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Is the Buddha Like “a Man in the Street”? Dharmakīrti’s Answer*

One of the tasks undertaken by Dharmakīrti (ca. 600-660 C.E.), exponent of the logico-epistemological school, is the proof of the Buddha’s reliability as a spiritual guide. In this connection, the nature of the Buddha’s compassion and omniscience plays a fundamental role and is a recurrent topic. Scholarly attention has recently focused on the issue; Pramāṇavārttika (PV) I.12 and Dharmakīrti’s commentary thereon, in particular, have been analyzed more than once, together with related texts of the brahmanical tradition as well as of other Buddhist schools.¹ No investigations have been made, however, with regard to the context of the passage in Dharmakīrti’s work itself.

A number of thematically connected passages in Dharmakīrti’s works on the distinct issues of the Buddha’s compassion and omniscience form a network that presents compassion and omniscience as complementary mental qualities. These linked discussions concern, on the one hand, the nature of the Buddha’s mental qualities and, on the other hand, the function and utilization of specific logical tools. They also contribute to the understanding of an essential epistemological issue in Dharmakīrti’s

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¹ With regard to compassion, Dunne (1996) and Franco (2004) consider the Buddha as having been possessed of desire insofar as he was compassionate. Taber (*forthc.*) thoroughly discusses their articles with respect to compassion and explains the passage at issue. He shows how Dunne’s and Franco’s interpretation would make Dharmakīrti’s argument defeat its purpose, “namely, to cite the Buddha as a counterexample to the generalization that no one ever speaks without desire” (Taber *forthc.*). Eltschinger (*forthc.*) and Iwata (*forthc.*) also deal with compassion, while Kataoka (2003) treats omniscience; in the context of their respective topics, they show that the Buddha’s mental qualities are different from those of ordinary people. Dunne 1996 also has a paragraph on “Dharmakīrti on Conceptuality”.

system: the import of non-observation in an inferential process of knowledge. Whether the doctrinal matter of the nature of the Buddha's mental qualities revealed the epistemological issue or an epistemological issue was used for doctrinal purposes remains to be seen.

THE ARGUMENT FROM SPEAKING

PV I.12 and its Svavṛtti (PVSV) are tied to other passages in Dharmakīrti's works through containing the reply to a specific objection set forth in particular by the brahmanical orthodoxy, i.e., by the Mīmāṃsakas,² which in short can be referred to as the "argument from speaking".

In this objection, the opponent points out that the Buddha's external manners were like those of ordinary people because he spoke, moved, and so forth. He is in fact considered by Buddhists as a mediator of the *dharma*, a spiritual friend (*kalyāṇamitra*),³ who teaches the path to liberation as a friend might, in a way that best accords with the disciple's disposition, and who teaches nothing other than what he himself has already experienced. It is undeniable that a literal interpretation of

² Cf. the commentaries which explicitly refer to the identity of the opponent; on PV I.12, see Pramāṇavārttika(śva)vṛttiṭīkā (PVVT) 50,18, where Kaṛṇakagomin mentions the *mīmāṃsakādayaḥ* in the commentary on the previous *kārikā* when he introduces the issue of also inferring an effect from an incomplete complex of causes. See also, on PV II.29, Pramāṇavārttikavṛtti (PVV) 20,4 (*jaiminiyāḥ*), and, on PV II.142, Pramāṇavārttikapañjikā (PVP) 67b5 (*rgyal dpog pa la sogs pa*) and PVV 60,18 (*jaiminiyāḥ*). The "et cetera" in the identification of the opponent most probably includes at least the Jainas (see Jaini 1974 and Balcerowicz 1999), who are also a common target of the Mīmāṃsakas, but here are put with them. Jñānaśrībhadrā's commentary (PVinṬ-Jñ 271a1ff.) on Pramāṇaviniścaya (PVin_{skt}) II 98,1-99,5 (~ PVin_{tib} II 44,18-45,25) indicates that Dharmakīrti's words there are a reply to the Mīmāṃsakas' argument against omniscience. Because this portion of the PVin is partly a quotation from a passage of the PVSV (see Steinkellner's edition of the PVin and *infra*, n. 57), in which the argument from speaking is under discussion, Jñānaśrībhadrā's statement refers to that argument. Furthermore, in Ratnakīrti's Sarvajñasiddhi (SS) a number of verses quoted from works by Kumāriḥ refer to the argument from speaking (the sources of the quotations are indicated in Bühnemann 1980). Another clear reference to the Mīmāṃsakas is found in Bhāvaviveka's Madhyamakahrdayakārikā, quoted in Silk 2002: 124.

³ On the *kalyāṇamitra* see, for example, Boyd 1972 and Sferra 2004. In Pāli texts, *kalyāṇamitta*, as a *karmadhāraya* compound, signifies a person who possesses the qualification that makes a master a spiritual master, and a friend a spiritual friend, thus indicating the mediatory role of someone in the realization of the *dharma*. It is also used in the technical meaning of "provider of a subject of meditation". In Mahāyāna works, the rarity of a *kalyāṇamitra* is emphasized, as well as the fact that his presence is "indispensable for attaining the *bodhicitta* and progressing further along the path" (Sferra 2004: 362).

some passages in ancient Indian sources, such as early Buddhist formulations of *pratītyasamutpāda*, the Nyāyasūtra and the Carakasamhitā, suggests a *necessary* connection of any action with desire, aversion, etc., and false knowledge.⁴ According to the opponent, the actions of the Buddha, and the act of speaking in particular, by way of which he taught the *dharma*, show that his mind was caught up in ordinary emotional and intellectual processes inasmuch as it was possessed of passions and conceptual representations. This common-sense observation entails that the Buddha cannot be considered as an authoritative source of *dharma*, in contrast to the Vedas which are traditionally claimed not to have had a human author who would be fallible by nature.

Dharmakīrti’s reply to this argument from speaking is based on the fact that mental phenomena, among which compassion and knowledge are particularly relevant, may not always be produced as they are in ordinary experience, yet, may nevertheless be associated with “ordinary” acts.

COMPASSION

The nature of the Buddha’s compassion is addressed in the reply to the argument from speaking introduced in PV I.12,⁵ a verse appearing in the discussion of the non-validity of an inference from effect to cause when the logical reason (*hetu*) is not observed in the dissimilar instances:

vipakṣe ’dṛṣṭimātreṇa kāryasāmānyadarśanāt |
hetujñānam pramāṇābham vacanād rāgitādivat ||

⁴ See Nyāyasūtra (NS) I.1.2: *duḥkhajanmapravṛttidoṣamīthyājñānānām uttarottarāpāye tadanantarāpāyād apavargaḥ* “When each preceding [factor in the series] of suffering, birth, activity, faults (i.e., attachment, aversion, etc.) and false cognition is annihilated, as a result of the annihilation of each subsequent one, liberation [is attained].” Carakasamhitā (CarS) Śārīrasthāna I.53cd: *puruṣo rāśisamjñas tu mohicchādvēzakarmajaḥ ||* “But the *puruṣa*, who is designated as the combination [of the twenty-four elements], is born out of an action deriving from desire and aversion due to delusion.” This statement can be considered to belong to a more complex context in which activity has passions as its immediately preceding cause, but false knowledge as its ultimate cause. On the similarities between the ideas expressed in NS I.1.2 and in the common formulation of *pratītyasamutpāda*, see Strauss 1930 and Biardeau 1964: 103.

⁵ In analyzing Tattvasaṅgraha (TS) 3156-3157 and the Pañjikā (TSP) thereon, Kataoka (2003: 60f.) suggests that Dharmakīrti’s commentary *ad* PV I.12 addresses Śloka-vārttika (ŚV) Codanā 137, while Taber (forthc., n. 22) states that TS 3156 may be taken from Kumārila’s Bṛhatṭikā, which is very similar to ŚV Codanā 132. It would seem to me that Ratnakīrti’s exposition in SS 23,19f. (see Bühnemann 1980: 142, n. 512) supports this latter hypothesis: the *kārikā* corresponding to TS 3156 is quoted as belonging to the Bṛhatṭikā and is followed by the quotation of ŚV Codanā 132.

[Inferential] cognition of a cause due to the observation of a common effect, through mere non-observation [of the *hetu*] in a dissimilar instance, has [only] the appearance of a valid cognition, like [the inference of] the fact that one has desire, etc., due to speaking.⁶

The absence of desire, aversion, etc., cannot be assumed to appear only in concomitance with the absence of the logical reason “speaking”, that is, it cannot be proven from the mere non-observation of the act of speaking. Therefore, there is no mutual exclusion between “speaking” and “*not* having desire and so forth”. In fact, the inference of the fact that *vītarāgas* like the Buddha have passions⁷ due to their speaking is wrong, because even though they perform acts of speaking, they do not have passions.

Dharmakīrti’s commentary relevant for this point is found at PVSV 9,3-18:⁸

*na hi rāgādīnām eva kāryaṃ spandanavacanādayaḥ | vaktukāmatāsā-
mānyahetuvāt | saiva rāga iti cet | iṣṭavān na kiṃcid bādhitam syāt |
nityasukhātmātmyadarśanāksiptaṃ sāsraavadharmaviśayaṃ cetaso 'bhi-
ṣvaṅgaṃ rāgaṃ āhuḥ | naivaṃ karuṇādayo 'nyathāpi sambhavād iti nive-
dayiṣyāmaḥ | atra yathā rakto bravīti tathā virakto 'pīti vacanamātrād
apratipattiḥ | nāpi viśeṣāt | abhīprāyasya durbodhatvāt | vyavahārasaṃ-
kareṇa sarveṣāṃ vyabhicārāt | prayojanābhāvād avyāhāra iti cet | na pa-
rārthatvāt | na yukto vītarāgatvād iti cet | na karuṇayāpi vṛtतेḥ | saiva rāga
iti cet | iṣṭam | aviparyāsasamudbhavān na doṣaḥ | asaty apy ātmagrahe
duḥkhaviśeṣadarśanamātreṇābhyāsabalotpādīnī bhavaty eva karuṇā | tathā
hi | sattvadharmādylambanā maitryādaya iṣyante | etāś ca sajātīyābhyā-
savṛttayo na rāgapekṣiṇyaḥ | naivaṃ rāgādayo viparyāsābhāve 'bhāvāt |
kāruṇikasyāpi niṣphala ārambho 'viparyāsād iti cet | na | parārthasyaiva
phalaveneṣṭatvāt | icchālakṣaṇatvāt phalasya |*

⁶ The present translation of the *kārikā* follows that given by Taber (forthc.). See also Mookerjee – Nagasaki 1964: 39, Dunne 1996: 535, and Kataoka 2003: 60, n. 35.

⁷ Following Taber’s observation (forthc.) regarding the word *rāga*, which can convey both a weak intensity and a stronger one, two different terms, namely, “desire” and “attachment”, will be used throughout this paper (whereas Taber uses “desire” and “passion”). However, the word *rāga* will be rendered by “passion” when it stands for the cluster *rāgadveśādi* or is contained in the expressions *vairāgya* and *vītarāga*. Although “passion” connotes a particular intensity that is not necessarily entailed by the term *rāgadveśādi*, it nevertheless indicates the plurality and diversity of emotions and an excess of feeling, and is thus apt to refer to the restless state of mind brought about by different emotions.

⁸ For a translation, see Mookerjee – Nagasaki 1964: 39-43 and Taber forthc., Appendix; for partial translations, see Dunne 1996: 536-539, Eltschinger forthc., n. 60 and 17, and Iwata forthc. For an analysis of the text, cf. the Appendix.

Here, Dharmakīrti provisionally accepts the extension of the semantical field of the word *rāga* which is given by the opponent; immediately afterwards he shows that the adduced reason is not necessarily related to the inferendum. The final effect is that the citing of speaking as an example is devoid of meaning.⁹

The discussion, which has two main stages with a parallel development, can be summarized as follows:

Stage I (PVSV 9,3-11): The speaking of a *vītarāga* arises from the wish to speak (*vaktukāmatā*). It might be argued that precisely this wish is *rāga*. However, if the word *rāga* is used in connection with the wish to speak, it cannot be assumed that *rāga* is a state of intense attachment (*abhiṣvaṅga*), because this is the case only when *rāga* is produced by misjudgements (*viparyāsas*), that is, by imagining the impermanent to be permanent, the unpleasant to be pleasant and what is not the self and what does not belong to the self to be the self and belong to it.¹⁰ The wish to speak may also arise from compassion, which is not necessarily produced by misjudgements. Indeed, as a mental quality, it can propel an action like speaking, which involves the benefit of others.

Stage II (PVSV 9,11-18): It might be argued that it is precisely compassion which is *rāga*. However, the compassion of a *vītarāga* is not a kind of *rāga* because it does not arise from misjudgements. A mind that has achieved the vision of Selflessness will be intent upon performing actions that are different from those we normally perform and experience. As a consequence, these actions will also have different results: they will not repeatedly nourish one’s defilements (*kleśas*), as happens when an action is performed by a person with a misjudging mind, but will be for the benefit of others.

In both stages of the discussion, Dharmakīrti states that (a) the emotional activity indicated by the opponent as *rāga* has to be distinguished by the type of mind producing it. The procedure by which an action is performed in our ordinary experience should not be assumed as the only possible one. Such an assumption would imply the denial of the possibil-

⁹ See PVSV 10,11f., at the end of the commentary on PV I.12: ... *tadāpy apārthako vacanodāhārah | tasmād vipakṣe ’dṛṣṭir ahetuḥ |*. Dharmakīrti here utilizes the adjective *apārthaka* to express the fact that logical coherence is lacking in the opponent’s argument. The word *apārthaka* reminds one of the technical term used in scholastic terminology by which a lack of coherence in the sentences of an utterance is indicated (see *Terminologie* I/74 s.v. *apārthakam*, and, for Dharmakīrti’s usage, *Vādanyāya* 43,11-44,7).

¹⁰ On the *viparyāsas*, see Conze 1962: 39-46 and 204-211, and Schmithausen 1987: II/449, n. 963 and II/542, n. 1445. Cf. also Ahn 2003: 188-193, n. 88-90.

ity of changing the conditions in which actions are performed and events take place; this denial would amount to a denial of the possibility to strive for liberation from suffering.

Furthermore, in both stages of the discussion Dharmakīrti explains that (b) it is not only emotional activity in its ordinary sense that gives rise to actions. An action can be recognized as such through the aim (*prayojana*) (1.b) impelling its performance and through the effect (*phala*) (2.b) that results from its performance. The Buddha can definitely be said to have performed efficacious actions in teaching the *dharmā*, motivated as he was by the intent (*icchā*) to achieve the benefit of others on account of compassion (*karuṇā*). Still, he had no desire as far as the common sense of the word is concerned, because as long as a superimposition of something unreal does not occur, he is free from any fault, and superimposition is the only acceptable reason for the possession of faults.

Stage	Opponent	Dharmakīrti
1.a	<i>vaktukāmatā: saiva rāgaḥ</i>	<i>vaktukāmatā < aviparyāsa -></i> \neg <i>rāga</i>
1.b	\neg <i>rāga</i> \supset \neg <i>prayojana</i>	\neg (\neg <i>rāga</i> \supset \neg <i>prayojana</i>) <i>prayojana = parārtha</i> <i>prayojana < karuṇā</i>
2.a	<i>karuṇā: saiva rāgaḥ</i>	<i>karuṇā < aviparyāsa -></i> \neg <i>rāga</i>
2.b	\neg <i>rāga</i> \supset \neg <i>phala</i>	\neg (\neg <i>rāga</i> \supset \neg <i>phala</i>) <i>phala = parārtha</i> <i>phala < icchā</i>

Table 1¹¹

DIFFERENT KINDS OF COMPASSION

In the second stage of the discussion, Dharmakīrti provides a short explanation of the different ways in which compassion arises (PVSV 9.12-16):

Even when there is no clinging to a Self, compassion is indeed being produced owing to the strength of habitual practice, through nothing more than the observation of a specific [instance of] suffering. To explain: friendliness, etc., are accepted as having living beings, elements of existence, etc., as their basis. And, proceeding by habitual practice of the same kind, they are not dependent on desire.

¹¹ The symbols used in this table are: “<” for “deriving from”, “->” for “consequence”, “=” for “consists in”, “ \neg ” for “negation of” and “ \supset ” for “if, then”.

Śākyabuddhi’s commentary, which is quoted almost verbatim by Karṇakagomin,¹² explicates the different agents and objects of compassion. Friendliness, compassion, sympathetic joy and equanimity, i.e., the four *apramāṇas*, are asserted to be based, for ordinary people, on seeing living beings (*sattvāḷambana*), for Noble Ones, on seeing elements of existence (*dharmāḷambana*), and for Buddhas and Bodhisattvas who do not adhere to the false subject–object dichotomy, to be without an object (*anāḷambana*).¹³

These distinctions are found in some Mahāyāna works, *inter alia* the Bodhisattvabhūmi (BoBh).¹⁴ A Bodhisattva is said to cultivate the four

¹² For the very close dependence of Karṇakagomin’s commentary on that of Śākyabuddhi, see Steinkellner 1979a.

¹³ Pramānavārttikaṭīkā (PVT) 24b5-7: ‘*dī ltar zēs bya ba la sogs pa smos so || byams pa la sogs pa ni byams pa dañ sñiñ rje dañ dga’ ba la sogs pa’o || sems can la dmigs pa ni so so’i skye bo rnams kyi’o || chos la dmigs pa ni ’phags pa rnams kyi’o || sogs pa zēs bya ba’i sgras ni dmigs pa med pa dag bsdū stē | dmigs pa med pa ni sañs rgyas dañ byañ chub sems dpa’ gzuñ ba dañ ’dzin pa mion pār zen pa dañ bral ba rnams kyi yin no || ’dod pa ni grub pa’i mtha’ las so ||*. PVT 53,8-11: *tathā hityādi ādisābdād anāḷambanā gṛhyante | sattvāḷambanāḥ pṛthagjanānām | dharmāḷambanā āryānām | anāḷambanā grāhyagrāhākābhiniveśavīgatānām buddhabodhisattvānām | maitrīyādayo maitrīkaruṇāmuditopekṣā iṣyante siddhānte* |. (Boldface type marks quotations from the basic text, while underlining indicates the differences between Śākyabuddhi’s and Karṇakagomin’s text.) Śākyabuddhi offers an analysis of the compound (*bsdū sattvadharmādi*- according to the sequence of its members, whereas in Karṇakagomin’s text the last member is commented upon first. It cannot be excluded that this sentence has been misplaced in the transmission of Karṇakagomin’s commentary, maybe because of the *-ādi* concluding the phrase *tathā hityādi*, which precedes *ādisābdād anāḷambanā gṛhyante*.

¹⁴ See Bodhisattvabhūmi (BoBh) 241,15ff. and Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra (MSA) 17,18f. (see Maithrimurthi 1999: 331f. [text] and 360f. [German translation]). In Akṣayamati-nirdeśasūtra (Akṣ) 86,28f., which is quoted in Śikṣāsamuccaya (Śikṣ) 212,12-14, and in the Mahāprajñāpāramitopadeśasūtra (*Traité* III/1245 and 1272), **sattva*-, **dharma*- and **anāḷambanā* explicitly refer to *maitrī* in the section devoted to **krpā*. For the threefold *maitrī*, see *Traité* III/1250ff. and Schmithausen 2000: 446-448, where passages from other works are also referred to, in particular from Śāntideva’s Bodhicaryāvatāra. As Maithrimurthi (1999: 259f.) states, even though the way the MSA deals with the *apramāṇas* is very similar to that of the BoBh, a relevant difference that is not easy to explain is found in the interpretation of *dharmāḷambanā maitrī*, *karuṇā*, and so on. The MSA in fact considers the word *dharma* in *dharmāḷambana* to be a singular noun, which refers to the doctrine where the *apramāṇas* are taught. However, the interpretation in Sthiramati’s commentary follows the typical Mahāyānistic opposition of *sattvas* and *dharma*s, referring to living beings and elements of existence. Also in the Abhidharmakośa (AK) it is stated that the *apramāṇas* cannot definitely destroy the *kleśas*. Among the adduced reasons there is the fact that they are based on seeing living beings. They are antidotes to the *kleśas* because their practice suspends them. However, the definitive abandonment of the *kleśas* is due to specific “ways of destruction”. Because of the obtainment of the basic *apramāṇas*, which is typical of the condition of one who has eliminated the passions, one is no longer overcome by the *kleśas*. See Abhidharmakośabhāṣya (AKBh)

apramāṇas, which are practised in one of the three ways dependent on one's level. According to the explanation in the *Bodhisattvabhūmi*, the friendliness, compassion and so on that do not have an object are cultivated by a Bodhisattva with no conceptual representation whatsoever. These are neither the common *apramāṇas*, which have as their focus living beings and are also practised by non-Buddhists (*tīrthyas*), nor are they the *apramāṇas* of the *śrāvakas* and *pratyekabuddhas*, which are rather based on the elements of existence.¹⁵

The configuration of compassion can be analysed here either by the opposition (1) practised by *tīrthyas* vs. practised by Buddhists, or by the opposition (2) *laukika* vs. *lokottara*, i.e., mundane vs. supra-mundane. (1) The compassion practised by *tīrthyas* occurs only in relation to the conceptual representation of a Self, by seeing living beings, whereas the Buddhist compassion also occurs without the seeing of an individual Self, either by seeing merely *dharma*s, or in the absence of any kind of object. (2) The *laukika* compassion occurs from observing any kind of suffering in living beings or the elements of existence, whereas the *lokottara* compassion is not conditioned by the vision of any kind of object; it does not ordinarily occur in an individual in the mundane condition. It is in fact typical of Buddhas and advanced Bodhisattvas corresponding to a disposition of the Bodhisattva in which the subject–object dichotomy has been definitely abandoned. Compassion as well as the other *apramāṇas* are thus said to arise without an object.¹⁶ It is this kind

454.1-4: *mauladhyaṇabhūmikavād adhimuktimanaskāratvāt sattvālabhānavāc ca | tatpratyogena tu vyāpādādiviṣkambhaṇāt tatpratipakṣatvam uktam | [...] tair tē viṣkambhya prahānamārgaiḥ prajāhāti | tato vītarāgāvasthāyām maulāpramāṇalābhāt | balavatpratya-yalābhe 'pi tair anādhṛṣyo bhavati |*. Cf. Maithrimurthi 1999: 202ff.

¹⁵ BoBh 242,3-5 and 19-21: *yat punar dharmān apy avikalpayams tām eva maitrīm bhāvayati, iyam asyānālambanā maitrī veditavyā. [...] yāni tu bodhisattvasyānālambanāny apramāṇāni, tāni sarvatīrthyāśrāvakapratyekabuddhāsādhāraṇāni veditavyāni*. See Maithrimurthi 1999: 306,14f., 307,15f. (text) and 317f. (German translation).

¹⁶ See Ernst Steinkellner in Bsteh 2000: 476f.: “Es scheint bei dem, was mit dem objektlosen Mitleid gemeint ist, um einen außerordentlich subtilen Versuch zu gehen, einem Verständnis- und Sprachproblem der Tradition zu entkommen [...]. [D]ann kann es sein, daß die ursprüngliche Definition des Mitleids, sofern sie [!] sich auf andere Wesen richtet, nicht mehr erfüllt werden kann. Dieses begriffliche, nicht ontologische Problem, daß das die Buddhaschaft konstituierende Mitleid nicht mehr im ursprünglichen, definitorischen Sinn verstanden werden kann, wird jetzt sozusagen überspielt durch das Attribut *anālambanā*, objektlos.”, and Lambert Schmithausen, op. cit., p. 495: “Das objektlose Mitleid ist m.E. ein Versuch, diese normalerweise auf Lebewesen bezogene Haltung mit der Einsicht in die Leerheit in Einklang zu bringen. [...] Die andere Möglichkeit wäre, daß das objektlose Mitleid tatsächlich für den Zustand der vorstellungsfreien Erfahrung postuliert wird. Dies ist die Auffassung der Yogācāras. Ich gebe

of compassion that some Mahāyāna texts call “great compassion” (*mahākaruṇā*).¹⁷

It is the opposition between the cultivation of compassion by *tīrthiyas* and the cultivation that is specifically Buddhist which is most probably being highlighted by Śākyabuddhi, Karṇakagomin and, later, by Vibhūticandra, when they state that compassion is not intense attachment because it is based on the elements of existence.¹⁸ The context of PV I.12 in effect implies the distinction between compassion as a kind of passion, albeit a meritorious one, being based on living beings, and compassion that is not conditioned by the conceptual representation of a Self. However, a textual attestation within the PV itself is needed to exclude the possibility that the commentators, by indicating the Buddhist “trend” Dharmakīrti refers to, forced the interpretation of his statements in this direction. Dharmakīrti himself, while maintaining the difference between *rāga* and *karuṇā*, seems to refer to another part of his work when he states: “We shall show that compassion and so on are not like that (i.e., like desire, etc.), because they can also occur otherwise.”¹⁹

In the Pramāṇasiddhi-chapter of the PV, where the nature and role of compassion are extensively described, Dharmakīrti also compares and contrasts the compassion of *tīrthiyas* and that of the Buddhist *vītarāgas*. In the section devoted to the first Noble Truth, that is, PV II.146-178, it is explained how passions are not due to an “objective” state of the matter. The emotional and intellectual reactions related to a particular object are neither produced nor restricted by a characteristic associated with the properties of the object itself (PV II.174cd):

zu, daß ein solches Mitleid in psychologischen Kategorien schwer nachvollziehbar ist und habe vorgeschlagen, es als eine *Disposition* aufzufassen.”

¹⁷ For references, see Schmithausen 2000: 438, n. 9.

¹⁸ PVT 24a4: *g’zan du yan srid pa’i phyir ro zes bya ba ni chos la dmigs pa dag kyañ srid pa’i phyir te*, quoted by Karṇakagomin in PVVT 52.13f.: *anyathāpi sambhavāt | dharmāmbanānām api sambhavāt*. See also Vibhūticandra (Vibhū.) 290, n. 7: *neyam abhiśvaṅgo dharmāmbanāt*. All passages belong to the commentaries ad PV I.12.

¹⁹ PVSV 9,6-7: *naivaṃ karuṇādayo ‘nyathāpi sambhavād iti nivedayiṣyāmaḥ*. Śākyabuddhi and Karṇakagomin comment upon this announcement with the words “just afterwards” (*mjug thogs su* [PVT 24a4]; *anantaram eva* [PVVT 52.14]). They thus indicate that the future form *nivedayiṣyāmaḥ* points to an explanation that immediately follows. This piece of information, however, would be redundant if it referred to an explanation that follows a couple of sentences later. Moreover, verbs in the future tense are used elsewhere in the Svārthānumāna-chapter to refer to passages in other chapters. See PVSV, Introduction, p. xvf., n. 1, where examples of future forms of the root *vac* are listed.

vikalpyaviṣayatvāc ca viṣayā na niyāmakāḥ ||

And owing to the fact that the objects [of attachment and so on] are conceptually represented, the objects are not the restricting factors.

If one paraphrases the relationship between passions and objects by referring to that between words and objects,²⁰ one could say that passions have no inherent fitness (*yogyatā*) by which they would connect to one specific property of an object rather than to another. For instance, fear is not more inherently fit to be connected to the darkness of night than to moonlight. Passions are connected to the objects according to the agent's intent (*icchā*). They are thus not subject to restrictions (*niyama*) based in the objects; that is to say, different living beings who perform the same act of seeing a single object will not have the same conceptual representation:

For a perceptual event generates [in a living being] grounds for a [certain] determination in accordance with [the living being's] habitual conceptual practice – as [happens] even in the absence of a specific [act] of seeing a form – [in the case of a dead woman] the conceptual representations of a corpse, a lover [and] something to eat.²¹

All these representations are legitimate and “correctly” produced by different cognizing beings, namely an ascetic, a man and a dog, with regard to a dead woman, on the basis of their habitual conceptual practice.²² But from an absolute point of view, none of these representations

²⁰ See Tillemans 2000: 162-166.

²¹ PVSV 32,5-7, ad PV I.58: *anubhavo hi yathāvikalpābhyaśaṃ niścayapratyayān janayati | yathā rūpadarśanāviśeṣe 'pi kuṇapakāminībhaḥṣyavikalpāḥ |*. See Kellner 2004: 19-30 (where the passage is examined in the context of the causation of perceptual ascertainment), and Kyuma 2005: 40, n. 31. The object of the conceptual representation is said to be a dead woman by Śākyabuddhi, who is verbatim quoted by Kaṛṇakagomin (PVT 70b2-4: *dper na zes bya ba la sogs pa smos te, bud med śi ba'i gzugs mthoñ ba la khyad par med kyañ, kun du rgyu dañ 'phyon ma dañ khyi rnam la go rims bzin du, rnam par rtog pa la ji ltar goms pa bzin ro myags pa dañ, ñal po bya ba dañ, bza' bar bya ba'i rnam par rtog padag'byuñ balta bu'o |* ~ PVVT 142,4-5: *yathetyādi | mṛtastrūrūpadarśanāviśeṣe 'pi parivrāṭkāmukaśunāṃ yathākramāṃ kuṇapakāminībhaḥṣyavikalpā yathāvikalpābhyaśaṃ jāyante |*). The example also appears in ŚV Śūnyavāda 59ab (*parivrāṭkāmukaśunāṃ kuṇapādīmatī tathā |*) and in the corresponding *kārikā* of the Mīmāṃsaka's refutation, Śūnyavāda 215 (*kuṇapādīmatāu caivaṃ sārvarūpye vyavasthite | vāsanāḥ sahakāriṇyo vyavasthākāradarśane |*). Pārthasārathimīśra explains the example as referring to the body (*tanu*) of an attractive woman: cf. ŚV 203,28f: *ekasyām eva pramadātānau parivrāṭkādīnāṃ kuṇapaṃ kāmīnī bhakṣaḥ*. For some references to it in Nyāya works, cf. Slaje 1995.

²² The example refers to the meditation on death as described in the Satipaṭṭhānasutta, as part of the second of the nine “contemplations in the cemetery”: *bhikkhu seyyathā pi passeya sarīraṃ sīvatthikāya chaddītaṃ [...] supānehi vā khajjamānaṃ [...] so imam eva*

is more “correct” than the other, because each of them arises from a fundamental misunderstanding, namely, that of identifying a certain character with an existing, permanent, individual object.

As explained in PV II.194-198,²³ attachment, aversion and so forth also arise from a conceptual representation, that is, as the result of superimposing an alien nature onto the elements of existence by seeing them as a separate distinct unity. In contrast, a Bodhisattva’s compassion arises from seeing things as they are, namely in Buddhist terms, without a Self. Compassion does not depend on the proximity of somebody in a particular condition; its arising is just a property of what is real, that is, suffering.²⁴ It is free of the conceptual representations that make it seem that an object or an event is the cause of a mental state, for example suffering, and that therefore are responsible for an ethically “positive” reaction, as compassion is considered to be. The Bodhisattva’s compassion arises because of mere contact with the continuum that consists in suffering²⁵ and does not generate a further, different reaction, as, for instance, aversion, which is the opposite of compassion. When the mind does not side with something (including one’s own Self) against something else, it has abandoned the conception of a Self. The compassion that is then generated, Dharmakīrti states, is not considered to be a

kāyaṃ upasaṃharati: ayaṃ pi kho kāyo evaṃdhammo evaṃbhāvī etaṃ anatīto ti (MN I.10, p. 58). – “[A]s though he were to see a corpse thrown aside in a charnel ground, being devoured by [...] dogs [...], a bhikkhu compares this same body with it thus: ‘This body too is of the same nature, it will be like that, it is not exempt from that fate.’” (Bodhi 1995: 148). The subject of a monk meditating on death and a corpse devoured by dogs also occurs in the Buddhist iconography of Central Asia. See Lo Muzio (2005: 486-491), who quotes the Satipaṭṭhānasutta with regard to a painting at Kyzyl (Eastern Turkestan) and one at Kara Tepe (Old Termez, Uzbekistan), both approximately dating to the middle of the fourth up to the early fifth century C.E.

²³ For the text and philological notes, see Vetter 1990: 95-99, and Pecchia forthc., § 4.

²⁴ PV II.194: *duḥkhajñāne ’viruddhasya pūrvasaṃskāravāhinī | vastudharmo dayotpatir na sā sattvānurodhinī ||* “When there is knowledge of suffering for somebody who is not in opposition [to anything] (i.e., does not react to anything) the arising of sympathy, [an arising] which carries along previous [karmic] impulses, is the property of something real. This [arising] is not in accordance with [the seeing of] a living being.” *dayā* is not translated as “compassion”, but as “sympathy” here, in order to highlight the distinction between *dayā* and *karuṇā* that Dharmakīrti seems to adopt; see Pecchia forthc., n. 26.

²⁵ PV II.195: *ātmāntarasamāropād rāgo dharme ’tadātmake | duḥkhasantānasamsparsā-mātreṇaiva dayodayaḥ ||* “From the superimposition of an alien nature attachment [arises] towards an element of existence that does not have such a nature. The arising of sympathy [on the other hand] is due precisely to mere contact with the continuum that consists in suffering.” See the previous note for the translation of the term *dayā*.

fault.²⁶ It is conditioned by previous karmic impulses and continues to exist by virtue of its own essence, flowing automatically.²⁷ Because of compassion (which in this case is *mahākaruṇā*), those who are devoted to others are able to make the effort to stay in *saṃsāra*.²⁸ The actual means by which a Bodhisattva stays here is *āvedha*, the continuative force of his previous *karman*, which is the continuative force of his past practice (*pūrvāvedhāt* = *abhyāsāvedhāt*),²⁹ also responsible, according to Prajñākāragupta's commentary,³⁰ for the act of speaking when conceptual activity (*vitarka*)³¹ has come to an end.

THE BUDDHA'S OMNISCIENCE³²

In PV III.92-94, the argument from speaking occurs in relation to omniscience, in the wider context of *anupalabdhi*. The presumed contradiction between omniscience and the act of speaking is solved by Dharmakīrti by means of arguing that something which is inaccessible to the sense faculties, like omniscience or the afterworld, cannot be established as impossible³³ (PV III.92-93ab):

²⁶ PV II.196: *mohaś ca mūlaṃ doṣāṇāṃ sa ca sattvagraho vinā | tenāghahetau na dveṣo na doṣo 'taḥ kṛpā matā ||* "Delusion is the root of faults and it consists in the clinging to a living being. Without this [clinging], there is no aversion towards the cause of grief. Hence, compassion is not considered to be a fault."

²⁷ PV II.124: *kāṣṭhapāradahemāder agnyāder iva cetasi | abhyāsajāḥ pravartante svarasena kṛpādayaḥ ||* "Compassion, etc., which arise from habitual practice, proceed in the mind by their own essence, like [the qualities of] wood, quicksilver, gold, etc. [that arise] from [contact with] fire and so on." See Franco 1997: 7, Iwata forthc., Eltschinger forthc., and Franco, Summary.

²⁸ PV II.198: *mandatvāt karuṇāyās ca na yatnaḥ sthāpane mahān | tiṣṭhanti eva parādhīnā yeṣāṃ tu mahatī kṛpā ||* "Because compassion is weak, also the effort to make [oneself] stay [here] is not great. Those, however, who have great compassion certainly stay [here], devoted to others."

²⁹ See LVP II/118 on AKBh 151,24f.

³⁰ PVA 117,16-17 (ad PV II.142): *atyantābhyāsād vitarkam antareṇāpi vacanavṛtteḥ. āvedhasāmarthyād vacanaṃ pravartata eva.*

³¹ See LVP V/294, n. a, for the different nuances of the term *vitarka*: "Pour les Yogācāras, *vitarka* signifie *prajñāvīśeṣa abhisamskāralakṣaṇa*: une *prajñā* qui a le caractère d'action, de décision. – Pour l'auteur [i.e., Vasubandhu], le *vitarka* est une *etanā*, 'volition', dont le caractère est de 'faire' (*abhisamskar*)."

³² The word "omniscience" is used here to translate *sarvajñatva* and related terms, keeping in mind the remark by P. Griffiths concerning the fact that, in the present kind of context, *jñāna* is not a type of *scientia*, but a particular kind of awareness; see Griffiths 1990: 90-92.

³³ If one could establish that omniscience is impossible on the mere ground that it cannot be perceived inasmuch as it is inaccessible to the sense faculties, one would have

uktyādeḥ sarvavitpretya³⁴ bhāvādi pratiśedhavat |
aṅdriyāṇām arthānām virodhasyā prasiddhitāḥ ||
bādhya bādhakabhāvaḥ kaḥ syātām yady uktisaṃvidau³⁵ |

[This claim that non-perception is a means of knowledge is] like the denial of an all-knowing [person], the afterworld, etc., due to the act of speaking and so on.

[Reply:] Since a contradiction concerning things that are inaccessible to the sense faculties is not established [as a proof],

What might be the relation between invalidated and invalidator, if [the two terms of the relation] would be the act of speaking and thorough awareness [i.e., omniscience]?

The opponent argues that the Buddhist claims to prove something inaccessible to the sense faculties by using non-perception as a means of proof, since an omniscient being who speaks, moves, etc., has indeed never been seen. Dharmakīrti’s reply makes clear the limited capacity of non-perception as a proof (PV III.93cd-94):

tādṛśo ’nupalabdheś ced ucyatām saiva sādhanam ||
aniśayakaram proktam īdṛkṣānupalambhanam³⁶ |
tan nātyantaparokṣeṣu³⁷ sadasattāviniścayau ||

If [one argues that] the same [contradiction is stated] with regard to non-perception, precisely this [non-perception] should be said to be the prover [for you].

[Reply:] Non-perception of this kind (i.e., of imperceptible things) has been declared [by us] as unable to produce certainty.

Therefore there is no settled certainty concerning either being existent or being non-existent with respect to [objects] radically inaccessible to the sense faculties.³⁸

Omniscience (as well as the state after death) is radically beyond the range of ordinary human sense faculties; however, its non-perception leads to it being taken as uncertain, but not as impossible. This statement raises the question of what is actually possible, from a Buddhist viewpoint, in terms of extraordinary knowledge, and whether the issue

to admit any claim that is made on the ground of the non-observation of something imperceptible.

³⁴ *sarvavit pretya-* PV_{Mi/s} against all other witnesses.

³⁵ *yad yuktisaṃvidau* PV_{Mi/s} against all other witnesses.

³⁶ *īdṛkṣānupa-* PV_{To} (cf. *mi dmigs pa ni de lta bu* PV_{Mi/t}): *īdṛg anupa-* PVV_{com}: *īdṛkvānu-* PVA_{ms}: *īdṛk kvānupa-* PVA PVV PV_{Mi/s}. — The *akṣaras kṣā* and *kvā* are very similar in the script of the PVA manuscript.

³⁷ *tan nātyanta-* PVA_{ms} PVV (cf. *de phyir śin tu lkog gyur la || yod med* PV_{Mi/t}): *tatrātyanta-* PVA PV_{Mi/s}.

³⁸ See Tosaki 1979: 167-169 (Japanese translation) and Kataoka 2003: 61, n. 36 (English translation).

is, for Dharmakīrti, an abstract one or applied to a specific case. As the argument from speaking suggests, the opponent's contention concerns the Buddha. The issue is thus the nature and extraordinary quality of the Buddha's knowledge, which is explicitly described by Dharmakīrti in PV II.29-33. Here, omniscience in relation to the path to liberation, which is later termed *upayuktasarvajñatā*, i.e., omniscience applicable to the spiritual goal and the path towards it, and therefore beneficial as far as liberation is concerned, is contrasted with *sarvasarvajñatā*, omniscience about everything.³⁹ Dharmakīrti says (PV II.30-32):⁴⁰

Those who suspect deception in the teaching of a person who is not knowledgeable seek someone who is knowledgeable, in order to practise what he teaches.

Therefore, his knowledge regarding what has to be practised should be examined. Where is his complete knowledge of the number of insects applicable for us?

The one who makes known what has to be relinquished and what has to be taken up, together with the means [to accomplish this], is considered an authority [in terms of knowledge], but not one who makes known everything.

With the example of someone who has a thorough knowledge of the number of insects it is made clear that the word *sarvajña*, used with respect to the Buddha, does not refer to someone who has wide conceptual knowledge, including all possible detail. This kind of knowledge does not in itself guarantee competence in knowing the path to liberation. And, in fact, it is an absolutely refined soteriological knowledge level that makes the Buddha eligible as a teacher.

Also the Mīmāṃsakas' contention, especially as voiced by Kumāriḷa, does not concern the Buddha's knowledge of everything. In Ratnakīrti's

³⁹ Jñānaśrīmitra seems to be the first Buddhist philosopher to use *upayuktasarvajña* and *sarvasarvajña*, as stated by Bühnemann (1980: 92f., n. 9) and, more recently, by McClintock (2002: 123), who refers to the two connotations by means of the English terms "practical omniscience" and "full-blown omniscience".

⁴⁰ *jñānavān mṛgyate¹ kaścīt taduktapratipattaye | ajñopadeśakarāṇe vipralambhanaśaṅkibhiḥ || tasmād anuṣṭheyagataṃ jñānam asya vicāryatām | kīḷasaṃkhyāparijñānam² tasya naḥ kvopayujyate³ || heyopādeyatattvasya sābhyupāyasya⁴ vedakahaḥ | yaḥ pramāṇam asāv iṣṭo na tu sarvasya vedakahaḥ ||*. ¹ *mṛśyate* PV_{RS} against all other witnesses; ² *-jñāne* PV_{RS} against all other witnesses; ³ *nāḷko 'pi yujyate* PV_{RS} against all other witnesses; ⁴ *sābhyupāyasya* PV_{RS} PVA_{ms} PVV (cf. *abhyupāyatattvaṃ* PVA_{com} and *thas daṅ bcas pa* PV_{Mi/A}) : *hānyupāyasya* PVA PV_{Mi/S}. — The present translation slightly diverges from the numerous other translations of these verses; see Jaini 1974: 86f.; Bühnemann 1980: 1f. with n. 7-9; Jackson 1991: 233; Eltschinger 2001: 110-113; McClintock 2002: 125; Moriyama 2003: 187f.; Franco, Summary.

words: “But only the denial of the knowledge of the *dharmā* is applicable in this context. By whom is it ever excluded that someone knows all the rest?”⁴¹ In the particular context of PV II.29-33, and in general in the framework of the discussion concerning the Buddha’s reliability as a spiritual guide, Dharmakīrti’s reply is thus strictly pertinent to the context, referring to the discussion about the Buddha’s discriminating soteriological knowledge, and not to the question of whether the Buddha knows everything. The discussion in PVin II 29,3ff.⁴² also concerns this perfect awareness, which is ultimately awareness of the *dharmā*.

GREAT COMPASSION AND OMNISCIENCE AS
CHARACTERISTICS OF THE BUDDHA

The awareness of all modes in which things may appear to the mind (*sarvākārajñatā*) is an “unexcelled position from which [the Buddha] acts for the well-being of all sentient beings”;⁴³ it is the result of long individual training, at the end of which the karmic traces of the cause of suffering are removed and the Bodhisattva attains the condition of being able to teach the four Noble Truths.⁴⁴

In the group of *kārikās* where he discusses the Buddha as *sugata* (PV II.139-144),⁴⁵ Dharmakīrti distinguishes between the eradication of *doṣas* with remainder and without remainder. Although the *kleśas* are not present and are no longer produced,⁴⁶ the eradication with remainder leaves one with lack of clarity in the exposition of the Path, as stated in PV II.141cd.⁴⁷ Only the definitive abandonment of this remainder of imperfection, namely a complete eradication of the *doṣas* through ha-

⁴¹ SS I.11-12: *dharmajñatvaniṣedhas tu kevalo 'tropyayujyate | sarvam anyad vijñānaṃ tu puruṣaḥ kena vāryate ||*. See Bühnemann 1980: 1.

⁴² See Steinkellner 1979: 92, n. 332.

⁴³ MSA 14.46: *sarvākārajñatāṃ caiva labhate 'nuttaraṃ padam | yatrasthaḥ sarvasattvānām hitāya pratipadyate ||*; translation as in Griffiths 1990: 118, n. 70.

⁴⁴ PV II.137: *buddheś ca pātāvād dhetor vāsanātaḥ prahīyate | parārthavṛtteḥ khadgāder¹ viśeṣo 'yaṃ mahāmuneh ||*. ¹ *padārthavṛtteḥ khaṅgāder* PV_{MiS} against all other witnesses. — “And, as a consequence (i.e., because of the practice), due to the sharpness of the [Buddha’s] mind, the karmic trace of the cause [of suffering] is removed. Because [he] acted for the sake of others, the great Sage has this as [his] distinctive quality with respect to Pratyekabuddhas, etc.” See the analysis of this *kārikā* in Eltschinger 2005: 405f., 418.

⁴⁵ See Vetter 1990: 47-49, Iwata 1991: 153, n. 6, Franco, Summary, and, for an accurate analysis of *kārikās* 139-142a, Eltschinger 2005: 408ff.

⁴⁶ The word *kleśa*, as stated in *BHSD*, is “extremely common, but usually vague and undefined”. The *kleśas* are produced when the *doṣas* are present.

⁴⁷ See the analysis in Eltschinger 2005: 418f.

bitual practice, enables the future *sugata* to have perfect knowledge of the path towards liberation and makes it possible for him to teach it. However, from his act of speaking one might infer that the Buddha's mind is not free of faults, but endowed with desires and so forth;⁴⁸ after all, the Buddha is like a man in the street, *rathyāpuruṣavat*, as Manoranandin concisely expresses the opponent's position in his comments on PV II.142, which runs as follows:

aśeṣahānam abhyāsād uktyāder doṣasaṃkṣayaḥ |
nety eke vyatireko 'sya sandigdho vyabhicāry ataḥ⁴⁹ ||

Abandoning without remainder is due to habitual practice. Some [say] that due to the act of speaking, etc., [a *sugata*'s] faults are not completely destroyed.

[But] the co-absence of this [logical reason with the probandum in the negative example of this inference] is doubtful. Hence [the logical reason] is deviant.

Dharmakīrti's reply consists in explaining why the opponent's inference is wrong:⁵⁰ the logical reason, i.e., "because [he] spoke, etc." (*uktyādeḥ* or *vaktṛtvāt*), is inconclusive. It also occurs in a dissimilar instance (*vipakṣa*) where the property to be proven, "having desires, etc." (*rāgādīmatva*) is absent; hence the negative concomitance of the logical reason and the property to be proven cannot be stated without doubt.

The reply, however, is not yet complete. As observed by the opponents who speak in PV III.92-94, the Buddhist assumption, too, is based on a doubtful logical reason, and Dharmakīrti cannot but agree with them. The doctrinal level that the question involves is then presented to us, with reference to the eradication of the *doṣas* (PV II.143-144):

akṣayitvaṃ ca doṣānāṃ nityatvād anupāyataḥ |
upāyasyāparijñānād iti vā⁵¹ parikalpayet ||
hetumatvād viruddhasya⁵² hetor abhyāsataḥ kṣayāt |
hetusvabhāvajñānena tajjñānam api sādhyate ||

Or one might also suppose the indestructibility of faults to be due to permanence, to lack of means or to lack of thorough knowledge of the means.

⁴⁸ See Vibhū. p. 60, n. 1: *rāgādīmān vivakṣitaḥ puruṣo vaktṛtvāt*.

⁴⁹ *sandigdho vyabhicāry ataḥ* PV_{RS} PVV PV_{Ve} (cf. *ato 'sya sandigdhavyatirekitvād agamakatvām | vikalpe vā sādhye vacanam | vyabhicāry* PVA_{com} and *the tshom za ba de phyir 'khrul* PV_{Mi(t)}) : *sandi'gdhāvvyabhicāry ataḥ* PVA_{ms} : *sandigdhāvvyabhicāry ataḥ* PVA PV_{Mi(s)}.

⁵⁰ Vibhūticandra formulates the *pūrvapakṣa* as follows: *asati rāgādīmatve na bhavati vaktṛtvam iti* (Vibhū. p. 60, n. 2).

⁵¹ *iti vā* PVA PV_{Mi(s)} PV_{Ve} (cf. *yañ na* PV_{Mi(t)}; PVV_{com} has only *vā*) : *api vā* PV_{RS} PVV.

⁵² *viruddhasya* PV_{RS} PVA PVV PV_{Mi(s)} PV_{Ve} : *vipakṣasya* PVA_{com} PVA n. 3 (cf. *gñen po* PV_{Mi(t)}) : *vipakṣayasya* PVA_{ms}.

[To this we reply:] Due to the fact that [faults] – because [they] have a cause – are destroyed by habitual practice of the cause opposed [to them] (i.e., the seeing of Selflessness),

its knowledge (i.e., the knowledge of the cause opposed to them, whose practice is the means for their destruction) is also proved, [namely] through the knowledge of the nature of [their] cause.

The efficaciousness of habitual practice (here to be considered as meditative practice) can only be assumed if the *doṣas* can be destroyed. On the basis of this presupposition, which is shown as valid by means of the proof of impermanence, the attainment of a perfect awareness of everything is conceivable: the progressive freedom from the dominion of passions, culminating in *vairāgya*, and the progressive realization of the seeing of Selflessness, i.e., the awareness of the modes in which things may appear to the mind, culminating in *sarvajñatva*, are nothing but two sides of the same coin. This conception is beautifully formulated by Karṇakagomin in the PVVṬ *ad* PV I.21, who quotes Dharmottara’s commentary on PVin II 44,18-45,25 almost verbatim.⁵³ In Karṇakagomin’s wording, being not-possessed-of-passions (*vairāgya*) and being omniscient (*sarvajñatva*) are explicitly mentioned as the two characteristics of a mind that has achieved the vision of Selflessness and the knowledge of everything:

Therefore, just as [the knowledge of the fact] that – in the absence of obstacles and incompleteness [regarding the complex of causes] – this complex of causes related to a seed is suitable for making a sprout arise is inferential knowledge of the suitability [of this complex], in the same way [the knowledge of the fact] that – in the absence of obstacles and incompleteness [regarding the complex of causes] –, due to the long-lasting and uninterrupted special habitual practice, the knowledge that has Selflessness and all things as its content appears vividly is inferential knowledge of the origin of the facts of being not-possessed-of-passions and being omniscient.⁵⁴

⁵³ Dharmottara is commenting on *tadvad anyasyāpi sambhavāt* (for the whole passage, see below n. 57). The identification of the quotation is found in Steinkellner 1979b: 153.

⁵⁴ PVVṬ 70,23-26 ~ PVinṬ P 338a3-8 ~ PVinṬ D 282a4-6 (see Steinkellner 1979b: 153): *tasmād yathāsati¹ pratibandhavaikalye samartheyaṃ bījakāraṇasāmagry aṅkurotpādāyeti sāmārhyanumānam | tadvad asati pratibandhavaikalye cirakālān nairantaryavataś cābhyāsaviśeṣān² nairātmyaviṣayasya sarvapadārthaviṣayasya ca jñānasya sphuṭābhatvaṃ sambhavadīti vairāgyasarvajñatvayoḥ sambhavānumānam |*. ¹ *asati ~ med na PVinṬ D 282a4 : *sati ~ yod na PVinṬ P 338a7* (= Steinkellner 1979b: 153, n. 10); ² *em. : cābhyāsaviśeṣāc ca PVVṬ PVVṬ_{ms} : *bhyāsavaśāt ~ goms pa’i dbaṅ gis PVinṬ* (= Steinkellner 1979b: 153, n. 11).

Dharmakīrti and his commentators here reflect a foundational point in the Buddhist approach: both the intellectual and emotional aspects of the mind are to be transformed, as the one is not separate from the other; they are actually indistinguishable. Expressing this in the words of M. Nussbaum with respect to the ancient Greek Stoic view, one can say that emotions should not be considered as “non-reasoning movements”, or as bodily rather than mental, but instead as forms of evaluative judgement.⁵⁵ It is thus all the more clear that the condition of a total absence of *doṣas* goes hand in hand with the total eradication of the concept of a Self and corresponds to the complete transformation of the mind (*āśrayaparivṛtti*).⁵⁶

LOGICAL TOOLS

The observation of actions that are typical of the human condition does not, in itself, inform us about the nature of the individual’s mental qualities. As explained in the PVSV *ad* PV I.21, which is repeated in PVin II:

It is not the case that, for human beings, [events] do not occur owing to distinct causes, so that one might infer similarity in every respect due to, for instance, the act of speaking which possesses only little similarity. For diversity is observed in all [mental] qualities, since diversity is understood through the difference of the mental formations (*saṃskāra*). Therefore a [quality x] different [from quality y] might also occur like this [quality y], and there is no invalidating reason in the case of an inference of [its] non-occurrence. For being not-possessed-of-desire is not observed, and with something not observed, a relation of invalidator and invalidated is not established because attachment, etc., do not have a non-deviating (*avyabhicārin*) effect, since diversities [in the effects] (i.e., distinct qualities) may not be observed even though they occur.⁵⁷

The issue occurs in the context of the *śeṣavadanumāna*, the “partially-ascertained inference” which is presented in PV I.11-14 and 21. Such an inference is only partially able to ascertain something, because a non-

⁵⁵ See Nussbaum 1997: 235.

⁵⁶ See PV II.205 and the analysis in Eltschinger 2005a.

⁵⁷ PVSV 15,19-25 (~ PVin_{skt} II 98,8-13, *ad kārikā* 68 ~ PVin_{tib} II 44,33-45,6, *ad kārikā* 70; see Steinkellner 1979: 132f.): *naivam asambhavadviśeṣahetavaḥ puruṣā yena vacanādeḥ kiṃcinmātrasādharmyāt sarvākārasāmyam anumīyeta | sarvagūṇeṣu viśeṣadarśanāt | saṃskārabhedena viśeṣapratipatteḥ | tadvad anyasyāpi sambhavāt | asambhavānumāne ca bādha-kahetvabhāvāt | vairāgyādṛṣṭeḥ | adṛṣṭena ca bādhyabādhakabhāvāsiddheḥ | rāgādyavyabhicārikāryābhāvāt | sambhave 'pi viśeṣānām draṣṭum aśakyatvāt |.*

ascertained remainder (*śeṣa*) is left in the proof,⁵⁸ due to the non-ascertained co-absence (*vyatireka*)⁵⁹ of the logical reason with the property to be proved: the possibility of proving an inferendum by means of such a logical reason is related to a merely non-observed effect in dissimilar instances.⁶⁰ A *śeṣavadanumāna* thus occurs in connection with a doubtful logical reason, namely the one by which Dharmakīrti basically refutes the argument from speaking. By a periphrasis which is very similar to PVSV 164,23f. *ad* PV I.311, Dharmakīrti also indicates a partially ascertained inference in PV II.142cd.⁶¹

There is no need to stress the importance of the point – the necessity of ascertaining the co-absence of the logical reason by its non-occurrence, and not by its mere non-observation, in dissimilar instances – in Dharmakīrti’s system, since this is well known from Steinkellner’s study on the word *nīścita* (1988). It is worth noting that in connection with this point, at the beginning of the PV, the mental qualities are addressed, with particular reference to “desire” and “being possessed of passions” (see *rāgānumānavat* and *rāgitādivat*, in PV I.11 and 12), which are typically absent in *vītarāgas* like the Buddha, even though a mundane and traditional example was available (*sthālītaṇḍulapākavat*, found also among the *laukīkanyāyas*) and is in fact used by Dharmakīrti immediately afterwards in PV I.14.

A detailed description of a doubtful reason is given in Nyāyabindu (NB) III.69-71, where the wish to speak is associated by an opponent with non-omniscience or having attachment, aversion and so forth; the case

⁵⁸ See Steinkellner 1979: 113-116, n. 433 and 436; Iwata 1993: 169-171 (*ad* Prāmānaviniścaya III.64) and n. 18; Franco 1997: 127, n. 87; Eltschinger 2001: 107f. and 115 (*śeṣavadanumāna* is here translated with “inférence résiduate”). For the use of the term in some non-Buddhist systems, cf. *Terminologie* III, s.v. As explained by Steinkellner (1979: 114ff., n. 436, where *śeṣavadanumāna* is translated by “Schlußfolgerung, die mit einem Rest versehen ist”), by means of the possessive suffix *matup* contained in *śeṣavat* Dharmakīrti provides this kind of inference with an interpretation which, with respect to Dignāga, is new and internally determined in his system. It is so called because it is possessed of a rest, a non-assured area (“[...] weil sie mit einem Rest, einem ungesicherten Bereich, versehen sind [...]”).

⁵⁹ For the English translation of *vyatireka* with “co-absence”, see Tillemans 2000: 55. It seems to us that “co-absence” well expresses that the logical reason and the property to be proved are contemporaneously absent in one place.

⁶⁰ PVSV 10,21: *sa tasya vyatireko na nīścita iti vipakṣe vṛttir āśaṅkyeta*. As explained by Steinkellner (1988: 1440): “The word *nīścita* [...] has the purpose of teaching that the inferring capacity of the reason comes from its real occurrence and non-occurrence, not from mere observation and non-observation, in similar and dissimilar instances.”

⁶¹ PVSV 164,23f.: *tasmāc cheṣavadanumānam etat | vyatirekasya sandehād asamartham adarśane 'pi vipakṣavṛtṭeh |*.

of a person being omniscient and speaking at the same time is then taken into consideration. The *hetu* is defined here as *sandigdghavipakṣavyāvṛttika*, a logical reason whose exclusion from the dissimilar instances is doubtful because no example is suitable to demonstrate its co-absence with the property to be proved.⁶² The doubtful logical reason is again referred to a number of times in the NB when “due to the act of speaking and so forth” and “due to being a speaker” (*uktyādeḥ*, *vakṛtvāt*) are mentioned.⁶³

In the case of NB 3.125,⁶⁴ the example used by Dharmakīrti to express the opponent’s position is “*rathyāpuruṣavat*”, “like a man in the street”. This example seems to be, or to have become after Dharmakīrti, a standard example employed in the argument from speaking, because it later recurs a number of times in different works, in association with this argument.⁶⁵ It also occurs in a passage in Dharmakīrti’s commentary on PV I.311, in which he discusses the *puruṣātiśayasādhana*, the proof of a person who is eminent from an epistemic viewpoint, which is closely related to the issue of the possibility of a human being becoming omniscient.⁶⁶ In PV I.311,⁶⁷ the act of speaking is again mentioned by Dharmakīrti as one of the ordinary activities that the opponent would not admit as being concomitant with some special features like being free from passions, being omniscient or being a composer of *mantras* (*vairāgya*, *sarvajñatva*, *mantrakartṛtva*). However, the features that the opponent lists as proofs for his rejection of the epistemic eminence of a person, inasmuch as they are typically human, are said by Dharmakīrti

⁶² See Eltschinger 2001: 107.

⁶³ See NB 3.69-71, 76-80, 93-95 with the reference to the similar instances (*anvaya*), 125-126 and 133. See also Balcerowicz 1999: 2f.

⁶⁴ NB 3.125: *tathā sandigdghasādhyadharmādāyāś ca, yathā rāgādīmān ayaṃ vacanād rathyāpuruṣavat | maraṇadharmo ’yaṃ puruṣo rāgādīmatvād rathyāpuruṣavat | asarvajñō ’yaṃ rāgādīmatvād rathyāpuruṣavad iti |*.

⁶⁵ See, *ad* PV II.142, PVV 60,18f.: *eke jaiminīyā uktyāder heto rathyāpuruṣavad rāgādidoṣasamḥsayah kasyacin nāstīty āhuḥ |*; *ad* PV I.311, PVT 340a6f. ~ PVVT 452,21f., PVT 50b1-3 ~ PVVT 583,12f. (referred to in Eltschinger 2001: 105, n. 452) and PVV 402,18; *ad* TS 3156f., TSP 997,17f., where a possible objection to a *sugata*’s omniscience is formulated by means of a list of properties as the reason and by “like a man in the street” as the example: *sugato ’sarvajñah | jñeyatvaprameyatvavastulvasattvavaktṛtva-puruṣatvādibhyo rathyāpuruṣavad iti*. The same formulation of this objection is presented by Ratnakīrti in SS 23,11-14 (see Bühnemann 1980: 67) and, in a short version, by Mokṣākaragupta in Tarkabhāṣā (TBh) 26,13. See also TSP 782,24f., *ad* TS 2336, in the context of the Mīmāṃsaka position regarding the authority of the Veda.

⁶⁶ See the analysis in Eltschinger 2001: 101-114.

⁶⁷ *buddhīndriyoktipuṣṭvādi sādhanam yat tu varṇyate | pramāṇābhaṃ yathārthāsti na hi śeṣavato gatih ||*.

to merely have the appearance of a means of valid cognition (*pramāṇābhā*).⁶⁸ There are in fact human beings who are able to perceive states that are commonly considered imperceptible; they are nevertheless like any other human in the sense that they speak, for example. Consequently, their epistemic eminence is not in contradiction with their “human” activity, and the opponent’s argument is based on a logical reason that is left with a non-ascertained remainder (*śeṣavat*).

ACTION: MOTIVATION, INTENT AND RESULT

Considering that “doing is intending” (*karman* is *cetanā*, volitional consciousness, which is associated with *avidyā* and *tṛṣṇā*),⁶⁹ “doing”, in the sense of producing *karman*, cannot be stopped if the mind does not change, with the consequence that motivation, intent and result of actions are no longer prompted by the false view of the true state of the matter.

When the Mīmāṃsakas claim that the Buddha had desires because he spoke, they are actually claiming, indirectly, that action yielding impurity is in fact due to desire, and not to false knowledge, as the Buddhist as well as part of the brahmanical tradition asserts,⁷⁰ that a transformation of the mind is not possible, and, finally, that the change of perspective produced by the elimination of *avidyā* (i.e., ignorance, false belief, etc., as erroneous ways of seeing reality, which have to be abandoned in order to abandon *saṃsāra*) is not possible. The Mīmāṃsaka line of argumentation (at least as Dharmakīrti reports it) does not recognize (1) that Dharmakīrti, as far as *vītarāgas* like the Buddha are concerned, does not make any distinction at all within the category of *rāga*, for the simple reason that the Buddha is a *vītarāga*, one who has eliminated *rāgas*; (2) that he does not accept that only one kind of motivation (i.e.,

⁶⁸ It is worth noting that here Dharmakīrti has chosen the same word that he used in PV I.12 (cf. above p. 165).

⁶⁹ See PV II.261. The concept that the manifold world is caused by *karman*, and that *karman* is characterized by *cetanā*, volitional consciousness, is recorded in many passages of the Pāli Canon. In a number of passages of the Buddhist epistemological literature the wording used in AK 4.1ab is echoed: *karmajaṃ lokavaicitryaṃ cetanā talkṛtaṃ ca tat* /. See, for example, PVV 12.2f. ad PV II.10c (Krasser 2002: 37f.), PVA 59,12 ad PV II.40 (Franco 1997: 192f.) and TBh 60,13. Agostini forthc. gives a survey of the exegesis of *Dhammapada* 1.1-2: *manopubbavaṅgamā dhammā manomayā*. *dhammā* are considered mental phenomena by Theravāda sources after the first century C. E. Older Theravāda sources interpret the *dhammā* as actions and Mahāyānistic texts continue this interpretation.

⁷⁰ See our considerations above, p. 165 and n. 4.

desire, be it in the form of greed or compassion) is responsible for action and that, as far as *vītarāgas* are concerned, the category of motivation to act is not confined to desire; (3) that he does not accept that only desire is able to produce an action, being related to an intent and a result.

Great compassion (*mahākaruṇā*) is indicated by Dharmakīrti as the motivation for the Buddha's speaking, i.e. his teaching, because it produces in him the intent to act for the benefit of others; such an intent is the motivation for his acting,⁷¹ and produces the result of the Buddha being a protector (*tāyin*)⁷² who teaches the four Noble Truths for the sake of others. Even though this action is indicated by Dharmakīrti himself with the expressions "intent", "motivation" and "result" (see Table 1 above, where it is evident that compassion that is not born from the *vīparyāsas* is connected to the motivation and the result of the action), the Buddha's compassion is in no way a form of desire, because it is not an emotion in terms of an evaluative judgement. On the contrary, it arises from the abandonment of the notion of "I", to the effect that, for the mind in which it arises, the difference between "I" and "other" no longer exists, and even attributes like "non ego-centred" or "altruistic" actually become inappropriate.⁷³ It is this specific Buddhist understanding of the term *karuṇā* as applied to the Buddha that is not realized by the opponent when he develops his "argument from speaking".

⁷¹ PV II.145-146ab: *tāyāḥ svadṛṣṭamārgoktir vaiphalvyād vakti nānṛtam | dayālutvāt parārthaṃ ca savārambhābhīyogataḥ || tataḥ¹ pramāṇaṃ tāyo vā catuḥsatyaprakāśanam |¹ tataḥ PVA PV_{MiS} PV_{Ve} : tasmāt PV_{RS} PVV (de *phyir* PV_{MiIt} can be a translation for both *tataḥ* and *tasmāt*). — "Protecting [consists in] stating the way [to liberation] that was seen by [the Buddha] himself. He does not speak untruth, because there is no gain [for him to tell a lie], because he is full of compassion and because he applies himself in all [his] undertakings for the sake of others. Because of this, he is a means of knowledge. Or, protecting [means] revealing the four [noble] truths" (translation by Franco [1997: 26 and 32]). Cf. above p. 177, n. 44.*

⁷² See Franco 1997: 26.

⁷³ See Maithrimurthi's considerations on this matter, especially Maithrimurthi 1999: 183-185, as well as chapter 6, in which H.B. Aronson's interpretation is examined.

APPENDIX

Analysis of PVSV 9,3-18

The purpose of this appendix is to show the structure of the passage according to our understanding, because components of the meaning of a text, such as internal coherence and structure, which are different from the semantical level, might be unclear.

According to the following analysis, each Buddhist refutation of an objection by the opponent begins after *cet* and ends with the sentence immediately preceding the next sentence containing *cet*. This final sentence preceding a sentence containing *cet* indicates the reason for the Buddhist refutation which is taken by the opponent as the source for his next objection.

The two main stages of the discussion (1 and 2) are each characterized by an initial identical objection that is relevant in terms of admissibility (cf. the sequences 1.1 and 2.1). From the Buddhist viewpoint, the argument on which the opponent’s objection is based fails, in both cases, and the respective reason for that is given. Precisely this reason is the source for the next objection, respectively, and its refutation (cf. sequences 1.2, 1.3 and 2.2). The latter objections, however, are not relevant in terms of admissibility, because only a doubtful reason can be adduced to substantiate them.

Because the opponent’s position in 1.1 and 2.1 may be admitted on specific grounds, the Buddhist position is shown to be precarious, but ultimately correct (hence the use of specific logical tools in the treatment of the argument from speaking).⁷⁴ The objections in 1.2, 1.3 and 2.2 are shown as straightforward inadmissible.

A = Buddhist, **B** = opponent

0 = point under discussion, **1** = refutation

⁷⁴ For a similar formulation concerning a precarious position, which is actually false from the Buddhist viewpoint, see, for example, PV II.190cd: *samsāritvād anirmokṣo neṣṭatvād aprasiddhitāḥ* // “[Opponent: A living being] does not [attain] liberation due to the fact that [it] is characterized by transmigration. [Proponent:] No, [this is not a fault for us] because this is admitted, since [such a living being] is not established [for us].”

1.1	A.0 Buddhist statement	<i>na hi rāgādīnām eva kāryam spandanava- canādayaḥ vaktukāmatāsāmānyahetuvāt </i>
	B.0 opponent's objection	<i>saiva rāga iti cet </i>
	A.1.0 comment on the relevance of the objection	<i>iṣṭatvān na kimcid bādhitam syāt </i>
	A.1.1.1 exposition of the Buddhist viewpoint	<i>nītyasukhātmatmīyadarśanākṣiptam sāsra- vadharmaviśayaṃ cetaso 'bhiṣvaṅgaṃ rāgam āhuh naivaṃ karuṇādayo 'nyathāpi sam- bhavād iti nivedayiṣyāmaḥ </i>
	A.1.1.2 the argument on which the opponent's objection is based fails	<i>atra yathā rakto bravīti tathā virakto 'pīti va- canamātrād apratipattiḥ nāpi viśeṣāt </i>
	A.1.1.3 reason	<i>abhiprāyasya durbodhatvāt vyavahārasam- kareṇa sarveṣāṃ vyabhicārāt </i>
1.2	A.0 = A.1.1.3 [Buddhist statement]	[idem]
	B.0 opponent's objection	<i>prayojanābhāvād avyāhāra iti cet </i>
	A.1.0 comment on the relevance of the objection	<i>na</i>
	A.1.1 reason	<i>parārthatvāt </i>
1.3	A.0 = A.1.1 [Buddhist statement]	[idem]
	B.0 opponent's objection	<i>na yukto (scil. vyāhāra) vītarāgatvād iti cet </i>
	A.1.0 comment on the relevance of the objection	<i>na</i>
	A.1.1 reason	<i>karuṇayāpi vṛtteḥ </i>
2.1	A.0 = A.1.1 [Buddhist statement]	[idem]
	B.0 opponent's objection	<i>saiva rāga iti cet </i>
	A.1.0 comment on the relevance of the objection	<i>iṣṭam aviparyāśasamudbhavān na doṣaḥ </i>
	A.1.1.1 exposition of the Buddhist viewpoint	<i>asaty apy ātmagrahe dukkhaviśeṣadarśana- mātrenābhyāsabalotpādīnī bhavaty eva ka- ruṇā tathā hi sattvadharmādyālambanā māitryādaya iṣyante etāś ca sajātivābhyā- savṛttayo na rāgāpekṣiṇyaḥ </i>
	A.1.1.2 the argument on which the opponent's objection is based fails	<i>naivaṃ rāgādayo</i>
	A.1.1.3 reason	<i>viparyāśabhāve 'bhāvāt </i>
2.2	A.0 = A.1.1.3 [Buddhist statement]	[idem]
	B.0 opponent's objection	<i>kāruṇikasyāpi nisphala ārambho 'viparyā- sād iti cet </i>
	A.1.0 relevance of the objection	<i>na </i>
	A.1.1 reason	<i>parārthasyaiva phalatveneṣṭatvāt icchāla- kṣaṇatvāt phalasya </i>

Table 2

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