti] states [the passage] beginning with *tatkārya*° so as [to answer the following objection]: 'But let [us] admit that there is indeed an apprehension (*upalambha*) of the self that [consists] only [in] an inference.'"

inferential mark,] is unestablished.[103] [104]On the contrary (*tu*), one [can legitimately] say that [things] such as the sense organs[105] are [inferentially] established, for it is established that the effect consisting in a [sensory] cognition depends [on an additional cause] because it is occasional.[106] [In the case of

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[103] Or should one read, with $PVSV_{Tib}$ P414a7 (*bdag mṅon sum ma yin pa'i phyir daṅ 'bras bu ma grub pa'i phyir ro* //): "Because the self is imperceptible [and] because its effect[, which might serve as an inferential mark,] is not established"? In any case, Śākyabuddhi and Karṇakagomin comment the passage in the following way. PVṬ *Je* D38a6/P45b1–2: *bdag mṅon sum ma yin pa'i* (D : *sum yin pa la* P) *mṅon sum daṅ mi dmigs pa bsgrubs* (D : *bsgrub* P) *pa 'bras bu daṅ rgyu'i dṅos po med do* // *de bas na rtags med pa'i phyir bdag ni rjes su dpag pa'i yul yaṅ ma yin no* //. "There is no causality relationship (**kāryakāraṇabhāva*) that could be established through perception (**pratyakṣa*) and non-perception (**anupalabdhi*) for an imperceptible (**apratyakṣa*) self. Therefore, since there is no [inferential] mark (**liṅga*), the self is not the object (**viṣaya*) of an inference (**anumāna*)." PVSVṬ 72,25–26: *apratyakṣatvād evātmanas tatkāryasvabhāvarūpasya liṅgasyāniścayān nānumānam upalambhaḥ* /. "Precisely because the self is imperceptible, one cannot ascertain an [inferential] mark [for it] that would consist either in its effect or in a nature; therefore there is no apprehension [of the self that would consist in] an inference."

[104] PVṬ *Je* D38a6–7/P45b2–3: *gal te mig la sogs pa mṅon sum ma yin pa rnams ji ltar 'bras bu rnam par śes pas rjes su dpog ce na / dbaṅ po la sogs pa ni źes bya ba la sogs pa smos te* /. "[Dharmakīrti] states [the passage] beginning with **indriyāṇām* so as [to answer the following objection]: 'Just as one infers the visual sense organ, etc. (**cakṣurādi*), which are not perceptible (**apratyakṣa*), one will infer [the self] through the cognition (**vijñāna*) of [its] effect (**kārya*)." PVSVṬ 73,8–9: *yathā nityaparokṣāṇām apīndriyādīnām anumānaṃ tathātmano bhaviṣyatīti ced āha – indriyāṇām ityādi* /. "[Dharmakīrti] states [the passage] beginning with *indriyāṇām* so as [to answer the following objection]: 'Just as there is an inference of the sense organs even though they are always imperceptible, in the same way, there must be [an inference] of the self [even though it is always imperceptible]."

[105] According to Śākyabuddhi and Karṇakagomin, these things also include the "seeds of memory, etc." (PVṬ *Je* D38a7/P45b3–4 ≈ PVSVṬ 73,9: *ādiśabdāt smṛtibījādīnām* /). On *smṛtibīja*, see below, fn. 203–204, p. 181.

[106] PVṬ *Je* D38b1–2/P45b4–5 = PVSVṬ 73,10–12: *tathā hi satsv api rūpālokamanaskāreṣu nimīlitālocanādyavasthāsu vijñānasyābhāvāt punaś conmīlitālocanāvasthāsu bhāvād vijñānakāryaṃ kāraṇāntarasāpekṣaṃ sidhyati / tataḥ* [...] /. "To explain: since in states where the eyes (Tib. *mig*) are shut for instance, there is no [sensory] cognition even though a visible object, light and an act of attention are present, and since on the other hand, in states where the eyes are opened, there is [a sensory cognition], it is established that the effect [consisting in a sensory] cognition is dependent on some other cause [besides the visible object, light and the act of attention]. Therefore [...]." On this reasoning see, e.g., Ratié 2011b: 491–492.

the sense organs, etc., one simply infers] that something [more, subsequently called "sense organ,"] is the cause of this [effect consisting in a sensory cognition],[107] but not that [this cause is] so [and so, as the Ātmavādin does in the case of the self].[108] [And attempting to] demonstrate that an effect such as pleasure [can be explained] in the same way[109] (*evam*) does not promote the cause (*na* [...] *kañcid arthaṃ puṣṇāti*) [of the Ātmavādin], for [everyone] admits that [things like pleasure] possess some kind of indeterminate cause (*yena kenacit*).[110] [111]And thus, there can only be non-perception of the self.

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[107] PVṬ *Je* D38b2–3/P45b6–7 ≈ PVSVṬ 73,14–15: *etad uktaṃ bhavati /[a] yat[b] sāpekṣam idaṃ kādācitkam vijñānaṃ tat[c] kim apy asya vijñānasya kāraṇam astīty anumīyate /[d] tad eva cendriyam iti vyavahriyate /*. [[a]] PVṬ with no equivalent of *etad uktaṃ bhavati /*. [[b]] Note PVṬ *gaṅ gi phyir* (**yataḥ*). [[c]] Note PVṬ *de'i phyir* (**tat[aḥ?]*). [[d]] Note PVṬ *źes bya ba'i rnam pa 'dis* (**ityevamprakāreṇa*?) instead of *ity anumīyate /*.] "This is what [Dharmakīrti] says [here]: since this [sensory] cognition is dependent [on something else as it is] occasional, one infers that there is some (*kim api*) [additional] cause of this [sensory] cognition; and this is what is called 'sense organ.'"

[108] PVṬ *Je* D38b3/P45b7 ≈ PVSVṬ 73,15–16: *na tv evambhūtam iti na rūpaviśeṣeṇa mūrttatvādinā yuktam indriyam anumīyata[a] ity arthaḥ /*. [[a]] PVṬ has no equivalent of *yuktam indriyam anumīyate*.] "The meaning of 'but not that it is so' is, '[but] the sense organ is not legitimately inferred as having a particular form [i.e.,] as having the [property of] being material, etc.'"

[109] PVSVṬ 73,16–18: *evam iti yathā kādācitkavijñānakāryānyathānupapattyendriyānumānaṃ tathā sukhādikāryaṃ yasya sukhādi kāryaṃ[a] tat kim apy astīty anumāne[b] tac cātmasvarūpam iti prasādhitam /*. [[a]] *sukhādi kāryaṃ* em. : *sukhādikāryaṃ* Ed. [[b]] *anumāne* PVSVṬ$_{MS}$: *anumānena* Ed.] "'[Attempting to demonstrate that an effect such as pleasure can be explained] in the same way' [means arguing the following:] just as the inference of the sense organs is based on the impossibility of accounting for the effect [consisting in] an occasional [sensory] cognition otherwise [i.e., if one does not assume the existence of the sense organs], in the same way, the effect [consisting in] pleasure, etc., is proved [to be dependent on some additional cause] in an inference [according to which] there is something which possesses pleasure, etc., as its effect, and [according to which] this [something] has the nature of the self." Note that the PVṬ (*Je* D38b4/P45b8) understands *sukhādikārya* as **ātmaguṇa* (*bdag gi yon tan*), i.e., "property of the self."

[110] PVṬ *Je* D38b5/P46a1 = PVSVṬ 73,19–20 explain *yena kenacid* as *anirdiṣṭaviśeṣeṇa*, i.e., "of unknown/indeterminate specificity."

[111] PVṬ *Je* D38b5–6/P46a1–2 = PVSVṬ 73,20–22: *na caivambhūta ātmā / nityakartṛbhoktṛ[a]tvādilakṣaṇatvenābhyupagamāt / yataś ca yathābhyupagatasyātmano nāsti kāryaliṅgam / tathā ca sati* [...] */*. [[a]] The PVṬ analyzes *nityakartṛbhoktṛ*° as a *dvandva* compound.] "And the self is not so [i.e., it is not just some kind of indeterminate cause], because [the Ātmavādin] considers that [it] is characterized [by the prop-

[Therefore,] why is the [Buddhist,] who discards the [self] by means of the [non-perception defined as the silence of both perception and inference,][112] rejected [by the Ātmavādin] on the grounds that [mere] non-perception does not prove [the non-existence of the self]? How could [then non-perception, if it] does not prove [that the self does not exist], prove [that the logical reason] is absent [from the dissimilar instances][113]?[114]

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erties of] being permanent, being an agent and being an experiencer, etc.; and since there is no [inferential] mark of the self considered in this way, [Dharmakīrti says 'thus,' i.e.,] since it is so."

112 See PVSVṬ 73,22–23: *tasmāt tam ātmānaṃ tenānupalambhena pratyakṣānumānanivṛttilakṣaṇena pratyācakṣāṇaḥ /*. "Therefore [the Buddhist,] who discards the self by means of that [type of] non-perception defined as the silence of both perception and inference." Note also PVṬ *Je* D38b6/P46b2–3: *saṅs rgyas pa la sogs pas bdag med de mi dmigs pa'i phyir ro źes mi dmigs pa des bdag de sel ba* […]*/*. "The Buddhist, etc., who discards the self by means of non-perception [by saying]: 'The self does not exist, because one does not perceive it.'"

113 PVṬ *Je* D38b6–7/P46a3–4 = PVSVṬ 73,24–25: *katham asādhanaṃ sad vipakṣād dhetoḥ prāṇādimattvāder vyatirekaṃ sādhayet /*. "How could [non-perception, if it] does not prove [that the self does not exist,] establish that the logical reason [i.e.,] possessing breath, etc., is absent from the dissimilar instances?"

114 PVSV 16,8–19 (together with PV 1.22): *kiṃ ca / ātmamṛccetanādīnāṃ yo 'bhāvasyāprasādhakaḥ / sa evānupalambhaḥ kiṃ hetvabhāvasya sādhakaḥ // anupalambhaṃ cāsya pramāṇayata ātmavādo nirālambaḥ syāt / apratyakṣatvād ātmanas tat[a]kāryāsiddheḥ / indriyāṇāṃ tu vijñānakāryasya kādācitkatvāt sāpekṣyasiddhyā prasiddhir ucyate / kim apy asya kāraṇam astīti / na tv evambhūtam iti / naivaṃ sukhādikāryaṃ prasādhitaṃ kañcid arthaṃ puṣṇāti / yena kenacit kāraṇavattvābhyupagamāt / tathā cānupalambha evātmanaḥ syāt / taṃ tena pratyācakṣāṇaḥ kim iti prativyūḍho 'nupalambhasyāsādhanatvād iti / katham asādhanaṃ vyatirekaṃ sādhayet /*. [a] Note that PVSV$_{Tib}$ P414a7 and PVṬ *Je* D38a6–7/P45b1–2 are without any equivalent of *tat*°.

2.3. THE REFUTATION OF THE SĀṄKHYA'S TELEOLOGICAL ARGUMENT FOR THE EXISTENCE OF THE SELF

2.3.1. The Sāṅkhya's Teleological Argument

In several of his works, Dharmakīrti mentions and criticizes another argument meant to establish the self's existence. According to the SK,[115]

> the Person (*puruṣa*) exists, because composites (*saṅghāta*) are for the benefit of another [entity] (*parārtha*); because of [its] difference from the three qualities (*guṇa*), etc.; because of the [need of a] control [for the three qualities, etc.]; because of the existence of an experiencer (*bhoktṛ*); and because of the activity aimed at [obtaining perfect] isolation (*kaivalya*).[116]

Later Sāṅkhya texts such as the GBh,[117] the MV,[118] the YD[119] or the TK[120] explain the first reason mentioned in SK 17 in the following way:

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[115] As far as our knowledge goes, the SK is the most ancient extant Sāṅkhya text presenting the argument criticised by Buddhist authors. Note, however, that Vasubandhu, who may have been active at the latest during the first half of the fifth century CE, already criticised a similar argument (see below, §2.3.2). Moreover, both the NPSū and the NB (see below, fn. 134, p. 158, and 126, p. 155) obviously target an argument whose example was *śayanāsanādyaṅgavat*, which does not appear in the SK. A likely candidate as the source of this argument is the *Ṣaṣṭitantra*.

[116] SK 17: *saṅghātaparārthatvāt triguṇādiviparyayād adhiṣṭhānāt / puruṣo 'sti bhoktṛbhāvāt kaivalyārthaṃ pravṛtteś ca //*. The last argument apparently alludes to the Sāṅkhya principle according to which the activity of primordial nature is for the benefit of the Person in the sense that it has as its sole purpose the liberation (*vimokṣa*) of the Person. See, e.g., SK 56–57: *ity eṣa prakṛtikṛto mahadādiviśeṣabhūtaparyantaḥ / pratipuruṣavimokṣārthaṃ svārtha iva parārtha ārambhaḥ // vatsavivṛddhinimittaṃ kṣīrasya yathā pravṛttir ajñasya / puruṣavimokṣanimittaṃ tathā pravṛttiḥ pradhānasya //*. "This [phenomenal world], from the [evolute called] the Great to the particular [great] elements, is produced by primordial matter for the benefit which is the liberation of each Person; this activity is for the benefit of another [i.e., the Person, although it] seems to be for [nature's] own benefit. Just as milk, which is unconscious, acts so as to (*nimitta*) make the calf grow, in the same way, primordial nature acts so as to free the Person."

[117] GBh 20,9–15: *asti puruṣaḥ / kasmāt / saṅghātaparārthatvāt / yo 'yaṃ mahadādisaṅghātaḥ sa puruṣārtha ity anumīyate 'cetanatvāt paryaṅkavat / yathā paryaṅkaḥ pratyekagātrotpalaka[a]pādapīṭhatūlīpracchādanapaṭopadhānasaṅghātaḥ parārtho na hi svārthaḥ / paryaṅkasya na hi kiñcid api gātrotpalādyavayavānāṃ parasparaṃ*

kṛtyam asti / ato 'vagamyate 'sti puruṣo yaḥ paryaṅke śete yasyārthaṃ paryaṅkaḥ / tat parārtham idaṃ śarīraṃ pañcānāṃ mahābhūtānāṃ saṅghāto vartate / asti puruṣo yasyedaṃ bhogyaṃ śarīraṃ bhogyamahadādisaṅghātarūpaṃ samutpannam iti /. [[a] *pratyekagātrotpalaka*° conj.: *pratyekaṃ gātrotpalaka*° Ed.] "The Person exists. Why? 'Because composites are for the benefit of another [entity].' [We] infer that this composite consisting of [the evolutes of primordial matter called] the Great [i.e., the intellect], etc., is for the benefit of the Person, because it is unconscious, like a bed. For instance, a bed, which is a composite [made of various] elements [considered] one by one: *utpalaka* [?], feet, a support, a covering blanket [made of] cotton and a pillow, is for the benefit of another [entity]; for it is not for its own benefit, since the parts of the bed [i.e.,] the elements *utpala* [?], etc., that are [its] parts, do not produce anything for each other. From this [we] understand [that] there is a person who lies on the bed, for the benefit of whom the bed is. Therefore this body, which is a composite of the five great elements (*mahābhūta*), exists for the benefit of some other [entity; that is,] there is [indeed] a Person for whom this body is produced, [as this body is] an object of experience (*bhogya*) [and] consists of a composite of [the evolutes called] the Great, etc., that are [in turn] objects of experience."

118 MV 22,6–15: *asti puruṣaḥ / saṅghātaparārthatvāt / yataḥ saṅghātaś ca parārthaḥ / tasmād dhetoḥ / iha loke ye saṅghātās te parārthā dṛṣṭāḥ paryaṅkarathaśaraṇādayaḥ / evaṃ gātrāṇāṃ mahadādīnāṃ saṅghātaḥ samudāyaḥ parārtha eva / paryaṅkarathādayaḥ kāṣṭhasaṅghātāḥ / gṛhādayaḥ kāṣṭheṣṭakādisaṅghātāḥ / na hi te rathagṛhaparyaṅkādayaḥ kim api svārthaṃ sādhayanti / na vā parasparārthāḥ / kiṃ tv asty asau devadattādir yo 'smin paryaṅke śete rathena gacchati gṛhe nivasatīti / evam amī mahadādayaś cakṣurādayo na svārthā na ca parasparārthāḥ / kiṃ tu parārthāḥ / yaś cāsau paraḥ sa cātmā / tasmād anumīmahe 'sti puruṣo yasyārthe cakṣurādisaṅghātaḥ śarīram utpannam iti /*. "The Person exists, for the reason [stated in the stanza:] 'Because a composite is for the benefit of another [entity].' In this world, [we] observe that [things] that are composites, such as a bed, a chariot, a house, etc., are for the benefit of another [entity]. In the same way, the composite [i.e.,] the combination of the parts [consisting of the evolutes called] the Great, etc., is indeed for the benefit of another [entity]. Beds, chariots, etc., are composites [made] of wood; houses, etc., are composites [made] of wood, bricks, etc. For these – chariots, houses, beds, etc. – do not produce anything for their own benefit, nor do they [produce anything] for each other. Rather, there is an [individual], e.g., Devadatta, who lies in the bed, drives the chariot [and] inhabits the house. In the same way, the eyes, etc., which [consist of the evolutes called] the Great, etc., are not for their own benefit, nor are they for the benefit of each other; rather, they are for the benefit of another [entity]. And this other [entity] is the self. Therefore we infer that there is a Person for whose benefit the composite [consisting of] the eyes, etc., [i.e.,] the body, is produced."

119 YD 168,5–7: *iha saṅghātāḥ parārthā dṛṣṭās tadyathā śayanāsanarathaśaraṇādayaḥ / asti cāyaṃ śarīralakṣaṇaḥ saṅghātaḥ / tasmād anenāpi parārthena bhavita-*

the body or the bodily organs (often simply referred to as *cakṣurādi*, "the eyes, etc.") are for the benefit of another [entity] because they are composed (*saṃhata*) or are composites. To justify the necessity for composites of being for the benefit of another entity, they give examples of composites such as beds and seats, the existence of which is not an end in itself since it is not for their own benefit (*svārtha*), and which do not exist for the benefit of each other (*parasparārtha*) but for that of the individuals who use them. Beds and seats are therefore for the benefit of another entity; accordingly, the eyes, etc., which are composites, must be for the benefit of another entity, and this other entity must be the self (which is *asaṃhata*, "uncomposed"). As noted by Watson, although some modern scholars have understood the Sāṅkhya inference as an argument "from design," it does not endeavour to prove the existence of the self as the designing author of the composites that exist for its sake.[121] It is therefore a teleological argument in the sense that it claims to establish the existence of an uncomposed entity from the mere fact that composites always exist for the sake of an entity distinct from them. The idea is mentioned and criticized in Buddhist texts such as (at least) one of Vasubandhu's lost works,[122] Dignāga's PSV, the NPSū, works by Dharmakīrti and his commentators or the TS(P); but it

vyam / yo 'sau paraḥ sa puruṣaḥ / tasmād asti puruṣaḥ /. "In this [world, we] observe that composites are for the benefit of another [entity], as a bed, a seat, a chariot, a house, etc. Now, this composite defined as the body exists; therefore it too must be for the benefit of another [entity]. This other [entity] is the Person – therefore the Person exists."

120 TK 120,11–14: *puruṣo 'sty avyaktāder vyatiriktaḥ / kutaḥ / saṅghātaparārthatvāt / avyaktamahadahaṅkāraprabhṛtayaḥ parārthāḥ / saṅghātatvāt / śayanāsanādyaṅgavat / sukhaduḥkhamohātmatayāvyaktādayaḥ sarve saṅghātāḥ /*. "There is a Person [that is] distinct from the unmanifest, etc. – Why ? – 'Because composites are for the benefit of some other [entity]': the unmanifest, the Great, the sense of ego (*ahaṅkāra*), etc., are for the benefit of another [entity], because they are composites, like utensils such as a bed, a seat, etc. All [things] such as the unmanifest are composites, because they consist of pleasure, pain and delusion [i.e., the three qualities *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*]."

121 See Watson 2006: 195–196.

122 See below, §2.3.2 and fn. 139, p. 159.

also appears in a variety of texts that belong neither to the Sāṅkhya nor to the Buddhist tradition.[123]

2.3.2. The Refutation of the Argument as Proving the Contrary of the Intended Thesis

The Sāṅkhya argument is mentioned in PV 4, PVin 3 and NB 3 while Dharmakīrti endeavours to defend Dignāga's assertion that a thesis in an inference for others (*parārthānumāna*) must be that which is intended (*iṣṭa*) by its proponent.[124] There the Sāṅkhya proof of the self is adduced as a mere example of an ambiguously formulated argument[125] where the actually intended thesis must be understood from the context of the discussion (*prakaraṇa*), since the SK for instance only states that the eyes, etc., must be for the benefit of some other entity without specifying that this other entity is the self.[126] But while doing so,

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[123] See, e.g., NV 326,7–11 (quoted below, fn. 148, p. 162) and ŚV *anumānapariccheda* 105–106 (quoted below, fn. 149, p. 163). The argument also appears in non-Brahmanical contexts, e.g., in the Śaivasiddhānta, and it is exploited along with its Buddhist refutation by Rāmakaṇṭha: see Watson 2006: 192–202. Note that it is also mentioned by the Śaiva nondualist Utpaladeva, albeit in the context of his dualistically oriented *Īśvarasiddhi*: see Taber 1986: 110 and Ratié forthc.: fn. 28.

[124] PS 3.2ab. For a detailed analysis of this discussion, see Tillemans 2000: 50–67 and Iwata 2007a and 2007b.

[125] On the examples of such arguments mentioned by Dharmakīrti, see Iwata 2007a and 2007b.

[126] PV 4.29cd: *anukto 'pīcchayā vyāptaḥ sādhya ātmārthavan mataḥ* //. "Even though not [explicitly] stated, what is pervaded by the [proponent's] intention is held to be the *sādhya*, as in [the Sāṅkhya's argument that the eyes, etc., are] for the benefit of the self (*ātman*)." Translation Tillemans 2000: 48. Cf. PVV 425,2–3: *tato 'nuktam apy ātmārthatvaṃ saṅghātatvāc cakṣurādeḥ sāṅkhyasya sādhyam* /. "Therefore, although [it] is not [explicitly] stated, what is to be proved (*sādhya*) for the Sāṅkhya is that the eyes, etc., are for the benefit of the self, because they are composites." Cf. also PVV 425,6–8: *ātmārthavat / yathātmāsti na veti vivāde tatsādhanārthaṃ sāṅkhyena parārthāś cakṣurādayaḥ saṅghātatvāc chayanāsanādyaṅgavad ity uktasya sādhanasyātmārthatvam anuktam api sādhyam icchāviṣayatvāt* //. "[This is what Dharmakīrti means by stating] 'As in [the Sāṅkhya's argument that the eyes, etc., are] for the benefit of the self': for instance, in the dispute [concerning the question] whether there is a self or not, in the argument formulated in the Sāṅkhya in order to demonstrate the [point in dispute, i.e.:] 'The eyes, etc., are for the benefit of another [entity], because they are composites, just as utensils such as a bed, a seat,

Dharmakīrti explains how the actually intended thesis of the Sāṅkhya is illegitimate: there is no co-presence (*anvaya*) of the property to be proved (i.e., being for the benefit of the self,) and the logical reason (i.e., being a composite,) in the examples presented (i.e., the bed, etc.), as such composites are seen to be for the benefit of another composite, and not for that of an uncomposed entity such as the so-called Person of the Sāṅkhya. (According to Dharmottara, this is precisely the reason why the Sāṅkhyas ambiguously state that the eyes, etc., are for the benefit of another entity instead of clearly saying that they are for the benefit of the self.[127]) As a consequence, the logical reason refutes the Sāṅkhya's very intention (*iṣṭaghātakṛt*, *iṣṭavighātakṛt*).

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etc.,' what is to be proved, although [it is] not [explicitly] stated, is the fact that [they] are for the benefit of the self, because it is the object of [the Sāṅkhya proponent's] intention." PVin 3 12,1–3: *katham idānīm aśrūyamāṇaḥ sādhyatveneṣṭa iti gamyate / prakaraṇāt / yathā saṃhatānāṃ pārārthye sādhya ātmārthatvam / tad anuktam apīcchayā vyāptaṃ sādhyam iti darśanārtham iṣṭagrahaṇam /*. "[Objection:] Now, how do [we] know that [a property] is intended as that which is to be proved [although we] do not hear [it since it is not explicitly stated by its proponent]? [Answer:] From the context of the discussion. For instance, [the property of] being for the benefit of the self when one wishes to prove that composites are for the benefit of another [entity]: although what is to be proved is not stated, it is pervaded by the [proponent's] intention; this is what [the word] 'intended' conveys [in the definition of the inference for others]." NB_M 3.45–47/NB_S 3.47–49: *iṣṭa iti yatrārthe vivādena sādhanam upanyastaṃ tasya siddham icchatā so 'nukto 'pi vacanena sādhyaḥ / tadadhikaraṇatvād vivādasya / yathā parārthāś cakṣurādayaḥ saṅghātatvāc chayanāsanādyaṅgavad iti / atrātmārthā ity anuktāv apy ātmārthatā sādhyā / tena noktamātram eva sādhyam ity uktam bhavati /*. "[The following] is what is expressed [by the word] 'intended' [in the definition of the inference for others]. Although the point with respect to which [someone] presents a demonstration while intending to establish this [demonstration] because of a dispute may not be explicitly stated, it is that which is to be proved, because this [point] is the basis of the dispute. For example, in: 'The eyes, etc., are for the benefit of another [entity], because they are composites, just as utensils such as a bed, a seat, etc.,' although it is not stated that [the eyes, etc.,] are for the benefit of the self, what is to be proved is [precisely that they] are for the benefit of the self. Therefore what is to be proved is not merely what is [explicitly] stated." See Iwata 2007b: 276–279.

127 See $NBṬ_M$ 181,3–5/$NBṬ_S$ 58,5–6: *śayanāsanādiṣu hi puruṣopabhogāṅgeṣv ātmārthatvenānvayo na prasiddhaḥ / saṅghātatvasya pārārthyamātreṇa tu siddhaḥ / tataḥ parārthā ity uktam /*. "For the co-presence [of the logical reason 'being composed' and of the property to be proved] 'being for the benefit of the self' is not well established in utensils [instrumental in] a person's enjoyment, such as beds and seats; whereas [the co-presence] of [the reason] 'being composed' with [the prop-

The Sāṅkhya's proof of the self had already been used by Dignāga (PSV ad PS 3.22d) as an illustration of an argument that disproves the property (meant) to be proved.[128] Thus Dignāga explains:

> For example, that particulars [such as the sense organs] are composites proves both that [these] are for the benefit of another [entity] and that [this] other [entity] is a composite.[129]

In his introductory prose to PS 3.27, he goes on asking:

> But how should the [kind of] contradictory [logical reason called] *iṣṭavighātakṛt* be explained?[130]

After explaining that this is a logical reason for the reverse (*viparyāsahetu*) of the property (meant) to be proved, he adds later in his commentary:

> But if it is so, this [logical reason] is contradictory because it proves the contrary of the *pārārthya* [as it is] specified [by the Sāṅkhya opponent, i.e., being for the benefit of the self].[131]

Dignāga further explains:

> For [the Sāṅkhya opponent] admits that composite [entities such as the sense organs] are for the benefit of another [entity that is] not a composite [viz. the self/Person] [...] Now, the fact that this [other entity] is not a composite is established neither through perception nor through inference, because its [very] existence is not established.[132]

And he concludes:

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erty] 'being for the benefit of another [entity]' is established – therefore [the Sāṅkhyas only] say that [the eyes, etc.,] are 'for the benefit of another [entity].'"

128 PSV ad PS 3.22d$_2$ (PSV$_K$ P131b7, PSV$_V$ P49a7): **sādhyabādhakasādhanam*.

129 PSV ad PS 3.22d$_2$ (PSV$_K$ P131b7, PSV$_V$ P49a7): **tad yathā bhedānāṃ saṅghātatvaṃ pārārthyaṃ ca sādhayati / saṅghātatvaṃ ca parasyāpi /*.

130 PSV ad PS 3.27 (PSV$_K$ P133b1, PSV$_V$ P50b3): **yat tarhi ya iṣṭavighātakṛd viruddhaḥ sa kathaṃ vaktavyaḥ*.

131 PSV ad PS 3.27 (PSV$_K$ P133b4, PSV$_V$ P50b6): **evaṃ tarhi viśiṣṭapārārthyaviparyayasādhanād viruddha eṣaḥ*.

132 PSV ad PS 3.27 (PSV$_K$ P133b4, PSV$_V$ P50b6): **tathā hi saṅghātānām asaṅghātapārārthyam iṣṭam* [...] *na ca tasyāsaṅghātatvaṃ pratyakṣeṇānumānena vā siddhaṃ tatsattvāsiddheḥ*.

> [It is] undoubtedly a reason for the reverse [of the property meant to be proved].[133]

In other words, the Sāṅkhya argument entails a contradictory reason (*viruddhahetu*) insofar as it shows that the eyes, etc., must be for the benefit of another composite[134] rather than for the supposedly uncomposed self assumed by the Ātmavādin.

Now, we can be fairly certain that Dignāga's critique relied on earlier arguments put forward by Vasubandhu against the Sāṅkhya proof. In both PV 4 and PVin 3, Dharmakīrti himself specifies that this criticism had already been put forward by others before him while giving the following quotation:

> If the *ātman* is [what is meant by] "another" (*para*), [then] this [*ātman*] is not established [in the example].[135]

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[133] PSV ad PS 3.27 (PSV_K P133b4, PSV_V P50b6): **asaṃśayaṃ viparyāsahetuḥ*.

[134] See, e.g., NPSū 13: *dharmaviśeṣaviparītasādhano yathā parārthāś cakṣurādayaḥ saṅghātatvāc chayanāsanādyaṅgavad iti / ayaṃ hetur yathā pārārthyaṃ cakṣurādīnāṃ sādhayati tathā saṃhatatvam api parasya sādhyadharmaviśeṣaviparītaṃ sādhayati / ubhayatrāvyabhicārāt /*. "[There is a kind of fallacious logical reason] that proves the contrary of the particular property [meant to be proved], for instance in: 'The eyes, etc., are for the benefit of another [entity] because they are composites, just as utensils such as a bed or a seat.' This reason [i.e., 'because they are composites'], while proving that the eyes, etc., are for the benefit of another [entity], proves that this other [entity] is composed, which is the reverse of the particular property that is to be proved, because these two[, being for the benefit of another entity and being a composite,] do not deviate from one another." Cf. NPṬ 40,12–14: *tathā caivam api vaktuṃ śakyata eva – saṃhataparārthāś cakṣurādayaḥ saṅghātatvāc chayanāsanādyaṅgavad iti / śayanāsanādyaṅgāni hi saṃhatasya karacaraṇorugrīvādimata evārthaṃ kurvanti nānyasya / tathopalabdher iti /*. "And thus [this] can be said just as well: 'The eyes, etc., are for the benefit of another composite [entity], because they are composites, just as utensils such as a bed or a seat.' For utensils such as a bed or a seat are for the benefit of [something] composed that possesses hands, feet, thighs, a neck, etc., and for nothing else, because [we] oberve that such is the case."

[135] PV 4.32c: *ātmā paraś cet so 'siddhaḥ.* Translation Tillemans 2000: 55. PVin 3 13,4–5: *yad āha – ātmā paraś cet so 'siddha iti / tasyaiva ceṣṭasya vighātakṛdviruddhaḥ /*. "This has been said: 'If the self is [what is meant by] 'another,' [then] this [self] is not established [in the example].' And the [logical reason] of this intended [thesis] is contradictory [as it] refutes precisely the [intended thesis]."

Dharmottara and Manorathanandin identify the author of the quotation as Vasubandhu.[136] According to Tillemans, the passage might be borrowed from Vasubandhu's *Vādavidhi* or *Vādavidhāna*.[137] But the lost *Paramārthasaptatikā*, which is written in verse and in which Vasubandhu criticised the Sāṅkhya teacher Vindhyavāsin,[138] seems to be a much more likely candidate as a source of Dignāga's and Dharmakīrti's polemics. According to Watanabe's reconstruction, Vasubandhu's verse was as follows:

> If the self is [what is meant by] "another," [then] this [self] is not established [in the example]; if [it means another] composite[, then something like a sense organ] is for the benefit of that [i.e., another composite; and if] internal (*āntara*) composites [such as the mind and mental factors were adduced as the logical reason,] then, as [in the case where the self is what is meant by "another"], they could not be for the benefit of another [entity understood as an entity distinct from composites].[139]

Leaving *pāda*s b to d provisionally out of consideration,[140] let us briefly focus on the meaning of the beginning of the verse according to Dharmakīrti. PV 4.32 states:

> This [viz. being for the benefit of the *ātman*] also has the fault that there is no co-presence (*anvaya*) [of the property to be proved (*sādhyadharma*) and the reason] in the example. As [Vasubandhu] has explained: "If the *ātman* is

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[136] PVinṬ *Dze* D17a3/P20a2–3 (see Tillemans 2000: 55, fn. 194): *slob dpon dbyig gñen gyis ci skad du gźan gyi don źes bya ba 'dir gal te pha rol po bdag gźan gyi sgras brjod par 'dod na bdag de ni ma grub pa'o źes bśad pa yin no //.* "The master Vasubandhu has said that if, in the [statement] 'for the benefit of another,' the [Sāṅkhya] opponent means the self with the word 'another,' [then] this self is not established [in the example]." PVV 426,10–11: *yathoditam ācāryavasubandhunā / parārthāś cakṣurādaya ity atra paraś ced ātmā vivakṣitaḥ so 'siddho dṛṣṭānta iti /.* "As the master Vasubandhu has said: 'In [the argument:] 'The eyes, etc., are for the benefit of another [entity],' if the self is what is meant by 'another,' [then] this [self] is not established in the example."

[137] Tillemans 2000: 55 (as noted ibid., fn. 194, the fragment is not found in Frauwallner 1933 and 1957).

[138] See, e.g., Frauwallner 1959: 809, Mejor 1999: 107–110 and Mejor 2008: 120, fn. 2.

[139] Watanabe 2008: 64: *ātmā paraś cet so 'siddhaḥ saṅghātaś cet tadarthakaḥ / saṅghātā āntarā evaṃ tathā na syuḥ parārthakāḥ //.*

[140] See below, §2.3.3.

> [what is meant by] 'another' (*para*), then this [*ātman*] is not established [in the example]." In that case [the reason] would refute what is intended (*iṣṭaghātakṛt*).[141]

Thus in NB 3, Dharmakīrti illustrates the *iṣṭavighātakṛt* type of contradictory reason in the following way:

> [An] example [of contradictory reason that refutes what is intended is:] 'The eyes, etc., are for the benefit of another [entity], because they are composites, as utensils such as a bed or a seat. [The logical reason] is contradictory, because it proves the contrary of what is intended by the [Sāṅkhya proponent, namely] being for the benefit of another [entity] that is not composed.[142]

Neither Dignāga nor Dharmakīrti explains why the logical reason adduced by the Sāṅkhya proves the contrary of what he intends to prove, viz. the fact that being a composite entity implies being for the benefit of another *composite* entity. In this connection, Dharmottara provides the following explanation. According to him, the reason why they are necessarily for the benefit of another composite is that they must be regarded as causal factors in the production of that for whose benefit they are; but what is produced is necessarily composed (*saṃhata*):

> The Sāṅkhya [proponent] who claims that the self exists, when urged by the Buddhist to answer the question: "Why is that?" states this argument (*pramāṇa*) in order to establish the self. From this [context we know that] what is to be proved [in his argument] is the fact that the eyes, etc., provide a help (*upakārakatva*) to the self which is uncomposed. But this [logical] reason is pervaded with the contrary [of what the argument is aimed at establishing], because that [entity] x that provides a help to [another entity] y is the producer of y; and that which is being produced, whether simultaneously or gradually, is composed. Therefore what [the argument] establishes is [only] that the eyes, etc., which are for the benefit of another [entity], are for the

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141 PV 4.32: *ananvayo 'pi dṛṣṭānte doṣas tasya yathoditam / ātmā paraś cet so 'siddha iti tatreṣṭaghātakṛt //*. Translation Tillemans 2000: 55.

142 NB_M 3.87–88/NB_S 3.90–91: *yathā parārthāś cakṣurādayaḥ saṅghātatvāc chayanāsanādyaṅgavad iti / tadiṣṭāsaṃhatapārārthyaviparyayasādhanād viruddhaḥ /.*

benefit of another *composed* [entity, but not that they are for the benefit of an uncomposed self].[143]

Dharmottara thus points out the very basis of the Buddhist criticism of the teleological argument: from the Buddhist perspective, existing for the sake of something else can only mean having a causal role in the production of that thing, and being causally produced can only mean being composed. The Sāṅkhya leaves itself open to the Buddhist assault all the more since the teleological argument is stated in such a way that the Person (*puruṣa*), understood as a pure, uncomposed and inactive consciousness, ends up being equated with empirical individuals (*puruṣa*) that the Sāṅkhya itself regards as composed entities.[144]

This criticism is in turn found in the works of Sāṅkhya authors[145] who endeavour to defend the argument formulated in SK 17 by show-

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[143] NBṬ$_M$ 212,12–15/NBṬ$_S$ 74,4–8: *ātmāstīti bruvāṇaḥ sāṅkhyaḥ kuta etad iti paryanuyukto bauddhenedam ātmanaḥ siddhaye pramāṇam āha / tasmād asaṃhatasyātmana upakārakatvaṃ sādhyaṃ cakṣurādīnām / ayaṃ tu hetur viparyayavyāptaḥ / yasmād yo yasyopakārakaḥ sa tasya janakaḥ / janyamānaś ca yugapat krameṇa vā bhavati saṃhataḥ / tasmāt parārthāś cakṣurādayaḥ saṃhataparārthā iti siddham /.*

[144] See, e.g., GBh 20,9–15 (quoted above, fn. 117, p. 152), where this ambiguity is obvious, as Gauḍapāda mentions that the bed is for the benefit of the person (*puruṣa*) who lies on it, or MV 22,6–15 (quoted above, fn. 118, p. 153) where Māṭhara specifies that a bed, a chariot or a house are for the individual, "e.g., Devadatta, who lies in a bed, drives a chariot [and] inhabits a house." Compare with, e.g., YD 168,15–16 (quoted below, fn. 146, p. 162), where perceptible individuals such as Devadatta are presented as composed entities in contrast with the imperceptible Person. See also Iwata 2007b: 280 on this Sāṅkhya "trick."

[145] See, e.g., YD 168,8–11 (following the explanation of the teleological argument, see above, fn. 119, p. 153): *āha – na saṅghātārthatvopalabdheḥ / śayanādayo hi saty api parārthatve saṅghātārthāḥ / yadi ca tair atideśaḥ kāryakaraṇasaṅghātasya kriyate prāptam asya tadvat saṅghātārthatvam / evaṃ puruṣaviparītārthasiddhiprasaṅgaḥ / athaitad aniṣṭaṃ na tarhi cakṣurādayaḥ parārthāḥ /.* "[The Buddhist] replies: [This is] not [the case], because [we] observe that [composites] are for the benefit of [other] composites, since even if a bed, etc., are for the benefit of another [entity], they are for the benefit of [another] composite. And if through them [we] make an analogical reasoning (*atideśa*, lit. "transposition") concerning a composite consisting in the body and the sense organs (*kāryakaraṇa*), it follows that this [composite] is likewise for the benefit of a composite. Thus [this reasoning] leads to the establishment of an entity that is contrary to the Person; but this is not what [you] intend [to do], so [you must rather admit that] the eyes, etc., are not for the benefit of another [entity]." Cf. TK 120,14–16 (following the explanation of the teleological

ing, e.g., that the Person must be uncomposed because it is imperceptible[146] or that the Buddhist position leads to an infinite regress. [147]It is also mentioned by Brahmanical authors such as Uddyotakara[148] and

argument, see above, fn. 120, p. 154): *syād etat / śayanāsanādayaḥ saṅghātāḥ saṃhataśarīrādyarthā dṛṣṭā na tv ātmānaṃ prati parārthāḥ / tasmāt saṅghātāntaram eva paraṃ gamayeyur na tv asaṃhatam ātmānam iti /.* "Suppose the following be urged: [We] observe that a bed, a seat, etc., which are composites, are for the benefit of the body, etc., which [in turn] are composites; but they are not for the benefit of another [entity if this is meant] with respect to the self. Therefore [these examples] may lead us to understand [the existence] of another [entity] that is nothing but another composite, but not an uncomposed self."

146 In the YD, the reply to the Buddhist objection, too long to be quoted here in full, mainly consists in showing that the Person must be uncomposed because it is not directly perceived, "for if it were composed, like [an empirical individual such as] Devadatta, this Person would be directly perceived" (YD 168,15–16: *sati hi saṅghātatve devadattādivad ayaṃ puruṣaḥ pratyakṣata evopalabhyeta* /).

147 Vācaspatimiśra answers the Buddhist objection by interpreting the words that follow the argument in SK 17 as a complement of this argument (on the disagreement between the SK commentators in this respect see, e.g., Watson 2006: 192, fn. 211), and by resorting to a reasoning based on infinite regress probably borrowed from Uddyotakara's NV (quoted below, fn. 148; note that Vācaspatimiśra refers to his own NVTṬ in the same passage, TK 120,23). See TK 120,16–19: *ata āha – triguṇādiviparyayāt / ayam abhiprāyaḥ / saṅghātāntarārthatve hi tasyāpi saṃhatatvāt tenāpi saṅghātāntarārthatvena bhavitavyam evaṃ tena tenety anavasthā syāt /.* "[It is] due to this [objection that the SK's author] says: 'Because of [its] difference from the three qualities.' Here is the [author's] intention: for if [composites] were for the benefit of another composite, since this [second composite] would in turn be a composite, there should be a [third composite] being for the benefit of another composite, [and] in the same way there should be a [fourth, and] a [fifth]: there would be an infinite regress." In TK 120,28–29, Vācaspatimiśra concludes (after stating that the three qualities are composed): *tasmād ācāryeṇa triguṇādiviparyayād iti vadatāsaṃhataḥ paro vivakṣitaḥ / sa cātmeti siddham /.* "Therefore the master, by stating 'because of [its] difference from the three qualities,' means that the 'other' is not composed; and this [other, uncomposed entity is] the self – this is [now] established." The TK (and the YD?) thus seem to play on a second possible meaning of the first words of SK 17, *saṅghātaparārthatvāt*, which can be taken to mean "because composites are for the benefit of another [entity]," but also, if interpreted as a (Buddhist) *pūrvapakṣa*, "because [composites] are for the benefit of another composite."

148 The Buddhist objection is stated in NV 326,7–8: *parārthāś cakṣurādayaḥ saṅghātatvāc chayanāsanādivad iti / saṅghātāḥ saṅghātāntarārthā iti cet /.* "[The Sāṅkhya argues as follows:] 'The eyes, etc., are for the benefit of another [entity], because

Kumārila[149] (who present it as the standard Buddhist refutation of the reasoning put forward in SK 17), and Uddyotakara in particular sets out to defend the Sāṅkhya argument, notably by accusing the Buddhist of inconsistency (since he asserts that composites must be for the benefit of other composites while denying reality to composites)[150] and by arguing that an uncomposed entity must be assumed in order to avoid infinite regress.[151]

[they] are composites, just as a bed, a seat, etc.' [Here, the Buddhist objects:] 'Composites are for the benefit of another composite.'"

149 After presenting the argument in ŚV *anumānapariccheda* 105ab, Kumārila explains (ibid., 105cd–106): *śayane saṅghapārārthyaṃ bhautikavyāptahetuke // ātmānaṃ prati pārārthyam asiddham iti bādhanam / asaṃhataparārthatve dṛṣṭe saṃhatatāpi ca //*. "In [the example, i.e.,] a bed, where the reason ['being a composite'] is pervaded with [the property of being] a material entity, [we find a property of] being for the benefit of another [entity] that is [itself] a composite; [therefore the property of] being for the benefit of another [entity] is not established [if this is meant] with respect to the self – this is the refutation. And whereas [the Sāṅkhya] sees the [property of] being for the benefit of another [entity as the property of being for the benefit of] an uncomposed [entity, this other entity must] be composed." Cf. NR 270,27–28: *saṃhatarūpavastvantarapārārthyasādhanāt prakṛtyatiriktātmapārārthyam abhimataṃ na sidhyet / ato na siṣādhayiṣitātmasiddhir iti /*. "Because it establishes [the property of] being for the benefit of another [entity, viz.] another entity the nature of which is composed, the intended [property to be proved, viz.] being for the benefit of another [entity understood as] a self distinct from primordial matter, cannot be established; therefore there is no demonstration of the self as [the Sāṅkhya] wishes to establish [it]."

150 See NV 326,8–11: *atha manyase satyaṃ saṅghātāḥ parārthā bhavanti te tu saṅghātāntarārthāḥ / yathā śayanādaya iti / na / saṅghātasyābhyupagame virodhāt / na hi rūpādiskandhavyatiriktaṃ saṅghātaṃ bhavantaḥ pratipadyante / na cāsati saṅghātāntare saṅghātānāṃ saṅghātāntarārthatā sidhyati / atha pratipadyate vyāhataṃ bhavati /*. "But if you consider that it is true that composites are for the benefit of another [entity], but that they are for the benefit of another composite [and not for that of the uncomposed entity that the self is supposed to be], just as a bed, etc., [are for the benefit of another composite, your position is] not [sound], because it is contradictory [for you] to admit [the very existence of] a composite. For you [Buddhists] do not admit any composite over and above constituents such as corporeality; and if there is no other [entity apart from the constituents that would be] a composite, [you can]not establish that composites are for the benefit of other composites! But if [you] admit [the existence of such a composite over and above the constituents], there is a contradiction."

151 See NV 327,2–5: *yac cāpi bhavān saṅghātāntaraṃ pratipadyate / tatrāpy anivṛttaṃ saṅghātatvam iti tenāpi saṅghātāntarārthena bhavitavyam iti / evaṃ cānavasthā /*

2.3.3. The Refutation of the Argument as Being Useless

In PVin 3 and PV 4, Dharmakīrti, after explaining how the Sāṅkhya's intended thesis is refuted, also expounds what absurd consequences follow if one takes a thesis independently of its proponent's actual intention: either the demonstration establishes something that its author does not intend to establish, or it is useless because it establishes something that is already admitted.[152] As an illustration of the latter case[153] he mentions again the assertion that the eyes, etc., are for the benefit of some other entity: if we merely take into account what the argument explicitly states, it is useless because it only establishes that the eyes, etc., have a causal efficacy with respect to some other entity that is not particularized by the property of being uncomposed, which

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na caināṃ śaktaḥ kaścit pratipādayitum iti yad eṣā nivartate tad asaṃhatam / athāsaṃhataṃ naivāsti / asaṃhatānabhyupagame saṅghātānupapatter vyāghātaḥ / na hi kadācid asaṃhatapratiṣedhe saṅghātaḥ sidhyatīti /. "Besides, in that which you regard [as] another composite [for the benefit of which the eyes, etc., are], the [property of] being a composite does not disappear; therefore this too must be for the benefit of another composite, and thus there is an infinite regress. And since nobody can justify this [infinite regress], that which puts an end to this [infinite regress] is [necessarily] uncomposed. [Objection:] But there is no uncomposed [entity. Answer:] Refusing to acknowledge [the existence of] an uncomposed [entity] is contradictory [for you], because of the impossibility of [the very existence of] a composite [according to you]; for no composite is established if one denies [the existence of] an uncomposed entity." For a critical assessment of Uddyotakara's defence of the Sāṅkhya argument, see Oetke 1988: 379–381 and Watson 2006: 201, fn. 239. The argument of infinite regress is exploited in the TK (see above, fn. 147, p. 162).

[152] PV 4.33: *sādhanaṃ yadvivādena nyastaṃ tac cen na sādhyate / kiṃ sādhyam anyathāniṣṭaṃ bhaved vaiphalyam eva vā //*. "Suppose that when a *sādhana* is presented because of a dispute about a certain [proposition], that [proposition] is [nonetheless] not being proved. Then what is being proved? Otherwise [if the proposition in dispute were not the *sādhya*], then either [the *sādhya*] would be something unintended, or [the *sādhana*] would be completely superfluous." Translation Tillemans 2000: 57. See also PVin 3 13,6–8, closely similar to PV 4.33.

[153] On the illustration of the former case (viz. an argument aimed at showing that a word has a meaning before its connection with a conventional meaning, which, when taken regardless of the proponent's intention, ends up showing that a word has a meaning due to external factors), see Iwata 2007a.

the Buddhists too gladly admit (since they acknowledge that the sense organs contribute to the production of cognitions):[154]

> In the same way, [if the Sāṅkhya's *sādhya* merely consists in what is explicitly stated, i.e., being for the benefit of another entity, then] the eyes, etc., although they are established to be for the benefit of another [entity] because they are composites, are not [established to be] for the benefit of the self since the [general property of] being for the benefit of another [entity] is not [further] specified. Since [we Buddhists too] accept that these [eyes, etc.,] have causal efficacy with regard to another [entity, viz. cognition, that is itself] composed, the argument is [simply] useless.[155]

Jinendrabuddhi's explanation of *pāda* b in Vasubandhu's stanzas arrives at the same conclusion:

> If the word "other" indicates a composite [made] of eyes, etc., such as Caitra, [then] the eyes, etc., too are established to be for the benefit of that for which the bed, the seat, etc., are; i.e., [they too are] for the benefit of [another] composite. This establishes that composites are for the benefit of [other composites. But] because the [Buddhist] opponent too acknowledges that the eyes, etc., are for the benefit of the group of the mind and mental factors, what [the argument] proves is [already] established (*siddhasādhya*).[156]

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[154] See PVV 427,1–3: *athaveṣṭasya sādhyatvābhāve parārthāś cakṣurādayaḥ saṃhatatvād ity atrātmārthatvasyāsaṃhatapārārthyasyāsādhyatvāt / jñānahetutvena saṃhatapārārthye[a] bauddhenāpīṣṭe sādhanavaiphalyam eva vā syāt //.* [[a] *saṃhatapārārthye* conj.: *saṃhatapārārthyasya* Ed.] "Alternatively, if what is intended [by the proponent of a thesis] is not what is to be proved, in this [proposition]: 'The eyes, etc., are for the benefit of another [entity] because [they] are composed,' what is to be proved is not that [the eyes, etc.,] are for the benefit of the self [or] that they are for the benefit of some uncomposed [entity]. Therefore the argument can only be useless, since the Buddhist too admits that [they] are for the benefit of a composed [entity] insofar as [they] are causes of a cognition."

[155] PVin 3 13,10–14,2: *tathā parārthāś cakṣurādayaḥ saṅghātatvāt siddhā api pārārthyāviśeṣe nātmārthāḥ / saṃhataparārthakriyopagamād eṣāṃ sādhanavaiphalyam //.*

[156] PST$_{MS\ B}$ 137b1–3 (PST$_{Tib}$ D175b5–176a2/P201a2–6; the passage is also quoted in Watanabe 2008: 65, fn. 12): *atha cakṣurādisaṅghātaś caitrādikaḥ paraśabdenopalakṣito yadarthāḥ śayanāsanādayaś cakṣurādayo 'pi tadarthāḥ sidhyanti / saṅghātārthā ity arthaḥ / anena saṅghātānāṃ tadarthatā siddhā / pareṇāpi cakṣurādīnāṃ cittacaittakalāpārthatvābhyupagamāt siddhasādhyatā /.*

According to Jinendrabuddhi, Vasubandhu's Sāṅkhya opponent now attempts to save his logical reason "being a composite" from being contradictory by specifying it through the additional property of being internal (*āntaratva*).[157] Vasubandhu replies that internal composites such as the mind and mental factors (*cittacaitta*), which belong to the Buddhist explanation of mental machinery, are also for the benefit of composite entities inasmuch as they are for their mutual benefit (*parasparārthaka*). Such is Dignāga's elaboration on Vasubandhu's answer (which he quotes in his commentary on PS 3.27[158]):

> In this regard, [the properties attributed to] the eyes, etc., [namely] "being a composite" together with "being internal," which are presented as the [logical] reason, are refuted because [they] do not possess the [threefold] characteristic of a logical reason. To explain: these two [properties] are not established [to exist together] in the similar instances [i.e., in that which is for the benefit of the self], and because, on the contrary, they are [both] established in the dissimilar instances, i.e., in that which is for the benefit of each other, they are included in the first [kind of] contradictory [reason].[159]

However, note that according to Dharmakīrti, the dilemma regarding the way the term "other" should be interpreted is not exactly that

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[157] See $PSṬ_{MS\ B}$ 137a4–5 ($PSṬ_{Tib}$ D175b2–3/P200b6–7): *bhavatu kevalasya saṅghātatvasya viruddhatvam / yadā tv āntaratvasahitaṃ prayujyate yad āśaṅkyācāryavasubandhunā saṅghātā āntarā evaṃ tathā na syuḥ parārthakā ity uktam / tadā kathaṃ tasya viruddhatvam /.* "Let us admit that [the property of] being a composite is contradictory on its own (*kevala*). However, if [it is] accompanied with [the property of] being internal – which the master Vasubandhu, who has anticipated [this objection], expresses in 'In the same way, the *internal* composites [too, such as the mind and mental factors,] are [for the benefit of another composite]; thus they cannot be for the benefit of another [entity understood as an entity distinct from composites]' –, then how could this [reason] be contradictory?"

[158] See PSV_K P134a6–8, PSV_V P51a6–8.

[159] PSV ad PS 3.27 (Watanabe 2008: 66, fn. 16; see PSV_K P134a6–8, PSV_V P51a6–8): *tatra saṅghātatvam āntaratvasahitaṃ cakṣurādīnāṃ hetutvenopanyastaṃ hetulakṣaṇāyogān niṣiddham / tathā hy ubhayaṃ sapakṣe 'siddhaṃ vipakṣe tu parasparārthake siddhatvād viruddhe pūrvaka evāntarbhūtam /.* Some Sāṅkhya texts allude to this property of being for the benefit of each other and deny that such may be the case in the examples they adduce (see, e.g., GBh 20,9–15, quoted above, fn. 117, p. 152, or MV 22,6–15, quoted above, fn. 118, p. 153). See also TSP_K 117,17–24/$TSP_Ś$ 107,3–7 (quoted below, fn. 163, p. 168), where an argument similar to Vasubandhu's is used to refute the objection of an Ātmavādin.

found in the fragment of Vasubandhu: in the PVin the alternative is not (or at least, not immediately) between the meaning "self" and the meaning "composite," but rather, between the meaning "self," understood as an entity that has the particularity (*viśeṣa*) of being uncomposed, and the meaning "other" in general, devoid of any particularity – in which case one is entitled to consider that composites are included within this general class of entities. In this respect the TS(P)'s analysis of the Sāṅkhya argument is particularly interesting. It enumerates three possible interpretations of the Sāṅkhya argument:[160] (1) the argument demonstrates that the eyes, etc., are for the benefit of another entity that is altered by them insofar as it receives some additional property from them – in which case what is proved is already admitted by the Buddhists, who acknowledge that the eyes, etc., contribute to the production of a cognition;[161] (2), it demonstrates that the

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[160] TSP_K 117,10–11/$TSP_Ś$ 106,23–24: *ādheyātiśayo vā paro 'bhipreto bhavet yadvānādheyātiśayarūpatvād avikāry atha vā sāmānyena pārārthyamātram avicāritaramaṇīyaṃ sādhyata iti trayo vikalpāḥ* /. "[In the Sāṅkhya's argument,] 'the other' [for the benefit of which the eyes, etc., are] may mean either '[something] that can receive some additional property' [from them], or '[something] unchanging because its nature cannot [receive] any additional property,' or again, [what this argument] demonstrates [may be] the mere fact, pleasant [as long as it is left] unexamined, that [the eyes, etc.,] are for the benefit of some other [entity] in general – these are the three options."

[161] TS 307–308: *pārārthyaṃ cakṣurādīnāṃ yat punaḥ pratipadyate / śayyāsanādivat tena saṅghātatvena hetunā // ādheyātiśayārthatvaṃ yady eṣām upapādyate / iṣṭasiddhir yad iṣṭās te 'smābhir jñānopakāriṇaḥ* //. "The [Sāṅkhya] demonstrates that eyes, etc., are for the benefit of another [entity] through the [logical] reason consisting in [their] being composites, as a bed, a seat, etc. If what they [thus] prove is the fact that [eyes, etc.,] are for the benefit of another [entity] that can receive an additional property [from them, they only] establish what [we already] admit, since we admit that the [eyes, etc.,] contribute to [producing] a cognition." Cf. TSP_K 117,11–13/$TSP_Ś$ 106,24–27: *tatra prathamapakṣe siddhasādhyatā / yatas te cakṣurādayo 'smābhir vijñānopakāriṇa iṣṭāḥ / cakṣuḥ pratītya rūpāṇi cotpadyate tac cakṣurvijñānaṃ yāvat kāyaṃ pratītya spraṣṭavyāni cotpadyate kāyavijñānam iti vacanāt* /. "In the first hypothesis among these [three], that which is to be proved is [in fact already] established, since we admit that the eyes, etc., help [produce] a cognition; because it is said [in the Buddhist scriptures]: 'This visual cognition arises in dependence on the eye and visible [objects, etc.,] up to bodily cognition[, which] arises in dependence on the body [i.e., skin,] and tactile [objects].'" This quotation is often found in Buddhist sources (see, e.g., ŚrBhū 66,4–5 and $AKBh_{Pr}$ 31,11–12); see, e.g., SN IV.67–69: *dvayam bhikkhave paṭicca viññāṇaṃ sambhoti* / [...] *cakkhuñca*

eyes, etc., are for the benefit of some unchanging entity – in which case the example is empty of what is to be proved (since beds, etc., are not for the benefit of such an unchanging entity), so that the logical reason ("because they are composites") establishes the contrary of what the Sāṅkhya is trying to prove (since composites are only seen to be for the benefit of other composites);[162] (3), it demonstrates that the eyes, etc., are for the benefit of some unspecified other entity – in which case the demonstration is useless, since the eyes, etc., are already admitted to have a causal role with respect to thought (*citta*).[163] The second

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paṭicca rūpe ca uppajjati cakkhuviññāṇaṃ / [...] *sotañ ca paṭicca saddecuppajjati sotaviññāṇaṃ* / [...] *ghānañca paṭicca gandhe cuppajjati ghānaviññāṇaṃ* / [...] *jivhañca paṭicca rase ca uppajjati jivhāviññāṇam* / [...] *kāyañ ca paṭicca phoṭṭhabbe cuppajjati kāyaviññāṇaṃ* /. "O monks, a [sensory] cognition arises in dependence on two [things] [...] In dependence on the eye and a visible thing there arises an eye-cognition [...] In dependence on the ear and a sound there arises an ear-cognition [...] In dependence on the nose and a smell there arises a nose-cognition [...] In dependence on the tongue and a taste there arises a tongue-cognition [...] In dependence on the body [i.e., the skin,] and a tactile thing there arises a body-cognition."

[162] TS 309: *avikāryupakāritvasādhane sādhyaśūnyatā* / *dṛṣṭāntasya calasyaiva yuktās te 'py upakāriṇaḥ* //. "[But] in case [the argument is meant] to prove that they help some unchanging [entity], the example is devoid of what is to be proved, [since] these [eyes, etc.,] can rightly [be considered to] help only a changing [entity]." Cf. TSP_K 117,13–17/$TSP_Ś$ 106,28–33: *atha dvitīyaḥ pakṣas tadā viruddhatā hetor ity ādarśayann āha avikāryupakāritvetyādi* / *avikāriṇo nityasyopakāritvam avikāryupakāritvam* / *tasya cakṣurādīnāṃ sādhane sati dṛṣṭānte sādhyaviparyayeṇaiva hetor vyāptatvād viruddhatā* / *yatas te śayanādayaś calasyānityasyaivopakāriṇo yuktāḥ* / *avikāriṇy atiśayasyādhātum aśakyatvāt* /. "But if [you adopt] the second hypothesis, then the [logical] reason is contradictory. [Śāntarakṣita] shows this when stating [the verse] beginning with *avikāryupakāritva*°. 'Being of help to something unchanging' [means] being of help to something permanent. If [this argument] demonstrates this with respect to the eyes, etc., since the [logical] reason is pervaded by the contrary of what is to be proved in the example, it is contradictory, because beds, etc., can legitimately [be said to] help only an [entity] that is changing [i.e.,] impermanent, since no additional property can be brought to an unchanging [entity]."

[163] TS 310: *sāmānyena tu pārārthyaṃ yady eṣāṃ samprasādhyate* / *tathāpi sādhanaṃ vyarthaṃ siddhāś cittopayoginaḥ* //. "But if [what] they show [with this argument] is that [the eyes, etc.,] are for the benefit of another [entity] in general, even so, this argument is useless, [since the eyes, etc.,] are [already] established to help [produce] the mind (*citta*) [i.e., a cognition]." Cf. TSP_K 117,17–24/$TSP_Ś$ 107,3–7: *atha sāmānyenādheyātiśayādivikalpam[a] apāsya pārārthyamātraṃ sādhyata iti tṛtīyaḥ pakṣaḥ* / *tadāpi siddhasādhyatā* / *cittopakāritvena cakṣurādīnām iṣṭatvāt* / *atha cit-*

interpretation obviously corresponds to the first option mentioned by Vasubandhu ("If the *ātman* is [what is meant by] 'another' [...]") and formulated by Dharmakīrti with respect to the actually intended thesis of the Sāṅkhya. The first and the third are at first sight quite similar since in both cases it proves something that the Buddhists already admit. They do differ though, insofar as the first apparently corresponds to Vasubandhu's second member of the alternative ("if it means [another] composite [...]") whereas the third TS(P) interpretation corresponds to Dharmakīrti's statement that if one understands the argument according to what it explicitly says, i.e., as meaning that the eyes are for the benefit of some unspecified other entity (and not for the benefit of an entity particularized by the property of being uncomposed), the argument becomes useless.

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tam api sādhyadharmitvenābhyupagamyate yathā naiyāyikair abhyupagatam / evam api bhavatāṃ neṣṭasiddhiḥ / cittavyatirekeṇātmano 'niṣṭatvāt / nāpi naiyāyikānām abhimatārthasiddhiḥ / parasparopakāritvena cakṣurādīnāṃ paropakāritvasyeṣṭatvāt[b] / pārāvāravad āpekṣikatvāt paratvasya / cittasya cānekakāraṇakṛtopakāropagraheṇotpatteḥ saṅghātatvaṃ kalpitam asty eveti hetor api na siddhiḥ /. [[a] Note TSP_{Tib} P264b4: *bya ba'i khyad par daṅ bya ba'i khyad par ma yin pa'i rnam par rtog pa*, i.e., **ādheyātiśayānādheyātiśayavikalpa*. [b] TSP_K *nāpi* [...] °*eṣṭatvāt* : $TSP_Ś$ om. *nāpi* [...] °*eṣṭatvāt*.] "But if [we] eliminate the options [according to which what the argument proves is that the eyes, etc., are for the benefit of a changing entity] that can receive an additional property and [for the benefit of an unchanging entity] that cannot receive any additional property,[a] [what] is demonstrated [by this argument is] the mere fact that [the eyes, etc.,] are for the benefit of another [entity] in general – this is the third hypothesis. In that case too, what is to be proved is [in fact already] established, because the eyes, etc., are admitted to help [produce] the mind [i.e., a cognition]. But if [you reply] that [you] admit the mind as well to be the property-bearer of what is to be proved [along with the eyes, etc., which must be proved to be for the benefit of some other entity], as the Naiyāyikas admit it, even so, you do not establish what you intend [to establish], since [you Sāṅkhyas] do not accept the self to be distinct from the mind. Nor does [this] establish the point acknowledged by the Naiyāyikas, [because the fact that [factors such as] the eyes are of help to another [entity] is [to be] accepted in the [mere] sense of being of help to each other, since 'being other' is relative (*āpekṣika*), as the further and nearer ends [of something]. And that the mind is a composite is indeed [to be] assumed on the grounds that it arises by benefitting from the help of various causes (*anekakāraṇakṛta*); therefore the reason is not established either." [a] Translated on the basis of the Tibetan version.

2.3.4. Dharmakīrti's Critique of the Sāṅkhya's Argument in PVSV 16,20–27: Once Again on Non-Perception

The PVSV criticism of the Sāṅkhya argument is quite different, and so is the context. Dharmakīrti has just accused a (Naiyāyika) Ātmavādin and a Cārvāka of inconsistency since they admit the epistemic validity of mere non-perception as a means to establish absence when it suits them and reject it when it does not.[164] Thus the Naiyāyika uses it to establish the self's absence in things that are without breath but refuses to draw from the self's imperceptibility the conclusion of its nonexistence. Similarly, the Cārvāka uses non-perception as a means of valid cognition when refuting the Buddha's omniscience but he refuses to apply it to consciousness that he claims to be a product of material elements.[165] Dharmakīrti then accuses a Sāṅkhya proponent of self-contradiction: on the one hand, this third character acknowledges the

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[164] See above, §2.2.2.

[165] PVSV 16,19–20: *mṛdaḥ khalv api kaścic caitanyam anupalabhyamānam apīcchann adarśanād vacanāder vyāvṛttim āha /.* "And although someone [i.e., the Cārvāka,] admits [the existence of] a consciousness [arising] from earth even if it is not perceived, he [nonetheless] asserts the exclusion of speech and so on [in all omniscient beings] on the grounds that [it] is not perceived." Cf. PVṬ *Je* D39a1–2/P46a5–6 = PVSVṬ 73,27–29: *tata evāpramāṇakāt* [...] *adarśanād vacanāder asarvajñatvādisādhanāya liṅgatvenopanītasya vipakṣād vyāvṛttim āha /.* "On the grounds of this very non-perception [which he holds] not to be a means of valid cognition [in the other case], he asserts the exclusion of speech and so on, which [he] presents as marks for establishing that there is no omniscience, etc., from the dissimilar instances [i.e., omniscient persons]." On this argument see, e.g., TS_K 3240/$TS_Ś$ 3239: *yadā copadiśed ekaṃ kiñcit sāmānyavaktṛvat / ekadeśajñagītaṃ tan na syāt sarvajñabhāṣitam //.* "And should [the alleged omniscient Buddha] teach [even] a single thing as an ordinary speaker, this would be the discourse of someone knowing [only] a part [of what is to be known]; it would not be the speech of an omniscient." Cf. TSP_K 843,8–10/$TSP_Ś$ 1019,13–16: *na hy avitarkā vacanapravṛttir astīti savikalpaceto 'vasthitenaivānena dharmo deśanīyaḥ / tataś cāsyām avasthāyāṃ bālapaṇḍitayor aviśeṣād asarvajña evāsāv iti tadbhāṣitam asarvajñabhāṣitam eva syāt /.* "For the activity of speaking is not devoid of reasoning (*vitarka*); therefore he must teach the *dharma* while being in a state where his thought is conceptual; and therefore, in this state, 'because there is no difference between a child and a learned one, he cannot be omniscient' [i.e.,] his speech must be the speech of [someone] who is not omniscient." Cf. fragment BSū 54 of Bṛhaspati in Namai 1976b: *lokavyavahāraṃ prati sadṛśau bālapaṇḍitau.* "With respect to worldly transactions, the child and the learned are similar."

invisible presence of curd in milk in the form of a potentiality (*śakti*);[166] on the other hand, he asserts the absence of composition in entities that are not for the benefit of another entity, and his assertion is solely based on the fact that we do not see that these entities are composites. This latter idea is the very foundation of the teleological argument since, as Dharmakīrti notices, the absence (*vyatireka*) of the property of being composed in that which is not for the benefit of another entity guarantees that every composite is for the benefit of another entity; and the YD for instance explicitly states that the Person must be uncomposed for the reason that contrary to composed entities, we do not perceive it:

> For if it were composed, like [an empirical individual such as] Devadatta, this Person would be directly perceived.[167]

While taking this opportunity to criticize the Sāṅkhya conception of transformation and the notion of potentiality that it involves,[168] Dharmakīrti once more emphasizes the inconsistency of the Ātmavādin, who admits the nonexistence of an entity on the grounds of its imperceptibility only insofar as it suits his agenda:

> And another one [i.e., a Sāṅkhya, although he admits the existence of] curd etc., [which are invisible,] in milk, etc., [asserts] the absence [of the property of being a composite] in [entities] that are not for the benefit of another [entity] on the grounds that one does not perceive [their] being composites. For what necessity is there in this [assertion] that composed [entities] should necessarily be for the benefit of another entity?[169] [The Ātmavādin: But] there

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166 On the notion of potentiality in Sāṅkhya, see Frauwallner 1953: 391. In PVinṬ (*Tshe* D125b3–5/P147a5–8), Dharmottara distinguishes two currents within Sāṅkhya, namely that of the "proponents of the thesis according to which [transformation] is a manifestation" (*abhivyaktivādin*) and that of the "proponents of the thesis according to which [transformation] is another state" (*avasthāntaravādin*), and he specifies that the former propound the notion of potentiality while the latter refuse it (see Watanabe 2011: 561, fn. 21).

167 YD 168,15–16 (see above, fn. 146, p. 162).

168 For other passages targetting the Sāṅkhya notion of transformation in Dharmakīrti's works, see Watanabe 2011.

169 PVṬ *Je* D39a3–4/P46a8–b1 ≈ PVSVṬ 74, 11–13: *na cādarśanamātreṇāsya hetor vyāptiḥ sidhyati / ko hy atra niyamaḥ saṅghātair avaśyaṃ parārthair bhavitatvyaṃ yataḥ[a] saṅghātatvāc cakṣurādīnāṃ pārārthyasiddhyātmārthatvaṃ sāṅkhyasya sidh-

is indeed a perception of curd and so on in milk and so on: it is an inference from the fact that [curd, etc.,] could not arise from [milk, etc., if milk, etc.,] did not have [this] potentiality (*aśakta*) [in them beforehand].[170] [Answer:] But what is this potentiality? Is it the entity itself [i.e., curd, etc.,] or something else?[171] If it is the [entity] itself, [this potentiality present in the milk] should be perceived exactly in the same way [as curd, etc., when it becomes manifest and milk disappears,] because there [can be] no difference [between the objects of these two perceptions].[172] [But] if [this potentiality is] something dis-

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yet /. [ᵃ Note that PVṬ reads *gaṅ gis na*, i.e., **yena* instead of *yataḥ*.] "Besides, [it is] not [the case that] the pervasion of this logical reason is established through mere non-perception. For what necessity is there in this [assertion that] composites should necessarily be for the benefit of another [entity], so that the Sāṅkhya may establish that the eyes, etc., are for the benefit of the self through the demonstration that [they] are for the benefit of another [entity] due to [their] being composites?"

[170] PVṬ *Je* D39a5–b1/P46b3–6 ≈ PVSVṬ 74,15–20: *anumānaṃ cāhāśaktād anutpatter iti / yadi hi kṣīrādau dadhyādiśaktir na syāt tato 'śaktāt kṣīrāder dadhyādi notpadyeta / prayogas tu yad yajjanane na śaktaṃ na tasya tata utpattir yathā śālibījād yavāṅkurasya / utpadyate ca dadhyādiḥ kṣīrādibhyas tasmād asti dadhyādiśaktiḥ kṣīrādāv iti kāryahetupratirūpako vaidharmyaprayogaḥ / śaktirᵃ eva ca dadhyādi / kāryakāraṇayor abhedād iti manyate* /. [ᵃ *śaktir* em. (PVSVṬ$_{MS}$, PVṬ) : *śakter* Ed.] "And [the objector] says that [this] inference is [drawn] from the fact that [curd, etc.,] could not arise [from milk, etc., if milk, etc.,] did not have this potentiality [in them beforehand]. For if the potentiality of curd, etc., did not exist in milk, etc., then curd, etc., could not arise from milk, etc., [as milk, etc., would be] devoid of this potentiality. As for the [formal] application[, it is as follows]: 'An x that is not capable of producing a y does not give rise to y – for instance, a seed of rice [does not give rise] to a sprout of barley. Now milk, etc., do give rise to curd, etc.; therefore there is indeed a potentiality of curd, etc., in milk, etc.' So it is a reasoning through dissimilarity that counterfeits an [inference through] effect as a [logical] reason. And curd, etc., are the potentiality itself, since there is no difference between the effect and its cause – so thinks [the Sāṅkhya opponent]." On the *satkāryavāda*, see also fn. 13, p. 41.

[171] PVṬ *Je* D39b1/P46b6–7 ≈ PVSVṬ 74,20–21: *athetyādi siddhāntavādī / yo 'sau dadhyādiko bhāvaḥ paścād upalabhyate kiṃ sa eva bhāvaḥ śaktir utānyad eva kiñcid dadhyāder arthāntaraṃ* /. "In 'But [...],' the Buddhist (*siddhāntavādin*) [replies]: This entity which [is called] potentiality, is it the same as the entity which is curd, etc., [and] which is perceived afterwards [instead of the milk]? Or is it some other thing that is distinct from curd, etc.?"

[172] PVṬ *Je* D39b1–2/P46b7 ≈ PVSVṬ 74,21–22: *tathaiveti niṣpannarūpaᵃdadhyādivat kṣīrāvasthāyāmᵇ upalabhyeta viśeṣābhāvāt* /. [ᵃ PVṬ without equivalent of °*rūpa*°. ᵇ *kṣīrādyavasthāyām* em. (PVṬ) : *kṣīrāvasthāyām* Ed.]. "[It should be perceived] 'ex-

tinct [from curd, etc.], how can this [i.e., curd, etc.,] exist when a distinct thing [i.e., this potentiality,] exists? Rather, [when the Sāṅkhya says that curd, etc., are in milk, etc., due to the latter's capacity to produce milk,] it must be a mere metaphor (*upacāra*). This is their [i.e., the Sāṅkhya Ātmavādins'] inconsistency [i.e., discarding non-perception as a means of valid cognition and nonetheless making use of it][173].[174]

2.4. ON MEMORY: PV 2.267–269

In PV 2.258–266, Dharmakīrti polemicizes against a likely Śaiva opponent in whose views one can secure final liberation from all impurities (*mala*) through ritual initiation (*dīkṣā*).[175] Dharmakīrti closes his critique by demonstrating that the self can be of no help in the initiatory process.[176] Whatever the polemical context, PV 2.267–269 can be re-

actly in the same way' – i.e., [when] in the state of milk for instance, [this potentiality] should be perceived [exactly] as [when it] takes on the form of curd, etc., because there is no difference between the objects [of these two perceptions]."

[173] According to PVṬ *Je* D39b3–4/P47a1–2 ≈ PVSVṬ 74,23–25: *dadhyādijananasāmarthyāt kṣīrādau dadhyādīty upacāramātraṃ syāt / anupalambham apramāṇīkṛtya punas tasyaiva pramāṇīkaraṇam ayam parasparavyāghāta eṣām ātmavādinām[a] ity upasaṃhāraḥ //*. [[a] *ātmavādinām* em. (PVṬ) : *ātmādivādinām* Ed.] "It must be a mere metaphor [when the Sāṅkhyas say] that curd, etc., are in milk, etc., due to [milk's] capacity to produce curd, etc. Having discarded non-perception as a means of valid cognition, nonetheless [they] make this very [non-perception] a means of valid cognition. [With this Dharmakīrti] sums up [the meaning of the verse by pointing out that] this is the Ātmavādins' inconsistency."

[174] PVSV 16,20–27: *dadhyādikaṃ cāparaḥ kṣīrādiṣv aparārtheṣu saṅghātatvādarśanād vyatirekam / ko hy atra niyamaḥ saṃhatair avaśyaṃ parārthair bhavitavyam iti / asty evopalambho dadhyādīnāṃ kṣīrādiṣv anumānam / aśaktād anutpatteḥ / atha keyaṃ śaktiḥ / sa eva bhāva utānyad eva kiñcit / sa eva cet tathaivopalabhyeta viśeṣābhāvāt / anyac cet katham anyabhāve tad asti / upacāramātraṃ tu syād ity ayam eṣāṃ parasparavyāghātaḥ /*.

[175] See Sanderson 2001: 10–11, fn. 7 and Eltschinger forthc. a (§1.3.2).

[176] Note, for a transition to the issue of the self, PVP D114a3–4/P132a7–8: *gal te bdag kyaṅ 'di la ñe bar sbyor ba yod pa de ltar na de ci'i phyir lhag mar byas pa yin źe na / gaṅ gis na 'jug pa daṅ ldan pa daṅ ldog pa daṅ ldan pa de tsam ñid ni bdag gi ṅo bo yin no //*. "[Objection:] If the self is also involved (**upa√yuj-*) in this [(soteric) process?], then why does it remain? For the nature of the self is nothing but possessing action (**pravṛtti?*) and abstaining [from action] (**nivṛtti?*)." The meaning of this passage remains obscure to us.

garded as a self-contained series of arguments against the self. In several respects, this important section testifies to Dharmakīrti's indebtedness to Vasubandhu: on the one hand, those of his arguments that question the causality of permanent entities echoe the KSP's critique of a permanent self (as well as yet older Yogācāra Buddhist arguments against a permanent creator God);[177] on the other hand, his critique of the self as the only possibility to account for the continuity seemingly at work in memory and karmic retribution apparently presupposes Vasubandhu's arguments against both the Pudgalavādin and the non-Buddhist Ātmavādins in AKBh 9. Interestingly enough, PV 2.269 is likely to provide us with Dharmakīrti's only allusion to the vexed problem of memory in the context of an explicit critique of the self.

Basing himself on PVSV 174,14–16,[178] Devendrabuddhi introduces Dharmakīrti's argument as follows:

> There is no self (**na kaścid ātmā*) that would provide its help (**upakāraka*?) either by being the controlling agent (**adhiṣṭhātṛ*) or the inherence cause (**samavāyikāraṇa*), or [by] any other [kind of] contribution (**upayoga*?), so that (**yena*) one could admit to say that it provides its help.[179]

Here is Dharmakīrti's first assault against the self as a cause:

> Since [something] permanent [i.e., a permanently efficacious[180] self,] does not depend [on any cooperating factor], it is contradictory that [its effect] be produced in succession,[181] [as] the [causal] action of [something] whose nature [remains] the same when it produces and when it does not produce [an effect

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[177] See Yoshimizu 1999. As we shall see below, PV 2.267–269 presupposes Dharmakīrti's arguments against *īśvara* as they can be found, e.g., in PV 2.21 and 23.

[178] See above, fn. 81, p. 20.

[179] PVP D114a4–5/P132a8–b2: *byin gyis rlob pa po ñid dam 'phrod pa 'du ba can gyi rgyu ñid dam ñe bar sbyor ba gźan 'ga' źig gis phan 'dogs par byed pa'i bdag cuṅ zad yod pa ma yin na gaṅ gis na de yaṅ 'dir ñe bar sbyor ba can du brjod par 'dod par 'gyur /*.

[180] According to PVP D114a5/P132b1 (*dṅos po rtag pa rtag tu nus pa*).

[181] PVP D114a5/P132b2: *de maṅ du dpyad zin to //*. "[And] this has [already] been often examined." See below, fn. 183, p. 175.

is contradictory], and [as it is contradictory that] the cause and [its] result are one [and the same].[182]

Dharmakīrti's critique entails three successive steps, all of which presuppose the following premise: if it is of a productive or causally efficient nature, a permanent entity does not depend on cooperating factors (*sahakārin*, the presence and hence co-efficience of which are occasional [*kādācitka*], i.e., spatio-temporally limited) in order to bring about its effect.

As Devendrabuddhi remarks, the first step of Dharmakīrti's argument – the fact that a permanent entity such as God or the self cannot produce anything in succession (*krameṇa*) – permeates Dharmakīrti's arguments against a creator God (*īśvara*), the Mīmāṃsaka conception of authorless (*apauruṣeya*) and permanent Vedic words as well as his proofs of momentariness (*kṣaṇikatva*, especially in the so-called *sattvānumāna*).[183] As far as the issue of the self is concerned, however, Dharmakīrti's argument is reminiscent of Vasubandhu's critique of the causality of a permanent self in the KSP,[184] even in not taking into consideration the second term of the usual alternative, i.e., the hypothesis of a causal efficiency producing its effect at one time, all at once, "simultaneously" (*yaugapadyena*).[185]

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[182] PV 2.267–268a: *nityasya nirapekṣatvāt kramotpattir virudhyate / kriyāyām akriyāyāṃ ca kriyā ca sadṛśātmanaḥ // aikyaṃ ca hetuphalayoḥ* [...] //.

[183] On Dharmakīrti's arguments against *īśvara*, see Nagatomi 1967, Jackson 1986, Krasser 1999, Krasser 2002: II.19–55, Kapstein 2004 (and, for antecedents, see Chemparathy 1968 and Yoshimizu 1999: 242–243, fn. 23). On Dharmakīrti's arguments against the manifestation of permanent Vedic words, see Yoshimizu 1999: 238, fn. 20, and Eltschinger 2007: 189–196. On Dharmakīrti's proofs of momentariness, see above, fn. 92, p. 26.

[184] See above, fn. 96, p. 28.

[185] Note, e.g., PVin 2 80,1–6 (quoted above, fn. 92, p. 26). Sumatiśīla (KSṬ D96a3–b6/P109b1–110a8) explains as follows Vasubandhu's silence about the *yaugapadyena* hypothesis: *de la cig car bya ba mi byed par ni gsal ba ñid de / cig car de la rag lus pa'i 'bras bu mi snaṅ ba'i phyir ro //*. "Among these [alternatives], it is very clear that the [self] cannot produce an effect simultaneously, since no effect that depends on it is seen to be simultaneous." Translation (modified) Yoshimizu 1999: 240, fn. 22. See also Yoshimizu's remarks on Sumatiśīla's explanation in Yoshimizu 1999: 237, fn. 19.

As for the second step of Dharmakīrti's argument, according to Devendrabuddhi,[186] it echoes PV 2.21:

> Provided that (*yadā*) the entity [called "God," when it is] not a cause [i.e., before it creates], is [of] the very same [nature] as [when it is] a cause [i.e., in the state of creating], due to which [differentiation] do [you] accept it [as] a cause? [And you] do not accept [it] as not [being] a cause.[187]

Lastly, Devendrabuddhi explains the third step of Dharmakīrti's argument as follows:

> Thus: the active state of a permanent self is the cause, whereas its state of experiencing is the effect. [But there can be] no difference between these two states, because [otherwise] permanence would be lost. [In this way,] that which has the nature of the cause of this very [effect] is the effect, [and] in this sense it is contradictory that the cause and the effect do not differ.[188]

According to Dharmakīrti, a permanent self can be neither a cause nor an agent. Or if it is, then its active state (the cause) must be the same as its experiencing state (the effect).

In order to escape Dharmakīrti's critique, the Ātmavādin now suggests a new argument. In Devendrabuddhi's words:

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[186] PVP D114a6–7/P132b3–4: *mi byed pa'i dus las khyad par med pa'i phyir phyis kyaṅ 'di byed pa 'gal bar 'gyur ro źes / ji ltar dṅos de rgyu yin pa / de ltar de ñid gaṅ gi tshe / rgyu min de ni gaṅ gis 'gyur // źes bya ba'i skabs su bśad zin to //*. "Since there is no difference with the time when it does not produce [its effect] (**akriyākālād viśeṣābhāvāt*), it is contradictory that it may produce it afterwards (**paścāt*). [And this] has [already] been stated on the occasion of PV 2.21." Note also PVṬ *Ñe* D146a4/P180b4: *'bras bu byed pa'i dus daṅ 'bras bu mi byed pa'i dus dag tu bdag ñid mtshuṅs pa yin no źes bya ba'i don to //*. "The [intended] meaning (**artha*) [of PV 2.267cd] is: the self is the same at the time when it produces [its] effect and at the time when it does not produce [its] effect."

[187] PV 2.21: *yathā tat kāraṇaṃ vastu tathaiva tad akāraṇam / yadā tat kāraṇaṃ kena mataṃ neṣṭam akāraṇam //*.

[188] PVP D114a7–b1/P132b5–6: *de ltar na bdag rtag pa'i byed pa'i gnas skabs gaṅ yin pa de ni rgyu yin źiṅ de ñid kyi loṅs spyod pa'i gnas skabs gaṅ yin pa de 'bras bu yin na gnas skabs 'di ñid la khyad par med pa yin te / rtag pa ñid ñams pa'i phyir ro // de ñid kyi rgyu'i raṅ bźin gaṅ yin pa de 'bras bu yin pa de ltar na rgyu daṅ 'bras bu tha dad pa med pa 'gal ba yin no //*.

> Suppose the following be urged (**syād etat*): The agent (**kartṛ*) and its result (**tatphala*?) are different from the self, so [that] what [we accept] is established.[189]

Here is Dharmakīrti's reply:

> If [one admitted that] the two of them [viz. agency and experience] are distinct from the [self, then the self's] being an agent and an experiencer would be lost. Moreover, [its] capacity [as a cause] is not ascertained (*na sidhyati*).[190]

The Ātmavādin opponent wishes to demonstrate that the self is both an agent and the experiencer of the results of its agency. Now if, in order to escape Dharmakīrti's arguments, he admits that agency and experience are distinct from the self (so that the cause and the effect can themselves be different), then he must admit that this independent self is neither an agent nor an experiencer. While explaining the (rather obscure) last *pāda* of PV 2.268, Devendrabuddhi again refers back to a stanza belonging to Dharmakīrti's polemic against an eternal creator God:

> [That something permanent that is not a cause may get involved in a causal] operation is also ill-founded without a difference in nature. And since a permanent [God] is never absent (*avyatirekin*), [its] capacity [as a cause] is difficult to be found out.[191]

Devendrabuddhi explains *pāda* d as follows:

> [An entity's] being a cause (**hetutā*?) is not [ascertained] merely because it produces something (**vastu*) but because, for example, x exists when y exists and x is absent when y is absent even though [all of] x's capable causes [that are] other than y are present. Thus one can show without any doubt that x is an effect of y [and] then establish that y is its cause. But God, because it is eternal, lacks such an absence, [and] thus it is not established that it obeys co-

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189 PVP D114b2/P132b7: *de ltar ni 'gyur mod kyi / bdag las byed pa daṅ de'i 'bras bu gźan yin pa de ltar na 'dod pa la sgrub pa ñid yin no źe na /*.

190 PV 2.268bd: *vyatireke tatas tayoḥ / kartṛbhoktṛtvahāniḥ syāt sāmarthyaṃ ca na sidhyati //*.

191 PV 2.23: *svabhāvabhedena vinā vyāpāro 'pi na yujyate / nityasyāvyatirekitvāt sāmarthyaṃ ca duranvayam //*.

> presence (**anvaya*) and co-absence (**vyatireka*) with the entities [that are supposed to be its effects]. Therefore, how [can it be] a cause?[192]

As for PV 2.269, Devendrabuddhi introduces it as follows:

> [The target of PV 2.269 is] the [following] claim (**yad api* [...] *uktam*) [of the Ātmavādin]: if there is nothing unitary (**yadi na kaścid eko 'sti*?) [such as the self], then (**tadā*) that which is [perceptually] experienced (**anubhūta*) by one [person must] be remembered (**smṛta*) by another, or what is seen (**dṛṣṭa*) by one [person must] be recognized (**pratyabhijñāta*) by another, or [the action] performed (**kṛta*) by one [person must] be experienced (**anubhūta*) by another.[193]

Or, in Manorathanandin's words:

> Objection: If there is no self, then as a result, it should be the case that one [person] perceives and performs the action, [and that] another one remembers and enjoys the result, and thus [there would be] an absurdity. [Against this, Dharmakīrti] states [PV 2.269].[194]

These arguments, which form the classical answer of both the Pudgalavādins and the Ātmavādins to the Buddhist charge against the self,[195] recur throughout AKBh 9.[196]

> And the [undesirable] consequences [put forward by our opponents as invalidating our position[197] – namely that] memory, the experience [of pleasure

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[192] PVP D12b2–4/P14a2–4: *dṅos po la byed[a] pa tsam gyis rgyu ñid ma yin gyi 'on kyaṅ dper na 'di ni 'di yod na 'gyur la / de las gźan pa'i nus pa de'i rgyu dag yod du zin kyaṅ de med na med par 'gyur ba'i phyir / de ltar na the tshom med par de'i 'bras bu ñid du bstan par 'gyur ba de'i tshe / de'i rgyur grub par 'gyur ro // 'di 'dra ba'i ldog pa ni rtag pa ñid kyi phyir dbaṅ phyug la yod pa ma yin pa de ltar na dṅos po rnams la de'i rjes su 'gro ba daṅ ldog pa'i rjes su byed pa grub pa med pa'i phyir ji ltar na rgyu yin /.* [a] *byed* em. : *med* P, *yod* D.

[193] PVP D114b7–115a1/P133a6–8: *gaṅ yaṅ gal te gcig 'ga' źig kyaṅ yod pa ma yin pa de'i tshe gźan gyis ñams su myoṅ ba gźan gyis dran pa 'am / gźan gyis mthoṅ ba gźan gyis ṅo śes pa 'am / gźan gyis byas pa gźan gyis myoṅ ba ma yin no //* [...] *źes brjod pa /.*

[194] PVV 102,6–7: *nanu yady ātmā nāsti tadānyenānubhūtaṃ karma ca kṛtam anyaḥ smarati bhuṅkte phalam iti syāt tathā cātiprasaṅga ity āha* [...] */.*

[195] For the use of this type of argument by Ātmavādins see, e.g., Oetke 1988: 468; for its use by Pudgalavādins see above, Chapter 1, §1.1.3.4.3.

[196] See below, fn. 211, p. 184.

> and pain as karmic retribution], etc., [would belong to] another [person than the one who perceived, acted, etc.,[198] in the first place –] do not invalidate [our arguments], for [according to us] there is no one to remember something [previously perceived], because [what is] remembered [i.e., remembrance,][199] arises [indirectly] from [perceptual] experience [alone].[200]

Like his opponent's counter-arguments, Dharmakīrti's answer is strongly reminiscent of Vasubandhu's rebuttal of similar objections in AKBh 9. Given that Dharmakīrti's answer is elliptic, that his ideas regarding memory (*smṛti*, *smaraṇa*) and recognition[201] (*pratyabhijñāna*) are under-studied and that his commentators' explanations are scarce,[202] the best thing one can do for now is to interpret PV 2.269cd

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197 According to PVP D115a2/P133a8 (*gźan gyis gnod pa can du brjod pa gaṅ yin pa de*).

198 PVP D115a1/P133a7–8: *sogs pa smos pas ni gźan the tshom za bar gyur pa la gźan gyis ṅes pa yin no //*. "The word 'etc.' (**ādiśabdāt*) [covers such cases as:] one would ascertain what another was in doubt about."

199 According to PVP D115a3/P133b2 (*dran pa ñid dran pa yin te*) and PVV 102,12 (*smṛtir eva smṛtaṃ tasyodbhavaḥ*).

200 PV 2.269: *anyasmaraṇabhogādiprasaṅgāś ca na bādhakāḥ / asmṛteḥ kasyacit tena hy anubhūteḥ smṛtodbhavaḥ //*.

201 Note that *pratyabhijñā(na)* is an important concept in the framework of Dharmakīrti's version of the *apoha* theory, where it is synonymous with words such as *niścaya*, "(perceptual) judgment/ascertainment" and *adhyavasāya*, "determination (as)." On *pratyabhijñā(na)* as ascertainement, see, e.g., Katsura 1993, Kellner 2004 and Eltschinger 2010b: 403–404 (§5c). While there can be no doubt that Dharmakīrti's account of identification or ascertainment in the PVSV has an important bearing on the issue of memory and cannot differ significantly from Dharmakīrti's elaborations in PV 3.503cd–531, any account of memory in Dharmakīrti's thought must await the results of current research on PV 3.

202 PVP D115a3/P133b2: *ñams su myoṅ ba gsal bas nus pa phyi ma phyi ma ches śin tu ba'i[a] yid kyi rnam par śes pa bskyed pa'i sgo nas phyis rkyen ji lta ba bźin du dran pa skyed par byed do // gaṅ gi phyir de ltar ñams su myoṅ ba las dran pa skye ba de bas na gcig 'ga' źig ñams su myoṅ ba ñid dran par byed pa ma yin no // 'dir dṅos po'i rkyen yin na yaṅ byed pa po la ltos pa ma yin te / sṅa phyir gyur pa'i 'du byed rnams la rnam pa 'ga' źig la sgro btags pa la 'jug pa de ltar na de las dṅos po'i raṅ bźin grub pa ma yin no //*. [[a] To be read *ches śin tu byuṅ ba'i*?] "A vivid (**spaṣṭa*, **sphuṭa*, **paṭu*?) [perceptual] experience (**anubhūti*?), due to [the fact that it] generates a mental cognition (**manovijñāna*) that produces? a [reproductive] capacity which [in turn produces a] subsequent [reproductive capacity, etc.] (**uttarottaraśakti*?), later generates a memory according to conditions (**yathāpratyayam*). Since, in this way,

against the background of parallel passages in AKBh 9. But let us first consider the following excerpt of Dharmakīrti's PVin 1:

> [Objection:] But how [is it] now [that human] practice [is] due to perception, which [according to you] does not consist in [a conceptual] ascertainment [but in the mere awareness of an object]? For it is while [conceptually] ascertaining [i.e., identifying something,] as 'this [brings pleasure' or 'this brings suffering]' that one acts in order to obtain what is instrumental in [securing] pleasure and to avoid what is instrumental in [provoking] suffering. [Answer:] This is not a fault [on our part], because [human] practice, [which arises] from a desire for perceived [things that occurs] immediately upon perceiving them, is [made possible] due to memory, which arises through the capacity of [a former perceptual] awareness (*saṃvid*). Even though perception is a bare vision of the object, [human] practice, [which arises] from a desire and [its] opposite [i.e., aversion,] regarding perceived things immediately upon perceiving them, is [made possible] due to memory, which arises through the capacity of [a former perceptual] experience [and] synthetically connects (*pratisandhāyin*) [the presently perceived object with the object previously] experienced. It is indeed a property of what is real that[, provided it is] vivid, a [previous perceptual] experience imprints (*ādhatte*) a seed of memory. Due to the perception of something similar [to what has been perceived previously], this [seed of memory] awakens(/is actualized); [thereu-

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a memory arises from [perceptual] experience, it is not the case that a certain [agent that would be] unitary (**eka*) causes [one] to remember what has been [perceptually] experienced [before]. Here, although something real [i.e., perceptual experience,] is the condition [of the memory's arising, the causal process] does not depend on an agent (**kartṛ*): one superimposes a certain aspect (**ākāra*) on the conditioning factors (**saṃskāra*) that arise in succession (**pūrvāpara*?). Thus, a real nature (**vastusvabhāva*?) [such as a self] is not established through it." On *manovijñāna* and *mānasapratyakṣa*, see Stcherbatsky 1993: 309–339; see also PVin 2 19,3–20,7 (and Vetter 1966: 59–63 for a German translation; note Vetter 1966: 104, fn. 36) and NB 1.9 (and Stcherbatsky 1993: 26–28 for an English translation): *svaviṣayānantaraviṣayasahakāriṇendriyajñānena samanantarapratyayena janitaṃ tan manovijñānam* /. "A mental [perceptual] cognition is that [cognition which is] generated by a sensory cognition [functioning here as this mental cognition's] condition [in quality of homogenous and] immediate antece dent, [a sensory cognition] whose cooperating [factor] is the object[a] that follows immediately its own object [i.e., this sensory cognition's own object]." [a] Or: which cooperates with the object (Dharmottara [NBṬ$_M$ 58,4/NBṬ$_S$ 10,11] clearly interprets the compound as a *bahuvrīhi*).

pon] the impregnation of desire develops and, due to it, action [can take place].[203]

In this oft quoted passage, Dharmakīrti explains that human practice arises from a desire that presupposes memory and presents memory as originating from a past perceptual awareness (*anubhava*, *saṃvid*) via the subsequent "awakening" (*prabodha*) of a seed of memory (*smṛtibīja*) imprinted (*āhita*) by this past perception itself[204] and subsisting in the subsequent series of momentary cognitions. In Dharmakīrti's views, this seed of memory becomes actualized due to one's perceiving something similar (*tādṛśadarśana*) to the object of the past perception.

In several respects this explanation seems to echo one of the most important arguments developed by the commentators of NSū 1.1.10[205] so as to support their Ātmavāda, and it is tempting to read the passage as being meant at least in part as an implicit refutation of this argument. Thus according to Pakṣilasvāmin, human practice occurs through a desire (*icchā*) that rests on our capacity to synthetically apprehend (*pratisandhāna*) both the object perceived as a cause of pleasure in the past and the object perceived now,[206] and action involves an effort to

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[203] PVin 1 18,5–19,2 (together with PVin 1.18): *kathaṃ tarhīdānīm aniścayātmanaḥ pratyakṣād vyavahāraḥ / niścinvan hīdantayā sukhaduḥkhasādhanayoḥ prāptiparihārāya pravartate / nāyaṃ doṣaḥ / yasmāt taddṛṣṭāv eva dṛṣṭeṣu saṃvitsāmarthyabhāvinaḥ / smaraṇād abhilāṣeṇa vyavahāraḥ pravartate // arthālocanamātre 'pi pratyakṣe 'nubhavasāmarthyabhāvino 'nubhūtapratisandhāyinaḥ smaraṇāt taddṛṣṭāv eva dṛṣṭeṣv abhilāṣetarābhyāṃ vyavahāro bhavati / vastudharmo hy eṣa yad anubhavaḥ paṭīyān smṛtibījam ādhatte / tādṛśadarśanād asya prabodho 'bhilāṣavāsanāvivṛttir ato vṛttiś ca /*. Dharmottara's lenghty commentary is found in PVinṬ *Dze* D82b2–86a3.

[204] PVin 1 19,1–2 is the source of Manorathanandin's (PVV 102,13–14) commentary on PV 2.269: *vastudharmo hy eṣa yad anubhavaḥ paṭīyān smaraṇabījādhānadvāreṇa smaraṇaṃ janayati /*. "It is indeed a property of what is real that [provided it is] vivid, a [perceptual] experience generates a memory by imprinting a seed of memory."

[205] See, e.g., Kellner 2001: 504, according to which the description in PVin 1.18 "bears a not insignificant resemblance to precursors in Pakṣilasvāmin's *Nyāyabhāṣya* and Patañjali's *Mahābhāṣya*."

[206] See above, fn. 77, p. 140, and NBh 16,5–7: *yajjātīyasyārthasya sannikarṣāt sukham ātmopalabdhavān tajjātīyam evārthaṃ paśyann upādātum icchati / seyam ādātum*

obtain something or to get rid of it that can occur only provided that one remembers the pleasure or pain experienced upon perceiving a particular object.[207] While Dharmakīrti acknowledges this, his explanation of memory shows that human practice and the capacity to recollect that it involves can be accounted for without having recourse to the notion of a permanent and unitary self, since memory requires nothing more than a trace left in a series of momentary and heterogenous cognitions.

Now, this explanation of memory is the one Vasubandhu develops at length against a Pudgalavādin opponent in AKBh 9. The key-passage occurs in the framework of the critique of the Pudgalavāda:

> [Objection:] But if a self does not exist in any way, how is it that, thoughts being momentary, one remembers or recognizes an object that has been perceived a long time before? [Answer: Remembrance and hence recognition arise] from a particular thought the cause (*anvaya*, gl. *hetu* AKVy) of which is a [perceptual] notion of the object [that will later be that] of memory. [Ques-

icchaikasyānekārthadarśino darśanapratisandhānād bhavati liṅgam ātmanaḥ /. "The self, which has [formerly] experienced pleasure from the contact with an object of a certain sort [and] now sees an object of the same sort, desires to obtain it. This very desire to obtain [an object, which arises] from the synthesis (*pratisandhāna*) of the [past and present] perceptions belonging to a unitary perceiver [who apprehends] various objects, is a mark of the self." According to NBh 16,8, the same is true of aversion, which drives us away from objects that we consider causes of pain: *evam ekasyānekārthadarśino darśanapratisandhānād duḥkhahetau dveṣaḥ /*. "In the same way, aversion[, which arises] from the synthesis of the [past and present] perceptions belonging to a unitary perceiver [who apprehends] various objects[, is a mark of the self]."

[207] NBh 16,8–10: *yajjātīyo 'syārthaḥ sukhahetuḥ prasiddhas tajjātīyam arthaṃ paśyan ādātuṃ prayatate / so 'yaṃ prayatna evam anekārthadarśinaṃ darśanapratisandhātāram antareṇa na syāt /*. "[Someone] makes an effort so as to obtain an object upon seeing it [if] this [object is] of the same sort as an object that this [person already] knows [to be] a cause of pleasure; [and] in the same way, this very effort could not take place without a perceiver of various objects [who is also] the synthesizer (*pratisandhātṛ*) of these perceptions." NBh 16,12–13 specifies that the cause of this knowledge is memory while explaining how pleasure and pain are also marks of the self: *sukhaduḥkhasmṛtyā cāyaṃ tatsādhanam ādadānaḥ sukham upalabhate / duḥkham upalabhate sukhaduḥkhe vedayate /*. "And this [person] experiences – [i.e.,] becomes aware of – pleasure and pain while obtaining what is instrumental in [producing] these [present pleasure and pain] thanks to the memory of some [past] pleasure and pain."

> tion: But] of what kind is the particular thought from which memory arises immediately? [Answer: From a thought] inclined toward the [object or associated] with notions, etc.,[208] that are either similar or related [to this object; and it is a thought] whose force is not impaired by [problems] such as a modification of the basis [i.e., an illness], sorrow and [mental] distraction. For a particular thought that does not have this [perceptual notion of the object] for its cause is not capable of generating this memory even though it may be of this sort [i.e., inclined toward the object, possessing similar or related notions, etc., and of unimpaired force]; and a [particular thought] of another sort [i.e., one that is not inclined toward the object, etc., and is of impaired force,] is not capable of generating this memory [either] although it [may have] this [(perceptual) notion of the object] for its cause. But in the case where the two [conditions are found], it is capable [of generating it]. So this is how memory occurs, since one does not observe that another [kind of thought] has [this] capacity.[209]

For memory to arise, two sets of conditions that pertain to memory's immediate cause – called a "particular thought" by Vasubandhu – must be instantiated. (1) First, this thought *must* be, through a process that we will consider below, the end-product of a previous perceptual awareness of the object upon which memory bears (*pace* momentariness). (2) Second, this thought must meet two further sub-sets of conditions: (2a) this thought must be characterized by *at least one* of the following features: (2a1) being inclined toward or focusing on the object (say the actual fire in the case of fire); (2a2) being associated with a notion, a former resolution, an intentness or a perceptual habitus,

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[208] AKVy 711,7–8: *ādigrahaṇena praṇidhānanibandhābhyāsādigrahaṇam /*. "The word 'etc.' includes [factors] such as habitus based (?*nibandha*) on a [former] resolution."

[209] AKBh$_{Pr}$ 472,16–22/AKBh$_{LE}$ 122,1–9: *yadi tarhi sarvathāpi nāsty ātmā kathaṃ kṣaṇikeṣu citteṣu cirānubhūtasyārthasya smaraṇaṃ bhavati pratyabhijñānaṃ vā / smṛtiviṣayasañjñānvayāc cittaviśeṣāt / kīdṛśāc cittaviśeṣād yato 'nantaraṃ smṛtir bhavati / tadābhogasadṛśasambandhisañjñādimato 'nupahataprabhāvād āśrayaviśeṣaśokavyākṣepādibhiḥ / tādṛśo 'pi hy atadanvayacittaviśeṣo na samarthas tāṃ smṛtiṃ bhāvayituṃ tadanvayo 'pi cānyādṛśo na samarthas tāṃ smṛtiṃ bhāvayitum / ubhayathā tu samartha ity evaṃ smṛtir bhavaty anyasya[a] sāmarthyādarśanāt /*. [[a] *anyasya* AKBh$_{LE}$: *anyasyāṃ* AKBh$_{Pr}$.] See *Kośa* V.274–276 and Duerlinger 2008: 96–97 and 238–244. For an overview of Abhidharmic conceptions of recollection, see Cox 1992: 85–87.

etc.,[210] that bears similarity with the object (say a notion of heat in the case of fire); (2a3) being associated with a notion related to the object (say smoke in the case of fire); (2a4) being associated with a former resolution (*praṇidhāna*, AKVy); (2a5) being associated with (perceptual) habitus (*abhyāsa*, AKVy). (2b) Besides, its causal capacity (*prabhāva*) must be impaired by *none* of the following factors: (2b1) illness (*vyādhi*, AKVy), (2b2) sorrow, (2b3) mental distraction, (2b4) magical action (*karman*, AKVy) and (2b5) formulas (*vidyā*, AKVy).

Provided all these conditions are instantiated, memory arises. But what about the process leading from the initial perceptual thought (*upalabdhicitta*) to the "particular thought" responsible for the rise of memory and then to the mnesic thought (*smṛticitta*) itself? As hinted at by Manorathanandin, this process, which Vasubandhu describes as an evolution or, better, a (series of) transformation(s) of the series (*santatipariṇati*), is to be accounted for in terms of seeds (*bīja*).[211] What does this process consist of? Vasubandhu spells this out in a passage that provides us with clues regarding the second aspect of the problem at stake, viz. the explanation of the relationship between past action (*karman*) and (the experience of) its results (*phala*):[212]

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[210] See above, fn. 208, p. 183.

[211] See above, fn. 204, p. 181, and AKBh$_{Pr}$ 472,22–26/AKBh$_{LE}$ 124,1–7: *katham idānīm anyena cetasā dṛṣṭam anyat smarati / evaṃ hi devadattacetasā dṛṣṭaṃ yajñadattacetaḥ smaret / na / asambandhāt / na hi tayoḥ sambandho 'sty akāryakāraṇabhāvād yathaikasantānikayoḥ / na ca brūmo 'nyena cetasā dṛṣṭam anyat smaratīty api tu darśanacittāt smṛticittam anyad utpadyate / santatipariṇatyā yathoktam iti ka evaṃ sati doṣaḥ / smaraṇād eva ca pratyabhijñānaṃ bhavati /*. "[Objection: But] how is it, now, that one [mind] remembers what has been seen by another mind? For in this case (*evam*), Yajñadatta's mind would remember what has been seen by Devadatta's. [Answer:] No, [it is not so,] because there is no [causal] relation [between their two minds]. Indeed, there is no relation between [their] two [minds], because there is no causality relationship [between them] as there is [one] between [minds] belonging to one [and the same] series. Moreover, we do not claim that one [mind] remembers what has been seen by another, but [that] another, mnesic thought arises from a perceptual thought, [and this] due to a transformation of the series, as was said [before]. Therefore, what is the fault [on our side] if it is so? And it is from memory that recognition arises." See *Kośa* V.274–276 and Duerlinger 2008: 96–97 and 238–244.

[212] AKBh$_{Pr}$ 477,7–9/AKBh$_{LE}$ 158,1–5: *katham asaty ātmani vinaṣṭāt karmaṇa āyatyāṃ phalotpattiḥ / ātmany api sati kathaṃ vinaṣṭāt karmaṇa āyatyāṃ phalotpattiḥ /*

As for ourselves, however, we do not claim that the result arises subsequently from an action [that is already] destroyed, but from a particular transformation of its series, as the sprout from the seed, as it is said [in ordinary language] that the result arises form the seed. And [here,] neither [is it meant that] this [result] arises from a seed [that is already] destroyed, nor [that it arises] immediately [after the seed]. Rather, [it arises] from a particular transformation of its series [i.e.,] from the last stage [which consists in] the flower [and is] realized through a succession that comprises the sprout, the stalk and the leaf. [The Ātmavādin:] But [if] the [result] is realized by the flower, why do [we] say [that it is] the result of the seed? [Vasubandhu:] Because the [causal] capacity imprinted by the [seed] indirectly accrues to the flower. If [the capacity of the flower] were not preceded by the [capacity of the seed, the flower] would not be capable of generating a result of that kind [i.e., similar to the seed]. Similarly, it is said that the result arises from the action. And neither does it arise from an action [that is already] destroyed nor [does it arise] immediately [after the action], but from a particular transformation of its series. [The Ātmavādin:] But what is the series, what is the transformation, what is the particularity [of the last phase of transformation]? [Vasubandhu:] The series [consists in] the stream, which originates from an action, of each successive thought, and this [series]'s arising [ever] differently is [its] transformation. And that [transformation, i.e., that new phase] which is capable of generating the result immediately is [called] a particular transformation because it is distinguished [in this regard] with regard to the other[, preceding] transformations.[213]

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tadāśritād dharmādharmāt / yathā kaḥ kimāśrita ity uktottaraiṣā vācoyuktiḥ / tasmād anāśritād eva dharmādharmād bhavatu /. "[The Ātmavādin:] If there is no self, how [can] a result arise later from an action [that is already] destroyed? [Vasubandhu: But] even if there is a self[, as you contend], how [can] a result arise later from an action [that is already] destroyed? [The Ātmavādin:] From merit and demerit, which rest on the [self as qualities of a substance. Vasubandhu:] This is vain rhetoric (*vācoyukti*), to which [we have already] answered, for example [while asking:] 'What rests on what?' [So] let us admit [that the result arises] from merit and demerit which do not rest [on the self]." On *nairātmya* and the relation between action and its result in the AKBh, see also Sanderson 1994.

213 $AKBh_{Pr}$ 477,9–20/$AKBh_{LE}$ 158,5–160,5: *naiva tu vayaṃ vinaṣṭāt karmaṇa āyatyāṃ phalotpattiṃ brūmaḥ / kiṃ tarhi / tatsantatipariṇāmaviśeṣād bījaphalavat / yathā bījāt phalam utpadyata ity ucyate / na ca tad vinaṣṭād bījād utpadyate / nāpy anantaram eva / kiṃ tarhi / tatsantatipariṇāmaviśeṣād aṅkurakāṇḍapattrādi-*

As it is accounted for by Vasubandhu and Dharmakīrti, the process does not require any agent, subject or substratum responsible for the continuity between perception and memory or between acts and their (eschatological) experience. Acts and perceptual experiences simply plant seeds[214] that gradually transform themselves up to the point where the conditions are met for them to produce their result.

kramaniṣpannāt puṣpāvasānāt / tat punaḥ puṣpān niṣpannaṃ kasmāt tasya bījasya phalam ity ucyate / tadāhitaṃ hi tat paramparayā puṣpe[a] sāmarthyam / yadi hi tatpūrvakaṃ[b] nābhaviṣyat tattādṛśasya phalasyotpattau na samartham abhaviṣyat / evaṃ karmaṇaḥ phalam utpadyata ity ucyate / na ca tad vinaṣṭāt karmaṇa utpadyate nāpy anantaram eva / kiṃ tarhi / tatsantatipariṇāmaviśeṣāt / kā punaḥ santatiḥ kaḥ pariṇāmaḥ ko viśeṣaḥ / yaḥ karmapūrva uttarottaracittaprasavaḥ[c] sā santatis tasyā anyathotpattiḥ pariṇāmaḥ / sa punar yo 'nantaraṃ phalotpādana-samarthaḥ so 'ntyapariṇāmaviśiṣṭatvāt pariṇāmaviśeṣaḥ /. [[a] *paramparayā puṣpe* AKBh$_{LE}$ (Tib. *brgyud pas*) : *parayā puṣpe* AKBh$_{Pr}$. [b] *tatpūrvakaṃ* AKBh$_{LE}$: *tatpūrvikān* AKBh$_{Pr}$. [c] *prasavaḥ* AKBh$_{LE}$: °*pravasaḥ* AKBh$_{Pr}$.] See *Kośa* V.295–296 and Duerlinger 2008: 108 and 293–296.

[214] AKBh$_{Pr}$ 64,5–7: *kiṃ punar idaṃ bījaṃ nāma / yan nāmarūpaṃ phalotpattau samarthaṃ sākṣāt pāramparyeṇa vā / santatipariṇāmaviśeṣāt / ko 'yaṃ pariṇāmo nāma / santater anyathātvam / kā ceyaṃ santatiḥ / hetuphalabhūtās traiyadhvikāḥ saṃskārāḥ /*. "[Question:] But what is it that [you] call a 'seed'? [Answer: A seed] is a name-and-form that is capable of giving rise to a result in a direct or an indirect manner due to a particular transformation of the series. [Question:] What is it that [you] call a 'transformation'? [Answer: A transformation] is the fact that the series is otherwise. [Question:] And what does this series consist of? [Answer: The series consists of] the conditioning factors that are [successively] causes and results [and] belong to the three times [i.e., past, present, future]." See *Kośa* I.185.

Chapter 3

Dharmakīrti against the Self as the Basis of Brahmanical Soteriologies

3.1. The Doctrines of the Self as Soteriologies

In PV 2.220–256, Dharmakīrti engages in what appears to be the longest and most elaborate critique of Ātmavāda(s) found in his works. Here however, the subject of the discussion is neither ontological nor epistemological. These stanzas are not meant to demonstrate that the self does not exist, nor that it cannot be apprehended by any means of valid cognition. They address a soteriological issue and are aimed at showing that if there is a self, there can be no liberation (*mokṣa*) from a painful existence within the beginningless cycle of births and deaths (*saṃsāra*). This demonstration entails a detailed criticism of the way the Ātmavādins define liberation and what one should aspire to be liberated from, since Dharmakīrti's opponents consider that liberation can be obtained by discriminating the self from what is not the self (*anātman*) and by achieving detachment (*vairāgya*)[1] from what we wrongly take to belong to the self (*ātmīya*).

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[1] Although there seems to be no perfect equivalent of the term *vairāgya* in European languages, it is often translated thus (as opposed to *rāga* understood as "attachment"). Admittedly, the word may sometimes mean "aversion," "disgust," "loathing" (see MW s.v.). In the present context, however, it rather denotes a perfect indifference or dispassion, i.e., a disposition contrary to *rāga* (which designates the fact of being "coloured," i.e., affected by something, as well as passionate desire or love). As will be seen below, this state of dispassion excludes all passions, i.e., desire (sometimes expressed by the word *rāga*) but also hatred or aversion (*dveṣa*). It is often opposed to a state designated by words that literally mean something like "attachment": *sneha* (which means "love," but also designates the property of being sticky), *sakti* (which means "adherence," "attachment" in the literal sense of the term, but also "addiction" for instance), *anu√sañj-* (which refers to the act of clinging, adhering or being attached to), etc.

3.1.1. Sāṅkhya

Thus the Sāṅkhyas hold that bondage arises from the confusion between an unconscious and active primordial nature (*prakṛti*) or matter (*pradhāna*) and the Person (*puruṣa*) conceived as an inactive consciousness.[2] Thus according to the SK,

> and because of the opposition [between the possession of the three qualities that characterizes matter and the Person's status], it is established that the Person is a witness, possesses isolation (*kaivalya*), neutrality (*mādhyasthya*), is the perceiver, and is not an agent. Therefore, due to association (*saṃyoga*) with this [Person], the unconscious subtle body (*liṅga*) seems to be endowed with consciousness; and in the same way, although agency belongs to the qualities [of matter, the Person, which] is indifferent (*udāsīna*), seems to be an agent.[3]

Individuals who are not liberated confuse matter with the Person inasmuch as they attribute agency to consciousness in spite of its being a purely contemplative entity. But they also wrongly ascribe consciousness to what is in fact a purely material entity (or rather, a collection of entities), namely the subtle body (*liṅga/liṅgaśarīra/sūkṣmaśarīra*). The latter is said to "go from the [evolute called] the Great to the subtle [elements]."[4] In other words, it comprises, besides the five subtle elements (*tanmātra*),[5] the "thirteenfold instrument,"[6] i.e., the threefold internal organ (*antaḥkaraṇa*) made up of the intellect (*buddhi*), the sense of ego (*ahaṅkāra*) and the mind (*manas*), together with the five sense

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[2] Although the SK for instance does not use the term *ātman* to designate this consciousness, Dharmakīrti calls it an *ātman* (see, e.g., below, PV 2.247–248) because it is defined by the Sāṅkhya as a lasting, unchanging entity that constitutes the very foundation of a person's empirical identity.

[3] SK 19–20: *tasmāc ca viparyāsāt siddhaṃ sākṣitvam asya puruṣasya / kaivalyaṃ mādhyasthyaṃ draṣṭṛtvam akartṛbhāvaś ca // tasmāt tatsaṃyogād acetanaṃ cetanāvad iva liṅgam / guṇakartṛtve ca tathā karteva bhavaty udāsīnaḥ //.*

[4] *mahadādisūkṣmaparyantam* (SK 40).

[5] I.e., sound (*śabda*), tactile form (*sparśa*), visual form (*rūpa*), taste (*rasa*) and smell (*gandha*). On these see, e.g., GBh ad SK 3.

[6] *karaṇaṃ trayodaśavidham* (SK 32).

organs (*buddhīndriya*) and the five organs of activity (*karmendriya*).[7] According to the Sāṅkhyas, as long as the subtle body goes on transmigrating, the individual is bound to experience pain, but liberation can be achieved through a discriminative knowledge (*vijñāna*) that counteracts the confusion between matter and the Person. Thus SK 55 states:

> In this [condition of living beings], pain, which is the result of ageing and death, accrues to the conscious Person, because the subtle body has not ceased; therefore [in this state], there is pain by nature.[8]

In his commentary, Gauḍapāda explains how liberation from this painful state can be achieved:

> When the subtle body ceases, there is liberation; [and] when one obtains liberation, there is no [longer] pain. But how does the [subtle body] cease? [Answer:] When the knowledge of the twenty-five elements constituting reality (*tattva*) occurs. [This knowledge is] characterized by the perception (*khyāti*) of the distinction between [the quality of matter called] *sattva* and the Person [and takes such a form:] "This is primordial matter, this is the intellect, this is the sense of ego, these are the five great elements, [and] the Person is distinct from [all of] them." The cessation of the subtle body is due to such a knowledge, [and] liberation is due to the [cessation of the subtle body].[9]

The subtle body can be eliminated through knowledge[10] that consists in discriminating the Person from matter,[11] described in the SK in the following way:

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[7] See SK 26: the five sense organs are the ear (*śrotra*), skin (*tvac*), eye (*cakṣus*), tongue (*rasana*) and nose (*ghrāṇa*); the five organs of activity are speech (*vāc*), hand (*pāṇi*), foot (*pāda*), anus (*pāyu*) and genital organ (*upastha*).

[8] SK 55: *tatra jarāmaraṇakṛtaṃ duḥkhaṃ prāpnoti cetanaḥ puruṣaḥ / liṅgasyāvinivṛttes tasmād duḥkhaṃ svabhāvena //.*

[9] GBh 50,23–51,3: *liṅganivṛttau mokṣaḥ / mokṣaprāptau nāsti duḥkham iti / tat punaḥ kena nivartate / yadā pañcaviṃśatitattvajñānaṃ syāt / sattvapuruṣānyatākhyātilakṣaṇam idaṃ pradhānam idaṃ buddhir ayam ahaṅkāra imāni pañca mahābhūtāni yebhyo 'nyaḥ puruṣo visadṛśa iti / evañjñānāl liṅganivṛttis tato mokṣa iti /.*

[10] See, e.g., MV 53,21: *jñānena hi liṅgaṃ nivartate /*. "For knowledge makes the subtle body cease."

> Thus, through the repeated [meditation] (*abhyāsa*) on the elements constituting reality arises knowledge [in the form] "[I] am not [this, this] is not mine, [this is] not myself." [This knowledge] is complete, stainless because it is devoid of doubt (*viparyaya*),[12] and pure (*kevala*).[13]

The commentaries diverge as to the meaning of the verse.[14] However, in spite of these diverging interpretations, the gist is the same: as the MV puts it, the liberating knowledge "consists of the perception that

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[11] JM 110,12–13: *tasya ca nivṛttiḥ pradhānapuruṣāntarajñānāt.* "And the cessation of this [subtle body occurs] thanks to the knowledge that primordial matter and the Person are distinct."

[12] See GBh 58,16 (*aviparyayād asaṃśayāt*), MV 58,9 (*viparyayaḥ saṃśayas tadviparīto 'viparyayaḥ*) and JM 115,5 (*aviparyayād aham ity amānasaṃśayāt*).

[13] SK 64: *evaṃ tattvābhyāsān nāsmi na me nāham ity apariśeṣam / aviparyayād viśuddhaṃ kevalam utpadyate jñānam //.*

[14] Thus GBh 58,14–15 interprets *nāsmi na me nāham iti* as "it is not me who exist; this is not my body; since I am one [thing and] the body is another, I am not [it]" (*nāsmi nāham eva bhavāmi / na me mama śarīraṃ tat / yato 'ham anyaḥ śarīram anyan nāham iti /*), whereas MV 58,6–7 understands it as "I am not the elements constituting reality, the elements constituting reality do not belong to me, I do not belong to the elements constituting reality; rather, these are material" (*nāsmi tattvāni / na me tattvāni / nāhaṃ tattvānām / kiṃ tu prādhānikāny etāni /*). JM 115,2–4 comments: *yad etat sūkṣmaśarīraṃ bhautikaṃ ca tasmin na bhavāmy api tu prakṛtiḥ / na ma ityādi / na mamedam api tu prakṛteḥ / nāham iti / nāpy ahaṃ prakṛtir iti /.* "[I am not in this, i.e.,] I do not exist in that which is the subtle body and is material; rather, primordial nature does; 'it is not mine, etc.' [means]: it is not mine, but rather, the primordial nature's; [it] is not myself, i.e., neither am I primordial nature." (Contrary to the other commentaries mentioned here, the JM does not present the sentence as the expression of the liberating knowledge, but of the repeated meditation that must lead to it; see JM 115,4–5: *ity evaṃ tattvābhyāsāt*). The TK, for its part, relies on a grammatical analysis and explains that in the first element of the sentence, where the negation occurs with the verb "to be," the speaker simply denies his agency (see TK 170,19–20: *nāsmīty ātmani kriyāmātraṃ niṣedhayati /.* "With 'I am not,' [the speaker] merely denies the action [of being] in himself."). Vācaspatimiśra understands the third element of the sentence (where the subject occurs with the negation) as a denial that the self may be the substratum of agency (see TK 170,24: *aham iti kartṛpadam /*, "'I' is the word [designating] the agent," and TK 170,25–26: *niṣkriyatve ca kartṛtvābhāvaḥ /*, "And if there is no action, there is no agency"). Finally, regarding the second element, TK 170,26–27 explains: *ata eva na me / kartā hi svāmitāṃ labhate* [...]/. "For the same reason, it is not mine; for it is the agent that has the status of a possessor."

the qualities [belonging to matter] and the Person are distinct."[15] In fact though, acquiring this discriminating knowledge does not lead to an immediate and full liberation. Someone who possesses it no longer performs acts that require a karmic retribution, but the merits and demerits accumulated prior to this knowledge subsist in the form of residual traces (*saṃskāra*) and must first be exhausted before the Person can be finally released from the body. Nonetheless, the cause of liberation remains discriminative knowledge, since transmigration can only be made to cease through it:

> Although due to the attainment of correct knowledge, merit and so on have ceased to be causes, [the Person] remains trapped in a body due to the force of residual traces, just as the whirling of [the potter's] wheel [that goes on because of the impulse given to it. But] when one has obtained separation from the body, [and] when matter has ceased [to be active] because it has reached its goal,[16] one obtains an isolation (*kaivalya*) that is both complete and definitive.[17]

Thus according to the Sāṅkhya, liberation from pain consists of a state of perfect isolation in which the permanent, conscious and inactive entity that is the Person has severed all ties with unconscious and active matter by becoming fully aware of the radical difference that separates them.

3.1.2. Nyāya

The Naiyāyikas too contend that bondage stems from a wrong knowledge (*mithyājñāna*) primarily characterized as a confusion between the self and what is not the self. For bondage consists in being attached

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[15] MV 58,11: *guṇapuruṣāntaropalabdhirūpam*.

[16] I.e., enabling the Person to discriminate itself from the *prakṛti*. See, e.g., SK 56: *ity eṣa prakṛtikṛto mahadādiviśeṣabhūtaparyantaḥ / pratipuruṣavimokṣārthaṃ svārtha iva parārtha ārambhaḥ //*. "Therefore this, from [the evolute called] the Great to the various [gross] elements, is [all] done by primordial nature for the sake of each Person's liberation (*vimokṣa*); this endeavour is for the benefit of another [i.e., the Person,] as for one's own benefit."

[17] SK 67–68: *saṃyagjñānādhigamād dharmādīnām akāraṇaprāptau / tiṣṭhati saṃskāravaśāc cakrabhramivad dhṛtaśarīraḥ // prāpte śarīrabhede caritārthatvāt pradhānavinivṛttau / aikāntikam ātyantikam ubhayaṃ kaivalyam āpnoti //*.

(*virakta*) to pleasure (*sukha*) and the means of realizing pleasure (*sukhasādhana*),[18] and this attachment, which necessarily leads to pain (*duḥkha*), cannot disappear as long as wrong knowledge remains. Thus while commenting on NSū 1.1.2, according to which "when wrong knowledge, defects (*doṣa*), activities (*pravṛtti*), [re-]births (*janman*) and pain disappear one after the other, liberation (*apavarga*) [occurs] immediately after their disappearance,"[19] Pakṣilasvāmin specifies:

> Wrong knowledge, which is of many kinds, occurs with respect to the [already stated] object of knowledge [the enumeration of which] starts with the self and ends with liberation. [I.e., wrong knowledge takes these forms]: first, with respect to the self, "it does not exist"; with respect to [what is] not the self, "[it is] a self"; with respect to pain, "[it is] pleasure"; with respect to [what is] impermanent, "[it is] permanent"; with respect to [what is] not safe, "[it is] safe"; with respect to [what is] dangerous, "[it is] not dangerous"; with respect to [what is] disgusting, "it is desirable"; with respect to [what] should be rejected, "[it] should not be rejected."[20]

The Naiyāyikas' concise definition of wrong knowledge is even more telling:

> But what is this wrong knowledge? It [consists in] apprehending as the self what is not the self.[21]

The following passage from the NBh makes clear that it is because we take the impermanent body, sense organs, mind, feelings and cognitions for their unchanging substratum that we suffer and transmigrate:

> [Question:] But what is this wrong knowledge [said to be the cause of attachment]? [Answer:] It [consists in] apprehending as the self what is not the

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[18] See NBh 247,3–11, quoted below, fn. 78, p. 206.

[19] *duḥkhajanmapravṛttidoṣamithyājñānānām uttarottarāpāye tadanantarāpāyād apavargaḥ //*. On the order in which the initial compound should be read according to the commentators, see below, fn. 23, p. 193.

[20] NBh 6,9–11: *tatrātmādyapavargaparyante prameye mithyājñānam anekaprakārakaṃ vartate / ātmani tāvan nāstīti / anātmany ātmeti / duḥkhe sukham iti / anitye nityam iti / atrāṇe trāṇam iti / sabhaye nirbhayam iti / jugupsite 'bhimatam iti / hātavye 'pratihātavyam iti /.* Note the proximity of this description with the four Buddhist wrong notions (on these *viparyāsa*s see above, fn. 35, p. 53).

[21] NV 470,19–20: *kiṃ punas tan mithyājñānam / anātmany ātmagraha iti /.*

> self. The delusion [consisting in thinking] 'I am' [with respect to what is not the self] is [called] the sense of ego, since indeed, the [false] view of [someone] who sees what is not the self as 'I am' is the sense of ego. [Question:] But what is the group of objects with respect to which the sense of ego [arises]? [Answer:] The body, the sense organs, the mind, feelings and cognitions. [Question:] How is the sense of ego that [arises] with respect to them the seed of *saṃsāra*? [Answer:] Indeed, when the [sense of ego] has determined (*vyavasita*) the group [of objects] that are the body and so on as 'I am,' due to the annihilation of these [objects], one [wrongly] considers that the self is annihilated, [and being] overwhelmed by the craving (*tṛṣṇā*) for non-annihilation, one clings (*upādatte*) to them again and again. Clinging to them, one strives for [re-]birth and death. Therefore, because one is not free from a body, one is not entirely freed from pain.[22]

According to the Naiyāyikas, bondage occurs because we desperately seek permanency in our body, sense organs, mind, feelings and cognitions, which are by nature transient, instead of acknowledging that permanence solely belongs to the substratum of subjectivity that alone can legitimately be denoted by the word "I" – namely, the self. As a consequence, the Naiyāyikas state that liberation is achieved by acquiring knowledge of reality or right knowledge (*tattvajñāna*) in which the self is no longer confused with any of its impermanent and contingent adjuncts,[23] and they claim that in the liberated state the self is free of all pain because it is free of all causes of perception:

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[22] NBh 258,10–15: *kiṃ punas tan mithyājñānam iti / anātmany ātmagrahaḥ / aham asmīti moho 'haṅkāra iti / anātmānaṃ khalv aham asmīti paśyato dṛṣṭir ahaṅkāra iti / kiṃ punas tad arthajātaṃ yadviṣayo 'haṅkāraḥ / śarīrendriyamanovedanābuddhayaḥ / kathaṃ tadviṣayo 'haṅkāraḥ saṃsārabījaṃ bhavati / ayaṃ khalu śarīrādyarthajātam aham asmīti vyavasitas taducchedād ātmocchedaṃ manyamāno 'nucchedatṛṣṇāyāḥ pariplutaḥ punaḥ punas tad upādatte / tad upādadāno janmamaraṇāya yatate / tena śarīreṇāviyogān nātyantaṃ duḥkhād vimucyata iti /.*

[23] See, e.g., NBh 7,12–14: *yadā tu tattvajñānān mithyājñānam apaiti tadā mithyājñānāpāye doṣā apayanti / doṣāpāye pravṛttir apaiti / pravṛttyapāye janmāpaiti / janmāpāye duḥkham apaiti / duḥkhāpāye cātyantiko 'pavargo niḥśreyasam iti /.* "But when wrong knowledge disappears due to right knowledge, then the defects disappear upon the disappearance of wrong knowledge. Upon the disappearance of defects, activity disappears; upon the disappearance of activity, [re-]birth disappears; upon the disappearance of [re-]birth, pain disappears; and upon the disappearance of pain, ultimate liberation [occurs], which is the summum bonum (*niḥśreyasa*)." On *niḥśreyasa*, see Slaje 1986.

> In liberation, there is no body, etc., which are causes of perception. Therefore liberation is the release from all pains. Because every seed of pain and pain [itself] are cut off in liberation, liberation is the release from all pain.[24]

While commenting on NSū 4.2.45 ("And this is absent in liberation"),[25] Pakṣilasvāmin likewise emphasizes that the liberated state is devoid of all cognitions, specifying that "this [i.e.,] the substratum and cause of cognitions, [namely] the body and sense organs, is absent in liberation, because [in liberation] there is neither merit nor demerit,"[26] and he adds that as a consequence, liberation is free of all pain:

> Therefore liberation is the release from all pain. Because the seed of all pain and the basis of all pain is cut off in liberation, liberation is the release from all pain, since pain cannot arise without [its] seed and [its] basis.[27]

Uddyotakara, for his part, criticizes the Buddhist view that liberation does not consist in releasing the self but merely a series of momentary thoughts (*citta*):

> Others [say] that [only] the mind is released, because desire and so on have power over it, since it is due to desire, etc., that the mind arises in different [transmigratory] destinies[28] and with different supports [i.e., objects]; whereas desire and so on have no power over the self. [We Naiyāyikas answer that] this is not [true], because [if it were, liberation] would be accomplished effortlessly: those who consider liberation to be the non-producing and cessation of mind, for those liberation would be attained without effort. Why? Because [its] arising means [nothing but its] destruction: since what is born [instantly] perishes, this is accomplished effortlessly. If [the Buddhist opponent replies] that liberation is the non-arising of the series [and not the mere non-arising of one single momentary thought, we reply that] this is not [true

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[24] NV 495,2–4: *tasya śarīrāder upalabdhikāraṇasyābhāvo 'pavarga iti / tasmāt sarvaduḥkhamokṣo 'pavargaḥ / yasmāt sarvaṃ duḥkhabījaṃ duḥkhaṃ cāpavarge vicchidyate tasmāt sarveṇa duḥkhena vimuktir apavargaḥ /.*

[25] *tadabhāvaś cāpavarge /.*

[26] NBh 279,11: *tasya buddhinimittāśrayasya śarīrendriyasya dharmādharmābhāvād abhāvo 'pavarge /.*

[27] NBh 279,13–15: *tasmāt sarvaduḥkhavimokṣo 'pavargaḥ / yasmāt sarvaduḥkhabījaṃ sarvaduḥkhāyatanaṃ cāpavarge vicchidyate tasmāt sarveṇa duḥkhena vimuktir apavargaḥ / na nirbījaṃ nirāyatanaṃ ca duḥkham utpadyata iti /.*

[28] According to NVTṬ 203,11 (*devamanuṣyādijātir gatis tatrotpattiḥ*).

> either,] because [the non-arising of the series] is impossible: the non-arising of the series cannot be produced, because the series consists of a stream of entities [existing] as causes and effects [that must go on producing new effects and causes, etc.]. If [the Buddhist opponent replies] that what is produced is the non-arising of [thoughts that] have not appeared yet, [then] since the non-production of [thoughts that] have not appeared yet is [already] present [for the very reason that they have not been produced yet], what could be produced [in liberation]? Therefore the release of [mere] thought is absolutely unestablished.[29]

3.1.3. Vaiśeṣika

The case of the Vaiśeṣika is somewhat obscure, as one of the vexed problems with respect to the history of this system regards the actual antiquity of its soteriological aspects. Thus modern scholarship has often presented the passages in the VSū related to *yoga* and liberation as later additions to an original text exclusively devoted to a physico-ontological enquiry. This is, for instance, Faddegon's opinion:

> It is not the wish to discriminate soul from that which is not soul, ego from non-ego, as conceived by later scholiasts, but it is the theoretical desire for a correct classification and system of definition which has been the starting-point of the Vaiśeṣika system.[30]

Several other scholars have more or less adopted this opinion,[31] among whom Frauwallner, who has argued in particular that the sentence "Now, from here we shall explain *dharma*" (*athāto dharmaṃ vyākhyā-*

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[29] NV 83,5–12: *cittaṃ vimucyata ity anye / rāgādīnāṃ tatra sāmarthyād yasmād rāgādivaśaṃ cittam ālambanānantaragatyantareṣūtpadyate / na punar ātmani rāgādīnāṃ sāmarthyam iti / na / ayatnatas tatsiddheḥ / ye cittasyānutpādanaṃ nirodhaṃ cāpavargam icchanti teṣām ayatnasiddho mokṣaḥ / kiṃ kāraṇam / janmano vināśārthatvāt / jātaṃ vinaśyatīty ayatnena siddham etat / santater anutpādo 'pavarga iti cet / na / tasyāśakyatvāt / santater anutpādo na śakyaḥ kartum / kāryakāraṇabhāvapravāhasya santatibhāvāt / anāgatānutpādaḥ kriyata iti cet / anāgatānutpādasya vidyamānatvāt kiṃ kriyata iti sarvathā na cittasyāpavargaḥ sidhyatīti /.*

[30] Faddegon 1969: 12.

[31] See Ui 1917: 73–74, Frauwallner 1956: 90, Halbfass 1991: 314–315 and 311, Wezler 1982: 647 and Wezler 1983: 57. For a synthetic presentation of these scholars' respective positions, see Houben 1994: 712–721.

syāmaḥ) at the beginning of the VSū must have been a later addition probably dating from Praśastapāda's time.[32] Engaging in a detailed examination of the complicated issue of the historical development of the Vaiśeṣika's soteriological aspects is of course far beyond the scope of this study. Suffice it to say here that, as noted by Halbfass and Houben, the passage suspected by Frauwallner was already quoted by Bhartṛhari in this form,[33] and that several scholars have convincingly argued that, as Houben puts it, "the Vaiśeṣika's concern with liberation was [...] original in the system as it arose in a context in which Jainism and Buddhism were challenging the Brahmanic society," and that "the sixth chapter (dealing with Vedas, *dharma* and liberation) formed the very heart of the system."[34]

With respect to this Vaiśeṣika view of liberation, it is worth noting here that the VSū too considers that "desire comes from pleasure,"[35] that this desire is "due to [the] craving"[36] that arises from the experience of pleasure as well as "from the unseen [force]"[37] of merit and demerit, and that the "activity" resulting from it, which binds the individual in *saṃsāra*[38] because it produces merit and demerit in turn, "presupposes desire (*icchā*) and aversion, [whether it is aimed] at merit or demerit."[39] Candrānanda, commenting on VSū 6.2.18, "from this [arise] contact and separation,"[40] explains:

> When merit and demerit have accumulated, then there is a contact [of the self] with the body and sense organs called birth. And when they have been exhausted, at the time of death there is a separation. But again, through merit

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[32] See Frauwallner 1956: 339, n. 387, and Frauwallner 1984.

[33] See Halbfass 1986: 857 and Houben 1994: 717–719.

[34] Houben 1994: 732; see also, e.g., Biardeau 1964: 242–243, fn. 3 (cf. Biardeau 1968: 111), Bronkhorst 1993a and Isaacson 1993 (which focuses on the antiquity of yogic perception in early Vaiśeṣika).

[35] VSū 6.2.12: *sukhād rāgaḥ* /.

[36] VSū 6.2.14: *tṛpteḥ* /.

[37] VSū 6.2.15: *adṛṣṭāt* /.

[38] On the binding role of effort/activity in the Vaiśeṣika, see, e.g., Bronkhorst 1986: 55.

[39] VSū 6.2.17: *icchādveṣapūrvikā dharmādharmayoḥ pravṛttiḥ* /.

[40] VSū 6.2.18: *tataḥ saṃyogo vibhāgaś ca* /.

> and demerit, there is [another] contact with [another] body and [other sense organs] and [then] a separation [from them]: thus this beginningless living being keeps coming back, just as the buckets of a well [that keep being emptied and filled again].[41]

Similarly, Bhāviveka describes in the following way the Vaiśeṣika view of bondage:

> By acting for what are characterized thus as *dharma* and *adharma*, there arise pleasure (*sukha*) and pain (*duḥkha*), and attachment [to the former] and aversion [from the latter]. Being affected by these [attachment and aversion], man is born again [in another world] as in this world and undergoes transmigration.[42]

However, according to Bhāviveka, the Vaiśeṣikas consider that liberation can be achieved through the realization that the self is distinct from the body, sense organs and mental organ, a realization thanks to which one achieves detachment from them:

> When the soul (*ātman*), which is different from body (*śarīra*), sense organs (*indriya*) and mind (*manas*) is perceived, pleasure [or pain, which causes attachment or aversion] does not arise, and by the complete abandonment of the causes (*sādhana*), the future [*dharma* and *adharma*] also will not ensue. The accumulated [*dharma* and *adharma*] are also discarded. On apprehending the true nature of the body, man will not begin to form attachment to it. When man definitely apprehends the real soul and firmly understands the true nature of the six *padārthas*, *dharma* [and *adharma*] also become extinct. On this point it is affirmatively stated as follows: "By completely abandoning the body and the false notions formed by the mind, one attains the pure, perfect deliverance. [This state is] just like fire whose fuel is burnt up."[43]

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[41] VSV 51,1–3: *sañcitau yadā dharmādharmau bhavatas tadā śarīrendriyaiḥ saṃyogo janmākhyo bhavati / kṣīṇayoś ca tayor maraṇakāle viyogaḥ / punar apy ābhyāṃ dharmādharmābhyāṃ śarīrādisaṃyogo vibhāgaś cety evam anādir ayaṃ ghaṭīyantravad āvartate jantuḥ /.*

[42] TJ D243b6–7/P274a5–6 (as edited in Hattori 1994: 703): *de lta bu'i chos daṅ chos ma yin pa'i mtshan ñid la 'jug pa las bde ba daṅ sdug bsṅal yin la / de dag la chags pa daṅ sdaṅ pa'o // des byas pas 'di ltar yaṅ skye źiṅ 'khor bar 'gyur te //*. Translation Hattori 1994: 705.

[43] TJ D244a3–5/P274b2–5 (as edited in Hattori 1994: 703): *gal te chos daṅ chos ma yin pa med par ji ltar 'gyur źe na / ma 'oṅs pa mi 'byuṅ źiṅ bsags pa 'gog pa ste / de la*

As noted by Hattori,[44] the above-mentioned passage bears close resemblances to Praśastapāda's PDhS:

> However, when someone, thanks to his activity preceded by knowledge [and performed] without desiring a [particular] result, is born in a virtuous family and wishes to know the means of getting rid of pain, he approaches a master [and thus] receives the right knowledge (*tattvajñāna*) of the six [Vaiśeṣika] categories; upon the cessation of ignorance, he becomes detached (*virakta*). Because [he] no [longer] has desire, aversion, etc., merit and demerit, which are born from these, no [longer] arise, and the previously accumulated [merit and demerit] cease due to the experience [that is their retribution]. And having brought about satisfaction and pleasure [and] the separation from the body, since desire, etc., have ceased, only a merit consisting in the cessation [of activity] remains while producing a pleasure born from the perception of the ultimate reality. Then, [since this] self is devoid of seeds due to [their] annihilation, it ceases to be endowed with a body, etc. When the body, etc., no longer arise, there is liberation [i.e.,] a cessation (*upaśama*) similar to [that of] a fire the fuel of which has been burnt.[45]

Liberation (once more) involves the separation of the self from what is not the self. This separation can be obtained, at least partially and/or momentarily, in yogic states (where, "due to a particular contact of the self and mental organ in the self, there is a perception of the self"[46])

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lus daṅ / dbaṅ po daṅ / yid las tha dad pa'i bdag mthoṅ ba na dge ba skye bar mi 'gyur la / de sgrub par byed pa yoṅs su spaṅs pas ma 'oṅs pa yaṅ mi skye ba ste / bsags pa 'gog pa yaṅ lus kyi de kho na ñid la rtogs par byed pa na chags par mi rtsom pa'o // don dam pa'i bdag ṅes par rtogs śiṅ tshig gi don drug gi de kho na ñid ṅes par śes pa na / chos kyaṅ med par 'gyur ba yin te / 'dir lus daṅ yid kyi rnam rtog ni // thams cad spaṅs nas dri med pa'i // yoṅs su 'da' bar de 'gro ste // śiṅ zad pa yi me bźin no //. Translation Hattori 1994: 705–706.

[44] Hattori 1994: 706.

[45] PDhS 66,2–10: *jñānapūrvakāt tu kṛtād asaṅkalpitaphalād viśuddhe kule jātasya duḥkhavigamopāyajijñāsor ācāryam upasaṅgamyotpannaṣaṭpadārthatattvajñānasyājñānanivṛttau viraktasya rāgadveṣādyabhāvāt tajjayor dharmādharmayor anutpattau pūrvasañcitayoś copabhogān nirodhe santoṣasukhaṃ śarīrapariccheḍaṃ cotpādya rāgādinivṛttau nivṛttilakṣaṇaḥ kevalo dharmaḥ paramārthadarśanajaṃ sukhaṃ kṛtvā nivartate / tadā nirodhān nirbījasyātmanaḥ śarīrādinivṛttiḥ / punaḥśarīrādyanutpattau dagdhendhanānalavad upaśamo mokṣa iti /*. Translation (modified) Bronkhorst 1986: 56–57.

[46] VSū 9.13: *ātmany ātmamanasoḥ saṃyogaviśeṣād ātmapratyakṣam /*.

and becomes definitive at death when all karmic residues have disappeared:

> Pleasure and pain are due to the contact between the self, a sense organ, the internal organ and an object. When there is no production of this [contact] since the internal organ remains within the self, the absence of pleasure and pain for the embodied [self] is *yoga*.[47] […] Liberation is the absence of contact whereas the [unseen force] no [longer] exists, [and] the non-manifestation [of a new body].[48]

Dharmakīrti's non-Buddhist opponents – whether Sāṅkhya, Nyāya or Vaiśeṣika – thus consider that liberation consists in getting rid of what we wrongly take to be the self or to belong to it in some essential way. As for Dharmakīrti, he sets out to show that on the contrary, liberation can only consist in getting rid of the self itself, since the wrong belief in the existence of a permanent subjective entity is the root cause of pain and transmigration.

3.2. DHARMAKĪRTI'S MAIN TARGET: THE NYĀYA'S SOTERIOLOGY

Dharmakīrti criticizes in passing the Sāṅkhya view on liberation, but obviously this is not his main target. Dharmakīrti's commentators often ascribe the position of the main opponent in these stanzas to someone belonging to the so-called Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika (as modern scholarship usually designates it), or more precisely, to the "Vaiśeṣika, etc." (*vaiśeṣikādi*), i.e., to a doctrine admitted by both Naiyāyikas and Vaiśeṣikas. The Naiyāyikas and Vaiśeṣikas share many views on liberation, so that it is often difficult to determine whether a stanza is specifically aimed at one of them only. However, it seems to us that Vetter is right to consider that on the whole, Dharmakīrti's main opponent defends a Naiyāyika doctrine.[49]

Thus, much like Pakṣilasvāmin or Uddyotakara, this opponent contends that the cause of *saṃsāra* is attachment to that which is wrongly

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[47] VSū 5.2.16–17: *ātmendriyamanorthasannikarṣāt sukhaduḥkhe tadanārambha ātmasthe manasi saśarīrasya sukhaduḥkhābhāvaḥ sa yogaḥ /*. See Wezler 1982: 660–663 and Nozawa 1996: 928.

[48] VSū 5.2.20: *tadabhāve saṃyogābhāvo 'prādurbhāvaḥ sa mokṣaḥ /*.

[49] Vetter 1990: 120, fn. 1.

considered to belong to the self and enables one to realize pleasure (*sukhasādhana*).[50] According to this opponent, while the self is free of defects (*nirdoṣa*), the attachment to these means of realizing pleasure is defective (*sadoṣa*) insofar as it is in fact the basis of pain.[51] Due to it one craves (*tṛṣṇā-/paritṛṣṇāvat*) pleasure and thus clings (*upā√dā-*) to *saṃsāra*.[52] Similarly, the Naiyāyikas consider that confusing the self with the impermanent elements that are means of realizing pleasure leads to a painful craving, which in turn leads to clinging to *saṃsāra*.[53]

According to Dharmakīrti's opponent, liberation therefore consists in achieving a state (which once again closely resembles final release as described by the Naiyāyikas)[54] where the self is isolated (*kevala*, *vinā*)[55] from all the elements wrongly attributed to the self,[56] and as a

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[50] On the role of attachment to *sukhasādhana*s in bondage according to Dharmakīrti's opponent, see PVV 87,19–21 (quoted below, fn. 82–83, p. 208), PVV 89,2 (quoted below, fn. 111, p. 216), PVP D99a1/P114a4–5 and PVṬ *Ñe* D140b4–5/P173b6–7 (quoted below, fn. 126, p. 220), PVV 89,24–25 (quoted below, fn. 131, p. 221), PVV 91,15–16 (quoted below, fn. 179, p. 233), PVV 92,16 (quoted below, fn. 212, p. 243), PVV 93,21–22 (quoted below, fn. 253, p. 253), PVP D108a7–b2/ P125b4–6 (quoted below, fn. 339, p. 273). Compare, e.g., with NBh 15,11–15 (quoted below, fn. 64, p. 202), NBh 245,9–14 (quoted below, fn. 74, p. 205), and NBh 247,3–11 (quoted below, fn. 78, p. 206).

[51] See PV 2.224. On the opponent's definition of what is defective (*sadoṣa*) as the basis of pain see, e.g., PVP D104b5/P121a4 (quoted below, fn. 257, p. 253).

[52] See, e.g., PVP D97b4/P112b4–5 (quoted below, fn. 110, p. 215).

[53] On this craving and the subsequent clinging (either to *saṃsāra* or to the objects that bind to *saṃsāra*) in Nyāya, see, e.g., NBh 245,9–14 (quoted below, fn. 74, p. 205), NBh 258,10–15 (quoted above, fn. 22, p. 193) and NV 59,18–60,6 (quoted below, fn. 73, p. 205).

[54] See below, §§3.3.2ff.

[55] See PV 2.225.

[56] According to PVP D98a2–3/P113a2–3 (see below, fn. 115, p. 217), Dharmakīrti's opponent has in mind "attachment, cognitions and sense organs, etc." The Naiyāyikas consider that these elements are "the body, the sense organs, the mind, feelings and cognitions" (see NBh 258,10–15, quoted above, fn. 22, p. 193). Besides *(ātma)sneha*, *buddhi* and *indriya*, other factors appear in Prajñākaragupta's and Śākyabuddhi's commentaries: thus, the self is a cause of pain when accompanied (*sahāya*) by merit (*dharma*), demerit (*adharma*) and residual traces (*saṃskāra*) in PVA 148,32–33; *dharma* and *adharma* recur in PVṬ *Ñe* D140a1–2/P172b7–8, together with effort (*rtsom*, **[pra]yatna*). The Vaiśeṣikas present effort, merit, deme-

means to achieve this, he advocates the "cultivation of [the thought of] pain" (*duḥkhabhāvanā*).[57] By bringing to perception (*pratyakṣī√kṛ-*) the fact that everything is pain,[58] this cultivation leads to the knowledge of the defects (*doṣa*) that stain what we wrongly take to belong to the self[59] insofar as they are the cause of activity (*pravṛttinimitta*)[60] and therefore lead to pain. This cultivation of pain, in which one realizes that pleasure, like poisoned food, is essentially mixed with pain,[61] is aimed at cutting off (**vyavaccheda*?)[62] our belief that the elements wrongly attributed to the self are endowed with good qualities[63] and thus supposedly induces a state of complete detachment that leads to liberation from *saṃsāra*.

As far as we know, such a cultivation was not prescribed in the Vaiśeṣika that Dharmakīrti may have known, but Naiyāyikas such as Pakṣilasvāmin and Uddyotakara do contend that in order to achieve detachment and therefore liberation, one should cultivate (the thought of) pain with respect to rebirth and the means to obtain pleasure. In other words, according to them, one should concentrate on the thought

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rit or residual traces as adventitious qualities of the self (see, e.g., PDhS 16,9–10, quoted below, fn. 180, p. 233). On *dharma* and *adharma* as causes of pain and bondage in the Nyāya, see above, fn. 26, p. 194, and below, fn. 73, p. 205. On the role of activity (*pravṛtti*) in bondage according to the Naiyāyikas, see, e.g., NSū 1.1.2, quoted above, fn. 19, p. 192, NBh 219,11–13, quoted above, fn. 71, p. 204, and fn. 225, p. 246, below.

[57] See in particular PV 2.226–227, 229, 238–239, 245–246, 249, 253–254 and their commentaries. Here the term "thought" between brackets translates the word *saṅjñā* found in the compound *duḥkhasaṅjñābhāvana*/*duḥkhasaṅjñābhāvanā* used by Pakṣilasvāmin (see, e.g., NBh 247,3–11, quoted below, fn. 78, p. 206, and NBh 247,3, quoted below, fn. 76, p. 206; see also, for *duḥkhasaṅjñā*, NBh 245,9–14, quoted below, fn. 74, p. 205). Note, however, that Devendrabuddhi uses the expression **duḥkhākārabhāvanā*, "the cultivation of the aspect of pain" (see PVP D108b2–3/P125b6–8, quoted below, fn. 340, p. 274).

[58] See PV 2.238.

[59] See PV 2.236.

[60] See PVṬ *Ñe* D102b5–7/P118b6–8, quoted below, fn. 224, p. 246.

[61] See PV 2.231 and PVV 90,20–21 (quoted below, fn. 163, p. 229), PVP D100b6/P116a8 (quoted below, fn. 172, p. 231), PVV 89,22–23 (quoted below, fn. 173, p. 231).

[62] PVP D106a2–3/P122b6–7 (quoted below, fn. 283, p. 259).

[63] See PV 2.245.

that these are intermingled with pain. While explaining why pleasure has been omitted from the list of objects of knowledge enumerated in NSū 1.1.9, Pakṣilasvāmin thus states:

> [The mention of] "pain" [without that of pleasure] is not a denial of the awareness of pleasure [i.e., of that] which is experienced as pleasant; rather, what is taught [by this] is the cultivation [consisting of a mental] concentration (*samādhibhāvana*) [on the fact that re-]birth itself, along with the means of obtaining pleasure, is pain, because it is intermingled with pain, since it is [never] free of pain, [and] since it is endowed with various torments. It is [a cultivation consisting of a mental concentration, i.e.,] one cultivates it while being concentrated; [and] by cultivating it one becomes disgusted; [and he] who is disgusted [obtains] detachment; [and he] who is detached [obtains] liberation. Liberation is the annihilation of the series of births and deaths [and] the abandonment of all pain.[64]

The cultivation of the thought of pain must lead to disgust (*nirveda*),[65] which in turn must lead to a detachment that brings about liberation:

> That which is pervaded by this [torment], intermingled with it, which exists without being apart from it, is [called] pain due to [its] association with pain. He who sees that everything is [thus] pervaded with pain, wishing to get rid of pain [and] seeing pain in [re-]birth, is disgusted; being disgusted, he is detached; being detached, he is liberated.[66]

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[64] NBh 15,11–15: *duḥkham iti nedam anukūlavedanīyasya sukhasya pratīteḥ pratyākhyānam / kiṃ tarhi janmana evedaṃ sasukhasādhanasya duḥkhānuṣaṅgād duḥkhenāviprayogād vividhabādhanāyogād duḥkham iti samādhibhāvanam upadiśyate / samāhito bhāvayati / bhāvayan nirvedyate / nirviṇṇasya vairāgyam / viraktasyāpavarga iti / janmamaraṇaprabandhocchedaḥ sarvaduḥkhaprahāṇam apavarga iti /.*

[65] See NBh 15,11–15 (quoted above, fn. 64). On the cultivation of disgusting thoughts described in the commentaries ad NSū 4.2.3, see, e.g., Oberhammer 1984: 38ff., Oberhammer 1987 and Slaje 1995.

[66] NBh 21,11–13: *tayānuviddham anuṣaktam avinirbhāgena vartamānaṃ duḥkhayogād duḥkham iti / so 'yaṃ sarvaṃ duḥkhenānuviddham iti paśyan duḥkhaṃ jihāsur janmani duḥkhadarśī nirvidyate / nirviṇṇo virajyate / virakto vimucyate /.*

This cultivation is meant to make obvious the various defects that arise from the confusion between the self and what it is not,[67] but also their causes, i.e., the various elements that are unduly confused with the self. Thus NSū 4.2.1 specifies that "through the right knowledge of the causes of defects, the sense of ego ceases," [68] and the NBh explains:

> The objects of knowledge [the varieties of which have been enumerated in NSū 1.1.9,] from the body, [sense-organs, objects of perception, cognitions, internal organ, activity, defects, rebirth,] up to pain, are the causes of defects insofar as wrong knowledge bears upon them. Therefore when the right knowledge which bears upon them arises, [it] makes the sense of ego cease, because it is contradictory that these two [i.e., this right knowledge and the sense of ego,] may bear upon the same object.[69]

The knowledge of the defects' causes allegedly brings about liberation because the various defects are the causes of activity (*pravṛttinimitta*). Commenting on NSū 1.1.18 (according to which "the defects are characterized as prompting to act"),[70] Pakṣilasvāmin explains that as such they bind individuals to *saṃsāra*:

> Because [the defects] have a common substratum with cognitions, they are qualities of the self; because they are the cause of activity and because they have the power of connecting [the present life] with a new birth, they are the causes of *saṃsāra*; because *saṃsāra* is beginningless, they occur in a beginningless series. Wrong knowledge ceases through right knowledge; when

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[67] See NBh 7,12–14 (quoted above, fn. 23, p. 193) and NBh 7,1–2: *etasmān mithyājñānād anukūleṣv artheṣu rāgaḥ pratikūleṣu ca dveṣaḥ / rāgadveṣādhikārāc cāsatyeṛṣyāsūyāmānalobhādayo doṣā bhavanti /.* "From this wrong knowledge [arise] desire for things that are favourable [to the self's pleasure] and aversion for those that are adverse [to it]. And because desire and aversion are at the head [of all the other defects, in turn,] defects such as untruthfulness, envy, jealousy, [self-]conceit or cupidity occur." NSū 4.1.3 distinguishes three sorts of such defects: *tat trairāśyaṃ rāgadveṣamohārthāntarabhāvāt /.* "This [multitude of defects] is [divided] into three groups, because desire, aversion and delusion are distinct things."

[68] *doṣanimittānāṃ tattvajñānād ahaṅkāranivṛttiḥ /.*

[69] NBh 259,6–7: *śarīrādiduḥkhāntaṃ prameyaṃ doṣanimittaṃ tadviṣayatvān mithyājñānasya / tad idaṃ tattvajñānaṃ tadviṣayam utpannam ahaṅkāraṃ nivartayati / samānaviṣaye tayor virodhāt /.*

[70] *pravartanālakṣaṇā doṣāḥ /.*

> wrong knowledge ceases, the series of desire and aversion is cut off; this is liberation.[71]

Upon seeing defects and action as the cause of pain, someone who practices the cultivation of the thought of pain gets rid of pain and thus gets liberated:

> On the other hand, he who sees pain, the basis of pain and pleasure [which is always] intermingled with pain [i.e., he who sees] that all of this is pain, thoroughly knows pain; and pain, [when] thoroughly known, is abandoned, because it is no [more] clung upon to, just as poisoned food. In the same way, [he who knows pain] sees defects and action as the cause of pain; and as long as the defects have not been abandoned, the annihilation of the series of pains cannot occur; therefore he abandons the defects. And once defects have been abandoned, activity does not lead to the connection [to a new birth] for [someone] who has abandoned defilements, as has been said [in NSū 4.1.34].[72]

Cultivating the thought of pain therefore brings about the power to cut off (*vicchid-*) any craving, as Uddyotakara specifies:

> [He] who cultivates [the thought that] everything is pain has the thought of non-attachment (*anabhirati*) with respect to the three worlds. And for [him] who dwells (*upāsīna*) in this [thought], the craving regarding the three worlds is cut off. What [we] call craving is one's longing for rebirth. He who cultivates [the thought] that everything is pain does not have this [craving]; for nobody longs for pain. Since [he] has abandonned [this] craving, he no [longer] clings to these [things] which are instrumental in rebirth. Because [he] does not cling to them, merit and demerit that have not yet arisen no [longer] occur; as for the merit and demerit that have already arisen, they are

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[71] NBh 219,11–13: *buddhisamānāśrayatvād ātmaguṇāḥ / pravṛttihetutvāt punarbhavapratisandhānasāmarthyāc ca saṃsārahetavaḥ / saṃsārasyānāditvād anādinā prabandhena pravartante / mithyājñānanivṛttis tattvajñānāt / mithyājñānanivṛttau rāgadveṣaprabandhavicchedo 'pavarga iti /.*

[72] NBh 258,15–20: *yas tu duḥkhaṃ duḥkhāyatanaṃ duḥkhānuṣaktaṃ sukhaṃ ca sarvam idaṃ duḥkham iti paśyati sa duḥkhaṃ parijānāti / parijñātaṃ ca duḥkhaṃ prahīṇaṃ bhavaty anupādānāt saviṣānnavat / evaṃ doṣān karma ca duḥkhahetur iti paśyati / na cāprahīṇeṣu doṣeṣu duḥkhaprabandhocchedena śakyaṃ bhavitum iti sa doṣān prajahāti / prahīṇeṣu ca doṣeṣu na pravṛttiḥ pratisandhānāya hīnakleśasyety uktam /.*

> exhausted through [his] experiences. Because of the annihilation of the seed of *saṃsāra* that is merit and demerit, he is liberated, i.e., he is not born again.[73]

Here, Uddyotakara seems to have in mind another passage from Pakṣilasvāmin's NBh:

> Thus, for [someone] who sees that every locus of the arising [of the body, sense organs and cognitions] is intermingled with various torments, the thought of pain is firmly established with respect to both pleasure and the means of obtaining pleasure[, namely] the body, sense organs and cognitions. And because of this firm establishment of the thought of pain, [this individual] has the thought of non-attachment with respect to all worlds. [And] for [him] who dwells in this thought of non-attachment with respect to all worlds, the craving regarding all worlds is cut off. Because of the abandonment of craving, he is freed from all pain, just as [someone] who understands that milk is poison because of [its] having poison [in it] does not cling to [milk, and] not clinging [to it], does not suffer the pain of death.[74]

The cultivation of the thought of pain is thus presented as the antidote (*pratipakṣa*) to pleasure, which for its part is compared to poisoned food.[75] Pakṣilasvāmin, while commenting on NSū 4.1.58 (which he

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[73] NV 59,20–60,5: *sarvaṃ duḥkhaṃ bhāvayatas trailokye 'syānabhiratisañjñā bhavati / tāṃ copāsīnasya trailokyaviṣayā tṛṣṇā vicchidyate / tṛṣṇā nāma punarbhavaprārthanā / sāsya sarvaṃ duḥkham iti bhāvayato na bhavati / na hi kaścid duḥkhaṃ prārthayate / tṛṣṇāprahāṇād yāni punarbhavasādhanāni / tāni nopādatte / tadanupādānād anāgatau dharmādharmau na bhavataḥ / yāv apy utpannau dharmādharmau tāv apy upabhogāt prakṣayaṃ gacchataḥ / so 'yaṃ dharmādharmalakṣaṇasya saṃsārabījasyocchedād apavṛjyate na punar jāyata iti /.*

[74] NBh 245,9–14: *evaṃ sarvam utpattisthānaṃ vividhabādhanānuṣaktaṃ paśyataḥ sukhe ca sukhasādhaneṣu ca śarīrendriyabuddhiṣu duḥkhasañjñā vyavatiṣṭhate / duḥkhasañjñāvyavasthānāc ca sarvalokeṣv anabhiratisañjñā bhavati / sarvalokeṣv anabhiratisañjñām upāsīnasya sarvalokaviṣayā tṛṣṇā vicchidyate / tṛṣṇāprahāṇāt sarvaduḥkhād vimucyata iti / yathā viṣayogāt payo viṣam iti budhyamāno nopādatte / anupādadāno maraṇaduḥkhaṃ nāpnotīti /.*

[75] For occurrences of the comparison of food poison in Nyāya texts besides NBh 245,9–14 and NBh 247,3–11 (quoted below, fn. 78, p. 206), see NBh 258,15–20 (quoted above, fn. 71, p. 204); see also, e.g., NBh 8,2–3: *tad yathā madhuviṣasampṛktam annam anādeyam evaṃ sukhaṃ duḥkhānuṣaktam anādeyam iti /*. "Therefore, just as food mixed with honey and poison is to be avoided, in the same way, pleasure, which is intermingled with pain, is to be avoided."

takes to prescribe the cultivation of the thought of pain),[76] further explains:

> And indeed, this [individual] firmly established in the consciousness of pleasure [wrongly] believes pleasure to be the highest human goal[, thinking]: "There is no higher good besides pleasure; when pleasure is obtained, the goal is attained, what was to be done is done." Because of a wrong conception, he is attached (*saṃrajyate*) to pleasure and the objects that are means of obtaining it. Being attached (*saṃrakta*), he attempts [to obtain] pleasure. [And] for this [individual thus] attempting [to obtain pleasure] arises a pain of various kinds that is the cause of [re-]birth, old age, disease, death, the contact with undesirable [things], the separation from desirable [things], and the non-occurrence of the [things he] longs for; [and] he wrongly believes all this variety of pain to be pleasure. Pain involves (*aṅga*) pleasure: without getting pain, one cannot obtain pleasure. He whose intelligence is troubled by the thought of pleasure, [thinking about pain]: "This is [all] pleasure because it is aimed at [bringing about pleasure]," does not escape *saṃsāra* since he runs [through it like the tiny creatures ceaselessly revolving in the state described in the scriptures as] "Be born! Die!" (*jāyasva mriyasva*).[77] Therefore [the NSū] teaches the antidote (*pratipakṣa*) to this thought of pleasure, [namely] the cultivation of the thought of pain.[78]

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[76] NSū 4.1.58 states *duḥkhavikalpe sukhābhimānāc ca* /. "And because one wrongly believes the variety of pain to be pleasure." According to NBh 247,3, the following should be supplied: *duḥkhasañjñābhāvanopadeśaḥ kriyate*, "[we] teach the cultivation of the thought of pain."

[77] See ChU 5.10.8: *athaitayoḥ pathor na katareṇacana tānīmāni kṣudrāṇy asakṛd āvartīni bhūtāni bhavanti jāyasva mriyasveti / etat tṛtīyaṃ sthānam* /. "Then there are those proceeding on neither of these two paths – they become the tiny creatures revolving ceaselessly. 'Be born! Die!' – that is a third state." Translation Olivelle 1998: 237.

[78] NBh 247,3–11: *ayaṃ ca khalu sukhasaṃvedane vyavasthitaḥ sukhaṃ paramapuruṣārthaṃ manyate / na sukhād anyan niḥśreyasam asti / sukhe prāpte caritārthaḥ kṛtakaraṇīyo bhavatīti / mithyāsaṅkalpāt sukhe tatsādhaneṣu ca viṣayeṣu saṃrajyate / saṃraktaḥ sukhāya ghaṭate / ghaṭamānasyāsya janmajarāvyādhiprāyaṇāniṣṭasamprayogeṣṭaviprayogaprārthitānupapattinimittam anekavidhaṃ yāvad duḥkham utpadyate / tad duḥkhavikalpaṃ sukham ity abhimanyate / sukhāṅgabhūtaṃ duḥkham / na duḥkham anāsādya śakyaṃ sukham avāptum / tādarthyāt sukham evedam iti sukhasañjñopahataprajño jāyasva mriyasveti sandhāvatīti saṃsāraṃ*

Uddyotakara too explains:

> And he who wrongly believes that the variety of pain accruing to [someone] who makes efforts so as to obtain pleasure is pleasure because it is a cause of pleasure clings to it again [and again]. He does not escape *saṃsāra* [i.e.,] he is born again and again. The antidote to this thought of pleasure is taught [here – namely, the thought that] everything is pain.[79]

Dharmakīrti devotes a great part of the stanzas translated below to criticizing the Naiyāyikas' understanding of *duḥkhabhāvanā* and to distinguishing it from the Buddhist understanding of *duḥkhabhāvanā*. This fact is worth noting, because the reason why Dharmakīrti primarily targets Naiyāyikas in this debate may well be the (at least apparent) proximity of the Nyāya's soteriology with that of Buddhism. For although the Naiyāyikas claim that liberation is a process of discrimination and isolation of the self from what it is not, and although they criticize the Buddhist view that no self is liberated, their soteriological categories resemble very much the Buddhist ones. Similarities are particularly obvious in, e.g., the meditation on the thought of pain, but also in meditations aimed at provoking disgust, the notion of right knowledge as an antidote to bondage, the three types of defects, concepts that are analogous to the Buddhists' *bhava-* and *vibhava-tṛṣṇā*, similarities with certain sequences of *pratītyasamutpāda*, reinterpretation of the Buddhists' four wrong notions, etc.[80] As already noted by several modern scholars, in all probability these resemblances are due to the fact that the Nyāya's soteriology was influenced by that of Buddhism through the intermediary of the YSū and YBh.[81] These borrowings

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nātivartate / tad asyāḥ sukhasañjñāyāḥ pratipakṣo duḥkhasañjñābhāvanam upadiśyate /.

[79] NV 463,17–464,2: *yaś ca sukhārthaṃ yatamānasya duḥkhavikalpo bhavati taṃ sukhāṅgabhāvāt sukham ity abhimanyamānaḥ punas tad upādatte / punaḥ punar jāyata iti na saṃsāram ativartate / tasyāḥ sukhasañjñāyāḥ pratipakṣa upadeśo 'yaṃ kriyate sarvaṃ duḥkham iti /.*

[80] See, e.g., Faddegon 1969: 352, Vetter 1990: 127, fn. 1 (which suggests in particular that the Nyāya's method of the cultivation of the thought of pain was borrowed from Buddhism) and Halbfass 1997: 160 and 163, n. 37.

[81] On the influence of the YSū and YBh on the NBh, see, e.g., Oberhammer 1964: 312–315. On the absorption of Buddhist soteriological aspects within the YSū and YBh see, e.g., La Vallée Poussin 1937, Wezler 1987: 375–378 and Bronkhorst 1994. On

might be the reason why Dharmakīrti is so eager to present the Naiyāyikas' soteriological doctrine as a sort of misunderstanding of the Buddhist doctrine of salvation – a misunderstanding that, according to him, stems from the belief in the self's existence to which the Naiyāyikas continue to cling.

3.3. TRANSLATION AND COMMENTARY OF PV 2.220–256

3.3.1. Dharmakīrti's Main Point: Detachment Presupposes Detachment from the Self (PV 2.220–225)

As seen above, the Naiyāyikas hold that liberation consists in achieving a state of detachment where the self is entirely disconnected from the various means of realizing pleasure (such as our body or sense organs) that we wrongly take to belong to the self, whereas these means of realizing pleasure are only adventiously associated to the self. Thus according to Manorathanandin, the debate between a proponent of the existence of the self (Ātmavādin) and a proponent of selflessness (Nairātmyavādin) starts with this assertion from the Ātmavādin:

> Objection: Even if [someone] has an attachment to the self, due to [his] detachment from what [supposedly] belongs to the self [and] is the means to realize pleasure, he is not entangled in *saṃsāra*.[82]

Dharmakīrti's answer runs as follows:

> (2.220) Of necessity, [someone] who is attached to the self is not detached (*virajyate*) from what [supposedly] belongs to the [self and is the means to realize pleasure].[83] And there is no cause [that would allow him] to eliminate

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the hypothesis that Buddhism influenced the Nyāya soteriology through this absorption, see, e.g., Wezler 1984: 336, Oberhammer 1984: 38ff. and Slaje 1995: 121–122. As for the alternative possibility that the cause of these resemblances may lie in some other common source, see Oberhammer 1977: 210, fn. 287.

[82] PVV 87,19–20: *yady apy ātmani snehavān tathāpy ātmīye sukhasādhane vairāgyān na saṃsaratīti cet* /. To be compared with the nearly identical PVP D96a3/P110b8.

[83] According to PVP D96a4/P111a1 and PVV 87,21. Note PVṬ *Ñe* D139a2–3/P171b4–5: *bdag gi chags pa gaṅ yin pa de bdag tu chags pa daṅ ldan pa daṅ 'brel pa tsam gyis byas pa yin gyi rgyu lhag pa la ltos pa ni ma yin no // 'brel pa de yaṅ dus thams cad du khyad par med pa yin no źes bya bar dgoṅs so //*. "Attachment to what [suppo-

> [his] attachment to a self [regarded as] free from defects [i.e., free from suffering and absolutely devoid of affliction][84].[85]

From the very beginning of the discussion, Dharmakīrti states the gist of his critique of the Nyāya position: no one can achieve detachment from what supposedly belongs to the self without being detached from the self, and the Naiyāyika, by claiming that the self is free of defects (i.e., devoid of any of the aspects that bind us to suffering and *saṃsāra*), makes liberation an unattainable goal. Manorathanandin draws the consequence of this assertion:

> Therefore how [could] liberation [be achieved] through a detachment that would regard [merely] what [supposedly] belongs to the self [and not the attachment to the self], since attachment to the self is contradictory to detachment from what [supposedly] belongs to the self?[86]

The Naiyāyika claims that liberation consists in freeing ourselves from our attachment to various factors that we wrongly take to belong to the self; but Dharmakīrti points out that we cannot get rid of what we wrongly consider to belong to the self as long as we do not get rid of our attachment to the self itself.

> (2.221a) Objection: [It is not the self but one's] attachment [to the self which] is defective [and should be eliminated].[87]

The Ātmavādin objects that the self is not defective in itself, and that it is only the attachment to it that should be abandoned in order to reach liberation, as Devendrabuddhi explains:

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sedly] belongs to the self is due merely to the relation to possessing attachment to the self, but does not depend on any additional cause. Now, this relation never differs. Such is the intention."

[84] According to PVP D96a6–7/P111a4–5 (*skyes bu de ni sdug bsṅal daṅ bral ba daṅ gcig tu rnam par 'tshe ba med pa'i bdag 'dod pa yin pa de ltar na bdag la chags pa daṅ bral ba ñid ma yin no* //. Tib. *rnam par 'tshe ba* may render Skt. *viheṭhā* or *vihiṃsā*).

[85] PV 2.220: *niyamenātmani snihyaṃs tadīye na virajyate / na cāsty ātmani nirdoṣe snehāpagamakāraṇam* /. See Devendrabuddhi's formal application (*prayoga*) in PVP D96a7–b1/P111a5–7.

[86] PVV 87,22: *tat katham ātmīyavirāgān muktiḥ / ātmasnehasyātmīyavairāgyavirodhitvāt* /.

[87] PV 2.221a: *snehaḥ sadoṣa iti cet.*

> The opponent thinks as follows: The self is free from defects, but [it is] the attachment to this [immaculate self that] is defective. [And] since [it is] defective, the wise ought to eliminate [it], as [one ought to eliminate] a finger bitten by a snake.[88]

Manorathanandin similarly clarifies the Ātmavādin's position in the following way:

> Even though the self is free from defects, the attachment to it is defective.[89]

Here is Dharmakīrti's riposte:

> (2.221b–222) [Dharmakīrti:] Then [i.e., since attachment is defective and hence ought to be eliminated,][90] what [should be done]? [The Ātmavādin:] Get rid of it! [Dharmakīrti: But] it is impossible to get rid of this [attachment] if its object[, the self,][91] is [regarded as] unblemished (*adūṣita*). [And indeed,] the elimination of desire, aversion, etc.,[92] which are related to [i.e., arise from one's seeing] good qualities and defects [in a certain object, can only be] due to [the fact that one] no [longer] sees these [good qualities and defects] in the object; but [this elimination can]not [take place according to] the method (*krama*) that [obtains] in the [case of] external [things].[93]

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[88] PVP D96b2–3/P111a7–8: *bdag ni ñes pa med pa ñid yin la / de la chags pa gaṅ yin pa de ñid ñes pa daṅ ldan pa yin no // ñes pa daṅ ldan pa ñid kyi phyir mkhas pa ñid kyis dor bar bya ba yin te / sbrul gyis zin pa'i sor mo bźin no źes de ltar gźan dag sems so //*. On the comparison with a finger bitten by a snake, see below, fn. 123, p. 219.

[89] PVV 88,1: *yady apy ātmā nirdoṣas tathāpi snehaḥ sadoṣa iti*.

[90] According to PVP D96b3/P111b1 (*ñes pa daṅ bcas pa yin na* and *bdag tu chags pa skyon daṅ ldan pa ñid yin pa'i phyir*) and PVV 88,1 (*tataḥ sadoṣatvāt*).

[91] According to PVP D96b4/P111b2 (*bdag*) and PVV 88,4 (*ātmani*).

[92] According to PVP D96b7/P111b6, "etc." includes jealousy (**īrṣyā*). For a definition of *īrṣyā*, see PVṬ *Ñe* D139a7/P172a3.

[93] PV 2.221b–222: *tataḥ kiṃ tasya varjanam / adūṣite 'sya viṣaye na śakyaṃ tasya varjanam // prahāṇir icchādveṣāder guṇadoṣānubandhinaḥ / tayor adṛṣṭer[a] viṣaye na tu bāhyeṣu yaḥ kramaḥ //*. [[a] PV_{Miy} and PV_{PVV} read *adṛṣṭir*, whereas $PV_{Miy(Tib)}$ reads, together with the PVP (passim), *ma mthoṅ bas*.] This might be related to the commentators' explanation of *prahāṇi* as *prahāṇyupāya* (PVP D97a1/P111b7 and PVV 88,10–11). Understanding *prahāṇi* as *prahāṇyupāya* allows one to read *adṛṣṭiḥ* ("[The means for] eliminating [...] is [one's] failing to see [...]"), whereas understanding *prahāṇi* alone fits well the ablative *adṛṣṭeḥ*, indicating the means or cause

According to Dharmakīrti, if, as the Ātmavādin claims, it is only our attachment to the self that is defective while the self remains free of defects, then nothing can remove our attachment to the self. Manorathanandin (anticipating Dharmakīrti's own explanation in PV 2.223) specifies that we could get rid of attachment if attachment were merely due to our seeing positive qualities in the very fact of being attached: upon realizing that attachment is defective, we would cease to be attached. But we are attached to something insofar as we see good qualities in the thing to which we are attached. Therefore if the very object of our attachment, namely the self, is not considered to be defective, it is impossible to cease being attached to it:

> Indeed, attachment is not clung to or abandoned due to its own good qualities and defects, but [due to those] of [its] object. Now, [according to you] this object[, the self,] is free from defects; therefore how to get rid of [attachment to] it?[94]

Seeing the self as free of defects in fact means attributing to it a positive quality, namely the property of really existing; and it is this attribution that prevents us from getting rid of our attachment to the self. Thus, while commenting on Devendrabuddhi,[95] Śākyabuddhi specifies that if the self is not regarded as defective, it is impossible to cease being attached to it, "because the attachment to the self only arises from

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of this elimination. On the issue of *upāya*, note Śākyabuddhi's (PVṬ *Ñe* D139b1–2/P172a5–6) interesting explanation: *ma mthoṅ ba tsam ni thabs su 'gyur ba ma yin te / med pa ni rgyu ma yin pa'i phyir ro // 'on kyaṅ yon tan ma mthoṅ ba daṅ skyon ma mthoṅ bas 'dod chags daṅ źe sdaṅ mi skye ba de la go rim bźin du yon tan mthoṅ ba ma yin pa daṅ skyon mthoṅ ba ma yin pa ñid ma yin par dgag pas mthoṅ ba min pa'i sgras bśad pa yin no //*. "The mere absence of vision cannot be a means, for an absence is not a cause[, and this is the reason why the negation in *adṛṣṭi* is not a categorical one (*prasajyapratiṣedha*)]. Rather, [it is] through the non-vision of good qualities and the non-vision of defects [that] desire and aversion no [longer] arise. Here, the word 'non-vision' expresses, by [way of] an affirmative negation (**paryudāsapratiṣedha*), the fact that one does not see good qualities and does not see defects, respectively."

[94] PVV 88,4–6: *na hi snehaḥ svaguṇadoṣābhyām upādīyate tyajyate vā / kiṃ tu viṣayasya / viṣayaś ca nirdoṣa iti katham asya varjanam /*.

[95] See PVP D96b4–5/P111b2–3.

the [false] view of the self as [really] existing."[96] As a consequence, we cannot eliminate "desire, aversion, etc.," or, as the Naiyāyikas put it, "desire, aversion and delusion (*moha*)" – which constitute the defects of the transmigrating individual[97] – as we could get rid of some unwanted thing that we would regard as external to us.[98]

Indeed, Śrīdhara for instance claims that detachment from the means of realizing pleasure arises in the same way as our avoidance of ordinary unwanted things such as snakes or thorns, i.e., through a conscious effort to get rid of them caused by the realization that they are defective:

> [We] see [that people] avoid objects such as snakes, thorns and so on through an effort that is a particular quality of the self [and consists in] an intentional avoidance which presupposes the perception of a particular defect [in them]. From this [we] understand [that] the definitive avoidance of the body and [other means of realizing pleasure] too has as its cause the particular quality of the self that is [an effort consisting in] an intentional avoidance which presupposes the perception of the defects in the [things to be avoided].[99]

However, as Devendrabuddhi emphasizes, one cannot get rid of the attachment to the self as one gets rid of undesirable entities that do not belong to the mental sphere, since attachment of the self cannot be

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[96] PVṬ *Ñe* D139a5/D171b8: *bdag tu chags pa ni bdag yod pa ñid du lta ba tsam las skyes pa can ñid yin pa'i phyir*.

[97] See above, fn. 67, p. 203, and 71, p. 204.

[98] According to Prajñākaragupta, the phrase "but [this elimination can]not [take place according to] the method (*krama*) that [obtains] in the [case of] external [things]" is a reply to the following: "Objection: But one [can] abandon something external, even though it is endowed with good qualities." (PVA 148,19: *athāpi syāt / bāhyaṃ vastu guṇavad api parityajyate /*.) However, as the other commentators emphasize, Dharmakīrti's main point here seems to be rather that we can get rid of an external thing just because we do not want it (*anicchā*), whereas we cannot get rid of our attachment to the self (however hard we may want to abandon this attachment) as long as we do not eliminate its cause, i.e., our belief in the self.

[99] NK 27,1–3: *dṛṣṭo viṣayāṇām ahikaṇṭakādīnāṃ parityāgo viśeṣadoṣadarśanapūrvakābhisandhikṛtanivartakātmaviśeṣaguṇāt prayatnāt / tena śarīrādīnām ātyantikaḥ parityāgo 'pi taddoṣadarśanapūrvakābhisandhikṛtanivartakātmaviśeṣaguṇanimitto vijñāta iti* [...] /.

uprooted as long as one does not eliminate its cause, i.e., the belief in the self's very existence:

> When one has caught [something] undesirable like a thorn, one eliminates it [by removing it and putting it] elsewhere, but it is not so with mental qualities (**manoguṇa*) [such as desire and aversion]. Therefore, how [can] attachment to the self (**ātmābhiṣvaṅga*?), which comes from [one's] seeing the self as [really] existing, [be] eliminated as long as it has not been [clearly] established that [its] cause (**nimitta*), the [false] view of self, no [longer] exists?[100]

Manorathanandin too explains that while we can abandon some external thing just because we do not want it, we cannot get rid of our attachment to the self as long as the very cause of this attachment, i.e., the wrong notion that the self exists, is complete (*avikala*), i.e., as long as the conditions for the production of its effect remain intact:

> However, [it is] not [the case that] the method [employed] with respect to external things, viz. eliminating [them] just because [we] do not want [them] (*anicchā*), can also be employed with respect to internal [factors] such as attachment. [For] it is possible to eliminate [something] external that is [in turn] dependent on [some] external [factor just] because [we] do not want it, but it is not possible to uproot [attachment, etc.,] which are dependent on the [false] view of a self[, just because we do not want it], since [attachment] arises because [its] cause[, the false view of a self,] is complete.[101]

Dharmakīrti goes on:

> (2.223) [And] indeed, attachment is not due to the good qualities [seen in] attachment [itself]; rather, [it is due] to [one's] seeing good qualities in the ob-

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[100] PVP D97a2–3/P112a1–2: *tsher ma la sogs pa mṅon par mi 'dod pa gaṅ yin pa de phyuṅ nas gźan du 'dor bar byed pa de ltar yid kyi yon tan rnams ni ma yin no // de bas na bdag yod pa ñid du lta ba'i sgo nas 'oṅs pa'i bdag tu mṅon par chags pa ni ji srid bdag tu mthoṅ ba'i rgyu mtshan med par[a] ma grub pa de srid du gaṅ las spaṅs pa yin /*. [a] Taking PV 2.223 and PVV 88,15–17 (quoted below, fn. 101) into consideration, one is tempted to read *rgyu ma tshaṅ (ba) med par* instead of *rgyu mtshan med par*, i.e., "as long as it is not established that its cause, the [false] view of a self, is no [longer] complete."

[101] PVV 88,15–17: *na tu bāhyeṣu vastuṣu yaḥ kramo 'nicchāmātrakṛtatyāgarūpaḥ sa āntareṣv api snehādiṣu yuktaḥ / bāhyādhīnaṃ bāhyam anicchayā tyaktuṃ śakyam / ātmadarśanādhīnaṃ tu na śakyaparihāram / avikalahetutvenotpatteḥ /*.

> ject [of attachment. Now] if this cause is complete, what [will] prevent [its] effect [viz. attachment to the self, from arising]?[102]

According to Dharmakīrti, attachment does not grow from our seeing positive qualities in attachment itself, but rather, from our seeing good qualities in the object of our attachment. As Devendrabuddhi points out, this means that we cannot put an end to attachment just because we see the defects of being attached:

> If attachment [simply] arose due to seeing good qualities in attachment to the self, then this [attachment] could cease to exist due to seeing defects in it. [But this is not the case.][103]

Dharmakīrti further argues that attachment to the self cannot be eliminated as long as its cause is complete, and Manorathanandin explains that this cause is "the good quality [that we see] in the object [of our attachment]."[104] Devendrabuddhi specifies that the quality thus attributed to the self is its mere existence:

> The cause of [one's] seeing good qualities in the attachment to the self is simply that one sees the self as [really] existing. [Now,] this [cause] is complete.[105]

As long as the cause of our attachment to the self remains intact, this attachment cannot be eliminated. However, the Ātmavādin has stated earlier that the attachment to the self is defective, and Dharmakīrti is now about to ask him a question that Devendrabuddhi introduces in the following way:

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[102] PV 2.223: *na hi snehaguṇāt snehaḥ kiṃ tv arthaguṇadarśanāt / kāraṇe 'vikale tasmin kāryaṃ kena nivāryate //*.

[103] PVP D97a5/P112a4–5: *gal te bdag tu chags pa la yon tan du lta ba las chags pa skye bar 'gyur ba de'i tshe de ñes par mthoṅ ba las de med par 'gyur na*. The sentence is an introduction to PV 2.223. Manorathanandin (PVV 88,18) simply introduces Dharmakīrti's verse with *kiṃ ca*. As for Prajñākaragupta (PVA 148,26), he holds PV 2.223 to provide a summary (*saṅgraha*) of what precedes.

[104] PVV 88,22: *kāraṇe 'vikale tasmin viṣayaguṇe*.

[105] PVP D97a6/P112a5–6: *bdag la chags pa'i yon tan mthoṅ ba'i rgyu mtshan yaṅ bdag yod pa mthoṅ ba tsam ñid yin no // de ma tshaṅ ba med pa yin no //*. See Devendrabuddhi's *prayoga* in PVP D97a7–b2/P112a7–b1.

> [You have] said: Attachment is defective, and what is defective ought to be abandoned by the wise, as a finger bitten by a snake. Now, attachment to the self is defective [and] hence ought to be abandoned. With regard to this[, let us ask the following question]:[106]
>
> (2.224) Or, what [does] the defectiveness which [you] observe in attachment [consist of, so that attachment to the self would have to be abandoned][107]? [If you answer: The defectiveness of attachment consists in its being] the basis of pain[, we shall reply: But] even so [i.e., even if this attachment is the cause of pain,[108] there will be] no detachment from it, just as [one is not detached] from the self [in spite of its being the cause of pain], because one sees [it] as being one's own.[109]

According to the Ātmavādin, attachment to the self must be abandoned because it is the basis, i.e., the cause, of pain. Devendrabuddhi explains that the Ātmavādin thus regards attachment as the basis of pain because due to it one craves for pleasure and thus clings to *saṃsāra*, which in turn is pain:

> [He] who craves (**paritṛṣṇāvat*) for pleasure due to attachment to the self will cling to *saṃsāra*, which is pain (**duḥkhabhūta*). Therefore the defect of attachment is nothing but [its being] the cause of pain (**duḥkhahetu*), [and] thus it is established as being defective.[110]

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106 PVP D97b2–3/P112b1–3: *chags pa ni skyon daṅ bcas pa yin źiṅ / ñes pa daṅ ldan pa gaṅ yin pa de mkhas pa rnams kyis dor bar bya ba yin te / dper na sbrul gyis zin pa'i sor mo lta bu'o // bdag tu chags pa yaṅ ñes pa daṅ ldan pa yin pa de bas na dor bar bya ba yin no źes bśad pa gaṅ yin pa de la* [...] /.

107 According to PVP D97b3/P112b3 (*gaṅ gis 'di spaṅs yin*) and PVV 89,1 (*yenāyaṃ varjayitavyaḥ*).

108 According to PVV 89,5 (*tathāpi duḥkhahetutve 'pi*). PVP D97b5–6/P112b6–7: *gal te yaṅ de sdug bsṅal gyi rten ñid yin pa'i phyir ñes pa daṅ ldan pa dor bar bya ba yin pa / de ltar yaṅ* [...] /. "Even if this [attachment, which is] defective due to its being the basis of pain, ought to be abandoned, even so [...]."

109 PV 2.224: *kā vā sadoṣatā dṛṣṭā snehe duḥkhasamāśrayaḥ / tathāpi na virāgo 'tra svatvadṛṣṭer yathātmani //*.

110 PVP D97b4/P112b4–5: *bdag tu chags pa las bde ba la yoṅs su sred pa daṅ ldan pa sdug bsṅal du gyur pa'i 'khor ba len par 'gyur ro // de bas na chags pa'i ñes pa ni sdug bsṅal gyi rgyu ñid yin pa de ltar na skyon daṅ ldan par grub pa ñid do //*. See also Devendrabuddhi's *prayoga* in PVP D97b4–5/P112b5–6.

Manorathanandin gives a similar explanation:

> To explain: [he] who is attached to the self craves for the means of realizing the [self's] pleasure [and therefore] clings to *saṃsāra*, which is pain.[111]

However, according to Dharmakīrti, even though the Ātmavādin may be right to regard attachment to the self as the cause of pain, he fails to see that this attachment cannot be eliminated as long as it is considered one's own. For regarding something as one's own (whether this thing is seen as a cause of pain or not) is nothing but being attached to it; and the belief that something is our own stems from the belief in the self's existence. Thus Devendrabuddhi explains:

> Just as one is not detached from the self even though the self is the cause of pain, because it is the cause of the notion of "one's own," in the same way, one will not be detached from the attachment to the self, if it is grasped as one's own, even if it is the cause of pain.[112]

The Ātmavādin, however, refuses to draw from this the conclusion that the cause of pain is in fact the *ātman* itself:

> (2.225) Objection: The self is not a cause of pain [when] in isolation (*vinā*) from these [factors that are attachment, cognition and sense organs, but only when associated with them. Answer: But] these [factors] too are such [i.e., they are not causes of pain in isolation but only insofar as they are associated with the self]! [And] thus, both of them [viz., the self and factors such as attachment] are [equally] free from defects [since neither are causes of pain in isolation]; therefore [one can]not [become] detached from either of them.[113]

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111 PVV 89,2: *tathā hy ātmani snihyan tatsukhasādhaneṣu tṛṣṇāvān duḥkhabhūtaṃ saṃsāram upādatte* /.

112 PVP D97b6–7/P112b7–8: *ji ltar bdag la raṅ gi blo rgyu yin pa'i phyir / bdag sdug bsṅal gyi rgyu yin na yaṅ 'dod chags daṅ bral ba ma yin pa de ltar bdag la chags pa yaṅ raṅ ñid du bzuṅ ba na sdug bsṅal gyi rten ñid yin na yaṅ 'dod chags daṅ bral bar 'gyur ba ma yin pa* [...] /. Note also PVV 89,5–6: *yathātmani svatvadṛṣṭer duḥkhanidānabhūtāyā hetāv ātmani na virāgaḥ* /. "Just as one is not detached from the self, which is the cause of [one's] seeing [something] as one's own, which [in turn] is the cause of pain." See also Devendrabuddhi's *prayoga* in PVP D97b7–98a1/P113a1–2.

113 PV 2.225: *na tair vinā duḥkhahetur ātmā cet te 'pi tādṛśāḥ / nirdoṣaṃ dvayam apy evaṃ vairāgyaṃ na dvayos tataḥ* //.

The Ātmavādin defends his contention that although attachment to the self is defective insofar as it produces suffering and bondage, the self, for its part, is free of such defects. He does so by objecting, in accordance with the Nyāya doctrine, that in fact the self is not the cause of pain in itself, i.e., when isolated from the factors that we wrongly take to be the self.[114] It can legitimately be considered a cause of pain only insofar as it is associated with them:

> It is because it is endowed with [things] such as attachment, cognitions and sense organs, which [supposedly] belong to it, that the self is a cause of pain, but not in isolation (**kevala*?). Thus only the attachment to the self, etc., are defective, but not the self.[115]

Dharmakīrti replies that such a reasoning equally applies to the various elements that, according to the Naiyāyika, are adventitiously associated to the self. Thus Devendrabuddhi explains:

> Just as the self is not a cause of pain [when] in isolation, but [only] because it is associated with [things] such as the attachment to the self, in the same way, [things] such as the attachment to the self are not [causes of pain] in isolation, but because they are associated with a self.[116]

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[114] On these factors see above, fn. 56, p. 200.

[115] PVP D98a2–3/P113a2–3: *bdag gi chags pa'i blo daṅ dbaṅ po la sogs pa daṅ ldan pa'i phyir bdag sdug bsṅal gyi rgyu ñid yin gyi yan gar ba ni ma yin pa de ltar na bdag la chags pa la sogs pa ñid ñes pa daṅ ldan pa ñid yin gyi bdag ni ma yin no //*. This interpretation of *bdag gi chags pa'i blo daṅ dbaṅ po la sogs pa daṅ ldan pa'i phyir* is based on the wording of PVV 89,10: *(na taiḥ) snehabuddhīndriyādibhir ātmīyair (vinā duḥkhahetur ātmā cet /)*.

[116] PVP D98a4–5/P113a6–7: *ji ltar bdag yan gar ba sdug bsṅal gyi rgyu ma yin gyi 'on kyaṅ bdag tu chags pa la sogs pa daṅ ldan pa yin pa'i phyir yin pa de ltar na bdag la chags pa la sogs pa yaṅ yan gar ba ma yin gyi 'on kyaṅ bdag daṅ ldan pa ñid kyi phyir ro //*. Manorathanandin and Prajñākaragupta provide a similar interpretation. Cf. PVV 89,10–11: *te 'pi snehādayas tādṛśā ātmānam antareṇa na duḥkhahetavaḥ /*. "These [things] too – such as the attachment to the self – are 'such' [i.e., they too] are not causes of pain in isolation (*antareṇa*) from the self." See also PVA 149,3–4: *na cātmasnehādaya ātmānam āśrayam antareṇa duḥkhahetavaḥ /*. "And [things] such as attachment to the self are not causes of pain in isolation from the self, which is [their] substratum (*āśraya*)."

The Ātmavādin must therefore acknowledge that neither the self nor what we wrongly consider to belong to the self are defective in themselves:

> Just as the isolated self is not defective since it is not a cause of pain, in the same way, [things] such as the attachment to the self are not defective, since they are not causes of pain [in isolation].[117]

As a consequence, in the Nyāya perspective, it is impossible to reach detachment either from the self or from these various factors, since they are both seen as free of defects. And yet the Naiyāyika himself admits that they are both defective insofar as they are both causes of pain when associated:

> Just as one does not become detached from the self, which entails the same defect as [things] such as the attachment to the self and the sense organs, in the same way, one will not become detached from [things] such as the attachment to the self, which share the same defect as the self.[118]

In other words, liberation is impossible:

> And thus, *saṃsāra* and defects are difficult [i.e., impossible,] to escape, because [their] cause is complete.[119]

3.3.2. Cultivating the Thought of Pain (duḥkhabhāvanā) Does Not Eliminate the Notion of Belonging to the Self (ātmīya) (PV 2.226–228)

The Ātmavādin does not admit his defeat so easily. He puts forward a new argument that involves what Pakṣilasvāmin and Uddyotakara

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[117] PVP D98a5–6/P113a7–b1: *ji ltar bdag yan gar ba sdug bsṅal gyi rgyu ma yin pas ñes pa daṅ ldan pa ma yin pa de ltar bdag tu chags pa la sogs pa yaṅ*[a] *sdug bsṅal gyi rgyu ma yin pas na bdag tu chags pa la sogs pa yaṅ ñes pa daṅ ldan pa ma yin no //.* [a] Although *yaṅ* (**api*) makes sense (but is redundant with the second *yaṅ*), one wonders whether *yan gar ba* ("isolated/in isolation"), or even *yaṅ yan gar ba* are not to be preferred.

[118] PVP D98a7–b1/P113b1–3: *ji ltar bdag tu chags pa daṅ dbaṅ po la sogs pa daṅ ñes pa mtshuṅs pa can gyi bdag gi chags pa daṅ bral ba ma yin pa de ltar bdag daṅ mtshuṅs pa'i ñes pa bdag tu chags pa la sogs pa'i chags pa daṅ bral bar mi 'gyur ro //.*

[119] PVV 89,15: *tathā ca saṃsāro doṣāś ca durvārā hetusākalyāt /.*

present as the Nyāya's main instrument of liberation, namely, the cultivation of the thought of pain.

> (2.226) Objection: By [subjecting attachment, etc., to] the cultivation of [the thought of] pain, one can [become detached from them in spite of their being one's own], as a limb bitten by a snake [can] be abandoned [although it is one's own, after one has become detached from it because of pain].[120]

According to Devendrabuddhi, the Ātmavādin's reasoning is as follows:

> A human being cultivates [the thought of] pain [by seeing pain] in [things] such as the attachment to the self; and by [thus] cultivating [the thought of] pain, he becomes detached from [things] such as the attachment to the self, as someone who cultivates [the thought of] pain abandons a limb bitten by a snake, although [this limb is] grasped as his own.[121]

The Naiyāyika opponent considers that it is indeed possible to become detached from the factors wrongly thought to belong to the self by cultivating the thought of pain with respect to them, i.e., by cultivating the idea that they are in fact causes of pain and not means of pleasure: this cultivation can make us abandon them, as Manorathanandin puts it,

> just as the limb [that has been] bitten by a snake, although [it is] one's own, is abandoned after one has become detached [from it] due to pain, because [this limb] is no [longer] a basis for enjoyment.[122]

While comparing this process to that of somebody resorting to the amputation of his own limb bitten by a snake, the Ātmavādin might be implying that the Buddhists, who also make use of this image in their soteriology,[123] should acknowledge the possibility of eliminating attachment to the self according to this analogy.

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[120] PV 2.226ab: *duḥkhabhāvanayā syāc ced ahidaṣṭāṅgahānivat* /.

[121] PVP D98b3–4/P113b6–7: *skyes bu bdag tu chags pa la sogs pa la sdug bsṅal du sgom par byed ciṅ sdug bsṅal bsgom pas kyaṅ bdag tu chags pa la sogs pa la 'dod chags daṅ bral bar 'gyur te / dper na sbrul gyis yan lag bzuṅ ba bdag gi ñid du ñe bar bzuṅ ba de yaṅ sdug bsṅal bsgom pa daṅ ldan pas spoṅ bar byed pa* [...] /.

[122] PVV 89,17: *yathātmīyam apy ahidaṣṭam aṅgaṃ duḥkhavaśād virajya tyajyate / anupabhogāśrayatvāt* /.

[123] See, e.g., RĀ 3.64: *sbrul gyis zin la ji lta bur / sor mo bcad la phan bśad pa / de bźin thub pas gźan phan pa / mi bde ba yaṅ bya bar gsuṅs* //. "Just as one says that it is beneficial to cut off a finger when [it has been] bitten by a snake, so the sage

Dharmakīrti's reply runs as follows:

> (2.226cd–228) [Answer:] The abandoning [of the sick limb occurs] due to [one's] abandoning the notion of [something] belonging to the self regarding this [limb], but not in the contrary case [i.e., not as long as the notion that this limb belongs to the self remains].[124] [But] with regard to [things] such as the [body and] sense organs,[125] which are grasped as the basis of enjoyment [i.e., as the means to realize it],[126] what could prevent the idea that [they] are one's own? [And] therefore how (*kutaḥ*) [could one ever become] detached from them[, so that one could get rid of them][127]? It is [indeed] obvious (*pratyakṣa*) to everybody [that] with respect to [things] such as hair that have fallen off [one's] body, a cognition accompanied by contempt (*saghṛṇa*) arises, [whereas] with respect to [such things when they have] not [fallen off yet,[128] it is a cognition] accompanied by love (*saspṛha*) [that arises].[129]

According to Dharmakīrti, only someone who has already abandoned the notion that a limb is his own – i.e., belongs to the self – accepts the amputation of this limb. In Devendrabuddhi's words:

(**muni*) says that if it helps others, even a [temporary] displeasure (**asukha*) can be brought about."

124 Our interpretation of *atra* relies on PVV 89,22: *tatrāhidaṣṭāṅge*. As for *viparyaye*, Manorathanandin (PVV 89,22–23) interprets it as *ātmīyabuddhisattāyām*; see also Devendrabuddhi's commentary quoted below.

125 *ādi* is explained *lus kyi dbaṅ po la sogs pa* (**śarīrendriyādi*) in PVP D99a1/P114a5. PVA 149,12 mentions *śarīrādiṣu*. PVṬ *Ñe* D140b4/P173b6 also points to the body (*loṅs spyod pa'i rten ñid kyis ni lus bzuṅ ba yin no* //).

126 *āśraya* is explained *sgrub par byed pa* (**sādhana*) in PVP D99a1/P114a4–5, and *kāraṇatvena* in PVV 89,23. According to PVṬ *Ñe* D140b1–5/P173b3–8, *upabhoga* amounts to *sukha*, and *āśraya* to *hetu* (or *kāraṇa*), "because [it is] on their basis [that] the pleasures of the self arise" (PVṬ *Ñe* D140b4/P173b6: *de'i sgo nas bdag gi bde ba skye ba'i phyir ro* //). As for the sense organs, they are included because they are instrumental in the pleasures of the self (**ātmasukhasādhana*) insofar as they grasp objects (**viṣayagrahaṇa*).

127 According to PVV 89,25 (*yena tyajyate*).

128 According to PVV 90,4 (*anyatrācyuteṣu*).

129 PV 2.226cd–228: *ātmīyabuddhihānyātra tyāgo na tu viparyaye* // *upabhogāśrayatvena gṛhīteṣv indriyādiṣu* / *svatvadhīḥ kena vāryeta vairāgyaṃ tatra tat kutaḥ* // *pratyakṣam eva sarvasya keśādiṣu kalevarāt* / *cyuteṣu saghṛṇā buddhir jāyate 'nyatra saspṛhā* //.

> As long as one has not abandoned the notion that the limb bitten by a snake is the basis of enjoyment, one does not proceed to eliminate [it. But] when one gets rid of the notion of [something] belonging to the self regarding it, [thinking:] "If it is not in its natural condition, this sick limb is not the basis of enjoyment," then one can eliminate this limb [...] Therefore as long as the notion of [something] belonging to the self exists, one does not get rid [of anything].[130]

If we consider our body or sense organs as ours, how could we ever become detached from them? Or, as Manorathanandin puts it, "[how could one ever become detached from] them [whereas, insofar as they are] means of realizing enjoyment, [they are] parts of oneself?"[131] Dharmakīrti gives an example favoured by Buddhist authors,[132] namely that of those elements (such as hairs or nails) that we love as long as we regard them as part of ourselves, and to which we become indifferent or averse when they fall off the body: we keep loving them as long as they are part of our body (which is in turn a means of realizing pleasure) so that we regard them as ours,[133] and we only cease being at-

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130 PVP D98b6–7/P114a2–4: *ji srid du sbrul gyis bzuṅ ba'i yan lag la loṅs spyod pa'i rten gyi blo ñams pa med pa de srid du dor bar spro ba ma yin no // gaṅ gi tshe raṅ bźin du gnas par ma gyur pa na man chad yan lag 'di loṅs spyod pa'i rten ma yin no źes de la bdag gi blo 'dor bar byed pa de'i tshe yan lag de dor bar 'gyur ro //* [...] *de bas na ji srid du bdag gi blo yod pa de srid du dor ba ma yin no //*.

131 PVV 89,24–25: *tatropabhogasādhane svīyāvayave*.

132 As noted in Vetter 1990: 128, fn. 1, the passage is reminiscent of VisM 195,29–196,1: *tathāhi kesalomanakhadantakheḷasinghāṇika-uccārapassāvādisu ekakoṭṭhāsam pi sarīrato bahi patitaṃ sattā hatthena chupitum pi na icchanti aṭṭīyanti harāyanti jigucchanti / yaṃ yaṃ pan'ettha avasesaṃ hoti taṃ taṃ ti evaṃ paṭikūlam pi samānaṃ avijjandhakārapariyonaddhā attasineharāgarattā iṭṭhaṃ kantaṃ niccaṃ sukhaṃ attāti gaṇhanti /.* "And then, when any such bits of it as head hairs, body hairs, nails, teeth, spittle, snot, excrement or urine have dropped off the body, beings will not touch them; they are ashamed, humiliated and disgusted. But as long as anyone of these things remains in it, though it is just as repulsive, they take it as agreeable, desirable, permanent, pleasant, self, because they are wrapped in the murk of ignorance and dyed with affection and greed for the self." Translation Ñāṇamoli 2010: 184.

133 See PVP D99a3/P114a7–8: *skra la sogs pa lus las tha dad par ma gyur pa bdag gi ñid du kun nas bzuṅ ba yod na chags pa'i blo 'byuṅ ba bźin no //*. "As a cognition accompanied by love arises when [things] like [one's] hair, which are not separated [yet] from [one's] body, are grasped as being one's own."

tached to them inasmuch as our belief that they belong to us disappears.[134]

3.3.3. The Criticism of the Self's Relations with What One Ought to be Detached From (PV 2.229)

The commentators explain that the Ātmavādin (who, according to Prajñākaragupta, is relying on the doctrine of the "Vaiśeṣika, etc.,"[135] i.e., here, most probably the Nyāya doctrine of liberation) then objects the following:

> Objection: One abandons the very notion of [something] belonging to the self by cultivating [the thought of] pain [with regard to the different factors regarded as belonging to the self].[136]

Dharmakīrti replies:

> (2.229) Indeed, the idea of one's own [that applies] to these [factors][137] is generated by [their various] relations [to the self],[138] e.g., [the relation of]

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[134] See PVP D99a2–3/P114a7: *skyon bcas blo ni skye 'gyur ro // raṅ gi blo ni ma rtogs te / ṅa'i loṅs spyod kyi rten sgrub par byed pa yin no źes blo daṅ bral ba'i phyir ro //*. "[With respect to things such as hair that have fallen off one's body,] a cognition accompanied by contempt (**saghṛṇa*) arises; [i.e.,] the cognition of one's own (**sva[tva]buddhi*) is no [longer] perceived, because it is devoid of the cognition (**buddhi*) that [these things] are instrumental (**sādhana*, **sādhaka*) in [being] the basis of the I's enjoyment." Note, however, that Manorathanandin seems to understand that in both cases the hair, etc., are cognized as belonging to the self. See PVV 90,3–4: *etac ca pratyakṣam eva sarvasya keśādiṣu kalevarāc cyuteṣv ātmīyabuddhiviṣayeṣu saghṛṇā buddhir jāyate / janasyānyatrācyuteṣv ātmīyabuddhiviṣayeṣu saspṛhā /*. "And this is obvious for everybody: a cognition accompanied by contempt arises with respect to [things] such as hair that have fallen off the body [and] are the object of the cognition of belonging to the self;[a] [and] people have [a cognition] accompanied with love with respect to [such things] that are the object of the cognition of belonging to the self 'when [they have] not' [i.e.,] when they have not fallen [yet]." [a] Although PVV_{MS} 17a5 bears the same reading as the edition, we wonder whether the first *ātmīyabuddhiviṣayeṣu* could be a corruption of *anātmīyabuddhiviṣayeṣu* (in which case Manorathanandin's explanation would be similar to Devendrabuddhi's).

[135] PVA 149,18: *kiṃ ca / vaiśeṣikādīnām /*.

[136] PVV 90,6: *duḥkhabhāvanayātmīyabuddhir eva hīyata iti cet /*. See also PVP D99b1–2/P114b6–7.

> inherence (*samavāya*).[139] [Now] since this relation [too] is exactly of the same kind [i.e., complete,[140] the idea of the factors being one's own which is born from it[141] can]not [be] abandoned even if one sees [defects in them][142].[143]

Dharmakīrti is now targetting another aspect of the Nyāya's soteriology. The Naiyāyikas consider that the self entertains various relations (*sambandha*) with the elements to which it is associated in *saṃsāra*, and that these relations must cease in the liberated state. According to Dharmakīrti, they consist of "inherence, etc." (*samavāyādi*), and Prajñākaragupta as well as Manorathanandin seem to explain the "etc." in terms of the sixfold classification of the relation between the sense organ and the sensory object found in Uddyotakara's NV.[144] Thus, among the relations between the sense organ and the object per-

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137 I.e., "attachment, etc." (*snehādi*) according to PVP D99b2/P114b7, "cognition, etc." (*buddhyādi*) according to PVV 90,8.

138 According to PVP D99b2/P114b7–8 (*bdag la 'phrod pa 'du ba'i 'brel pa las yin no* //).

139 On the meaning of °*ādi* here, see the commentaries quoted below and PVP D99b2–3/P114b8: *sogs pa smos pas ni lus loṅs spyod kyi rten ñid daṅ dbaṅ po loṅs spyod kyi sgrub par byed pa ñid 'brel pa las skye ba*. "With the word 'etc.,' [Dharmakīrti means that this idea] is generated by relations [such as] the body's being the basis of the [self's] enjoyments (**upabhogāśrayatva*) and the sense organs' being instrumental in [the self's] enjoyments (**upabhogasādhanatva*)."

140 According to PVP D99b3/P115a1 (*de bźin yin / sṅa ma bźin du ma tshaṅ ba ñid med pa yin no* //). At the very end of his commentary on PV 2.229, Manorathanandin (PVV 90,13–14) explains *na hīyate* as follows: *nimittasyāvaikalyāt*, "because [its] cause is complete." Note also Prajñākaragupta's (PVA 149,23) explanation: *ity ātmasambandho na vyapaiti* /. "Therefore the relation with the self does not disappear."

141 According to PVP D99b3–4/P115a1–2 (*'phrod pa 'du ba la sogs pa'i 'brel pa las skye ba'i bdag tu chags pa la sogs pa la raṅ ñid kyi blo*) and PVV 90,13 (*sā svadhīḥ*).

142 According to PVP D99b3/P115a1 (*bdag la chags pa la sogs pa'i ñes pa de ltar mthoṅ yaṅ*), PVV 90,13 (*doṣadṛṣṭāv api*) and PVA 149,23 (*doṣadarśane 'pi*). While commenting on *sambandhaḥ sa tathaiveti*, Devendrabuddhi (PVP D99b3/P114b8–115a1) and Manorathanandin (PVV 90,13) had explained: *chags pa daṅ bral bar 'dod pa'i gnas skabs yin na yaṅ* (**vairāgyecchāvasthāyām api*?), "even when [one] is [in] the condition of aspiring to detachment," and: *duḥkhabhāvanāyām api*, "even if one cultivates [the thought of] pain."

143 PV 2.229: *samavāyādisambandhajanitā tatra hi svadhīḥ / sambandhaḥ sa tathaiveti dṛṣṭāv api na hīyate* //.

144 On the issue of this classification's origin, see Preisendanz 1989: 162, fn. 91.

ceived,[145] the NV distinguishes inherence, but also contact (*saṃyoga*), inherence in what is in contact (*saṃyuktasamavāya*) or inherence in what is inherent in what is in contact (*saṃyuktasamavetasamavāya*). Similarly, Prajñākaragupta explains:

> With pleasure, etc., [the self has] a relation [consisting of] inherence; with the body, [it has a relation consisting of] contact; with visual form, etc., which have their substratum in the body [and are therefore inherent in the body, the self has a relation consisting of] inherence in what is in contact [with it]; with [the properties of] being a visual form, etc., [which are inherent in the visual form, etc., which in turn are inherent in the body in contact with the self, the self has] a [relation consisting of] inherence in what is inherent [in what is in contact with it]; with the auditory sense organ, [it has] a [relation consisting of] contact; with the visual sense organ, etc., [it has a relation consisting of] contact with what has a contact [with it].[146]

Whatever the exact meaning of °*ādi* ("etc."), Dharmakīrti's stanza explicitly mentions the relation of inherence, since according to the Naiyāyikas, the elements from which we should detach ourselves inhere as qualities (*guṇa*) in the substratum constituted by the self.[147] As posterior Naiyāyikas such as Jayanta explain, these qualities are adventi-

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[145] NV 28,19–29,1: *sannikarṣaḥ punaḥ ṣoḍhā bhidyate / saṃyogaḥ saṃyuktasamavāyaḥ saṃyuktasamavetasamavāyaḥ samavāyaḥ samavetasamavāyo viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyabhāvaś ceti /*. "As for the contact [between the sense organ and the object mentioned in NSū 1.1.4], it is divided into [the] six [following] kinds: contact [*per se*], inherence in what is in contact, inherence in what is inherent in what is in contact, inherence, inherence in what is inherent (*samavetasamavāya*) and the relation between a particularity and what it particularizes (*viśeṣaṇaviśeṣyabhāva*)."

[146] PVA 149,21–23: *sukhādinā samavāyasambandhaḥ / śarīreṇa saṃyogaḥ / śarīrāśritai rūpādibhiḥ saṃyuktasamavāyaḥ / rūpatvādibhiḥ samavetasamavāyaḥ / śrotrendriyeṇa saṃyogaḥ / cakṣurādinā saṃyogisaṃyogaḥ /*. Cf. PVV 90,8–10: *tathā cātmanaḥ sukhādinā samavāyaḥ sambandhaḥ / śarīreṇa saṃyogaḥ / śarīrāśritai rūpādibhiḥ samyuktasamavāyaḥ / śrotrendriyeṇa saṃyogaś cakṣurādibhiḥ saṃyogisaṃyoga ātmasambandhaḥ /*. "And thus, the self's relation with pleasure, etc., is inherence. The self's relation with the body is contact; [its relation] with visual forms, etc., which have their substratum in the body, is inherence in what is in contact [with the self; its relation] with the auditory sense organ is contact; [its relation] with the visual sense organ and so on is contact with what has a contact [with the self]."

[147] On this notion of inherence and Dharmakīrti's criticism of the self as an inherence cause, see above, Introduction, §0.2.2.

tious (*āgantuka*) and not intrinsic (*sāṃsiddhika*) to the substance that is the self,[148] so that their inherence within the self must disappear in the state of liberation, which the Naiyāyikas describe as precisely the absolute separation (*viyoga*) of the self from these various elements.[149] The same idea is found in the Vaiśeṣika: thus Candrānanda, commenting on VSū 1.1.2 ("Merit is that thanks to which prosperity and the *summum bonum* are obtained"),[150] explains that whereas "prosperity is the obtaining of a desired body in the worlds of Brahmā, etc., and the cessation of the non-beneficial, the *summum bonum* is liberation, which consists in the self's not possessing [its] specific qualities."[151] Dharmakīrti, however, points out that there is no reason why such a relation should cease: even if we are aware of the defects affecting the elements that inhere in the self, why should this inherence vanish if its causes (i.e., the locus in which the elements inhere and the elements themselves) are still present? But if the Naiyāyika admits that there is no such relation, then he is incapable of explaining how these elements come to be regarded as our own.

3.3.4. The Naiyāyikas' Liberated State Cannot Be Desired by Those Who Seek Liberation (PV 2.230–235)

According to the commentators, the next objection put forward by the Ātmavādin implicitly targets Sāṅkhya ideas,[152] or at least, someone who does not admit that the self may have a relation such as inherence

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[148] See, e.g., NM_M II.437,15–16/NM_V III.6,15: *ātmanaś ca sukhaduḥkhabuddhyādaya āgantukā guṇā na mahattvavat sāṃsiddhikāḥ /*. "And pleasure, pain, cognitions and so on are adventitious qualities of the self: [They are] not intrinsic [qualities] such as [the self's] greatness."

[149] See, e.g., NV 81,2: *tena śarīrādinā duḥkhāntenātyantiko viyoga iti /*. "[Final release is the liberation from that, i.e., it is] the absolute separation from that which begins with the body and ends with pain."

[150] VSū 1.1.2: *yato 'bhyudayaniḥśreyasasiddhiḥ sa dharmaḥ /*.

[151] VSV 2,2–3: *abhyudayo brahmādilokeṣv iṣṭaśarīraprāptir anarthoparamaś ca / niḥśreyasam adhyātmano vaiśeṣikaguṇābhāvarūpo mokṣaḥ /*.

[152] See PVP D99b5/P115a4 (*graṅs can*), PVṬ *Ñe* D141a3/P174a6 (*graṅs can*), Vibh. 90, fn. 1 (*sāṅkhyaṃ praty āha /*. "Against the Sāṅkhya he says [what follows].").

to anything else,[153] which is the Sāṅkhya's case.[154] Thus Devendrabuddhi explains that a Sāṅkhya opponent enters the debate at this point and takes advantage of Dharmakīrti's refutation of the Naiyāyika's position so as to put forward his own thesis regarding the self:

> The Sāṅkhya [opponent] thinks [as follows]: Since [there can be] no detachment from the idea, born of relations such as [that of] inherence, that attachment to the self, etc., is one's own, one cannot achieve liberation. According to us, however, one remains in *saṃsāra* as long as the cognition that determines primordial nature (**prakṛti*) and the Person (**puruṣa*) as being one [and the same] is present. But when one knows that primordial nature and the Person are distinct, then one is liberated [from *saṃsāra*] because one knows that primordial nature and the Person are different [things] (**prakṛtipuruṣāntarajñāna*?).[155]

If the Naiyāyika is right, then as Dharmakīrti has shown, there can be no liberation, because the relation of inherence between the self and the elements thought to belong to it cannot cease, so that one cannot stop regarding attachment to the self, etc., as one's own. The Sāṅkhya proponent, however, offers an alternative that has the advantage of rescuing the self while explaining how we come to see extrinsic elements as belonging to the self, and how the self can be freed from these

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[153] See PVA 149,2–3 (*atha samavāyādisambandhaṃ nāṅgīkuryāt / tatrāpi parihāraḥ /*. "But [even] if [the opponent] does not admit relations such as inherence, in this [case] too [his objection] is refuted."), PVV 90,14 (*atha samavāyādir nāsty eva tadā* [...]. "But if [the opponent considers that] there is simply no [relation such as] inherence, etc., then [...]").

[154] On the opposition between Sāṅkhya and Vaiśeṣika in this regard, see, e.g., Bronkhorst 1986: 57. The Naiyāyikas and Vaiśeṣikas criticize the Sāṅkhyas for disregarding the relation of inherence. For instance, in his commentary ad NSū 1.1.5, Uddyotakara criticizes the Sāṅkhya inference by showing that the seven relations regarded by the Sāṅkhyas as the basis of inference are invalid because none of them expresses *samavāya* (see, e.g., Harzer 2006: 91).

[155] PVP D99b5–7/P115a4–6: *gaṅ yaṅ graṅs can 'phrod pa 'du ba la sogs pa'i 'brel pas bdag tu chags pa la sogs pa raṅ gi blo bskyed pa gaṅ yin pa de ni de la chags pa daṅ bral ba ma yin pas grol bar mi 'gyur gyi / kho bo cag gis ni ji srid du raṅ bźin daṅ skyes bu dag la gcig ñid du ṅes pa can gyi blo yod pa de srid du 'khor ba yin źiṅ / gaṅ gi tshe raṅ bźin daṅ skyes bu gźan ñid yin par śes pa de'i tshe raṅ bźin daṅ skyes bu'i khyad par śes pa'i phyir grol ba yin no źes sems na /*. On the compound *prakṛti-* or *pradhāna-puruṣāntarajñāna*, see above, fn. 11, p. 190.

elements: bondage consists in confusing the Person with primordial matter. In other words, the only relation between the self and the elements wrongly ascribed to it in *saṃsāra* is a wrong notion that mixes them, but as soon as this wrong knowledge disappears, i.e., provided that the Person is discriminated from primordial matter, one is liberated.[156]

According to the commentators, it is with this Sāṅkhya objection in mind that Dharmakīrti's opponent replies:

> (2.230) [Objection:] Even if there were no [relation of] inherence, etc., [nonetheless you must admit a relation since] all these [factors] help produce (*upakāritā*) [the self's enjoyment].[157]

According to Devendrabuddhi, the Ātmavādin with whom Dharmakīrti has been debating is trying to avoid the Sāṅkhya's solution to the problem raised by the Buddhist, and his answer runs as follows:

> Even so, one should answer [in the following way]: The idea that [factors] such as attachment to the self are one's own is not due to the fact that one does not know that primordial nature and the Person are different [things]; rather, it is due to the fact that [these factors] are means of enjoyment. [And] indeed, [two] distinct things that are external [to each other, i.e., not related through inherence] (**bāhyavastu*?), are not the cause of a single cognition. The notion that these [factors] are one's own could also be due to [their] help in producing [the self's enjoyment. Thus it is said:] "Even if there were no [relation of] inherence, etc." [To wit:] as regards all [these factors], things that are external [to each other] (**bāhyārtha*?), [even though they] lack inherence, "help produce [the self's enjoyment]." [To wit:] they are the causes of the idea of one's own. Thus, the idea of [these things as being] one's own is not due to [one's] determining primordial nature and the Person as being one [and the same], for even if this [determination] is missing, [the idea that these things are one's own] exists on the basis of a relation between what helps produce and what is produced with this help (*upakāryopakārakabhāva*).[158]

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156 See above, §3.1.1.

157 PV 2.230ab: *samavāyādyabhāve 'pi sarvatrāsty upakāritā* /.

158 PVP D99b7–100a3/P115a7–b2: *de ltar yaṅ brjod par bya ste / raṅ bźin daṅ skyes bu'i khyad par śes pa med pa'i phyir bdag tu chags pa la sogs pa la raṅ gi blo ma yin gyi / 'on kyaṅ loṅs spyod kyi yan lag ñid kyis yin no[a] // de ltar na[b] phyi rol gyi dṅos po*

Dharmakīrti's Naiyāyika (and/or Vaiśeṣika) opponent refuses to consider, as the Sāṅkhya does, that we wrongly believe this or that extrinsic element (including the attachment to the self) to be our own because we would confuse the Person with primordial matter. He rejects this hypothesis on the grounds that two distinct entities that are not related through inherence cannot be the cause of a single cognition: how could we ever come to confuse them? According to him, the notion that these various factors are one's own can be explained otherwise: even assuming that these elements do not inhere in the self (an assumption that Dharmakīrti has just forced him to make), these elements help bring about the self's enjoyment insofar as they are means of enjoyment (*upabhogāṅga*); and it is this causality relation between what helps and what is helped that is responsible for our belief that they belong to us.

Devendrabuddhi thus reformulates the Ātmavādin's reasoning in the following way:

> The argument [is as follows]: an x that exists even if y is absent neither depends on y nor is produced by y, as the rice sprout which, even if the barley seed is absent, exists if the rice seed is present. Now, even if one does not know that [primordial matter and the Person] are one [and the same thing], the idea [that factors such as attachment, cognition and sense organs are] one's own exists if one knows that these two things that are external [to each other] stand in a relation between what helps produce and what is produced. The logical reason [involved in this argument] is an essential property.[159]

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tha dad pa dag ni blo gcig gi rgyu ma yin na / de dag la raṅ gi blor phan 'dogs par byed pa'i sgo nas 'gyur ba yaṅ yin no // 'phrod pa 'du sogs med na yaṅ / 'phrod pa 'du ba ma yin pa'i phyi rol gyi don / thams cad la ni phan 'dogs yod // raṅ gi blo'i rgyu yin pa de ltar na raṅ bźin daṅ skyes bu dag la gcig ñid du ṅes par byas pa'i raṅ gi blo ni ma yin te / de med na yaṅ phan gdags par bya ba daṅ phan 'dogs par byed pa'i sgo nas yod pa'i phyir ro //. [a] Cf. Vibh. 90, fn. 2: *upabhogāṅgatvena (vṛtteḥ) /.* [b] *de ltar na* is interpreted here in the sense of *'di ltar*, i.e., **yasmāt*.

159 PVP D100a3–5/P115b2–4: *sbyor ba ni gaṅ źig gaṅ med na yaṅ yod pa de ni de la ltos pa med ciṅ des byas pa ma*[a] *yin te / dper na nas kyi sa bon med du zin kyaṅ sā lu'i sa bon yod na yod pa'i sā lu'i myu gu lta bu'o // raṅ gi blo yaṅ gcig ñid du śes pa med na yaṅ phyi rol gyi don dag la phan gdags par bya ba daṅ phan 'dogs par byed pa'i dṅos po'i śes pa yod na yod*[b] *pa yin no źes bya ba ni raṅ bźin gyi gtan tshigs so //.* [a] *ma* em. : DP om. *ma.* [b] *na yod* em. : DP om. *na yod*.

Having thus explained how the notion that these factors are one's own arises, Dharmakīrti's opponent proceeds to show how this idea can be eliminated:

> (2.230cd–231) The idea of [these factors being] one's own may [simply] cease (*na bhavet*) because [they] help produce pain, as [this idea ceases] regarding a finger [bitten by a snake. Objection from Dharmakīrti:][160] Indeed, this [factor] is not exclusively [a cause of] pain[161][, insofar as in a certain respect it is also a cause of pleasure.[162] Answer from the Ātmavādin:[163] But it is] predominantly (*bhūyasā*) [a cause of pain], as poisoned food [which is pleasurable and nonetheless causes pain. And] on account of [one's] attach-

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[160] According to PVṬ *Ñe* D141a7–b1/P174b4–5 (*gcig tu de ni sdug bsṅal min źes bya ba la sogs pa ni grub pa'i mtha' smra ba'o //*. "[The sentence] *na hy ekāntena tad duḥkham* [belongs to] the Siddhāntavādin."). Cf. PVV 90,19, where *na hy ekāntena* [...] is immediately preceded by *iti cet* ("If [the opponent] objects that [...]") which marks the end of the opponent's objection.

[161] According to PVP D100a7/P115b8 (*sdug bsṅal gyi rgyu*) and PVV 90,19 (*duḥkhaṃ duḥkhahetuḥ*).

[162] According to PVP D100a7/P115b7–8 (*rnam graṅs kyis bde ba'i rgyu ñid kyaṅ 'di la yod pa yin no //*) and PVV 90,19–20 (*paryāyeṇa sukhahetutvād api /*).

[163] According to PVP D100b3–4/P116a4–5, which clearly takes *bhūyasā saviṣānnavat* as part of the Ātmavādin's reply: *de ltar ni 'gyur mod kyi / gal te yaṅ gcig tu sdug bsṅal gyi rgyu ma yin pa de ltar na yaṅ phal cher lus daṅ dbaṅ po la sogs pa sdug bsṅal gyi rgyu ñid yin pa'i phyir / bde ba ñe bar byed pa'i blo daṅ chags pa daṅ bcas pa'i blo ñid ma yin te / dug bcas zas bźin no //*. "Suppose the following be urged (**syād etat*): Even though they are not exclusively (**ekāntena*) a cause of pain, nevertheless (**tathāpi*), [things] such as the body and sense organs are predominantly (**bhūyasā*) a cause of pain, and this is the reason why [they] are not [the object of] the cognition [of what] helps produce pleasure (**sukhopakārabuddhi*?) nor [the object of] a cognition accompanied by love (**saspṛhabuddhi*?), as poisoned food (**saviṣānnavat*) [which is pleasurable and nonetheless causes pain]." However, note that Manorathanandin seems to understand *bhūyasā saviṣānnavat* as the sequel of Dharmakīrti's objection. See PVV 90,20–21: *kintu bhūyasā tad duḥkhaṃ saviṣānnavat / pariṇatiduḥkhahetur api viṣānnam āpātasukhaṃ ca /*. "Rather, it is [only] predominantly[, but not exclusively,] pain, as poisoned food. And although poisoned food is a cause of pain [in the sense] of a change [for the worse], it involves pleasure at the present moment." Vetter (1990: 130) seems to favour Manorathanandin's interpretation.

> ment to a superior (*viśiṣṭa*) pleasure, one can become detached from [poisoned food insofar as it is] contradictory to this [superior pleasure].[164]

The Naiyāyika portrayed by Dharmakīrti contends that the notion that this or that factor belongs to the self can be eliminated for the simple reason that these elements cause pain: upon realizing that they cause pain, we can let go of them, thinking "being the cause of suffering, they ought to be abandoned,"[165] just as we let go of a limb that we no longer regard as ours because it brings nothing but pain. Devendrabuddhi thus explains:

> The argument [is as follows]: someone cannot have the idea of one's own concerning that which causes him an undesirable sensation, as the finger bitten by a snake that is to be eliminated. Now, the complex [formed by things] such as the self, the body and the sense organs is the cause of an undesirable sensation. [The logical reason involved in this argument] is the perception of [something] contradictory to the pervading [property].[166]

Dharmakīrti then replies that the notion that these factors are ours cannot disappear as easily as the Ātmavādin contends, for the reason that they are not merely causes of pain. If they were, we would not in fact form any attachment to them and they would not constitute a soteriological obstacle; the difficulty of getting rid of them rather consists in the fact that they are also instrumental in producing pleasure.

As a matter of fact, the Naiyāyika does not deny that the various factors wrongly attributed to the self bring about pleasure.[167] Nonetheless, as he points out in his answer to Dharmakīrti, he considers that *in*

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[164] PV 2.230cd–231: *duḥkhopakārān na bhaved aṅgulyām iva cet svadhīḥ // na hy ekāntena tad duḥkhaṃ bhūyasā saviṣānnavat / viśiṣṭasukhasaṅgāt syāt tadviruddhe virāgitā //*.

[165] PVP D100a5–6/P115b5–6: *sdug bsṅal gyi rgyu ñid du 'gyur ba dor bar bya ba yin no //*.

[166] PVP D100a6–7/P115b6–7: *sbyor ba ni gaṅ źig gaṅ gi mi 'dod pa'i tshor ba'i rgyu yin pa de la de ni raṅ gi blor mi 'gyur te / dper na sbrul gyis bzuṅ ba'i sor mo dor bar bya ba lta bu'o // bdag daṅ lus daṅ dbaṅ po la sogs pa'i tshogs kyaṅ mi 'dod pa'i tshor ba'i rgyu yin no źes bya ba ni khyab par byed pa 'gal ba dmigs pa'o //*.

[167] See, e.g., NBh 15,11–15, quoted above, fn. 64, p. 202, where Pakṣilasvāmin explains that NSū 1.1.9 must not be interpreted as a denial of the experience of pleasure. See also Halbfass 1997: 154–155.

spite of their property of bringing about pleasure, these means of realizing pleasure can be abandoned in view of the greater benefit (i.e., liberation,) that can be expected from this abandonment, just as (according to Pakṣilasvāmin's analogy)[168] we abandon what we know to be poisoned food in spite of its good taste. The various elements that are means of realizing pleasure are bound to produce pain, and the pleasure that they bring about is necessarily intermingled with pain,[169] because of the craving that they induce[170] and because due to this craving, one clings to pain.[171] However, the Ātmavādin points out that we are not condemned to being attached to poisoned food: as soon as we discover some other food capable of bringing us some superior pleasure, we renounce eating what we know to be poisoned food, "so that one may renounce poisoned food because there is another possibility,"[172] as Devendrabuddhi explains. Manorathanandin, for his part, formulates the reasoning in the following way:

> But food which is poisoned and [yet] mixed with pleasure is regarded with detachment by those who are attached to their own good; in the same way, attachment [to the self], etc., must also be [regarded with detachment by those who are attached to their own good].[173]

According to the Naiyāyika then, detachment from the means of realizing pleasure is possible if we are aware of the possibility of liberation, understood as the cessation of all pain. It is precisely this contention that Dharmakīrti is going to target in the next verses.

> (2.232–234) [Answer:] One may [well] renounce a certain state of pleasure (*saukhya*) due to craving for a superior pleasure, but if one does not expect [to reach this superior pleasure], one acts, out of attachment to the self,

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168 See, e.g., NBh 258,15–20 (quoted above, fn. 72, p. 204), NBh 245,9–14 (quoted above, fn. 74, p. 205) and fn. 75, p. 205.

169 See, e.g., NBh 15,11–15 (quoted above, fn. 64, p. 202).

170 See, e.g., NBh 258,10–15 (quoted above, fn. 22, p. 193), NV 59,20–60,5 (quoted above, fn. 73, p. 205), NBh 245,9–14 (quoted above, fn. 74, p. 205).

171 See, e.g., NBh 247,3–11 (quoted above, fn. 78, p. 206) and NV 463,17–464,2 (quoted above, fn. 79, p. 207).

172 PVP D100b6/P116a8: *rnam pa gźan srid pa'i phyir ro* //.

173 PVV 89,22–23: *nanu saviṣam annaṃ sukhamiśraṃ ca vairāgyaviṣayaḥ svahitakāmānām / evaṃ snehādir api syād iti* [...] /.

> [merely] according to what one obtains: [we] observe that if [a man driven by lust] does not obtain the wanton woman [whom he is longing for, he can turn his] desire (*kāmitā*) towards animals.[174] [And since according to you, when liberated, the self is in a state of isolation that amounts to being nonexistent,] how does someone for whom the self is beloved above all (*vallabha*) accept (*icchati*) the destruction of this [self]? [For] how can love (*preman*)[175] [itself] desire (*icchet*) [something that has] ceased [to be the] substratum of all experiences, transactions (*vyavahāra*) and qualities?[176] [It cannot desire it,] for such is not the nature of love.[177]

Dharmakīrti is now criticizing the Nyāya's definition of the liberated state by showing that this state cannot be wanted, and that as such, it prevents the individuals from seeking liberation.

He first points out that we do not abandon a certain pleasure (even a pleasure that, according to the Ātmavādin himself, is intermingled with pain)[178] as long as we cannot expect any pleasure superior to what we are currently experiencing; but the Naiyāyikas' alleged libe-

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[174] The reading *nairāśye* is obviously correct, but Prajñākaragupta and Manorathanandin comment on *nairātmye*; we therefore leave PVV 91,7–14 (ad PV 2.232) out of consideration. Vibhūticandra (see Vibh. 91, fn. 1) was aware of this variant reading.

[175] According to Śākyabuddhi (PVṬ *Ñe* D142a4/P175b3), *preman* is to be understood in the sense of the agent, i.e., is the subject of the sentence (*chags pa byed pa po ñid du'o*, **prema kartarī*). Among the arguments in favour of *preman* as the subject of *icchet*, note PVV 92,2 (*kathaṃ prema snehātiśaya icchet*) and PVP D101b1/P117a4–5 = PVṬ *Ñe* D142a4/P175b3 (*pratīka*: *chags pa yis ni ji ltar 'dod*).

[176] Devendrabuddhi (PVP D101b1/P117a4) explains **guṇa* as **prajñādi*. For an analysis of *anubhavavyavahāraguṇa*, see especially PVṬ *Ñe* D142a4–5/P175b4–5, where Śākyabuddhi explains it as a *dvandva* compound, and then analyzes: *gaṅ la ñams su myoṅ ba daṅ tha sñad daṅ yon tan gyi rten ñid ldog pa yod pa źes bya bar tshig rnam par sbyar ro* // (**yatrānubhavavyavahāraguṇāśrayo nivṛtto 'stīti vigrahaḥ* /).

[177] PV 2.232–234: *kiñcit parityajet saukhyaṃ viśiṣṭasukhatṛṣṇayā / nairāśye tu yathālābham ātmasnehāt pravartate // alābhe mattakāśinyā dṛṣṭā tiryakṣu kāmitā / yasyātmā vallabhas tasya sa nāśaṃ katham icchati // nivṛttasarvānubhavavyavahāraguṇāśrayam / icchet prema kathaṃ premnaḥ prakṛtir na hi tādṛśī //*.

[178] See PVV 91,3: *kiñcit saukhyaṃ pariṇatiduḥkhabahulam*. "A certain state of pleasure [i.e., a state of pleasure] which is accompanied by pain [in the sense of] a change [for the worse]."

rated state cannot be regarded as such a superior pleasure. As Manorathanandin explains:

> If one does not obtain a means of realizing a superior pleasure, and if [there is] a cause of pseudo-pleasure, attachment to the self, which is strong, prompts to act [so as to obtain it].[179]

Dharmakīrti is attacking here one of the most peculiar features of the Nyāya doctrine of liberation: because in the liberated state, the self supposedly ceases to be the substratum of the impermanent qualities that are instrumental in experiencing pain as well as pleasure, the (or at least some) Naiyāyikas contend that the liberated self is perfectly insentient and deny that it may experience any kind of pleasure. The same idea is found in the Vaiśeṣika, since there too, liberation is conceived of as the separation of the self from such qualities as knowledge and pleasure.[180] As is well known, this doctrinal element was rejected by Bhāsarvajña, a much later Naiyāyika;[181] but it was criticized early on by some proponents of the thesis that liberation consists in a permanent state of bliss,[182] and Pakṣilasvāmin already mentions their objec-

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[179] PVV 91,15–16: *balavān ātmasneho viśiṣṭasukhasādhanasyālābhe sukhābhāsahetau ca pravartayati /.* Should one interpret *sukhābhāsahetau ca* as a locative indicating the object, i.e.: "the attachment to the self, which is strong, prompts to act even with regard to a pseudo-pleasure"?

[180] See, e.g., VSV 2,2–3 quoted above (fn. 151, p. 225). The specific qualities of the self involve those mentioned in VSū 3.2.4 (i.e., "pleasure and pain; desire and aversion; and effort": see above, fn. 82, p. 20), as specified by Praśastapāda in PDhS 16,9–10: *ātmaliṅgādhikāre buddhyādayaḥ prayatnāntāḥ siddhāḥ /.* "The [qualities] beginning with 'cognition' and ending with 'effort' have been established [to belong to the self] in the section [of the VS] devoted to the marks of the self." (On the qualities of the self, note also PDhS 16,7–9: *tasya guṇā buddhisukhaduḥkhecchādveṣaprayatnadharmādharmasaṃskārasaṅkhyāparimāṇapṛthaktvasaṃyogavibhāgāḥ.* "The qualities of the [self] are: cognition, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, effort, merit, demerit, residual traces, number, dimension, separateness, conjunction and disjunction.") Note, however, that according to Vibhūticandra, Dharmakīrti's target here is rather the Sāṅkhya (see Vibh. 91, fn. 3, where *sāṅkhyasya* explains *yasya* in PV 2.233c).

[181] See, e.g., Narayanan 1983, Chakrabarti 1983: 171 and 173–175, Oberhammer 1984: 285ff., Halbfass 1997: 156, Ratié 2011a: 86–91.

[182] See, e.g., NBh 23,4–5: *nityaṃ sukham ātmano mahattvavat / tat tu mokṣe 'bhivyajyate / tenābhivyaktenātyantaṃ vimuktaḥ sukhī bhavatīti kecin manyante / teṣāṃ pramāṇābhāvād anupapattiḥ /.* "Some consider that, just as [its] greatness, the

tion that "activity is aimed at obtaining [something] desirable (*iṣṭa*),"[183] so that in order to be sought, liberation must be a desirable (and therefore pleasurable) state:

> Here is [our opponent's] inference: "The teaching of liberation is aimed at obtaining [something] desirable, and [so is] the activity of [those] who seek liberation; neither can be aimed at nothing."[184]

Uddyotakara, for his part, mentions the objection in the following way:

> [Objection:] In this [world], the ordinary people [whom we can observe], when engaging in activity, do so in order to obtain [something] desirable; now, those who are in the process of liberating themselves (*mokṣamāṇa*) engage in activity; [therefore] they too must have an activity aimed at obtaining [something] desirable, [and] this very activity [can] have a goal [only] if [there is] a permanent pleasure, [and] not otherwise.[185]

It is again to be found in some later works such as Jayanta's NM:

> With respect to [liberation as we define it, some] proponents of Vedānta object [the following]. Such a liberation[, which consists in the mere separation from pain,] cannot be the goal of the efforts of [practically] rational people; for who indeed would make effort so as to obtain a self in which no awareness of pleasure whatsoever is attained, [as this self is] similar to a piece of stone?[186]

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pleasure of the self is permanent, but [only] becomes manifest in liberation, [and that] thanks to this manifested [pleasure], one is entirely released [i.e.,] experiences pleasure (*sukhin*). [But] because they have no means of valid cognition [to justify it,] it cannot be [so]." On this controversy over the blissful state of the liberated condition in the Nyāya, see, e.g., Chakrabarti 1983.

183 NBh 23,18: *iṣṭādhigamārthā pravṛttir iti.*

184 NBh 23,18–19: *idam anumānam / iṣṭādhigamārtho mokṣopadeśaḥ pravṛttiś ca mumukṣūṇām / nobhayam anarthakam iti /.*

185 NV 82,13–15: *ihāyaṃ lokaḥ pravartamāna iṣṭādhigamārthaṃ pravartate / pravartante ca mokṣamāṇāḥ / teṣām apīṣṭādhigamārthayā pravṛttyā bhavitavyam / seyaṃ pravṛttir nityasukhe 'rthavatī nānyatheti / .*

186 NM_M II.431,17–432,1/NM_V III.2,11–13: *tatra vedāntavādina[a] āhuḥ – nāyam īdṛśo mokṣaḥ prekṣāvatāṃ prayatnabhūmir bhavitum arhati / ko hi nāma śilāśakalakalpam apagatasakalasukhasaṃvedanasampadam[b] ātmānam upapādayituṃ yateta /.* [a] *tatra vedāntavādina* NM_V: *atra tāvad vedāntina* NM_M. [b] °*sampadam* NM_V: °*saṃsparśam* NM_M.

Jayanta's opponent further explains:

> But if the self were insentient in this [liberated] state [and thus] in no way different from a stone, then liberation would be done with! Only *saṃsāra*, in which at least pleasure is enjoyed, would be a state worth [experiencing], however occasional (*antarāntarāpi*), stained with pain [and] meagre [this saṃsāric pleasure may be. For] let [us] ponder over this: what is preferable – the experience of a little pleasure, or the annihilation of all pleasures?[187]

The objection seems to have been some kind of *topos*[188] and its actual authorship is unclear. Jayanta attributes it to Vedāntins, but was it really formulated in the first place (i.e., at least from the NBh onwards) by "early Vedāntins," as some modern scholars assume,[189] or by other early Naiyāyikas whose doctrines have not come down to us?[190] In any case, Dharmakīrti apparently exploits this very objection when he argues that there can be no expectation (*nairāśya*) of the Naiyāyika's liberated state since it is devoid of pleasure, so that if one loves the self, one cannot desire this state: if liberation is a mere lack of pleasure, there is no reason why we should abandon the pleasures of *saṃsāra*, however infected they may be by pain. It is worth noting too that a Vedāntin such as Maṇḍanamiśra formulates against the Naiyāyikas and/or Vaiśeṣikas an objection very close to Dharmakīrti's here:

> And a liberation defined as the cessation of the specific qualities [of the self, namely] consciousness and so on, is not different from the view of annihilation; for even if [something] exists, [its] entirely lacking perception is not

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[187] NM_M II.432,4–7/NM_V III.2,15–18: *yadi tu jaḍaḥ pāṣāṇanirviśeṣa eva tasyām avasthāyām ātmā bhavet tat kṛtam apavargeṇa / saṃsāra eva varam avasthānam*[a] *yatra tāvad antarāntarāpi duḥkhakaluṣitam api svalpam api sukham upabhujyate / cintyatāṃ tāvad idaṃ kim alpasukhānubhavo bhadraka uta sarvasukhoccheda eva /.* [a] *avasthānam* NM_V : *astu* NM_M.

[188] On the comparison of the Nyāya's liberated state with a stone (and on the statement that being a jackal in the Vṛndā forest would be preferable to liberation according to the Vaiśeṣika/Nyāya), see Halbfass 1997: 156 and 161–162, n. 26; see also Frauwallner 1956: 105, n. 142 and Mesquita 1995: 253.

[189] See, e.g., Jha 1984: I.285ff., Chakrabarti 1983, Halbfass 1997: 155, or Framarin 2008. On the paucity of our knowledge regarding pre-Śaṅkarian Vedānta, and for bibliographical references on the subject, see, e.g., Qvarnström 1989: 15–18.

[190] See, e.g., Potter 1977b: 688, n. 21; see also Shamasastry 1937: 355–356.

> different from nonexistence. And who would long for the nonexistence of a self beloved above all? Therefore liberation would not be a human goal.[191]

One can wonder whether here Maṇḍanamiśra has borrowed the criticism from Dharmakīrti, or if they have both drawn it from a common source. At any rate, Dharmakīrti's ironical analogy in PV 2.233ab (a man who wants a woman but cannot hope to get one contents himself with an animal) is explicitly quoted by another Brahmanical author, namely, the Naiyāyika Udayana. Quite amusingly, the latter exploits it *against* the proponents of the thesis that liberation consists in bliss, as an illustration of the fact that as soon as desire arises, it can focus on any object (so that someone who desires a liberation imagined as an eternal bliss is bound to end up desiring worldly objects as well):

> And this [process supposedly leading to the removal of ignorance] can never reach its end since, the intention [to act] being dependent on the traces [left by former] pleasure, once this [intention to act] arises, one can act even with regard to sensuous objects [even though one is] desirous of superior pleasures, according to the illustration [given by Dharmakīrti]: "[We] observe that if [a man driven by lust] does not obtain the wanton woman [whom he is longing for, he can turn his] desire towards animals."[192]

Interestingly enough, Pakṣilasvāmin already addresses the objection according to which a liberated state devoid of pleasure cannot be desired. His main line of argument consists in pointing out that we do not merely act so as to get something that we desire, but also so as to avoid what we do not desire. According to him, the objection does not hold "because [activity can also] be aimed at avoiding [something that is] not desirable";[193] one can endeavour to obtain liberation with the sole

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191 BSi 16,14–16: *vijñānādiviśeṣaguṇanivṛttilakṣaṇā ca muktir ucchedapakṣān na bhidyate / na hi sato 'py ātyantiko darśanābhāvo 'bhāvād viśiṣyate / kaś ca sarvataḥ preyasa ātmano 'bhāvam abhikāṅkṣed ity apuruṣārtho mokṣaḥ syāt /.*

192 ĀTV 922,3–8: *durantaṃ ca tat / tadabhisandheḥ sukhasaṃskārasahakāritayā tadudbhave viśiṣṭasukhābhilāṣiṇo vaiṣayike 'pi pravṛttisambhavāt / alābhe mattakāśinyā dṛṣṭā tiryakṣu kāmitety udāharaṇād iti /.* Chakrabarti (1983: 177) considers that the "rather obnoxious illustration" belongs to Udayana himself; Dravid (1995: 434) presents the quotation as a general "saying."

193 NBh 23,18: *aniṣṭoparamārthatvāt.*

aim of getting rid of pain, and in order to get rid of pain, it is necessary to renounce whatever is the object of our desires:

> And this [inference put forward by our opponent] does not hold, since the teaching of liberation is aimed at avoiding what is not desirable, and [so is] the activity of [those] who seek liberation. Even [that which is] desirable turns out not [to be] desirable because it is intermingled with [what is not] desirable, since no desirable [thing] can exist without being pervaded with [something] undesirable. And [someone] making efforts so as to get rid of what is not desirable also abandons what is desirable, because it is impossible to get rid [of one of them while] separating [it from the other].[194]

Pakṣilasvāmin emphasizes that this position is in keeping with scripture (even though they may state that liberation involves a permanent pleasure) provided that one understands the term "pleasure" as merely denoting an absence of pain (and the Ātmavādin portrayed by Dharmakīrti may well have this reasoning in mind when mentioning a "superior pleasure" in PV 2.231):

> And even though there may be [some] scripture [teaching that the liberated state is pleasant, this does] not [entail any] contradiction since the mention of pleasure [in this scripture simply] means the absolute absence of the pain [which characterizes] *saṃsāra*. [In other words:] even though there may be a certain scripture [teaching] that for [someone who is] liberated there is an absolute pleasure, this is possible in the following way: the word "pleasure" is used [here] in the sense of an absolute absence of the pain [which characterizes] *saṃsāra*. For [we] observe that in the world, [people] frequently use the word "pleasure" in the sense of an absence of pain.[195]

Uddyotakara similarly explains:

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[194] NBh 23,19–22: *etac cāyuktam / aniṣṭoparamārtho mokṣopadeśaḥ pravṛttiś ca mumukṣūṇām iti / neṣṭam aniṣṭenānanuviddhaṃ sambhavatīty aniṣṭānubandhād iṣṭam apy aniṣṭaṃ sampadyate / aniṣṭahānāya ca ghaṭamāna iṣṭam api jahāti vivekahānasyāśakyatvād iti /.*

[195] NBh 24,7–10: *ātyantike ca saṃsāraduḥkhābhāve sukhavacanād āgame 'pi saty avirodhaḥ / yady api kaścid āgamaḥ syān muktasyātyantikaṃ sukham iti sa sukhaśabda ātyantike saṃsāraduḥkhābhāve prayukta ity evam upapadyate / dṛṣṭo hi duḥkhābhāve sukhaśabdaprayogo bahulaṃ loka iti /.*

> [This objection does] not [hold], because [we] observe [that there are] two [kinds of] activities: two [kinds of] activities are found in the world, [namely those] that are aimed at obtaining [what is] desirable and [those] that are aimed at getting rid of [what is] not desirable. Among them, it is uncertain whether the state of renunciation (*pārivrājya*) is aimed at obtaining [what is] desirable or at getting rid of [what is] not desirable. If [you reply that we know this] from scripture [i.e., that we] know from scripture that a liberated self possesses a permanent pleasure, since [we] learn [from the scripture] that the liberated self experiences pleasure, [we answer that] scripture too must be examined in the following way: does it say that [the liberated self] possesses (*yoga*) a permanent pleasure, or rather that it is completely separated (*viyoga*) from pain? And [we] observe in the world that the word "pleasure" is frequently used in the sense of a [mere] absence of pain as well. And thus, when [they] cease to have (*viyoga*) fever, etc., even ordinary people are found to say: "[Now] we have come to experience pleasure (*sukhin*)."[196]

Pakṣilasvāmin further argues that if someone who aspires to be liberated wanted bliss, he would never obtain liberation, since he would remain attached to pleasure (and therefore to the bondage of *saṃsāra* as well):

> [Besides,] one does not obtain liberation if one does not get rid of the desire of a permanent pleasure, because it is acknowledged that desire is bondage. If that is the case, he who strives for liberation incited by desire for a permanent pleasure, [thinking:] "A permanent pleasure is manifested in liberation," cannot obtain liberation; [i.e.,] he is not capable of obtaining [it]. For desire is acknowledged to be bondage; and it is not sound [to say] that although there is [such a] bondage, somebody [can] be liberated. [On the other hand, someone] who has abandoned the desire of a permanent pleasure encounters no obstacle [to the obtainment of liberation. I.e.,] on the other hand, he [who really seeks liberation] abandons the desire of a permanent pleasure; since

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196 NV 82,15–21: *na / pravṛttidvaitadarśanāt / dve pravṛttī loke dṛṣṭe / iṣṭādhigamārthāniṣṭahānārthā[a] ca / tatredaṃ pārivrājyaṃ kim iṣṭādhigamārtham āho 'niṣṭahānārtham iti sandihyate / āgamād iti cet / āgamād etad gamyate muktasyātmano nityaṃ sukham iti / muktaḥ sukhī bhavatīti śrūyate / āgamo 'py evaṃ vicāraṇīyaḥ / kim ayaṃ nityena sukhena yogam āhota duḥkhenātyantikaṃ viyogam āheti / dṛṣṭaś ca duḥkhābhāve 'pi sukhaśabdaprayogo bahudhā loka iti / evaṃ ca jvarādiviyoge laukikā apy ācakṣāṇakā bhavanti sukhinaḥ saṃvṛttāḥ sma iti /.* [a] *iṣṭādhigamārthāniṣṭādihānārthā* conj. : *iṣṭādhigamārthāniṣṭādihānārthā* Ed.

> this [desire] is abandoned, this [person] has no desire of a permanent pleasure that would be an obstacle [to liberation]. If that is so, [there is no desire of a permanent pleasure,] whether [someone] liberated possesses a permanent pleasure or not, in either case, his obtaining liberation is not doubtful.[197]

It is striking that Dharmakīrti does not mention any of these Naiyāyika replies to the objection according to which the liberated state as they describe it cannot be desired nor, as a consequence, aimed at. Instead of attacking these responses, he points out in PV 2.234 that in the Nyāya system, because the liberated state is devoid of pleasure, it amounts to naught, since it is no longer what the Naiyāyikas themselves consider it to be, i.e., "the substratum of all experiences, transactions and qualities." As Śākyabuddhi explains:

> But if, in the state of liberation (**nirvāṇāvasthā*), [the self] is devoid of the nature [consisting in being the] substratum of the experience of all pleasures and pains, then it has no possibility of pleasure; how[, then,] could [we] accept that one [may] long for it?[198]

Dharmakīrti's commentators point out that by presenting liberation in such a way, the Ātmavādins implicitly admit the self's impermanence, since according to their own definition of the self, the liberated state as they describe it is indistinguishable from the self's perishing. Devendrabuddhi thus introduces the passage in the following way:

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197 NBh 24,11–18: *nityasukharāgasyāprahāṇe mokṣādhigamābhāvo rāgasya bandhanasamājñānāt / yady evaṃ mokṣe nityaṃ sukham abhivyajyata iti nityasukharāgeṇa mokṣāya ghaṭamāno na mokṣam adhigacchen nādhigantum arhatīti / bandhanasamājñāto hi rāgaḥ / na ca bandhane saty api kaścin mukta ity upapadyata iti / prahīṇanityasukharāgasyāpratikūlatvam / athāsya nityasukharāgaḥ prahīyate / tasmin prahīṇe nāsya nityasukharāgaḥ pratikūlo bhavati / yady evaṃ muktasya nityaṃ sukhaṃ bhavaty athāpi na bhavati nāsyobhayoḥ pakṣayor mokṣādhigamo vikalpyata iti /.*

198 PVṬ *Ñe* D142a1–2/175a8–b1: *ci ste mya ṅan las 'das pa'i gnas skabs na bde ba daṅ sdug bsṅal thams cad ñams su myoṅ ba'i rten gyi ṅo bo daṅ bral ba ñid yin pa de bas na de la bde ba'i srid pa yod pa ma yin na / de ji ltar don gñer bar byed ces 'dod pa* [...] /.

> Don't you [Ātmavādins] admit that [liberation is] the isolation (**kaivalya*) from any substratum of experience, etc.? [But] since this isolation is not different from nonexistence, [you] will indirectly admit that this self perishes.[199]

While commenting on Devendrabuddhi's introduction to the same passage, Śākyabuddhi explains:

> For if it loses its [very] nature of self, [namely its nature of being] the substratum of qualities of the self such as pleasure and pain, then it will be without a nature [of its own], because [you Ātmavādins] do not accept [this] nature [as that of the self in the liberated state] and because no new nature is [ever] produced [in this state, for] if a new nature were produced, the self would turn out to be impermanent. Such is [Devendrabuddhi's] intention.[200]

Devendrabuddhi, for his part, adds:

> If the [opponent] admits that the substratum of experiences, transactions and qualities [has] ceased, then he should admit that it is no [longer] a self. Thus, there is not the least difference between [something that is] without a nature of its own (**niḥsvabhāva*?)[, like a hare's horn][201] and [something that has] ceased [to be the] substratum of experiences, transactions and qualities.[202]

He concludes:

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[199] PVP D101a7/P117a2–3: *loṅs spyod la sogs pa'i rten thams cad ma tshaṅ ba ñid du 'dod pa 'am / med par khyad par med pa ñid kyi phyir / don gyis bdag de 'jig pa ñid yin par 'dod par 'gyur ro //*. According to LC 1771[b], Tib. *ma tshaṅ ba* may render Skt. *kaivalya*.

[200] PVṬ *Ñe* D142a2–3/P175b1–3 (commenting on *med par khyad par med pa'i phyir* in Devendrabuddhi's introduction): *'di ltar gal te bde ba daṅ sdug bsṅal la sogs pa bdag gi yon tan gyi rten bdag gi raṅ gi ṅo bo de las ñams pa de bas na ṅo bo med pa ñid du 'gyur te / raṅ gi ṅo bo khas mi len pa'i phyir daṅ ṅo bo gźan skye ba med pa'i phyir ro // ṅo bo gźan skye na ni bdag ñid mi rtag pa ñid du 'gyur ro źes bya bar dgoṅs so //*.

[201] According to PVṬ *Ñe* D142a5–6/P175b6 (*raṅ bźin med pa las te ri boṅ gi rā la sogs pa las źes bya ba'i don to //*).

[202] PVP D101b4–5/P117b1–3: *gal te 'di ñid ñams su myoṅ ba daṅ tha sñad daṅ yon tan gyi rten ldog pa can du 'dod pa de'i tshe des ni de'i bdag med pa ñid yin par 'dod par 'gyur ro // de ltar na raṅ bźin med pa las ñams su myoṅ ba daṅ tha sñad daṅ yon tan thams cad kyi rten ldog pa can yin par khyad par cuṅ zad kyaṅ yod pa ma yin no //*.

> Therefore whoever does not accept that the self is nonexistent ought not to admit that all the [self]'s experiences, etc., [have] ceased [in the liberated state].[203]

Manorathanandin gives a similar explanation:

> Moreover, [you] accept [that] the self is in [a state of perfect] isolation because [things] like cognitions, the sense organs and the body being causes of pain, one becomes detached from them [and consequently] abandons them. Therefore [you] ought to accept that [it] perishes, since in the state of liberation, this self is entirely severed from experiences, etc., [and] since there is no difference [between thus lacking the nature of a self] and perishing.[204]

Dharmakīrti comes back to this idea in PV 2.255, at the very end of his long criticism of Ātmavāda as the main obstacle to liberation. For now however, the argument does not seem to be put forward as a general remark regarding the internal contradiction of Ātmavāda (seen as a doctrine that asserts the existence of the self and yet advocates reaching a state where the self is as good as annihilated). Here, it rather seems to serve the specific purpose of showing that the Naiyāyikas fail to answer their opponents' objection: it is useless to assert as they do that one does not act merely so as to obtain pleasure but also so as to avoid pain, because someone who seeks liberation while being attached to the self cannot *want* such a state, i.e., cannot really seek such a liberation, as the nature of attachment is precisely not to be able to want the disappearance of what we are attached to. As Devendrabuddhi puts it:

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[203] PVP D101b7/P117b4–5: *de bas na gaṅ źig bdag gaṅ yin pa med par mi 'dod pa des ni de'i ñams su myoṅ ba la sogs pa thams cad kyaṅ ldog pa can yin par 'dod par mi bya'o* //.

[204] PVV 91,17–19: *kiṃ ca / yadi buddhīndriyaśarīrādīnāṃ duḥkhahetutvāt teṣu vairāgyāt tattyāgāt kaivalyam ātmana iṣṭam / muktidaśāyāṃ tadātmabhogādisakalaparicchedabhāvān*[a] *nāśāviśeṣān nāśa eveṣṭaḥ syāt /.* [a] °*paricchedabhāvān* em.: °*paricchedābhāvān* Ed.

> [It is not the nature of love to] long for [something] desirable whose nature turns out to be as good as nonexistent, since it is devoid of any substratum of experience, etc.[205]

However hard the Naiyāyikas may try to justify the absence of pleasure in their liberated state, they themselves cannot make an effort to obtain liberation, because they cannot want it. Dharmakīrti concludes:

> (2.235) [Therefore][206] in all cases, believing in the self greatly[207] (*alam*) strengthens [one's] attachment to the self; [and] this [attachment to the self,[208] which is the] seed of the attachment to what [supposedly] belongs to the self, remains intact (*tadavastha*) [as long as one believes in the self].[209]

The belief in the self, far from being helpful to someone who seeks liberation, makes attachment to the self virtually unshakable. This attachment to the self is in turn the cause of what the Ātmavādin claims to eradicate, namely attachment to what is thought to belong to the self, and it is bound to go on producing its effect as long as the very belief in the self is not eliminated.

3.3.5. The Criticism of the Naiyāyikas' Understanding of duḥkhabhāvanā as a Means of Liberation (PV 2.236–246)

Dharmakīrti now turns back to the Nyāya's main instrument of liberation, i.e., the cultivation of the thought of pain. According to Manorathanandin, the following verses answer this objection from the Ātmavādin:

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[205] PVP D101b3/P117a7: *loṅs spyod la sogs pa'i rten thams cad daṅ bral ba ñid kyis med par mtshuṅs par 'gro ba'i bdag ñid can gyi 'dod pa don du gñer bar byed /*.

[206] According to PVV 92,5 (*tasmāt*) and PVP D102a1–2/P117b7 (*gaṅ gi phyir de lta yin pa de'i phyir*).

[207] Skt. *alam* is rendered by Tib. *śin tu* (PVP D102a2/P117b7) and explained *atyartham* in PVV 92,7.

[208] Devendrabuddhi explains *tat* as **ātmasneha* in PVP D102a2/P117b8.

[209] PV 2.235: *sarvathātmagrahaḥ sneham ātmani draḍhayaty alam / ātmīyasnehabījaṃ tat tadavasthaṃ vyavasthitam //*.

> Suppose the following be urged: Detachment arises due to seeing defects in what [supposedly] belongs to the self. [Against this, Dharmakīrti] says [...].[210]

The Ātmavādin considers that detachment can be achieved by making us aware of the defects in what we wrongly take to belong to the self, and according to him, this perception of the defects can be brought about by the cultivation of the thought of pain. Dharmakīrti is about to show at length that this cultivation is useless.

> (2.236) Even if [one makes] an effort [in order to become detached from pain,[211] attachment to the self,] which exists (*vṛttimat*) provided that [it can] rest on [one's seeing even] the slightest (*leśa*) positive quality [in the self],[212] opposes detachment from [the things] that [supposedly] belong to the self and conceals their defects.[213]

According to the Ātmavādin, the cultivation of the thought of pain makes obvious the defects of the means of realizing pleasure that we wrongly take to belong to the self. In other words, it shows how they actually bring about pain. According to the Nairātmyavādin, however, this cultivation cannot achieve its goal, because our attachment to these factors rests on attachment to the self, which in turn rests on our belief that the self exists; and as Devendrabuddhi remarks,

> if one does not eliminate attachment to the self, one cannot eliminate attachment to what [supposedly] belongs to the self.[214]

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210 PVV 92,12: *syād etat / ātmīye doṣadarśanād vairāgyam utpadyata ity āha* [...] /.

211 According to PVP D102a3–4/P118a1–2 (*gal te yaṅ sdug bsṅal la chags pa daṅ bral ba'i phyir / 'bad rtsol rtsom pa yod pa de lta na yaṅ /*). Note also PVV 92,15: *doṣadarśanād yatne 'pi sati*. "Even if there is an effort due to [one's] seeing defects [in what supposedly belongs to the self]."

212 According to PVP D102a4/P118a2 (*bdag gi yon tan gyi cha mthoṅ ba'i sgo nas*). Note however PVV 92,16: *ātmīyeṣu guṇaleśasya sukhasādhanatvasya samāśrayaṇāt*. "Provided that [it can] rest on [one's seeing even] the slightest good quality in the [things supposedly] belonging to the self[, namely their] being means of realizing pleasure."

213 PV 2.236: *yatne 'py ātmīyavairāgyaṃ guṇaleśasamāśrayāt / vṛttimān pratibadhnāti taddoṣān saṃvṛṇoti ca //*.

214 PVP D102a5/P118a4: *bdag tu chags pa dor ba med na / bdag gi chags pa dor bar bya bar nus pa ma yin no //*.

This attachment to the self, which rests on our seeing even the slightest positive quality (i.e., mere existence)[215] in the self, prevents us from seeing the factors' defectiveness (i.e., the fact that they cause pain)[216] and hence from becoming detached from them. Manorathanandin draws the consequence of this:

> Therefore how can [someone] who is attached to the self be detached from what [supposedly] belongs to the self? For attachment to the self is the root[-cause] of all defects.[217]

To this the Ātmavādin replies that by becoming detached from the self we can become detached from what we wrongly consider to belong to the self, though the self is not *per se* responsible for our attachment:

> (2.237) Objection: [But one] becomes detached from the self as well. [Answer:] Now[, even if we admit that one can become detached from a self regarded as free from defects], just as he who becomes detached [from the self thus considered] does not abandon the self [for all that, in the same way, he will not abandon what supposedly belongs to the self just because he has become detached from it].[218] As a consequence, cultivating [the thought of] pain is useless.[219]

As Devendrabuddhi explains,[220] the Ātmavādin's answer is unacceptable because PV 2.220cd has already shown that there is no way to become detached from a self seen as perfectly free of defects. Manorathanandin too reminds his readers of this impossibility:

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215 See, e.g., PVP D97a6/P112a5–6, quoted above, fn. 105, p. 214.

216 See PVV 92,17: *taddoṣāṃś ca duḥkhasādhanādīn.* "And [it conceals] their defects, i.e., [their being] means of realizing pain, etc."

217 PVV 92,17–18: *tat kuta ātmasnehavata ātmīye vairāgyayogaḥ / ātmasnehasya sarvadoṣamūlatvāt /.*

218 According to PVP D102b2/P118b1 (*skyes bu bdag la chags pa daṅ bral du zin kyaṅ bdag spoṅ ba ma yin no // de bźin bdag gi yaṅ chags pa daṅ bral na yaṅ de dor bar 'gyur ba ma yin pa de ltar na*). The wording is closely similar to PVV 92,24–25 (*na hy ātmani virakto 'pi taṃ tyajati / tathātmīye 'pi viraktas taṃ na tyakṣyatīti* [...] /).

219 PV 2.237: *ātmany api virāgaś cen nedānīṃ yo virajyate / tyajaty asau yathātmānaṃ vyarthāto duḥkhabhāvanā //.*

220 See PVP D102b1/P118a8: *de ñid 'dir ñes med gaṅ la chags pa daṅ bral ba'i rgyu ni yod pa ma yin no źes bya bar bśad zin to //.*

> And there is no cause [that could] remove the attachment to a self free of defects.[221]

Nonetheless, here Dharmakīrti provisionally admits that we can become detached from the self;[222] nevertheless, even then we would not really abandon it, since we would still believe in its existence; and for the same reason, we would not really abandon what we wrongly take to belong to it. Devendrabuddhi summarizes the argument in the following way:

> Thus, one gives oneself up to the cultivation [of the thought] of pain in order to achieve detachment, which is the cause (**nimitta*) of [one's] getting rid of pain; [but] if (**yadā*), although one obtains detachment through this [cultivation of the thought of pain], one does not get rid of the self, then, similarly, he who cultivates [the thought of] pain will not get rid of what [supposedly] belongs to the self.[223]

An Ātmavādin relying on the doctrine defended by Pakṣilasvāmin and Uddyotakara might object that even though the self is not eliminated when we become detached from it, pain at least is eliminated; and pain is precisely what someone seeking liberation tries to avoid. Devendrabuddhi explains why such a reasoning does not hold:

> Suppose the following be urged: Although one becomes detached [from the self], one eliminates pain [alone], which can be eliminated, whereas the self cannot be eliminated. [To this one should answer: But] then, if one does not get rid of the self, which is the cause of activity (**pravṛttinimitta*) [leading to] pain, this [pain] does not cease either, [and] thus one does not eliminate what [supposedly] belongs to the self. Or, if [you] accept that one eliminates the na-

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221 PVV 92,20–21: *na cātmani nirdoṣe snehāpagamakāraṇam asti /.*

222 See PVP D102b1/P118a8–b1 (*gźan yaṅ bdag la chags pa daṅ bral ba yaṅ bla ste / de ltar na yaṅ* [...] /). See also PVV 92,21 (*bhavatu tāvat tathāpi*).

223 PVP D102b3–4/P118b2–4: *de ltar na sdug bsṅal bsgom pa sdug bsṅal dor ba'i rgyu mtshan 'dod chags daṅ bral ba kun nas byed pa'i phyir tshol bar byed do // gaṅ gi tshe des kyaṅ 'dod chags daṅ bral ba thob pa yod na yaṅ bdag dor ba ñid ma yin pa de'i tshe / de daṅ 'dra bar sdug bsṅal bsgoms pas bdag gi yaṅ dor bar mi 'gyur ro //.*

> ture which is the cause of activity [leading to] pain, [then] it will follow that, since [it] is of a perishable nature, the self is not a self.[224]

According to the Naiyāyikas, activity (*pravṛtti*) leads to pain, and the defects (*doṣa*) are the causes of activity.[225] However, Dharmakīrti has already shown that it is the belief in the self's existence that constitutes the real defect, i.e., the real cause of bondage. As a consequence, the self must be the real cause of activity that leads to pain, so that pain itself cannot cease as long as we do not cease believing in the self's existence. If the Naiyāyika really seeks to eliminate the cause of activity, he should rather endeavour to eliminate the self itself, i.e., he should accept the doctrine of *nairātmya.*

Dharmakīrti is now about to adduce a third reason why the cultivation of the thought of pain as advocated by the Naiyāyikas is useless. Devendrabuddhi introduces the verse in the following way:

> Moreover[, let us consider the following objection:] He who cultivates [the thought of] pain can become detached from what [supposedly] belongs to the self, [for] he can make pain [directly] perceptible (**pratyakṣī√kṛ-*) through cultivation, because all undertakings of [salvific] means such as cultivation are aimed at having [something directly] perceptible, because a specific result other than this one is not established. [Now,] in order to show that, since [pain] is not different when [the cultivation of the thought of pain and the subsequent perceptualization] exist, there is no detachment [from what (supposedly) belongs to the self] even by means of the perception produced

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[224] PVP D102b5–7/P118b6–8: *de ltar ni 'gyur mod kyi / 'dod chags daṅ bral ba yod du zin kyaṅ dor bar nus pa can gyi sdug bsṅal dor ba yin gyi / bdag dor bar nus pa can ni ma yin no źe na / de'i tshe sdug bsṅal 'jug pa'i rgyu mtshan bdag daṅ ma bral na de yaṅ ldog pa med pa ñid yin pa de ltar na bdag gi yaṅ dor ba ñid ma yin pa 'am / sdug bsṅal la 'jug pa'i rgyu mtshan gyi raṅ bźin spoṅ bar khas len na 'jig pa'i raṅ bźin can yin pas na bdag bdag med pa ñid thal bar 'gyur ro //.*

[225] See, e.g., NSū 1.1.18, quoted above, fn. 70, p. 203, and NBh 219,11–13, quoted above, fn. 71, p. 204. According to the Naiyāyikas, activity leads to pain because it produces merit and demerit (*dharmādharma*) which in turn lead to the experience of pleasure and pain. See, e.g., NSū 1.1.2, quoted above, fn. 19, p. 192, NBh 258,10–15, quoted above, fn. 22, p. 193, and NBh 7,12–14, quoted above, fn. 23, p. 193.

> by the cultivation [of the thought of pain, Dharmakīrti] states [the following stanza].[226]
>
> (2.238) Even by cultivating [pain], it is nothing but pain that the [*yogin*][227] may make [directly] manifest [to himself. But] this [pain, which is taught in your treatises as a means towards liberation and which, according to them, must be cultivated,][228] is already perceptible prior [to the cultivation process. Thus] even so,[229] [he who makes pain directly perceptible to himself through cultivation][230] does not become detached [from what supposedly belongs to the self].[231]

The Naiyāyikas' cultivation of the thought of pain is supposed to bring about the immediate awareness of pain, but this attempt is perfectly redundant insofar as we experience pain as the most evident of facts. As Manorathanandin explains, pain is already perceptible prior to the cultivation process, "when one experiences the blow of a sword for instance" (*śastraprahārādyanubhavakāla*).[232] Now, there is no point in revealing what is already obvious, and this cultivation has no effect whatsoever on the pain that we are already experiencing, so that it

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[226] PVP D102b7–103a2/P118b8–119a3: *gźan yaṅ sdug bsṅal bsgoms pas bdag gi la 'dod chags daṅ bral bar 'gyur źiṅ / 'dis kyaṅ bsgom pas sdug bsṅal mṅon sum du byed par 'gyur te / bsgom pa la sogs pa thabs rtsom pa thams cad kyi 'bras bu ni mṅon sum du gnas pa can ñid yin pa'i phyir ro // de las lhag pa'i 'bras bu'i khyad par grub pa med pa ñid kyi phyir ro // de'i yod na yaṅ khyad par med pa'i phyir / 'dod chags daṅ bral ba mi 'byuṅ ba ni bsgom pas byas pa'i mṅon sum las kyaṅ yod[a] pa yin no źes bstan pa'i phyir / sdug bsṅal bsgoms pas kyaṅ de dag ces bya ba la sogs pa smos te /*. [a] *yod* em. : *med* DP.

[227] According to PVP D103a2/P119a3 (**yogin*) and PVV 93,1 (*bhāvaka*).

[228] According to PVP D103a3/P119a4–5 (*luṅ las bstan pa'i sdug bsṅal gaṅ yin pa de gaṅ bsgom pas bsgom par bya ba gaṅ yin pa de*) and PVV 93,4 (*tac ca* [...] *pratyakṣam eva duḥkhaṃ snehādi*).

[229] PVV 93,5: *tathāpi pratyakṣīkṛtātmasnehādiduḥkhatve 'pi*. "'Even so' [i.e.,] even if [cultivating the thought of pain] makes [directly] perceptible the fact that attachment to the self and so on are pain."

[230] According to PVP D103a3–4/P119a5–6 (*bsgom pas kyaṅ sdug bsṅal mṅon sum du byas pa can*).

[231] PV 2.238: *duḥkhabhāvanayāpy eṣa duḥkham eva vibhāvayet / pratyakṣaṃ pūrvam api tat tathāpi na virāgavān /*.

[232] PVV 93,4.

cannot bring about any detachment. Devendrabuddhi thus reformulates Dharmakīrti's reasoning in the following way:

> And [here,] the argument [is as follows]: he who is attached to the self (**ātmasnehavat*?), even though he perceives pain in a direct manner, does not become detached through it [from what supposedly belongs to the self], like the human being in the condition of an ordinary person (**pṛthagjana*). Now, the human being who wishes to perceive pain in a direct manner is attached to the self even after [he has made it perceptible by means of cultivation. The logical reason involved in this argument] is the perception of [what is] contradictory to the cause (**kāraṇaviruddhopalabdhi*).[233]

While commenting on this stanza, Devendrabuddhi emphasizes the difference in this respect between the Naiyāyikas' cultivation of the thought of pain and the Buddhist cultivation of selflessness:

> The treatise that teaches [that] the mere cultivation of [the thought of] pain [is enough] in order to [achieve] liberation does not teach anything [that would be] unperceived [otherwise]. For the manifestation [of pain] thanks to the cultivation [of the thought] of pain is not known to be a cause of detachment. Thus, the treatise is useless even though it teaches this [cultivation of the thought of pain as a salvific means. On the contrary,] our [treatises] are correct because [according to them], one becomes detached through selflessness, which [remains] first unperceived [and] then [only] is made [directly] perceptible through cultivation.[234]

The Naiyāyikas' doctrine is useless because it teaches nothing that would be unknown prior to its understanding, whereas the Buddhist path leads to the direct realization of the thus far unperceived selfless-

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[233] PVP D103a6–7/P119a8–b2: *sbyor ba yaṅ gaṅ bdag la chags pa daṅ ldan pa de ni sdug bsṅal mṅon sum du mthoṅ du zin kyaṅ de las 'dod chags daṅ bral bar ñe bar 'gro ba ma yin te / dper na so so'i skye bo'i gnas skabs can gyi skyes bu de ñid lta bu'o // sdug bsṅal mṅon sum du mthoṅ bar 'dod pa'i skyes bu de yaṅ phyis kyaṅ bdag tu chags pa daṅ ldan pa yin no źes bya ba ni rgyu 'gal ba dmigs pa'o //.*

[234] PVP D103a4–6/P119a6–8: *grol ba'i phyir sdug bsṅal bsgom pa tsam ston pa'i bstan bcos kyis ma mthoṅ ba cuṅ zad kyaṅ bstan pa med de / 'di ltar sdug bsṅal bsgom pas rnam par bsgoms pa 'dod chags daṅ bral ba'i phyir rgyur rtogs[a] pa ma yin pa de ltar na de ston par byed pa yin du zin kyaṅ bstan bcos kyi 'bras bu med pa ñid yin no // kho bo cag gi ni sṅar bdag med pa ñid ma mthoṅ ba phyis bsgom pas mṅon sum du byas pas 'dod chags daṅ bral ba'i phyir rigs pa yin no //. [a] rtogs* conj. : DP *rtag*.

ness. Thus according to our authors, ordinary persons (*pṛthagjana*) are *per definitionem* under the sway of ignorance (*avidyā*), of which we already know that it consists in the twofold false view of the self or personalistic belief (*ātmadṛṣṭi*, *satkāyadṛṣṭi*).[235] However, through listening to the Buddhist teachings (the so-called *śrutamayī prajñā*) and reflecting upon them by means of the *pramāṇa*s (the so-called *cintāmayī prajñā*), they gain an initial insight into selflessness and enter the path properly speaking, i.e., cultivation (the so-called *bhāvanāmayī prajñā*), which entails two main segments: first, the path of vision (*darśanamārga*), in which they secure a first intuitive insight into the nobles' truths, i.e., the fundamental structure of reality, and get rid of the speculative (*vi-* or *pari-kalpita*) form of the personalistic belief; and second, the path of (mental) cultivation (*bhāvanāmārga*), in which they gradually uproot all the remaining defilements. Finally, upon the transformation of the basis-of-existence (*āśrayaparivṛtti*) – which coincides with the attainment of liberation – the innate (*sahaja*) form of the personalistic belief is eradicated.

The Ātmavādin could nonetheless argue that the cultivation of the thought of pain does reveal something thus far unperceived, namely the defects inherent in what we wrongly think to belong to the self. Thus according to Devendrabuddhi, the following stanzas answer this objection from the Ātmavādin:

> [Objection: But we] observe that someone becomes detached due to seeing a defect in something.[236]

Dharmakīrti shows, however, that as long as we believe in the self's existence, making these defects obvious is of no avail:

> (2.239–241) Even if [someone's] mind momentarily (*tatkṣaṇam*)[237] swerves by [observing] a [certain] defect in one [thing usually recognized as a means

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[235] See above, Introduction, §0.1.1.

[236] PVP D103a7/P119b2–3: *gal te la lar ñes pa mthoṅ ba las skyes bu 'dod chags daṅ bral ba mthoṅ ṅo //*.

[237] I.e., according to PVP D103b2/P119b5 (*ji srid ñes pa mthoṅ ba'i bar la*), "as long as he observes [this] defect."

of realizing the self's pleasure],[238] yet it does not become [entirely][239] detached from this [thing], as a lover [who has become detached from a certain woman because he sees a defect in her does not become detached] from another woman.[240] For when one distinguishes between what is to be avoided (*tyājya*) [e.g., the unattractive woman from whom one is detached] and what is to be sought (*upādeya*) [e.g., the attractive woman to whom one is attached],[241] the attachment that has arisen regarding the [attractive] one[242] is the seed [i.e., the cause,][243] of the rise, in turn, of all [other] attachments[, including the attachment to what one was previously detached from]. An immaculate attachment to an immaculate [self], and the [diverse immaculate] means[, such as the sense organs, which are means of providing enjoyment for this self],[244] and the world consists of just this.[245] Now[, under

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238 According to PVP D103b1/P119b4 (*bdag gi bde ba sgrub par byed pa ñid du khas blaṅs pa'i yul 'ga' źig la*). Note, however, PVV 93,7: *ekatrāparādhakāriṇi*, "in one offending [thing]." In fact the two commentaries are not contradictory, as the Naiyāyikas advocate a variety of cultivation of the thought of pain that focuses on the disgusting or offending aspects of things usually regarded as instrumental in pleasure: see above, fn. 65, p. 202.

239 According to PVV 93,11 (*viraktaḥ sarvathā*).

240 According to PVP D103b3–4/P119b7–8 (*dper na 'dod pa daṅ ldan pa 'ga' źig bud med gźan la skyon cuṅ zad mthoṅ bas chags pa daṅ bral ba / gźan la chags pa daṅ ma bral ba ñid yin pa lta bu'o // yul gźan la 'byuṅ ba can gyi 'dod chags kyi lhag ma ni bud med de la yaṅ 'dod chags skye ba'i rgyur 'gyur ro //*).

241 According to PVP D103b5–6/P120a2–3 (*skyes bu 'ga' źig dor bar bya ba yin / dper na mṅon par 'dod par bya ba ma yin pa'i bud med lta bu'o // 'ga' zig blaṅ bar bya ba yin te / dper na mṅon par 'dod pa'i bud med lta bu'o // de ltar na blaṅ bar bya ba daṅ dor bar bya ba sna tshogs pa ñid yod na'o //*).

242 Devendrabuddhi clearly takes *eka* to refer to the thing recognized as desirable (PVP D103b6–7/P120a3–4: *blaṅ bar bya bar 'dod pa'i don gyi rjes su 'braṅ ba can no //*). Manorathanandin takes it to refer to either the *tyājya* or the *upādeya* (PVV 93,15: *ekasmin bhāvinī dveṣaviṣayatayānurāgaviṣayatayā vā /*).

243 That is, **nimitta* according to PVP D103b7/P120a4 (*'dod chags kyi yul gyi rjes su 'byuṅ ba can gyi chags pa de ni / sa bon yin te rgyu mtshan yin no //*) and *kāraṇa* according to PVV 93,18 (*sā saktir bījaṃ kāraṇam*).

244 According to PVP D104a6/P120b4–5 (*bdag skyon med pa'i loṅs spyod sgrub par byed pa dbaṅ po la sogs pa de dag kyaṅ skyon med yin no //*).

245 I.e., according to PVP D104a7/P120b5–6, of the self (**ātman*), of the attachment to it (**tatsneha*) and of things such as the sense organs and the body (**indriyaśarīrādi*). Note PVV 94,1: *tribhir jagataḥ saṅgrahāt /*. "Because the world exhausts itself (*saṅgraha*) in [these] three [things]."

> such circumstances,] from what [can] the [person longing for liberation][246] become detached?[247]

There is no point in making obvious the defects inherent in the means of realizing the self's pleasure, since the awareness of these defects is incapable of putting an end to our attachment to what we consider ours: if we happen to realize that something considered ours is defective, for all that we do not become detached from it, just as a lover who has seen a defect in the woman he loves and gets detached from her does not thereby acquire detachment with respect to all women. Devendrabuddhi explains:

> The remaining [part] of the desire that was born regarding one object [i.e., the woman whom one used to love,] can become the cause of the rise of desire even towards the woman [from whom one had become detached in the meantime]. Thus [it is the seed of the rise,] in turn, [of all other attachments. To wit:] even if the vision of good qualities is a cooperating [factor in the rise of desire, the fact that one sees defects certainly does not guarantee that desire does not rise anew, so that] at a certain time, one can feel desire even for that very woman from whom one used to be detached (**vairāgyaviṣaya*?). Thus, one is [certainly] not entirely detached [from this object].[248]

According to PV 2.240, the very distinction between what is to be avoided and what is to be sought involves attachment, since attachment to what is to be sought in turn gives rise to all other attachments, including those that regard objects from which we used to be detached. Devendrabuddhi explains:

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[246] According to PVV 94,1 (*sa moktukāmaḥ*).

[247] PV 2.239–241: *yady apy ekatra doṣeṇa tatkṣaṇaṃ calitā matiḥ / virakto naiva tatrāpi kāmīva vanitāntare // tyājyopādeyabhede hi saktir yaivaikabhāvinī / sā bījaṃ sarvasaktīnāṃ paryāyeṇa samudbhave // nirdoṣaviṣayaḥ sneho nirdoṣaḥ sādhanāni ca /[a] etāvad eva ca jagat kvedānīṃ sa virajyate //*. [a] Note $PV_{Miy(Tib)}$: *skyon med yul can chags pa daṅ // sgrub byed kyaṅ ni skyon med yin* /, suggesting a distributive meaning for *nirdoṣaḥ*.

[248] PVP D103b4–5/P119b8–120a2: *yul gźan la 'byuṅ ba can gyi 'dod chags kyi lhag ma ni[a] bud med de la yaṅ[b] 'dod chags skye ba'i rgyur 'gyur ro // de ltar na rnam graṅs kyis yon tan mthoṅ ba lhan cig byed pa yod na yaṅ dus gcig gi tshe sṅar 'dod chags daṅ bral ba'i yul du gyur pa'i bud med de ñid la yaṅ 'dod chags daṅ ldan par 'gyur ba de ltar na / śin tu 'dod chags daṅ bral ba ñid ma yin no //*. [a] See PVṬ *Ñe* D143a1–2/P176b4–5. [b] See PVṬ *Ñe* D143a2/P176b5.

> Someone may [well] be detached, at a [certain point in] time, from a certain [thing supposedly] belonging to the self; nonetheless, since [this person] has not abandoned attachment to a self,[249] he can in turn, due to this very seed [of another attachment], feel again an attachment for [something supposedly] belonging to the self, as [one falls in love] with another woman. Therefore, this [person] is not entirely detached from a certain [thing].[250]

The commentator then emphasizes the contrast with the Buddhist path in this respect:

> And this defect does not pertain to the [Buddhists'] perception of selflessness (**nairātmyadarśana*) [as a means toward salvation], because the perception of selflessness makes one detached from all [this, viz. both] the self and what [supposedly] belongs to the self indifferently. Moreover, [for the Ātmavādin] there [can] be no detachment from attachment to the self, etc., because, given that the self is immaculate, [things] like desire for this [self] are no less immaculate [than the self].[251]

Dharmakīrti concludes in PV 2.241 that if, as the Ātmavādin contends, the root of attachment and suffering is nothing but the self's adventitious association with elements wrongly regarded as belonging to it, then nothing is defective in any way: neither the self (since it is free of defects when isolated from the means of experience), nor attachment to it (since the object of this attachment is immaculate), nor even the means of pleasure wrongly ascribed to it. For as Manorathanandin explains, even the means of realizing pleasure, which the Naiyāyika

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[249] Note that Tib. *bdag tu chags pa*, although it most often renders *ātmasneha*, is occasionally found to render *ātmīyasneha*: the passage could also mean "because he has not abandoned the attachment to what [supposedly] belongs to the self."

[250] PVP D103b7–104a2/P120a4–6: *'di dus gcig gi tshe bdag gi 'ga' źig la gaṅ 'dod chags daṅ bral bar 'gyur ba de ltar na yaṅ / bdag tu chags pa ma spaṅs pa ñid kyi phyir / sa bon de ñid kyis bdag gi la yaṅ rnam graṅs 'ga' źig gis chags par 'gyur te / bud med gźan la bźin no // de bas na de la la la śin tu 'dod chags daṅ bral ba ma yin no //*.

[251] PVP D104a4–5/P120b2–4: *bdag med par mthoṅ ba la yaṅ skyon 'di yod pa ma yin te / bdag med pa ñid mthoṅ ba las bdag daṅ bdag gi thams cad la khyad par med par 'dod chags daṅ bral ba ñid kyi phyir ro // gźan yaṅ bdag tu chags pa la sogs pa la 'dod chags daṅ bral ba ñid ma yin no // de ltar na bdag skyon med pa yin pa'i phyir / de la 'dod chags la sogs pa yaṅ skyon yod pa ma yin te /*.

tries so hard to see as defective, are in fact immaculate insofar as they are not associated with the self:[252]

> The means of enjoyment as well [i.e.,] the sense organs, the body, etc., [and the sense organs' objects, i.e.,] sounds, tastes, visual objects, etc., are immaculate; because [according to the Ātmavādins,] all these [things] which are the self, etc., considered individually, are not causes of pain.[253]

Devendrabuddhi makes clear that as a consequence, in the Ātmavādin's perspective there is nothing to be detached from:

> And since this [all] is immaculate, detachment cannot be cultivated. And since there is nothing else to be abandoned, from what can this person become detached so that (s)he might be liberated from the bondage of *saṃsāra*?[254]
>
> (2.242) Objection: [Although attachment to the self for instance has an immaculate object, i.e., the self,] it[255] is [not only endowed with good qualities but it is] also defective[256] [inasmuch as it is the basis of pain. Answer:] The [defectiveness which you define as being the basis of pain][257] is the same for the self. [258][Thus as long as] the [person who strives for liberation[259] has] not

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[252] Dharmakīrti has already shown this in PV 2.225.

[253] PVV 93,21–22: *upabhogasādhanāni cendriyaśarīrādīni śabdarasarūpādīni nirdoṣāṇi / ātmādīnāṃ sarveṣāṃ pratyekaṃ duḥkhahetutvābhāvāt /*.

[254] PVP D104a7–b1/P120b6–7: *'di la skyon med pa ñid kyi phyir 'dod chags daṅ bral ba ñid bsgom par bya ba ma yin no // dor bar bya ba gźan yaṅ yod pa ma yin pa'i phyir skyes bu de dag gaṅ la chags bral 'gyur gaṅ gis 'khor ba'i 'chiṅ ba las grol bar 'gyur[a] /*. [a] P om. *gaṅ gis 'khor ba'i 'chiṅ ba las grol bar 'gyur /*.

[255] PVV 94,3 seems to include *tasya* in the objection and interprets it as *snehendriyādeḥ*. Devendrabuddhi (PVP D104b4–5/P121a4) seems to exclude *tasya* from the objection (as does the *pratīka*: *gal te skyon bcas yin na yaṅ*) and to treat it as **mumukṣoḥ puruṣasya*. However, Devendrabuddhi's (PVP D104b2–3/P121a1–2) explanation of the objection clearly refers to *ātmasneha* as the subject: *de ltar ni 'gyur mod kyi / gal te yaṅ bdag skyon med pa'i yul can bdag tu chags pa la sogs pa yin pa de ltar na yaṅ sdug bsṅal gyi rten ñid yin pa'i phyir 'di skyon daṅ ldan pa yin no //*. "Suppose the following be urged: Even if [things] such as the attachment to the self have the immaculate self as their object, they have defects because they are the basis of pain."

[256] According to PVV 94,3 (*na kevalaṃ guṇavattā sadoṣatāpi*).

[257] According to PVP D104b5/P121a4 (*sdug bsṅal gyi rten gyi mtshan ñid de /*).

[258] Note Manorathanandin's (PVV 94,5) introduction to PV 2.242cd: *evaṃ tarhy ātmadoṣam eva vairāgyabhāvanayā jahyād iti cet /*. "Objection: [If it is] so, then through

> [become] detached from the [self],[260] which entails the [very same] defect [as] the [above-mentioned factors, i.e., the defect of being the cause of pain],[261] from what does he now become detached?[262]

The Ātmavādin defends his position by arguing that his thought has been distorted by the opponent: he does hold that attachment to the self has an immaculate object, but this does not make attachment to the self free of defects. On the contrary, this attachment is wrong and must be eliminated, since the Ātmavādin has already made clear that it is the basis of pain.

Dharmakīrti answers that the same can be said of the self, which, according to the Ātmavādin himself, must also be regarded as a basis of pain, at least inasmuch as it is associated with the means of experience. Thus, if we do not get detached from the self although we see it as a cause of pain, we cannot get detached from anything else that we might wrongly consider to belong to the self, as Devendrabuddhi makes clear:

> Just as one is not detached from the self although it is the cause of pain, similarly, one will not be [detached] either from what [supposedly] belongs to the self.[263]

Manorathanandin further explains:

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the cultivation of detachment, one may abandon the self's defect only [and not the self itself]."

259 According to PVV 94,7 (*sa mumukṣuḥ*); see also PVP D104b6/P121a6, quoted above, fn. 255, p. 253.

260 According to PVP D104b5/P121a5 and PVV 94,7 (*tatrātmani*).

261 According to PVṬ *Ñe* D143a2–3/P176b5–6 (*gaṅ la bdag tu chags pa la sogs pa 'byuṅ ba'i ṅaṅ tshul can de'i skyon yod pa źes bya ba ni bdag tu chags pa la sogs pa la 'byuṅ ba'i ṅaṅ tshul can gyi skyon gaṅ yin pa'i skyon de ñid ni sdug bsṅal gyi rgyu ñid yin no //*). Whereas Manorathanandin provides no explanation of *taddoṣe*, Devendrabuddhi (PVP D104b5–6/P121a5) clearly interprets it as a *bahuvrīhi* compound (*gaṅ la bdag tu chags pa la sogs pa 'byuṅ ba'i ṅaṅ tshul can de'i skyon yod pa źes bya bar tshig rnam par sbyar ro //*).

262 PV 2.242: *sadoṣatāpi cet tasya tatrātmany api sā samā / tatrāviraktas taddoṣe kvedānīṃ sa virajyate //*.

263 PVP D104b6/P121a6–7: *ji ltar sdug bsṅal gyi rgyu ñid yod na yaṅ / bdag la 'dod chags daṅ bral ba ldan pa ma yin pa de ltar bdag gi la yaṅ mi 'gyur ba* [...] /.

> Just as one is not detached from the self, although it is defective, because one sees the self [as existing], similarly, due to attachment, one will not become detached from [something else] although it too has the defect of the [self], because one sees [it] as belonging to the self.[264]

Devendrabuddhi thus reformulates Dharmakīrti's reasoning in the following way:

> And [here,] the argument [is as follows]: an x that does not occur even though a y is present does not have this y for its cause, as a sprout of rice does not exist even though a seed of barley exists. Now, detachment from the self does not occur even though [its] being the cause of pain exists. [The logical reason involved in this argument] is the perception of [something] contradictory to the pervader (**vyāpakaviruddhopalabdhi*).[265]

Dharmakīrti goes on:

> (2.243ac) [Moreover, if] attachment [to what supposedly belongs to the self were] born of the vision of good qualities,[266] the vision of defects could [certainly] annul [it]. But this [attachment[267] indeed] bears on the sense organs, etc., however it is not of such a kind (*evam*) [i.e., it is not born of the vision of good qualities in the sense organs][268].[269]

Dharmakīrti is now attacking the Ātmavādin's contention that attachment to the things that we wrongly believe to belong to the self has as its sole cause the fact that we see good qualities in them. If it were the

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[264] PVV 94,7–9: *yathā sadoṣe 'py ātmany ātmadarśanād aviraktas tathā taddoṣe 'pi snehād ātmīyatvadarśanān na virajyete* /.

[265] PVP D104b7–105a1/P121a7–8: *sbyor ba 'aṅ gaṅ źig gaṅ yod na yaṅ mi 'gyur ba de ni de'i rgyu mtshan can ma yin te / dper na nas kyi sa bon yod na yaṅ sā lu'i myu gu med pa lta bu'o // bdag la 'dod chags daṅ bral ba yaṅ sdug bsṅal gyi rgyu ñid yod na yaṅ mi 'gyur ro źes bya ba ni khyab par byed pa 'gal ba dmigs pa'o //*.

[266] According to PVP D105a1/P121a8–b1 (*gźan yaṅ gal te bdag gi la chags pa 'di yon tan mthoṅ ba las 'gyur ba / de'i tshe* [...] /).

[267] According to PVP D105a2/P121b2 (*chags pa de*) and PVV 94,15 (where *sa ca snehajendriyādāv* is likely to be emended into: *sa ca sneha indriyādāv*).

[268] According to PVP D105a2/P121b2 (*yon tan mthoṅ ba las 'byuṅ ba ma yin*) and PVV 94,15 (*guṇadarśanān na dṛṣṭaḥ*).

[269] PV 2.243ac: *guṇadarśanasambhūtaṃ snehaṃ bādheta doṣadṛk / sa cendriyādāu na tv evam* [...] /.

case, this attachment could certainly be annulled through realizing that these factors are in fact defective, and the Naiyāyika's cultivation of the thought of pain would be an effective means of liberation, "for the vision of defects [would be] contradictory to the cause of the attachment to what [supposedly] belongs to the self."[270] But we are not attached to such things as our sense organs because we would see positive qualities in them:

> [Although it relates to the sense organs, this attachment] is not born of the vision of good qualities; rather, the notion of what [supposedly] belongs to the self arises due to [its] being the basis of [the self's] enjoyment, etc. Now, how could the vision of pain, which does not annul the cause of the attachment to what [supposedly] belongs to the self [i.e.,] the notion of what [supposedly] belongs to the self, remove the attachment to what [supposedly] belongs to the self?[271]

Dharmakīrti then adduces several reasons to show that the Naiyāyika's cultivation of pain is useless:

> (2.243d–244) [It is not born of the vision of good qualities in the sense organs, and therefore cannot be eliminated through the cultivation of the thought of pain,] because even children for instance have [attachment to their sense organs, etc.]; because [attachment to what supposedly belongs to the self][272] occurs even with regard to what [is one's own but] has defects[, like one's own impaired sense organs];[273] because [attachment to what suppo-

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[270] PVP D105a1/P121b1: *skyon du lta ba bdag gi chags pa'i rgyu daṅ 'gal ba'i phyir /*.

[271] PVP D105a2–3/P121b2–3: *yon tan mthoṅ ba las 'byuṅ ba ma[a] yin gyi / 'on kyaṅ loṅs spyod kyi rten ñid yin pa la sogs pa'i sgo nas bdag gi blo bskyed pa yin na de ji ltar bdag gi chags pa'i rgyu bdag gi blo la sdug bsṅal mthoṅ ba gnod par byed pa ma yin no // bdag gi chags pa la gnod par 'gyur /*. [[a] *ma* conj. : DP om. *ma*.] The Sanskrit original of the last (and, as far as its Tibetan translation is concerned, problematic) segment of Devendrabuddhi's explanation is provided by Vibh. 94, fn. 3: *ātmīyabuddher abādhakaṃ duḥkhadarśanaṃ katham ātmīyasneham apanudet /*.

[272] According to PVP D105a7/P122a1 (*rjes su chags pa*) and PVV 94,19 (*snehasya*). Cf. below, ad PV 2.244b, PVP D105b1/P122a3 (*bdag gi chags pa*) and Vibh. 94, fn. 6 (*snehaḥ*).

[273] According to PVP D105a6–7/P121b8–122a1 (*mig la sogs pa bdag gi la yaṅ bdag gi ñid du bzuṅ ba la*) and PVV 94,18 (*svakīye cakṣurādau guṇavikale*). As examples of the defects involved, see PVP D105a7/P122a1 (*rab rib daṅ loṅ ba daṅ źa ba daṅ*

> sedly belongs to the self] does not occur with regard to what [belongs] to someone else even if [it is] endowed with good qualities[, like another person's beautiful eyes];[274] or [again,] because [even] when it is one's own, one abandons [attachment to what supposedly belongs to the self] with regard to what is dead for instance[, like one's fallen hair, nails or amputated limbs][275].[276]

First, even children, who do not discriminate yet between defects and good qualities, are attached to their sense organs, which shows that our attachment to our sense organs does not arise from our finding positive qualities in them:

> Even children and cattle, etc., who do not conceptualize the good qualities and defects (**a[pari]kalpitaguṇadoṣa*?) of [things] like the eyes that are [supposedly] related to the self, are attached to the eyes, etc. One ought to understand that, since this [attachment] exists even when there is no seeing of good qualities, it is not produced by the [latter].[277]

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gzugs ṅan pa la sogs pa, i.e., **timira*, **kāṇa[tva]*, *źa ba* [?], **vairūpya*) and PVV 94,18 (*kāṇatva*).

274 According to PVP D105b1/P122a2–3 (*skyes bu gźan ñid du mṅon par 'dod pa'i mig la sogs pa yon tan daṅ ldan pa gaṅ yin pa de la*) and PVV 94,19 (*anyatra parakīye netrādau doṣarahite guṇavaty api*).

275 According to PVP D105b2/P122a4 (*gaṅ gi tshe bdag gi yaṅ 'das śiṅ źig par gyur pa la'o* //). Examples and explanations of *ādi* are found in PVP D105b2–3/P122a4–5 (*sogs pa smos pas ni raṅ gi lus las bog pa la sogs pa'i yan lag daṅ ñiṅ lag de daṅ 'dra ba khyad par med pa yon tan ldan par mtshuṅs pa dag la*) and PVV 94,23 (*atītādau keśanakhādau / ādiśabdāl lūnāṅgulyādau* [...] /).

276 PV 2.243d–244: *bālāder api sambhavāt[a]* // *doṣavaty api sadbhāvād abhāvād guṇavaty api / anyatrātmīyatāyāṃ vā vyatītādau vihānitaḥ* //. [a] PV_{Vetter} and $PV_{Miy(Tib)}$ read *darśanāt* instead of *sambhavāt*, but all commentators comment on *sambhavāt*: PVP D105a5/P121b6–7 (*yod pa'i phyir ro*), PVA 155,19 (*bhāvāt*), PVV 94,16 (*sambhavāt*).

277 PVP D105a5–6/P121b7–8: *byis pa daṅ phyugs la sogs pa bdag daṅ 'brel pa'i mig la sogs pa la yon tan daṅ skyon du brtag pa daṅ bral ba la yaṅ mig la sogs pa de la chags par 'gyur ba ñid yin no // yon tan mthoṅ ba de med par yaṅ 'di yod pa'i phyir des byas pa ma yin no źes bya bar rtogs par 'gyur ro* //. Cf. PVA 155,18–19: *bālapaśvādīnāṃ cāparikalpitaguṇadoṣāṇāṃ bhāvāt* /. "Because children, cattle, etc., have [an attachment to what supposedly belongs to the self] although they do not conceptualize good qualities and defects." See also PVV 94,15–16: *bālāder api guṇaparīkṣām anupagamya[a] cakṣurādāv ātmīyatvamātreṇa snehasya sambhavāt* /. [a] *guṇa-*

Manorathanandin further explains that the real cause of the child's attachment to his organs is his mere apprehension of these organs as *his*:

> The presence and absence of attachment are not [respectively] due to the vision of good qualities and defects [in the object of attachment]; rather, [they are respectively] due to the vision [of this object] as belonging to the self (*ātmīyatvadarśana*) [and] to the lack of [such a] vision, because [attachment and its absence respectively] conform to the presence and absence of this [vision].[278]

Second, we are attached to our sense organs even though we realize that they are impaired, which shows that the awareness of our organs' defects does not prevent us from being attached to them:

> Therefore the [attachment to what supposedly belongs to the self] occurs even from [one's] seeing defects.[279]

In contrast, we are not attached to the others' sense organs, even though we may notice their virtues, and we cease to be attached to what we no longer consider ours (such as fallen hair), "because one abandons attachment to what [supposedly] belongs to the self when one gets rid of the notion of what [supposedly] belongs to the self."[280] As a consequence, "attachment [to what supposedly belongs to the self] is not produced by the vision of good qualities,"[281] but stems from our very belief that it does belong to the self:

> Therefore, since [attachment to what supposedly belongs to the self] does not occur even when one sees good qualities and occurs when there is a notion of what [supposedly] belongs to the self, [this attachment,] which arises from

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parīkṣām anupagamya conj.: *guṇaparīkṣā 'bhyu(paga)mya* Ed.] "Because children for instance can have an attachment to the eyes, etc., whereas they have not [yet] undertaken an examination of [their] good qualities [i.e.,] due to the mere fact that [they regard the eyes, etc.,] as belonging to the self."

[278] PVV 94,16–17: *guṇadoṣadarśanān na snehabhāvābhāvau / kiṃ tv ātmīyatvadarśanādarśanāt tadanvayavyatirekānuvidhānād iti /.*

[279] PVP D105a7/P122a1–2: *de bas na yon tan daṅ skyon mthoṅ ba las kyaṅ 'di 'gyur ba yin no //.*

[280] PVP D105b3/P122a5: *bdag gi blo dor ba yod na bdag gi chags pa daṅ bral ba'i phyir /.*

[281] PVP D105b3/P122a5: *chags pa yon tan mthoṅ bas byas pa ma yin no //.*

> the notion of what [supposedly] belongs to the self, does not have the vision of good qualities for its cause (**nimitta*).[282]

Dharmakīrti has shown that our attachment to the elements that we take to belong to the self does not arise from our seeing positive qualities in them, but from the mere fact that we take them to be ours. The Ātmavādin might attempt to escape the objection by showing that nonetheless, our very notion that the means of enjoyment belong to us arises from our seeing positive qualities in them. In this way, he could show that Dharmakīrti's argument does not affect his position: the cultivation of the thought of pain can lead us to detachment by making us cease to see the means of enjoyment as endowed with positive qualities, and therefore by making us cease to see them as ours. According to Devendrabuddhi, PV 2.245 answers such an objection from the Ātmavādin:

> Suppose the following be urged: [Well,] the vision of good qualities is not the cause of attachment to what [supposedly] belongs to the self. Rather, [its cause] is the notion of what [supposedly] belongs to the self. But this [very] notion of what [supposedly] belongs to the self arises from the vision of good qualities. Therefore, one becomes detached from what [supposedly] belongs to the self by breaking, by means of the cultivation [of the thought] of pain, the vision of good qualities which is the cause of the notion of what [supposedly] belongs to the self.[283]

Dharmakīrti's answer runs as follow:

> (2.245–246) And for this very reason, nor is the observation of good qualities the cause of the notion of what [supposedly] belongs to the self. Therefore [i.e., since this notion does not have the vision of good qualities for its

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[282] PVP D105b3–4/P122a5–6: *de bas na yon tan mthoṅ ba la yaṅ med pa'i phyir daṅ bdag gi śes pa yod na yod pa'i phyir bdag gi blo las byuṅ ba ni yon tan mthoṅ ba'i rgyu mtshan can ma yin pa* [...] /.

[283] PVP D106a2–3/P122b6–7: *de ltar ni 'gyur mod kyi bdag gir chags pa'i yon tan mthoṅ ba ni rgyu ma yin no // 'o na ci yin źe na / bdag gi blo ñid yin no // bdag gi blo de yaṅ yon tan mthoṅ ba las 'gyur ro //[a] des na sdug bsṅal bsgom pas bdag gi'i blo'i rgyur gyur pa yon tan mthoṅ ba'i rgyun bcad pa las bdag gi chags pa daṅ bral ba yin pa* [...] /. [a] To be compared with Vibh. 95, fn. 3: *syād etat / ātmīyasnehasyātmīya-buddhir eva hetuḥ / sā tu guṇadarśanāt* [...] /.

> cause,][284] it[285] is not abandoned either due to the vision of non-qualities [i.e., defects].[286] Furthermore, [we] indeed observe that due to attachment,[287] one superimposes unreal good qualities onto that [which is taken to be one's own,[288] so that attachment prevents the vision of defects]. Therefore how [can] a [soteriological] injunction [prescribing the cultivation of the thought of pain][289] annul this [attachment to what supposedly belongs to the self[290] if, as is the case, it] does not annul its cause [i.e., the vision of the self][291]?[292]

Dharmakīrti has just shown that our attachment to the elements thought to belong to the self does not stem from our observing positive qualities in them. He now specifies that he has refuted by the same token the contention that our very notion that they belong to the self may arise from our observing such good qualities in them. Rather, as Manorathanandin specifies, the cause of this notion can be nothing but the vision of the self:

> And the cause of the notion of what [supposedly] belongs to the self is not observing good qualities, but rather, the very vision of the self.[293]

As a consequence, the cultivation of the thought of pain as the Naiyāyikas define it cannot have the power to eliminate our attachment by

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[284] According to PVP D106a5/P123a1 (*yon tan mthoṅ ba'i rgyu can ma yin pa de'i phyir*) and PVV 95,1 (*tasmād guṇadarśanahetukatvābhāvāt*).

[285] I.e., according to PVP D106a5/P123a2 and PVV 95,1, the notion of what supposedly belongs to the self (*bdag gi blo* = *ātmīyabuddhi*).

[286] According to PVV 95,1–2 (*aguṇasya doṣasya darśanāt*).

[287] PVP D106a7/P123a5 explains: *bdag tu chags las* (**ātmasneha*). Should *bdag tu chags* rather be reconstructed as **ātmīyasneha*?

[288] Devendrabuddhi (PVP D106a7/P123a5) seems to explain *tatra* as **ātmīyasnehe*, while Manorathanandin (PVV 95,7) explains it as *ātmīye*, preferable in our opinion.

[289] According to PVP D106b1/P123a6 (*grol ba'i phyir brjod pa'i cho ga*) and PVV 95,8–9 (*vidhir dīkṣā duḥkhabhāvanādirūpaḥ*).

[290] According to PVP D106b1–2/P123a7 (*bdag gi'i chags pa de la*) and PVV 95,9 (*taṃ snehādim*).

[291] According to PVV 95,8 (*tasya snehādeḥ kāraṇasyātmadarśanasya*).

[292] PV 2.245–246: *tata eva ca nātmīyabuddher api guṇekṣaṇam / kāraṇaṃ hīyate sāpi tasmān nāguṇadarśanāt // api cāsadguṇāropaḥ snehāt tatra hi dṛśyate / tasmāt tatkāraṇābādhī vidhis taṃ bādhate katham //*.

[293] PVV 94,25: *ātmīyabuddher api na guṇekṣaṇaṃ kāraṇaṃ kintv ātmadarśanam eva.*

making obvious the defects of what we are attached to. As Manorathanandin points out, the reason for this is that perceiving these defects is not contradictory to the cause of attachment:

> For a [particular] property suppresses something [when it is] contradictory to [its] cause, as fire [eliminates] a specific horripilation [caused by cold. And] indeed, the vision of a self is the cause of attachment, of the vision of what [supposedly] belongs to the self, etc. Now, the vision of defects is not contradictory to this [vision of a self].[294]

According to Devendrabuddhi, Dharmakīrti further points out that attempting to make obvious these defects is all the more useless since we naturally tend to superimpose good qualities onto what we take to be ours; "and due to [this] superimposition of unreal qualities, one never finds oneself in the position of seeing the defects."[295] Devendrabuddhi thus introduces this verse by explaining:

> Moreover, the notion of what [supposedly] belongs to the self, [and] hence also attachment to what [supposedly] belongs to the self, exists as long as one has not got rid of attachment to the self. Now, this [attachment] prevents the vision of defects [...] Thus how [can there be] a vision of defects [under such circumstances], so that attachment to what [supposedly] belongs to the self might be eliminated through it [i.e., through the vision of defects]?[296]

Dharmakīrti concludes that the Naiyāyikas' cultivation of the thought of pain is pointless, since it is incapable of achieving the goal that the Naiyāyikas ascribe to it, i.e., eliminating our attachment to what we

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[294] PVV 95,4–5: *kāraṇaviruddho hi dharmo[a] nivartakaḥ kasyacid yathāgnī romāñcaviśeṣasya / ātmadarśanaṃ hi snehātmīyadṛśādeḥ kāraṇam / na ca tadvirodhinī doṣadṛk /*. [[a] *dharmo* PVV_{MS} 18a3 : *dharmī* Ed.] What Manorathanandin has in mind here is the perception of something contradictory to the cause, *kāraṇaviruddhopalabdhi*, the example of which is the elimination of a specific horripilation by fire, which contradicts its cause, i.e., cold: see NB_M 2.40/NB_S 2.41 and $NBṬ_M$ 137,3–138,2/$NBṬ_S$ 35,9–20.

[295] PVP D106a7–b1/P123a5: *yon tan med par sgro 'dogs pa las kyaṅ skyon mthoṅ ba'i skabs śin tu med pa ñid yin no //*.

[296] PVP D106a6–7/P123a3–5: *gźan yaṅ ji srid du bdag tu chags pa daṅ ma bral ba de srid du bdag gi blo yod pa / de bas na de srid du bdag gi'i chags pa yaṅ yod pa yin no // de yaṅ skyon mthoṅ ba* [...] *la gags byed pa yin pa de ltar na gaṅ las skyon mthoṅ ba yin źiṅ / gaṅ gis de las bdag gi chags pa zad par 'gyur /*.

take to belong to the self. He then states the reason for this: such a cultivation has no power to eliminate the cause of this attachment, namely, our belief in the existence of the self, so that, as Manorathanandin explains, it cannot destroy our attachment to the means of enjoyment, "because the negation (*niṣedha*) of the effect cannot be achieved without the suppression (*nivṛtti*) of [its] cause."[297]

3.3.6. Dharmakīrti's Refutation of the Sāṅkhya Position (PV 2.247–248)

According to the commentators, the next couple of verses are directed against the Sāṅkhya soteriology. Devendrabuddhi thus considers that these stanzas are a reply to an Ātmavādin who defends the Sāṅkhya thesis that attachment is due to the confusion between the Person and primordial matter,[298] and whose objection runs as follows:

> As for us, we do not claim that attachment is due to the vision of good qualities, but rather, that attachment is [due to] a cognition which [erroneously] unifies primordial nature and the Person. Therefore, since one eliminates the idea of one's own by knowing that primordial nature and the Person are distinct [things], one becomes detached [from what supposedly belongs to the self].[299]

Manorathanandin gives a similar explanation:

> As for the representatives of the Sāṅkhya, they think [as follows]: As long as one regards the Person and primordial matter, which are [respectively] conscious and unconscious, as being one, (s)he is possessed of attachment and is not freed; [whereas] when (s)he perceives [their] difference, there is no [more] attachment, and (s)he is released.[300]

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[297] PVV 95,9: *kāraṇānivṛttyā kāryaniṣedhasya kartum aśakyatvāt* /.

[298] See above, §3.1.1.

[299] PVP D106b2–3/P123a7–8: *kho bo yon tan du mthoṅ ba las chags par mi smra'o // 'o na ci yin źe na / raṅ bźin daṅ skyes bu dag la blo gcig tu byed pa ni chags pa yin no // des na raṅ bźin daṅ skyes bu gźan du śes pas raṅ ñid kyi blo 'dor ba'i phyir 'dod chags daṅ bral ba yin no źe na* /.

[300] PVV 95,11–12: *sāṅkhyās tu manyante / cetanācetanayoḥ puruṣapradhānayor yāvad aikyaṃ manyate puruṣaḥ / tāvat sa snehavān amuktaś[a] ca / bhedapratītau na sneho vimuktaś[b] ceti* /. [a] *amuktaś* conj. : *ayuktaś* Ed. [b] *vimuktaś* conj. : *viyuktaś* Ed.

According to the Sāṅkhya, we are attached to things such as our sense organs because although these are in fact nothing but evolutes of the primordial, unconscious and active matter, we wrongly identify them with the self, i.e., the Person understood as a pure, passive consciousness. Devendrabuddhi notices that the Sāṅkhya position has already been set aside earlier and refers back to PV 2.230ab.[301] There, according to Devendrabuddhi's interpretation of the verse,[302] the Naiyāyika opponent was criticizing the Sāṅkhya thesis that we regard what does not essentially belong to the self as ours because of some confusion between the Person and primordial matter. Devendrabuddhi then adds:

> [But] let [us] admit that [attachment] is produced by [such] a unitary cognition. Even so, it is incorrect that the cognition of the self is one with [that of] the sense organs, etc.[303]

In other words, Dharmakīrti is now going to refute in his own name the Sāṅkhya position; but whereas, according to Devendrabuddhi, the Naiyāyika was attacking the Sāṅkhya thesis in PV 2.230 on the grounds that "[two] distinct external things are not the cause of a single cognition,"[304] here Dharmakīrti is ready to concede that attachment might be the result of a unitary cognition confusing two distinct entities. However, he is about to show that attachment to things that we consider to belong to us does not arise from the confusion between the Person and primordial matter:

> (2.247–248) [Even] an [ordinary, non-liberated] person (*ayaṃ janaḥ*) knows that the self is distinct from [things] such as the sense organs. [And this (s)he knows] because [(s)he] longs for ever better [sense organs, but not for an ever better self, and] because [(s)he] knows [that things like hair and limbs are subject to] destruction and arising [while the self is lasting]. As a consequence, attachment [to what supposedly belongs to the self] is not due either to [one's] seeing [primordial matter and the Person] as being one[, because

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301 See PVP D106b3–4/P123a8–b2: *'dir phyi rol gyi don dag la gcig tu źen pa med na yaṅ phan 'dogs par byed pa tsam gyis raṅ ñid kyi blos chags pa yin no źes bśad zin to //*.

302 See above, fn. 158, p. 227.

303 PVP D106b3–4/P123a8–b2: *blo gcig gis byas pa yin pa yaṅ bla ste / de ltar na yaṅ dbaṅ po la sogs pa la bdag ñid kyi blo gcig pa ñid 'thad pa ma yin no //*.

304 See above, fn. 158, p. 227.

> such an attachment exists even when this view does not.[305] Thus this is the real cause of the attachment to what supposedly belongs to the self:] it is by nature that, being attached to the self, one is attached to (*anu√rañj-*) the internal factors of perception.[306]

Dharmakīrti's reply to the Sāṅkhya opponent consists in showing that attachment to what we consider to belong to the self cannot be the result of a confusion between the self and matter (or more precisely, between the Person and the subtle body, which includes the sense organs),[307] because any ordinary person (i.e., anyone who is not yet liberated) is already aware of the difference between his or her sense organs and the self understood as a permanent entity. This knowledge is obvious from the fact that we do long for better sense organs but not for a better self. Thus Manorathanandin explains in the following way why it is obvious that ordinary persons know this difference:

> Because [this person] longs for [things] such as eyes and a body which are, [as Dharmakīrti says, *parāpara*, that is,] ever different (*aparāpara*) from [those] having defects such as blindness [i.e.,] ever better [than those]; but [(s)he] does not desire another self. Therefore, even if (s)he is not liberated, this person knows [that] the self is distinct [from the sense organs, etc.].[308]

As for Devendrabuddhi's lengthier commentary, it explains that when wishing that we had better organs, we are actually longing for organs other than those that we currently possess, whereas we never long for another self. Even if we happen to long for a better self, we are not thereby aspiring to a self that would be other than the actual self, precisely because we consider the self a permanent entity:

> Because [this person] longs for sense organs, etc., that are better than the eyes, etc., obtained earlier [and] devoid of good qualities, thinking: "I wish my

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[305] According to PVP D107a4/P124a4 (*de med na yaṅ yod pa'i phyir ro //*).

[306] PV 2.247–248: *parāparaprārthanāto vināśotpattibuddhitaḥ / indriyādeḥ pṛthagbhūtam ātmānaṃ vetty ayaṃ janaḥ // tasmān naikatvadṛṣṭyāpi snehaḥ snihyan sa ātmani / upalambhāntaraṅgeṣu prakṛtyaivānurajyate //*.

[307] See above, §3.1.1.

[308] PVV 95,14–16: *kāṇatvādidoṣayuktāparāparasya viśiṣṭaviśiṣṭasya cakṣuḥśarīrādikasya prārthanātaḥ / ātmanaś cānyasyānabhilāṣataḥ / tasmāt pṛthagbhūtātmānam ayam amukto 'pi jano vetti /*.

> eyes, etc., were other, better than these [ones]," but not: "I wish my self were other [than this one]." And even when [this person] has such a longing, "I wish my self were so [and so]," (s)he longs for a [better] condition of a lasting self, not for another self. Therefore, [this person] has the cognition that the sense organs, etc., are different from the self.[309]

Besides, ordinary persons distinguish the sense organs from the self insofar as they are aware of the sense organs' impermanence, whereas they consider the self a lasting entity:

> And this [person], by seeing that the self is lasting, has the cognition that [things] such as hair, nails, limbs and the eye, etc., arise and cease to exist; therefore (s)he does not believe that [they] are one [and the same].[310]

As a consequence, attachment to what we think to belong to the self cannot originate from the confusion between primordial matter and the Person: although we do consider that the sense organs belong to the self, we do not identify the sense organs with the self, and yet, despite our distinguishing between the sense organs and the self, we are attached to our sense organs. What, then, is the cause of this attachment? According to Dharmakīrti, when one is attached to the self, one is *ipso facto* or by nature[311] attached to the internal factors of perception, i.e., "to the sense organs and so on [regarded as] belonging to the self, which are the means of realizing [the self's] enjoyment."[312] Devendrabuddhi explains:

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309 PVP D106b4–6/P123b3–5: *gaṅ gi phyir sṅar thob pa'i mig la sogs pa yon tan med pa las mchog ste* [...] *dbaṅ po la sogs pa* [...] *don du gñer ba'i phyir ro // 'di las bdag gi mig la sogs pa gźan khyad par du gyur cig sñam pa yin gyi ṅa'i bdag gźan du gyur cig ces ni ma yin no // gaṅ gi tshe yaṅ ṅa'i bdag 'di lta bar gyur cig ces don du gñer bar 'gyur ba de yaṅ bdag gnas pa'i gnas skabs don du gñer ba yin gyi / bdag gźan du don du gñer ba ni ma yin no // de'i phyir mig la sogs pa bdag las tha dad pa'i blo daṅ ldan pa yin no //.*

310 PVP D107a1–2/P123b8–124a1: *'di kyaṅ bdag gnas pa ñid du mthoṅ bas skra daṅ sen mo daṅ yan lag daṅ mig la sogs pa skye ba daṅ 'jig pa'i blo daṅ ldan pa ñid kyi phyir gcig tu źen pa can ma yin no //.*

311 I.e., by *prakṛti*. Here Dharmakīrti might be playing with the meaning of the word, which of course also denotes the Sāṅkhya's primordial nature.

312 PVP D107a6/P124a6 (which explains *upalambhāntaraṅgeṣu*): *dbaṅ po la sogs pa loṅs spyod sgrub par byed pa bdag gi la'o* (**upabhogasādhaneṣv indriyādiṣv ātmīyeṣu*). Cf. PVV 95,24.

> As a consequence, attachment to the self indeed has the property of arising merely from the vision of the self as [really] existing. This [attachment to the self] is [in turn] the cause of [one's] attachment to what [supposedly] belongs to the self, [and] prevents detachment from what [supposedly] belongs to the self. Thus, the cultivation of [the thought of] pain is [simply] useless.[313]

The mere belief in the self's existence generates attachment to the self, and mere attachment to the self generates in turn attachment to what we think to belong to the self. As a consequence, the Naiyāyika's cultivation of the thought of pain is useless, because it is aimed at destroying attachment to what we regard as belonging to the self while leaving intact its root cause, namely, our belief in the self's existence.

3.3.7. The Naiyāyikas' Cultivation of the Thought of Pain as a Misunderstanding of the Buddhist Path (PV 2.249–254)

From PV 2.249 onwards, Dharmakīrti endeavours to show in what way the Buddhist view of detachment differs from the Naiyāyikas' and how the cultivation of the thought of pain should be understood in the Buddhist perspective. As already noted above (§3.1.2), Dharmakīrti seems to engage at length in this discussion with a Naiyāyika for the reason that the latter's soteriology comprises many features (among which, most importantly, the cultivation of the thought of pain) very similar to those of Buddhism (and perhaps indirectly borrowed from the latter). As a result, Dharmakīrti seems eager to show the superiority of the Buddhist path while presenting the Naiyāyikas' "crypto-Buddhist" soteriological notions as a basic misunderstanding of the Buddhist, selfless soteriology.

According to Devendrabuddhi, the next stanza is a reply to the following objection:

> But do [we] not observe that one becomes detached [from what supposedly belongs to the self] upon seeing the present pain of living beings? Therefore

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313 PVP D107a6–7/P124a7–8: *des na bdag tu chags pa bdag yod pa ñid du mthoṅ ba tsam las 'byuṅ ba'i ṅaṅ tshul can med pa can ma yin te / de ni bdag gi la chags pa'i rgyu yin no // de bdag gi la 'dod chags daṅ bral ba'i gags byed pa yin pa de ltar na sdug bsṅal sgom pa 'bras bu med pa yin no //.*

> how [can you say that they do] not become detached [from it] by means of the cultivation [of the thought] of pain?[314]

Dharmakīrti answers in the following way:

> (2.249–250) As for the disgust (*nirveda*) for [one's] present pain, [it is] not detachment: such [a thing] is aversion (*dveṣa*). [And] even then [i.e., in this condition where disgust prevails],[315] there is attachment [to what supposedly belongs to the self],[316] because one seeks another[, more satisfactory] condition. Because aversion originates from pain (*duḥkhayoni*), it lasts just as long [as there is pain.[317] But] once this [pain] has ceased [due to the presence of something contradictory to its cause,[318] a person[319]] recovers its original nature [of loving what supposedly belongs to the self][320].[321]

The Nyāya's cultivation of the thought of pain is aimed at bringing about disgust: according to Pakṣilasvāmin, "by cultivating it, one becomes disgusted; [and he] who is disgusted [obtains] detachment; [and he] who is detached [obtains] liberation."[322] Dharmakīrti, however,

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[314] PVP D107a7–b1/P124a8–b1: *srog chags rnams kyi da ltar gnas pa'i sdug bsṅal mthoṅ nas 'dod chags daṅ bral bar 'gyur ba mthoṅ ba ñid ma yin nam / de ji ltar na sdug bsṅal bsgom pas 'dod chags daṅ bral ba ma yin źe na /*.

[315] According to PVP D107b3/P124b5 (*gnas skabs gaṅ la yaṅ skyes bu 'di la lar yid 'byuṅ ba de tshe yaṅ*) and PVV 96,3 (*tadāpi nirvedāvasthāyām*).

[316] According to PVP D107b3/P124b5 (*bdag gi la yaṅ chags pa*).

[317] According to PVP D107b5/P124b8 (*ji srid du 'di sdug bsṅal 'jug pa de srid du 'di'i yid byuṅ ba 'jug par 'gyur ro //*) and PVV 96,6–7 (*sa nirvedākhyo dveṣo yāvad duḥkham anuvartate tāvanmātraṃ tāvatkālaparimāṇaṃ saṃsthitir asyeti /*).

[318] According to PVP D107b5–6/P124b8–125a1 (*gaṅ gi tshe yaṅ de 'jug pa'i rgyu daṅ 'gal ba'i rkyen ñe bas sdug bsṅal ldog par 'gyur ba de'i tshe sdug bsṅal de log na*) and PVV 96,10 (*tasmin duḥkhe kāraṇanirodhān nivṛtte*).

[319] According to PVP D107b6/P125a1 (*skyes bu de*) and PVV 96,11 (*sattvadarśī*). Note, however, that the stanza could also be read as meaning that after taking the form of aversion, *attachment* recovers its original nature when pain ceases.

[320] According to PVP D107b7/P125a1 (*bdag gi'i chags pa las byuṅ ba'i mtshan ñid can gyi raṅ bźin*) and PVV 96,10–11 (*svām eva prakṛtiṃ viṣayeṣv avirāgalakṣaṇām*).

[321] PV 2.249–250: *pratyutpannāt tu yo duḥkhān nirvedo dveṣa īdṛśaḥ / na vairāgyaṃ tadāpy asti sneho 'vasthāntaraiṣaṇāt // dveṣasya duḥkhayonitvāt sa tāvanmātrasaṃsthitiḥ / tasmin nivṛtte prakṛtiṃ svām eva bhajate punaḥ //*.

[322] See NBh 15,11–15, quoted above, fn. 64, p. 202. On *nirveda* in the Nyāya, see also above, fn. 65, p. 202.

considers that this disgust is in fact no detachment at all, but a kind of aversion. Now, the Naiyāyikas themselves acknowledge that aversion is still a form of attachment, or its negative side: according to Pakṣilasvāmin, liberation consists in the cessation of the series of desire and aversion.[323] Dharmakīrti explains that it is the case because someone full of aversion for his or her present condition does not cease to aspire to another, more pleasurable condition. Devendrabuddhi comments:

> [Even in the condition where disgust prevails,] because one seeks a pleasurable condition other than the present painful condition, attachment [to what supposedly belongs to the self] is not abandoned.[324]

Manorathanandin similarly explains:

> [Even in the condition where disgust prevails, there is attachment,] because one seeks another condition [i.e.,] a [condition] different from the condition that arouses disgust because of pain. For when there is no attachment, the rejection of one [thing] does not lead to the desire of another.[325]

In fact, this accusation had already been put forward against the Nyāya by the time the NV was composed, and Uddyotakara denies that the Nyāya's prescribed abandonment of pain may amount to mere aversion:

> [Objection: But] even if [someone seeking liberation] acts out of aversion, [thinking,] "I must abandon pain," even so, [this person] cannot be released, because aversion is acknowledged to be bondage; for [you yourself acknowledge that] bondage [consists of] both desire and aversion. [Reply:] No, because it is not an obstacle; [i.e.,] abandoning pain is not an obstacle [to liberation]. On the contrary, the [person who endeavours to achieve liberation] is not averse to pain; and since (s)he acts without being averse [to anything],

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[323] See NBh 219,11–13, quoted above, fn. 71, p. 204, and NBh 7,12–14, quoted above, fn. 67, p. 203.

[324] PVP D107b4/P124b6: *da ltar gyi sdug bsṅal gyi gnas skabs ma gtogs pa'i bde ba'i gnas skabs gźan tshol ba'i phyir chags pa ma spaṅs pa yin no //*.

[325] PVV 96,4–5: *avasthāntarasya duḥkhahetor nirvedakāriṇyām avasthāyāṃ vilakṣaṇasyaiṣaṇāt / na hi sneham antareṇaikatyāgād aparavāñchā /*.

> (s)he reaches an abandonment of pain that is not an obstacle [to liberation].[326]

According to Dharmakīrti, however, this denial is meaningless, since the Naiyāyikas' rejection of pain cannot be anything but aversion, i.e., a hatred that still stems from attachment, as long as the root cause of attachment, namely the belief in the self, has not been eradicated. As a result, his pseudo-detachment is bound to cease as soon as the cause of pain disappears and to recover its original nature of love for what he still believes to belong to the self.

By way of contrast, Dharmakīrti now explains what authentic detachment is, i.e., what detachment is in the Buddhist perspective:

> (2.251) On the other hand, what [we Buddhists] call "detachment"[327] [is nothing but the] equanimity (*audāsīnya*)[328] towards everything [which characterizes the *arhat*s – who are] like the sandalwood [in the presence of] the axe[329] – [and which is] due to the abandonment of repulsion (*tyāga*) and clinging (*upādāna*).[330]

What the Buddhists call detachment is indifference or equanimity (*audāsīnya*) "'towards everything' [i.e.,] towards all objects, which, due to the absence of the [false] view of a [substantial] living being, are no longer determined as being harmful or beneficial [to the self]."[331] This

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[326] NV 83,1–4: *yady api dveṣāt pravartate duḥkhaṃ hāsyāmīti tathāpi na mucyeta / dveṣasya bandhanasamājñānād iti / rāgadveṣau hi bandhanam iti / na / apratikūlatvāt / apratikūlaṃ duḥkhahānaṃ bhavati / na punar ayaṃ duḥkhaṃ dveṣṭi / adviṣaṃś cāyaṃ pravartamāno 'pratikūlaṃ duḥkhahānam adhigacchatīti /.*

[327] PVV 96,18: *vairāgyaṃ nāma āgamaprasiddhaṃ kathyate /*. "What is called 'detachment,' i.e., known through scripture [as 'detachment']."

[328] PVV 96,17–18: *audāsīnyam anunayapratigharahitatvam*. "Equanimity [i.e.,] being devoid of inclination and hostility."

[329] See below, fn. 332, p. 270.

[330] PV 2.251: *audāsīnyaṃ tu sarvatra tyāgopādānahānitaḥ / vāsīcandanakalpānāṃ vairāgyaṃ nāma kathyate //.*

[331] PVV 96,15–16: *sattvadṛṣṭyabhāvāt sarvatra viṣaye pratikūlatvānukūlatvābhyām anadhyavasite*. See also PVP D107b7–108a1/P125a3–4: *bdag gi dṅos po źes bya ba ñe bar len pa'i phuṅ po'i tshogs srid[a] pa la ñe bar mkho ba rnams la btaṅ sñoms su gnas pa la'o //.* [[a] PVṬ *Ñe* D144b1/P178b1 reads *sred*.] "['Equanimity,' i.e.,] a state of indifference (**upekṣāvasthā*?) towards [all things] that are conducive (**upayogin*?)

equanimity arises from the abandonment of the attitude consisting in clinging, but also of the repulsion that drives us away from things without constituting a genuine detachment. And whatever may be the exact meaning of the sandalwood and axe simile illustrating the nature of this equanimity,[332] Dharmakīrti is here pointing out that detachment

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to the [re-]birth of the group of the *upādānaskandha*s [commonly referred to as] 'body(/embodiment)' (**ātmabhāva*)."

[332] As pointed out by Vetter (1990: 146, fn. 1), Norman (1960: 270–271) has studied the original meaning (common to early Jaina and Buddhist sources) of the compound *vāsīcandanakalpa*: "like the sandalwood tree [in the presence of] the axe" (but note Bloomfield's [1920: 342] rendering: "he for whom the [cooling] sandal is not different from a [painful] sword"). Norman comes to his conclusion on the basis of Böhtlingk's *Sprüche* no. 401, 2313 and 7099: *apamānito 'pi kulajo na vadati puruṣaḥ svabhāvadākṣiṇyāt / na hi malayacandanataruḥ paraśuprahataḥ sravet pūyam //*; *chinno 'pi candanatarur na jahāti gandhaṃ vṛddho 'pi vāraṇapatir na jahāti līlām / yantrārpito 'pi madhuratāṃ na jahāti hīkṣuḥ kṣīṇo 'pi na tyajati śīlaguṇān kulīnaḥ //*; *sujano na yāti vairaṃ parahitabuddhir vināśakāle 'pi / chede 'pi candanataruḥ surabhayati mukhaṃ kuṭhārasya //*. In Norman's (partial) translation (1960: 270): "Even when disgraced, a noble man does not speak [...]; when struck by the axe the sandalwood tree would not put forth evil-smelling sap." "Even when cut down the sandalwood tree does not give up its smell; [...] even when destroyed a noble man does not abandon his morality and virtue." "Even at the time of destruction a noble man whose mind is devoted to the good of others does not become hostile; even when being cut down a sandalwood tree perfumes the blade of the axe." Note, however, that Devendrabuddhi's, (Śākyabuddhi's and) Manorathanandin's explanations of the compound suggest that these had forgotten the original meaning of the simile. See PVP D108a2–5/P125a5–b1: *de la skyes bu gcig sems dań ba can gyis lag pa gcig śin tu tsan dan gyis byugs la gźan rnam par sdań bas lag pa cig śos śin tu bcad pa de la skyes bu de dag de* (P : D *de ji*) *ltar 'jug pa dag gi nań nas gcig yid byuń ba 'am / cig śos la mńon par chags pa med pa de bźin du tsan dan dań ste'u la yin te / 'on kyań gñi ga la rjes su chags pa dań / khoń khro ba med pa'i mtshan ñid can gyi btań sñom su gnas par 'gyur ba de ltar na / grol bar 'dod pa'i bdag ñid can / tsan dan dań ste'u dag la mtshuńs par 'jug par 'gyur ro // don de ñid bstan pa'i phyir tsan dan dań ni ste'u bźin źes smos pa yin no //*. "In that respect, one person has placidly (**prasannacitta*?) smeared (**vi√lip-*?) one hand entirely with sandal while another [person] has cut off one hand with contempt (**vidveṣa*?); from among the two actions of that kind [proper to] these two persons, one is without [any] agitation (**udvega*) and the other without [any] attachment (**abhiṣvaṅga*?), [and] so it is with regard to the axe and the sandal. However, [it is] with regard to both [of them that] one should dwell in equanimity, which consists (**lakṣaṇa*) in the absence of [both] inclination (**anunaya*?) and hostility (**pratigha*?). Thus, he whose nature is to desire liberation ought to act similarly with regard to [both] the sandal and the axe. In order to indicate this meaning, [Dharmakīrti] says: *vāsīcan-*

is a state of real indifference rather than a mere aversion, and that the Ātmavādins are incapable of making us reach such a state.

However, Dharmakīrti himself has stated in PV 2.222ac that desire, aversion, etc., can be eliminated only provided that the good qualities and defects of objects are no longer seen. Now, as Devendrabuddhi makes clear, this seems to be contradictory to Dharmakīrti's rejection of the cultivation of the thought of pain (since the latter is supposed to prevent us from seeing good qualities in objects) and the Ātmavādin could exploit this apparent contradiction:

> Objection: If one does not eliminate attachment to what [supposedly] belongs to the self, etc., by means of the cultivation of [the thought of] pain, how [is it, then, that] you have said above[, in PV 2.222ac]: "[And indeed,] the elimination of desire, aversion, etc., which are related to [i.e., arise from one's seeing] good qualities and defects [in a certain object, can only be due to the fact that one] no [longer] sees these [good qualities and defects] in the object"? Do you claim that the cultivation of [the thought of] pain is the means to get rid of desire, etc., or do you claim that the cultivation of [the thought of] pain [can]not destroy it? [There is obviously] a contradiction here.[333]

Besides, as Manorathanandin points out, Dharmakīrti's position could seem contradictory to his own scriptures, since the Buddha himself is said to have taught the cultivation of the thought of pain:

> Objection: If [one does] not [achieve] liberation by eliminating attachment, etc., by means of the cultivation of [the thought of] pain, how [is it,] then,

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danakalpa." The translation of this passage is tentative. Devendrabuddhi's explanation is reminiscent of *Yājñavalkyasmṛti* II.3.53: *yaḥ kaṇṭakair vitudati candanair yaś ca limpati / akruddho 'parituṣṭaś ca samastasya ca tasya ca //*. "If someone pricks him with thorns, or anoints him with sandal, he is neither angry nor satisfied with all and with that man." Translation Bronkhorst 1986: 46. See also PVṬ *Ñe* D144b1–3/P178b2–4. PVV 96,16–17 explains *vāsīcandanakalpānām* as *sākṣātkṛtanairātmyatattvānām.*

333 PVP D108a5–7/P125b1–4: *gal te sdug bsṅal bsgom pas bdag gi'i chags pa la sogs pa spoṅ ba ma yin na / ji ltar na raṅ ñid kyis sṅar yon tan skyon daṅ rjes 'brel ba'i / 'dod sdaṅ la sogs spaṅs pa ni // de dag yul la mthoṅ med pa // źes bśad pa yin na / ci bdag ñid kyis sdug bsṅal bsgom pa 'dod pa la sogs pa spoṅ ba'i thabs su brjod nas / yaṅ na sdug bsṅal bsgom pa 'di źi bar byed pa ma yin no źes brjod pa 'dir 'gal lo źe na /.*

> [that] the Blessed One has preached the cultivation of [the thought of] pain?[334]

Dharmakīrti anticipates these objections by explaining that admittedly, the Buddhist scriptures teach some sort of cultivation of the thought of pain, but not in the sense understood by the Naiyāyikas:

> (2.252) [It is not with reference to the painfulness consisting of physical and mental pain that] the cultivation of [the thought of] pain is taught [in our scriptures; rather, the cultivation of the thought of pain is taught there] with respect to (*matvā*) the [kind of] painfulness [consisting of] the conditioning factors (*saṃskāra*). And according to us [Buddhists],[335] this [kind of painfulness] consists in [these factors'] arising from [causes and] conditions. This is [not directly the salvific means properly speaking, but] the basis [i.e., the cause,][336] of the perception of selflessness[, the latter being the direct means to achieve liberation].[337]

The Buddhist position involves no contradiction, because the cultivation of the thought of pain is not advocated by the Buddhists with reference to the "painfulness [consisting of] pain" (*duḥkhaduḥkhatā*) but only to the "painfulness [consisting of] conditioning factors" (*saṃskāraduḥkhatā*).[338]

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[334] PVV 96,20–21: *nanu yadi duḥkhabhāvanayā snehādihānyā na muktis tat kathaṃ bhagavatoktā duḥkhabhāvaneti /.*

[335] According to PVV 97,1 (*no 'smākaṃ saugatānām*).

[336] According to PVP D108b4/P126a1–2 (*bdag med pa ñid mthoṅ ba skye ba'i thabs yin te /*) and PVV 97,2 (*āśrayaḥ kāraṇam*).

[337] PV 2.252: *saṃskāraduḥkhatāṃ matvā kathitā duḥkhabhāvanā / sā ca naḥ pratyayotpattiḥ sā nairātmyadṛgāśrayaḥ //.*

[338] Note PVV 96,23–24: *na hi duḥkhaduḥkhatām abhisandhāya tadbhāvanoktā kiṃ tarhi saṃskāraduḥkhatām /.* "For it is not with respect to the painfulness [consisting of] pain that this cultivation [of the thought of pain] has been taught; rather, [it is with respect to] the painfulness [consisting of] the conditioning factors." On the three painfulnesses (*duḥkhatātraya*) in Buddhism, see Schmithausen 1977. From relatively later parts of the *sūtra*s onward, Buddhism distinguishes three forms of painfulness: painfulness of pain, painfulness (lying) in transformation(/decay), and painfulness of the conditioning factors (where items 1 and 3 are genitive-*tatpuruṣa*s and item 2, a locative-*tatpuruṣa*; see Schmithausen 1977: 921). These three forms were originally related to the three varieties of (affective) sensation (*vedanā*). The pleasant (*sukha*) sensation is painful inasmuch as it changes for the worse;

Devendrabuddhi first explains that according to the Ātmavādins, we are attached to things because we see positive qualities in them, and by this vision of good qualities, the Naiyāyikas mean that we regard these things as means of pleasure for the self. In contrast, for the Buddhists, the vision of positive qualities is much more complex and involves a number of convictions, such as the belief in permanence, pleasurableness, but also selfhood or the property of belonging to a self – and as a result, its antidote involves the realization of selflessness:

> [Answer:] This is not the case, for [we] do not admit that the vision of good qualities [as you present it, i.e.,] being a means for the pleasure of the self, is [really] the vision of good qualities, so that one could admit that attachment vanishes through the vision of defects. Rather, the qualities consist of [being] permanent, [being] pleasurable, [being] a self and [being] what [supposedly] belongs to the self, and seeing them separately or altogether is the vision of good qualities [that we have in mind]. One gets rid of it by means of its antidote [i.e.,] the perception of impermanence, etc. [And] since this is the intention, there is no contradiction.[339]

Devendrabuddhi then explains Dharmakīrti's distinction between painfulness consisting of psychological and/or physical pain and painfulness consisting of the conditioning factors:

> The cultivation of the aspects of pain, etc., that is taught in [our authoritative] treatise(s) does not consist in [that kind of] pain characterized as the painful-

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the unpleasant (*duḥkha*) sensation is painful simply inasmuch as it amounts to psychological and/or physical pain; the neither-unpleasant-nor-pleasant (*aduḥkhāsukha*, viz. neutral) sensation is painful inasmuch as it is conditioned. The doctrine of the three painfulnesses was later reinterpreted so as to match Buddhism's claim to the universality of suffering. Moreover, new interpretations were put forward in order to provide the three compounds with a symmetrical analysis as *karmadhārayas*: *duḥkham eva duḥkhatā*, *saṃskārā eva duḥkhatā*, and *vipariṇāma eva duḥkhatā*.

339 PVP D108a7–b2/P125b4–6: *de ni ma yin te / 'di ltar yon tan mthoṅ ba bdag ñid kyi bde ba sgrub par byed pa ñid ni / 'dir yon tan mthoṅ bar 'dod pa ma yin na / gaṅ gis na de skyon du mthoṅ ba las chags pa zad par 'dod par 'gyur / 'o na ci yin źe na / rtag pa daṅ / bde ba daṅ / bdag daṅ / bdag gi ñid la sogs pa ni yon tan yin źiṅ de mthoṅ ba yaṅ lhan cig gam / so sor yon tan du mthoṅ ba / de'i gñen po mi rtag pa ñid la sogs par mthoṅ bas spoṅ ba yin no źes dgoṅs pa'i phyir 'gal ba yod pa ma yin no //*. On the aspects (*ākāra*) "(im)permanent," "(un)pleasurable," "self(less)" and "belonging to a self(/empty)," see Introduction, §0.1.3.

> ness [consisting of] pain, [which is] due to the associated [mental factors] or to [that which is] related to them [i.e., to the objects that one experiences as painful]; rather, [it is] while having in mind another [kind of] pain [that] it has been taught [by the Blessed One. Objection: Now,] what does [this] cultivation of [the aspect of] pain consist of? [Answer:] Having cognized painfulness [consisting of] the conditioning factors, having acknowledged painfulness [consisting of] the conditioning factors, [the Blessed One has] taught the cultivation of painfulness [consisting of] the conditioning factors.[340]

In the Buddhist perspective, the cultivation of the thought of pain has as its sole object the fact that conditioning factors are causally produced in dependence on other conditioning factors, or, as Devendrabuddhi puts it, the fact that "the [successive] moments of an entity are dependent on causes (**hetupāratantrya*)."[341] This thought is the basis of the awareness that everything is empty of self:

> By ascertaining through reason(ing) that the entities which perish instantaneously [are] impermanent, one can progress to [the determination that] what is impermanent is dependent on causes, perishes at every moment [and is] not an agent. Therefore, if one cultivates [the fact] that "this is not the self" or "this is not what belongs to the self," one will know [i.e., perceive in a direct manner,] that [everything] is empty of a person.[342]

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[340] PVP D108b2–3/P125b6–8: *bstan bcos las sdug bsńal la sogs pa'i rnam pa bsgom pa bśad pa gaṅ yin pa de yaṅ de daṅ mtshuṅs par ldan pa 'am / de daṅ 'brel ba las[a] de sdug bsńal gyi sdug bsńal ñid kyi mtshan ñid can gyi sdug bsńal ma yin gyi 'on kyaṅ sdug bsńal gźan la dgoṅs nas bstan pa yin no // 'o na sdug bsńal bsgom pa gaṅ yin źe na / 'du byed sdug bsńal ñid mkhyen nas / 'du byed kyi sdug bsńal ñid du bźed nas / 'du byed kyi sdug bsńal bsgom pa gsuṅs pa yin /.* [a] Note PVṬ *Ñe* D144b4/P178b6: *de daṅ mtshuṅs par ldan pa ni sems daṅ sems las byuṅ ba'i tshogs so // de daṅ 'brel pa las ni sdug bsńal gyi ñams su myoṅ ba'i 'gyur ba'i yul lo //.*

[341] PVP D108b4/P126a1: *dṅos po skad cig ma rnams ni rgyu'i gźan dbaṅ ñid yin no //. hetupāratantrya* also occurs at PVV 97,1.

[342] PVP D108b4–5/P126a2–3: *skad cig mar zad pa can gyi dṅos po mi rtag pa rigs pas ṅes par byas pas mi rtag pa gaṅ yin pa de ni rgyu'i gźan dbaṅ skad cig ma re rer 'jig pa can byed pa med par 'jug par 'gyur ro // de bas na 'di ni bdag gam bdag gi ma yin no źes bsgoms pa na / gaṅ zag stoṅ pa ñid du rtogs pa 'gyur ro[a] //.* [a] Note PVṬ *Ñe* D144b4–5/P178b6–7: *rtogs par 'gyur ro źes bya ba mṅon sum du byed pa'o //.*

Although cultivation of the thought of pain thus considered is not a means of liberation *per se*,[343] it is the cause of the perception of selflessness. The latter, at which all cultivations (including that of the thought of pain) are aimed, is the real means of liberation, as Manorathanandin emphasizes while introducing the following verse:

> To explain: entities, which are the effects of causes, perish at [every] moment [and] occur in series, are neither of the nature of a self nor controlled by a self. Therefore the cultivation of the painfulness [consisting of] the conditioning factors is conducive to the perception of selflessness; and this is the [real] cause of liberation. This is what [Dharmakīrti] says [in PV 2.253].[344]
>
> (2.253) As for liberation, [one achieves it] by perceiving emptiness [i.e., the fact that everything is empty of a self.[345] All] the remaining [forms of] cultivation [viz. those of impermanence, pain, etc.,][346] are [only] aimed at this [perception that everything is empty of self[347]. And] this is the reason why [the Blessed One] has said that pain[fulness] is [established] through impermanence, [and] selflessness through pain[fulness].[348]

Devendrabuddhi explains the beginning of the stanza in the following way:

> "By perceiving emptiness" [i.e.,] by no [longer] perceiving [anything in the form] "I" and "mine," [one has] no [longer] attachment or disgust towards anything [and] thus one is liberated from the bondage of *saṃsāra*. As a consequence, liberation is [achieved] by perceiving selflessness [i.e.,] by seeing emptiness, whereas all the remaining [forms of] cultivation, such as [that] of

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343 PVP D108b4/P126a1: *de ni bsgom pa na yaṅ dṅos su grol ba'i phyir ma yin no* //. "[But] even if one cultivates it, it is not in order to really [achieve] liberation."

344 PVV 97,3–4: *tathā hi hetuphalabhūtāḥ kṣaṇakṣayiṇo bhāvāḥ prabandhapravṛttayo[a] nātmarūpā nāpy ātmādhiṣṭhitā iti saṃskāraduḥkhatābhāvanā nairātmyadarśanānukūlā saiva ca muktihetur ity āha* [...] /. [a] *prabandhapravṛttayo* PVV_{MS} 18b1 : *pravṛttayo* Ed.

345 According to PVV 97,6 (*śūnyatāyā nirātmatāyā dṛṣṭeḥ*).

346 According to PVV 97,6 (*śeṣasyānityaduḥkhāder bhāvanāḥ*).

347 According to PVV 97,6–7 (*tadarthā nirātmatādarśanārthāḥ*).

348 PV 2.253: *muktis tu śūnyatādṛṣṭes tadarthāḥ śeṣabhāvanāḥ / anityāt prāha tenaiva duḥkhaṃ duḥkhān nirātmatām* //.

> impermanence, aim at this [perception of emptiness, i.e.,] result in the perception of emptiness.[349]

And again:

> Cultivations [such as those] of impermanence and pain are means to perceive emptiness but are not really the cause of liberation. For this very reason, the Blessed One says that pain is due to impermanence, and selflessness to pain.[350]

Dharmakīrti himself specifies in the stanza that this is the reason why the Buddha has said that painfulness is established through impermanence and selflessness is established through painfulness. In this respect all the commentators quote the following *sūtra* text from the *Madhyamāgama*:

> Corporeity, O monks, [is it] permanent or impermanent? – Impermanent, O Venerable. [And] that which is impermanent, [is it] painful or pleasurable? – Painful, O Venerable. That which is impermanent, painful and subject to change, is it suitable to regard it [in the following way,] "This is mine," "I am this," "This is my self"? – No, O Venerable.[351]

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[349] PVP D108b5–7/P126a3–5: *stoṅ pa ñid mthoṅ ba las* [...] *ṅa daṅ ṅa'i źes bya bar mthoṅ ba med pas 'ga' źig la yaṅ rjes su chags pa 'am / 'ga' źig las skyo[a] ba med pa de ltar na / 'khor ba'i 'chiṅ ba las grol bar 'gyur ro // de bas na bdag med pa ñid mthoṅ ba de ni / stoṅ pa ñid lta bas grol bar 'gyur gyi / mi rtag pa ñid la sogs pa bsgom pa lhag ma gaṅ yin pa de dag thams cad de don yin / stoṅ pa ñid mthoṅ ba'i 'bras bu can yin no //.* [a] *skyo* em. : *skye* DP.

[350] PVP D108b7–109a1/P126a5–6: *mi rtag pa daṅ sdug bsṅal bsgom pa dag ni stoṅ pa ñid mthoṅ ba'i thabs yin gyi / dṅos su grol ba'i rgyu ma yin pa'i gtan tshigs de phyir / bcom ldan 'das ñid kyis mi rtag pa'i rgyu las sdug bsṅal daṅ sdug bsṅal gyi rgyu las bdag med gsuṅs* [...] /.

[351] See PVP D109a1–3/P126a7–b1: *dge sloṅ dag 'di lta ste / gzugs rtag pa 'am mi rtag pa yin / btsun pa mi rtag pa lags so // mi rtag pa gaṅ yin pa de bde ba yin nam sdug bsṅal yin / btsun pa sdug bsṅal lags so // mi rtag pa daṅ sdug bsṅal daṅ / rnam par 'gyur ba'i chos can gaṅ yin pa de la 'di ni ṅa'o // 'di ni ṅa'i'o // 'di ni bdag go źes bya ba de ltar blta bar rigs pa ma yin no // btsun pa de ni ma lags so źes bya ba lta bu'o //.* PVV 97,11–14: *rūpaṃ bhikṣavo nityam anityaṃ vā / anityaṃ bhadanta / yad anityaṃ tad duḥkhaṃ sukhaṃ vā / duḥkhaṃ bhadanta / yad anityaṃ duḥkhaṃ vipariṇāmadharmakaṃ kalpyan nu tad evaṃ draṣṭum[a] etan mamaiṣo 'ham asmy eṣa me ātmeti / no hīdaṃ bhadanta /.* [[a] *draṣṭum* PVV_{MS} 18b2 : *draṣṭur* Ed.] PVA 157,17–19: *rūpaṃ bhikṣavo nityam anityaṃ vā / anityaṃ bhadanta / yad anityaṃ tad duḥ-*

Devendrabuddhi explains in what sense the knowledge of impermanence and painfulness (understood as painfulness consisting of the conditioning factors, i.e., as the mere fact that conditioning factors are produced in dependence on other conditioning factors) can be considered a means of liberation:

> Thus painfulness is established on account of impermanence, [and] impermanence and painfulness are [in turn] the means towards selflessness[, and] this is the reason why they are said to be the means towards liberation. Therefore, knowing impermanence and painfulness is not directly the cause of liberation; rather, [it is] the cause of the vision of emptiness, which is the basis of liberation.[352]

In contrast, Dharmakīrti now depicts the result of the cultivation of pain as understood by the Ātmavādin:

> (2.254) And failing to be(come) detached [from what supposedly belongs to the self, one] is subject to craving [and] relies on all [sorts of] undertakings [aimed at securing pleasure and avoiding pain.[353] Thus] failing to be liberated

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khaṃ sukhaṃ vā / duḥkhaṃ bhadanta / yad anityaṃ tad duḥkhaṃ vipariṇāmadharmakaṃ kalpyan nu[a] tad evaṃ draṣṭum etan mamaiṣo 'ham asmy eṣa mamātmeti / no hīdaṃ bhadanta /. [[a] *nu* conj. : *tu* Ed.] The text translated above runs as follows: *rūpaṃ bhikṣavo nityam anityaṃ vā / anityaṃ bhadanta / yad anityaṃ tad duḥkhaṃ sukhaṃ vā / duḥkhaṃ bhadanta / yad anityaṃ duḥkhaṃ vipariṇāmadharmakaṃ kalpyan nu tad evaṃ draṣṭum etan mamaiṣo 'ham asmy eṣa me ātmeti / no hīdaṃ bhadanta /*. The parallel Pali text (MN III.19 [no. 109: *Mahāpuṇṇamasutta*]) runs as follows: *(taṃ kim maññatha bhikkhave /) rūpaṃ niccaṃ vā aniccaṃ vā ti / aniccaṃ bhante / yaṃ panāniccaṃ dukkhaṃ vā taṃ sukhaṃ vā ti / dukkhaṃ bhante / yaṃ panāniccaṃ dukkhaṃ vipariṇāmadhammaṃ kallan nu taṃ samanupassituṃ / etaṃ mama eso 'ham asmi eso me attā ti / no h' etaṃ bhante /*. The reference to the Pali canon is indicated at Vibh. 97, fn. 2 (most certainly to be interpreted as a footnote by Sāṅkṛtyāyana himself). On *etaṃ mama eso 'ham asmi eso me attā ti*, see Collins 1982: 96 and 98.

[352] PVP D109a3–4/P126b1–3: *de ltar na mi rtag pa ñid kyi phyir sdug bsṅal ñid du rab tu bsgrubs pa bdag med pa ñid kyi mi rtag pa ñid daṅ / sdug bsṅal ba ñid thabs su gyur pa'i phyir grol ba'i thabs su gsuṅs pa yin no // des na mi rtag pa daṅ sdug bsṅal ba ñid śes pa dṅos su grol ba'i rgyu ma yin gyi 'on kyaṅ grol ba'i rten du gyur pa stoṅ pa ñid du lta ba'i rgyur gyur pa ñid yin no //*. See also PVV 97,14–15.

[353] According to PVP D109a7/P126b6–7 (*bde ba daṅ sdug bsṅal thob pa daṅ yoṅs su spaṅs pa'i phyir 'jug pa la brten pa'o //*).

> from defilements and actions, such [a person][354] is said to be[355] entangled in *saṃsāra*.[356]

According to Manorathanandin, the subject of this sentence is "he who sees the self."[357] However, according to Devendrabuddhi, it is rather "he who possesses the cultivation of [the thought of] pain";[358] and here, Devendrabuddhi certainly has in mind the Nyāya's way of understanding this cultivation. In other words, someone who, following the Nyāya's method, merely cultivates the thought of pain instead of cultivating the thought of the conditioning factors' painfulness as defined by Dharmakīrti, can only fail to become detached from what (s)he regards as belonging to the self, because (s)he remains inexorably attached to the self. (S)he is thus bound to go on craving, and for this reason "[(s)he] relies on the causes that bring about actions [and are] characterized as rejecting and clinging."[359] Because (s)he thus rejects and clings, (s)he cannot free him- or herself "from defilements and actions," which, according to Manorathanandin, "have the [false] view of a self and activity for their [respective] causes."[360] According to Devendrabuddhi,

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354 I.e., according to Devendrabuddhi, "the person who wishes to be(come) detached withoug having eliminated the [false] view of self" (PVP D109b1–2/P126b8: *skyes bu 'dod chags daṅ bral bar 'dod pa bdag tu lta ba ma spaṅs pa can no* //).

355 On the meaning of *nāma* here see PVV 97,23: *saṃsārī nāma prasiddhaḥ*. "[Such a person is] well known under the name of *saṃsārin*."

356 PV 2.254: *aviraktaś ca tṛṣṇāvān sarvārambhasamāśritaḥ / so 'muktaḥ kleśakarmabhyāṃ saṃsārī nāma tādṛśaḥ* //.

357 PVV 97,17: *ātmadarśī saḥ*.

358 PVP D109a6–7/P126b5–6: *gaṅ gi phyir de ltar sdug bsṅal bsgoms pas 'dod chags daṅ bral ba ma yin pa de'i phyir / sdug bsṅal bsgoms pa daṅ ldan pa bdag daṅ bdag gi 'dod chags daṅ bral ba ma yin no* //. "[And] since, in this way, one does not be(come) detached through the cultivation of [the thought of] pain, he who possesses the cultivation of [the thought of] pain does not become detached from the self and what [supposedly] belongs to the self."

359 PVV 97,19–20: *hānyupādānalakṣaṇān karmaprasavahetūn samāśritaḥ* /.

360 PVV 97,23: *kleśakarmabhyām ātmadarśanapravṛttikāraṇakābhyām*.

> he causes desirable and undesirable actions and defilements such as attachment to thrive; thus failing to be liberated from defilements and actions, these cause [him] to take a new existence.[361]

Attachment as well as actions requiring a karmic retribution lead him to rebirth, so that he remains trapped in the cycle of rebirths.

3.3.8. The Inconsistency of the Nyāya's Soteriology with Its Ātmavāda and the Soteriological Necessity of Selflessness (PV 2.255–256)

Before concluding that the way to liberation consists in cultivating the thought of selflessness rather than that of pain, Dharmakīrti once again attacks the Naiyāyikas' depiction of the liberated state. So far he has shown that contrary to what the Ātmavādin claims, it is impossible to get rid of our attachment to what we regard as belonging to the self without getting rid of the very belief in the self. According to his commentators, however, here he provisionally accepts his opponent's view that one can abandon what is wrongly believed to belong to the self without getting rid of the belief in the self, and he does so in order to show the absurd consequence to which such a position leads anyway. Devendrabuddhi thus introduces the next verse in the following way:

> Therefore so far [it has been shown] in this way [that] if one grasps a self, there is no elimination of what [supposedly] belongs to [this] self, so that one [could] accept [that] liberation [occurs]. Alternatively, let us admit that one eliminates [what supposedly belongs to the self]. Accepting [this provisionally], one ought to say [what follows].[362]

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[361] PVP D109a7–b1/P126b7–8: *las 'dod pa daṅ mi 'dod pa daṅ mṅon par chags pa la sogs pa'i ñon moṅs pa gso bar byed pa de ltar na / de ñon moṅs las las grol ba ma yin / de dag gis kyaṅ yaṅ srid pa len par byed pa* [...] /.

[362] PVP D109b5/P127a6: *de de ltar na re źig bdag tu 'dzin pa yod na bdag gi dor ba med pa gaṅ gis na grol bar 'dod / dor ba yaṅ bla ste / khas blaṅs nas brjod par bya'o //*. Cf. PVV 97,24–25: *tad evam ātmani sati nātmīyatyāgaḥ / tathā'muktir ity uktam / bhavatu vātmīyatyāgas tathāpi* [...] /. "Thus in this way, it has been said that if there is a self, [there can be] no elimination of what [supposedly] belongs to the self, [and] thus no liberation. Alternatively, let us admit that there [can be] an elimination of what [supposedly] belongs to the self [even if there is a self. But] even so [...]." Note Prajñākaragupta's somewhat different introduction in PVA 157,26–27:

> (2.255–256) He[363] who would reject (*necchet*) only what [supposedly] belongs to the self [while claiming not to reject the self would] possess neither an experiencer[, since there would be nothing left to be experienced,] nor, then, a self; for the characteristic of the [self] is [precisely] to act and to experience [the results of action]. Therefore, O [you] who desire liberation, uproot the [false] view of a [substantial] living being, [a false view] whose seed, [a previous] similar [false view, occurs in] a beginningless series[364].[365]

According to Dharmakīrti, even if the Naiyāyika managed to get rid of the factors that he regards as leading to craving, he would be left with no experiencer, since there would be nothing left to be experienced in his liberated state, "for being an experiencer requires [something] to

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athāpi syāt / ātmīyam eva paramārthato nāsti / tena kutaḥ snehasambhavaḥ / sneho hi nāma viṣaye bhavati / na nirviṣayaḥ / tad apy asat /. "Suppose the following be urged: That which [supposedly] belongs to the self does not really exist. Therefore, how can there be an attachment [to it]? [And] indeed, what we call 'attachment' bears on an object [and is] not objectless. [Answer:] This too is false[, because] [...]."

363 PVV 97,25 explains *asya* as *ātmīyasya*. With *asya* thus interpreted, PV 2.255ab could be rendered as follows: "[For him] who would reject only what [supposedly] belongs to the self, there is neither an experiencer of that [which supposedly belongs to the self] [...]." Devendrabuddhi's (PVP D109b6–7/P127a7) explanation remains unclear (*de gaṅ gi tshe des dor ba de'i dus na bdag gi yin no źes bya ba de'i tshe rgol ba po / 'di'i za ba po ste /*), but he is likely to interpret *asya* as the correlative of *yaḥ*, i.e., **asya vādinaḥ* (note that Manorathanandin added *tanmate*, i.e., "in the doctrine of him [who] [...]," in order to supply a correlative of *yaḥ*.

364 Or more literally, "whose seed [...] has a beginningless series." For an analysis of the compound, see PVP D110a6–7/P128a1–2: *gaṅ la thog ma med pa'i rgyun yod pa de ni thog ma med pa'i rgyun can no // 'jig tshogs su lta ba gaṅ la rigs mtshuṅs pa sa bon yod pa de ni rigs mtshuṅs pa'i sa bon can te /*. "That which has a beginningless series is *anādisantāna*. The personalistic [false] view which has a homogenous seed is *tulyajātīyabījaka*." The compound belongs to the *bahuvrīhigarbhabahuvrīhi* class. Note also PVV 98,13–14: *anādisantānas tulyajātīyaḥ pūrvapūrvasattvadarśanasvabhāvo 'vidyārūpo bījaṃ kāraṇaṃ yasyās tām*, "that whose seed [i.e.,] cause is [something] homogenous – the series of which is beginningless – whose nature is each preceding perception of a [substantial] living being [and] consists of nescience." Following Manorathanandin, the translation would be: "whose seed is the homogenous [false view of a (substantial) living being,] the series of which (= *tulyajātīya*) is beginningless."

365 PV 2.255–256: *ātmīyam eva yo necched bhoktāpy asya na vidyate / ātmāpi na tadā tasya kriyābhogau hi lakṣaṇam // tasmād anādisantānatulyajātīyabījakām / utkhātamūlāṃ kuruta sattvadṛṣṭiṃ mumukṣavaḥ //*.

be experienced," as Devendrabuddhi and Manorathanandin put it.[366] Devendrabuddhi further clarifies Dharmakīrti's reasoning by reformulating it into the following inference:

> That for which there is nothing to experience (**bhogya, *bhoktavya*) cannot be an experiencer (**bhoktṛ*), as the son of a barren woman (**vandhyāputra*). Now, the self that longs for liberation has nothing to experience. [The logical reason involved in this argument] is the non-perception of the pervader.[367]

However, a self that would be no experiencer at all would no longer be a self, "for if there is no experiencer, it follows that there is no self either."[368] The reason for this is that the Naiyāyikas themselves define the self as the agent (*kartṛ*) of all actions and as the experiencer (*bhoktṛ*) of all pleasant and unpleasant experiences that result from actions. As a matter of fact, they even rely on this definition of the self so as to prove its existence: according to them, the self must be inferred because a permanent agent and experiencer must be postulated so as to account for both action and its karmic retribution in the form of pleasure and pain.[369] If, however, the liberated self is free of action, pleasure and pain, it is no longer a self, as it loses *ipso facto* the very characteristic that makes it a self. The argument is reminiscent of the following passage in Aśvaghoṣa's BC, which is likely to target the view of the liberated self propounded by the Vaiśeṣikas[370] and/or Naiyāyikas:

> And a knowing subject (*kṣetrajña*) free of a body must be either knowing or without knowledge. If he is knowing, there is [something] to be known for him, [and] since there is [something] to be known, he is not released. But if he is proven to be without knowledge [in the liberated state], what is the point

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366 PVP D109b7/P127a8: *za ba po ñid ni loṅs spyod par bya ba la brten pa can ñid yin pa'i phyir ro* //. The Sanskrit of the PVP passage is found at PVV 97,26: *bhogyāpekṣatvād bhoktṛtvasya* /.

367 PVP D109b7/P127a8: *gaṅ la loṅs spyod par bya ba yod pa ma yin pa de ni za ba por yaṅ 'gyur ba ma yin te / dper na mo gśam gyi bu lta bu'o // bdag grol bar 'dod pa'i yaṅ bdag gi'i loṅs spyod par bya ba yod pa ma yin no źes bya ba ni khyab par byed pa mi dmigs pa yin no* //.

368 PVV 98,6: *bhoktrabhāve ātmāpi nāstīti prasaṅgāt* /.

369 See above, Introduction, §0.2.2, and Chapter 2, §2.2.

370 See Bronkhorst 2005: 593.

> of the self that you postulate? For [the property of] not knowing is well known without [having recourse to] a self, as [for instance] in the case of a log or a wall.[371]

Devendrabuddhi, for his part, explains that being neither an agent nor an experiencer is contradictory to the very definition of the self propounded by the Ātmavādin:

> If it neither performs actions nor experiences the results of the actions performed [in the past], it is not a self, [and] thus it violates the characteristic of the self.[372]

The same idea is spelled out by Manorathanandin:

> [What is] called a self is the agent and experiencer. But if what [supposedly] belongs to the self no [longer] exists, for which purpose is an action to be performed, or what is there to be experienced? [And] since there [can] be no agent and no experiencer, one must accept that there is simply no self. Consequently, if there is a self, [there is] what [supposedly] belongs to [this] self; [and] if there is attachment to it, etc., *saṃsāra* cannot be annihilated at all.[373]

The Ātmavādins thus absurdly defend the existence of the self while seeking to reach a state where the self as they define it ceases to exist. As a consequence – or, as Devendrabuddhi puts it, "since thus, the perception of selflessness alone is the path in order to reach the city of *nirvāṇa*,[374] [and] not another one [like] the cultivation of pain, etc."[375] –

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[371] BC 12.80–81: *kṣetrajño viśarīraś ca jño vā syād ajña eva vā / yadi jño jñeyam asyāsti jñeye sati na mucyate // athājña iti siddho vaḥ kalpitena kim ātmanā / vināpi hy ātmanājñānaṃ prasiddhaṃ kāṣṭhakuḍyavat //.*

[372] PVP D110a2/P127b2–3: *gaṅ gi tshe las rnams mi byed ciṅ las byas pa rnams kyi 'bras bu ñams su mi myoṅ ba de'i tshe de bdag med pa ñid yin pa de ltar na / bdag gi mtshan ñid las śin tu 'das pa yin no //.*

[373] PVV 98,7–10: *kartā bhoktā cātmocyate / yadā cātmīyam eva nāsti kimarthaṃ karma kartavyaṃ kiṃ vā bhoktavyam / kartṛtvabhoktṛtvābhāvād ātmābhāva eva svīkṛtaḥ syāt / tasmāt saty ātmany ātmīyaṃ tatsnehādisattve 'nuccheda eva saṃsārasya /.*

[374] On the city of/which is *nirvāṇa*, see above, fn. 6, p. 3, Venkataramanan 1975: 294, AKVy 721,25–30 (where the compound is analysed *nirvāṇam eva puram*) and Bhattacharya 1973: 58, fn. 3.

it is the belief in a permanent, substantial living being that must be eradicated in order to escape *saṃsāra*.

As for this false view itself, it is nothing like a permanent, substantial entity, but rather, a series of momentary beliefs arising in a beginningless causal series. Devendrabuddhi explains:

> The [intended] meaning is: each subsequent [moment of nescience] arises in dependence on each preceding [moment of] nescience, [and this] from a beginningless time.[376]

As Dharmakīrti has shown, the only way to break this series consists in cultivating painfulness as consisting of the conditioning factors; i.e., salvation lies in the cultivation of the thought that all conditioning factors are produced in dependence on causes and conditions. Or, as Devendrabuddhi concludes:

> If you desire liberation from worthless *saṃsāra*, uproot the personalistic [false] view by cultivating the perception of selflessness with great effort![377]

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375 PVP D110a5–6/P127b7–8: *gaṅ gi phyir de ltar na mya ṅan las 'das pa'i groṅ khyer thob pa'i phyir / bdag med pa ñid mthoṅ ba ñid lam yin gyi gźan sdug bsṅal la sogs pa bsgom pa ni ma yin pa /*.

376 PVP D110a7–b1/P128a2–3: *ma rig pa sṅa ma sṅa ma ñid la brten nas phyi ma phyi ma 'byuṅ ba ste / thog ma med pa'i dus nas* [...] /. Cf. PVV 98,14–15: *sattvadarśanam avidyāsvabhāvaṃ pūrvapūrvam uttarottarasya sattvadarśanasya hetur ity arthaḥ* /. "The [intended] meaning is: each preceding perception of a [substantial] living being, which consists in nescience, is the cause of each subsequent perception of a [substantial] living being."

377 PVP D110a6/P127b8–128a1: *gal te khyod 'khor ba sñiṅ po med pa las grol bar 'dod pa de bas na 'bad rtsol chen pos bdag med pa mthoṅ goms pas 'jig tshogs su ni lta ba dag rtsa ba ñid nas bcom par gyis* /.

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PST_{Tib} — *Pramāṇasamuccayaṭīkā* (Jinendrabuddhi). D no. 4268, *Ye* 1–314a7/P no. 5766, *Re* 1–355a8.

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PSV_K — *Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti* (Dignāga), Kanakavarman's translation. P no. 5702, *Ce* 93b4–177a7.

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