

II

Translation

Epistemology—The Dispeller of the Mind’s Darkness

In Sanskrit: *Pramāṇa manas tamas tānava*.

In Tibetan: *Tshad ma yid kyi mun pa sel ba*.¹

[EX1: Invocation and introductory verses]²

*** First chapter: Determining the divisions of awareness ***

For the exact determination of the system of knowledge, two items will be presented:

- In general, the division of awareness (1)
- In particular, elucidating the instances of awareness that are episodes of knowledge (2)

1 In general, the division of awareness

There are two items:

- The three-fold division of awareness based on the apprehended object (11)
- The seven-fold division of awareness based on both the apprehended object and intentional object (12)

¹ The *Mun sel* is the only work of Phya pa (among the works for which the first page of the manuscript is not missing) that provides a Sanskrit title, and also the only one in which the text proper (not counting the indication on the cover page of the manuscript) starts with the mention of the work’s title.

On the Tibetan custom of including bilingual titles for autochthonous works, see Almqvist 2005: 51–54. Here, as is often the case in such works, the Sanskrit title provided is not a proper Sanskrit expression. It consists in the juxtaposition of a phonetic equivalent of the Sanskrit translation of each word of the Tibetan title arranged according to the order of the words in the latter: *tshad ma—pramāṇa; yid—manas; mun pa—tamas*; the Sanskrit *tānava* for the Tibetan *sel ba* is peculiar. The Sanskrit title may be an echo of the term *manastamastānavam* (Tib. *yid kyi mun pa sbyong bar mdzad*) occurring in the introductory verse of Dharmottara’s *Nyāyabinduṭīkā*.

² On this portion of the text and the four other excursions in the first chapter of the *Mun sel* that have not been translated here (marked EX1 to EX5), see VII, Appendix 1.

11 The three-fold division of awareness based on the apprehended object

(a) In general, apprehended objects, which are those that appear to awareness, are three-fold:

i. Real particulars

These are clearly appearing without being mixed with respect to time or place, and capable of being causally active. They are: what appears as an apprehended object—the five objects (of the senses), the five senses, and what is part of the physical world—as well as all episodes of awareness—namely, mind and mental factors.

ii. Concepts

These are not clearly appearing, since they appear as mixed with respect to time and place, and are incapable of being causally active. They are: what suddenly arises to conceptual cognition—whether past, present or future, near or far, real or unreal, possible or impossible, or anything at all that one contemplates.

iii. The referents of non-conceptual erroneous cognition

These are clearly appearing without being mixed with respect to time and place, but are incapable of being causally active. They are: appearances such as a double moon and an elephant within a dream.

(b) Likewise, awareness is three-fold, because it engages these three objects:

i. That which takes as its apprehended object a real particular

This includes: the reflexive awareness that exists for every cognition, the sense cognition in which there is the appearing of one of the five sense objects—form, etc.—together with what accompanies it,³ the mental cognition in which there is an appearance of those

³ “What accompanies sense cognition” refers to the mental factors (Skt. *caitta*) associated with the episode of cognition. These include feelings and positive or negative inclinations, such as mindfulness, diligence, hatred, envy, etc. More specifically, Phya pa could be referring to the mental factors that always accompany cognition. According to Vasubandhu’s *Pañcaskandhaprakaraṇa*, those are contact (*sparsā*), feeling (*vedanā*), recognition (*saṃjñā*), volition (*cetanā*), and attention (*manasikara*). Phya pa lists 51 mental factors in his doxography, when presenting the views of the Vaibhāṣikas (*Grub mtha’* 20b2–5). See Rinpochoy&Napper 1980: 36–39 for a list of 51 mental factors divided into six

sense cognitions, together with yogic cognition.⁴ These are perceptions, which are non-conceptual. Because the object is veridical,⁵ the awareness is non-erroneous. The object and awareness are both real entities. They are both dependent (from the perspective of the Three-Nature model).⁶

categories. Lists including 52 mental factors and seven mental factors that always accompany cognition are also found in Abhidharma literature.

⁴ Reflexive awareness, sense cognition, mental cognition and yogic cognition are the four types of awareness considered by the forefathers of Buddhist epistemology Dignāga (PS 1.6–7, see Hattori 1968: 27) and Dharmakīrti (PV 3.192–287) when they distinguish the types of perceptual knowledge (Skt. *pratyakṣa*). In the chapter on perception in the *Mun sel*, Phya pa adopts this four-fold division for perception but holds the three-fold division of transitive awareness into sense cognition, mental cognition and yogic cognition to be merely grounded in scriptures (*Mun sel* 42a5–7; see also 'Od zer 47a2–5).

⁵ The reader should note our (somewhat idiosyncratic) use of the term “veridical” (and its parallel term “falsidical”). Throughout this translation, the term “veridical” is used to translate the Tibetan *bden pa* (and “falsidical” translates the Tibetan *brdzun pa*). Here and in most occurrences within this text, to say of something that it is “veridical” is to say that it is causally efficacious, and thus that it applies to real entities (*dnngos po*) alone, whereas a separate understanding of veridical is at work in Phya pa’s characterization of veridical engaged objects (see 121.3, n. 41). When used in this manner, it is *objects (yul)* that either are or are not veridical.

This is mentioned because our use here differs from the standard application of the term(s) veridical (and falsidical) in contemporary philosophy of mind. There, the term “veridical” is applied not to objects but to *experiences*. Perception, for example, is typically regarded as a kind of veridical experience—in contrast to illusion and hallucination, which are frequently assumed to be non-veridical (or falsidical) kinds of experiences.

In short:

- a) The term “veridical” (*bden pa*) for Phya pa, in most circumstances, approximates what contemporary philosophers of mind would call “real” (in the sense of being causally efficacious).
- b) The term “veridical” for contemporary philosophers of mind approximates what Phya pa would call “non-erroneous” (*ma 'khrul ba*).

Yet, for Phya pa, having a veridical apprehended object (*gzung yul bden pa*) is a feature only possessed by non-erroneous cognitions, and so it is largely for this reason that we have used “veridical” to translate the term *bden pa*.

⁶ On the various characterizations of the object and the awareness see VI, Table A.

- ii. That which takes as its apprehended object a concept
This includes: mental cognition that is oriented outwards,⁷ together with what accompanies it. This is conceptual cognition. Because the object is falsidical, the awareness is erroneous. The object is unreal, but the awareness is real. (From the perspective of the Three-Nature model) the object is imagined and the awareness is dependent.
- iii. That which takes as its apprehended object the referent of a non-conceptual erroneous cognition
This includes: the sense cognition consisting of, for example, the appearance of a double moon, and the mental cognition consisting of, for example, a clear appearance within a dream. This is non-conceptual erroneous cognition. Because the object is falsidical, the awareness is erroneous. The object is unreal, but the awareness is real. (From the perspective of the Three-Nature model) the object is superimposed and the awareness is dependent.

Here, there are two items:

- The three types of objects (111)
- The three types of awareness (112)

⁷ Phya pa uses the expression “being oriented outwards” on this single occasion in the *Mun sel*. Later authors, such as Sa skya Paṇḍita (see Hugon 2008b: 531 [d]), make it clear that the qualification “being externally oriented”/“being oriented outwards” (Tib. *kha phyir (b)ltas*, Skt. *bahirmukha*) expresses the mind’s relation to an object in opposition to “being internally oriented”/“being oriented inwards” (Tib. *kha nang (du) bltas*, Skt. *antarmukha*), which is a characteristic of reflexive awareness. The association of the notion of “being oriented outwards” with conceptuality is found in the *Abhidharmakośa*—more precisely, the association with the types of conceptuality called “conjecture” (Skt. *vitarka*, Tib. *rtog pa*) and “analysis” (Skt. *vicāra*, Tib. *dpyod pa*), which are present in any mental state in the so-called “realm of desire” (*kāmadhātu*), which corresponds to the realm human beings live in (see AKBh ad AK I.32ab–33ab, and AK II.33ab). This characterization bears some similarity with the notion of “being directed externally” (*phyi rol du zhen pa*), on which see below, n. 14 and 15, but the former is attached by Phya pa to conceptual cognition in general, whereas he distinguishes some instances of conceptual cognition in which the latter is lacking.

111 The three types of objects

(a) Excursus on the three apprehended objects in various philosophical systems

[EX2: Refutation of other philosophical systems]

D Our own position

Thus, mind and mental factors, external objects, the senses, and the physical world, etc., all of these, are real. These all exist as objective and subjective elements, in that they are distinct, simultaneous, and have the same complex of causes.⁸

A double moon, etc., and concepts are unreal, since they are incapable of being causally active.

Conventionally, these objects exist in a way that accords with worldly consensus.

(b) The status of real entities and the way they are apprehended

The elucidation of real entities involves four items:

- Their being devoid of distinction (1)
- The way distinction is superimposed (2)
- Their being devoid of commonality (3)
- The way commonality is superimposed (4)

1 Their being devoid of distinction⁹

- The blue thing itself is not different from its impermanence because it will cease at another moment. And it is not different from its being produced because it was generated by causes.

⁸ The simultaneity of the object and its cognition and their being the result of the same complex of causes are two tenets that match the model of cognition adopted by Vaibhāṣika philosophers, with whom Phya pa has been associated by later scholars, although he does not himself claim any affinity with the Vaibhāṣika. See Hugon 2016c: §3.3.

⁹ The void of distinction is exemplified by the case of an unspecified real entity (which could be, for example, a lapis-lazuli) which can be described as being “blue,” “produced,” and “impermanent” and as having the corresponding properties. Some additions were made here and below in the translation to account

- The produced thing itself is not different from its blue because it is excluded from non-blue. And it is not different from its impermanence because it does not abide for another moment.
- The impermanent thing itself is not different from its blue because it is excluded from non-blue. And it is not different from its being produced because it was generated by causes.

Even though the concepts ‘blue,’ ‘produced,’ and ‘impermanent’ appear individually, the real particular is undifferentiated. This is to be viewed in the same way for all the exclusion properties that exist for each essence.¹⁰

for the ambiguity of the Tibetan formulation, which does not distinguish between a thing instantiating a property and the property being predicated to it. To some extent, in fact, this ambiguity can be used on purpose. For instance, *mi rtag pa* and *byas pa* are said to be “substantially identical” (*rdzas cig*) or “essentially identical” (*ngo bo cig*) when these terms are understood to refer, respectively, to “the impermanent thing” and “the produced thing” (both of which are, for instance, the lapis-lazuli). But when these terms are used to refer to the properties ‘impermanent’ and ‘produced,’ they represent distinct exclusion properties (*ldog pa tha dad*) and are “conceptually distinct.” To make the text intelligible in English, we removed the ambiguity, rendering accordingly, for instance, *mi rtag pa*, as “the impermanent thing” or respectively as “its impermanence” (i.e., the impermanence of the blue thing).

¹⁰ The term “exclusion property” is used here to translate the Tibetan *ldog pa*. This term and other terms in this paragraph and the following ones (e.g., *log pa* and *log sa*) are linked with Dharmakīrti’s theory of “exclusion” (Skt. *apoha*) (see Siderits et al. [eds] 2011). A key notion of this theory is that real entities (which are in themselves unique and undivided) are not categorized on the basis of positive properties existing in reality. Admitting such properties, shared among entities, would commit one to accepting real universals, which Buddhist epistemologists such as Dignāga and Dharmakīrti reject. The latter, rather, invoke as a categorizing principle the exclusion of entities from a counterpart within a conceptually established network of oppositions. Real entities determined to belong to a category *X* are thus said to be “excluded” (Tib. *log pa*, Skt. *vyāvṛtta*) from the counterpart non-*X*, for which Phya pa uses below the term *log sa*, literally “the ground of exclusion.” Although a positive corresponding concept ‘*x*’ arises and a positive word “*x*” is applied (for instance “blue”), the relevant categorizing property is not a positive property *x*, but the “exclusion from non-*x*.” Phya pa refers to it in terms of *ldog pa* (Skt. *vyāvṛtti*)—lit. “exclusion.” An entity can be ascribed as many such *ldog pa* as there are counterparts being taken into consideration. Our translation, “exclusion property” is meant to hint to the role these

If this was not the case, given that in the case of directly incompatible items (x and non- x), the negation of the opposite one (non- x) is the essence of the other (x), there would be faults such as the following:

- If the blue thing was distinct from its impermanence, it would be permanent. And if it was distinct from its being produced, it would be unproduced.
- If the produced thing was distinct from its blue, it would be non-blue. And if it was distinct from its impermanence, it would be permanent.
- If the impermanent thing was distinct from its blue, it would be non-blue. And if it was distinct from its being produced, it would be unproduced.

2 The way distinction is superimposed

If these are undifferentiated, how can one account for the worldly practice of distinguishing the elements of an inferential reasoning: the subject, ‘blue;’ the logical reason, ‘produced;’ and the property to be proven, ‘impermanent’? And how is it that they are stated as distinct in the treatises, which say that ‘blue’ belongs to the aggregate of form and ‘produced,’ ‘impermanent,’ etc., to the aggregate of compositional factors?¹¹

This is a matter of conventions that are superimposed. And in this regard there are two items:

- The origin of the superimposition of distinction (21)
- The representation of the superimposition of distinction (22)

ldog pa play in processes of predication and categorization. Earlier and later authors actually speak of them in terms of “properties.” rGya dmar ba, one of Phya pa’s teachers, uses in an equivalent manner the two expressions *ldog pa tha dad* and *chos kyī dbye ba*. Sa skya Paṅḍita uses the term *ldog chos*.

¹¹ The classification of phenomena (Skt. *dharma*, Tib. *chos*) into five categories of aggregates (Skt. *skandha*, Tib. *phung po*) of physical and mental events—form (Skt. *rūpa*), feelings (Skt. *vedanā*), recognition (Skt. *saṃjñā*), (volitional) formations (Skt. *saṃskāra*) and consciousness (Skt. *viññāna*)—goes back to the early Buddhists texts and is dealt with systematically in the Abhidharma in the analysis of the nature of experience and of individual beings, supporting the claim of the absence of a personal self. For an introduction and further bibliographical references, see, for instance, the entry “Skandha (Aggregate)” by Mathieu Boisvert in Buswell (ed.) 2004: vol. 2, 779.

21 The origin of the superimposition of distinction

For a singular essence, distinct mistaken cognitions—conceiving it as non-blue, conceiving it as unproduced, and conceiving it as permanent—are to be eliminated, and the singular essence is excluded from the multiple intentional objects of those mistaken cognitions. There is, therefore, the positing of multiple exclusion properties.

22 The representation of the superimposition of distinction

Individual concepts arise for these three (i.e., blue, impermanent, and produced).

- The arising concept ‘blue’ is conceived of as external. Thus, the superimposition ‘non-blue’ is excluded first. As such, the subject ‘blue’ is initially established.
- Next, the concept ‘produced’ arises. It is conceived of as external. Thus, the superimposition ‘unproduced’ is excluded. As such, the logical reason ‘produced’ is determined next.
- The concept ‘impermanent’ arises. But there is no directing of one’s mind externally, so the superimposition ‘permanent’ is not excluded. As such, the property to be proven, ‘impermanence,’ needs to be established afterward.¹²

In this way, there is superimposing as distinct.

3 Their being devoid of commonality

Although one uses the single convention “blue”:

- The blue in another place is distinct from the blue in this place.
- The blue in the past, etc., is distinct from the blue in the present time.

¹² “Appearing,” “directing one’s mind,” and “excluding” are three operations of conceptual cognition that are discussed below (112.111.111). On the alternative renderings of *phyi rol du zhen pa* as “conceiving of ... as external” and as “directing one’s mind externally” see n. 14. The absence of directing of one’s mind in the case of the concept ‘impermanent’ is to be associated with an episode of doubt preceding the arising of the inferential cognition properly speaking, as the latter will involve the directing of one’s mind and the exclusion of the superimposition ‘permanent.’ Doubt has, in general, the operation of directing one’s mind, but not in a determinate way that would be partial to ‘impermanent’ (see 112.112).

- The blue of the lotus is distinct from the blue of the lapis-lazuli.¹³

This is because, if they were not distinct, there would be the following consequences:

- When perceiving the blue in this place, one would also perceive the blue in another place.
- When the blue in the past has ceased, the blue in the present would also have ceased.
- When the blue of the lotus has faded, the blue of the lapis-lazuli would also have faded.

4 The way commonality is superimposed

If that is so, how does one come to use the single expression “blue” for distinct natures?

It is by way of superimposing.

- The reason for the superimposition is the following: with regard to these individual substances, there is the single superimposition ‘non-blue’ that is to be eliminated, and the individual substances are excluded from a single counterpart. There is, therefore, superimposing as one.
- The representation of the superimposition is the following: the arising of a single concept for all of the distinct substances.

112 The three types of awareness

The division of the subjective element (i.e., awareness) is three-fold:

- Conceptual cognition (112.1)
- Non-conceptual non-erroneous cognition (112.2)
- Non-conceptual erroneous cognition (112.3)

¹³ These three points spell out the unicity of a particular entity with regard to space, time, and aspect. “Lapis-lazuli” renders here the Tibetan *be du rya* (calque of the Sanskrit *vaidūrya*). This term strictly speaking refers to beryl, which can be of various colors (green, blue, rose or yellow). But in epistemological works, *vaidūrya* is exclusively used to refer to a blue stone. We have thus preferred the term “lapis-lazuli,” which makes this feature of the intended example more explicit than “beryl.” See Hugon 2008b: 166, n. 98 for references.

112.1 Conceptual cognition

Conceptual cognition has two subtypes:

- That which is directed externally¹⁴ (112.11)
- That which is not directed¹⁵ (112.12)

¹⁴ The terms “directing” and “directed” have been used here and elsewhere to capture the idea that certain episodes of awareness possess intentionality, and that toward which these episodes of awareness are directed are called “intentional objects” (see 121.12). Because this feature of awareness, for Phya pa, as for Dharmakīrti (see McCrea&Patil 2006: 307–318), is restricted to episodes of conceptual cognition, it is also natural to speak of this directedness of the mind as cases in which something is “conceived of as” something else. In all these cases, the Tibetan verb employed is *zhen pa*. Throughout this translation the following conventions have been followed:

- In those cases in which both the grammatical subject and direct object of the verb *zhen pa* were left implicit—leaving only an indirect object (the “intentional object”) specified—we have used the convention “directing one’s mind toward <intentional object>.”
- In those cases in which the direct object of the verb *zhen pa* is a concept appearing within an episode of awareness, we have used the convention “<concept> is conceived of as <intentional object>” or “<concept> is conceived to be <intentional object>.”

¹⁵ The specification “externally” is not repeated at the beginning of 112.11. Being “externally directed” is the prototypical case of a conceptual cognition which is “directed.” For instance, this is the case when the appearing concept of a pot is conceived of as being a real, extra-mental pot. When dealing with the second subtype (112.12), Phya pa describes the cognition illustrating it as “not having the operation of directing one’s mind externally.” He does not suggest that it is directed otherwise. However, when discussing inferential cognition, Phya pa mentions the case when a concept is conceived of as being a concept, hence not as being real and extra-mental (see 112.111.11.2 [c] below). This leaves open the possibility that the mind could be directed, although not externally. This possibility was not discussed in the Indian works of Dharmakīrti, whose focus in this regard was on explaining the way to bridge the gap between cognitions bearing on concepts and reality (see McCrea&Patil 2006: 307–325). It seems that the division presented here should likewise be regarded as focusing on the distinction between cognitions that are directed (typically, externally) and those that are not directed at all.

In the parallel passage of the *'Od zer*, the division is made in terms of presence or absence of conceiving the object as being veridical externally (*phyi rol du bden pa 'i zhen pa yod pa / med pa*).

112.11 Within conceptual cognitions that are directed, there are two sub-types:

- Determinate awareness (112.111)
- Doubt (112.112)

112.111 Within determinate awareness there are:

- Those in which the determination corresponds with the object to be cognized (112.111.1)
- Those in which the determination does not correspond with the object to be cognized (112.111.2)¹⁶

112.111.1 Within this first category there are two types:

- Inferential cognition (112.111.11)
- Factive assessment (as well as post-knowledge cognition) (112.111.12)

112.111.11 Inferential cognition

112.111.111 The three operations

For inferential cognition there are three operations:¹⁷

- Appearing (112.111.111.1)
- Directing (112.111.111.2)
- Excluding others (112.111.111.3)

112.111.111.1 With regard to the operation of appearing, this inferential cognition is just a mistaken cognition that is erroneous with respect to the state of affairs that is to be apprehended.¹⁸ This is because the concepts—

¹⁶ The second item is unexpectedly discussed after “Doubt” (112.112) and “Cognitions which are not directed” (112.12).

¹⁷ What follows with respect to these “three operations” is not a full descriptive or explanatory account of how they operate. Rather, Phya pa bypasses descriptions of these notions and moves directly to classifying whether a given form of awareness is mistaken or erroneous from the perspective of the relevant operations. See also the Introduction (I.1, 3.1) and Hugon 2008b: 170–172.

¹⁸ The type of mistaken cognition involved in the operation of appearing is related to the apprehended object. It corresponds to the first form of mistaken

such as ‘fire’ and ‘impermanence’—that appear are imagined (from the perspective of the Three-Nature model).

112.111.111.2 With regard to the operation of directing one’s mind, in two cases, (the pair of [a] and [b], as well as [c] below¹⁹), inferential cognition is a mistaken cognition because it is directed in a way that does not correspond to the object to be cognized, like in the case of a rope being conceived of as a snake.²⁰

- When directing the mind toward the nature of a real particular:
 - When the arising concept of ‘fire’ is conceived to have the nature of an external fire [a], or
 - When the arising concept of ‘impermanence’ is conceived to have the nature of impermanence as an external property [b].
- When one infers that a double moon can be given the designation “conventionally true,” because it does not withstand analysis [c], the arising concept of ‘the aggregate of double moon and the designation “conventionally true”’²¹ is conceived to have the nature of a double moon.

In one case inferential cognition is not erroneous, because a verbal object is conceived of as a verbal object.²²

cognition distinguished below, namely, the apprehension of something superimposed (123.411), here, a concept in the case of inferential cognition. This type is labeled MC_{1.1} in Table 3 (IV, 4[b]).

¹⁹ The instances of inferential reasoning to which [a] through [c], and later [f], refer are explained in more detail in VII, Appendix 2.7.

²⁰ On this type of mistaken cognition involved in the operation of directing and its relation to the second form of mistaken cognition distinguished later in the text, the incorrect determination of the intentional object (123.412), see Table 3 in IV, 4(b), where this type is labeled MC_{2/3}.

²¹ The notion of an “aggregate” refers to the combination of the subject and the property to be proven which, together, constitute the thesis of an inferential reasoning. Strictly speaking, it is the “aggregate” that is the object of the inferential cognition, but often (as above in [a] and [b]) the property to be proven is mentioned alone.

²² The notion of a “verbal object” (*sgra don*) has, for Phya pa, the same meaning as “concept” (*don spyi*) (the term *don spyi* is used along with *sgra don* in the parallel passage of the ‘*Od zer*). The former typically occurs in discussions drawing

- When one infers that the verbal object ‘Luna’²³ is the direct referent of the word “moon,” because it is the apprehended object of a conceptual cognition [d], the appearing concept of ‘the aggregate of the verbal object “Luna” and direct referent of words’ is conceived to have the nature of the verbal object ‘Luna.’

112.111.111.3 With regard to excluding others, it is due to this operation that inferential cognition is an instance of knowledge. This is because:

- [In b] The determination of something as impermanent excludes one’s engaging in the mistaken cognition of its being permanent.
- [In a] Directing one’s mind toward a fire excludes directing one’s mind toward there not being a fire.
- [In c] Directing one’s mind toward being conventional excludes directing one’s mind toward being ultimate.
- [In d] Directing one’s mind toward being the direct referent of words excludes directing one’s mind toward not being the direct referent of words.

Thus, [in e] with respect to the appearing in the mind of the concept of ‘emptiness,’ which is a mistaken conventionality, and with respect to conceiving of it as emptiness that is perfected (as in the Three-Nature model), inferential cognition is a mistaken cognition. But with respect to excluding the mistaken cognition in which one’s mind is directed toward a true reality, inferential cognition is an instance of knowledge. This is expressed also through the example of a child appearing as dead within a dream, which, while being a mistaken cognition, eliminates the superimposition of a child existing.²⁴

from Dharmakīrti’s works, in which the Sanskrit *śabdārtha* (which translates in Tibetan as *sgra don*) is used.

²³ The Tibetan reads *ri bong can* (going back to the Sanskrit expression *śāśin*), literally “the one which has a hare” or “the one marked with a hare,” and refers to the hare-like shape visible on the face of the full moon.

²⁴ This example is found in the *Bodhicaryāvatāra* by the Indian Buddhist scholar Śāntideva (7th–8th century): “Therefore, when, in a dream, [one’s] son has been killed, the conceptual cognition “he does not exist” obstructs the arising of the notion of his existence. But this [conceptual cognition] is false.” (BCA 9.141: *tasmāt svapne sute naṣṭe sa nāstīti vikalpanā / tadbhāvavikalpanotpādaṃ vibadhnāti mṛṣā ca sā //*).

112.111.112 For these (inferential) cognitions that are endowed with conceptuality there are three items:

- The way real entities exist (112.111.112.1)
- The way awareness apprehends them (112.111.112.2)
- The manner by which they (i.e., inferential cognitions) come to be episodes of knowledge (112.111.112.3)

112.111.112.1 A real entity (such as a fire) exists:

- As fire itself, and
- As devoid of distinction, because it is undifferentiated from producthood and impermanence, and
- As devoid of commonality, because it is not intermixed with fires that are different with respect to time, place, and their specific natures.

112.111.112.2 The way awareness apprehends them is as follows:

- Fire is apprehended as fire.
- But producthood, impermanence, and fire appear as distinct, because the respective concepts arise individually. And this is the opposite of the absence of distinction that pertains to the real entity.
- Real entities that are individualized with respect to their time, place, and specific natures appear commonly, because a single concept of ‘fire’ arises. And this is in opposition to the real entity being devoid of commonality.

112.111.112.3 The manner by which they come to be episodes of knowledge is, in all the aforementioned cases of inferential cognition, by prohibiting the directing of one’s mind in the opposite way, that is, by engaging their object via the exclusion of what is other.

[EX3 On the epistemic object of inferential cognition]

112.111.12 Factive assessment (as well as post-knowledge cognition)

The conceptual cognitions which, though not being instances of knowledge, are determinate awarenesses in which the determination corresponds with the object to be cognized are (i) factive assessment and (ii) post-knowledge cognition.²⁵ These also have the three operations:

- From the perspective of appearing, as for the appearing of the concept of ‘water in an old well’ (in [i]) and the appearing of the concept of ‘blue’ (in [ii]), these are each mistaken cognitions that are erroneous with regard to the state of affairs to be apprehended.
- From the perspective of conceiving the concepts as external (in [i] and [ii]), they are mistaken cognitions that conflate items that are distinct.
- From the perspective of excluding the consideration that there may be no water in the well (in [i]), it is a factive assessment, and from the perspective of excluding non-blue (in [ii]), it is a post-knowledge cognition.

112.112 Doubt

Doubt also has the three operations:

- With regard to the appearing of the concept of, for example, ‘demon,’²⁶ doubt is a mistaken cognition that is erroneous with regard to the state of affairs to be apprehended.
- As for conceiving the concept to be the appearance of something external, doubt is a mistaken cognition that conflates items that are distinct.

²⁵ The case that exemplifies (i) is the conceptual determination that there is water in an old well (a determination that follows from neither looking into the well nor from an established triply characterized logical reason—on which see VII, Appendix 2). (ii) is exemplified by the conceptual determination “[this is] blue” that follows the perception of a blue object (i.e., a determining cognition), or which consists in a memory (see 123.21). This is the conceptual type of post-knowledge cognition (cf. 122.2).

²⁶ The word “demon” is used here to translate the Tibetan *sha za* (lit. “flesh-eater”), which translates the Sanskrit *piśāca*. Mentioned in Buddhist and non-Buddhist Indian literature, these “demons” are invoked by philosophers as instances of entities whose existence cannot be either ascertained or refuted by episodes of knowledge of ordinary beings.

- However, conceiving of the existence of a demon as possible excludes conceiving of the existence of a demon as impossible. Based on this operation, it is doubtful.

112.12 Conceptual cognition that is not directed

Regarding the conceptual cognitions that take as their objects kingdoms within one's mind or totally made up things, as well as those in which one meditates on one's body being that of, for example, a monkey, these cognitions do not at all have the operation of directing one's mind externally nor do they have the operation of excluding others. They are limited to the appearing of concepts, and so are merely mistaken cognitions that are erroneous with regard to the state of affairs to be apprehended.

112.111.2 (As for an episode of determinate awareness in which the determination does not correspond with the object to be cognized,) for instance, when conceiving of sound as permanent, there are the three operations:

- From the perspective of the appearing of the concept of 'the aggregate of "sound" and "permanence",' it is a mistaken cognition that is erroneous with regard to the state of affairs to be apprehended.
- From the perspective of conceiving of this concept as external, it is also a mistaken cognition that conflates items that are distinct.
- From the perspective of excluding what is other—which excludes conceiving of sound as impermanent—it is a mistaken cognition that affirms something that is not the case and denies something that is the case.

And so it is, from all three perspectives, a mistaken cognition.²⁷

²⁷ The type of awareness discussed in this section is also called "mistaken determinate awareness" (*log par nges pa*) by Phya pa. This form of mistaken cognition corresponds to the category of "incorrect determination of the intentional object" (123.412). It differs from the previously mentioned instances of awareness that are mistaken cognitions from the perspective of conceiving concepts as external in that the operation of exclusion also is a mistaken cognition. Here, the incorrect determination of the intentional object involves the double error of:

1. conflating the type of the object (i.e., conceiving of a concept as being a real particular), as well as,

112.2 Non-conceptual non-erroneous cognition

112.21 Non-conceptual non-erroneous cognition, of which there is reflexive awareness and transitive awareness,²⁸ has only the operation of appearing, because it is established by experience that there is no operation of directing one's mind—conceiving of what appears as, for example, blue—nor is there the operation of excluding others—such as the differentiation from non-blue that occurs because of conceiving of something as blue.

112.22

(a) The established fact that this is the appearance of a real entity itself without the appearance of something superimposed derives from establishing that the apprehended object is a real entity, since it is causally active.

Here, because it is the real entity itself that appears, it is devoid of distinction, and it appears as such. This is because exclusion properties that are essentially identical have no duality of appearing and non-appearing.

It is devoid of commonality and appears precisely as devoid of commonality, because distinct natures appear individually.

(b) As for manifest features, their appearing as devoid of distinction is established by experience. For instance, blue and its shape are experienced as a unitary, not dual, appearance.

Their appearing as devoid of commonality is also established by experience. For instance, the blue of lapis-lazuli and the blue of the

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2. misidentifying the nature of the intentional object as it is in reality (e.g., conceiving of sound as permanent).

The former error (1) is common to all conceptual cognitions that are directed externally, but the latter error is specific to this subtype of awareness.

See also the discussion of the various types of mistaken cognition in IV, 4(b).

²⁸ “Transitive awareness” is used here to translate the term *gzhan rig* (lit. “awareness of something else”), a type of awareness that is not merely aware of itself (like “reflexive awareness”) but takes as its object something other than itself. The term *don rig* (lit. “awareness of an object”), sometimes found instead of *gzhan rig*, has the same meaning.

lotus, as well as the blue in this place and the blue in another place, are experienced as appearing individually.

- (c) As for non-manifest features (such as momentariness), a moment (of blue) appears individually and as devoid of commonality with the preceding and succeeding moments of blue. This is established (by an inferential cognition) from a logical reason: Since the previous moment of blue has ceased, it does not exist; and so it does not appear. And since the subsequent moment of blue has not come into being, it does not exist; and so it does not appear. Therefore, the present moment of blue cannot be conflated with those two moments, as the present moment alone is appearing.

Concerning, for example, blue and momentariness, which are essentially identical and are devoid of distinction, they appear as devoid of distinction. This is established through the experience that they do not appear individually. And it is determined by an inferential cognition that there is no duality of appearing and non-appearing.

[EX4: Proof that there is no duality of appearing and non-appearing for what is essentially identical]

112.23 As for the manner by which perception comes to be an episode of knowledge, to be a perception is to be non-erroneous with respect to the state of affairs to be apprehended.²⁹ Therefore, it would be contradictory for perception to have duality, namely, appearing and non-appearing, with regard to a singular substance. But to be an episode of knowledge is to eliminate opposite superimpositions. Therefore, when one's mind is focused on manifest features, opposite superimpositions are eliminated, and so perception is an episode of knowledge only with regard to manifest features such as 'blue.' But, with regard to appearing non-manifest features such as 'momentariness,' it is not an episode of knowledge.

²⁹ Cf. (231.12), where "non-erroneous with respect to the state of affairs to be apprehended" is given as the definition of perception. In the present passage, it is identified as the "exclusion property" (*ldog pa*) of perception, which we render in the translation in the sense "what it is to be a perception." In 'Od zer 46a1, Phya pa identifies it as 'meaning-exclusion property' (*don ldog*), i.e., its defining property.

*Some say that what makes a perception an episode of knowledge is merely its “bringing about a determinate awareness.”*³⁰

If that were the case, just like when one determines that an object is veridical through inferential cognition one also determines that the awareness itself evaluates something veridical, so too, when an object is determined to be, for example, blue, the awareness is determined to be, for example, something that has a blue object. Thus, it is impossible for a reflexive awareness experiencing a determinate awareness to be an episode of non-ascertaining perception. Yet, since the reflexive awareness experiencing the last moment of a determinate awareness before it ceases does not “bring about a determinate awareness,” according to you it would be an instance of non-ascertaining perception.³¹

Also, in the case of omniscient beings, it is impossible for a determinate awareness to be brought about, because there is never the generation of conceptual cognitions that are erroneous with regard to the state of affairs to be apprehended. Because of this, every perception of omniscient beings would become a non-ascertaining perception.³²

³⁰ Phya pa is addressing here the position of rNgog Blo ldan shes rab or his followers (see I.2, 4.2). This position on the nature of knowledge is correlated to the first alternative definition of non-ascertaining perception discussed in (123.1 [a]).

³¹ Phya pa distinguishes three kinds of reflexive awareness: knowledge, non-ascertaining perception, and post-knowledge cognition (see 122.3 and 122.31). Here the discussion leaves out the third type, focusing on whether the particular type of reflexive awareness considered is an episode of knowledge or of non-ascertaining perception. Phya pa’s argument excludes the possibility that the reflexive awareness of a determinate awareness would be an episode of non-ascertaining perception (a similar argument is found in *’Od zer* 59a3–6). It is never “non-ascertaining” even when it does not bring about a determinate awareness in the next moment; it is an episode of knowledge. The opponent’s definition, on the other hand, implies that in such a case the reflexive awareness cannot be an episode of knowledge and would qualify as a non-ascertaining perception. Note that this consequence, which according to Phya pa is unacceptable, is however accepted by a later thirteenth-century Tibetan scholar who adopted the position being criticized here, Chu mig pa Seng ge dpal (see IV, 1(b), n. 11).

³² Phya pa’s argument runs on the idea that omniscient beings (i.e., Buddhas) cannot have erroneous cognitions because their reaching this stage of the path to enlightenment presupposes that they have cut off the roots of all obstructions—including, notably, ignorance (this is pointed out explicitly in *’Od zer* 23a7–8), and thus also error. Hence they cannot have conceptual cognitions, as these are, by nature, erroneous. The issue of the characteristics of the awareness of Buddhas

112.3 Non-conceptual erroneous cognition

Non-conceptual erroneous cognition, in which there is the appearance of, for example, a double moon, is only a mistaken cognition that is erroneous with regard to the state of affairs to be apprehended, because it takes as its object something that is merely superimposed. Indeed, it does not engage a real entity positively, because a real entity does not appear, nor does it engage a real entity via the exclusion of others, because it is not incompatible with opposite superimpositions.

12 The seven-fold division of awareness based on both the apprehended object and intentional object

The division of awareness based on these includes:

- The division of objects (121)
- The seven-fold division of awareness based on those objects (122)
- Specifically laying out the five types of awareness that are not episodes of knowledge (123)

121 The division of objects

- The definitions of apprehended object, engaged object, etc. (121.1)
- Distinguishing these objects by reflecting on the partial overlap between apprehended objects and engaged objects (121.2)
- Establishing that the object of knowledge is the engaged object by reflecting on the partial overlap between the episodes of awareness involving these objects (121.3)

121.1 The definitions of apprehended object, engaged object, etc.

121.11 The definition of *apprehended object* is: something such that its own nature itself appears to awareness.

[EX5: On the definition of the apprehended object in the various philosophical systems]

(or, in contrast, the view that mind and mental factors cease upon reaching Buddhahood) is the subject of an intensive debate among Tibetan scholars. Phya pa's original view on this point is discussed in Vose 2009: 120–132.

121.12 What is called the “*intentional object*” is: what the mind is directed toward, and the mind being directed toward it excludes engaging in the opposite directing of one’s mind.

- For episodes of doubt, directing one’s mind toward its possibility excludes its impossibility.
- For mistaken cognition, directing one’s mind toward what is incorrect excludes the actual way things are.
- For factive assessment, post-knowledge cognition, and inferential cognition, directing one’s mind toward the actual way things are excludes engaging in the opposite directing of one’s mind.

121.13 In the case of perception, by focusing one’s mind on appearing manifest features, opposite superimpositions are eliminated. And inferential cognition eliminates opposite superimpositions through a reliance on evidence. In these two specific cases there is:

- (K1) the elimination of superimpositions,
- (K2) with regard to states of affairs not previously known,
- (K3) by an apprehension that requires an invariable relation to the state of affairs.³³

And thus these objects for which superimpositions have been eliminated (in accord with the above) are the epistemic objects of these episodes of awareness. And these are also called the “*engaged objects*” of those episodes of awareness.

121.2 The two objects—apprehended objects and engaged objects—are distinct:³⁴

- (++) There exist items that are both the apprehended object and the engaged object. For instance:

³³ See, in relation to (K1)–(K3), the criteria that are presented in Phya pa’s definition of knowledge (212.14). See also I.1, 4 and I.2, 3.

³⁴ See VI, Table B.

- Blue is the apprehended object of perception, because it is what appears in perception, and it is the engaged object, because perception eliminates for blue the superimposition of non-blue.³⁵
- Taking a concept as the subject of a proof, when one proves that it can be given the designation “conventionally true,” because it does not withstand analysis [f], the concept is the apprehended object, because the concept appears in the inferential cognition. And it is the engaged object of that inferential cognition because, for that concept, the superimposition of it not being conventionally true is eliminated.
- (+–) There exist items that are the apprehended object but not the engaged object. For instance:
 - In the inferential cognition that concludes that sound is impermanent [b], the concept of ‘impermanence’ is the apprehended object because it is what appears. But it is not the engaged object because there is not, for that concept, the elimination of the superimposition consisting in the apprehension as permanent.
 - In a non-ascertaining perception, momentariness is the apprehended object, because it appears, but it is not the engaged object, because the superimposition of permanence is not eliminated.
 - Consider:
 - The concept that appears in factive assessment
 - The concepts that appear in mistaken cognition, (conceptual) post-knowledge cognition, and doubt
 - What appears as a double moon, etc., in non-conceptual erroneous cognition
 - The blue that appears in perceptual post-knowledge cognition

³⁵ In this example, Phya pa is using the term “perception” in the restricted sense of “perceptual knowledge.” The perception of blue in the form of non-ascertaining perception—such as when a person visually perceives blue without eliminating superimpositions due to being totally absorbed in one’s thoughts (see 123.112)—is ruled out by the claim that there is an elimination of the superimposition non-blue. The perceptual post-knowledge cognition of blue is ruled out as well, for Phya pa specifies below that in such a case the blue that appears is not the engaged object of this cognition.

These are the apprehended objects of those episodes of awareness, because they are what appears in those episodes. But they are not the engaged objects because, for those objects, there is no elimination of superimpositions by those episodes of awareness.³⁶

- (-+) There exist items that are the engaged object but not the apprehended object. For instance:
- The impermanence of sound is the engaged object of inferential cognition [b], because, for the impermanence of sound, inferential cognition eliminates the superimposition of permanence. But it is not the apprehended object, because impermanence *qua* real particular does not appear.³⁷
 - Concepts and double moons, etc., are the engaged objects of reflexive awareness, because, for those objects, reflexive awareness eliminates the superimposition of non-existence from the perspective of appearance. But they are not the apprehended objects of reflexive awareness, because they do not appear in reflexive awareness. These are the indirect objects of perception.³⁸

³⁶ For the apprehended object to be also the engaged object, it is necessary that (i) elimination of superimpositions takes place and (ii) that it takes place with regard to the object which is also the apprehended object. In the case of inferential cognition the first condition is fulfilled, but not the second, while in the case of non-ascertaining perception the first condition is not fulfilled. It is less clear which criterion fails to apply for the remaining types of awareness listed in the third point, and whether the way they are being grouped has any significance in this regard. In particular, it is questionable in the case of perceptual post-knowledge cognition whether *Phya pa* implies that there is no elimination of superimpositions at all or no elimination of superimpositions characterized by novelty (K2), which is a requirement for the object to qualify as an engaged object (cf. 121.13). On this question, see I.2, 3.2.2.

³⁷ The example is easier to understand in the case of the inferential cognition of 'fire' [a]: superimpositions are eliminated with regard to a particular fire, but a particular fire does not appear to the inferential cognition. This is the example provided in the parallel discussion in *'Od zer* 112.221 (21a4).

³⁸ What appears in reflexive awareness is the cognition in which these objects appear. The distinction between direct and indirect objects of perception parallels the distinction between direct understanding (*dnogs rtogs*) and indirect understanding (*shugs rtogs*) (discussed in *Mun sel* 212.331.142 [36b1–2]). The first is

- (–) There exist items that are neither the apprehended object nor the engaged object. For instance:
- Sound, with respect to a visual cognition.³⁹

121.3 With respect to establishing that the object of knowledge is the engaged object by reflecting on the partial overlap between the episodes of awareness involving these objects:

In general, a veridical engaged object is that for which there is no opposition with regard to a positively discerned state of affairs.⁴⁰ A veridical apprehended object is that which is capable of being causally active.⁴¹

explained as “the elimination of superimpositions with regard to a real particular that appears” (*rang gi mtshan nyid snang pa la sgro 'dogs sel pa mngon sum gyi dngos rtogs*), the second as “the elimination of superimpositions without a real particular appearing” (*rang gi mtshan nyid mi snang pa la sgro 'dogs sel pa shugs la rtogs*).

³⁹ An additional note on the manuscript reports the view of some scholars whose identity is uncertain (see III, 4.a): “‘Water’ is said to be an example based on the factive assessment (that there is water in the old well), because being an object presupposes that it is taken as a basis.”

⁴⁰ The notion of “positively discerned state of affairs” corresponds with that of engaged object and epistemic object in the case of perceptual knowledge and inferential cognition. For episodes of awareness that are not knowledge and thus are not considered by Phya pa to have an engaged object and an epistemic object, the expression refers to the apprehended object for non-conceptual cognitions, and to the intentional object of conceptual ones. See also n. 42 on the term “positively discerning.”

⁴¹ On the equation of “veridical” with “capable of being causally active” in the case of the apprehended object, see VI, Table A. The definition of “veridical” in terms of “lacking opposition” in the case of the engaged object follows from the discussion elucidating the meaning of “veridical” in the definition of knowledge in terms of “knowing something veridical” (see 212.14). There, Phya pa has a more expansive understanding of veridicality, one that can be applied not just to real entities, but to non-entities as well and, beyond the conventional domain, to the ultimate domain. He rejects the understanding of “veridical” as “capable of being causally active” and as “resisting analysis,” which both would limit the range of epistemic objects. He adopts an understanding of “veridical” as “unopposed” (Tib. *gnod pa med pa*, Skt. **abādhita*) or “existing according to the natural disposition of the object to be cognized” (*shes bya 'i gshis su gnas*). The two formulas are combined in the definition of the veridical engaged object in

- (++) There are episodes of awareness having both a veridical apprehended object and veridical engaged object. For instance: Perceptual knowledge has a veridical apprehended object, because a real entity appears, and it has a veridical engaged object, because there is no opposition with regard to the positively discerned epistemic object.
- (-+) There are episodes of awareness having a veridical engaged object but not having a veridical apprehended object. For instance: Inferential cognition has a veridical engaged object, because there is no opposition with regard to the positively discerned state of affairs, but it does not have a veridical apprehended object, because a concept, which is unreal, appears.
- (+-) There are episodes of awareness having a veridical apprehended object but not having a veridical engaged object. For instance: Non-ascertaining perception has a veridical apprehended object, because a real entity appears, but it does not have a veridical engaged object for which superimpositions have been eliminated.
- (--) There are episodes of awareness that have neither a veridical apprehended object nor a veridical engaged object. For instance: The conceptual cognition of a rope as a snake does not have a veridical apprehended object, because, since the concept ('snake') appears, an apprehended object that is a real entity does not appear. And it does not have a veridical engaged object, because there is no snake in external reality.

The object of knowledge is the engaged object.

Having a veridical engaged object is a sufficient condition for being an episode of knowledge. Indeed, a perception having both a veridical engaged object and veridical apprehended object is an episode of knowledge. And inferential cognition, which has a veridical engaged object but no veridical apprehended object, is an episode of knowledge.

Also, having a veridical engaged object is a necessary condition for being an episode of knowledge. Indeed, an episode of awareness such as the conceptual cognition of a rope as a snake, which has neither a veridical apprehended object nor a veridical engaged object, is not an episode of knowledge. So too, non-ascertaining perception, which has a veridical

the 'Od zer ('Od zer 21a5: 'jug yul bden zhes bya ba ni shes bya'i gshis gnod med du gnas pa). For more on this, see Hugon 2011a: 162–165.

apprehended object but not a veridical engaged object, is not an episode of knowledge.

On the other hand, having a veridical apprehended object is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for being an episode of knowledge. It is not a sufficient condition, because, although non-ascertaining perception has a veridical apprehended object, it is not an episode of knowledge. And it is not a necessary condition, because, even though inferential cognition does not have a veridical apprehended object, it is an episode of knowledge.

Therefore, the object of knowledge is the engaged object alone.

122 The seven-fold division of awareness based on the division of objects

For the seven-fold division of awareness based on the apprehended and engaged objects there are three topics:

- Determining that there are seven types of awareness (122.1)
- Subsuming those seven within the earlier three-fold typology of awareness (122.2)
- Examining the mutual compatibility and incompatibility among the twelve types of awareness (122.3)

122.1 In general, episodes of awareness that positively discern⁴² a state of affairs are of two types:

122.11 Episodes of awareness that discern something not set apart from what is directly incompatible with it, without being partial to either.

- This is *doubt*. When considering that something may be impermanent one also considers its permanence. As such, impermanence is not set apart from permanence.

122.12 Episodes of awareness that discern something standing apart from what is directly incompatible with it, while being partial to it.

⁴² “Positively discerning” translates here the Tibetan term *yongs su gcod pa*, which stands as a broad notion that encompasses both the ideas of “appearing” and “directing.” It is to be distinguished from its use in the pair *yongs su gcod pa/rnam par gcad pa*, where it denotes the positive aspect of a conceptual process, which we translated instead as “positively ascertaining” (see n. 74).

122.121 Episodes of awareness that discern in a way that does not correspond with the object to be cognized.

- This is *mistaken cognition*.

122.122 Episodes of awareness that discern in a way that corresponds with the object to be cognized.

122.122.1 Episodes of awareness that are compatible with directing one's mind in the opposite way.

- This is *non-ascertaining perception*.

122.122.2 Episodes of awareness that are incompatible with directing one's mind in the opposite way.

122.122.21 Episodes of awareness that engage an object already known.

- This is *post-knowledge cognition*.

122.122.22 Episodes of awareness that engage an object not previously known.

122.122.221 Episodes of awareness that oppose superimpositions by observing a real particular.

- This is *perceptual knowledge*.

122.122.222 Episodes of awareness that oppose superimpositions without a real particular being observed.

122.122.222.1 Episodes of awareness that rely on evidence.

- This is *inferential cognition*.

122.122.222.2 Episodes of awareness that do not rely on evidence.

- This is *factive assessment*.

Thus, the five episodes of awareness that are not instances of knowledge and the two episodes of awareness that are instances of knowledge total, altogether, seven.⁴³

122.2 *How are these seven types of awareness to be subsumed under the earlier three-fold typology of awareness?*⁴⁴

- The pair of perceptual knowledge and non-ascertaining perception is subsumed under non-conceptual non-erroneous cognition.
- The trio of inferential cognition, factive assessment, and doubt is subsumed under conceptual cognition.
- Mistaken cognition occurs within non-conceptual erroneous cognition and within conceptual cognition.
- Post-knowledge cognition is found within both non-conceptual non-erroneous cognition and within conceptual cognition.

122.3 When one subdivides these seven episodes of awareness they become twelve-fold.⁴⁵ The trio of non-ascertaining perception, (perceptual) post-knowledge cognition, and perceptual knowledge is subdivided into three kinds of reflexive awareness and three kinds of transitive awareness, which sums to six. In mistaken cognition there are two subdivisions, conceptual and non-conceptual,⁴⁶ which brings the sum to eight. There is conceptual post-knowledge cognition, which brings the sum to nine. The

⁴³ See VI, Table E. The two that are instances of knowledge are perceptual knowledge and inferential cognition. The other five, which are not instances of knowledge, are discussed in detail in (123).

⁴⁴ See (112).

⁴⁵ See VI, Table F.

⁴⁶ Note that this division is not equivalent to Phya pa's later delineation of the two forms of mistaken cognition (123.41). The first of those two (123.411) can be either conceptual or non-conceptual, the second (123.412) exclusively conceptual. On these alternative divisions of mistaken cognition, see further IV, 4(b). A possible explanation for Phya pa utilizing the present sub-divisions (of conceptual versus non-conceptual mistaken cognition) here is that the incompatibility of episodes of cognition is often easily explained by focusing on whether the cognitions are or are not conceptual. It is central to Phya pa's reasoning that conceptual cognitions are incompatible with transitive non-conceptual cognitions.

trio of inferential cognition, factive assessment, and doubt brings the total to twelve.

As to the way in which these twelve can be classified as mutually compatible and incompatible there are five items to be examined:

- The three episodes of reflexive awareness (122.31)
- The four episodes of non-conceptual transitive awareness (122.32)⁴⁷
- The three episodes of conceptual cognition in which there is a correct determination (122.33)⁴⁸
- (Conceptual) mistaken cognition (122.34)⁴⁹
- Doubt (122.35)

122.31 All episodes of cognition entail reflexive awareness. A reflexive awareness can be:

- (i) an instance of non-ascertaining perception with regard to the experience of a non-manifest feature (of the episode of awareness) such as momentariness;
- (ii) a post-knowledge cognition with regard to a manifest feature previously known;
- (iii) an episode of knowledge with regard to a manifest feature not previously known.

These three forms of reflexive awareness have a shared identity with all cognitions.

⁴⁷ These four are the three kinds of perceptual transitive awareness (non-ascertaining perception, perceptual post-knowledge cognition, and perceptual knowledge) and non-conceptual mistaken cognition.

⁴⁸ “Correct determination” (*yang dag par nges pa*) is used here in place of and in the same sense as “determination corresponding with the object to be cognized” in the three-fold typology (see 112.111.1). The three episodes are inferential cognition, factive assessment, and conceptual post-knowledge cognition.

⁴⁹ Non-conceptual mistaken cognition is dealt with in (122.32). Note that in section (122.34) and in the discussion of the other types of awareness, “mistaken cognition” (whether conceptual or non-conceptual) refers exclusively to instances of the first form delineated later in (123.411), namely, those in which the apprehended object is a superimposed concept.

122.32 As for the four episodes of non-conceptual transitive awareness: A single visual cognition can be:

- (i) a mistaken cognition—a white shell appearing as yellow;
- (ii) a non-ascertaining perception—the appearing of a pot’s momentariness;
- (iii) a post-knowledge cognition with regard to blue, etc., that has previously been known;
- (iv) an episode of knowledge with regard to a specific shape, etc., that has not previously been known.⁵⁰

⁵⁰ A first problem with this list is that it purports to refer to “a single visual cognition,” but is actually based on two distinct situations: the visual cognition of a white shell in (i), the visual cognition of a blue object in (ii) and (iii) (and probably in (iv)). In the mention of Phya pa’s view on the compatibility/incompatibility of the various kinds of awareness by the author of the *Tshad bsdus*, (i) is exemplified by the mistaken cognition of dripping strands of hair (by a person suffering from an eye-disease) when looking at a pot. The example offered on Phya pa’s behalf allows him to distinguish the four types of non-conceptual transitive awareness based on the same situation: the visual cognition of a blue pot. (See also the discussion in gTsang drug rdo rje’s *gSal byed* [9a8], illustrating this case by the appearance of something yellow on the edge of the pot for someone afflicted by jaundice). Notably, however, the author of the *Tshad bsdus* does not himself believe that the other six episodes of non-conceptual awareness—exemplified by (ii) through (vii)—are compatible with non-conceptual mistaken cognition (i) and reports that Phya pa’s account of compatibility and incompatibility in the case of non-conceptual transitive awareness has been judged “unappealing.” (*Tshad bsdus* 54,2–5: *phya pa ni bum pa’i steng du skra shad la sogs pa ’dzag par snang ba’i shes pa zhig ’byung bas rtog med log shes dang bdun mi ’gal la lnga dang ’gal lo zhes zer te blo la mi ’bab bo zhes gsung ngo //*).

This brings us to a second issue: Phya pa himself does not accept that, in the same situation, an episode of non-conceptual mistaken cognition could also be an episode of knowledge. In a later discussion in *Mun sel* 212.231 (34a5–b2) (parallel in *’Od zer* 29b2–8), Phya pa precisely refutes scholars holding such a view:

Some say that episodes of non-conceptual erroneous cognition, such as the appearing of a tree as moving or of a shell appearing as yellow, are also episodes of perceptual knowledge, because they are reliable with regard to some features, such as the shape, etc. [...].

And the reflexive awareness (of this visual cognition) can be:

- (v) a non-ascertaining perception—the appearing of the momentariness of the visual cognition;
- (vi) a post-knowledge cognition with regard to a manifest feature of the visual cognition that has previously been known;
- (vii) an episode of knowledge with regard to a manifest feature of the visual cognition that has not been previously known.

Therefore, these four types of awareness—comprised of the three types of transitive perception plus non-conceptual erroneous cognition—are compatible with seven kinds of awareness: the four just mentioned and the three types of reflexive awareness.

Regarding the awareness that apprehends a shell as yellow, etc., since there is no ‘being non-erroneous with regard to the state of affairs to be apprehended,’ one negates that it would be a perception in general, and hence also (*a fortiori*) that it would be an episode of perceptual knowledge. This is because, when negating the definiens, one negates the definiendum.

It is possible that distinguishing two situations when listing the compatible types of awareness was precisely meant to avoid admitting that the mistaken cognition of the white shell as yellow would be an episode of knowledge with regard to shape (since this is a position that Phya pa refutes), while retaining the idea that “visual cognition in general” could instantiate both types of awareness. But as both would not be instantiated in a single awareness, the mention of “a single visual cognition” remains problematic.

In rNgog Lo’s *dKa’ gnas*, the scholars holding the view that the mistaken appearing of a white shell as yellow is knowledge with regard to shape are identified as “some student of Dignāga and some non-Buddhist” (*dKa’ gnas* 34,8–11). In the *Tshad bsdu*s 119,13, the proponent of this view is said to be rGyal ba’i blo gros, probably for rGyal dbang blo gros, i.e., Jinendrabuddhi (c. 8th–9th century). (For some references on Jinendrabuddhi’s theory of “partial validity” [*aṃśasaṃvādavāda*], see Franco 2006: 225–226). Analyzing this case, rNgog Lo adopted a more nuanced position than Phya pa as he concluded that the awareness in which there is the appearing of ‘yellow’ in the case of a white shell cannot be an episode of knowledge with regard to the object of the particular sense faculty involved (i.e., anything that has to do with vision, including shape), but can be an episode of knowledge with regard to the co-existing object of another sense faculty such as touch. It can, for instance, be knowledge with regard to the shell being ‘large’ or ‘soft.’ (See *dKa’ gnas* 46,8–14).

But since being a non-conceptual transitive episode of awareness is incompatible with being a conceptual transitive episode of awareness, the above four are incompatible with five kinds of awareness: inferential cognition, factive assessment, doubt, conceptual mistaken cognition, and conceptual post-knowledge cognition.

122.33 When one concludes, from the presence of smoke, that there is a sandalwood fire on the mountain pass, the awareness can be:

- (i) an inferential cognition with regard to mere fire;
- (ii) a factive assessment with regard to sandalwood fire;
- (iii) a post-knowledge cognition with regard to just being a mountain pass;
- (iv) a mistaken cognition based on the concept 'fire.'

And there also can be the three types of reflexive awareness just as before.

Therefore, these three, factive assessment, (conceptual) post-knowledge cognition, and inferential cognition, are compatible with seven kinds of awareness: the three just mentioned, conceptual mistaken cognition, and the three types of reflexive awareness.

But since a determinate awareness is not an episode of doubt, and since, with regard to transitive episodes of awareness, being conceptual is incompatible with being non-conceptual, the above three are incompatible with five kinds of awareness: doubt, the three types of transitive perception, and non-conceptual erroneous cognition.

122.34 In five types of cognition—inferential cognition, factive assessment, doubt, conceptual post-knowledge cognition, conceptual mistaken cognition—there is a conceptual mistaken cognition that apprehends a concept. And there are also the three previously mentioned types of reflexive awareness.

Therefore, conceptual mistaken cognition is compatible with eight kinds of awareness: the five conceptual cognitions and the three types of reflexive awareness.

But since what is a conceptual cognition cannot be a non-conceptual transitive episode of awareness, conceptual mistaken cognition is incompatible with four kinds of awareness: the three types of transitive perception and non-conceptual erroneous cognition.

122.35 In episodes of doubt there are the three previously mentioned types of reflexive awareness, and there is also the conceptual mistaken cognition that apprehends a concept.

Therefore, doubt is compatible with five kinds of awareness: the three types of reflexive awareness, conceptual mistaken cognition, and doubt itself.

But since being a conceptual cognition is incompatible with being a non-conceptual episode of transitive awareness, doubt is incompatible with the three types of transitive perception and non-conceptual erroneous cognition. And since doubt is not a determinate awareness, it is incompatible with inferential cognition, factive assessment, and conceptual post-knowledge cognition. As such, it is incompatible with seven kinds of awareness.

123 Specifically laying out the five types of awareness that are not episodes of knowledge

For all five types of awareness that are not episodes of knowledge there are three topics to be elucidated for each:

- Its nature (123.x1)
- Its definition (123.x2)
- The episode of knowledge that determines that the definition applies (123.x3)

123.1 Non-ascertaining perception

123.11 There are two forms of non-ascertaining perception: cases where there is an appearance but no ascertainment due to the object being a non-manifest feature (123.111), and cases where there is an appearance but no ascertainment due to not focusing one's mind on the object (123.112).⁵¹

123.111 First, when a real entity appears to perception, the present momentariness that is substantially identical with the real entity, which is a

⁵¹ An additional note on the manuscript (see III, 4.β) reads: "And they come to three forms together with the case where there is an appearance but no ascertainment due to being overwhelmed by causes of error." Such a third category was distinguished by Phya pa's successors and is usually exemplified by the example

momentariness that is not mixed with the momentariness that precedes or follows it, appears to perception. However, its not being mixed is not ascertained, since the feature that consists in its being unmixed is not clearly appearing. This is because other similar moments arise and exist uninterruptedly.

123.112 Second, for instance, a case where blue, etc., appears but it is not ascertained because one is absorbed in one's thoughts.

123.12 The definition of *non-ascertaining perception* is: the appearing of a real particular, and compatible with opposite superimpositions. This excludes, by the first criterion, all those types of awareness that are not episodes of perception, and, by the second criterion, perceptual knowledge and (perceptual) post-knowledge cognition.

123.13

- As for its compatibility with opposite superimpositions, this is determined by reflexive awareness, which experiences the engaging in the directing of one's mind toward, for example, permanence in the case of a real entity appearing.⁵²
- As for the appearing of momentariness, when, taking as one's subject the state of affairs that appears, one determines that it is momentary through a logical reason such as its being produced [b], the awareness also is indirectly established as one that apprehends something momentary. Or, although mother-of-pearl was not initially ascertained, when it is subsequently ascertained that the object is mother-of-pearl by getting closer to it, the previous awareness is also indirectly established as one for which mother-of-pearl appeared.

of mother-of-pearl appearing and being determined to be silver. Phya pa mentions the mother-of-pearl case below (123.13) without clarifying which subtype of non-ascertaining perception it belongs to. See IV, 1(b).

⁵² The "directing of one's mind toward permanence" is not performed by the perceptual awareness (which, being non-conceptual, is devoid of the operation of directing) but by a conceptual episode, which is simultaneous with it or possibly subsequent to it and amounts to the superimposition 'permanent.'

(a) *Some assert as the definition of non-ascertaining perception “not bringing about a determining cognition, but appearing.”*

This is not correct. It is too broad because it would apply to reflexive awareness that experiences the last moment of a determinate awareness before it ceases, which is a reflexive awareness that is an instance of knowledge, and to the perception of omniscient beings.⁵³

(b) *Alternatively, some say “the appearing of a real particular, and co-existing with a superimposition.”*

This too is incorrect. It is too narrow because, if this is speaking of “coexisting with an actual superimposition,” it would not apply to the appearing of momentariness at a time when one’s mind is not focused on permanence. And if this is speaking of “coexisting with a potential superimposition,” it would not apply to cases of non-ascertaining perception in which there is an appearing of momentariness when one already knows that something is momentary through inferential cognition.⁵⁴

123.2 Post-knowledge cognition

123.21 Post-knowledge cognitions are, for an object already known:

⁵³ Compare with the corresponding discussion of an opponent’s position on the feature that makes perception an episode of knowledge in (112.23) above. An interlinear note on the manuscript of the *sGron ma* by mTshur ston gZhon nu seng ge, who also cites this definition, attributes it to “rtag” or “stag,” probably r/sTag pa Kha che (“tak pa kha ché”). A note on the manuscript of the *gSal byed* by gTsang drug rdo rje links this definition with Dharmottara. See IV, 1(b) for the references.

⁵⁴ It is unclear whether the expression “not focused on permanence” is an (awkward) way of referring to the absence of the actual superimposition of ‘permanence’ (one would have expected, rather, an expression such as “directing one’s mind towards permanence”) or indicates that an appeal is being made to the second form of non-ascertaining perception (123.112), which is linked to not focusing one’s mind. (Indeed, this second form of non-ascertaining perception is only illustrated with the absence of focus regarding appearing manifest properties.) Possibly, Phya pa is implying that the absence of focus also prevents the actual occurring of a superimposition.

See also the parallel discussion considering the options “actual superimpositions” and “potential superimpositions” in (212.14 [b]) below.

- Engaging in perception capable of bringing about a directing of one's mind.⁵⁵
- Engaging in a conceptual cognition that is a memory.
- A subsequently arising determining cognition.

There cannot be instances of inferential cognition that are episodes of post-knowledge cognition. This is because, on the one hand, if one has previously ascertained, for instance, that sound is momentary, the mental state derived from a logical reason is not an instance of inferential cognition, because the logical reason would not fulfill the criterion of 'being a property of the subject,' since there would not be a desire to know (whether the subject has the property to be proven).⁵⁶ On the other hand, if one concludes something not previously ascertained, it could not be an instance of post-knowledge cognition.

(a) Objection: *Although the first moment of inferential cognition that arises from a reliance on the determination of the triple characteristic of a logical reason is an episode of knowledge, the second moment and so on are post-knowledge cognitions. But since these follow from the previous apprehension of the logical reason, they are also instances of inferential cognition. Thus, there are instances of inferential cognition that are episodes of post-knowledge cognition.*⁵⁷

Reply: The ascertainment in the first moment follows the logical reason, since it emerges from the apprehension of the logical reason. But,

⁵⁵ The specification "capable of bringing about a directing of one's mind" is meant to imply some sort of "ascertainment" in order to eliminate non-ascertaining perception. Phya pa cannot invoke here "ascertainment" in the sense of "the capacity to eliminate opposite superimpositions," as the latter is absent in post-knowledge cognition (see 212.22). He thus invokes a feature that is common to perceptual post-knowledge cognition and perceptual knowledge, and absent in non-ascertaining perception, the capacity to give rise to a determining cognition. See however, above, Phya pa's rejection of the identification of the feature "bringing about a determining cognition" with "ascertainment" when distinguishing non-ascertaining perception from perceptual knowledge.

⁵⁶ See VII, Appendix 2, sections 4 and 6 on the features required for a logical reason to be valid and the corresponding faults.

⁵⁷ The same view is ascribed to a scholar called g.Yor gnyan ("yor nyen") in the *Tshad bsdus* and in an interlinear note in the *Tshad nye bsdus*. Sākya mchog ldan

though the ascertainment in the second moment, etc., is an ascertainment that follows the first moment, it is not an ascertainment that follows the logical reason. This is because it does not arise directly from the apprehension of the logical reason.

If it did qualify as an ascertainment that follows a logical reason due to its arising indirectly from the apprehension of the logical reason, then consider the yogic perception in which, by meditating on the emptiness that has been determined by an inferential cognition, emptiness comes to appear clearly.⁵⁸ This also would become an inferential cognition for which there is understanding coming from a logical reason, because it indirectly arises from the apprehension of a logical reason.

(b) *Objection: In the case of a locus where fire is observed, the conclusion, from smoke, that there is fire, is a post-knowledge cognition, but it is also an inferential cognition.*

Reply: This is not an inferential cognition. This is because, given that the logical reason does not have the characteristic of ‘being a property of the subject’—since there is no desire to know pertaining to the locus (having or not having the property to be proven)—this awareness is not based on a logical reason endowed with the three characteristics.

123.22 The definition of *post-knowledge cognition* is: engaging in an awareness that is incompatible with directing one’s mind in the opposite way with regard to a state of affairs for which superimpositions have already been eliminated.

123.23 What determines that the definition applies is as follows:

- As for the superimpositions already having been eliminated, this is determined by the reflexive awareness that experiences the earlier awareness (in which the superimpositions were eliminated).

reports that the view that an inferential cognition can be a post-knowledge cognition was held by rGya dmar ba (see V, 1, R52.4). Later scholars who adopt this view refer to Dharmottara in support of this option (see Rinbochay&Napper 1980: 86). See IV, 2(b) for more details.

⁵⁸ On the theory of yogic perception in Dharmakīrti’s system, which is applied here to a topic that is characteristic of Madhyamaka philosophy (i.e., the realization of emptiness), see Dunne 2006. Phya pa deals with yogic perception in *Munsel* 232.5 (42b1–43a1) and *’Od zer* 112.24 (64b5–66a4).

- And the incompatibility with directing one’s mind in the opposite way is determined by the reflexive awareness of that awareness itself (i.e., post-knowledge cognition).

123.3 Factive assessment

123.31 Factive assessment is not a non-conceptual cognition: it is a conceptual cognition.

It is not an episode of doubt: it is a determinate awareness.

It is not a mistaken determinate awareness: it is a determinate awareness in which the determination corresponds with the object to be cognized.

It is not a determinate awareness of something already known: it is a determinate awareness of something concealed and not previously known, such as the impermanence of sound.⁵⁹

It is not a determinate awareness that is based on having determined, by an episode of knowledge, that a logical reason is a property of the subject and entails the property to be proven. Therefore, there are three subtypes:

- (i) Factive assessment lacking a reason
A determinate awareness of, for example, sound being impermanent, without being based on either a valid logical reason or a pseudo-logical reason.

⁵⁹ The idea that the object must be “concealed” is absent from the definition of factive assessment in the *Mun sel* (123.321), but is included in the definition in the *’Od zer*. There the role of this criterion is said to be the elimination of perceptual knowledge (but it actually eliminates all perceptions). This role is already fulfilled in the *Mun sel* by the mention of factive assessment being a conceptual cognition. The inclusion of the mention “concealed” in this sentence makes better sense if the Tibetan term *nges pa* is understood in the general sense of “ascertainment” rather than the specific sense of “determinate awareness.” The order in which the features of factive assessment are discussed however corresponds to that of the characteristics used to distinguish conceptual cognitions in the three-fold typology; it is therefore more natural to understand *nges pa* here in the sense of “determinate awareness,” a subtype of conceptual cognition, like in the definition of factive assessment below, in which it is given as a criterion that excludes all perceptions and doubt (123.321). See the discussion in IV, 3(b).

(ii) Factive assessment having a mistaken reason

A determinate awareness of a veridical thesis⁶⁰ from taking as one's logical reason a property for which its being a property of the subject or its entailing the property to be proven is not found in reality. Namely, a determinate awareness (of sound being impermanent)⁶¹:

- Based on an unestablished logical reason, such as the property of being visible.
- Based on an inconclusive logical reason, such as the property of being an epistemic object.

(iii) Factive assessment with an uncertified reason

Deducing a veridical thesis from having determined, via factive assessment, that a potential logical reason is a property of the subject or that it entails the property to be proven. Such as:

- The determination of 'being produced' being a property of sound, via factive assessment.
- The determination that 'being produced' entails 'being impermanent,' via factive assessment.

For mistaken cognitions that determine a non-veridical thesis, like 'sound being permanent':

- There are those that are lacking a reason.
- There can be those having a mistaken reason. Namely, those which are
 - Based on an unestablished logical reason, such as the property of being visible.
 - Based on a contradictory logical reason, such as the property of being produced.
 - Based on an inconclusive logical reason, such as the property of being an epistemic object.

⁶⁰ The thesis (Tib. *bsgrub bya*, literally "what is to be proven") consists in the aggregate of the subject and the property to be proven. See VII, Appendix 2.3.

⁶¹ For the remainder of this section, Phya pa is using as his basic case the stock example of seeking to establish that sound is impermanent (see VII, Appendix 2.7[b]). Mistaken reasons and uncertified reasons (see [iii] below) are instances of pseudo-logical reasons, on which see VII, Appendix 2.6.

- But those that have an uncertified reason are not possible.⁶²

For factive assessment there cannot be those that are based on a contradictory logical reason. This is for the following reason. Since factive assessment determines a veridical thesis, the subject is a similar instance. And so, if the logical reason does not occur in the similar instances, it could not be a property of the subject, and if the logical reason does occur in the similar instances, it would not entail the opposite of the property to be proven.⁶³

123.32 Definition⁶⁴

123.321 Presenting one's own position

The definition of *factive assessment* is: a determinate awareness of a veridical state of affairs not previously known, that is not based on having determined, via an episode of knowledge, the characteristics of a logical reason.

- The criterion 'determinate awareness' eliminates all three types of perception and doubt.
- The criterion 'veridical' eliminates mistaken cognition.⁶⁵
- The criterion 'not previously known' eliminates post-knowledge cognition.

⁶² This case is not possible, because if there were a reason which, even if currently uncertified, could potentially be established, the conclusion derived from this reason would be *true*. It could not, therefore, be a mistaken cognition.

⁶³ For Phya pa, a "similar instance" is an instance that is qualified by the property to be proven. This is the case for the subject when the thesis—the aggregate of the subject and the property to be proven—is veridical. A "contradictory reason" only qualifies instances that are qualified by the opposite of the property to be proven, i.e., "dissimilar instances." See VII, Appendix 2.4 and 2.6.

⁶⁴ A marginal note (see III, 4.γ) specifies that this section includes three subdivisions: "presenting one's own position" (123.321), "refuting the position of others" (123.322), and "rejecting objections with regard to one's own position" (123.323).

⁶⁵ Strictly speaking, the non-conceptual form of mistaken cognition is also eliminated by the preceding criterion 'being a determinate awareness,' which presupposes 'being conceptual.'

- The criterion ‘not based on having determined, via an episode of knowledge, the characteristics of a logical reason’ eliminates inferential cognition.

123.322 Refuting the position of others⁶⁶

Some assert (D1) “directing one’s mind toward a state of affairs, while being partial to it, without relying on either experience or a logical reason”⁶⁷ as the definition of factive assessment.

Parallel assertion (D2): Likewise, why not assert “directing one’s mind without relying on experience” as the definition of factive assessment?

Reply (D2): This is too broad. It would apply to inferential cognition.

Parallel reply (D1): Likewise, the previous definition would be too broad. It would apply to the mistaken cognition that determines sound to be permanent.

Retort (D1): In terms of its substance, mistaken cognition is an episode of factive assessment. Thus, although the definition applies to mistaken cognitions, it is not too broad. This is just like, although the definition of

⁶⁶ The opponent’s objection is discussed here by way of an argumentative pattern profusely used by Phya pa, which Hugon (2008a) has termed “argumentation by parallels.” It consists in introducing into the discussion of a topic pertaining to a given domain (noted here D1) a parallel domain (noted D2), which is often a more basic one, in which the relationship between the elements is easier to grasp, or a domain less prone to controversy. The method of argumentation consists, for the person answering an initial objection, in reduplicating any statement of the opponent in the parallel domain. Thus, objections in D1 are turned into similar objections in D2, and defenses for these objections in D2 become similar defenses in D1. The argument thus develops in intersecting zig-zag patterns.

In our translation, left aligned statements constitute the core argument pertaining to D1, indented the statements the parallel argument in domain D2. Statements in italics are those ascribed to the opponent. Statements in regular font are by Phya pa, but should not be regarded as representing his own view. They are statements parallel to the opponent’s previous statement, meant to lead to the next step of the argument.

⁶⁷ This definition is ascribed in various texts to Phya pa’s teacher rGya dmar ba. See IV, 3(b).

*impermanence applies to things that arise from effort, it is not too broad.*⁶⁸

Parallel retort (D2): In terms of its substance, inferential cognition is an episode of factive assessment. Thus, although the definition applies to inferential cognition, it is not too broad, just like above.

Objection (D2): How would one differentiate inferential cognition and factive assessment?

Parallel objection (D1): How would one differentiate mistaken cognition and factive assessment?

*Reply (D1): They are differentiated, because, although they are substantially identical, they are conceptually distinct.*⁶⁹ *This is because, from the perspective of analyzing incorrectly, the episode of awareness is a mistaken cognition, but from the perspective of being a determinate awareness that does not rely on experience or a logical reason, the episode of awareness is a factive assessment. This is just like, although ‘arising from effort’ and ‘impermanent’ are substantially identical, they are conceptually distinct, and therefore can be, respectively, the logical reason and that for which it is a logical reason (in a proof).*

Parallel reply (D2): Inferential cognition and factive assessment are differentiated, because, although they are substantially identical, they are conceptually distinct. This is because, from the perspective of being a determinate awareness that relies on a triply-characterized logical reason, the episode of awareness is an inferential cognition.

⁶⁸ The definition of “impermanent” is “not remaining in the second moment” (*dus gnyis par mi sdod pa*) (see *Mun sel* 13a5). Things that arise from effort (such as pots, etc.) constitute a subcategory of things that are impermanent, and thus also have the property of ‘not enduring for a second moment.’ But the latter is not their definition, because it also applies to impermanent things that do not arise from effort (such as lightning or the sound of a river).

⁶⁹ “Conceptually distinct” renders here the expression *ldog pa tha dad* (lit. “distinct exclusion properties”) in reference to Phya pa’s explanation of the process by which multiples properties are being conceived for a singular substance, which involves the appearing of distinct concepts to conceptual cognition (see 111.2). In the analogy, the exclusion properties ‘arising from effort’ and ‘impermanent’ are being distinguished for a singular substance (for instance, a pot). But ‘arising from effort’ and ‘impermanent’ are said to be “substantially identical” insofar as it is the same substance (e.g., the pot) which is something that arises from effort and something that is impermanent (see 111.1).

But from the perspective of being a determinate awareness that does not rely on experience, the episode of awareness is a factive assessment.

Objection (D2): From the point of view of what is determined—sound being impermanent—the awareness would be both an episode of knowledge and not an episode of knowledge.

Parallel objection (D1): From the point of view of what is to be determined—the aggregate of sound and permanence—the awareness would be both a mistaken cognition and not a mistaken cognition.⁷⁰

123.323 Rejecting objections with regard to one's own position

Objection (D1): If it is the case that factive assessment entails determining a veridical object, then it must entail that the object is veridical. This being the case, is there (1) entailment due to essential identity, (2) entailment due to causality, or (3) entailment without dependence?

- *If (1), then an episode of factive assessment would become material, since it would have a shared identity with a material object.*
- *If (2), then an episode of factive assessment would become an episode of knowledge, since the awareness would be invariably related to a positively discerned state of affairs.*
- *If (3), there would be the possibility of a logical reason lacking dependence, since entailment would be acceptable for that which lacks dependence.*

⁷⁰ This conclusion follows in Phya pa's system, in which factive assessment is posited as being a non-mistaken cognition. But it does not necessarily follow in the system of the opponent, if the latter holds, like Phya pa implies, that factive assessment is a broader category that includes mistaken cognition as a subtype. The same episode of awareness can be, in the opponent's system, characterized as mistaken cognition and as factive assessment without implying that it would be both mistaken and non-mistaken, because the opponent's definition of factive assessment does not entail that it is non-mistaken. Note, however, that the opponent's mention of "state of affairs" in the definition might have precisely served the purpose of indicating the non-mistaken nature of factive assessment. If this is indeed the case, the opponent cannot be said to hold the view that factive assessment is a broader category. He could still hold that it is a type of awareness that is substantially identical with mistaken cognition—the two being introspectively undistinguishable—but would not hold that the definition of factive assessment applies to cases of mistaken cognition.

Parallel objection (D2): Similarly, for (the thesis that) being a conceptual cognition entails that the apprehended object is a concept, is there (1) entailment due to essential identity, (2) entailment due to causality, or (3) entailment without dependence?

- If (1) or (2), the concept would be a real entity, since:
 - In the first case, the concept would be substantially identical with conceptual cognition, and
 - In the second case, it would be the cause of the conceptual cognition.
- If (3), there would be the possibility of a logical reason lacking dependence, since it would bring about entailing and entailed items that lack dependence.

Reply (D2): Since we do not assert either of these two forms of dependence (between concepts and conceptual cognition), concepts would not become real entities. And although these are entailing and entailed items that lack dependence, this is not a case where the former one is a logical reason, because the latter is not something to be inferred. Indeed, when determining an awareness to be a conceptual cognition, one also determines the object to be a concept. Thus, there would not be the possibility of a logical reason lacking dependence.

Parallel reply (D1): Since we do not accept either of the two forms of dependence between factive assessment and a veridical object, there are neither of the first two faults. And although these two are entailing and entailed items that lack dependence, when determining an awareness to be an episode of factive assessment, one has already determined that the object is veridical, and thus it is not something to be inferred. Thus, there would not be the possibility of a logical reason lacking dependence.⁷¹

123.33 The episode of knowledge that determines that the definition applies is as follows:

- As for its being a determinate awareness of something not previously ascertained, this is established by reflexive awareness.

⁷¹ For a detailed discussion of this particular argument, see Stoltz 2009.

- As for its not relying on the determination of the characteristics of a logical reason via an episode of knowledge:
 - In the case of factive assessment lacking a reason, it is established by reflexive awareness.
 - In the case of factive assessment having a mistaken reason, it is established by an episode of knowledge that observes the logical reason's faults.
 - In the case of factive assessment with an uncertified reason, it is established by determining that the cognition that apprehends the characteristics of the logical reason is an instance of factive assessment.
- As for the state of affairs being veridical, this is determined subsequently by an episode of knowledge ascertaining that state of affairs.

123.4 Mistaken Cognition

123.41 Mistaken cognition has two forms:

- Apprehension of something superimposed (123.411)
- Incorrect determination of the intentional object (123.412)

123.411 The first form is a mistaken cognition in reference to the apprehended object being something superimposed. Namely:

- Non-conceptual erroneous cognition in which there is an appearance as of a double moon, etc.

And, from the perspective of their apprehending a concept:

- Inferential cognition
- Factive assessment
- Conceptual post-knowledge cognition
- Doubt
- Mistaken determinate awareness

123.412 As for the incorrect determination of the intentional object, this is conceiving of sound as permanent, etc.

123.42 The definition of *mistaken cognition* is: positively discerning a state of affairs incorrectly.⁷²

123.43 What determines that the definition applies is as follows:

- As for its positively discerning a state of affairs, this is determined by reflexive awareness.
- As for being incorrect, this is determined by an episode of knowledge that opposes the object being veridical in the way it has been positively discerned.

123.5 Doubt

123.51 The consideration “Is this permanent or impermanent?”—this is doubt.

123.52 The definition of *doubt* is: that which includes the consideration of another alternative being possible.

123.53 As for what determines that the definition applies, this is determined by reflexive awareness itself.

(a) ⁷³*Some say (D1) that doubt does not have the operation of excluding others.*⁷⁴

⁷² Phya pa’s use of the expression “positively discerning” (*yongs su gcod pa*) in this definition corresponds to that in the seven-fold typology, which ranges over both the operations of “appearing” and “directing” (see n. 42), so as to cover the various types of mistaken cognition.

⁷³ See n. 66 on the structure of this argument “by parallels.”

⁷⁴ The opponent that Phya pa has in mind could be his predecessor rNgog Lo, who supported the view that doubt does not “negatively ascertain” (*rnam par gcod pa*), and hence also does not “positively ascertain” (*yongs su gcod pa*) anything, or Phya pa’s teacher rGya dmar ba, who reportedly also held such a view. See IV, 5(b) for more details. In this argument, the Tibetan term *yongs su gcod pa* is used as a correlate of *rnam par gcod pa* (matching the use of the Sanskrit term *pariccheda* in opposition to *vyavaccheda*). The two correlates typically represent, respectively, the positive and negative sides of a determining process (e.g., ‘this is blue’ / ‘this is not non-blue’). This use of *yongs su gcod pa* (which we translated as “positively ascertaining”) is different from its use by Phya pa in the

This is incorrect. In that case,

Parallel objection (D2): The determinate awareness of blue would not have the operation of excluding others.

Reply (D2): That determinate awareness does exclude non-blue, because if it did not exclude non-blue it would not be acceptable for it to positively ascertain blue.

Parallel reply (D1): Doubt excludes the impossibility of sound being permanent, because if it did not exclude the impossibility of this, it would not be acceptable for it to positively ascertain the possibility of this.

(b) *Some say that the exclusion of a third alternative by an episode of doubt in which one ponders, “Is it a pile of stones or a person?”, is an exclusion of others.*⁷⁵

This is not the case. Take the determinate awareness that something is just a pile of stones. In saying that it is neither a person nor some third alternative, there is a determination that it is not some third alternative. Therefore, though this is not an episode of doubt, it excludes a third alternative.

When one has the doubt, “Is it a person, or a pile of stones, or some third alternative?”, even though this is an episode of doubt, there is no determination that it is not some third alternative, and so it does not exclude a third alternative.

Therefore, the exclusion of a third alternative is an exclusion of others for a determinate awareness, but not an episode of doubt.

*** End of the first chapter ***

seven-fold typology (see 122.1), where we translated it as “positively discerning” (see n. 42).

⁷⁵ The same view is ascribed in the *Tshad bsdus* (60,18–20) to an anonymous “senior Tibetan” (*bod bgres po kha cig*).

***** Second chapter: Elucidating the definition of knowledge
and its types *****

2 In particular, elucidating the instances of awareness that are episodes of knowledge

[...]

212.14 Our own position (regarding the definition of knowledge)

Here, our position is this. The meaning of “Revealing an unknown state of affairs”⁷⁶ is: that which counters the capacity to produce superimpositions that are incompatible with the way things are (K1), through aspects of awareness that are non-erroneous with regard to a positively discerned state of affairs (K3).⁷⁷ Here, this is what is called “understanding something veridical.”⁷⁸

[...]

(a) Objection: *If there is a countering of superimpositions by an awareness that “understands something veridical,” would it be (i) countering through experience, (ii) countering through a reliance on a logical reason, (iii) countering through these two together, or (iv) countering in general?*

If (i), then the definition would be too narrow, as it would not apply to inferential cognition.

*If (ii), then the definition would be too narrow, as it would not apply to perception.*⁷⁹

⁷⁶ This is part of Dharmakīrti’s definitions of knowledge in *Pramāṇavārttika* 2.5c (*ajñātārthaprakāśo vā*), which Phya pa quoted earlier in *Mun sel* 212.11 (32a3).

⁷⁷ Compare with the criteria given in (121.13). See the discussion in I.1, 4 and I.2, 3.

⁷⁸ In an earlier passage, Phya pa associates the definition of knowledge as “understanding something veridical” (*bden pa rtogs pa*) with the Indian philosopher Śāṅkaranandana (*Mun sel* 212.11 [32a3]: *bram ze chen pos bden pa rtogs pa la ’dod pa*). This is supported by Śāṅkaranandana’s *Bṛhatprāmāṇyaparīkṣā*, k. 22 (see Hugon 2011a: 161, n. 14 and the discussion in I.2, 5).

⁷⁹ Here, Phya pa explicitly points out that if interpretation (ii) had been implied by the definition of knowledge, then the definition would (wrongly) not apply to perception at all. This carries the immediate (but unstated) consequence that the definition, *a fortiori*, could not apply to the narrower category of perceptual knowledge. For an analogous, but explicit, use of the same kind of reasoning see *Mun sel* 212.231 (34a6–7), which has been earlier quoted in n. 50.

Option (iii) is impossible.

If (iv), then, since the determination that sound is impermanent by an episode of factive assessment counters the superimposition ‘permanence,’ and the determination as singular counters the superimposition ‘multiple,’ the definition would be too broad, as it would apply to these two.⁸⁰

Reply: It is none of those four. It is a countering of superimpositions through those aspects that are non-erroneous with regard to the state of affairs. The way of apprehending that is non-erroneous with regard to the state of affairs exists only for perception and inferential cognition, but not for factive assessment. This is because, at a time when the object is not yet established, there is no difference between factive assessment and mistaken cognition in terms of the awareness’s way of apprehending.

(b) *Objection: Is countering superimpositions the rendering powerless of actual superimpositions, or is it just the potential opposition of superimpositions?⁸¹*

If it is the former, then since two conceptual cognitions cannot occur simultaneously, at the time of the inferential cognition, there is no superimposition. As such, the criterion of actually opposing superimpositions is too narrow, because it does not apply to inferential cognition.

If it is the latter, the criterion would be too broad, because it would apply to perceptual post-knowledge cognition.

Reply: It is (in some cases) the actual rendering powerless. Although there are no superimpositions *per se* at the time of inferential cognition,

⁸⁰ According to the parallel discussion in the *’Od zer* (111.221.222), the second type of determination to which the definition would apply is an episode of mistaken cognition—for instance, the mistaken determination of an entity being ultimately permanent opposes the (also incorrect) superimposition ‘ultimately impermanent.’ The example provided in the *Mun sel* is found in *’Od zer* 29a9, where the determination ‘singular’ illustrates a mistaken cognition which is incompatible with the mistaken cognition that apprehends as ‘multiple.’ (This is because, in the Madhyamaka framework, things are in reality neither singular nor multiple). See also the parallel discussion in *Mun sel* 212.22, in which Phya pa gives the example of the mistaken determinate awareness “yellow” pertaining to a white shell which, although mistaken, eliminates the mistaken superimposition ‘blue.’

⁸¹ On the issue whether actual or potential superimpositions are meant in K1, see also the discussion in *Mun sel* 123.1 [b].

since there is the capacity for them to be generated, it is that capacity that is opposed by inferential cognition.

It is (in other cases) the potential opposition to superimpositions. But it is not the case that the criterion would be too broad, applying to post-knowledge cognition, because we said “incompatible with superimpositions with regard to something not previously known.”⁸²

212.2 Rejecting faults of that definition

There are three items:

- Rejecting the fault of the definition being too narrow (212.21)
- Rejecting the fault of the definition being too broad (212.22)
- Rejecting misconceptions regarding the basis of definition (212.23)

212.21 Rejecting the fault of the definition being too narrow

(a) *Objection:* If the awareness that “understands something veridical” must be a determinate awareness (since it eliminates superimpositions), then the definition is too narrow, since it would not apply to perception, which is non-conceptual.

Reply: When perception and a superimposition come into contact, the superimposition—which acts as cause—and the perception—which acts as condition—generate, in the second moment, a superimposition that is powerless. As a result of this, in the third moment, the superimposition has ceased. When this is the case, what renders it powerless is the perception. Thus, what eliminates a superimposition is that perception. The determining cognition is a post-knowledge cognition, because it occurs

⁸² Phya pa is referring here to the definition of knowledge including the criterion K1 and the criterion of novelty (K2). Note, however, that the formulation of K1 in terms of “incompatibility with opposite superimpositions” is not used elsewhere in the *Mun sel*, and that the definition of knowledge in the *Mun sel* (212.14) does not make K2 explicit. This phrasing corresponds, rather, to that of the definition of knowledge in the *'Od zer*. Alternatively, one could reject the scribal correction on the manuscript and read “incompatible with opposite superimpositions with regard to something previously known,” which could be understood as a rephrasing of the definition of post-knowledge cognition (123.22). For further discussion of this argument, see I.2, 3.2.2.

after the superimposition has been eliminated. Thus, the definition does not fail to apply to perception.⁸³

(b) ⁸⁴*Objection (D1): Since, from the perspective of the concept, inferential cognition is a mistaken cognition that is erroneous with respect to its apprehended object, the definition, “understanding something veridical,” would be too narrow, since it would not apply to inferential cognition.*

Parallel objection (D2): From the perspective of the seed, the sprout is subsequently arising. Thus the sprout would not be the cause of a visual cognition of the sprout.

Reply (D2): From the perspective of the seed, which is the reference point, the sprout is subsequently arising, and so it is incompatible with it being the cause of the seed. But we do not assert that the sprout is a cause from this perspective.

As for the argument that, from the perspective of the seed, since the sprout is subsequently arising, it is not the cause of the visual cognition, the entailment is not established.

*If one were to argue that, from the perspective of visual cognition, since the sprout is subsequently arising, it is not the cause of visual cognition, the argument lacks a logical reason.*⁸⁵

Parallel reply (D1): From the perspective of the concept, there is no “understanding something veridical” for inferential cognition. Thus, if one argues that inferential cognition is not, from this perspective, an instance of knowledge, one is proving what has already been established, because, from this perspective, it is a mistaken cognition.

As for the argument that, from the perspective of the external object, inferential cognition is not an episode of knowledge, since, from the perspective of the concept, there is no “understanding something veridical,” there is no entailment.

If one were to argue that inferential cognition is not an instance of knowledge from the perspective of the external object, since, from the perspective of the external object, there is no “understanding of something veridical,” then the logical reason is not established. This is because,

⁸³ On Phya pa’s ascription to perceptual knowledge of the capacity to eliminate superimpositions see Hugon 2011a: 166–167 and I.2, 3.1.3.

⁸⁴ See n. 66 on the structure of this argument “by parallels.”

⁸⁵ Namely, the property put forward as a logical reason does not fulfill the required characteristic of being a property of the subject (see VII, Appendix 2.6).

from the perspective of the external object, inferential cognition has the previously stated definition.

212.22 Rejecting the fault of the definition being too broad

This definition is not too broad, as it does not apply to the five previously described types of awareness that are not episodes of knowledge.

- For post-knowledge cognition, there is no contact with a capacity that could produce superimpositions, which is what would have to be eliminated. Thus, it is contradictory for post-knowledge cognition to be something that counters this capacity.⁸⁶
- For doubt and non-ascertaining perception, they are simply not incompatible with opposite superimpositions.⁸⁷
- In accordance with, for example, the countering of the superimposition ‘permanence,’ through the episode of factive assessment that determines sound to be impermanent, and the countering of the superimposition ‘blue,’ through the mistaken cognition that determines a white shell to be yellow,⁸⁸ factive assessment and mistaken cognition, respectively, have the criterion of countering superimpositions, in general. But, they do not have the definitional criterion of eliminating superimpositions by an apprehension that is non-erroneous with regard to the state of affairs (K3), since there is no contradiction in such episodes of awareness arising in the absence of the state of affairs.

[...]

***** End of the second chapter *****

⁸⁶ Phya pa is not explicitly advocating here the failure to fulfill the criterion of novelty (K2), but instead points to the failure to satisfy (K1). On the issues raised by the interpretation of this argument in relation with the discussion in *Mun sel* 212.14 (b), see I.2, 3.2.2.

⁸⁷ It follows from this that they fail to satisfy K1.

⁸⁸ Note that this form of mistaken cognition corresponds to a mistaken determinate awareness (for which see 112.111.2 and 123.412), which is to be distinguished from the example of a white shell appearing as yellow, which is a non-conceptual mistaken cognition (112.3).

***** Third chapter: Elucidating perceptual knowledge *****

23 The specific elucidation of perception

[...]

231.12 Presentation of our own position (on the definition of perception that eliminates the dissimilar types)

Thus, its being non-erroneous is considered from the perspective of the apprehended object, and its being a perception is also considered from the perspective of the apprehended object. Therefore, the definition of perception is “being non-erroneous with respect to the state of affairs to be apprehended.” And the appearing of a real entity is perception.

All the dissimilar types are excluded by this definition, and so “devoid of conceptuality” is not a criterion that serves to exclude the dissimilar types.⁸⁹

[...]

234.1 The nature of knowledge episodes (in the case of perceptual knowledge)

An experience of mind itself incompatible with superimpositions—this is an episode of knowledge which is a reflexive awareness.

The apprehension of something else being incompatible with superimpositions—this is an episode of knowledge which is a transitive awareness.

[...]

***** End of the third chapter *****

⁸⁹ See also 'Od zer 112.113 (46a1–2). The discussion focuses on the role of the two properties mentioned in Dharmakīrti's definition of perception in PVin 1.4: “non-erroneous” (Skt. *abhrānta*, Tib. *ma 'khrul pa*) and “devoid of conceptuality” (Skt. *kalpanāpodha*, Tib. *rtog pa dang bral pa/rtog bral*). According to Phya pa, Dharmakīrti's inclusion of the second property is meant to eliminate the mistaken conceptions of non-Buddhist philosophers (Naiyāyikas in particular) regarding perception. With regard to eliminating the dissimilar types, the second property is redundant.

*** Fourth chapter: Elucidating inferential cognition ***

24 The specific elucidation of inferential cognition

[...]

241 The definition of inferential cognition

The definition of inferential cognition is “concluding, through observing some property in a given locus, what is determined to be entailed by that property.” This is understanding from a logical reason endowed with the three characteristics.⁹⁰

This preceding definition, together with “understanding something veridical,” is the definition of inferential knowledge.⁹¹

[...]

⁹⁰ This formulation goes back to Dharmakīrti’s definition of inferential cognition. In PVin 2.1, Dharmakīrti defines “inference for oneself” as “the ‘vision’ of a state of affairs from a triply characterized logical reason” (Skt. *trirūpāl liṅgato ’rthadrk*, Tib. *tshul gsum rtags las don mthong yin*). “Vision” is rephrased as “knowledge” (Skt. *jñāna*, Tib. *rtogs pa*) in the auto-commentary (PVin 2 Skt. 46,3; Tib. 1,25–2,1).

⁹¹ “Understanding something veridical” is the definition of knowledge (see 212.14). Unlike in the case of perception, all episodes of inferential cognition are also episodes of inferential knowledge. This is pointed out explicitly by Phya pa in *’Od zer 78a2–3*.