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GEROTROPHIA. A CONTROVERSIAL LAW

When I presented at “Symposion 2009” a paper entitled *Fathers and Sons in Athenian Law and Society*,¹ I was very puzzled by the fact that Solon had recourse to a law² in order to impose on the Athenians the duty to *trephein*³ their father and mother, as well as their surviving forefathers/ancestors (within the sixth degree of kinship which defined the limits of *anchisteia*).⁴ My puzzlement arose from observing how relatively mild paternal powers were in the Athenian system, if compared to other legal systems and in particular to the Roman one. As the Roman jurist Gaius writes in the second century CE “hardly any other peoples have the kind of power we hold over our children” (Gai 1.55),⁵ and comparison between the condition of Athenian and Roman children shows how right Gaius was. In Rome the authority of fathers over their sons (unless the father decided to emancipate them) did not end when the children reached the age of majority but continued as long as the *paterfamilias*

¹ Cantarella (2010).

² For the law on *gerotrophia* see Demost., *C. Timocr.* 107; Diog. Laert., *Solon*, 1, 55; Aelian, *Nat. Hist.* IX,1. Cfr. Leão (2005a) and Leão & Rhodes (2015), particularly pp. 92-97.

³ This verb refers to our law again in Arist., *Av.*, 1357; Isae., VIII, 32; Dem., XXIV, 107; Aisch., I, 13 e 28; Aelian, *Nat. Hist.* IX.1.

⁴ See Isae., VIII, 32, mentioning *goneis*. On the presence of female ascendants, inside a larger discussion of mothership, see also Damet (2015). On maternal rights see also the Latin rhetors (e.g. Sen., *Controv.*, VII, 41), but on the difficulties about relating their typology to the Greek world see Rizzelli (2015), particularly p. 10 and n. 9.

⁵ Interesting overview of different ancient systems in Pellizer, Zorzetti e Maffi (1983).

lived, whatever might be the age of his descendants. Furthermore, upon the death of a *paterfamilias* only his immediate descendants were released from *patria potestas*. All the others passed under the authority of the new *paterfamilias* (i.e. the surviving ascendant), who together with the personal powers over the descendants obtained the ownership of the family property. A *filiusfamilias*, no matter how old, could not own property until he himself became a *paterfamilias*. All he had was a certain amount of money, the *peculium*, given to him by his father, which he could administer freely and that was socially considered his own. But this fund legally belonged to the father, who could take it back whenever he wanted. Finally, a son couldn't even count on his father's inheritance, because the *patresfamilias* could disinherit their children and descendants without needing to state any reason.

As scholars such as Paul Veyne and Yan Thomas have demonstrated, the result of these rules was that the relationship between fathers and sons was so difficult, complicated and problematic that patricide was a frequent crime, which worried the political and legal authorities.⁶ In the first century CE, under the emperor Vespasian (69-79 CE), the situation was such that, in the hope to avoid sons from killing long-lived fathers in order to finally inherit shares of the estate, a *senatusconsultum* (called *Macedonianum*) prevented a creditor who had lent a sum of money to a *filiusfamilias* from asking the restitution even after the death of his debtor's father.

But in Athens legal rules were very different: in the first place, the father's personal powers over his children were not perennial but ceased when the children reached the age of majority; secondly, they were sensibly softer than the Roman ones which included the *ius vitae ac necis*, nonexistent in Athens.⁷ The strongest penalty that a father could inflict to his sons was *apokeryxis*, a controversial and scarcely documented institution, consisting in the possibility for a father to exclude his son from the *oikos*.⁸

According to Demosthenes it was introduced by a law that gave the fathers the power not only to name their sons at birth but also, if they wanted, to *apokeryxai*.⁹ However he does not specify for what reason, and there are no further references in the ancient sources.

Aristotle, explaining why it would not seem suitable for a son to disown his father, whereas a father could disown his son, offers an interesting glimpse on the matter, comparing debtors and sons: a debtor must repay his creditors, but a son, whatever he may do, will never repay what he has received; therefore, as a creditor can remit a debt, a father can disown his son. But the conclusion of his reasoning

⁶ Sources and reference to the scholarly debate on the topic (especially between French and American scholarship) in Cantarella (2014).

⁷ A more detailed elaboration on Athenian paternal powers and related bibliography in Cantarella (2010).

⁸ I have treated in further detail *apokeryxis* in Cantarella (2016), which I was completing at the time I presented this paper, and was published a few months later. Cfr. Cantarella (2016) pp. 75-77 and 81-86.

⁹ Dem., *c. Beot.*, 1, 39.

is that no father would disown his son unless the son “exceeded in perversity”.¹⁰ An opinion supported by other sources, namely some anecdotes which recount of fathers (or tutors) who considered and discussed the possibility to disown their son or pupil, but at the end avoided to resort to that penalty: the consequences would be too harsh for the culprit, whatever his bad behavior had been.¹¹

From the scarce sources we can infer that the law on *apokeryxis* turned the ethic principle of the filial hierarchical subordination to fathers in a legal rule, even if its value was more ideological than real. According to the sources, not a single case when the law was applied is documented in the sources.

Besides, it is impossible to identify the extreme “perverse” cases in which, according to Aristotle, the sanction would have been applied. We can only imagine that the sons entailed such disgrace and shame for the family name that disowning the culprit would have been the only way to re-establish its honor (with the help of the the *keryx* whose intervention, as the name *apokeryxis* explicitly says, was necessary to the legal validity of the paternal decision).

To conclude, the theoretical existence of *apokeryxis* did not change the relatively mild character of the Athenian paternal power.

All in all nothing leads to imagine, in Athens, a generational conflict such as the one existing in Rome. The limits imposed to paternal powers and the tools given to sons to protect their inheritance expectations suggest that taking care of parents was an ethical duty sufficiently respected without having to be enforced by the threat of a criminal sanction.

But then why the necessity of a law on *gerotrophia*? Why did Solon decide to “resort by law” to impose the moral and social duty for children to take care of their elderly parents? This was the question I asked myself then, and since in later years I did not have the chance to return on the topic, this Symposium was the opportunity to think again over this issue and present some general consideration on *gerotrophia*, which I very briefly advance.

The father-son relations between Solon’s age and the last decades of the fifth century seem to show that during this stretch of time *gerotrophia* took on a new function in addition to the ones it had when it was introduced. The new function was to contain the growth of a generational conflict linked to the progressive democratization of institutions, facilitated in the fifth century by the sophistic revolution, represented by the advent of a new *paideia* and of new teachers. The features of *gerotrophia* that suggested this idea are the following:

- 1) Some categories of persons were exempted from the duty of *gerotrophia*.
 - a) According to Aeschines (*c. Tim.* 13) the children who had been forced by

¹⁰ *Eth. Nic.*, VIII, 16.4 (1163b20-7).

¹¹ Very well known are the cases of Themistocles (Plut. *Them.*, 2, 7-8; Val. Max. 6, 9 ex; Elian., *V.H.* 2,12) and Alcibiades (Plut., *Alc.*, II) for his relationship with his tutor Pericles.

their father into prostitution (whose only duty was to provide burial);

b) According to Plutarch (*Sol.* 22,4, quoting Heraclides Ponticus) children born by *hetairai*;

c) Always according to Plutarch (*Sol.*, 22,1), children to whom the father had not taught a *techne* (which consisted mainly in crafts,¹² but one cannot exclude agriculture).

2) The *graphe goneon kakoseos*, which could be exercised against those who violated this law, was not subjected to the penalties laid down for those who withdrew an accusation or did not reach 1/5 of the votes. As Aristotle writes in *Ath. Pol.* (56, 6), these trials were *azemioi to boulomeno diokein*, without fine for those who wanted to start them.

3) During the trials for *goneon kakosis* the time allowed to the speakers was not limited by the hourglass (*Lys.*, 63, *de hered. Heges.*= fr. 127 Carey, and Harpocration, 167, s.v. *kakoseos*).

4) According to general opinion (based on Diog. Laert. 1,55) the penalty for *goneon kakosis* was *atimia*. Of *atimia* (in the species with conservation of property) also speaks And., *Myst.* 74. According to Lysias instead (*Agor.* 91), a *nomos kakoseos* inflicted the death penalty not only on the natural child who beat his parents but also on the child who denied them assistance, and on the adopted son who stole their property. But this passage is suppressed in most editions as spurious, and according to the general opinion the penalty was *atimia*. However, an important inscription coming from Delphi -that contains the only law on *gerotrophia* preserved epigraphically- brings further evidence concerning the issue of penalty that induces to open a parenthesis.

The (readable part of the) text of the Delphic inscription says:

- 1 [θε]ός, ἔδοξε τᾷ πόλι ἐν ἀγορᾷ [τ]-
 [ελ]είωι σὺν ψάφοις τριακαταία-
 [ς π]εντήκοντα τρίεσσι, τὸν νόμ[ο]-
 [ν ἀ]νγράψαι περὶ τῶν γονέων, βο[υ]-
 5 [λευ]όντων Μελανώπο[υ,]Φιλύτα, Ἡ[ρ]-
 [ακ]λείου, Φειδωρίδα, Ἀγήτορος· [ῶ]-
 [στ]ις κα μὴ τρέφῃ τὸν πατέρα κα
 [ἰ τ]ὰν μητέρα, ἐπεὶ κα [π]οτανγέ[λ]-
 [λη]ται πο[ἰ τ]ὰν βουλὰν, ἂ βουλὰ κατ-
 10 [αδε]ίτω τὸν μὴ τρέφοντα καὶ ἀγ[έ]-
 [το ἐ]ν τὰν δαμοσίαν οἰκίαν ἔντ[ε]
 κα].¹³

¹² See Leão (2005*b*), 43-75 (particularly pp. 49-50 of the comment of the *Life of Solon* 24,4).

¹³ IG transcribes the first seven lines, the following five are integrated from Lerat (1943). I accept the translation “until” proposed by Lerat of the three last letters of line 11 (*ent*)

(Zeus. The city decided in a plenary assembly, with 353 votes, to have the law on parents engraved. Members of the council were Melanopos, ..., Herkleios, Theodoridas, Hagetor. If someone does not provide for his father and mother, when he will be reported to the council, the council will have him who has not provided chained and led in a public jail until ...)

Albeit it is impossible to determine the year in which the law on *gerotrophia* was proposed and approved in Delphi, as the text ordering to recopy it can be traced back to the period between the late 4th and early 3rd century BCE,¹⁴ one can deduce that the requirement of *gerotrophein* had been established in previous times. How long before we cannot say. But we know that the person accused of having violated the law was chained and brought to the public prison. Why and for how long the text does not say. After the word “until” the document is unreadable.

Considering that in principle the prison in Athens and as far as we know in other *poleis* was not a penalty, but a place where criminals awaited the sentence or an execution, a question arises: if the Delphic penalty was *atimia*, as in Athens, why does the text consider preventive detention? The difficulty to find a convincing answer could suggest that the Delphic penalty was not *atimia*, but rather a monetary penalty, in which custody was aimed at obtaining payment.¹⁵ If we take in account this hypothesis, we may suggest that perhaps also in Athens the original penalty was not *atimia* (which would be a very harsh penalty in the context of Solon’s legislation), but, as in Delphi, a monetary penalty, substituted with *atimia* in post-Solonian age.¹⁶

Back to Athens and to the trial features of the actions linked to the *graphe goneon kakoseos* and to other actions (*graphe argias*, *graphe paranomon*) aimed at facilitating it or at avoiding the squandering of family property. Disregarding here the debate on the moment when *graphai* were introduced, on their nature and on the difficulty of identifying them with the actions we call “public actions”,¹⁷ just a few considerations

followed at line 11 by *ka*. According to Lerat *ent* can not be the preposition *en* followed by the indication of a place (given the fact that everybody knew where the public *demasia* was located), or by the indication of a delay imposed to the Council for providing to chain the condemned person: *ent* are rather the first three letters of *ente*, very frequent in Delphic language, followed by *ka* and the subjunctif present in the sense of “till”, “until”, “up to”. Lerat (1943) 68.

¹⁴ More on the subject in Lerat (1943) *loc. cit.*

¹⁵ Interpretation and relevance of the manumission acts found at Delphi, where the owners subordinate the freeing of their slaves to the condition that they should, upon the death of the testator, assume their obligation to *trephein* his parents, in Lerat (1943) 81-83.

¹⁶ On this see Leão (2011) and Leão – Rhodes (2015) 97.

¹⁷ On these issues see (with bibliography) C. Pelloso, “Protecting the community. Public actions and forms of punishment in ancient Athens”, in E. Harris- M. Canevaro (eds.), *Oxford Handbook of Ancient Greek Law*, forthcoming, that I have been able to read thanks to the courtesy of the author.

on their function.¹⁸ In different ways one from another, the actions connected to *gerotrophia* offered a special protection to the interests of the *oikos*, preventing its patrimony from being dispersed, and guaranteeing to the elderly members of the group the rights of *gerotrophia*. The inclusion of the *graphe goneon kakoseos* in the *azemioi to boulomeno diokein*, as the exclusion for the speakers of the hourglass limitations, were clearly designed to encourage hesitant parents to sue, as well as to encourage strangers to intervene in turn of parents who for any reason did not wish to sue their children.

Why these facilitations? Is it possible that in addition to its original and fundamental ideological value, *gerotrophia* was aimed also at limiting the cases of abandonment of elderly ascendants? Or (even without considering similar cases) may these facilitations suggest that generational conflicts were stronger than the legal rules on paternal powers may suggest?

Some documents displaying behaviors and not legal rules (as the ones examined so far), possibly confirm this suspicion. Among these documents are anecdotes, which, together with the gossips that often inspire them, are always useful to reconstruct practices, social assessments, beliefs and mindset.¹⁹

Let us start from one of the many anecdotes regarding the private life of Pericles, who, thanks to his position and also to his unconventional personal choices, was one of the privileged targets of Athenian gossip.

One of Pericles' legitimate children, his eldest named Xanthippos, had –they said– an extravagant and lavish nature, and used to live above his possibilities. Since his father would give him little money and even that little by little, one day Xanthippos asked for a loan, using his father's name, and obtained it. But the debt was not paid on the due date, and when the lender turned to Pericles the latter didn't pay but denounced his son instead (Plut., *Per.* 36, 2-3).²⁰

True or false, the episode offers a number of interesting considerations: obviously, father and son had from a very long time a strained relation. How could we explain, otherwise, Pericles' decision to transfer the confrontation on the city level, renouncing to impose on Xanthippos a penalty in his capacity of *kyrios*? The decision to sue his son suggests an exasperated father, who does not consider himself able or anyways does not wish to further face his son with the disciplinary means at his disposal. And the son's reaction to the father's initiative signals an equally exasperated attitude:

¹⁸ For example the *graphe argias*, once considered as safeguarding the entire community's interest. According to e.g. de Bruyn (1995), 80, its aim would have been to limit an increase of criminality due to idleness and consequent impoverishment. Different position in Leão (2001).

¹⁹ As rightly noted by Hunter (1994) 96, at the beginning of chapter IV on gossip as social construct, quoting the authors who in the past couple of decades started to make use of this kind of documents. Among them recently, Schmitt-Pantel (2009).

²⁰ On the relationship Pericles/Xanthippos and the sociological and psychological consideration that the episode suggests see Cantarella (2016) 81-89.

far from repenting or attempting to recompose the confrontation, Xanthippos raises the tones ridiculing his father throughout Athens, telling about the talks that, he says, Pericles had with the Sophists. More specifically, he ridiculed a conversation of Pericles' with his friend Protagoras. The two had allegedly squandered an entire day discussing who was guilty of the death of a person hit by a javelin: the javelin, the one who hurled it, or the judges of the contest?

The generational problem, in Athens, did not depend on the strictness of the legal rules but rather on the gap between them: namely the theoretical possibility to possess at majority a personal patrimony and the fact that in reality usually this happened only after the death of the father, which usually happened a number of years after the son became of age. In short, before their father's death, the children who reached majority of age had, in terms of property, only hereditary expectations.²¹

Not surprisingly, therefore, the sources speak of many attempts of fathers who helped financially their children to start an activity. As for example did Sopeus, who –as we read in Isocrates' *Trapeziticus*– had started his son (Isocrates' client) to the family activity of wheat maritime trade, giving him ships laden with wheat and giving him money to entertain trade relations with the Greek cities, notably Athens, where apparently he was a metic.²²

But there were also fathers who tried to solve the problem even in a more drastic and final way: to avoid that children should wait until their deaths, they divided their estate among them while alive, sometimes entrusting the management, sometimes transferring the ownership.²³

Lysias, for example, speaking of the provisions taken by Conon and Nicophemus on their property, notes that “you have to consider that, even if a man had distributed among his sons what he had not acquired but inherited from his father, he would have reserved a goodly share for himself; for everyone would rather be courted by his children as a man of means than beg of them as a needy person” (Lys., *On the property of Aristophanes*, 36-37).

The Athenian fathers in short (or at least a number of them) tried to avoid trouble (for themselves and their children) by giving children part or all of their wealth. But as the just mentioned passage by Lysias shows, the fact of having transferred the estate to the children was not sufficient to assure parents that they would be provided for during their old age.

²¹ Matters were further complicated by the fact that Athenians could dread to inherit from their fathers much less than their due according to Solon's law. However, as time passed, the severity of the law relented and a new law established that also those who had sons could dispose of their estate *mortis causa*, provided they took arrangements in case these would die *prin dietes eban*, that is to say before two years since they had reached majority (Dem., *Steph.* 2, 24).

²² Isocr., *Trapez.* 6-7.

²³ This custom was in use also outside Athens, and not only in the Ionian cities: the Gortinian code provides rules for the division of paternal as well as maternal estates (col. IV, at vv. 23-29). See Maffi (1997) 35-39.

Let us overlook, here, that in addition to financial problems between father and son there could also be a sexual rivalry for the young stepmother. When this kind of rivalry existed, it could have devastating effects (as demonstrated in Homer by the story of Phoenix and in the fifth century by Euripides' *Hippolytus*),²⁴ but –although serious when they exploded– those kinds of conflicts were certainly much less frequent than those related to financial dependency, which was in some way 'endemic' to the life of the *polis*, as confirmed by some interesting pages of Aristotle's *Politics*:²⁵ the age difference between father and children –writes Aristotle– should not be too large: those who have children when they are too old have no possibility to benefit from the gratitude of their children, and cannot be of help to them; but the age difference should not be too small: in this case sons have with their father a relationship too similar to the one they share with peers, and they do not respect him, as they should. On the basis of these previous statements (after claiming that men's ability to generate ceases around seventy and females' around fifty) Aristotle identifies the right age for marriage: 18 for women and 37 for men. In this case –he says– children will take their father's place at the time of their maximum strength, when the fathers will have reached the old age (70 years).

In his ideal world, therefore, children should have inherited when they were around 32 years old, but apparently they did not. According to the most widespread opinion the Athenians married younger, around twenty-five, became of age when their father was about fifty-five and when their father reached seventy they were already approximately forty-five: too many to endure financial dependency without serious problems.

Generational relations worried very much Aristotle, and not surprisingly.²⁶ In Athens, during the long years of the Peloponnesian War, the conflict between fathers and sons is a problem testified by all the sources, from historiography to tragedy to comedy, in which it continually comes back in the most diverse and different perspectives.

Let us limit to some examples, starting from tragedy: in *Oresteia*, and particularly in *Eumenides*, the conflict between the young gods (Apollo, Athena) and the old goddesses (the Furies); in *Antigone* the conflict between Haemon and Creon; in *Alcestis* the one between Admetus and his father Pheres, maybe the most interesting: Admetus could avoid death if someone were to die in his place, but only his wife Alcestis agreed to do that: Pheres had refused. After Alcestis' death, Admetus reproaches his father with harshness equal to his father's reply. "I have fed you and clothed you –replies Pheres– but I am not obliged to die for you, neither in our family customs or in the laws of Greece does it say that fathers must die to save their sons." Pheres speaks of *paidotrophia* as an existing law, which if respected –as he says he has

²⁴ See Cantarella (2016) 97-100.

²⁵ Aristot., *Pol.* 1335 a-b. Cfr. Cantarella (2016) 89-90.

²⁶ Interesting considerations on the relations between generations and the importance of different age groups in Athens in Golden (1990), and in Davidson (2006).

done— authorizes the father to expect his son to take care of him in return during his old age, and not to ask him to die.

Passing to comedy, in *Clouds* we assist both to the clash (also physical) between Strepsiades and his son, Pheidippides, and to the contest between the “Right Speech” and the “Wrong Speech”, too well known to be recalled. In *Acharnians* the *gerontes palaioi* reproach the city: “so many are the victories we have gained for the Athenian fleets that we well deserve to be cared for in our declining life; yet far from this, we are ill-used, harassed with law-suits, delivered over to the scorn of stripling orators. Our minds and bodies being ravaged with age, Poseidon should protect us” (vv. 676-682).

The contrast between fathers and sons, rather than being confined within the *oikoi*, produced a strong conflict even in the public space, where young people were coming up with their own ideas, sometimes trying to influence the city’s international policy. As it happened, with not irrelevant consequences, in 415, when Alcibiades (exponent of the *neoi*, favorable to the expedition in Sicily) confronted in the assembly the elder (*presbuteros*) Nicias, who wisely was listing the dangers of the expedition (the reconstruction of Nicias’ speech in Thucydides, VI, 9-14, of Alcibiades’ speech in VI, 16-18). Carried away by the enthusiasm and the eloquence of Alcibiades the youths were the most enthusiastic supporters of the expedition. Independently from the outcome, it was one of the moments, perhaps the moment in which the harshness of the contrast and the ability of the young people to have the best on their fathers had been stronger.

The circumstances that determined this phenomenon are complex: in Athens, simplistically, many thought it was an effect of sophistic education, considered to be cause of the destruction of old values. And it is indisputable that this education, as described in a caricature in Aristophanes’ *Clouds* (presented in 423), beyond the excesses typical of comedy, reflects the opinions of part of the Athenians. But if it is true that conservatives who shared this analysis of the facts could have some reason to do so, it is also true that they did not realize, or did not want to realize, that the causes of the crisis had deeper and more ancient roots and more complex and diversified causes.

As a matter of fact these issues existed long before the arrival of the Sophists: in the *polis* there was, so to speak, a structural contradiction between the position of son and that of citizen, which had been increased by the progressive democratization. As a citizen, a son could and was used to express his will in the assemblies, just like his father (whose vote was equal to his). But as a son, even if he had reached majority, his duty was to respect and obey his father, a duty aggravated by the financial subordination in which he often lived. The conflict, in short, was a mental state that, even when it did not manifest in behaviors, served as a background to the relations between generations making delicate and complicated the interactions among family members belonging to different age groups²⁷

²⁷ To quote only one among many possible examples, in 472 BCE, in Aeschylus’ *Persians*,

These problems in short existed from a long time, and around the mid fifth century alongside radical democracy, also the sophistic revolution increased the contrast and facilitated as a result actual conflicts. Although it would be excessive to talk, as some have done, of a generational conflict never seen up to that time, the opposition was strong on both the ideological and the practical level. And that might explain the revival, so to speak, of the law on *gerotrophia*.²⁸

Returning to the law, to try to reach a conclusion, we can distinguish two moments in its history.

The first is obviously the moment of its birth, when *gerotrophia* was established in order to respond to diverse needs: in the first place a fundamentally ideological requirement of affirming the crucial value of respect and gratitude towards parents (and grand-parents). M. do Céu Fialho has rightly observed that *gerotrophia* is one of those ancestral laws aimed at transferring on the civic level the natural principles that were later called *agrapta nomina*, specifically that natural principle of reciprocity (essential for the survival of the species) between the time in which parents give birth to children and provide for their subsistence (*paidotrophia*) and the one in which the children take care of the elderly when the latter are no longer able to do so.²⁹ However important, it is important to recall that the Solonian law did not have only this ideological function: it had also a socio-economical aim, entrusted to the duty of teaching sons a trade or a craft. As Plutarch says (Plut. *Sol.*, 22) at that time many abandoned the fields to move to town, and those who traded by sea did not want to import goods for those who had nothing to give in return. The law met also the needs of making the Athenians aware of the problem and of the importance of *technai*.

The second moment of the life of the law might be connected with the moment when, in the fifth century, at the time of the maximum juxtaposition between generations, it started to be seen as an instrument to contrast the increasing conflict between generations. The facilitations granted to those who filed the *graphe goneon kakoseos* and therefore the possibility for the transgressors of being condemned, could act, or at least one could hope would act as a deterrent, inducing children not to come short of their duties. Finally I must spend a word, again, on the law of Delphi: perhaps it is no coincidence that in that city the law on *gerotrophia* was republished between the last years of the 4th century BCE and the first of the 3rd. Perhaps it was considered necessary as a warning for young people, in order to

the ghost of Darius puts the blame of the defeat of Salamis on his son Xerxes, who forgetting all caution and teachings of his predecessors had attempted to subdue Greece, attacking it from land and sea. To invade Greece he had arrived to lock up the Bosphorus. Darius seeks an explanation of his son's endeavor in the fact that his son "in the folly of youth, forgot my advice" (v. 744).

²⁸ I do not go into the problem of youth groups and associations, which as important as certainly it is, has no relevance for the period I am discussing. On this subject I would just refer to Fröhlich & Hamon (2013).

²⁹ Fialho (2010).

remind them of the existence of an old and by then obsolete or perhaps never used law. Perhaps, also the Delphic legislator was worried about the effects of sophistic education.

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