

ARCHIV FÜR INDISCHE PHILOSOPHIE

Junjie Chu

A Study of *Sataimira* in Dignāga's Definition of Pseudo-Perception (PS 1.7cd-8ab)^{*}

I. INTRODUCTION

I-1. In *Pramāṇasamuccaya* (hereafter PS) 1.7cd-8ab Dignāga (c. 480-540) first enumerates three kinds of cognition, namely, 1) erroneous cognition, 2) cognition of conventional existence, and 3) cognition's inference, the result of inference, recollection, and desire. Then he states that these three kinds of cognition are pseudo-perception and *sataimira*. In the *Vṛtti* he explains with examples why all three are pseudo-perception, namely, because "conceptual construction" is involved, but he says nothing about *sataimira*. As an example for erroneous cognition he mentions the error proceeding from the conceptual construction of water, etc., in respect to a mirage, etc., but he does not explicitly mention a *timira*-cognition¹ such as the cognition of a double moon or of a hair-mesh, etc.²

* I am indebted to Univ.-Prof. Dr. Eli Franco and Univ.-Prof. Dr. Karin Preisendanz for their valuable comments on an earlier version of this paper, which allowed for great improvements in both content and language. I am also indebted to Univ.-Prof. Dr. Ernst Steinkellner, Univ.-Doz. Dr. Helmut Krasser and Dr. Horst Lasic who read earlier drafts of this paper and made numerous valuable suggestions. Many pertinent observations by Univ.-Doz. Dr. Chlodwig H. Werba and Univ.-Ass. Dr. Anne MacDonald contributed to the clarity and precision of presentation. I further thank Ms. Cynthia Peck-Kubaczek for polishing my English.

¹ Regardless of whether the word *timira* denotes an eye disorder, as Dharmakīrti interprets it, or "ignorance", as Jinendrabuddhi understands it, the denotation of the expression "*timira*-cognition" must be the same: cognition such as the vision of a double moon or a hair-mesh. I will therefore use the word "*timira*-cognition" in this paper to denote such cognition. Furthermore, I prefer in general to use the expression "*timira*-cognition" as opposed to "*tāmira*-cognition" (cf. Franco 1986). *timirajñāna* is used, for example, by Manorathanandin (PVV 206,11; 207,16; 227,26f.).

² PS(V) 1.7cd-8ab: *bhrāntisamvṛtisajjñānam anumānānumānikam // smārtābhilāṣikam ceti pratyakṣābhām sataimiram / tatra bhrāntijñānam mrgatṛṣṇādiśu toyādikalpanāpravṛttatvāt pratyakṣābhāsam. saṃvṛtisatsv arthāntarādhyaropāt tadrūpakalpanāpravṛttatvāt. anumānataphalādijñānam pūrvānubhūtakalpanayeti na pratyakṣam.* Cf. Hattori 1968: 28; 95, n. 1.53 and 97, n. 1.54.

I-2. Dharmakīrti (c. 600-660) interprets this passage as indicating four kinds of pseudo-perception, the first three being mental cognitions, and the fourth kind “arising from disturbance in the basis [of the cognition] (*āśraya*, i.e., the sense faculty), and free from conceptual construction”.³ Furthermore, he interprets the fourth kind as the “exception” (*apavāda*) to the generalization that all pseudo-perceptions are mentally constructed, and says that through this “exception” the cognition caused by an impairment of a sense faculty is indicated, and that the word *timira* indicates all kinds of impairment of sense faculties.⁴ In his later works *Pramāṇaviniścaya* and *Nyāyabindu* he adds a new element, “non-erroneous” (*abhrānta*), to the definition of perception.⁵ It follows from this that in his opinion the word *taimira* in the compound *sataimira* denotes an error arising from a defect of a sense faculty and constitutes the fourth kind of pseudo-perception. This position was accepted by the Buddhist epistemological school throughout the entire post-Dharmakīrti period.

I-3. There is a divergence of opinion among modern scholars regarding the question of whether Dharmakīrti’s interpretation is faithful to Dignāga’s intention, or in other words, whether Dignāga really accepts an error relating to sense faculties as being a fourth kind of pseudo-perception. Hattori maintains that “Dignāga attributed errors to *manas*”, and thus interprets the word *sataimira* “as an adjective modifying ‘*pratyakṣābhām*’, but not as mentioning a separate kind of *pratyakṣābhāsa*.⁶ Wayman disagrees with Hattori, maintaining that Dharmakīrti’s assertion of four kinds of *pratyakṣābhāsa* which “match up with” the four kinds of *pratyakṣa* does not deviate from Dignāga’s intention, and that Dignāga accepted four kinds of *pratyakṣābhāsa*, as Dharmakīrti maintained.⁷ Franco argues for still another interpretation. He points out that *taimira-jñāna* cannot be free from conceptual construction because Dignāga defines perception as free from concep-

³ Cf. PV 3.288: *trividhaṁ kalpanājñānam āśrayopaplavodbhavam / avikalpakaṁ ca pratyakṣābhām caturvidham //*.

⁴ Cf. PV 3.293: *apavādaś caturtho 'tra tenoktam upaghātajam / kevalam tatra timiram upaghātopalakṣanam //*.

⁵ Cf. PVin 1.40,2: *de la mñon sum rtog bral ma 'khrul ba //*; NB 1.4: *tatra pratyakṣam kalpanāpodham abhrāntam*.

⁶ Hattori 1968: 122, n. 3.7, and 95f., n. 1.53. The same argument is also to be found in Hattori 1965: 125.

⁷ Wayman 1978, especially 394f.

tual construction; thus *taimira-jñāna* does not form a separate kind of *pratyakṣabhāsa*.⁸ With regard to the cause of the cognition of a double moon, etc., Funayama points out that Dignāga principally regards it as being caused by the mind, but his “denial of sensory illusion was not consistently held throughout his writings”.⁹

I-4. Now that we are able to consult the Sanskrit text of Jinendrabuddhi's *Pramāṇasamuccayaṭikā* (hereafter PST) we have more clarity with regard to further opinions. In PST 5b2-8b7 Jinendrabuddhi explains Dignāga's list of pseudo-perceptions, and from 7a6 to the end of this section he presents his own view regarding the word *sataimira* in PS 1.8b, which is based on his understanding of the notion “trustworthiness” (*avisaṃvāda*). The main points are that some errors relating to sense faculties are trustworthy and consequently correct perceptions, and thus the word *timira*, in the special meaning of “ignorance”, refers to “untrustworthiness”. Funayama has demonstrated¹⁰ that these points are reported by Kamalaśīla as a *pūrvapakṣa* in his *Tattvasaṅgraha*pañjikā (TSP) and are attributed to certain Buddhists (*svayūthyā*). Generally speaking, Jinendrabuddhi follows Dharmakīrti on all basic points in his interpretation; here we have the only case I have found in which he offers us a completely different interpretation, although in this interpretation the notion of “trustworthiness”, as he understands it, i.e., as the definition of a valid cognition, is also borrowed from Dharmakīrti¹¹ and is unknown to Dignāga.¹² This paper aims to present a new interpretation of the word *sataimira* based on the ideas found in the Sanskrit text of Jinendrabuddhi's PST as well as in some Chinese materials.

⁸ Franco 1986, especially 83 and 85.

⁹ Funayama 1999: 77.

¹⁰ Funayama 1999: 85-92.

¹¹ At the beginning of PV 2 Dharmakīrti defines valid cognition (*pramāṇa*) as “trustworthy cognition”, and the trustworthiness as “constancy with regard to the production of an effect”. Cf. PV 2.1a-c: *pramāṇam avisamvādi jñānam arthakriyāsthitih / avisamvādanam*.

¹² The word *avisamvāda* was used by Dignāga, but in another context. Cf. PS 2.5 (quoted in PST 63b1f. and in PVSV 108,1: *āptavādāvisamvādasāmānyāt*). I would like to thank Univ.-Doz. Dr. Helmut Krasser for the reference to the quotation in PVSV.

II. THE CAUSE OF THE *TIMIRA*-COGNITION

II-1. In the PST the passage in which Jinendrabuddhi presents his own view begins with the explanation of the “theory of trustworthiness in a certain aspect” (*amśasamvādarāda*). This theory has been investigated in depth by Krasser and Funayama.¹³ Basing himself on this theory, he then introduces an objection to Dharmakīrti’s interpretation of *sataimira*. The conclusion of this objection runs as follows:

Consequently it should not be so explained: “Through this word for an exception, [namely] ‘*sataimira*’, cognition by means of a sense faculty impaired through the cause of an external or internal impairment, though it is free from conceptual construction, is mentioned as a pseudo-perception. Only there, in the word ‘*sataimira*’, *timira* is a mere indication for all causes of impairment of sense faculties”,¹⁴ because even certain cognitions by means of an impaired sense faculty are perception [with regard to a certain aspect]. The qualifier “non-erroneous” [added by Dharmakīrti in PVin 1.4b’] should also not be employed [in the definition of perception], because it is accepted that even certain erroneous [cognitions arising from the disturbance of a sense faculty] are perception with regard to a certain [aspect].¹⁵

This means that the objector does not believe that the word *taimira* denotes an error relating to sense faculties in the sense that Dharmakīrti interprets it, namely, that only the defective sense faculty is responsible for the cognition of a double moon, etc., and consequently he does not accept Dharmakīrti’s addition of “non-erroneous” to the definition of perception. As we shall see below, this objector may be Jinendrabuddhi himself, who, following this objection, presents his interpretation, namely, that the word *timira* means “ignorance” and “untrustworthiness” (see III-2). Therefore the question arises: Did Dignāga admit an error that is purely sensory in nature that the objector denies?

¹³ Cf. Krasser 1991: 73f. and n. 140; Funayama 1999: 88.

¹⁴ Cf. PST 7a1-2 in which Jinendrabuddhi explains the word *sataimira* in the same way Dharmakīrti does in PV 3.293: *tenāpavādavacanena bāhyābhyan taropaghāta-pratyayopahatendriyajñānam kalpanāpoḍhatre ’pi pratyakṣābhām ucyate. sataimiram ity atra tu timiram sarvendriyopaghāta-pratyayopalakṣaṇamātram kila drastavyam.*

¹⁵ PST 8a1-3.: *na tarhi sataimiram ity anenāpavādāpadena bāhyābhyan taro-paghāta-pratyayopahatendriyajñānam kalpanāpoḍhatre ’pi pratyakṣābhām uktam. kevalam tatra sataimiravacane timiram sarvendriyopaghāta-pratyayopalakṣaṇamātram ity evam vyākhyeyam, upahatendriyajñānasyāpi kasyacit pratyakṣatvāt. nāpy abhrāntam iti viśeṣaṇam kartavyam, bhrāntasyāpi kasyacit kvacit pratyakṣatveneṣṭatvāt.*

II-2. In the available works by Dignāga we find the following three statements (S1-3) concerning the problem of the cause of the cognition of a double moon, etc.:

In the first part of the Ālambanaparīkṣā(vṛtti) (ĀP[V]) Dignāga proves that the external object, regarded either as atoms or as an aggregate of atoms, is not the object-support (*ālambana*) of the awareness, on the ground that neither atoms nor their aggregates can fulfill the two necessary conditions for being the object-support, i.e., (1) being the cause of a cognition and (2) possessing the same form as that appearing in the cognition.¹⁶ In ĀP 2b Dignāga mentions a double moon as being analogous to the aggregate of atoms that is not substantially existent.¹⁷ He explains it in ĀPV *ad loc.*:

(S1:) As for seeing a double moon, owing to a defect (**vaikalya*) of the sense faculty, although [the double moon] appears in this [awareness], it is not its object.¹⁸

In PS(V) 1.14-16 Dignāga criticizes the definition of perception set forth in the Vādavidhi: “Perception is a cognition [arising] from that object” (*tato 'rthād vijñānam pratyakṣam*); in PSV *ad* 1.15 he mentions the sense faculty as being analogous to the atoms that do not assume the same form as that appearing in the cognition, though they are the cause of the cognition.¹⁹ That is to say, in this definition of perception only the first condition is implied, not the second; thus Dignāga uses a *prasaṅga* to indicate the fault of it not being taken into consideration:

(S2:) [The atoms cannot be the object-support of the cognition. Otherwise] it would follow that even the visual faculty and the other [causes]²⁰

¹⁶ Cf. Hattori 1968: 118, n. 2.17.

¹⁷ ĀP 2 = 176,20: *rdzas su med phyir zla gñis bzin* ||.

¹⁸ ĀPV 176,21f.: *dbaṇ po ma tshaṇ ba'i phyir zla ba gñis mthoṇ ba ni der snaṇ ba ñid yin du zin kyaṇ de'i yul ma yin no* ||.

¹⁹ Here the argument is the same as in ĀP 1: “Although atoms are the cause of the sensory cognition, they are not the objects of this [cognition], because they do not appear in this [cognition], like the sense faculty” (ĀP 1 = 176,7-11: *dbaṇ po rnam par rig pa'i rgyu* || *phra rab rdul dag yin mod kyi* || *der mi snaṇ phyir de'i yul ni* || *rdul phran ma yin dbaṇ po bzin* ||). This verse is quoted in PVA 336,5: *yady apīndriyavijñaptih kāraṇam paramāṇavah / atadābhatajā nāsyā akṣavad viśayo ṣavah* ||. The same view is also found in TSP¹ 582,16-17 = TSP² 711,6-7: *yady apīndriyavijñapter grāhyāṁśah kāraṇam bhavet / atadābhatajā tasyā nākṣavad viśayah sa tu* ||.

²⁰ “And the other” (^*ādi*) probably means “and causes” of the cognition “other” than the visual faculty. We find the same argument in the Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi:

would be the object-support. For they also – while existing in other ways [than the manner they appear in the cognition] in the ultimate sense – are the cause (*kāraṇa*) of the cognitions with the appearance of a double moon, etc., or something blue, etc.²¹

In the Nyāyaparīkṣā section of PS(V) 1 Dignāga criticizes the four components of the Naiyāyika's definition of perception;²² among them the qualifications “arisen from the contact of sense faculty and object” (*indriyārthasamnikarśotpanna*) and “non-deviating” (*avyabhicārin*) relate to our discussion. Dignāga rejects the qualification “non-deviating” on the ground that it is redundant in the presence of the other qualification “arisen from the contact ...”. He says:

(S3:) Also in the case where [a cognition] has a deviating object it is not (possible) [to include the qualification “non-deviating” in the definition] because a deviating [cognition] has for object [an object] of mental error (*manobhrānti*).²³

II-3. The problem is that, *prima facie*, S1 and S2 are inconsistent with S3, the former two seeming to blame the sense faculty for producing the cognition of a double moon, the latter seeming to attribute all error to the mind. Dharmakīrti also refers to S2 as indicating that Dignāga admits that some erroneous cognitions are the product of a sense faculty. He says that those who regard the cognition of a double moon, etc., as a mental product will be contradicting Dignāga's statement.²⁴ This interpretation is also followed by some modern scholars.²⁵ On the

Not anything whatsoever that produces the awareness is *ālambana*, because *hetu-pratyaya* and other *pratyayas*, too, cannot be called the *ālambana* of this consciousness (CWSL 4b5f: 非但能生。勿因緣等亦名此識所緣緣故 °); cf. also TBh 16,18-20: *bāhyo hy arthah svābhāsavijñānajanakatrena vijñānasyālambanapratyaya iṣyate, na kāraṇavramātrena samanantarādipratyayāviśeṣaprasaṅgāt* (v.l.: °*pratyayādiviśeṣaprasaṅgāt*). However, °*ādi* is translated as “and other [senses]” in Hattori 1968: 35.

²¹ Hattori 1968: 120, n. 2.26: *cakṣurādīnām apy ālambanatvaprasaṅgah. te 'pi hi paramārthato 'nyathā vidyamānā dvicandrādyābhāsasya nīlādyābhāsasya ca jñānasya kāraṇam bhavanti.* The sentence in bold face is quoted in PST 7a5.

²² Cf. Hattori 1968: 36.

²³ PSV (*ad* PS 1.17) 192-193. Sanskrit text quoted in PST 21b5: *na ca vyabhicāriviśayatve (sambhavo 'sti) manobhrāntivisayatvād vyabhicārinah* (quoted also in PVA 253,2 and 338,10). *sambhavo 'sti* is supplied following PST 21b5: *sambhavo 'stīty anuvartate*.

²⁴ Cf. PV 3.294: *mānasam tad apīty eke teśām grantho virudhyate / nīladvicandrādīhiyām hetur akṣāṇy apīty ayam //*. Cf. PVA 339,19; PVV 206,26ff.

²⁵ For example, Wayman 1978: 395 and Funayama 1999: 77, n. 21. Cf. also the interpretation in Franco 1986: 82f.

other hand, Jinendrabuddhi clearly interprets S3 as attributing all types of errors to the mind. With regard to the type of error relating to the mind he explains why the qualification “non-deviating” cannot be used, as follows:

To wit: A mental error arises determining an accumulation of elementary matter (*bhūta*) to have the form of water, etc., even though it does not have the essential property of water, etc. Therefore, because [it] is mentally constructed by that [mental error] this [form of water] is an object of the latter alone, not of a sensory cognition. Therefore [the word] ‘non-deviating’ should not be used in order to exclude this [mental error].²⁶

In other words, the object appears falsely through a mental determination, namely, a specific mental cognition, and therefore this cognition does not arise from the contact of the sense faculty with the object. And with regard to the error relating to a sense faculty, he explains why the qualification “non-deviating” cannot be used, as follows:

... because this [kind of error] is already rejected [from the scope of the definition] through the employment of [the phrase] “[arising from] contact [of the sense faculty] with the object”; otherwise it should be formulated thus: “[perception] arises from a sense faculty”, rather than “[perception] arises from the contact of the sense faculty with the object”, because for this [formulation] nothing [would] remain to be excluded.²⁷

In other words, the cognition of a double moon, etc., arises owing to a defect of a sense faculty that makes no contact with an object, so that what appears in the cognition is just “an object of mental error”.

²⁶ PST 21b7-22a1: *tathā hy anudakādisvabhāvam api bhūtasāṅghātam udakādirūpenādhyavasyanty upajāyate manobhrāntih. tatas tatkalpitavāt tasyā eva sa viṣayah, nendriyajñānasya. tato na tadvyavacchedārtham aryabhicārigrahaṇam kartavyam.* Cf. PVA 338,12-13: *na hīndriyārthaśannikarśotpannasyaiva vyabhicāritā sambhavati. pāriśeṣyān manasā yad adhikasya vikalpanam tatra vyabhicārah.* “[A cognition] which arises only from the contact of the sense faculty with an object cannot be deviating. Consequently, deviation [is possible only] in respect to the conceptualisation of something additional (*adhika*) through the mind.”

²⁷ PST 22a2-22a2: ... *arthasannikarsagrahanenaiva tasya pratiksepāt, anyathen-driyajam ity evam vācyam syāt, na tv indriyārthaśannikarśotpannam iti, tasya vyavacchedyābhāvāt.* Cf. PVA 338,15-16: *tasyārthagrahaṇena nirākṛytatrāt, vidyamānam api tad avidyamānakalpam eva.* “Because this [cognition] is excluded by the word ‘object’ [in the qualification ‘arising from the contact of the sense faculty with the object’], this [qualification ‘non-deviating’], although there, is practically not there.”

II-4. Dharmapāla (c. 530-561), in his commentary on the ĀP(V), has a new thought-provoking interpretation which may shed some light onto the problem. He explains S1 as follows:

When the visual faculty has lost its clarity owing to impairment through the *timira*-disorder, then seeing (**darśana*) a double moon will arise from the impaired sense faculty.²⁸

This statement should not be read as an indication that Dharmapāla accepts the vision of a double moon as purely a sensory product.²⁹ In later passages he emphasizes that the example “a double moon” is used to illustrate a non-existent thing (**abhūtārtha*), so it should be understood that it has been established as not being the cause [of the awareness] (**ahetutva*).³⁰ In answering the question why the double appearance is perceived directly (**pratyakṣam*) even though it is not existent,³¹ Dharmapāla explains the example once more:

On account of the special potency (**śaktiviśeṣa*) [of a sense faculty] laid down internally [in the store-awareness], immediately subsequent to this [potency] (**tatsamanantaram*) an awareness with a false appearance (**pratibhāsa*) occurs, just as a man sees objects appearing in dreams; on account of this (**tatah*) [awareness] a false conception (**abhūtakalpanā*³²) is caused which interprets [this awareness] in that way, as if something additional had been seen in respect to the moon.³³

II-5. Dharmapāla’s explanation is mentioned by the Chinese commentator Kui-ji (632-680) in his commentary on the Vimśatikā as follows:

If a man suffers from the *timira*-disorder, his mental awareness (**manovijñāna*) will see hair, flies, etc., in the air. ...³⁴ [In this case,] conditioned by the eye disorder, the mind (**manas*) apprehends hair,

²⁸ GSYLS 890b8-10: 若時眼根由翳等害損其明德。遂即從斯損害根處。見二月生。

²⁹ Funayama understands this paragraph differently. Cf. Funayama 1999: 78: “At the same period, however, there must have been yet another Buddhist who did approve of the existence of sensory illusion. I surmise that Dharmapāla was such a person.”

³⁰ GSYLS 890b19f.: 第二月喻非實事故。應知此是於非因性而成立之。

³¹ GSYLS 890b21f.: 若言無有第二月者。如何現見有二相生。

³² I understand 似妄 as 虛妄。

³³ GSYLS 890b22-24: 從內布功能差別。均其次已。似相之識而便轉生。猶如夢時見有境起。由此令似妄作斯解。於其月處乘更睹餘。

³⁴ The omitted part explains the words *timira* and “etc.”.

etc. In this [awareness] there is no existent object at all (**na kaścid arthah*).³⁵ Because [his] sight suffers from the disorder, the mind apprehends flies, etc., through the medium of (**dvārena*) sight.³⁶ This does not mean that the visual awareness can [actually] see hairs and flies. This is just as [in the case of] a man, who, pressing his one eye with his hand, etc., can apprehend in his mental awareness a second moon appearing.³⁷ This does not mean that his visual awareness perceives the second moon. It is the sixth [type of] awareness (i.e., *manovijñāna*) that, through the medium of the eyes, is clearly aware [of that second moon] simultaneously. It seems to be a visual cognition (**cakṣurdarśana*), but in reality it is not a visual cognition, because there is no mental construction in the five [sensory] awarenesses.³⁸

According to this interpretation Dharmapāla holds that the visual awareness cannot perceive a second moon because the second moon does not exist; a non-existent thing cannot be perceived by a visual awareness, but can only be apprehended by a mental awareness. That is to say, the mental awareness occurs already in the first moment of the series (*santāna*) of the awareness of a double moon, and does not, as in the case of visual awareness by means of an unimpaired sense faculty, occur in the second moment.

II-6. In the following passage Dharmapāla also reports and then criticizes the opinion of an opponent who interprets the vision of a double

³⁵ This is a *pratīka* in Xuan-zang's translation of Vimś 1 (WSESL 74b29-c1): 內識生時似外境現。如有眩翳見髮蠅等。此中都無少分實義。The sentence in bold face is not reconstructed in Lévi's edition (Vimś 1: *vijñaptimātram evedam a-sadarthāvabhāsanāt / yathā taimirikasyāsatkēcandrādarśanam //*; according to Lévi 1932: 44, n. 1, *yadvat* instead of *yathā*), but is confirmed by VimśT 4a5: *rnam par śes pa 'di ñid don du snañ 'byuñ ste | dpe na rab rib can rnam kyis skra zla la sogs pa med par mthon ba bzin te | don gañ yañ med do |*.

³⁶ Cf. AKBh 30,26f: *cakṣuṣā dvārena vijñānam paśyati*.

³⁷ The same idea is found in FBXL 25b: 以指按目則睹二月。(cf. Funayama 1999: 75 and n. 13). This means that the vision of a double moon, etc., can result not only from the defective visual faculty, but also from some special bodily action. Cf. also AKBh 31,23-24: *tathā hi dvayor vivṛtayoh pariśuddhataram darśanam bhavati. ekasmīmś commilite cakṣuṣi dvitīye cārdhanimilite dvicandrādigrahanam bhavati.*

³⁸ WSESL SJ 982c27-983a5: 如世有人。眼有眩翳。意識遂於空中。見有髮蠅等。…… 眼病爲緣。意見髮等。此中都無少分實義。由眼有病。以眼爲門。意見蠅等。非即眼識。能見髮蠅。如以手等按一目時。意識便見第二月現。非即眼識。見第二月。第六意識。以眼爲門。同時明了。狀如眼見。實非眼見。以五識中。無慧執故。

moon as arising in a series of two moments, the first one being a true perception, the second, a mental construction:³⁹

[Objection:] Some commentators say: When [a moon] appears in the visual awareness (**cakṣurvijñāna*) twice [i.e., one appearance immediately followed by a second appearance], [the two appearances] are taken to be simultaneous, because the sequence (**krama*) of these two is too difficult to determine and the mental awareness (**manovijñāna*) which [arises] later than these two appearances would [otherwise] say “I see a second moon [in addition to] the moon [that you see]”.⁴⁰

[Answer:] According to the doctrine which does not accept an external object, all such opinions [i.e., that mentioned above] are false. How can it be possible that the mental awareness which does not immediately (**samanantaram*) arise from the object-support of the [immediately antecedent] visual awareness [which cognizes a single appearance two times] cognizes the two appearances simultaneously [not as one following the other], and interpret it in this way: “[I] see a double moon”? Again, how can it be possible that, with regard to a sound and other [objects that appear in sequence], an awareness which apprehends that [sound, etc., in sequence] would be not aware of that sequence and thus perceive two sounds, etc., occurring simultaneously? Even for a man with a healthy visual faculty, the sequence in the mental consciousness is very difficult to determine, not to mention finding out the difference [of two moments] in the case of consciousness dependent on the material sense faculty (**rūpīndriya*). Consequently, when seeing a single moon (旃達羅), everyone⁴¹ would perceive two appearances [of this single moon], etc.⁴²

³⁹ In this passage Dharmapāla also refutes the opinion that the vision of a double moon is just “an error in number” in reference to the number generally accepted (**sanymata*), on account of the sense faculty being impaired, saying simply that if somebody asserted a substantially existent entity outside of consciousness, he would not need to make the effort to superimpose (**āropayati*) a double moon and claim that it is only an error in number (?) (GSYLS 890b27-28; 或復有云。於共許曰數有錯亂。由根損故。and GSYLS 890c5-6: 若時離識許實有者。斯乃何勞妄增二月而言於數有其錯亂。).

⁴⁰ GSYLS 890b24-27: 諸有說云。而於眼識雙現之時。此二次第難印定故。將作同時。於斯二種相貌之後。意識便云。我見月之第二月也。

⁴¹ I read 都 (*dou*) instead of 多 (*duo*).

⁴² GSYLS 890b28-c5: 若望不許外境之宗。如斯眾見但是妄執。由非眼識所緣無間引生意識。能於一時。雙緣兩相。作如斯解見二月耶。又於聲等緣彼之識。不知其次應有二聲等見同時起耶。好眼之人意識次第尙多難解。何況依於色根之識測其差別。便成多有二相等見一旃達羅。

The objector, as a proponent of external objects (**bāhyārthavādin*), tries to refute Dignāga's example by affirming that the vision of a double moon is based on a visual awareness. He argues that the visual awareness actually happens in the first moment of the series of the awareness of a double moon; it perceives a single moon twice, and just on account of the difficulty of the determination of the sequence the immediately following mental awareness falsely interprets it as a double moon. The problem is that, according to Dharmapāla, the mental awareness of a double moon that arises from the object-support of the immediately antecedent visual awareness could occur only if the visual awareness actually had perceived a double moon, not a single moon appearing twice; the visual awareness, however, cannot perceive this double moon, since the latter does not exist. It perceives merely a single moon twice, and consequently it is impossible that this visual awareness would result in or be transformed into a mental awareness in which two moons appear simultaneously. Furthermore, the basis of this argument, namely, the difficulty of the determination of the sequence of appearances of a single moon, would lead to an unacceptable consequence (*prasaṅga*). Thus for Dharmapāla the vision of a double moon absolutely does not arise from the external world.

II-7. In another work, a commentary on the Catuhśataka,⁴³ Dharmapāla clearly states that what is perceived by means of the affected visual faculty is definitely a non-existent thing (**abhūtārtha*), and that the *timira*-affected faculty cannot perceive anything.⁴⁴ He observes:

What is cognized by an erroneous awareness (**bhrāntivijñāna*) [which regards a non-existent thing as existent] is just like a double moon. So, though it is not existent (**abhūtabhāvata*), it can be an object [of such an awareness], make an appearance and be seen by the mind (**citta*).⁴⁵

Here he explicitly links the vision of a double moon to the mind. This point is again made clear in his criticism of the opinion of another opponent in the following passage:

[Objection:] If an apprehension of a false object results from erroneous seeing (**viparītadarśana*), the object may be unreal, [but] the seeing should be real [i.e., independent of the function of the mind].

⁴³ For Dharmapāla's philosophical position in this work, cf. Tillemans 1990: 54-66.

⁴⁴ Cf. DCGBLSL 196b26: 如病眼境定非實有; 200b12f.: 眼無障者能有所見。眼若有障即無所觀。

⁴⁵ DCGBLSL 215b8f.: 亂識所緣如第二月。如是雖無真實法體。而能爲境。生現見心。

[Answer:] Since the object is unreal, how can the seeing be real? Just as it is assumed in a dream that visual awareness and other [sensory awarenesses] (**cakṣurādivijñāna*) perceive an object such as colour-form (**rūpādivisaya*), [but] after awakening it is known that both [the visual awareness and the object] are not existent, so in the same way too are the false object and the erring mind (**viparītacitta*).⁴⁶

Here Dharmapāla criticizes the opinion that a man whose eyes are impaired by the *timira*-disorder actually sees a double moon. In his own view it is just the mind in a condition of error (e.g., in a dream) that assumes that the eyes see a double moon.

II-8. The opinion of Dharmapāla's first opponent (II-6) can be compared to an opinion mentioned briefly by Dharmakīrti and reported at length by Prajñākaragupta (c. 840-900). In PV 3.294a Dharmakīrti states: *mānasam tad apīty eke*. These *eke* may be Buddhists.⁴⁷ Prajñākaragupta reports the opinion of these *eke* as follows:

This cognition of a double moon is certainly mental, like the cognition of water in respect to sunrays. To wit, with regard to sunrays a sensory cognition that is absolutely non-erroneous arises first, but then the cognition of water that is accompanied by conceptual construction [results] from the awakening of the impression of a [past] experience of water. And this awakening [results] simply from seeing the sunrays. Sunrays endowed with similarity [to water] possess such a nature [of awakening the impression of the water-experience]. In the same way, also here the cognition with the object of a [single] moon that is not erroneous [arises] first, [and] later conceptual construction which has the appearance of a double moon [arises].⁴⁸

It is clear that in the post-Dignāga period there really existed a group of thinkers who held that the seeing of a double moon, etc., is just like the mental construction of water in respect to a mirage; for them no error was possible other than mental error. Thus, the seeing of a double

⁴⁶ DCGBLSL 215b8-15: 若緣妄境生於倒見。境可是虛。見應是實。境既是虛。見云何實。如在夢中。謂眼等識緣色等境。覺時知彼二事俱無。妄境倒心亦復如是。

⁴⁷ Cf. Schmithausen 1965: 214, n. 145. But according to Vibhūticandra they are Vaiśeṣikas, etc.; cf. PVV 206, n. 3: *kanādayah*.

⁴⁸ PVA 335.31-336.2: *mānasam evaitad dvicandrajñānam marīcikājalajñānavat. tathā hi marīcikāsu prathamam indriyajñānam abhrāntam evopajāyate, paścāt tu jalānubharavāsanāprabodhāt savikalpakam jalajñānam. sa ca prabodho marīcidarśanād eva. sādṛśyabhājō marīcaya evamdharmāṇah. tathātrāpi candraviśayam abhrāntam prathamam jñānam paścād dvicandrākāro vikalpah.*

moon could have an objective substratum, i.e., a single moon, just like a mirage for the mental construction of water; it is the function of the mind that is responsible for the attribution of a double moon to the single moon. In a passage in the Tātparyanibhandana (TPN), in the context of the discussion of the necessity of Dharmakīrti's addition of the word "non-erroneous" to his definition of perception, the author mentions an opinion that he attributes to a certain thinker (a group of thinkers?) "who is nearly a master" (*ācāryadeśīyāḥ*),⁴⁹ namely, that the error of a double moon, etc., pertains to the mind, and this error is already eliminated through the words "free from conceptual construction", which is why Dharmakīrti does not add the word "non-erroneous" to his definition of perception in the PV.⁵⁰ I do not know who this "master" is. A possible candidate is Vasubandhu (or Dignāga who follows Vasubandhu on this point?). Indeed, Vasubandhu admits only three kinds of pseudo-perception. His position is reported by Jineindrabuddhi. The main point is that an awareness arising from that object according to which the awareness is named is perception. Through this definition the following three kinds of cognition are excluded: (1) erroneous cognition (*bhrāntijñāna*), such as the cognition of silver in respect to mother-of-pearl, for it is called "cognition of silver", but arises from mother-of-pearl; (2) conventional cognition (*samvṛtijñāna*), for this is called "cognition of a jar, etc.", but the cognition does not arise from a jar, etc., because since the jar, etc., exist [only] conventionally, they are not the cause of the cognition; (3) inferential cognition, for this arises from the cognition of smoke and from the memory of fire's connection to smoke, not from a cognition of fire.⁵¹

⁴⁹ The plural form can be understood as a mark of respect.

⁵⁰ TPN 264,21-22: *ācāryadeśīyā hi — dvicandrāder bhrāntir mānasī. tasyāś ca kalpanāpodhapanenaiva nirāsaḥ. ata evācāryeṇa kalpanāpodham pratyakṣam pratyakṣenaiva sidhyatīti* (PV 3.123) *lakṣaṇe 'bhrāntapadam nopāttim* (recte: *nopāttam*) *iti pratipannāḥ.*

⁵¹ Cf. PST 16b3-6: *yasya viṣayasya vijñānam vyapadiṣyate, yadi tata eva tad utpadyate, nānyataḥ, nāpi tato 'nyataś ca, taj jñānam pratyakṣam. tad yathā rūpādijñānam sukhādijñānam iti. etena bhrāntijñānam nirastam, yathā śuktikāyām rajatājñānam. tad dhi rajatena vyapadiṣyate rajatājñānam iti. na ca tad rajatād utpadyate, śuktikayaiva tu tad upajanyate. samvṛtijñānam apy anenāpāstam. tathā hi tad ghaṭādibhir vyapadiṣyate, ghaṭājñānam ghaṭājñānam ity evam. na tu tat tebhyo bhavati, teṣāṁ samvṛtisattvenākāraṇatvāt. rūpādibhya eva hi tathāsannivisṭebhyas tad bhavati. anumānajñānam apy anenaiva nirastam. dhūmajñānasambandhasmr̄itibhyām api hi tad bhavati, nāgnita eva.* Cf. Frauwallner 1957: 18 (= 1982: 732).

II-9. The opinion of Dharmapāla's second opponent (II-7) can be compared to that held by Sthiramati (470-550), as it is explained by Kui-ji:

According to [masters] such as Sthiramati, the visual faculty, affected by the *timira*-disorder, sees a second moon. [This means that] sight is that which sees (**paśyaka*). Therefore both the perceiving part (**darśanabhāga*) and the perceived part (**nimittabhāga*) of a visual awareness and other [sensory awarenesses] are mentally constructed (**kalpita*). [Thus, it is not the case that a visual awareness perceives only existent things, it also perceives non-existent things like a double moon.]⁵²

Here it is clear that Kui-ji makes a distinction between Dharmapāla and Sthiramati.⁵³ According to the Chinese Yogācāra tradition starting with Xuan-zang's *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi*, Dharmapāla, as a *sākāravijñānavādin*, holds that mental construction can only be attached to mental awareness, and both the perceiving part and the perceived part of the visual awareness are real. Thus, the visual awareness endowed with the form of an object exclusively perceives existent things. On the other hand Sthiramati, as an extreme *nirākāravijñānavādin*, holds that both the perceiving part and the perceived part of a visual awareness are not real but mentally constructed; thus, the visual awareness can perceive a non-existent thing.⁵⁴

II-10. According to the above materials there were at least three different interpretations concerning the origin of the vision of a double

⁵² Cf. WSESLSJ 983a13f.: 眼有眩翳。見第二月。眼即能見。故眼識等。諸見相分。皆是所執。

⁵³ With regard to the passage quoted above (cf. n. 38) in which Kui-ji explains Dharmapāla's position, Kui-ji says: "Here the interpretation of Dharmapāla and other [masters] is that only the sixth and seventh [types] of awarenesses have conceptual construction [but not the first five types of sensory awarenesses]" (WSESLSJ 983a9f.: 此護法等。說唯六七有執者解。), and with regard to the passage quoted immediately above (cf. n. 52) in which Kui-ji explains Sthiramati's position he states: "As for Sthiramati and other [masters], [they] hold that all eight [types] of awarenesses have conceptual construction" (WSESLSJ 983a12: 若安慧等。說八識中皆有執者。).

⁵⁴ Cf. Frauwallner 1959: 396-407, especially 396; La Vallée Poussin 1928: 8f., 125-135, 416-419. Cf. also Kajiyama's remark: "As is well known, the information given by this Chinese source (i.e., *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi* [J. Chu]) is not always parallel with what we know from Sanskrit and Tibetan sources such as the writings of Sthiramati, and it must be accepted only with reserves [sic]. Nonetheless, the present writer thinks that the controversy ascribed to Dharmapāla and Sthiramati by the Chinese tradition is equivalent in principle to that between *sākāra-* and *nirākāra-vādins*, ..." (Kajiyama 1965 : 423).

moon, etc. (1) The first interpretation is advocated by the *ācāryadeśīyāḥ*. According to him (or them) the cognition of a double moon is a **mental error resulting from conceptual construction**. He maintains that it is conceptual construction (*kalpanā*) that falsely attributes the characteristic of other things to that which is perceived by the visual awareness in the immediately antecedent moment. He makes no difference between an error relating to a sense faculty such as the vision of a double moon, and the mental construction of water in respect to sunrays, etc. (2) The second interpretation is offered by Sthiramati and others, as reported by Kui-ji. Sthiramati indeed regards the vision of a double moon as a **sensory error resulting from a defective sense faculty**. In his opinion it is the visual awareness that perceives a double moon. Dharmakīrti perhaps holds a similar opinion in this connection. We have seen above that in PV 3.288 he maintains that *taimira* denotes a cognition arising from a disturbance in the sense faculties (see I-2), and in PV 3.294 he clearly expresses his rejection of the interpretation that this kind of error is a mental product (see II-3). (3) Dharmapāla suggests a third interpretation. According to this interpretation the cognition of a double moon is a **mental construction resulting from the defect of a sense faculty**. We may describe this interpretation as follows: In the case of a *timira*-impaired visual faculty, the visual awareness, on account of its lack of clarity, does not correctly see the moon, and this causes a mental illusion with the double moon falsely appearing (*pratibhāsa*) in it, like in the case of a man seeing something in dream. Since this mental act of seeing results directly from a defective sense faculty, one wrongly assumes that the visual faculty really does see a double moon. It is a perception with a clear appearance, free from conceptual construction, namely, the association of name, genus, etc.,⁵⁵ but both the perception and the clearly appearing object are not existent, are mentally imagined. The difference between this third interpretation and the first one is that, according to the latter, the vision of a double moon arises in the second moment and is not directly influenced by a defect of the visual faculty, while the former admits the role a defect of the visual faculty plays in generating the vision of a double moon. The difference between the third interpretation and the second one is that the latter does not take into account the role the mental faculty (*manas*) plays in generating the perception of a double moon, and holds that it is a false visual awareness, not a mental awareness, whereas ac-

⁵⁵ Cf. Kui-ji's remark quoted in n. 81.

cording to the former it is impossible that a visual awareness perceives a non-existent thing such as a double moon, such that both the appearance of a double moon and its visual awareness are mentally imagined.

It is true that the third interpretation is not in concordance with the pattern of cognitive occurrence as accepted by the Buddhist epistemological school, namely, that a sensory cognition arises in a first moment and is immediately followed by a mental cognition which is a transformation (*vikāra*) of this antecedent sensory cognition. However, the cognition of a double moon, etc., *per se* is not a normal cognition, or, as Jinendrabuddhi interprets it (vide infra III-1), it is non-cognition or ignorance (*ajñāna*). The inaccuracy of the first interpretation “mental error resulting from conceptual construction”, according to the Dharmapāla-school, derives from the fact that on this interpretation, the vision of a double moon that is not a true cognition is explained according to the pattern of occurrence of a true cognition.⁵⁶

II-11. In my opinion, it is unlikely that Dignāga would have accepted the interpretation that the error of a double moon is a sensory error resulting from a defective sense faculty, as this is not consistent with his fundamental views. He declares that “perception is free from conceptual construction”,⁵⁷ implying that all pseudo-perception is of a mental nature.⁵⁸ It is also unlikely that he would accept the interpretation that this error is merely a mental error resulting from conceptual construction, for he clearly mentions the role the sense faculty plays in producing the cognition of a double moon, etc. (see S1 and S2 in II-2). The interpretation as suggested by Dharmapāla that this error is a mental construction resulting from the defect of a sense faculty seems more convincing to me than the other two. The advantage of this interpretation is that it can avoid the inconsistency between Dignāga’s two groups of statements (S1 + S2 ↔ S3).

Two things remain to be reconsidered in the light of this interpretation. First, the sentence “[the visual faculty and the other (causes)] are the cause of the cognitions with the appearance of a double moon, etc., or

⁵⁶ I use the expression “true cognition” in the epistemological sense, to refer to *pratyakṣa* and *anumāna*, not in the ontological sense as Yogācāra does; cf. III-4.

⁵⁷ PS 3c: *pratyakṣam kalpanāpodham*. Cf. Hattori 1968: 25, 82, n. 1.25.

⁵⁸ This implication is mentioned by Jinendrabuddhi, cf. IV-2 and n. 104. Dignāga’s personal pupil Śaṅkarasvāmin defines pseudo-perception as pure mental cognition, cf. III-7 and n. 86.

of something blue, etc.” in Dignāga’s S2 should mean that a healthy visual faculty, together with an object, causes a true visual cognition, such as the cognition of something blue, but an impaired visual faculty, without an object, causes a mental illusion, such as the vision of a double moon. In the latter case the object is mentally imagined and not existent. This is accepted by all Buddhist schools, on the basis of the scripture that a visual cognition arises dependent on the visual faculty and colour-forms.⁵⁹ Thus, the sense faculty and the object are indispensable conditions for the origination of a cognition. Dignāga also says that the sense faculty is potency (*sakti*) or function in its nature which collaborates with an object in the process of the origination of a sensory cognition,⁶⁰ and that the form of an object (*viśayarūpa*) and the potency of the sense faculty are operating (*pravartete*) with each other as cause (*hetumat*), and this since beginningless time.⁶¹ Since in the case of the erroneous cognition of a double moon, etc., the object does not really exist, this cognition cannot be a sensory cognition, for the object is mentally imagined.

Second, the phrase “because a deviating [cognition] has for object [an object] of mental error” in Dignāga’s S3, according to Jinendrabuddhi, whom we understand now in the light of Dharmapāla’s statements, should be referring to both the mental error resulting from conceptual construction and the mental construction resulting from a defect of a sense faculty. The latter arises due to the defective sense faculty alone without any contact with the object; the object is not existent at all. Since visual awareness cannot perceive a non-existent thing by means of a visual faculty, both the perceiving cognition and the perceived object are not real; they are a mental illusion, and it is the mental awareness that apprehends, or more exactly, imagines a double moon. Thus, Dignāga does not recognize a sensory error resulting purely from a defective sense faculty.

⁵⁹ Cf. AKBh 19-20: *caksur hi pratītya rūpāni cotpadyatē cakṣurvijñānam*. Cf. n. 6 in PrasP 4.

⁶⁰ Cf. ĀP 7c-d = 179,6f.: *lhan cig byed dbaṅ nus pa yi // no bo gañ yin dbaṅ po'añ yin //*; ĀPT 75,2: *lhan cig byed dbaṅ žes bya ba 'di ni yul dañ lhan cig byed pa'i žes bya bar de ltar blta bar bya'o |*.

⁶¹ Cf. ĀP 8b-d = 179,13-15: *de ltar yul gyi no bo dañ // nus pa phan tsun rgyu can dañ // thog ma med dus 'jug pa yin //*.

III. THE NATURE OF THE *TIMIRA*-COGNITION

III-1. After introducing an objection against Dharmakīrti's interpretation of the word *taimira* as a cognition arising from a defect of a sense faculty and *timira* as an indication for all kinds of impairment of a sense faculty (see II-1), Jinendrabuddhi presents his own interpretation:

Therefore, this word for the exception, [namely] “[the cognition] arising from the *timira*-disorder” (*sataimira*) is explained in another way. The word *timira* denotes here “ignorance”, just as in the sentence beginning with [the phrase] “and eliminating the ignorance (*timira*) of the dull-witted”.⁶² *taimira* [refers to] occurrence in ignorance (*timira*).⁶³ Every sentence has a restriction [of its meaning] (*sāvadharana*), because a sentence results in exclusion.⁶⁴ Therefore [the word *taimira*] is a secondary derivative (*taddhita*) [derived from the noun *timira*] with regard to the meaning of the sentence that has a restriction, [namely]: “occurrence only in ignorance”. [Question:] But what is this [which occurs only in ignorance]? [Answer:] It is untrustworthiness.⁶⁵ For if this [untrustworthiness] occurs, it occurs only in ignorance, not in cognition, because it [i.e., cognition] is definitely trustworthy, and this is well known in the world. If [a mental moment] occurs accompanied by this [special] aspect of ignorance, it has a [special] aspect of ignorance (*sataimira*), meaning that it is untrustworthy.⁶⁶

⁶² Quotation from PPU (= AŚŚ) 78c.

⁶³ Cf. Pāṇ 4.3.53: *tatra bhavah*. Cf. also KV 651,1f (*ad loc.*): *sattā bhavaty* (*bhavity?*) *artho grhyate, na janma, tatra jāta iti gatārthatvāt* | “The sense of ‘being’ is understood as ‘existence’ (*sattā*), not as ‘origin’, because the sense ‘originated there’ has [already] been understood [from Pāṇ 4.3.25].” Jinendrabuddhi uses the word *taimira* here in its masculine form, presumably as a substantive; in the following sentence he also uses the masculine pronoun (*kah punar asau*) to refer to this *taimira*. However, *taimira* is used in TSP as an adjective in the same context, as is *bhava* (out of compound!); cf. TSP¹ 394,23 = TSP² 483,12: *timire bhavam taimiram, visamvādakam ity arthah*. Since in PST both *timira* and *taimira* are substantives, one might ask what difference there would be between *timira* and *taimira* in this context. I think that from Jinendrabuddhi's grammatical explanation one may understand as follows: When X' (*taimira*) exists in X (*timira*), this means that X' is included in the extension of X. Thus *taimira* can refer to a kind of ignorance (*timira*) or to that which belongs to ignorance. Jinendrabuddhi equates this *taimira* with untrustworthiness (*visamvāda*).

⁶⁴ Cf. PV 4.192a: *vyavacchedaphalam vākyam*.

⁶⁵ I read here two sentences (*kah punar asau? visamvādah!*); however, this is not supported by the Tibetan translation: *yañ 'di slu ba ci že na* (PST^T 3b1).

⁶⁶ PST 8a3-5: *tasmāt sataimiram ity etad apavādapadam anyathā vyākhyāyatē. timirāśabdo 'yam ihājñānavacano yathā timiraghnam ca mandānām ityādau vākye.*

III-2. As is well known, the original meaning of the word *timira* is “darkness” or “dimness”. In its metaphorical sense it denotes an eye disorder.⁶⁷ *timira* causes a *timirajñāna*, a cognition effected by means of impaired sight, such as the cognition of a hair-mesh or a double moon.⁶⁸ That is to say, *timira* is a disorder of the faculty of sight that produces certain kinds of illusions. However in some philosophical texts the word *timira* is occasionally used to denote an unsound mental state that produces illusion, etc., and often appears compounded with *ajñāna* or *avidyā*.⁶⁹ A study of the usages of this word in different contexts

timire bhavas taimirah. vyavacchedaphalatvād vākyasya, sarvavākyam sāvadhbhāraṇam iti timira eva bhava iti sāvadhbhāraṇe vākyārthe taddhito bhavati. kah punar asau. vi-saṁvādah, sa hi yadi bhavaty ajñāna eva bhavati, na jñāne, tasyaikāntena samvāditvāt. prasiddhataram caital loke. saha tena taimireṇa vartata iti sataimiram, visamvādīti yāvat.

⁶⁷ Cf. the explanation of J. Filliozat, who was both an ophthalmologist and an orientalist, quoted in May 1959: 226, n. 779 and again in Tillemans 1990: 236, n. 156: “*Timira* ne peut se traduire valablement par ‘ophthalmie’. Ce dernier terme désigne des conjonctives qui ne donnent pas les symptômes de *timira*. *Timira* = ‘obscurité’ ou plus généralement ‘trouble visuel’ dû à des opacités et altérations de réfringence à l’intérieur des milieux transparents de l’œil.” Dr. Anne MacDonald has recently identified the *timira* condition as *muscae volitantes*. Cf. her forthcoming critical edition and translation of the first chapter of Candrakīrti’s *Pra-sannapadā*, to be published from Vienna.

⁶⁸ Cf. MA 105a-c': *ji ltar rab rib mthu yis 'ga' žig skra šad zla gñis dañ // rma bya'i mdoñs dañ sbrañ ma la sogz log par 'dzin byed pa //* (quoted in Subhāśita-saṃgraha 18: *kaścid yathaiva vitatham̄ timiraprabhāvāt keśadvicandraśikhicandra-kamakṣikādi / grhyātī ...*; cf. Lévi 1932 : 44, n. 1) “Just as some persons falsely grasp hairs, a double moon, the eye in a peacock’s tail, a fly, etc., in consequence of the *timira*-disorder ...”.

⁶⁹ Cf. TSP¹ 173,9-10 = TSP² 215,23-25: *pracuratarājñānatimirasaṅghātopahata-jñānāloko loka ātmani tattrānyatvā*(TSP¹ 250a6: *yod pa!*)*sattvādivicāram avadhūya* “Ordinary people, whose light of intellect (*jñānāloka*) is impaired by [being in] a very large mass of darkness of ignorance, after rejecting the consideration of being this, being that and being non-existent, etc., with regard to the ‘Self’ ...” (here “light of intellect” is the opposite of “darkness of ignorance”); PrasP 172,14-173,1: *māyāsvapnagandharvanagarādivat tu laukikāḥ padārthāḥ nirupapattikā eva santāḥ sarvalokasyāvidyātimirophatamatinayanasya prasiddhim upagatā iti* “However, worldly objects, which are like an illusion, a dream, a city of Gandharvas, etc., cannot reasonably [be regarded] as existent, [but] they are generally established (*prasiddhi*) for all ordinary people, whose mental eye (*matinayana*, D 59a1: *blo gros kyi mig*) is impaired by the darkness of ignorance.” Cf. also TBh 35,18f: *vijñānam ca māyāgandharvanagarasvapnatimirādāv asaty apy* (? cf. TBh^T 164b4: *dmigs pa med pa la yañ*) *ālambane jāyate*. “And the awareness arises in the case of an illusion, a city of Gandharvas, a dream, and darkness (*timira*) [of the mind, i.e., ignorance], even though an object-support is not present.”

makes it clear that it means “ignorance”. Jinendrabuddhi’s interpretation of the word *timira* as *ajñāna* is thus supported by other texts. His example “and eliminating the ignorance (*timira*) of the dull-witted” seems to be taken from everyday usage. Here the “dull-witted” means those persons with *ajñāna*; *timira* is used to denote their mental state, not their physical state. The link between *timira* in this sense and *ajñāna* is that a *timira*-cognition has no objective substratum (*adhiṣṭhāna*), just as a cognition in a dream has none. Precisely for this reason Jinendrabuddhi regards the *timira*-cognition, such as the vision of a double moon and a hair-mesh, etc., as untrustworthy and the other illusions resulting from the affection of a sense faculty by disease, such as the cognition of a yellow conch in respect to a white conch, as trustworthy, since the latter has a mere conch (regardless of its colour) as its substratum. Mental errors such as the cognition of water in respect to a mirage or of silver in respect to mother-of-pearl have such substrata;⁷⁰ they are not true perceptions simply for the reason that they superimpose another characteristic upon those substrata.⁷¹ It is clear that for thinkers such as Jinendrabuddhi being *jñāna* (not *ajñāna*) or being trustworthy depends upon whether a cognition has an objective substratum, not whether it arises from a healthy sense faculty.

III-3. Interestingly, in the Yogācārabhūmi (YBh) there is a discussion about the erroneous mind (*citta* “awareness”)⁷² and the non-erroneous mind, in which it is said that an “erroneous mind” is the same as “mindless” (or “unawareness”):

Here is the establishment of the erroneous mind and the non-erroneous mind. That which becomes a false mind on the strength of the four kinds of falseness (**caturbhīr viparyāsaḥ*)⁷³ is called “erroneous [mind]”,

⁷⁰ Cf. Schmithausen 1965: 148f.

⁷¹ Cf. the discussion about “Irrtümer ohne Substrat” and “Irrtümer mit Substrat” in Schmithausen 1965: 179.

⁷² In the Yogācāra school, *citta* (mental activity) is a synonym of *vijñāna*, etc. Cf. Vimś 3,3: *cittam mano vijñānam vijñaptiś ceti paryāyāḥ*.

⁷³ The four kinds of falseness are: Regarding the momentary as eternal (*nitya*), regarding the painful as pleasant (*sukha*), regarding the impure as pure (*śuci*), and regarding the selfless as Self. Cf. YBh 162b 5-6: *phyin ci log bži ste | mi rtag pa la rtag go sñam pa'i phyin ci log pa dañ | sdug bsñal ba la bde ba'o sñam pa dañ | mi sdug pa la sdug go sñam pa dañ | bdag med pa la bdag go sñam pa'i phyin ci log go ||*. These four kinds of falseness are also mentioned in AKBh (cf. AKBh ad AK 6.15: *śucisukhanityātmaviparyāsānām caturñām pratipakṣeṇa catvāri smṛtyupapsthānāny uktāni yathākramam nādhikanyānāni*; the Tibetan translation has *gtsaṅ ba* for *śuci*) and are treated in the first four chapters of Āryadeva’s Catuhśataka (*bsTan bcos bži brgya pa*, D 3846).

[and] that which does not become false on the strength of the four kinds of falseness is called “non-erroneous mind”. Among these [two kinds of mind], that which is the erroneous mind is called “mindless” (*acitta*) on account of its being impaired (*bhrastatā*) in the intrinsic nature (*prakṛti*) [of the sense faculty laid down in store-awareness].⁷⁴ So in worldly life, if we see [a man] who is insane and has an erroneous (i.e., confused) mind, we call this man (*puruṣapudgala*) “a mindless man, an insane man, or a man with an erroneous mind”. Therefore, according to [the usage of] these synonyms, that which has an erroneous mind is in the stage (*bhūmi*) of the mindless. What is non-erroneous, that is a [sound] mind.⁷⁵

III-4. If we follow Dharmapāla's interpretation shown above, we shall understand Dignāga as holding that the *timira*-cognition such as the vision of a double moon is a mental illusion conditioned by the defective sense faculty. In reality the man with an eye disorder does not really see the double moon; what is seen is just like phenomena in a dream. Thus, the so-called “seeing of a double moon” is really non-cognition or ignorance (*ajñāna*) in the sense that it cognizes nothing; in other words, it has no objective substratum, just like a dream-cognition. It is not, however, without an objective substratum in the sense that it superimposes another characteristic upon what is perceived by the immediately antecedent sensory awareness, in the sense that conceptual construction is involved in it, or in the sense that it cognizes something in the way that, according to Yogācāra, would make it a false cognition, viz., it cognizes something appearing internally to be existing exter-

⁷⁴ Here *prakṛti* (= *rañ bžin*) should mean *no bo* (**svarūpa*) of the sense faculty, as mentioned in ĀP(V) 7c-d; cf. n. 60.

⁷⁵ YBh 160a7-b3: *de la sems 'khrul pa dañ | ma 'khrul pa rnam par gžag pa ni | phyin ci log bžis sems phyin ci log tu gyur pa gañ yin pa de ni 'khrul pa žes bya'o || phyin ci log bžis phyin ci log tu ma gyur pa gañ yin pa de ni sems ma 'khrul pa žes bya'o || de la sems 'khrul pa gañ yin pa de ni | rañ bžin las ñams pa'i phyir | sems med pa žes bya ste | 'di ltar 'jig rten na smyo žiñ sems 'khrul pa mthoñ na | skyes bu gañ zag 'di ni sems med pa smyo ba sems 'khrugs pa'o žes zer ro || de'i phyir rnam grañ des na sems 'khrul pa gañ yin pa de ni sems med pa'i sa yin la | ma 'khrul pa gañ yin pa de ni sems yod pa yin no ||* (for the Sanskrit text see Schmithausen 1987: I/221,11-18). Outside the Buddhist circle we can also find such a link between the erroneous cognition and ignorance. For example, cf. VS 9,25-27: *indriyadośāt samskārāc cāvidyā. tad duṣṭajñānam. aduṣṭam vidyā.* “Ignorance [arises] from a defect of the sense faculties and from impression. It is a wrong cognition. A correct [cognition] is knowledge.” In the Vaiśeṣika system, *avidyā* includes four kinds of defiled or invalid cognition: doubt, error, uncertainty and dream. Cf. VSV 71,4: *yad etat samśayaviparyayānadhyaivasāyasvapnalakṣaṇam tad duṣṭam apramāṇam iti*, following PDhS 40,7-8.

nally. Thus, to repeat, the difference between this kind of erroneous cognition and erroneous cognition resulting from conceptual construction is that the former has no objective substratum while the latter does have one.

In later texts there is mention of the view that this “non-cognition” is excluded from the category of “cognition”, and thus need not be mentioned again in the list of pseudo-perceptions. For example, Durveka-miśra (c. 970-1030) refers to this view in the context of explaining Dharmottara’s objection to Vinītadeva’s interpretation of the twofold definition of perception, i.e., “free from conceptual construction” and “non-erroneous”, in Dharmakīrti’s Nyāyabindu (NB). He says:

[What you say] is true. Only if the employment/use of the word “non-erroneous” definitely serves the purpose of exclusion, then it is proper that it serves solely the purpose of excluding inference, but does not serve the purpose of rejecting the cognition of a double moon, etc., because the exclusion of the latter is accomplished just on account of the topic [being] correct cognition (*samyagjñāna*).⁷⁶ To wit, if this definition [of perception] is being affirmed after stating “correct cognition is twofold” (NB 1.2), it is affirmed under this very topic [i.e., correct cognition].⁷⁷

III-6. I am not sure whether Dignāga is conscious of this point or not. However, from Kui-ji we know that the Dignāga-school distinguishes the *timira*-cognition from the cognition of water in respect to a mirage. Kui-ji uses the expression 邪智 to characterise the *timira*-cognition, which usually is a translation of the Sanskrit word *mithyājñāna*, as an antonym to (*samyag*-)*jñāna*. In explaining the words corresponding to *yaj jñānam* in the definition of perception in the Chinese translation of the Nyāyapraveśakasūtra (NPS),⁷⁸ he says:

A cognition (*jñāna*) is different from a false cognition (*mithyājñāna*);⁷⁹

⁷⁶ A correct cognition (*samyagjñāna*) is not always a valid cognition (*pramāṇa*). Here the word *samyagjñāna* should mean “a valid cognition”.

⁷⁷ DhPr 45.6-9: *satyam kevalam yady abhrāntagrahanam vyavacchedārtham eva, tadānumānavyavacchedārtham eva yujyate, na tu dvicandrādijñānanirāsārtham, tasya samyagjñānādhikārād eva vyavacchedasiddheh. tathā hi drividham samyagjñānam iti prastutya laksanam idam vidhīyamānam tadadhikārenaiva vihitam bhavati.* The same idea is found in NBTT 19.11-12: *yogācāramatena tv abhrāntagrahanam na kartavyam samvādakasya samyagjñānasya prastutatvāt, anyavyāvart�asyābhāvāt.*

⁷⁸ NPS 7.12-13: *yaj jñānam arthe rūpādau nāmajātyādikalpanārahitam, tad akṣam akṣam pratī vartata iti pratyakṣam.*

⁷⁹ Here it is also possible that with the expression 邪智 the author means *ajñāna* as the antonym of *jñāna*.

[the latter] means the vision of a hair-mesh or a double moon, etc., of a man who suffers from the *timira*-disorder. Though [such cognition] is free from all conceptual construction [i.e., the association] of name, genus, etc. (*nāmajātyādi*[*yojanā*]),⁸⁰ it is not perception.⁸¹

III-7. As stated at the beginning of this paper, Dignāga does not mention erroneous cognition such as the vision of a double moon in his list of pseudo-perceptions in PS(V) 1.7cd-8ab. It is also not mentioned by him in the list of pseudo-perceptions in his earlier work *Nyāyamukha* (NMukh):

Thus, it is said that memory, inference, desire, doubtful cognition,⁸² erroneous cognition, etc., [namely, the cognition of water] in respect to a mirage, etc., are not perception, because they occur as the conceptual construction of what has been experienced formerly (**pūrvānubhūta-kalpanayā*). In the same way all the cognitions of a jar (**ghaṭa*), etc., a number (**saṅkhyā*), etc., [movement such as] lifting (**utkṣepaṇādi*), etc.,⁸³ existence (**sattā*), etc., and jarness (**ghaṭatva*) that belong to the conventionally existent⁸⁴ are pseudo-perceptions, because they occur as conceptual constructions in assuming a different form (**anyarūpa*) [and] superimposing another object [that is not substantially existent] (**arthāntarādhvāropāt*) with regard to something substantially existent (**dravyasat*).⁸⁵

In the same way, Śaṅkaravāmin, a personal pupil of Dignāga's, defines pseudo-perception in his NPS as pure mental cognition:

⁸⁰ Cf. PS(V) 1.3d: *atha keyam kalpanā nāma. nāmajātyādiyojanā* //. Cf. Hattori 1968: 83, n. 1.26.

⁸¹ YMRZLLS 139a16-139a17: 若有正智。簡彼邪智。謂患翳目。見於毛輪第二月等。雖離名種等所有分別。而非現量。

⁸² “Doubtful cognition” (疑智) is not mentioned in the PSV *ad* PS 1.7cd-8ab. According to Kui-jī it should refer to the *samśaya* involved in wondering if the object in front is a tree trunk or a person (see below n. 87). Cf. VSV 19,12 (*ad* VS 2,2,19): *samśayah kim ayam sthānuḥ syāt puruṣo na veti*.

⁸³ Cf. VS 1.1.6.: *utkṣepaṇam avakṣepaṇam ākuñcanam prasāraṇam gamanam iti karmāṇi* |.

⁸⁴ All items listed here are objects exemplifying Vaiśeṣika categories. “Jar, etc.” belong to the category of substance (*dravya*), “number, etc.” are properties (*guṇa*) of substances, “lifting, etc.” (*utkṣepaṇādi*) belong to the category of movement (*karman*), “existence” (*sattā*) and “jarness” belong to the category of universal (*sāmānya*). Cf. Katsura 1982: 91.

⁸⁵ NMukh 8c19-24 (= Katsura 1982: 90): 由此即說憶念比度惱求疑智惑亂智等。於鹿愛等皆非現量。隨先所受分別轉故。如是一切世俗有中瓶等數等舉等有性瓶等智。皆似現量。於實有中作餘行相。假合餘義分別轉故。Cf. PSV *ad* 1.7cd-8ab quoted in n. 2.

The cognition which is the conceptual construction [of an object] in respect to another object [such as of the cognition of water in respect to sunrays] is a pseudo-perception. The cognition that arises for one who conceptually constructs “the jar” or “the cloth” is a pseudo-perception, because it does not take the particular characteristic of the thing as its object [but rather the universal characteristic].⁸⁶

The fact that Dignāga and his pupil do not mention the *timira*-cognition in the list of pseudo-perceptions may support the assumption that in Dignāga’s view such cognition is already excluded from the category of cognition; hence it is not necessary to mention it again in the list of pseudo-perceptions.

III-8. Kui-ji, in explaining the above definition in the NPS in his commentary on Xuan-zang’s translation of the NPS, also merely cites the same passage from the NMukh that we have quoted above. However, he subsequently adds the perception of a double moon, etc., as further examples for “erroneous cognition” when he explains the word “etc.” in the phrase “[cognition of water] in respect to a mirage, etc.”:

“Etc.” means [the doubtful cognition of] someone who takes a tree trunk to be a person, [erroneous cognitions such as] the seeing of a flower in the sky, a hair-mesh, and a double moon on the part of a man who suffers from an eye disorder, [and the conventional cognition] of a jar, a cloth, etc.⁸⁷

According to this interpretation it seems to me that for the Dignāga-school the *timira*-cognition can be included in the category of the first group of pseudo-perceptions in the PS, namely “erroneous cognition” (*bhrāntijñāna*), but that it is not absolutely necessary to mention it in the list. I assume that Dignāga’s main purpose in PS 1.7cd-8ab is to clearly distinguish perception from the conceptual construction in contradistinction to the opponent’s position. He does not mention the *timira*-cognition because it is also accepted by the opponent that a kind of cognition, being understood as ignorance, has no objective substratum (*adhiṣṭhāna*).

III-9. In contrast, mental error resulting from conceptual construction such as the cognition of water in respect to a mirage has something as

⁸⁶ NPS 7,18-20: *kalpanājñānam arthāntare pratyakṣabhāsam. yaj jñānam ghaṭah paṭa iti vā vikalpayataḥ samutpadyate, tad +arthasvalakṣaṇāviṣayatvāt pratyakṣabhāsam.* °*lakṣaṇāviṣayatvāt* should be emended to °*laksanāviṣayatvāt*, which occurs in NPV 36,23 (cf. YMRZLL 12c7-8: 由彼於義不以自相爲境界故 °).

⁸⁷ YMRZLLS 141a2-3: 等彼見杌謂之爲人。病眼空花毛輪二月瓶衣等 .

its objective substratum which is regarded by the opponents as the object-support of its cognition. Thus, Dignāga mentions it in his list of pseudo-perceptions. There was a long-lasting discussion between the Buddhists and the Naiyāyikas in regard to this type of erroneous cognition. Some opponents held that this kind of mental error was accompanied by a true perception which apprehends its object-support. From later materials which relate to the controversy and explicate the Nyāya arguments against the Buddhist position we can extract some information which may help us to better understand Dignāga's view of mental error resulting from conceptual construction and its difference from mental imagination resulting from a defect of a sense faculty.

First, the Naiyāyika opinion is mentioned in Buddhist sources. From Dharmakīrti we know that there were some thinkers who falsely maintained that mental error and cognition of conventionally existing things arise from a sense faculty. According to him, Dignāga mentions these kinds of conceptually constructed cognition in the list of pseudo-perceptions as the first two groups of pseudo-perceptions only in order to prove that these two are not sensory, as opposed to the mistaken assumption that they are, and he mentions inference, etc., only in order to emphasize that the first two groups of pseudo-perception are not sensory.⁸⁸ Jinendrabuddhi explains that the first two groups of conceptual constructions occur immediately after perception.⁸⁹ Thus, someone may think that a man who does not or cannot perceive, since it is difficult to determine, the subtle difference in time between these kinds of conceptual construction and perception, mistakes the former as perception.⁹⁰ He also mentions the opponent's opinion, possibly referring to the doctrine of a certain ācārya⁹¹ who attempts to counter the Buddhist criticism of the qualification "non-deviating" in Nyāyasūtra 1.1.4:

⁸⁸ PV 3.289: *anaksajatvasiddhyartham ukte dve bhrāntidarśanāt / siddhānumādi-vacanām sādhanāyaiva pūrvayayoh //.*

⁸⁹ For this idea cf. PV 3.290cd: *na pratyaksānurvṛttitvāt kadācid bhrāntikāraṇam //*. I follow Tosaki 1979: 386 who reads the underlined part as *pratyakṣāsannavṛttitvāt* (cf. Tib.: *mnon sum ñer 'jug can ñid phyir*). °āsanna° in this reading is also in accordance with the prefix *sam-* in our text (see next note). Manorathanandin para-phrases *pratyaksānurvṛttitvāt* with *pratyaksānantarabhbāvitvena*.

⁹⁰ PST 6b3-4: *te hi pratyaksasya samṛttinā tasmāt sūkṣmam utpādakālavibhāgām duravadhāratrād anupalakṣayataḥ pratyakṣe evaite iti kasyacin matih syāt.* This *mati* is, as far as I can tell, the opinion of a Buddhist interpreter of Dignāga.

⁹¹ Cf. the description of this ācārya in Schmithausen (1965: 182): "einerseits lehrte er die Existenz vorstellender Wahrnehmung, andererseits bestand für ihn der Irrtum darin, dass das als Objekt fungierende Substrat mit einer falschen Be-

We observe a different opinion among certain [teachers]. For example: “Cognition in respect to a jar, etc., that are conventionally existent and the cognition of water, etc., in respect to a mirage, etc., are certainly perception.”⁹² That is to say, only for the purpose of excluding the cognition of water, etc., in respect to a mirage, etc., is the qualification “non-deviating” given in the definition.⁹³

III-10. Secondly, from the Naiyāyika side, we are informed by Jayanta (840-900) that the above-mentioned opinion was held by some Naiyāyikas who propound the doctrine of “perception accompanied by conceptual construction”:⁹⁴

In this case [i.e., in the case of the cognition of water in respect to a mirage], the cognition generated from the first contact of the visual faculty [with the object], though free from conceptual construction, produces a cognition accompanied by the conceptual construction of water while indeed apprehending the water. It is not as the Buddhists say: “A cognition free of conceptual construction having a ray of sunlight as its object [in the first moment] is not a valid cognition for the reason that it produces [a cognition] accompanied by the conceptual construction of water [in the second moment],” because the water appears immediately in front of a man who has [just] opened his eyes in

stimmung belegt wurde.” This *ācārya* is the same as the one mentioned in NM. As shown in Wezler 1975 and already mentioned in Nagin Shah’s introduction to his edition of Cakradhara’s commentary (Shah 1972: 8), according to Cakradhara, the author of the Nyāyamañjarīgranthibhaṅga, this refers to *uddiyotakaravivṛtikṛto rucikāraprabhṛtayah*. The Rucikāra was identified in Steinkellner 1961 with Adhyayana(-pāda). Cf. also Franco 1984: 106.

⁹² The opponent may be a Naiyāyika who propounds the doctrine of perception with conceptual construction (*savikalpakapratyakṣa*). Cf. PVV 205,12f.: *ghaṭo 'yam dvau kampata ityādi, jalām idam iti ca vyavasāyātmakam indriyapratyakṣam eva pratipadyata iti paro manyate* “The opponent maintains that [cognitions] that have the nature of determination in the form ‘this is a jar’, ‘these two’, ‘he trembles’ (examples of cognition of the categories *dravya*, *saṅkhyā* and *karman*), etc., and ‘this is water’ [in respect to a mirage] (i.e., examples of *bhrāntijñāna*) are accepted absolutely as arising from a sense faculty.” For the doctrine of perception with conceptual construction cf. Gupta 1963: 96f., 110ff.; Schmithausen 1963: 106.

⁹³ PST 6b4: *drśyate ca kesāñcid vīpratipattih. yathā ghatādisu jñānam sam-vrtisatsu mṛgatṛṣṇādisu codakādikam jñānam pratyakṣam eveti. tathā hi tasyaiva mṛgatṛṣṇādau toyādijñānasya vyavarachedāyāvyabhicārīti pratyakṣalakṣaṇe viśesayam upāltam.* Prajñākaragupta also mentions the opinion that such a determining cognition is perception. Cf. PVA 333,6: *akṣajam eva tad iti paresām bhrāntir mṛgatṛṣṇi-kājalajñāne.*

⁹⁴ Cf. Gupta 1963: 92f.; Schmithausen 1965: 183.

the first moment and has not yet considered [it] in the stage [still] free of conceptual construction.⁹⁵

In II-8 we have mentioned the Buddhist interpretation of this kind of error. The difference between the Buddhist position and that of the Naiyāyika is that the former regards the cognition of water in respect to a mirage as arising in a series of two moments (*kramena*) whereby perception is distinct from conceptual construction, whereas the latter holds that in the first moment perception is already accompanied by conceptual construction, and thus does not accept the Buddhist theory that perception is free of conceptual construction.

In the following passage Jayanta reports three different interpretations of the object-support of this kind of error. These interpretations are meant to answer the objection that the cognition of water indeed does not arise from the contact of the sense faculty with the object, because it has the appearance of water that is not present, which means that the word “non-deviating” is useless, for it is already excluded through the phrase “arising from the contact of a sense faculty with the object”.⁹⁶ This objection in fact represents Dignāga's opinion (vide supra II-2). The three interpretations of object-support agree on one point: “The object-support of this mental error is existent.” The first states that the object-support is the sunrays which take on the form of water, but their own form is hidden.⁹⁷ The second, in contradistinction, holds that the object-support is water which is presented (*upasthāpita*) in the cognition through a recollection which arises from one having seen a thing similar to that which is now in front of the eyes.⁹⁸ The third maintains that the object-support is not what appears in the cognition. That is to say, the object-support is the sunrays, but water appears.⁹⁹

⁹⁵ NM 225,8-12: *tatra nirikalpakam api prathamayanasaṇnipātajam jñānam udakasavikalpakajñānajanakam udakagrāhy eva. na yathā tathā tathāgatāḥ kathayanti – marīciviśayam avikalpakam jñānam udakavikalpakajanānād apramāṇam iti nirikalpavasthāyām avicārayata eva prathamonnīlitacakṣuṣo jhaṭīti salilapratibhāsāt.*

⁹⁶ NM 226,5-7: *nanu marīciṣu jalajñānam avidyamānasalilāvabhāsitvād anindriyārthaśannikarṣajam. ataś cendriyārthaśannikarṣotpannapadena tadvyudāsasiddheh kim aryabhićāripadena.*

⁹⁷ NM 226,12-13: *kaiścid ālambanam tasminn uktam sūryamarīcayah | nigūhitānijākārāḥ salilakāradhāriṇāḥ //* (cf. Franco 1984: 107).

⁹⁸ NM 227,6-7: *anye tv ālambanam prāhuḥ puro'vasthitadharmaṇāḥ | sādrśyadarśanodbhūtaśmṛtyupasthāpitāḥ payāḥ //* (cf. Franco 1984: 120). According to Schmithausen 1965: 167 this seems to be the doctrine of the ācārya school.

⁹⁹ NM 228,1-2: *anyad ālambanam cānyat pratibhātīti kecana | ālambanam dīdhītayas toyāḥ ca pratibhāsate //* (cf. Franco 1984: 116).

This last interpretation is apparently aimed against Dignāga's above-mentioned position. The conclusion is that the object-support is existent, and therefore in this case it is necessary to have the word “non-deviating” in the definition, because errors that are in concomitance with the presence and absence of the external organ of sense and object cannot be excluded through the phrase “arising from the contact...”.¹⁰⁰

III-11. Thus, in contradistinction to the opponent's interpretation just referred to, Dignāga should maintain that the object-support of this kind of error is not existent, for the sunrays, though existent at this moment, do not appear in the cognition, and water, though appearing in the cognition, does not exist at this moment and is just a mental construct. On the other hand, according to the doctrine of the realist Naiyāyikas, the object-support of the mental error resulting from conceptual construction, alternatively water or sunrays, is existent. This is opposed to Dignāga's theory of a clear-cut distinction between the two kinds of means of valid cognition (*pramāṇavyavasthā*) that he sets out in PS(V) 1.2, i.e., perception and inference, which corresponds to the distinction between the two kinds of objects to be cognized (*prameya*), i.e., the particular (*svalakṣaṇa*) and the universal (*sāmānya*).¹⁰¹ If the opponent's opinion were accepted, then the object of mental error must be a particular and real thing, which would mean that Dignāga's epistemological foundation would be ruined.

Therefore I assume that Dignāga's distinction between the two kinds of means of valid cognition, as well as his mention of mental error resulting from conceptual construction in his list of pseudo-perceptions, represents a reaction to the Naiyāyikas' realistic doctrine that the cognition of water in respect to sunrays may be considered a perception. I realize that most of the materials available to us concerning this problem (for example, the materials I have quoted above) are later than Dignāga, but I think that the long-lasting discussion between the Buddhist epistemological school and the realist school would have been a reciprocal process. The view found in the later material may be an echo of an antecedent one and thus could possibly be that of Dignāga's opponent; thus it may not be unreasonable to say that in Dignāga's time

¹⁰⁰ NM 228,6-7: *tad evaṁ bāhyendriyārthānvayaryatirekānuvidhāyināṁ vibhramā-ṇāṁ indriyārthaśannikarśotpannapadena nirasitum aśakyatvād yuktam aryabhcāri-padopādānam.*

¹⁰¹ Cf. Hattori 1968: 24 and 79f., n. 1.14.

there were some masters in the realist schools such as the Nyāya who held the same or a similar opinion as that described above, although I have not seen any direct textual testimony concerning this.

IV. CONCLUSION

IV-1. Having examined the various individual points we can come back to the question of whether Dharmakīrti's view that there are four kinds of pseudo-perception is faithful to Dignāga's original intention. In this connection Jinendrabuddhi does not speak against Dharmakīrti's interpretation. Upon interpreting the word *sataimira* as “having a [special] aspect of ignorance” in the sense of “being untrustworthy” (cf. III-1) he states:

And since the [cognition] which possesses conceptual construction [and is] untrustworthy [i.e., *sataimira*] is referred to by means of the word “error”, etc., this [cognition] is determined as being free of conceptual construction.¹⁰²

His interpretative re-placement of the word *ca* in PS 1.8a makes his intention clearer:

And the word “as well as” (*ca*) in the [phrase] “as well as recollection [and] desire” (*smārtābhilāṣikam ca*) has the purpose of conjunction and is in a sequence deviating from the norm (*bhinnakrama*); it should be read in the following manner: “as well as [the cognition] having a [special] aspect of ignorance (*sataimiram ca*).” Through this [phrase, namely *sataimiram ca*.] the following meaning is [implied]: “[...] as well as the untrustworthy cognition is a pseudo-perception.”¹⁰³

IV-2. However, in my opinion, Jinendrabuddhi's interpretation is inconsistent. In the PST, at the beginning of the passage concerning pseudo-perception (5b2ff.), an objector states:

And indeed in saying that perception is free from conceptual construction [in PS 1.3c] it is said that conceptual [cognition] is pseudo-perception. And this [conceptual cognition] was already explained previously with [the phrase] “association of name, genus, etc.” (PS 1.3d). There-

¹⁰² PST 8a5-6: *savikalpasya ca visamvādino bhrāntyādiśabdenopādānād idam nirvikalpam avasīyate.*

¹⁰³ PST 8a6: *smārtābhilāṣikam ceti cāyam caśabdah samuccayārtho bhinnakramāś ca sataimiram cety evam draṣṭavyaḥ. tenāyam artho bhavati – visamvādi ca jñānam pratyakṣābhāsam iti.*

fore, of what use is it [here] to mention it [as a separate kind of pseudo-perception] once more?¹⁰⁴

Later, after explaining the three kinds of conceptual cognition that are regarded as the first three kinds of pseudo-perception, Jinendrabuddhi answers:

“Therefore, in this manner [namely, in the manner explained above] only the threefold conceptual cognition [mentioned in PS 1.7cd-8ab] is implicitly excluded by way of the formulation of the definition [sc. PS 1.3c].”¹⁰⁵

This means that only the fourth kind of pseudo-perception, the *timira*-cognition, which he interprets as having a special aspect of ignorance in the sense of being untrustworthy, should be excluded through the enumeration of pseudo-perceptions. On this point Jinendrabuddhi is right. In the strict sense of the word, only the so-called *sataimira*-cognition is *pratyakṣābhāsa*, “the false appearance of perception” – it is free from conceptual construction, namely, of the association of name, genus, etc., on the one hand, and it is in its nature a mental construction on the other. Even so, Dignāga does not mention the *timira*-cognition in the list of pseudo-perceptions. The other three conceptual cognitions do not “appear” as perception, and they are excluded through the definition of perception. Nevertheless, Dignāga mentions them again in the list of pseudo-perceptions. Thus, I think, this treatment represents Dignāga’s reaction to his opponent. This point proves again what I have pointed out above (III-8), namely, that Dignāga’s main purpose in PS(V) 1.7cd-8ab is to clearly distinguish perception from conceptual construction in contradistinction to the opponent’s position. But Jinendrabuddhi’s problem is that this *timira*-cognition is already excluded because the character of “being trustworthy” is accepted by him in accordance with Dharmakīrti as the definition of a valid cognition (*pramāṇa*), so that there is no need to set up an extra type of pseudo-perception for this sort of cognition. Though he has some new ideas which do not agree with Dharmakīrti’s interpretation of the word *sataimira*, he cannot escape the basic pattern fixed by the latter.

IV-3. Before asserting any conclusion, I would like to sum up the points

¹⁰⁴ PST 5b2: *nanu ca pratyakṣam kalpanāpoḍham iti bruvatā savikalpam pratyakṣābhāsam ity uktam bhavati. tac ca prāg evoktam nāmajātyādiyojanena. tat kimarthaṁ punas tasya vacanam.*

¹⁰⁵ PST 6b7: *tad evam trividham eva kalpanājñānam lakṣaṇavacanenārthāpattito nirastam.*

made in the above sections: (1) According to Jinendrabuddhi, *sataimira* in PS 1.7cd-8ab does not denote a sensory error resulting merely from a defective sense faculty. In the light of Dharmapāla's statements we understand that Dignāga regards cognitions such as the perception of a double moon, etc., as being mental constructions resulting from the defect of a sense faculty. In other words, Dignāga holds that owing to the defect of a sense faculty which impairs the clarity of seeing in a mental awareness, it is wrongly assumed that the visual faculty perceives a double moon, but in reality this visual awareness does not take place at all, just as visual awareness does not occur in a dream. (2) According to Jinendrabuddhi, since Dignāga does not accept sensory errors resulting from a defective sense faculty, the word *timira* – from which the secondary derivative *taimira* that he uses in the compound *sataimira* is formed – denotes *ajñāna*, i.e., non-cognition or ignorance; this concords well with the interpretation that the cognition of a double moon, etc., is a mental construction resulting from a sense faculty defect. This cognition takes something non-existent as its object and is thus not a cognition at all. Such non-cognition or ignorance which has no objective substratum is excluded from the category of cognition. This exclusion may well have been accepted by Dignāga. Thus, he does not mention the *timira*-cognition in his list of pseudo-perceptions; he mentions only mental error caused by mental construction such as the cognition of water in respect to sunrays which has an objective substratum, because the opponent holds that this mental error is accompanied by perception, and that its object-support is existent.

IV-4. From these results we can come to the conclusion – on the assumption that Jinendrabuddhi's interpretation of the word *taimira* as having a special aspect of ignorance, without his anachronistic interpretation of “untrustworthiness” and the improbable positioning of the word *ca*, is acceptable¹⁰⁶ – that the word *sataimira* is used as an attribute of the word *pratyakṣabhāsa* and does not denote a separate kind of pseudo-perception. I would translate PS 1.7cd-8ab as follows:

Erroneous cognition, [cognition of] conventionally existing [things],
[and cognitions such as] inference [and] the result [of inference] as well

¹⁰⁶ I do not mean that Jinendrabuddhi's interpretation is more acceptable than the one offered by Dharmakīrti, in other words, that it better represents Dignāga's intention, for, given the present state of research and the available materials, we cannot yet ascertain Dignāga's true intention. I merely wish to present another interpretation which I consider to be equally acceptable.

as recollection [and] desire are pseudo-perceptions, which have the special character of ignorance (*sataimira*).

Here Dignāga intends, according to my understanding, to use the compound *sataimira* to indicate that all three kinds of pseudo-perception lack an object-support (*ālambana*). In other words, they are practically ignorance (*timira*) like a *timira*-cognition or a cognition in a dream, for they lack an object-support, and may even have no objective substratum at all. Although the above three kinds of pseudo-perception have some objective substrata, in Dignāga's view these objective substrata are not the object-supports for their corresponding cognitions. As I have pointed out (III-11), Dignāga's main purpose in this PS(V) passage is to prove that these three kinds of cognition lack an object-support; thus, he aims here to allude to their similarity with the *timira*-cognition which has no objective substratum at all that could be regarded as its object-support. This fits his ĀP 2b statement where he maintains that the cognition of an aggregate of atoms that is not substantially existent, i.e., has no object-support, is like the perception of a double moon.

Abbreviations and Literature

I. PRIMARY LITERATURE

AKBh	Abhidharmakośabhāṣya: <i>Abhidharmakośabhāṣyam</i> of Vasubandhu. Ed. by P. Pradhan. Patna 1975.
ĀP	Ālambanaparīkṣā, in ĀPV.
ĀPT	Ālambanaparīkṣātīkā = dMigs pa brtag pa'i 'grel bṣad: D 4241, 175a3-187b5.
ĀPV	Ālambanaparīkṣāvṛtti, in Frauwallner 1930: 176-179 (D 4206, 86a5-87b2).
AŚŚ	Adhyardhaśataka: <i>Bauddhastotrasaṃgraha</i> , ed. by J. Shastri Pandey. Delhi 1994, p. 21-33.
CWSL	Cheng wei shi lun [成唯識論 = Vijnānamātrasiddhiśāstra]: T 1585 (vol. 31).
D	Derge edition of Tibetan Tripitaka: <i>sDe dge Tibetan Tripitaka, bstan 'gyur – Preserved at the Faculty of Letters, University of Tokyo</i> . Tokyo 1981.
DCGBLSL	Da cheng guang bai lun shi lun [大乘廣百論釋論 = Catuhśatakaṭīkā]: T 1571 (vol. 30).
DhPr	Dharmottarapradīpa: <i>Pañdita Durveka Miśra's Dharmottarapradīpa</i> . [Being a sub-commentary on Dharmottara's

	Nyāyabindutīkā, a commentary on Dharmakīrti's Nyāyabindu]. Ed. by D. Malvania. Patna 1971.
FBXL	Fan bian xin lun [方便心論]: T 1632 (vol. 32).
GSYLS	Guansuo yuan lun shi [觀所緣論釋 = Ālambanaparikṣāṭīkā]: T 1625 (vol. 31).
KV	Kāśikāvṛtti : <i>Nyāsa or Pañcikā Commentary of Ācārya Jinendrabuddhipāda and Padamañjarī of Haradatta Miśra on the Kāśikāvṛtti. [Commentary on the Aṣṭādhyāyī] of Pāṇini of Vāmana-Jayāditya.</i> Critically ed. by S.D.D. Śāstri and P.K.P. Shukla. Varanasi 1983.
MA	Madhyamakāvatāra: <i>Madhyamakāvatāra par Candrakīrti, Traduction tibétaine.</i> Publ. par L. de La Vallée Poussin. St. Pétersbourg 1907-1912.
NB	Nyāyabindu: see DhPr.
NBTT	Nyāyabindutīkātippaṇī: <i>Tolkovanie na sočinenie Darmotary Nyāyabindutīkā. Sanskrtskij tekst' s' priměčanijami.</i> Ed. F.I. Ščerbatskoj. St. Pétersbourg 1909.
NM	Nyāyamañjarī 1: <i>Nyāyamañjarī of Jayantabhaṭṭa with Tippaṇī – Nyāyasaurabha by the Editor.</i> Critically ed. by K.S. Varadacharya. Vol. I. Mysore 1969.
NMukh	Nyāyamukha (= YMZML)
NPS	Nyāyapravēśakasūtra: <i>Nyāyapravēśa of Diṅnāga with Commentaries of Haribhadra Sūri & Parsvadeva.</i> Ed. by A.B. Dhruva. Delhi 1930.
NPV	Nyāyapravēśavṛtti: see NPS.
Pāṇ	Pāṇini: see Böhtlingk 1887.
PDhS	Padārthadharmasaṅgraha: <i>Word Index to the Praśastapāda-bhāṣya.</i> Ed. by J. Bronkhorst – Y. Ramseier. Delhi 1994.
PPU	Prasādapratiṣṭhodbhava: D.R. Shackleton Bailey (ed.), <i>The Śatapañcasatka of Mātṛceta.</i> Sanskrit Text, Tibetan Translation and Commentary and Chinese Translation. With an Introduction, English Translation and Notes. Cambridge 1951.
PrasP	Prasannapadā: <i>Mūlamadhyamakārikās de Nāgārjuna avec la Prasannapadā Commentaire de Candrakīrti.</i> Publ. par L. de La Vallée Poussin. St. Pétersbourg 1903-1913.
PrasPT	Tibetan translation of PrasP = dBu ma rtsa ba 'I 'grel pa tshig gsal ba: D 3860,1b-200a.
PS 1	Pramāṇasamuuccaya 1, in PSV.
PST	Pramāṇasamuuccayaṭīkā, first chapter, critically edited by E. Steinkellner <i>et al.</i> (forthcoming).

PST ^T	Tibetan translation of of PST = Tshad ma kun las btus pa'i 'grel bśad: D 4268, 1b1-314a7.
PSV 1	Pramānasamuccayavṛtti 1: The Pramāṇasamuccayavṛtti Pratyakṣapariccheda, in Hattori 1968: 174-237.
PV	Pramāṇavārttika: see PVV.
PVA	Pramāṇavārttikālāṅkāra: <i>Pramāṇavārttikabhāṣyam</i> or <i>Vārtikālāṅkārah</i> of Prajñākaragupta (Being a Commentary on Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇavārttikam). Deciphered and ed. by R. Sāṅkrityāyaṇa. Patna 1953.
PVin 1	Pramāṇaviniścaya 1: T. Vetter, <i>Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇaviniścayah</i> , 1. Kapitel: Pratyakṣam. Einleitung, Text der tibetischen Übersetzung. Sanskritfragmente, deutsche Übersetzung. Wien 1965.
PVSV	Pramāṇavārttikasvavṛtti: <i>The Pramāṇavārttikam of Dharmakīrti</i> . The First Chapter with the Autocommentary. Ed. by R. Gnoli. Roma 1960.
PVV	Pramāṇavārttikavṛtti: <i>Dharmakīrti's Pramāṇavārttika with a commentary by Manorathanandin</i> . Ed. by R. Sāṅkrityāyaṇa. Patna 1938-1940.
T	Taishō Shinshū Daizōkyō
TBh	Trimśikāvijñaptibhāṣya: <i>Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi</i> , deux traits de Vasubandhu. Vimśatikā (la vingtaine) accompagnée d'une explication en prose et Trimśikā (la trentaine) avec le commentaire de Śthiramati, original sanskrit publié pour la première fois d'après des manuscrits rapportés du Népal. 1 ^{re} Partie: <i>Texte</i> . Ed. par S. Lévi. Paris 1925.
TBh ^T	Tibetan translation of TBh = Sum cu pa'i 'grel bśad: D 4064, 146b2-171b6.
TPN	[*Nyāyabinduṭīkā]ṭippanaka Tātparyanibandhana, sub-commentary on Nyāyabinduṭīkā, quoted as endnotes to DhPr.
TSP ^I	Tattvasaṅgrahapañjikā: <i>Tattvasaṅgraha</i> of Śāntarakṣita with the Commentary of Kamalashīla. Ed. by E. Krishnamacharya. 2 Vol. Baroda 1984.
TSP ²	Tattvasaṅgrahapañjikā: <i>Tattvasaṅgraha</i> of Ācārya Shāntarakṣita with the Commentary 'Pañjikā' of Shri Kamalashīla. Ed. by S. D. Shastri. 2 Vol. Varanasi 1981.
TSPT	Tibetan translation of TSP = De kho na ūnid bsdsus pa'i dka' 'grel: D 4267, vol. Ze, 133b1-363a7 and vol. 'E, 1b1-331a7.
Vimś	Vimśatikā: Vimśatikā Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi, see TBh.
Vimś ^T	Tibetan translation of Vimś = Ni śu pa'i 'grel pa: D 4057, 4a3-10a2.

VS	Vaiśeṣikasūtra: <i>Vaiśeṣikasūtra of Kanāda with the Commentary of Candrānanda</i> . Ed. by Muni Śri Jambuvijayaji. [Gaekwad's Oriental Series 136]. Baroda 1961.
VSV	Vaiśeṣikavṛtti: see VS.
WSESL	Wei shi er-shi lun [唯識二十論 = Vimśatikā Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi]: T 1590 (vol. 31).
WSESLSJ	Wei shi er-shi lun shu ji [唯識二十論述記]: T 1834 (vol. 43).
YBh	Yogācārabhūmi = rNal 'byor spyod pa'i sa: D 4035, 1b1-283a7.
YMRZLLS	Yin-ming ru zheng li lun shu [因明入正理論疏]: T 1840 (vol. 44).
YMZLML	Yin-ming zheng li men lun [因明正理門論 = NMukh]: T 1629 (vol. 32); see Katsura 1982.

II. SECONDARY LITERATURE

Böhtingk 1887	O. Böhtingk, <i>Pāṇini's Grammatik</i> . Herausgegeben, übersetzt, erläutert und mit verschiedenen Indices versehen. Leipzig 1887.
Franco 1984	E. Franco, Studies in the Tattvopaplavasimha II. The Theory of Error. <i>JIP</i> 12 (1984) 105-137.
Franco 1986	E. Franco, Once again on Dharmakīrti's Deviation from Dignāga on <i>Pratyakṣabhāsa</i> . <i>JIP</i> 14 (1986) 79-97.
Frauwällner 1930	E. Frauwällner, Dignāgas Ālambanaparīkṣā. Text, Übersetzung und Erläuterungen. <i>WZKM</i> 37 (1930) 174-194 (= <i>Kleine Schriften</i> . Wiesbaden 1982, p. 340-360).
Frauwällner 1957	E. Frauwällner, Vasubandhu's Vādavidhiḥ. <i>WZKSO</i> 1 (1957) 2-44 (= <i>Kleine Schriften</i> . Wiesbaden 1982, p. 716-758).
Frauwällner 1959	E. Frauwällner, <i>Die Philosophie des Buddhismus</i> . Berlin 1959.
Funayama 1999	T. Funayama, Kamalaśīla's Interpretation of "Non-Erroneous" in the Definition of Direct Perception and Related Problems. In: <i>Dharmakīrti's Thought and Its Impact on Indian and Tibetan Philosophy</i> . Proceedings of the Third International Dharmakīrti Conference, Hiroshima, November 4-6, 1997, ed. by S. Katsura. Wien 1999, p. 73-99.
Gupta 1963	B. Gupta, <i>Die Wahrnehmungslehre in der Nyāyamañjari</i> . Walldorf-Hessen 1963.
Hattori 1965	M. Hattori, Pratyakṣabhāsa, Dignāga's View and Dhar-

- makīrti's Interpretation. *Miscellanea Indologica Kiotiensia* [『インド学論集』] 6-7 (1965) 122-128.
- Hattori 1968 M. Hattori, *Dignāga, On Perception*, being the Pratyakṣapariccheda of Dignāga's *Pramāṇasamuccaya*. Cambridge, Mass. 1968.
- Kajiyama 1965 Y. Kajiyama, Controversy between the sākāra- and nirākāravādins of the yogācāra school – some materials. *JIBS* 14, 1 (1965) 418-429. (= *Studies in Buddhist Philosophy [Selected Papers]*, ed. by K. Mimaki et al. Kyoto 1989, 389-400).
- Katsura 1982 S. Katsura (桂紹隆), Inmyō shōri monron kenkyū (7) [『因明正理門論研究』(五)]. *Hiroshima Daigaku Bungakubu Kiyō* [『広島大学文学部紀要』第42卷] 42 (1982) 84-100.
- Krasser 1991 H. Krasser, *Dharmottaras kurze Untersuchung der Gültigkeit einer Erkenntnis, Laghuprāmāṇyaparīksā*. Teil 2: Übersetzung. Wien 1991.
- La Vallée Poussin 1928 L. de La Vallée Poussin, *La Siddhi de Hiuan-Tsang. Traduite et annotée*. Tome I-II. Paris 1928.
- Lévi 1932 S. Lévi, *Matériaux pour l'étude du système Vijñaptimātra*. Paris 1932.
- May 1959 J. May, *Candrakīrti Prasannapadā Madhyamakavṛtti*. Paris 1959.
- Schmithausen 1963 Lambert Schmithausen, Vorstellungsfreie und vorstellende Wahrnehmung bei Śālikanātha. *WZKSO* 7 (1963) 104-115.
- Schmithausen 1965 Id., *Maṇḍanamiśra's Vibhramavivekah, mit einer Studie zur Entwicklung der indischen Irrtumslehre*. Wien 1965.
- Schmithausen 1987 Id., *Ālayavijñāna. On the Origin and Early Development of a Central Concept of Yogācāra Philosophy*. Pt. I-II. Tokyo 1987.
- Shah 1972 Nagin J. Shah (ed.), *Cakradhara's Nyāyamañjarīgranthi-bhaṅga*. Ahmedabad 1972.
- Steinkellner 1961 E. Steinkellner, Die Literatur des älteren Nyāya. *WZKSO* 5 (1961) 149-162.
- Tillemans 1990 T.J.F. Tillemans, *Materials for the Study of Āryadeva, Dharmapāla and Candrakīrti*. The Catuhśataka of Āryadeva, Chapters XII and XIII, with the Commentaries of Dharmapāla and Candrakīrti: Introduction, Translation, Sanskrit, Tibetan and Chinese Texts, Notes. Vol. I. Wien 1990.
- Tosaki 1979 H. Tosaki (戸崎宏正), *Bukkyō ninshikiron no kenkyū Hossō cho "Pramāṇavārttika" no genryō ron - jōkan-gekan*.

[仏教認識論の研究 - 法称著『ブアマーナ・ヴァールティカ』の現量論 - 上、下巻]. Tōkyō 1979.

Wayman 1978

A. Wayman, A Reconsideration of Dharmakīrti's "Deviation" from Dignāga on Pratyakṣābhāsa. In: *Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute. Diamond Jubilee Volume*. Poona 1978, p. 387-396.

Wezler 1975

A. Wezler, Zur Identität der 'ācāryyāḥ' und 'vyākhyātārah'. *WZKS* 19 (1975) 135-146.

