

# VI

## Tables



**Table A: Apprehended objects and corresponding awarenesses**

Apprehended object				Awareness			
1	2	3	4	1	2	5	6
<b>Real particular</b>				<b>Non-conceptual non-erroneous cognition</b>			
real; capable of being causally active	dependent	veridical	clearly appearing	real	dependent	non-conceptual	non-erroneous
<b>Concept</b>				<b>Conceptual cognition</b>			
unreal (superimposed); not capable of being causally active	imagined	falsidical	not clearly appearing	real	dependent	conceptual	erroneous
<b>The referent of a non-conceptual erroneous cognition</b>				<b>Non-conceptual erroneous cognition</b>			
unreal (superimposed); not capable of being causally active	imagined	falsidical	clearly appearing	real	dependent	non-conceptual	erroneous

The three apprehended objects and the corresponding three types of awareness are characterized from the perspective of several different sets of properties:

### (1) Real/Unreal

In agreement with a core postulate of Dharmakīrti's system, the reality of the object is associated with its being capable of being causally active.<sup>1</sup> Accordingly, being unreal is linked to not being capable of being causally active. Only particulars are real. Objects that are not real are also described as 'superimposed' (*sgro btags*); they are mere mental imputations.

### (2) The Three-Nature framework

The characterizations 'dependent,' 'imagined,' and 'perfected' are related to the model of the Three Natures (Skt. *trisvabhāva*) developed by Indian Buddhist idealist philosophers such as Asaṅga and Vasubandhu (both c. 4<sup>th</sup>–5<sup>th</sup> century). The 'dependent' (Skt. *paratantra*) nature is that of phenomena that are causally conditioned. The 'imagined' (Skt. *parikalpita*) nature is the mere product of conceptual construction but is not founded on regular causes. The 'perfected' (Skt. *pariṇiṣpanna*) nature is the ultimate truth. It cannot be defined but can be conceived as the dependent nature void of any imagined nature.<sup>2</sup> In the discussion of the three apprehended objects, Phya pa uses 'superimposed' (*sgro btags*) as a synonym of 'imagined' (*kun btags*).

### (3) Veridical/Falsidical

The qualification 'veridical' in the case of the apprehended object is correlated by Phya pa with its being capable of being causally active (see *Mun sel* 121.3).<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> The key passages in this regard are found in Dharmakīrti's PV 3.1–3 (translated in Dunne 2004: 391–392; see also Franco&Notake 2014: 4 and 29–37). Dharmakīrti holds that what is capable of being causally active is ultimately real, and links this capacity exclusively with particulars (*svalakṣaṇa*). The type of causal efficacy observed in everyday life (such as a seed producing a sprout) may be considered by other philosophers to be merely conventional, but one cannot deny the capacity of being causally active altogether.

<sup>2</sup> See Wood 1991: 31–60 and Thakchoe 2017 (§3.1).

<sup>3</sup> Note that this link between being 'veridical' and being causally active extends only to its application to apprehended objects (see the translation in II, n. 5). In

The qualifications pertaining to (1), (2), and (3) are correlated. Given that all episodes of awareness are themselves real particulars and hence causally active, they all qualify as ‘real’ and ‘dependent’ when considered from the point of view of their status as apprehended objects (namely, the apprehended object of a reflexive awareness). Although Phya pa does not point this out specifically, all episodes of awareness would consequently also qualify as ‘veridical’ from this point of view.<sup>4</sup>

#### (4) Clearly/Not clearly appearing

Apprehended objects are defined as objects whose nature appears to awareness (*Mun sel* 121.11). This appearing is qualified as “clear” when the object is “not mixed with respect to time or place,” that is, there is the appearing of an object at a specific time and place. For instance, the appearing of an elephant in front of me at the present moment (whether the elephant is real or the product of a hallucination), in contrast to the appearing of an elephant whose spatial and temporal location are not specific. This distinction could have originated from the interpretation of PVin 2.7 (going back to PS 1.2) via Dharmottara’s commentary.<sup>5</sup>

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the context of engaged objects, on the other hand, the qualification ‘veridical’ does not involve having causal powers, but the idea of ‘lacking opposition.’ This latter sense is at work in Phya pa’s definition and explication of factive assessment (*Mun sel* 123.3). There, in particular, he writes of “a veridical thesis” (*Mun sel* 123.31), “a veridical states of affairs” (*Mun sel* 123.321), and “a veridical object” (*Mun sel* 123.323). In none of those cases is the application associated with being causally active. (For a more detailed discussion, see the translation in II, n. 41).

<sup>4</sup> In the sense operable in this context, to say that an episode of awareness is ‘veridical’ does not mean that the *content* or *object* of that awareness is real or true; it means only that the episode of awareness is causally active—a feature shared by all instances of awareness. This usage thus stands in contrast to current philosophical (and psychological) uses of the expression “veridical experience,” wherein the idea is that the content of the experience corresponds with reality. (For more on contemporary philosophical uses of ‘veridical,’ see, for example, Siegel 2010, chapter 6.) This latter (contemporary) usage corresponds most properly with Phya pa’s appeal to being “non-erroneous with regard to the state of affairs” (see, e.g., *Mun sel* 112.23).

<sup>5</sup> Dharmakīrti states: “The Teacher (Dignāga) has said that the object (of the two types of knowledge) is distinct because, since the appearing is distinct (Skt. *prati-bhāsasya bhinnatvād*, Tib. *snang ba tha dad pas*), it cannot apply to just one.”

### (5) Non-conceptual/Conceptual

The qualification in these terms only pertains to awareness. It is correlated with the qualification of the apprehended object according to set (4). Support in Dharmakīrti's system for this correlation can be found in PV 3.298cd–299.<sup>6</sup>

### (6) Non-erroneous/Erroneous

Phya pa correlates this qualification of awareness to the qualification of the apprehended object according to set (3).<sup>7</sup> It is thus also correlated to the object being real or unreal (1), and dependent or imagined (2). Being “non-erroneous” or “erroneous” is simply a matter of whether what is apprehended exists in reality or is merely a mental imputation.

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(PVin<sub>Skt</sub> 2 48,9 with PVin 2.7). In PVinṬ 2, Dharmottara comments on the distinction of appearing in terms of the two incompatible aspects of “clearly appearing” and “unclearly appearing” (PVinṬ 2 D179a1: *gsal bar snang ba dang mi gsal bar snang ba rnam pa 'gal ba gnyis po*). See Hugon 2008b: 146, n. 38. See also the verses referred to in (5) above and n. 6.

<sup>6</sup> In these verses, Dharmakīrti links “clearly appearing mind” (Skt. *dhīḥ sphuṭa-bhāsinī*, Tib. *gsal bar snang ba can blo*) with “non-conceptual” (Skt. *nirvikalpā*, Tib. *rtog med*), and the other case, i.e., what does not appear clearly (Skt. *na bhāseta parisphuṭam*), with “conceptual” (Skt. *vikalpikā*, Tib. *rtog pa*). See Hugon 2008b: 179, n. 134.

<sup>7</sup> Cf. in this regard 'Od zer 45b4: *ma 'khrul ba 'i don ni yul bden na blo ma 'khrul ba yin la yul brdzun na blo 'khrul pa yin no //*

**Table B: Apprehended objects and engaged objects—the partial overlap between these objects**

	<b>Apprehended object</b>	<b>Not apprehended object</b>
<b>Engaged object</b>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Blue (in perception)</li> <li>2. A concept (in an inferential cognition concluding that concepts are conventionally true [f])</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. The impermanence of sound <i>qua</i> real particular (in inferential cognition [b])</li> <li>2. Concepts and double moons (in episodes of reflexive awareness)</li> </ol>
<b>Not engaged object</b>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. The concept of ‘impermanence’ (in an inferential cognition concluding that sound is impermanent [b])</li> <li>2. Momentariness (in an episode of non-ascertaining perception)</li> <li>3. The concepts appearing in episodes of factive assessment, (conceptual) mistaken cognition, (conceptual) post-knowledge cognition, and doubt</li> <li>4. The appearance of a double moon (in non-conceptual erroneous awareness)</li> <li>5. Blue (in perceptual post-knowledge cognition)</li> </ol>	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1. Sound (in a visual cognition)</li> </ol>

**Table C: Apprehended objects and engaged objects—the partial overlap between the episodes of awareness involving these objects**

	Awareness with veridical apprehended object	Awareness without veridical apprehended object
Awareness with veridical engaged object	Episodes of perceptual knowledge	Episodes of inferential cognition
Awareness without veridical engaged object	Episodes of non-ascertaining perception	Episodes of mistaken determination

Phya pa devotes a large amount of space to the project of distinguishing apprehended objects (*gzung yul*) from engaged objects (*'jug yul*). By definition, an apprehended object is “something such that its own nature appears to awareness” (*Mun sel* 121.11) and engaged objects are those for which “there is the elimination of superimpositions, with regard to states of affairs not previously known, by an apprehension that requires an invariable relation to the state of affairs” (*Mun sel* 121.13).

Sections (121.2) and (121.3) in the *Mun sel* show in detail that being an apprehended object is not coextensive with being an engaged object, and that being an episode of awareness with a veridical apprehended object is not coextensive with being an episode of awareness with a veridical engaged object. To demonstrate these points, Phya pa provides examples of items that fall into one category but not the other, items that fall into both categories, and items that fall into neither. These examples are not meant to be exhaustive, and, in fact, additional examples are provided in Phya pa’s *'Od zer* (see V, 2.3).



**Table D: The three-fold division of awareness in the *Mun sel***

Awareness			Operations		
			Appearing	Directing	Excluding
<b>(I) Conceptual cognition</b>					
[1]	Not directing	<i>Non-directing conceptual cognition</i>	MC <sub>1.1</sub>	–	–
	Directing				
[2]	Not being determinate	<i>Doubt</i>	MC <sub>1.1</sub>	MC <sub>3</sub>	<i>Doubt</i>
	Being determinate				
[3]	Not determining in correspondence with the object to be cognized	<i>Mistaken cognition (Mistaken determinate awareness, MC<sub>2</sub>)</i>	MC <sub>1.1</sub>	MC <sub>3</sub>	<i>Mistaken cognition (MC<sub>2</sub>)</i>
		Determining in correspondence with the object to be cognized	<i>Post-knowledge cognition</i>	MC <sub>1.1</sub>	MC <sub>3</sub>
	Determining in correspondence with the object to be cognized	<i>Factive assessment</i>	MC <sub>1.1</sub>	MC <sub>3</sub>	<i>Factive assessment</i>
		<i>Inferential cognition</i>	MC <sub>1.1</sub>	[a][b][c][e] MC <sub>3</sub> [d] not MC <sub>3</sub>	<i>Knowledge</i>
<b>(II) Non-conceptual non-erroneous cognition</b>			not MC <sub>1</sub>	–	–
<b>(III) Non-conceptual erroneous cognition</b>			MC <sub>1.2</sub>	–	–

This table represents the various features attached by Phya pa to the basic three-fold division of awareness discussed in *Mun sel* 112, which is based on the apprehended object (see Table A and Table B).

Conceptual cognitions are divided according to three successive, nested criteria:

- [1] Directing (*zhen pa*)
- [2] Being determinate (*nges pa*)
- [3] Determining in correspondence with the object to be cognized (*shes bya dang mthun par nges*)

- These criteria are not involved in characterizing non-conceptual cognitions, which all lack directing.<sup>8</sup>
- The analysis also considers which of the three operations (*byed pa*)—appearing (*snang ba*), directing (*zhen pa*), and excluding (*sel ba*)—are present for the various types of awareness.
- All types of awareness have the operation of appearing, which is a matter of their grasping their apprehended object.
- The presence of the operation of directing is coextensive with the fulfillment of the criterion of directing [1], which presupposes that the cognition is conceptual (I).
- The operation of excluding is copresent with the operation of directing.<sup>9</sup> It is thus also limited to conceptual cognitions. But it is not correlated with the criterion of being determinate [2], because the operation of excluding is also found for doubt. “Exclusion of what is other” is expressed in a variety of ways, most commonly as the “exclusion of non-x” or “exclusion of directing one’s mind toward being non-x.” Doubt is a special case where what is excluded is the impossibility of the other option, and mistaken cognition is an instance where what is excluded is something that is actually the case.

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<sup>8</sup> In the table, the mental states appear in an order that differs from Phya pa’s presentation in order to highlight the presence/absence of the respective criteria.

<sup>9</sup> See, in relation to that, the definition of the intentional object in *Mun sel* 121.12: “what the mind is directed toward, and the mind being directed toward it excludes engaging in the opposite directing of one’s mind.”

- The operation of excluding is not coextensive with the elimination of superimpositions, for the latter is found also in some case of non-conceptual non-erroneous cognition (II) (these are not divided here).

Another point investigated by Phya pa is the status of each awareness with respect to each operation. More precisely, it can be asked: is the awareness a mistaken cognition or not from this perspective? In this context, one should be aware of the different connotations attached to the term “mistaken cognition” (*log shes*) (see IV, 4[b] for more details). In the context of the three-fold typology, Phya pa’s intention in highlighting the characterization as a “mistaken cognition” is to demonstrate that being a “mistaken cognition” with regard to the operation of appearing (MC<sub>1</sub> in the summarizing table in IV, 4[b]) or with regard to the operation of directing pertaining to the type of the apprehended object (MC<sub>3</sub>) does not have any impact on an awareness being an episode of knowledge. Its being an episode of knowledge is linked, in the case of conceptual cognitions, with the operation of excluding. All conceptual cognitions that are directed have the operations of directing and excluding. But they have different statuses with respect to the operation of excluding. Only inferential cognition has the status of knowledge in this regard.

In the case of inferential cognition and non-conceptual non-erroneous cognition, Phya pa adds a paragraph explaining in what way these come to qualify as episodes of knowledge (*Mun sel* 112.111.112.3 and 112.23). For inferential cognition it is through “engaging the object via the exclusion of what is other” and “countering the directing of one’s mind in the opposite way.” This is correlated with the operation of excluding. For perceptual knowledge, this is by “eliminating opposite superimpositions” when the mind is focused on manifest features. How this elimination (which is not to be confused with the operation of excluding) comes about for a non-conceptual cognition, through a causal process, is explained later when dealing with the definition of knowledge (see *Mun sel* 212.21).

**Table E: The seven-fold division of awareness in the *Mun sel***

	Positively discerning a state of affairs		
[1]	Discerning something not set apart from what is directly incompatible with it, without being partial to either	(1) <b>Doubt</b>	
	Discerning something standing apart from what is directly incompatible with it, while being partial to it		
[2]	Discerning in a way that does not correspond with the object to be cognized	(2) <b>Mistaken cognition</b>	
	Discerning in a way that corresponds with the object to be cognized		
[3]	Compatible with directing one's mind in the opposite way	(3) <b>Non-ascertaining perception</b>	
	Incompatible with directing one's mind in the opposite way		
[4]	That engages an object already known	(4) <b>Post-knowledge cognition</b>	
	That engages an object not previously known		
[5]	That opposes superimpositions by observing a real particular	(5) <b>Perceptual knowledge</b>	
	That opposes superimpositions without a real particular being observed		
[6]	That relies on evidence	(6) <b>Inferential cognition</b>	
	That does not rely on evidence	(7) <b>Factive assessment</b>	

This typology is said to be based both on the apprehended and engaged objects. Unlike the three-fold typology, it does not primarily divide episodes of awareness based on their apprehended object, but considers successive criteria that are related to various types of objects, without specifying which ones. This enables Phya pa in particular to list under the same heading types of awareness that admit of conceptual and non-conceptual subtypes, or have subtypes related to different objects. The ambiguities are lifted in the subsequent reduction to the types distinguished in the three-fold typology (*Mun sel* 122.2) and in the expansion to a twelve-fold division (*Mun sel* 122.3).

The distinguishing criteria are:<sup>10</sup>

- [1] The partiality criterion
- [2] The correspondence criterion
- [3] The incompatibility with opposite directing criterion
- [4] The novelty criterion
- [5] The experience criterion
- [6] The evidential criterion

Among the distinguishing criteria, [3] corresponds to K1 (incompatibility with opposite superimpositions), [4] to K2 (novelty), and [5] and [6] are two criteria that guarantee K3 (the mode of apprehension such that there is an invariable relation to the state of affairs).

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<sup>10</sup> The terminology is adapted from the list of criteria identified and discussed in Stoltz 2013: 413 in the case of the similar typology proposed by gTsang drug rdo rje in the *gSal byed*.

**Table F: The twelve-fold division of awareness in the *Mun sel***

	Conceptual	Non-conceptual non-erroneous		Non-conceptual erroneous
(1)Doubt	<b><u>1</u></b>			
(2)Mistaken cognition	<b><u>2<sub>c</sub></u></b>			2 <sub>n</sub>
(3)Non-ascertaining perception		3 <sub>r</sub>	reflexive	
		3 <sub>t</sub>	transitive	
(4)Post-knowledge cognition	<b><u>4<sub>c</sub></u></b>	4 <sub>r</sub>	reflexive	
		4 <sub>t</sub>	transitive	
(5)Perceptual knowledge		5 <sub>r</sub>	reflexive	
		5 <sub>t</sub>	transitive	
(6)Inferential cognition	<b><u>6</u></b>			
(7)Factive assessment	<b><u>7</u></b>			

In *Mun sel* 122.2, Phya pa subsumes the seven types of awareness (see Table E) within the three-fold division of awareness (see Table D), represented here in the three columns “conceptual,” “non-conceptual non-erroneous,” “non-conceptual erroneous.” As some of the seven types can be conceptual or non-conceptual, and non-conceptual episodes are divided into “reflexive” and “transitive,” this leads to the twelve-fold division spelled out in *Mun sel* 122.3.

In this paragraph, Phya pa also deals with the mutual compatibility and incompatibility among the twelve, which can be summarized as follows:

Section	Type(s)	Compatible with	Incompatible with
122.31	3 <sub>r</sub> , 4 <sub>r</sub> , 5 <sub>r</sub>	<b><u>1</u></b> , <b><u>2<sub>c</sub></u></b> , 2 <sub>n</sub> , 3 <sub>t</sub> , 4 <sub>t</sub> , 5 <sub>t</sub> , 3 <sub>r</sub> , 4 <sub>r</sub> , 5 <sub>r</sub> , <b><u>4<sub>c</sub></u></b> , <b><u>6</u></b> , <b><u>7</u></b>	
122.32	2 <sub>n</sub> , 3 <sub>t</sub> , 4 <sub>t</sub> , 5 <sub>t</sub>	2 <sub>n</sub> , 3 <sub>t</sub> , 4 <sub>t</sub> , 5 <sub>t</sub> , 3 <sub>r</sub> , 4 <sub>r</sub> , 5 <sub>r</sub>	<b><u>1</u></b> , <b><u>2<sub>c</sub></u></b> , <b><u>4<sub>c</sub></u></b> , <b><u>6</u></b> , <b><u>7</u></b>
122.33	<b><u>4<sub>c</sub></u></b> , <b><u>6</u></b> , <b><u>7</u></b>	<b><u>2<sub>c</sub></u></b> , 3 <sub>r</sub> , 4 <sub>r</sub> , 5 <sub>r</sub> , <b><u>4<sub>c</sub></u></b> , <b><u>6</u></b> , <b><u>7</u></b>	<b><u>1</u></b> , 2 <sub>n</sub> , 3 <sub>t</sub> , 4 <sub>t</sub> , 5 <sub>t</sub>
122.34	<b><u>2<sub>c</sub></u></b>	<b><u>1</u></b> , <b><u>2<sub>c</sub></u></b> , 3 <sub>r</sub> , 4 <sub>r</sub> , 5 <sub>r</sub> , <b><u>4<sub>c</sub></u></b> , <b><u>6</u></b> , <b><u>7</u></b>	2 <sub>n</sub> , 3 <sub>t</sub> , 4 <sub>t</sub> , 5 <sub>t</sub>
122.35	<b><u>1</u></b>	<b><u>1</u></b> , <b><u>2<sub>c</sub></u></b> , 3 <sub>r</sub> , 4 <sub>r</sub> , 5 <sub>r</sub>	2 <sub>n</sub> , 3 <sub>t</sub> , 4 <sub>t</sub> , 5 <sub>t</sub> , <b><u>4<sub>c</sub></u></b> , <b><u>6</u></b> , <b><u>7</u></b>

There is mutual incompatibility between every conceptual cognition (numbers in bold) and every non-conceptual cognition (non-bold), with the exception of the non-conceptual reflexive cognitions (numbers in italics), which are compatible with everything.

Among conceptual cognitions (in bold), there is mutual incompatibility between doubt (dotted underline) and three of the determinate cognitions (single underline), on account of doubt not being a determinate awareness. However, doubt is held to be compatible with conceptual mistaken cognition (double underline) on account of its having a concept for its apprehended object (as do the other three determined cognitions). The “conceptual mistaken cognition” at play here is thus just an awareness apprehending a concept ( $MC_{1.1}$ , see IV, 4[b]), not an incorrect determination ( $MC_2$ ).

**Table G: The ten-fold division of awareness in the 'Od zer**

<b>[1]</b>	<b>Taking as its apprehended object a real particular = Perception</b>			
[1.1]	Not incompatible with opposite superimpositions	<sup>(1)</sup> <b>Non-ascertaining perception</b>		
	Incompatible with opposite superimpositions			
[1.2]	With regard to an object previously known	<sup>(2)</sup> <b>(Perceptual) post-knowledge cognition</b>		
	With regard to an object not already known	<sup>(3)</sup> <b>Perceptual knowledge</b>		
<b>[2]</b>	<b>Taking as its apprehended object the referent of a non-conceptual erroneous cognition = Non-conceptual erroneous cognition</b>			
<b>[3]</b>	<b>Taking as its apprehended object a concept = Conceptual cognition</b>			
[3.1]	Which does not conceive of its object being veridical externally	<sup>(5)</sup> <b>Non-directing conceptual cognition</b>		
	Which conceives of its object being veridical externally			
[3.2]	Which conceives with the possibility of another option	<sup>(6)</sup> <b>Doubt</b>		
	Which conceives without the possibility of another option			
[3.3]	In which conceiving does not correspond with the object to be cognized	<sup>(7)</sup> <b>Mistaken cognition (MC<sub>2</sub>)</b>		
	In which conceiving corresponds with the object to be cognized			
[3.4]	Which directs with regard to an object previously known	<sup>(8)</sup> <b>(Conceptual) post-knowledge cognition</b>		
	Which directs with regard to an object not already known			
[3.5]	Which directs without relying on valid evidence	<sup>(9)</sup> <b>Factive assessment</b>		
	Which directs by relying on valid evidence	<sup>(10)</sup> <b>Inferential cognition</b>		
		~		
		<i>Appearing</i>	<i>Directing</i>	<i>Excluding</i>
[a][b]	Mistaken cognition (MC <sub>1,1</sub> )	Mistaken cognition (MC <sub>3</sub> )	Knowledge	
[e1][e2]				
[d]	Mistaken cognition (MC <sub>1,1</sub> )	Not MC <sub>3</sub>	Knowledge	



This typology is primarily based on the apprehended object and thus starts off with the same items as the three-fold division in the *Mun sel* (Table D) (cf. V, 2: 'Od zer 111.222.1.b1, °.b2 and °.b3). But it then proceeds to distinguish three types for non-conceptual non-erroneous cognition (there is no subdivision of this type in the three-fold division in the *Mun sel*) and six types for conceptual cognition (the same as the ones listed in the three-fold division in the *Mun sel*), using distinguishing criteria similar to the ones used in the three-fold division in the *Mun sel* and some from the seven-fold division (Table E). These criteria are, for non-conceptual non-erroneous cognitions:

- [1.1] The incompatibility with superimpositions criterion
- [1.2] The novelty criterion

and for conceptual cognition:

- [3.1] The directing criterion
- [3.2] The partiality criterion
- [3.3] The correspondence criterion<sup>11</sup>
- [3.4] The novelty criterion
- [3.5] The evidential criterion

[1.1] amounts to K1, which is discussed further for perceptual knowledge in a specific paragraph; [1.2] corresponds to K2; [1], which is equivalent to the “manifestation criterion” in the seven-fold division, guarantees K3 in the case of perceptual knowledge.

[3.1], [3.2], and [3.3] correspond to the three criteria of directing, being determinate, and determining in a way that corresponds to the object to be known, which are applied to conceptual cognition in the three-fold division in the *Mun sel*. [3.4] amounts to K2, [3.5] guarantees K3. K1 is made explicit in the discussion of the status of inferential cognition with respect to the three operations and in a specific paragraph.

The ten-fold division in the 'Od zer lists the seven types found in the seven-fold division in the *Mun sel*, but distinguishes already the conceptual and non-conceptual forms of post-knowledge cognition (2 and 8) and the conceptual and non-conceptual forms of mistaken cognition (4 and 7), and singles out non-directing conceptual cognition (5), which is also a

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<sup>11</sup> Note that this criterion is more restricted than the “correspondence criterion” in the seven-fold typology. It does not concern the correspondence pertaining to the apprehended object, only the one pertaining to the intentional object.

variety of mistaken cognition. In the *Mun sel*, non-directing conceptual cognition is mentioned in the discussion of the three-fold typology, but it does not count as a distinct type in the seven-fold and the twelve-fold typologies.