

## **IV**

# **On cognitions that are not episodes of knowledge**



This chapter aims to provide additional information regarding each of the five types of awareness that do not qualify as knowledge. It provides clues regarding the origin of these categories and the associated terminology (building on a previous discussion in Hugon 2014) and explains our choice of translation. The various understandings of these categories among Tibetan scholars are also discussed, focusing on the issues raised by Phya pa in the *Mun sel* and those relevant to the constitution of Phya pa's own position.

## 1. Non-ascertaining perception (*snang la ma nges pa*)

### (a) Terminology

The term *snang la ma nges pa* appears to have been originally coined as a descriptive term for the corresponding instances of awareness. Depending on how one understands the role of the particle *la*, one may understand these as cases for which there is no determination *with regard to* what appears, or cases in which there is the appearing (of something) *and* no determination (of it). The definitions of *snang la ma nges pa* cited by Phya pa support the idea that the corresponding instances of awareness are characterized by the conjunction of two criteria (one corresponding to *snang*, the other to *ma nges pa*), but this characterization may differ from the original intent of the expression.

This category and the corresponding term seem to be issued from rNgog Lo's reading of Dharmottara's discussions about the function and the result of knowledge. In his *Rigs thigs 'grel ṭi ka*, after identifying the passages of the *Nyāyabinduṭīkā* dealing with the non-application of the definition of knowledge to mistaken cognition, doubt, and factive assessment (i.e., NBT<sub>skt</sub> 21,2–23,1), rNgog Lo states:

*bCad pa'i yul can* and *snang la ma nges pa* are not discussed here.

This is because the analysis of these cases has been established previously when stating that the indication of an object of engagement is the function of knowledge; indeed, these two do not have the function of indicating the object of engagement.<sup>1</sup>

In rNgog Lo's exegesis of the passage indicated here, which can be identified as NBT<sub>skt</sub> 19,1–4 (Tib. D237b–38a1), the term *snang la ma nges pa*

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<sup>1</sup> See Hugon 2014: 234 (Tibetan text) and 219 (translation).

does not come forth, nor does the notion of *nges pa*. The discussion focuses, rather, on the idea of “understanding” (Skt. *adhigati*, *adhigama*; Tib. *rtogs pa*), which is identified as the result of knowledge (*pramāṇaphala*) and that through which the function of knowledge (*pramāṇavyāpāra*) is fulfilled.<sup>2</sup> Contrapositively, episodes of awareness that do not provide understanding are not knowledge.

But in a parallel passage in the *Pramāṇaviniścayaṭīkā*, Dharmottara states that “the function of knowledge is fulfilled with regard to the engaged object because an appearance that is determined is indicated” (Tib. *snang ba nges par byas pa ni bstan pa yin pa'i phyir*).<sup>3</sup> It is uncertain which Sanskrit expression *nges par byas pa* actually translates in this passage. The following sentence of the *Pramāṇaviniścayaṭīkā*, which discusses the case of a mistaken identification of the object that appears (e.g., the identification of a mirage as “water”), features the Tibetan *nges pa* for the Sanskrit *avasāya*. This could suggest that the expression *nges par*

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<sup>2</sup> Cf. NBT<sub>Skt</sub> 19,1: *ata eva cārthādhigatir eva pramāṇaphalam* /; Tib. D37b6–7: *de bas na don rtogs pa kho na tshad ma'i 'bras bu yin la* / and NBT<sub>Skt</sub> 19,2: *tathā ca saty arthādhigamāt samāptaḥ pramāṇavyāpāraḥ* /; Tib. D37b7: *de ltar na don rtogs par 'gyur ba'i phyir tshad ma'i bya ba rdzogs pa yin no* //

<sup>3</sup> PVinṬ(a) 15,7–12: *don thob par byed pa ni tshad ma yin la / de yang 'jug par byed pa nyid yin gyi gghan ni ma yin no* // *'jug par byed pa yang 'jug pa'i yul ston par nyid yin par brjod de / des na snang ba nges par byas pa ni bstan pa yin pa'i phyir 'jug pa'i yul la tshad ma'i bya ba yongs su rdzogs pa yin no* // “Causing one to obtain (Skt. *prāpakatvam*) the object’ is what it is to be knowledge. And this, in turn, amounts just to ‘motivating’ (literally ‘making one act,’ Skt. *pravartakatvam*) and not something else. ‘Motivating’ is said to be just ‘indicating the engaged object’ (Skt. *pravṛtṭiṣayapradarśakatvam*). Thus, the function of knowledge with regard to the engaged object is completely fulfilled because an appearance that is determined is indicated.”

In yet another parallel passage in his short *Prāmāṇyaparīkṣā*, Dharmottara refers, for the fulfillment of the function of knowledge, to the engaged object being indicated, the person being motivated, and the object being obtained. PPar II 5,15–6,3: *gang gi tshe 'dis 'jug pa'i yul rab tu bstan pa de'i tshe skyes bu rab tu 'jug cing don kyang thob pa'i phyir tshad ma'i bya ba yongs su rdzogs pa yin no* //. Krasser (1991, Teil 2: 38) translates: “Wenn das Handlungsobjekt von dieser (gültigen Erkenntnis) aufgezeigt ist, dann ist der Mensch motiviert und der Gegenstand einer, der erreicht gelassen worden ist (*prāpita*). Damit ist die Funktion der gültigen Erkenntnis völlig abgeschlossen.”

*byas pa*, which has been translated here as “determined” could translate *avasita*. But *niścita* or *niścetavya* are also possibilities.<sup>4</sup>

It might be this passage of the *Pramānaviniścayaṭīkā* that suggested the use of the expression *snang la ma nges pa*, connoting the absence of “determination” (*nges pa*) rather than the absence of “understanding” (*rtogs pa*). rNgog Lo did, however, classify this type (together with *bcad pa'i yul can*) in the overhead category of “non-understanding” (*ma rtogs*). But when explaining why it does not qualify as knowledge, he picks up, rather, on the absence of positive ascertainment (*yongs su gcod pa*) associated with the absence of determination (*nges pa*) (see below).

## (b) Understanding of the category

There is actually no definition or even an example of an instance of this category in rNgog Lo’s works. It is merely discussed in terms of not being an instance of knowledge. In the *dKa' gnas*, rNgog Lo explains the case of *snang la ma nges pa* together with post-knowledge cognition:

Although these two ultimately have the function of intelligence (*rig pa*), they cannot be conventionally designated as “ascertainers” (*yongs su gcod byed*) because there is no determination (*nges pa*) of something that was not previously known.<sup>5</sup>

In this argument, one must undoubtedly understand that “there is no determination” is the reason for excluding *snang la ma nges pa*, and the absence of determination “of something that was not previously known” is the reason for excluding post-knowledge cognition.

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<sup>4</sup> In rNgog Lo’s translation of the *Pramānaviniścayaṭīkā*, one finds *nges par byas pa* (D88b1) translating *niścetavyaḥ* (PVinṭ 3 84b4). In another passage, *nges pa'am / nges par byas su zin kyang* (D68b2) translates *avasito niścito pi* (PVinṭ 3 65a3) (although one could have expected the terms in the reverse order). In the translation of the *Nyāyabinduṭīkā*, one finds once *nges par bya ba* (D64b6) for *niścetavya* (162,8).

<sup>5</sup> *dKa' gnas* (see Hugon 2014: 232–233 for the edition of the whole passage): *don dam par rig pa'i byed pa yod kyang / sngar ma rtogs pa nges pa myed pas yongs su gcod byed kyi tha snyad du bya ba ma yin la /*. See Hugon 2014: 214 for a brief preliminary discussion. In the *Rigs thigs 'grel ṭi ka*, both are classified as “non-understanding” on account of “lacking the function of conventional understanding” (*tha snyad pa'i rtogs pa'i byed pa dang bral ba yin pas*). See Hugon 2014: 234 for the edition of the relevant passage and p. 219 and 222 for a discussion.

rNgog Lo held ascertainment (*yongs su gcod pa*), in the form of a conceptual determination (*nges pa*), to be a requirement for knowledge (see, I.2, 4.2). In the case of perception, this determination is provided by a subsequent determining cognition. Correlatively, cases of *snang la ma nges pa* are thus cases where no such subsequent determining cognition occurs. rNgog Lo might thus potentially be credited with the definition of *snang la ma nges pa* that Phya pa cites in *Mun sel* 123.1(a) (cf. §6.1 [i] in this chapter):

Some assert as the definition of *snang la ma nges pa* “not bringing about a determining cognition, but appearing.”

This definition is also cited by gTsang nag pa (cf. 6.1 [ix]) and by mTshur ston (6.1 [xi]). An interlinear note on the manuscript of mTshur ston’s work attributes this view to “rtag pa” or “stag pa,” who can probably be identified as rTag/sTag pa Kha che (“tak pa kha ché”), a disciple of Khyung Rin chen grags and bKa’ gdams pa teacher of epistemology and Madhyamaka.<sup>6</sup> gTsang drug rdo rje, who also cites this definition (6.1 [xv]), attributes it to “some commentator”—a marginal note provides the nominal reference “chos,” i.e., Dharmottara.

Phya pa rejects this definition by using the same argument that he uses to reject the position that the arising of a subsequent determining cognition is a requirement for perceptual knowledge (cf. *Mun sel* 112.23).<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>6</sup> rTag/sTag pa Kha che ba and rGya dmar ba Byang chub grags, the two principal students of Khyung (see Vetturini 2007: 333), are referred to together as “the pair, rGya and sTag” (*rgya stag gnyis*) (*Deb sngon* 163, Vitali 2015: 543 and n. 56). rTag pa Kha che was also a disciple of Rwa Lo tsā ba rdo rje grags (*Deb sngon* 456, Cuevas 2015: 61, n. 25). He taught epistemology and Madhyamaka in Upper Nyang (*nyang stod*). Among his students one finds lHa rje rgya nag (“lhar jé gya nak”) (*Deb sngon* 163) and rMe’u dgongs mdzod ri khrod chen po (“meu gong dzö ri trö chen po,” 1038–1096) (Kværne 1973: 31).

In the *Tshad bsdus*, four other views are ascribed to someone called “sTag pa” (pp. 113, 142, 240, 266; cf. van der Kuijp 2003: 416). But the author of the *Tshad bsdus* does not discuss the definition of *snang la ma nges pa* under consideration. A view on the nature of the logical reason is also ascribed to “sTag pa” in an interlinear note on the manuscript of the *dBu ma de kho na nyid* of rGya dmar ba (23b2).

<sup>7</sup> Note that the notion “unable to bring about a determining cognition” (*nges shes ’dren mi nus pa*) is associated by Phya pa with “non-ascertaining perception” in ‘*Od zer* 59a4 when commenting on the prose passage following PVin 1.19d. Since elsewhere in the ‘*Od zer* his views on *snang la ma nges pa* concord

Phya pa also criticizes a second alternative definition in *Mun sel* 123.1(b) (6.1 [ii]):

Alternatively, some say “the appearing of a real particular, and co-existing with a superimposition.”

This definition is rarely cited by later scholars.<sup>8</sup> It is likely to have been an alternative option that was not well-known or broadly adopted, and even not held to be significant.

Yet another definition is cited in the *Tshad bsdus* and is ascribed to “rGya” (6.1 [vii]):

An appearing that is compatible with superimpositions.

The author of the *Tshad bsdus* notes the problem that this formulation does not specify that a real particular appears, thus opening the door to the definitional criterion applying to cases other than perception.<sup>9</sup>

The second alternative definition cited by Phya pa and the definition ascribed to “rGya” in the *Tshad bsdus* (6.1 [ii] and [vii]) are interesting in that they explicitly bring into play the notion of “superimpositions.” One may thus hypothesize that their proponents favored a corresponding notion as one criterion in their definition of knowledge. This would imply, in particular in the case of the definition ascribed to “rGya” (presumably Phya pa’s teacher rGya dmar ba), a precedent for a criterion of knowledge along the lines of Phya pa’s K1 as it is formulated in the *’Od zer* (see I.2, 3.2.1).

Phya pa himself adopts as the definition of *snang la ma nges pa* (*Mun sel* 123.12) (6.1 [iii]):

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with that in the *Mun sel*, this may be explained as the result of a re-use from some other work supporting this definition of *snang la ma nges pa* (possibly rNgog Lo’s commentary).

<sup>8</sup> So far we have found only a single citation of this definition—in gTsang drug rdo rje’s *gSal byed* (cf. 6.1 [xiv]).

<sup>9</sup> *Tshad bsdus* 54,18–19: *rgya na re sgro ’dogs dang mi ’gal ba’i snang ba yin no zhes zer te mngon sum ma yin pa la snang la ma nges pa yod dam med dpyad par bya ’o //*

The appearing of a real particular, and compatible with opposite superimpositions.<sup>10</sup>

This definition may be seen as an adaptation of what was reportedly rGya's definition, making explicit the requirement that a real particular appears, a requirement that excludes all types of awareness that are not perceptual.

This requirement was integrated by the majority of Phya pa's successors with one notable exception. Chu mig pa, after refuting a definition similar to Phya pa's definition (6.1 [xvii]), states a definition that does not include this requirement (6.1 [xviii]):

An apprehending cognition which does not bring about a determining cognition with regard to the appearing object.

Chu mig pa exploits the whole range of the notion of "appearing" in distinguishing three subtypes of *snang la ma nges pa* (*rNam rgyal* A9a4; B11a9):

- Perceptual (*mngon sum snang la ma nges pa*). For instance, a cognition apprehending something blue, to which something momentary appears.
- Conceptual (*rtog pa snang la ma nges pa*). For instance, a conceptual cognition to which a verbal object that is like an illusion (*sgyu ma lta bu*, Skt. *māyopama*) appears.
- Non-conceptual and erroneous (*rtog med 'khrul pa snang la ma nges pa*). For instance, the cognition apprehending a double moon to which the aspect of a double moon that is like an illusion appears.

The first type corresponds to the standard understanding of *snang la ma nges pa*, in which there is the appearing of a real particular. In the other two types, what appears is not an entity. Chu mig pa thus explicitly endorses the extension of the category of *snang la ma nges pa* to cases that are not perceptions—an extension which, as the author of the *Tshad bsdus* noted with regard to the definition ascribed to rGya dmar ba (see above), could be held to be problematic.

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<sup>10</sup> Phya pa states his definition in the same terms in the *'Od zer* (6.1 [iv], [v], [vi]). Despite the slight modifications of formulation, he always includes the two criteria of the particular appearing, and of the compatibility with opposite superimpositions.



One can note that Chu mig pa also does not adopt the criterion of being “compatible with opposite superimpositions,” espousing instead the criterion of “not bringing about a determining cognition.” This phrasing was found in the first alternative definition refuted by Phya pa. Chu mig pa adopts this phrasing in full awareness of Phya pa’s criticism.<sup>11</sup>

As discussed in the introduction (I.2, 4.4), Sa paṅ, who supported a passive model of perception, rejected the very legitimacy of *snang la ma nges pa* as a category of awareness that is not knowledge distinct from perception. Phya pa does not confront any analogue position, which may indicate that the active perception model was in majority shared by his Tibetan forerunners and contemporaries.

Interestingly, an objection that corresponds to Sa paṅ’s criticism is addressed by Chu mig pa:

Some say: It is not correct to posit perceptual *snang la ma nges pa* as an awareness that is not knowledge, because it is knowledge. This is because all perceptions are knowledge.<sup>12</sup>

One may add this passage to a growing list of evidence that tends to indicate that Chu mig pa’s work was composed after Sa paṅ’s *Rigs gter*, or at least under some influence of a tradition of interpretation stemming from Sa paṅ’s questioning of the mainstream views flowing from scholars associated with gSang phu monastery.

Sa paṅ’s criticism was also taken seriously by some authors in the later dGe lugs pa tradition, who, following mKhas grub rje, shied away from distinguishing perception from perceptual knowledge and thus did not acknowledge *snang la ma nges pa* as a distinct type of awareness (see I.2, 2.3). On the other hand, in *blo rigs* texts by other dGe lugs pa authors, one can observe that *snang la ma nges pa* is typically preserved as a distinct category among those episodes of awareness that do not qualify as knowledge, in spite of the fact that the definition of knowledge does not make explicit a criterion equivalent to the notion of “ascertainment” in

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<sup>11</sup> Chu mig pa addresses in particular Phya pa’s objection that the last moment of the reflexive awareness of a determining cognition would be *snang la ma nges pa* (see *Mun sel* 123.1 [a]). Contrary to Phya pa, Chu mig pa accepts that this is indeed a case of *snang la ma nges pa*. See *rNam rgyal* A9a4; B11a8.

<sup>12</sup> *rNam rgyal* A9a4–5; B11a9–b1: *kha l mngon sum snang la ma* <sub>[A9a5][B11b1]</sub> {A ditto ma} *nges pa de tshad ma ma yin pa’i blor byed pa de mi ’thad de* {A de mi ’thad de, B mi ’thad do} / *tshad ma yin pa’i phyir te* / {A *phyir te* /, B *phyir ro* //} *mngon sum thams cad tshad ma yin pa’i phyir ro zhe na /*

rNgog Lo's indirectly active model or that in Phya pa's directly active model.<sup>13</sup>

### Subdivisions

A question arose in the course of our edition of the *Mun sel* regarding the number of types that Phya pa recognizes for this category. Indeed, only two types are listed in the text (*Mun sel* 123.11):

- (i) No ascertainment due to the object being a non-manifest feature. For example: "momentariness" when perceiving an entity;
- (ii) No ascertainment due to not focusing one's mind. For example: "blue" when being absorbed in one's thoughts.

But a third one is given in an interlinear note (see III, 4.β):

- (iii) No ascertainment due to being overwhelmed by causes of error.

We considered the interlinear note to represent an additional remark rather than the insertion of a portion of text skipped by the copyist. The text indeed announces two types (*gnyis te*), and each of those is given an illustration, whereas there is no illustration for case (iii) in the note.

The subdivisions of non-ascertaining perception are not spelled out in Phya pa's *'Od zer*. In his *Pham byed*, Śākya mchog ldan reports that Phya pa divided *snang la ma nges pa* into two categories, namely (i) and (ii) above (see V, 1, R52.2). But the illustration mentioned by Śākya mchog ldan for the second type (an auditory perception failing to ascertain "sound" when the mind is drawn towards a beautiful form) reveals the influence of the later tradition. In his *Rol mtsho* (see V, 1, R51.6), Śākya mchog ldan refers to three subcategories of *snang la ma nges pa* in "Phya pa's summary" (*phyas bsdus*), giving as an example of the third: a visual perception of mother-of-pearl in the case the latter is mistaken to be silver. This is also the example given for the third category by Go rams pa in his

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<sup>13</sup> For instance, in dGe bshes 'Jam dpal bsam 'phel's *blo rigs* work (Rinbochay&Napper 1980), knowledge is defined as "a newly non-deceiving awareness" (7b4: *gsar du mi slu ba'i rig pa*), and there is no mention of "elimination of superimpositions" or of another form of "ascertainment" being involved. Still, *snang la ma nges pa* is accepted as a type of awareness that is not knowledge, defined as "an awareness in which the real particular which is the own engaged object of this [awareness] clearly appears, but which is unable to bring about a determinate cognition in its regard" (6b3: *rang gi 'jug yul du gyur pa'i rang mtshan gsal bar snang yang de la nges pa 'dren mi nus pa'i rig pa*).

account of the views of “previous scholars such as Phya pa, etc.” (see V, 1, R6.2).

The three-fold division is well attested in the works of Phya pa’s students and close successors:<sup>14</sup>

- gTsang nag pa identifies as a third category the case where “the feature is clearly appearing and the mind is focused, but there is no determination due to causes of errors,” giving as an example the case where a rope appears but is conceptually determined to be a snake.<sup>15</sup>
- mTshur ston lists the same third category as gTsang nag pa, with the rope/snake example together with the example of mother-of-pearl appearing, but being determined to be silver.<sup>16</sup> In both cases, the cause of error is explained in term of “having perceived something similar” (*chos mthun pa mthong pa*), namely, a mother-of-pearl is white, like silver, and a rope is variegated, like a snake.
- The mother-of-pearl/silver case also figures as an example of a third category in the *Tshad bsdus*, a category that is described in terms of a specific cause of error: the object being distant (*thag ring ba’i stobs kyis snang la ma nges pa*).<sup>17</sup>

While a third category is not explicitly distinguished in the *Mun sel*, Phya pa does mention the case of mother-of-pearl as an instance of *snang la ma nges pa* (*Mun sel* 123.13). This raises the question of whether (like

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<sup>14</sup> In addition to the instances cited below, see also gTsang drug rdo rje’s *gSal byed*. The third category is termed *yul chos mthun pas ’khrul nas snang la ma nges pa* (9b8) and is also exemplified by the silver/mother-of-pearl example (10a1–2).

<sup>15</sup> *bsDus pa* 23a3: *gsal ba la yid gtad kyang ’khrul pa’i rgyu mtshan gyis mi nges par ’gyur te / thag pa snang pa las sbrul du rtog pa lta bu’o //*

<sup>16</sup> *sGron ma* 5b7–8: *gsuM pa ni {=’khrul pa’i rgyu mtshan gyis zin pa’i snang la ma nges pa} chos mthun pa mthong pa las rtog pa nya phyis la dngul du ’khrul pa’i tshe mig shes la nya phyis kar po snang yang ma nges pa lta bu’o // de bzhin du rtog pa thag pa’i khra bo la sbrul du ’khrul pa’i tshe mig shes la thag pa snang yang ma nges pa lasogs pa rgya cher shes par bya’o // de dag gi tshe mig shes ni dkar po tsam <sub>[5b8]</sub> dang khra bo tsam la tshad mar ’gyur pa yin no //*

<sup>17</sup> *Tshad bsdus* 54,21–55,1: *thag ring ba’i stobs kyis snang la ma nges pa ni thag ring po na nya phyis snang yang nges ma nus pa lta bu ste /*

his successors) he conceived of it as a case distinct from the two categories he listed as subdivisions of *snang la ma nges pa* (which, in such a case, would not be exhaustive), or whether he meant this case to be subsumed in one of these two categories. In the eventuality of the second option, since the appearing of the mother-of-pearl is obviously not a case of inattentive perception (ii), it should be assimilated with (i). If the example of the mother-of-pearl is strictly speaking a case where there is no ascertainment due to the object being a non-manifest feature, this would imply that the character of being “manifest” or “non-manifest” is not purely objective, but can be circumstantial. Indeed, when dealing with this example, Phya pa explains that one can “subsequently ascertain that the object is mother-of-pearl by getting closer to it.” This suggests that, given the proper spatial location, “mother-of-pearl” is a manifest feature in the same way “pot” or “blue” would be, a feature which can be ascertained by perceptual knowledge. Let us note that, in contrast, in the prototypical example of the first category of *snang la ma nges pa*, the perception of something impermanent, “impermanence” is characterized by Phya pa as a “non-manifest feature” even in situations where an ascertainment of it can nevertheless be achieved (such as in episodes of reflexive awareness of skilled cognizers, i.e., “Noble Beings”).<sup>18</sup>

### (c) Translation

In modern scholarship (including in previous publications by the authors of the present volume), the term *snang la ma nges pa* is found translated as “unascertained appearing,” “indeterminate appearing,” “unascertained appearance,” “undetermined appearance” and suchlike expressions, or more literally oriented expressions such as “indeterminate (cognition) as

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<sup>18</sup> This is pointed out in the *'Od zer* when discussing reflexive awareness: “With regard to non-manifest features such as “impermanence,” etc., the reflexive awareness of ordinary persons is usually a non-ascertaining perception, but there are circumstances where non-manifest features such as “efficacy,” etc. are ascertained via the ascertainment of the effect. As for Noble Beings, (their reflexive awareness) is perceptual knowledge even with regard to non-manifest features.” (*'Od zer* 59a4–5: *skad cig lasogs pa rnam myed la ni so so'i skye bo'i rang rig phal cher snang la ma nges pa yin la | nus pa lasogs pa'i rnaM myed 'bras bu nges pa'i shugs la nges pa'i skabs kyang yod de / 'phags pa rnams ni rnam myed la'ang mngon sum tshad* [<sub>59a5</sub>] *mar 'gyur ba'o /*)

to what is present” (van der Kuijp 1978), “nonascertainment of what is apparently present” (van der Kuijp 2009) or “awareness to which the object appears but is not ascertained” (Rinbochay&Napper 1980). Dreyfus (1997a) renders it as “inattentive cognition,” which, however, only connotes one of the subcategories of *snang la ma nges pa* (that in which there is an absence of focus).

In our translation, we chose “non-ascertaining perception,” thus departing from an attempt at a literal rendering of the term in favor of a concise expression which conveys in a more precise way the type of cognition involved, based on the (almost unanimously) shared notion that *snang la ma nges pa* is a subtype of perception which differs from perceptual knowledge in that it does not have the feature that makes perceptual knowledge “active.” Phrasing the latter specificity in terms of being “non-ascertaining” allows for our rendering to fit the various understandings of *nges pa* adopted by supporters and detractors of this category of awareness.

In light of the above-mentioned fact that *Chu mig pa* also accepts instances of *snang la ma nges pa* that are not perceptual, our translation of “non-ascertaining perception” cannot be extended to *Chu mig pa*’s account. One would have there to adopt a more literal translation for this term.



## 2. Post-knowledge cognition (*bcad pa'i yul can*)

### (a) Terminology

#### Origin

The origin of the technical term *bcad pa'i yul can*<sup>19</sup> for this category appears to be the translation of the Sanskrit term *adhigataviṣaya*, a possessive compound meaning “whose object has been understood.” This expression is found in the passage below from Dharmottara’s *Nyāyabinduṭīkā*, which is also where, according to rNgog Lo’s concise guide to this text (*Rigs thigs 'grel ṭi ka*), Dharmottara excludes this category from being an instance of knowledge:

Therefore, knowledge has for its object something that has not yet been understood (Skt. *anadhigataviṣaya*, Tib. *ma bcad pa'i yul can*). A person is incited to act and an object is obtained by means of the very cognition by which the object is first understood (Skt. *prathamam adhigato 'rthaḥ*, Tib. *thog ma nyid du don rtogs pa*). And with regard to this (object), then, what else would be achieved by another cognition? Therefore, [a cognition] whose object has already been understood (Skt. *adhigataviṣaya*, Tib. *bcad pa'i yul can*) is not knowledge.<sup>20</sup>

Here, Dharmottara restricts the “understanding of the object” (*arthādhi-gati*)—which he identified as the result of knowledge (see n. 2 above)—to the initial (*prathamam*) understanding of the object, and expresses what amounts to a “criterion of novelty.”

In this passage of the *Nyāyabinduṭīkā*, one finds two concurrent translations for *adhigata* (in bold in fn. 20): the Tibetan *rtogs pa*, which

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<sup>19</sup> The spelling *gcad pa'i yul can* is also frequently used in the manuscript of the *Mun sel* (but less often than *bcad pa'i yul can*), but never in that of the *'Od zer*.

<sup>20</sup> NBT<sub>Skt</sub> 19,2–4: *ata eva cānadhigataviṣayaṃ pramāṇam / yenaiva hi jñānena prathamam **adhigato** 'rthaḥ / tenaiva pravartitaḥ puruṣaḥ / prāpitaś cārthaḥ / tatraiva cātha kim anyena jñānenādhikaṃ kāryam / ato **'dhigataviṣayaṃ** apramāṇam*; Tib. D37b7–38a1: *de bas na ma **bcad pa**'i yul can ni tshad ma yin te / shes pa gang gis thog ma nyid du don **rtogs pa** de nyid kyis skyes bu bcug par gyur cing don dang phrad par gyur pa yang yin te / don de kho na la ni shes pa gzhan gyis lhag pa ci byar yang med do // de bas na **bcad pa**'i yul can ni tshad ma ma yin no //*

matches the translation of *adhigati* in the earlier sentence on the result of knowledge, and the Tibetan *bcad pa* in the expressions *bcad pa 'i yul can* (for the Sanskrit *adhigataviṣaya*) and *ma bcad pa 'i yul can* (for the Sanskrit *anadhigataviṣaya*). The latter translation appears specific to the *Nyāyabinduṭīkā*. In a parallel discussion in Dharmakīrti's *Hetubindu* (HB<sub>Skt</sub> 3,3–5,3)—which was not translated by rNgog Lo, but by Prajñāvarman and dPal brtsegs rakṣita (“pel tsek rakṣita”) around the beginning of the 9<sup>th</sup> century—the phrase *anadhigatārthaviṣayaṃ pramāṇam* (HB<sub>Skt</sub> 3,12) is translated *don ma rtogs pa 'i yul can tshad ma yin* (HB<sub>Tib</sub> 34,13). And the related phrase *anadhigataviṣayatvāt pramāṇasya* in Dharmakīrti's *Pramāṇaviniścaya* (PV<sub>inSkt</sub> 1 20,1) is translated by rNgog Lo as *tshad ma ni ma rtogs pa 'i yul can yin pa nyid kyi phyir* (PV<sub>inTib</sub> 1 60,17–18).<sup>21</sup>

rNgog Lo thus departs in his translation of the *Nyāyabinduṭīkā* from the more standard translation *rtogs pa* for *adhigata* (resp. *ma rtogs pa* for *anadhigata*), adopting instead the term *bcad pa* (resp. *ma bcad pa*). But he only does so for the two expressions in the passage under consideration.<sup>22</sup> As previously suggested (Hugon 2014: 222), this particular choice of translation might be related to rNgog Lo's understanding of the definitional criterion of knowledge, which he takes to be expressed in the *Pramāṇaviniścaya* by the Sanskrit expression *paricchidya*, which rNgog Lo translates as *yongs su gcod byed* (see I.2, 4.2, Dhk1)—*bcad pa* being the past form of *gcod pa*. Interestingly, in his commentary on the *Nyāyabinduṭīkā*, Durvekamiśra associates the meaning of *adhigati/adhigata* with that of *paricchitti/paricchinna*.<sup>23</sup>

<sup>21</sup> One also finds *ma rtogs* (presumably for the Sanskrit *anadhigata*) in the translation of a similar phrase in Dharmottara's PV<sub>inT</sub> 1. See PV<sub>inT</sub>(a) 9,15–16: *tshad ma thams cad ni ma rtogs pa 'i don can kho na yin no //*

<sup>22</sup> Given the predominance of *rtogs pa* as a translation elsewhere, it could be speculated that the translation *bcad pa* in the *Nyāyabinduṭīkā* represents one of the modifications brought by rNgog Lo to the previous translation of the text by Dharmāloka. Unfortunately, this hypothesis cannot be verified as the passage under discussion is not part of the incomplete manuscript of this earlier translation (on which see Lasic 2006).

<sup>23</sup> See DhP 19,8 ad NBT<sub>Skt</sub> 19,1: *ata evāsmād eva kāraṇād arthasyādadhigatiḥ paricchittiḥ phalam* and DhP 19,26 ad NBT<sub>Skt</sub> 19,2: *anadhigato jñānāntareṇāparicchinno viṣayo 'rtho yasya tat pramāṇam bhavati /*



## Evolution

While rNgog Lo, Phya pa and gTsang nag pa use the term *bcad pa'i yul can* for this category, a terminological change is attested as early as mTshur ston, who already uses both *bcad pa'i yul can* (once spelled *dpyad pa'i yul can*) and *bcad shes*. Sa paṅ does as well (with a marked preference for *bcad shes*), and Chu mig pa uses the homonyms *bcad shes/dpyad shes/spyad shes* exclusively.<sup>24</sup> The latter become the standard in works of the classical period.

It is possible that the first change, from *bcad pa'i yul can* to *bcad shes*, resulted from the understanding of *bcad pa'i yul can* as *bcad pa'i shes pa* rather than, as in rNgog Lo's use of the term, as the translation of the Sanskrit possessive compound *adhigataviṣaya*. In other words, it would result from ignorance of the origin of the term. As for the other readings, they seem to have been a mere consequence of homonymy. They are not coextensive with any significant difference in the understanding of this category of awareness.<sup>25</sup> It is only at a later period that the various spellings became the object of etymological discussions. As revealed in Lati Rinbochay's oral commentary (Rinbochay&Napper 1989), in such discussions "bcad" in *bcad shes* is related to the meaning "eliminated," which is taken to refer to the elimination of superimpositions by the preceding episode of knowledge. As such, it is related to Phya pa's definition of knowledge, and not to that of rNgog Lo, with whom the term for this category originated.

### (b) Understanding of the category

The passage of the *Nyāyabinduṭīkā* to which the term *bcad pa'i yul can* owes its origin discusses the requirement of novelty in a general way. But a subsequent sentence regarding perception makes it clear that one of the cases that this requirement targets is the determinate cognition following

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<sup>24</sup> This is always spelled *bcad shes* in manuscript A of the *rNam rgyal*, whereas manuscript B has the readings *dpyad shes* and *spyad shes*.

<sup>25</sup> On the alternative use of *bcad shes* and *dpyad shes*, see van der Kuijp 1985: 37. See also the preceding note on the concurrent use of these two spellings in different manuscripts of the same text.

a perceptual episode.<sup>26</sup> The corresponding passage of the *Hetubindu* in which the phrase *anadhigataviṣayaṃ pramāṇam* also occurs (HB<sub>Skt</sub> 3,3–5,3) is likewise concerned with determinate cognitions (*niścaya*) that are characterized as “recollected” (*smārta*), which grasp something that has already been grasped, and correspond to determining cognitions that follow a perception. A particular case in the context of an inferential process is the cognition of the logical reason (*liṅgajñānam*) that arises from the perception of, for instance, smoke (when inferring the presence of fire). Dharmakīrti denies the status of knowledge to such cognitions. The discussion in the *Hetubindu* extends to moments of perception following an initial perceptual episode which Dharmakīrti, on the contrary, holds to be knowledge.

Phya pa, in his enumeration of the three types of *bcad pa'i yul can*, preserves the distinction between two kinds of awareness following an initial perception—(i) another (moment of) perception or (ii) a determining cognition—but classifies both as *bcad pa'i yul can*. As the second is dealt with by Dharmakīrti in terms of “recollecting determination” (*smārto niścayaḥ*), “memory” (*smṛti*) and “recognition” (*pratyabhijñā*),<sup>27</sup> this opens the door to extending the category, as Phya pa does, to any conceptual episode of memory.

Tibetan scholars in Phya pa's time appear to agree that, in the case of perception, the moments following the initial perception still qualify as “perception” even if they do not qualify as “perceptual knowledge.” But what about the moment(s) following an initial moment of inferential cognition? Some authors consider that they still qualify as “inferential cognition” although not as “knowledge” and acknowledge the possibility of an inferential cognition being *bcad pa'i yul can*. Phya pa rejects the claim that they even qualify as “inferential cognition” (see *Mun sel* 123.21). The cases of perceptual knowledge and inferential knowledge are thus not parallel.

The debate around the possibility of an inferential *bcad pa'i yul can* appears to stem from sTod lung-associated scholars: the proponent of the opposite view is identified as a scholar called g.Yor gnyan (“yor nyen”)

<sup>26</sup> NBT<sub>Skt</sub> 20,1–3: *tatra yo 'rtho drṣṭatvena jñātaḥ sa pratyakṣena pravṛttiviṣayī-kṛtaḥ / yasmād yasminn arthe pratyakṣasya sāksāt kāritvavyāpāro vikalpenānugamyate tasya pradarsakam pratyakṣam / tasmād drṣṭatayā jñātaḥ pratyakṣadarśitaḥ /*

<sup>27</sup> See Katsura 1993: 70–72.

in the *Tshad bsdus*<sup>28</sup> and in an interlinear note of the *Tshad nye bsdus* (8b5), and as rGya dmar ba by Śākya mchog ldan (see V, 1, R52.4). g.Yor gnyan flourished in the first half of the 12<sup>th</sup> century and was teaching epistemology to Phag mo gru pa rDo rje rgyal po (“pak mo dru pa dor jé gyel po,” 1110–1170) in sTod lung around 1137 (van der Kuijp 2003: 417). Phya pa, who had been studying under rGya dmar ba in sTod lung from c. 1129 onward and taught Phag mo gru pa as well (van der Kuijp 1983: 60), was possibly directly acquainted with g.Yor gnyan.

In passages related to the notion of *adhigataviṣaya* (resp. *anadhigataviṣaya*), Dharmakīrti and Dharmottara only consider episodes of awareness that follow an episode of knowledge. *bcad pa'i yul can* is also restricted to such cases for Phya pa, as shown by the argument that one can actually prove that an episode of awareness is knowledge by establishing that the subsequent cognition is an episode of *bcad pa'i yul can*.<sup>29</sup> The majority of Tibetan scholars also discuss *bcad pa'i yul can* in such terms, and many even include the specification of the object having been previously understood “by an episode of knowledge” in their definition.<sup>30</sup>

There are a few exceptions, however: gTsang nag pa and mTshur ston consider a broader notion of “understanding” (*rtogs pa*) that is not limited to knowledge but also applies to factive assessment.<sup>31</sup> Accordingly, they distinguish as a subtype of *bcad pa'i yul can* a conceptual cognition following factive assessment.<sup>32</sup> mTshur ston even explicitly rejects a definition involving the notion of “a state of affairs already understood by an episode of knowledge,” arguing that it would not apply to cognitions following factive assessment.<sup>33</sup>

<sup>28</sup> *Tshad bsdus* 56,19–20: g.yor gnyan na re rjes dpag gi rgyun yin pas phyis kyi *bcad shes de rjes dpag yin no zhes 'dod pa ni mi rigs te /*

<sup>29</sup> See in this regard the argument in *Mun sel* 37a5–6.

<sup>30</sup> Neither in the *Mun sel* nor the *'Od zer* does Phya pa add this specification in his definition, but the author of the *Tshad bsdus* ascribes to him a definition that includes it. Cf. below 6.2 (iii).

<sup>31</sup> This contrasts with rNog Lo's categorization of factive assessment as a case of non-understanding (*ma rtogs*).

<sup>32</sup> *bsDus pa* 23a4–5: *de yang tshad ma gnyis dang yid dpyod* <sub>[23a5]</sub> *kyi rjes su skyes pa'i rtog pa dang mngon sum gyi rgyun rtog pa myed pa'o // sGron ma* 6a1–2: *dper brjod na gsuM ste /* <sub>[6a2]</sub> *mngon suM tshad ma'i rjes su skyes pa dang / rjes dpag gi rjes su skyes pa dang / yid dpyod kyi rjes su skyes pa'i bcad shes so //*

<sup>33</sup> See *sGron ma* 5b9–6a1.

Phya pa's successors—as early as gTsang nag pa—consider it possible, properly speaking, to *know* (again) something that had been understood before. The category of *bcad pa'i yul can* is limited to cases where the previous understanding is still vivid, and the subsequent cognition is indeed redundant. They refer in this regard to a notion that is found in PVin 1, namely the notion of “aggregates of vision not having decayed” (after an episode of perceptual knowledge).<sup>34</sup> They re-formulate the definition in corresponding terms, so that the object is characterized as “an object for which the function of (the previous) understanding has not been impaired.”<sup>35</sup> This formulation is still found in the definitions contained in the *Don gnyer mun sel* ascribed to Tsong kha pa (6a1) and in dGe 'dun grub's *Tshad ma rigs rgyan* (434). But starting with the *Rwa stod bsdus grwa* (15<sup>th</sup> century), the definition in terms of “awareness that understands something that was already understood” (*rtogs zin rtogs pa'i rig pa*) becomes predominant.<sup>36</sup>

Chu mig pa (*rNam rgyal* A9b3–4; B11b9) points out the abovementioned passage of the *Pramāṇaviniścaya* as evidence for the legitimacy of a perceptual type of this category of awareness (i.e., *mngon sum dpyad shes*) in answer to an anonymous objection which, like the objection against *snang la ma nges pa* that Chu mig pa also addresses (see §1(b) above), might be reflecting Sa paṅ's criticism of this category.<sup>37</sup>

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<sup>34</sup> PVin<sub>Skt</sub> 1 20,2–3: *abhraṣṭadarśanasamskārasya grhītagrahaṇasya smārtād aviśeṣāt /*; PVin<sub>Tib</sub> 1 60,19–20: *mthong ba'i 'du byed ma nyams pa'i gzung ba 'dzin pa ni dran pa las khyad par med pa'i phyir ro //*

<sup>35</sup> Cf. 6.2 (vi) and (ix). A similar characterization of the object is also found in the definitions of gTsang drug rdo rje (6.2 [xi]), Chu mig pa (6.2 [xv]), and Chos kyi bzhad pa (6.2 [xvi]). This is also the formulation known to Sa paṅ, cf. *Rigs gter* II 65,12–13: *sngar rtogs zin gyi byed pa ma nyams pa la bzlog phyogs kyi sgro 'dogs dang 'gal bar 'jug*. Note that this point is prefigured (although not exploited by Phya pa) by the mention of the temporal restriction pertaining to the elimination of superimpositions by an episode of knowledge in the *'Od zer*. Namely, superimpositions are eliminated between the time the episode of knowledge is generated and the time the compositional factors of memory are impaired. See I.2, 3.1.3.ii.

<sup>36</sup> See *Rwa stod bsdus grwa* (479), as well as, for instance, *'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa'i blo rigs* (10a2), *Klong rdol ming grangs* (12a7), and *Yongs 'dzin blo rigs* (14b1).

<sup>37</sup> *rNam rgyal* A9b3–4; B11b9: *kha l mngon sum {A sum, B 3} dpyad shes med ces zer ba ni*.

Sa paṅ, in his general criticism of this category (for which he uses the term *bcad shes*), points out that the various cases of *bcad shes* actually amount to “non-understanding,” “mistaken understanding,” or “knowledge” and thus have no legitimacy as a distinct category. The basic argument is that a *bcad shes* simply amounts to a “non-understanding” (*ma rtogs pa*): the object of knowledge being momentary, it is no longer there to be understood at the time of the *bcad shes*, and since it has already been understood, there is nothing left to be understood, on account of which the subsequent cognition could be an “understanding.”<sup>38</sup> Perceptual *bcad shes* is thus refuted on account of the momentariness of the object of perception: there cannot be a second perceptual awareness taking as its object the same object as the preceding one. Perception is always novel. The argument against conceptual *bcas shes* relies on the rejection of the status of agent in the absence of a patient or of an action to be performed. As Sa paṅ says: “The ax is not a ‘cutter’ once the tree has already been cut.”<sup>39</sup>

### (c) Translation

The most frequent translations found in modern scholarship for the term *bcad pa'i yul can* or for the corresponding expression in later works, *bcad shes/dpyad shes*, is “subsequent cognition” (Dreyfus 1997a, Stoltz 2009, Hugon 2011a). One also finds “cognition” (van der Kuijp 1978), “subsequent cognizer” (Rinbochay&Napper 1980), “determinative cognition” (van der Kuijp 2009), and “[cognition] whose object has been discriminated” (Hugon 2014).

While “subsequent cognition” highlights the temporal feature that characterizes this type of awareness (it comes after another cognition), it fails to convey its connection with the criterion of novelty, namely, it does not render explicit the fact that the previous cognition has already achieved knowledge of the object (whether conceived in terms of “understanding” or “elimination of superimpositions”). We were tempted by the

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<sup>38</sup> See *Rigs gter* II 65,18–66,9, and in particular 65,22–24. Reduction of *bcas shes* to a mistaken understanding is adduced in answer to the idea of an understanding that makes one remember something previously understood. Reduction to knowledge is adduced for a special case of *bcas shes* qua memory when yogic practitioners infer a previous experience based on a present memory.

<sup>39</sup> *Rigs gter* II 65,23–24: *shing bcad zin pas sta re gcod byed ma yin pa*.

translation “redundant cognition,” which reflects well Phya pa’s understanding of this category in contrast to the novelty of knowledge episodes, up to the connotation of such types of awareness as useless, at least with regard to what is expected of a knowledge episode. Such episodes do have a use, however. For instance, conceptual cognitions following perceptual knowledge provide a conceptual determination of the object. But such a use of determining cognitions (*nges shes*) is hardly pointed out by Phya pa, who merely mentions this aspect when discussing the views of proponents of the indirectly active model. We abandoned this translation in mid-course to avoid implying any derogatory connotation which, although fitting in Phya pa’s case, might not have been implied by other authors.

We ultimately opted for the translation “post-knowledge cognition,” in spite of the fact that this translation is problematic for authors such as gTsang nag pa and mTshur ston, who extend this category of cognitions to episodes that follow factive assessment (which is not knowledge), in which case one should rather speak of “post-understanding cognition.” These two authors’ uses appear to be idiosyncratic exceptions.

Correspondingly, we have rendered the distinguishing criterion that sets aside post-knowledge cognition in the seven-fold typology, which Phya pa phrases as “*rtogs ma zin la ’jug pa*,” as “engaging an object not previously known.” In the same way, we rendered as “known” rather than “understood” the verb *rtogs pa* in Phya pa’s formulation of criterion K2 in the definition of the engaged object (*Mun sel* 121.13).

### 3. Factive assessment (*yid dpyod*)

#### (a) Terminology

While it is very clear which textual passages in the *Nyāyabinduṭīkā* and the *Pramāṇaviniścayaṭīkā* prompted the idea of this distinct category of awareness, the origin of the term *yid dpyod* is still in question.<sup>40</sup> It is possible that the term *yid dpyod* was coined in opposition to *yid gnyis* (literally, “dual thought”), an expression that denotes “doubt” and is used (rather than *the tshom*) to translate the Sanskrit *saṁśaya* in the very passage of the *Nyāyabinduṭīkā* that motivated rNgog Lo’s application of the category *yid dpyod* (see §5 below).

#### (b) Understanding of the category

In view of the above hypothesis regarding the terminology, the category of *yid dpyod* could have initially simply connoted episodes of awareness involving a “decision” in opposition to an ambivalent hesitation, although not a decision that relied on any proper evidence (i.e., not following a perception, and not being derived from a valid logical reason). On such a view, *yid dpyod* would be a category that includes both episodes of incorrect determinate awareness (i.e., one form of mistaken cognition, which is noted MC<sub>2</sub> in §4 below) and of correct determinate awareness (for which there would be no specific term).

This overarching category of *yid dpyod* is precisely the conception that Phya pa addresses when criticizing, in *Mun sel* 123.322 (cf. also 6.3 [i]), the definition of factive assessment in the following terms:

Directing one’s mind toward a state of affairs, while being partial to it, without relying on experience or a logical reason.

Also cited by gTsang nag pa (6.3 [vii]) and mTshur ston (6.3 [viii]), such a definition is ascribed in various texts to Phya pa’s teacher rGya dmar ba.<sup>41</sup> But in the absence of more precise, first-hand information, we cannot conclusively assess whether rGya dmar ba indeed was a supporter of

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<sup>40</sup> See Hugon 2014: 224 for a previous discussion.

<sup>41</sup> It is ascribed in the *Tshad bsdus* (6.3 [vi]) and gTsang drug rdo rje’s *gSal byed* (6.3 [xi]) to a scholar identified as “rGya.” Glo bo mkhan chen (*Rigs gter nyi ma*



*yid dpyod* as an overarching category or whether he just adopted a definition that turns out to be too broad.

(Hypothetical) proponents of the overarching view and those who, like Phya pa, conceive of *yid dpyod* exclusively as a mental episode consisting in a correct determination, would both acknowledge that *yid dpyod* is intrinsically identical with mistaken cognition. Whether the determination is “correct” or “incorrect” can only be extrinsically ascertained.

Some degree of commonality between *yid dpyod* and mistaken cognition already stands out in rNgog Lo’s discussion. rNgog Lo speaks of *yid dpyod* as “having the nature of mistaken cognition” and “being subsumed in mistaken cognition,” because in both cases there is no ascertainment of an invariable relation with the state of affairs.<sup>42</sup> rNgog Lo however supported the notion of *yid dpyod* being restricted to correct determination rather than an overarching category or a category actually coextensive with mistaken cognition. The cases dealt with by Dharmottara that rNgog Lo classifies as *yid dpyod* are all instances of correct determination. *Yid dpyod* being subsumed within mistaken cognition is due to the fact that one cannot intrinsically reject the option that it is a mistaken cognition.

The definition adopted by Phya pa and the place ascribed to *yid dpyod* in the typologies of awareness show that he was less keen to highlight its similarity with mistaken cognition than its similarity with inference, from which it differs only by virtue of a single criterion: relying or not on correct logical evidence. However, the similarity with mistaken cognition surfaces in several occasions. For instance, both are excluded from being episodes of knowledge by the same criterion K3 (*Mun sel* 212.22). There Phya pa points out that some mistaken cognitions, like instances of factive assessment, are actually able to eliminate wrong superimpositions. Also, the discussion of the subtypes of *yid dpyod* (*Mun sel* 123.31) draws out a similar classification of the subtypes of mistaken cognitions: those lacking a reason, and those derived from incorrect logical evidence. The difference between the two sets of subtypes is grounded in the idea that *yid dpyod* determines a veridical thesis, whereas mistaken cognition establishes a non-veridical one.

Against the view that *yid dpyod* provides a determination, or even a correct determination, some Tibetan scholars focused rather on the absence of proper justification and subsumed instances of such episodes of

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53,3–5) specifies that its author is “sTod lung rGya mar ba byang chub grags.”

<sup>42</sup> See Hugon 2014: 214 and 220.



awareness under doubt. This is the position that was ascribed to Dharmottara by rNgog Lo.<sup>43</sup> This was also notably the position defended by Sa paṅ, who rejected the legitimacy of this category. For Sa paṅ, such episodes of awareness are unable to bring about any type of decisive understanding. Conversely, a factive mental episode must be knowledge.<sup>44</sup>

The abovementioned definition ascribed to rGya dmar ba still served as the basis for other scholars who built on it. The addition of the explicit criterion of the object being veridical (*don bden pa*) prevented the fault pointed out by Phya pa.<sup>45</sup> The addition of the criterion of novelty to rGya dmar ba's definition is linked with Byang chub skyabs ("jang chup kyap") in the *Tshad bsdus*.<sup>46</sup>

One may note that Phya pa phrases his own definition of *yid dpyod* in different terms in the *Mun sel* and the *'Od zer*, and explains the role of the various criteria in a slightly different way in each text.

In the *Mun sel* (123.321), *yid dpyod* is defined with four criteria.<sup>47</sup>

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<sup>43</sup> On rNgog Lo's presentation of Dharmottara's position and his direct or indirect criticism of it, see Hugon 2014: 214–215 and 220–221.

<sup>44</sup> On Sa paṅ's arguments, see Stoltz 2007: 407–411 and Stoltz 2009.

<sup>45</sup> See for instance the definitions of gTsang drug rdo rje (6.3 [xii]), of the *Rwa stod bsdus grwa* (480), and of Klong rdol bla ma (*Klong rdol ming grangs* 12b7). While those definitions insist on the object being veridical (*yul bden pa*), the *Tshad ma'i spyi skad* (4a3) reports the definition of *yid dpyod* in a unique manner as a "righteous establishing awareness" (*gtan la 'bebs pa'i blo gsha' ma*).

<sup>46</sup> *Tshad bsdus* 58,5–6: *gsar du zhes pa ni rtog pa bcad pa'i yul can bcad par byang chub skyabs bzhed la /*

<sup>47</sup> The citation of the definition of the *Mun sel* in Śākya mchog ldan's *Rol mtsho* (V, 1, R51.12) includes the criterion of the object being concealed (*lkog gyur*) as a fifth criterion. But this criterion does not figure in the *Mun sel* in the list of criteria that exclude other types of awareness from satisfying the definition, nor when Phya lists the episodes of knowledge establishing each criterion. The notion of the object being concealed appears when identifying the nature, but it does not play a role in excluding anything. Note in addition that Glo bo mkhan chen cites Phya pa's position (V, 1, R7.2) in a way that is quasi-literally identical with the version of the *Mun sel*, but without any mention of the object being concealed, thus suggesting that this criterion was added by Śākya mchog ldan under the influence of the wording of the definition in the *'Od zer* (see below) or that by other scholars.

These are shown to exclude all other types of awareness as follows:<sup>48</sup>

- |   |   |
|---|---|
| [1] a determinate awareness               | – excludes doubt <sup>(1)</sup> and the three types of perception <sup>(3), (4b), (5)</sup> |
| [2] of a veridical state of affairs       | – excludes mistaken cognition <sup>(2)</sup>  |
| [3] not previously known                  | – excludes post-knowledge cognition <sup>(4)</sup>  |
| [4] that is not based on a logical reason | – excludes inferential cognition <sup>(6)</sup>   |

The types of awareness listed as “excluded” are recognizable as the six other types in the seven-fold typology (see V, Table E), with the additional subdivision of post-knowledge cognition <sup>(4)</sup> into a perceptual type <sup>(4b)</sup>—implicitly included within the “three types of perception” eliminated by the first criterion—and a conceptual type <sup>(4a)</sup> implicitly included (as well as <sup>(4b)</sup>) in the mention of “post-knowledge cognition” eliminated by the third criterion. The four criteria adduced in the definition are difficult to read as effecting a step-by-step narrowing-down of the category (as in the seven-fold typology). Criterion [2] excludes mistaken cognition in general, while non-conceptual erroneous cognition would actually also be excluded by criterion [1]. Criterion [3] is said to exclude post-knowledge cognition in general, and thus overlaps with criterion [1] in excluding perceptual post-knowledge cognition, one of the three types excluded by the latter.

In the *'Od zer* (111.222.34), *yid dpyod* is defined with a different phrasing of the four criteria present in the *Mun sel* and the addition of another criterion—the object being concealed (*lkog gyur*).<sup>49</sup> The five criteria are here shown to exclude all the other types as follows:

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<sup>48</sup> The order in which the criteria are listed here corresponds to the order adopted by Phya pa when explaining which type of awareness each criterion eliminates. This order is reflected in the English translation of the definition proper, although it does not correspond to the order the criteria appear in the phrasing of the definition in Tibetan. Cf. *Mun sel* 123.321 (and 6.3 [ii] in this chapter): *yid dpyod kyi mtshan nyid ni sngar ma rtogs pa'i don bden pa rtags tshad mas nges pa la ma brten par nges pa*.

<sup>49</sup> *'Od zer* 111.222.34 (6.3 [iii]): *lkog gyur bden pa rtags kyi rjes su ma 'brangs par gsar du nges pa*. See n. 47 on this criterion in the citations of the definition of the *Mun sel* by Śākya mchog ldan.

[1] concealed object	– excludes perceptual knowledge <sup>(3)</sup>
[2] veridical object	– excludes mistaken cognition <sup>(7)</sup>
[3] not based on evidence	– excludes inferential cognition <sup>(10)</sup>
[4] determinate awareness	– excludes doubt <sup>(6)</sup> , non-ascertaining perception <sup>(1)</sup> , non-conceptual erroneous cognition <sup>(4)</sup> , non-directing conceptual cognition <sup>(5)</sup>
[4+5] novel determinate awareness	– excludes conceptual post-knowledge cognition following an inferential cognition <sup>(8b)</sup>

The types of awareness listed as “excluded” are, recognizably, taken from the ten-fold typology (see V, Table G). However, one may observe that perceptual post-knowledge cognition—type<sup>(2)</sup> of the ten-fold typology—is missing here. As for conceptual post-knowledge cognition—type<sup>(8)</sup>—only one sort of it is accounted for, namely, that following an inferential cognition (the more significant type, conceptual cognition following a perception, is not mentioned here). In addition to these omissions, one may note that, like in the *Mun sel*, the way the criteria are said to exclude the other types is not systematical. The criteria are listed here in the order in which they appear in the Tibetan phrasing of the definition, but the mention of what they exclude is incomplete. The criterion “concealed object” [1] would actually exclude all perceptions, but only perceptual knowledge is mentioned as being excluded by it. As for the criterion “veridical object” [2], it would also exclude non-conceptual erroneous cognition<sup>(4)</sup>, which is instead said to be excluded by the criterion of “being a determinate awareness” [4]. One cannot rule out the possibility that the text is faulty, and that the reading *lkog gyur zhes pas mngon sum tshad ma gcod la* (“the object being concealed excludes perceptual knowledge”) should be corrected to ... *mngon sum thams cad gcod la* (“... excludes all perceptions”). This would explain why perceptual knowledge and perceptual post-knowledge cognition are not mentioned as excluded by the subsequently mentioned criterion [4] and, for the latter, also [5].<sup>50</sup>

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<sup>50</sup> One may consider in this regard the definition adduced in the *Tshad bsdus*, which also counts five criteria, but with the criterion “not based on experience” instead of the criterion “the object being remote.” *Tshad bsdus* 58,1–2 (cf. 6.3 [v]): *myong ba dang rtags la ma brten par don bden pa gsar du nges pa*. “Not based on experience” [1] is said to exclude perception; “not based on a logical reason” [2] excludes inferential cognition; “veridical” [3] excludes mistaken cognition; “novel” [4] excludes conceptual post-knowledge cognition; “determinate awareness” [5] excludes non-ascertaining perception and doubt (i.e., what is left of the types that have not been excluded yet).

Due to the imprecision in both texts, the scope of the criterion expressed in Tibetan as “*nges pa*” in these two texts (criterion [1] in the *Mun sel*, [4] in the *'Od zer*) could appear as a debatable topic. In the *Mun sel*, a preceding discussion determining the nature of *yid dpyod* (*Mun sel* 123.31) clearly indicates that *yid dpyod* is *nges pa* in the sense of “being a determinate awareness.” *Yid dpyod* is characterized as being:

- |      |  |   |
|------|--|---|
| [1'] | not a non-conceptual cognition   | → a conceptual cognition  |
| [2'] | not doubt  | → a determinate awareness   |
| [3'] | not a mistaken determinate awareness   | → a determinate awareness in which the determination corresponds with the object to be cognized |
| [4'] | not a determinate awareness of something already known   | → a determinate awareness of something concealed and not previously known                       |
| [5'] | not a determinate awareness that is based on having determined, by an episode of knowledge, that a logical reason is a property of the subject and entails the property to be proven |   |

This characterization follows a strict order, narrowing down the notion of *yid dpyod* within the category of conceptual cognition, in way similar to that in the three-fold typology, but with the addition of criteria [4'] and [5'] that are not present in the three-fold typology. A determinate awareness is a subtype of cognitions that are “directing,” which is itself a subtype of those cognitions that are “conceptual.” Therefore, “being a determinate awareness,” as a definitional criterion, excludes cognitions that are non-conceptual, those that are non-directing, and those that are not determinate. “Non-directing” episodes are not considered in the seven-fold typology, on which the present list of types of awareness relies, and are thus left out of the discussion. When commenting on the defining criteria in the *Mun sel*, *Phya pa* only mentions the exclusion of doubt (the only instance of non-determinate conceptual cognition) and perceptual cognitions (one of the two types of non-conceptual cognitions). This is not, obviously, because non-conceptual erroneous cognitions are held to be determinate, but because *Phya pa* leaves to the criterion “veridical state of affairs” the role of excluding non-conceptual

erroneous cognitions together with other mistaken cognitions. This is understandable given that, in the seven-fold typology, non-conceptual erroneous cognition is not listed as a type distinct from mistaken cognition (it is distinguished as a subtype of the latter in the twelve-fold typology, see V, Table F).

One can unproblematically understand the criterion *nges pa* in the same sense in the *'Od zer*, and we have translated it accordingly, above (see criterion [4]). Under this reading, and if one does not want to correct the text as suggested above, it would be the case that, like in the *Mun sel*, Phya pa does not mention all the episodes excluded by this criterion, leaving this task to other criteria for perceptual knowledge—which is eliminated by [1]—and for perceptual post-knowledge cognition—which Phya pa omits to discuss.

There is, however, another possible interpretation. The four types of awareness that are excluded in the *'Od zer* by the criterion *nges pa* happen to be mentioned together again when Phya pa explains which of the criteria for knowledge do not apply to the eight types of awareness of the ten-fold typology that do not qualify as knowledge. There, he says that these four types—doubt<sup>(6)</sup>, non-ascertaining perception<sup>(1)</sup>, non-conceptual erroneous cognition<sup>(4)</sup>, and non-directing conceptual cognition<sup>(5)</sup>—are not knowledge because they lack the criterion of being incompatible with superimpositions (*sgro 'dogs dang 'gal ba*) (i.e., they lack K1).<sup>51</sup> It would thus also be possible to understand “*nges pa*” in the definition of factive assessment as connoting the “incompatibility with superimpositions,” hence in the extended sense of an ascertainment that is not limited to conceptual determination. The definition in the *'Od zer* could thus be read as:

The novel ascertainment of something remote and veridical, which is not based on a logical reason.

In such a case, the criterion of “the object being remote” [1] would not be redundant with [4] with regard to perceptual knowledge. As perceptual knowledge is incompatible with superimpositions, it would need to be excluded by a criterion other than “ascertainment.” Thus, this reading of

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<sup>51</sup> See the end of the superordinate section (*'Od zer* 111.222.3), 29a8–9: *snang la ma nges pa dang rtog myed 'khrul pa dang bden zhen myed pa'i rtog pa dang the tsom rnams la ni sgro 'dogs dang 'gal ba nyid myed /*

*nges pa* fares better with the presence of the additional criterion [1], which is otherwise redundant.

One can envisage that in the *'Od zer*, Phya pa wants to highlight “incompatibility with superimposition” rather than “being a determinate cognition” as a distinctive criterion, because the discussion is subsumed under the larger question of which of the criteria for knowledge do or do not apply to the respective types of awareness in the ten-fold typology. This connotation of *nges pa* would, however, be surprising here. Indeed, while such a use is attested in the works of Phya pa’s successors,<sup>52</sup> Phya pa does not explicitly associate the notion of *nges pa* with that of “incompatibility with superimpositions” or “elimination of superimpositions.”<sup>53</sup> While it remains possible that he is precisely doing so in the passage under consideration, one can, as indicated above, just as well make sense of the definition by understanding *nges pa* in the sense of “being a determinate cognition.”<sup>54</sup>

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<sup>52</sup> See I.2, 4.3, n. 123.

<sup>53</sup> He may at most be understood to do so implicitly when defining non-ascertaining perception, as the expression *ma nges pa* comes to be associated with the defining criterion of “compatibility with superimpositions.”

<sup>54</sup> The difference between the *Mun sel* and the *'Od zer* regarding the phrasing of the definition of factive assessment and the role of the defining criteria does not provide any compelling evidence in favor of the claim of a fundamental difference regarding the model of perceptual knowledge adopted by Phya pa in the respective texts, as argued in Nishizawa 2016. (According to Nishizawa, Phya pa supports in the *'Od zer* the view that perception is “object-ascertaining” and in the *Mun sel* the view that it is not, because *nges pa*, in the definition of *yid dpyod*, is said to exclude perceptual knowledge in the latter but not in the former. It is not entirely clear what the author means by “object-ascertaining,” which he essentially presents as a feature that is not present in cases of *snang la ma nges pa*.) Indeed, there is no evidence in the two texts of any difference pertaining to the model of perception adopted by Phya pa. In both texts, perception is not a conceptual determinate awareness. And in both texts, the definition of knowledge and the category of non-ascertaining perception support a directly active model of perception in which perception, in order to qualify as knowledge, has to ascertain its object, not in the sense of conceptually determining it (directly or indirectly), but in the sense of eliminating superimpositions (or being incompatible with superimpositions). Accordingly, in both texts, *snang la ma nges pa* is defined as “compatible with superimpositions.”

### Subdivisions

While the division of *yid dpyod* into three types is standard, it is worth noting that rNgog Lo identifies three subtypes in the *dKa' gnas*, but four in the *Rigs thigs 'grel ti ka*. There, in addition to the subtypes

- i. without a reason,
- ii. with a mistaken reason,
- iii. with a correct reason which is not established,

rNgog Lo adds in this text the case of *yid dpyod*

- iv. with a correct reason which is established but forgotten.

This difference is interesting given that in the *Nyāyabinduīkā* there are no illustrations of *yid dpyod*. Both the three-fold and the four-fold division are thus based on the same passage of the PVinṬ (D5b3–7), which also offers support for the terminology used by rNgog Lo for the different kinds, including the fourth that is singled out only in the *Rigs thigs 'grel ti ka*.<sup>55</sup>

Given the predominance of the three-fold division in subsequent epistemological works and the fact that the four-fold subdivision is never mentioned by subsequent scholars, this might be an indication that the *Rigs thigs 'grel ti ka* was composed earlier than the *dKa' gnas* and possibly did not have a large impact.<sup>56</sup>

### (c) Translation

The translation of *yid dpyod* adopted here—“factive assessment”—was first suggested in Stoltz 2007. It clearly reflects a key feature of such episodes which is explicit in the definitions of this type of awareness from Phya pa onward: their having a true object. Other translations found in modern scholarship include “reflection-as-an-ego-act” (van der Kuijp

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<sup>55</sup> See Hugon 2014: 220, n. 73. Support for the fourth subtype comes from the case provided by Dharmottara where it is concluded that there is fire based on the perception of smoke which one does not remember to be determined as the effect of fire.

<sup>56</sup> The author of the *Spyi skad* accepts four kinds of factive assessment. The fourth variety is not the one rNgog Lo distinguished in the *Rigs thigs 'grel ti ka*, but is instead exemplified by “The dawning of an understanding from hearing, reflecting, and practicing authoritative treatises” (4a2: *bka' bstan bcos la thos bsam byas nas go ba shar ba yang yid dpyod yin no*).

1978), “correct assumption” (Dreyfus 1997a), “correctly assuming consciousness” (Rinbochay&Napper 1980), “supposition” (van der Kuip 2009), and “presumption” (Hugon 2014).



## 4. Mistaken cognition (*log shes*)

### (a) Terminology

According to rNgog Lo's *Rigs thigs 'grel ti ka*, Dharmottara deals with the category that rNgog Lo calls *log pa'i shes pa* in the passage of the *Nyāyabinduṭīkā* dealing with cognitions other than perceptual knowledge and inferential cognition. Dharmottara says:

In some cases the object indicated by a cognition other than these two episodes of knowledge is a complete delusion (Skt. *atyantaviparyastah*, Tib. *shin tu phyin ci log pa*), just like water in the case of a mirage.<sup>57</sup>

In this passage, it is the object that is characterized as “a complete delusion.” It is possible that by the expression *log pa'i shes pa* rNgog Lo originally wanted to refer to “the cognition of something deceptive,” and that the characteristic of the object was later reported to the cognition, which became known as a “mistaken cognition” (*log shes*). But rNgog Lo might also have been using *log pa'i shes pa* in the sense of *log shes*. Instead of the Sanskrit expression *viparyasta*, he might also have had in mind (provided that rNgog Lo had a Sanskrit expression in mind, which is plausible, but not obligatory) an expression such as *mithyājñāna*, for which *log pa'i shes pa* is attested as a translation five times in the *Nyāyabinduṭīkā*.

### (b) Understanding of the category

The author of the *Tshad bsdus* reports three different definitions of *log shes*.<sup>58</sup> The first is ascribed to Phya pa, the second to Byang chub skyabs, and the third to rGya. However, given that it is the third and not the first that corresponds to Phya pa's definition in the *Mun sel* and the 'Od zer, we tentatively propose to correct these attributions as follows:

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<sup>57</sup> NBT<sub>skt</sub> 22,1: *ābhyāṃ pramāṇābhyāṃ anyena ca jñānena darśito 'rthaḥ kaścid atyantaviparyastah / yathā marīcīkāsu jalam /*; Tib. D38a4: *tshad ma gnyis las gzhan pa'i shes pas bstan pa'i don ni smig rgyu la chu bzhin du kha cig shin tu phyin ci log pa yin la /*. See Hugon 2014: 217.

<sup>58</sup> *Tshad bsdus* 61,11–16.

- rGya dmar ba – Taking as its object a non-veridical state of affairs (*don mi bden pa yul du byed pa*)<sup>59</sup>
- Byang chub skyabs – Taking as its object something that does not correspond to the state of affairs (*don dang mi mthun pa yul du byed pa*)<sup>60</sup>
- Phya pa – Positively discerning a state of affairs incorrectly (*don la phyin ci log tu yongs su gcod pa*)<sup>61</sup>

### Subdivisions

One should be aware of the different connotations attached to the term *log shes*, which are often not specified in discussions involving this category. Phya pa distinguishes in *Mun sel* 123.4 two forms of “mistaken cognition,” which pertain respectively to the apprehended object and to the intentional object. To define both of them together, Phya pa uses the criterion “positively discerning a state of affairs incorrectly.” Phya pa’s use of the term *yongs su gcod pa* (“positively discerning”) in his definition corresponds to a broad understanding of the term also attested in his seven-fold typology, where *all* cognitions are characterized as *don yongs su gcod pa*.<sup>62</sup>

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<sup>59</sup> Cf. 6.4 (iii). A similar definition is cited and refuted by gTsang nag pa (cf. 6.4 [vi]).

<sup>60</sup> Cf. 6.4 (iv). A similar definition is cited by Chu mig pa (6.4 [xiii]) and in the *Tshad nye bsdus* (6.4 [xv]), where it is however ascribed to Phya pa. The author of the *Tshad bsdus* mentions as the justification for adopting the second definition over the first that “it is difficult to assess the boundary between veridical and non-veridical” (*Tshad bsdus* 61,12–13: *bden mi bden gyi sa mtshams dka’ bas*). Byang chub skyabs is credited with the same remark with regard to the definition of knowledge (see *Tshad bsdus* 115,12–14).

<sup>61</sup> Cf. 6.4 (v). This corresponds to the definition found in *Mun sel* (6.4 [i]) and *’Od zer* (6.4 [ii]): *don phyin ci log tu yongs su gcod pa*. Note that in the seven-fold division, the distinguishing criterion that singles out mistaken cognition is formulated in terms similar to Byang chub skyab’s definition, namely, *shes bya dang mi mthun par yongs su gcod pa* (*Mun sel* 122.121).

<sup>62</sup> Phya pa thus escapes the fault reported in the *Tshad bsdus*, that “*gcod*” taken in the sense “leading to a determining cognition” would not allow the definition to apply to “non-conceptual mistaken cognitions” (*rtog med log shes*). *Tshad bsdus* 61,15–16: *gcod pa zhes bya ba nges shes ’dren pa la zer na rtog med log shes la ma khyab bo // zhes zer ro //*

- According to the first form (MC<sub>1</sub>), any awareness whose apprehended object is something superimposed (in other words, is not a real particular) is a *log shes*. This includes two subtypes: cognitions that apprehend a concept—i.e., all types of conceptual awareness (MC<sub>1.1</sub>)—as well as non-conceptual erroneous cognitions, which apprehend hallucinatory/illusory items (MC<sub>1.2</sub>).
- The second form (MC<sub>2</sub>) captures the more intuitive idea of an incorrect determination, for instance, for a Buddhist, the determination of sound as permanent. Apart from this standard example, a number of other cases discussed elsewhere in the text fall into this form.

Earlier in the *Mun sel*, when dealing with the three-fold typology, Phya pa formulates other specifications pertaining to *log shes*, in relation with the operations of the various types of awareness. With regard to each of those three operations—the operations of appearing, directing, and excluding others—it is possible that the episode of awareness could be a *log shes*:

- With respect to the operation of appearing, Phya pa speaks of “mistaken cognitions that are erroneous with respect to the state of affairs that is apprehended” (*gzung don la 'khrul pa'i log shes*). This type is related to the nature of the apprehended object, and thus corresponds to MC<sub>1</sub>.
- By contrast, the form of *log shes* associated with the operation of directing (MC<sub>3</sub>) is related to the intentional object of a (conceptual) cognition. Here, an awareness is said to be a *log shes* due to the apprehended object—a concept—being conceived of as a real particular. This form of *log shes* is found in all episodes of conceptual cognition, except for the narrow case of inferential cognitions in which one’s mind is directed upon concepts themselves (see *Mun sel* 112.111.111.2 [d]). It is sometimes formulated in terms of being “directed in a way that does not correspond to the object to be cognized” (*shes bya dang mi mthun par zhen*) and in other places as “mixing up things that are different” (*tha dad sre ba*).<sup>63</sup>

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<sup>63</sup> In his *gSal byed* (7a6–7), gTsang drug rdo rje distinguishes four different forms of “mixing together/conflating things that are different” (*tha dad l du bsre ba*): (1) temporally conflating (*snga spyi l du bsre ba*), (2) conflating similar types (*rigs mthun l tu bsre ba*), (3) conflating what appears and what is conceived

Phya pa does not consider this case, MC<sub>3</sub>, to be essentially different from the case of incorrect determination, MC<sub>2</sub>. He states that the mistake with respect to the operation of directing (MC<sub>3</sub>) is “just like in the case of a rope being conceived of as a snake.” It is worth making a distinction, however, because the mistaken cognition linked here with the operation of directing requires only that the awareness is *directed*, not that it is a determinate awareness. All conceptual cognitions (except one specific kind of inference), including doubt, are *log shes* in the form of MC<sub>3</sub> with respect to the operation of directing.<sup>64</sup>

On the other hand, the type of mistake associated with conceiving of sound as being permanent, or when conceiving of a rope as being a snake (MC<sub>2</sub>) is only present when the awareness is *determinate*, and, further, when the determination does not correspond with the object to be cognized (*shes bya dang mi mthun par nges*) (*Mun sel* 112.111.2). Phya pa also uses the expression “mistaken determinate awareness” (*log par nges pa*) to pick out such cases.

- The difference between MC<sub>2</sub> and MC<sub>3</sub> becomes clearer when we turn to the operation of exclusion. There, it is only when there is an “affirmation of something that is not the case and denial of something that is the case” (*shes bya la mi srid pa bsgrub cing srid pa*

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(*snang brtags l tu bsre ba*), and (4) conflating word and object (*ming don l tu bsre ba*). The form of mixing or conflating relevant in the context of the operation of directing is the third form: conflating what appears (a concept) and what it is conceived to be (a real particular). Cf. also the passage in the *'Od zer* (*'Od zer* 111.222.1.b.322.222.a.1, 26b9), where Phya pa discusses the mistake involved in the operation of directing in the case of inferences [b] and [e1] in these very terms: *snang brtags bsre ba'i log shes yin no*.

<sup>64</sup> Some later texts, including *bsDus pa* (23b3–4), *sGron ma* (6a8), and *gSal byed* (10b6), offer an alternative category of *log shes* in place of Phya pa's category of incorrect determinations (MC<sub>2</sub>). This alternative category is described as those instances of *log shes* that are “erroneous with respect to their intentional objects” (*zhen yul la 'khrul ba'i log shes*). This latter category is undoubtedly meant to include instances of Phya pa's MC<sub>2</sub>—for the illustrations these later texts offer for cognitions within this category are all instances of incorrect determination—but the wording “with respect to their intentional objects” would appear to apply to Phya pa's MC<sub>3</sub> as well. As such, we can think of this category of “*log shes* that are erroneous with respect to their intentional objects” as picking out the conjunction of Phya pa's MC<sub>2</sub> and MC<sub>3</sub>—which we can call MC<sub>2/3</sub>.

'*gog pa*) that the episode of awareness is classified as a *log shes*—and these cases are precisely those that are MC<sub>2</sub>.

What stands out in this discussion is a sort of “fascination” with the idea that an episode of awareness can be a *log shes* from several perspectives, but still qualify as knowledge.

Immediately after enumerating the seven-fold typology of cognitions (*Mun sel* 122.1), Phya pa then proceeds to show that these seven types of cognitions can be further subdivided into a grand total of twelve different forms of cognition. Among these twelve forms of cognition are two subtypes of *log shes*: conceptual *log shes* and non-conceptual *log shes*. These two subtypes are not, in fact, equivalent to the distinction between MC<sub>1</sub> and MC<sub>2</sub> (or MC<sub>3</sub>). Instead, it appears that Phya pa is taking the categories of conceptual and non-conceptual *log shes* to be subclassifications within MC<sub>1</sub>. In particular, conceptual *log shes* corresponds to MC<sub>1.1</sub> and non-conceptual *log shes* corresponds to MC<sub>1.2</sub>.<sup>65</sup>

That this is the case can be seen from Phya pa’s clarifications of how these two forms of *log shes* relate to the other ten forms of cognition in the twelve-fold typology. When discussing the place of conceptual *log shes* within the twelve-fold categorization, Phya pa argues that it is mutually compatible with other forms of conceptual cognition, including inferential cognitions. More explicitly, Phya pa believes that a given conceptual cognition can be, at one and the same time, both an instance of inferential knowledge and an instance of conceptual *log shes*. But since inferential cognitions are, by necessity, determinate cognitions that are correct with regard to their intentional objects, they cannot simultaneously be instances of mistaken determinate cognition (*log par nges pa*). Instead, what makes a conceptual mistaken cognition compatible with inferential cognition is, as Phya pa tells the reader, simply the fact that it “apprehends a concept” (*Mun sel* 122.33). This shows that when he is referencing conceptual *log shes* in this passage, Phya pa is definitely not thinking of mistaken determinate cognition (MC<sub>2</sub>), but is instead referring to conceptual cognitions that apprehend concepts (MC<sub>1.1</sub>).

Phya pa’s twelve-fold typology of cognition—within which we find this distinction between conceptual and non-conceptual *log shes*—is claimed to arise from subsuming the seven-fold typology (*Mun sel* 122)

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<sup>65</sup> The categorical division between conceptual vs. non-conceptual *log shes* is largely absent from the presentations given within later texts in this period. The only other text making use of this distinction is the *Tshad bsodus* (pp. 53 and 61).

within the earlier three-fold typology of awareness (*Mun sel* 112). Because that three-fold typology has at its heart the distinction between conceptual cognitions and non-conceptual cognitions, it is not surprising that Phya pa finds it valuable, within that context, to distinguish conceptual vs. non-conceptual *log shes*. Moreover, because the three-fold typology of cognitions is grounded in differences pertaining just to the apprehended objects (*gzung yul*) of those cognitions, it is understandable why Phya pa's contrast between conceptual and non-conceptual *log shes* is to be understood as involving subclassifications within MC<sub>1</sub>.

Table 3: Summary of the various types of mistaken cognition

MC <sub>1</sub>	Mistaken with respect to the apprehended state of affairs	
MC <sub>1.1</sub>	Mistaken with respect to an apprehended concept	Conceptual cognition "sound"
MC <sub>1.2</sub>	Mistaken with respect to an apprehended referent of a non-conceptual erroneous cognition	Cognition of a double moon
MC <sub>2/3</sub>	Mistaken with respect to the intentional object	
MC <sub>2</sub>	Mistake pertaining to the identification of the object or its properties—i.e., a determinate awareness in which the determination does not correspond to the object to be cognized	Determining 'sound' as being permanent
MC <sub>3</sub>	Mistake pertaining to conceiving of a concept as a real particular—i.e., a conceptual awareness that is directed in a way that does not correspond to the object to be cognized, conflating items that are distinct	Conceiving of the concept 'sound' as being a real sound

Some of Phya pa's successors noted that the application of the term *log shes* to such a variety of cases (or more)<sup>66</sup> was misleading, and consequently also rejected a single definition of *log shes*.<sup>67</sup> This did not bother others who, however, adopted definitions that differed from Phya pa's.<sup>68</sup> Some authors restricted the notion of *log shes* to the type MC<sub>2/3</sub>.<sup>69</sup>

### (c) Translation

*Log shes* is also translated “false cognition” (van der Kuijp 1978, Dreyfus 1997a, Stoltz 2009), “wrong consciousness” (Rinbochay&Napper 1980), “erroneous cognition” (van der Kuijp 2009), and “wrong cognition” (Hugon 2014).

The translation “false cognition” is not optimal, as that wording, insofar as it parallels standard uses of “false belief,” may wrongly suggest a

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<sup>66</sup> In addition to the distinction between a mistake pertaining to the apprehended object and a mistake pertaining to the intentional object, every cognition taking as its object conventional reality (which does not withstand analysis) is also called a “mistaken cognition.”

<sup>67</sup> This view is mentioned by gTsang drug rdo rje (cf. 6.4 [ix]) and by Chu mig pa (6.4 [xii]). An interlinear note on the manuscript of the former ascribes this view to “dan,” i.e., Phya pa's student Dan bag pa sMra ba'i seng ge. Chos kyi bzhad pa also shared this view (cf. 6.4 [xvii]) and proposes a distinct definition for each of the three cases he distinguishes (which are the same as the ones in the view reported by Chu mig pa) in *Tshad nye bsdus* 9a7–8.

<sup>68</sup> Only slightly differing from Phya pa's are the definitions *don phyin ci log du bcod pa* in the *Tshad ma'i spyi skad* (3b1), *rang yul phyin ci log tu 'dzin pa* (as a definition of *log rtogs*) in bCom ldan ral gri's *Tshad ma rgyan gyi me tog* (39), *rang yul phyin ci log tu 'dzin pa'i blo* in dGe 'dun grub pa's *Tshad ma rigs rgyan* (433), or *rang yul la phyin ci log tu zhugs pa'i rig pa* in *Yongs 'dzin blo rigs* (18a5). Other tendencies of definition involve the notion of “a superimposed object” as in the *bsDus pa* (6.4 [vii]) and the *sGron ma* (6.4 [viii]). Others draw on the traditional understanding of “error” and invoke the discrepancy between what exists and what is cognized, as in Chu mig pa's *rNam rgyal* (6.4 [xiv]) and the *Don gnyer mun sel* ascribed to Tsong kha pa (6a3: *de ma yin pa la der 'dzin pa'i shes pa*).

<sup>69</sup> See for instance the definition *rang gi zhen yul la 'khrul pa'i rig pa* found in the *Rwa stod bsdus grwa* (482) and *Klong rdol ming grangs* (13b3), or the definition *rang gi 'dzin stangs kyi zhen yul la 'khrul ba'i rig pa* in the *'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa'i blo rigs* (12b6).

more restricted application—such as  $MC_2$  alone—than is implied by Phya pa's broad use of the term. In order to cover all the various forms of this type of awareness, it is better to employ a more general term such as "mistaken" or "wrong."



## 5. Doubt (*the tshom*)

### (a) Terminology

This category of awareness is referred to with the term *the tshom* (also spelled *the tsom*) by rNgog Lo and in all subsequent works dealing with the typology of mind. But in the *Rigs thigs 'grel ti ka* rNgog Lo also uses the term *yid gnyis* when dealing with the classification of episodes of awareness he ascribes to Dharmottara (cf. Hugon 2014: 234). rNgog Lo indicates that Dharmottara rejects the application of the definition of knowledge to doubt (*yid gnyis*) in the following passage of the *Nyāyabinduṭīkā*:

In some cases it (i.e., the object indicated by a cognition other than perception and inference) is not determined as being real or unreal, like the object of doubt (Skt. *saṃśaya*, Tib. *yid gnyis*). And there does not exist in the world an object that is linked with both existence and non-existence. Therefore, such an object cannot be obtained.<sup>70</sup>

In this passage, the Sanskrit *saṃśaya* is translated as *yid gnyis*. Elsewhere in the *Nyāyabinduṭīkā*, both *the tshom* and *yid gnyis* are found to translate Sanskrit terms connoting “doubt” (*saṃśaya*, *āśāṅka*, *sandeha*, and related forms). The two Tibetan terms are clearly used as synonyms. But *yid gnyis* appears to be an older translation of Sanskrit terms connoting “doubt”—at least in the translation of Dharmottara’s *Nyāyabinduṭīkā*<sup>71</sup>—which then gave precedence to *the tshom* at the time rNgog Lo revised it or through a subsequent revision.

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<sup>70</sup> NBT<sub>skt</sub> 22,2–3: *kaścīd aniyato bhāvābhāvayoh / yathā saṃśayārthaḥ / na ca bhāvābhāvābhyāṃ yukto 'rtho jagaty asti / tataḥ prāptum aśakyas tādrśaḥ /*; Tib. P45b4–5: *kha cig ni yid gnyis kyi don bzhin du dngos po dang dngos po med pa ma nges pa yin la / dngos po dang dngos po med pa gnyi ga dang ldan pa'i don yang 'gro ba na yod pa ma yin pa de bas na de dang 'dra ba phrad par mi nus so //*. The reading in D presents some problems. D38a4–5: *kha cig ni yid gnyis kyi don bzhin ni yid gnyis ni don bzhin du dngos po dang dngos po med pa ma nges pa yin la / dngos po dang dngos po med pa gnyi ga'i don dang ldan pa'i 'gro ba yang yod pa ma yin la de bas na de dang 'dra ba phrad par mi nus so*. See Hugon 2014: 218–220.

<sup>71</sup> In contrast, the expression *yid gnyis* never occurs in the Tibetan translation of Vinītadeva’s *Nyāyabinduṭīkā* by Jinamitra and Ye shes sde that dates from c. 800.

In the canonical Tibetan translation one can find 71 occurrences of *the tshom za ba* and 22 of *the tshom*, while *yid gnyis za ba* occurs twice and *yid gnyis* thrice.

- In two cases, *yid gnyis*, resp. *yid gnyis za ba*, occurs together with *the tshom za ba* in the same sentence. This is clearly meant to avoid repeating the same Tibetan term when the sentence has two different Sanskrit words or two different forms of the same verb connoting doubt.<sup>72</sup>
- In two cases, the two translations appear in the same sentence or connected sentences for the very same Sanskrit expression.<sup>73</sup> In one such case (NBT<sub>Skt</sub> 29,1–3, see below), comparison with the fragments of an earlier translation of the *Nyāyabinduṭīkā* by Dharmāloka found in Tabo monastery demonstrates a process of revision at play.<sup>74</sup> Indeed, Dharmāloka's translation twice uses *yid gnyis* to translate the Sanskrit *sāśankā* in the same passage, whereas the canonical translation has *the tshom* for the first occurrence and *yid gnyis* for the second.

Sanskrit:

(a) *yatraiva hi prekṣāvanto 'rthinah sāśankāḥ / tat parīkṣyate*

(b) *tena tatra na sāśankā arthinah / atas tan na prīkṣaṇīyam* /<sup>75</sup>

<sup>72</sup> NBT<sub>Skt</sub> 193,1: *tasyāśrayaṇasya sandehe sandigdhaḥ*; Tib. D74a1 (= P89b8): *gzhi de la the tshom za ba ni yid gnyis za ba 'o* //; NBT<sub>Skt</sub> 214,14: *anvayavyati-rekarūpayoḥ sandehāṭ saṁśayahetuḥ* /; Tib. D80b3–4 (= P98a6–7): *rjes su 'gro ba dang ldog pa 'i tshul de nyid la the tshom za ba 'i phyir yid gnyis kyi rgyu yin no* //

<sup>73</sup> One case is NBT<sub>Skt</sub> 195,5–6: *api tu tadviparītaḥ saṁśayah / sādhyaitarayoh saṁśayahetur anaikāntika uktaḥ* //; Tib. P90b8: *'on kyang phyin ci log tu the tshom za ba yin te / bsgrub par bya ba dang cig shos la yid gnyis za ba 'i gtan tshigs ni ma nges pa zhes bstan to* //. The Tibetan text in D is faulty. D74b5: *'on kyang phyin ci log tu the tshom za ba yin te / nges pa ni gcig kho nar cig shos pa yid gnyis za ba 'i gtan tshigs ni ma nges pa zhes bstan to* //. *Nges pa ni gcig kho nar* appears to be a dittography of the translation of *eko 'nta ekānto* in the preceding sentence.

<sup>74</sup> This comparison was made possible thanks to Horst Lasic generously providing access to his transcription of this material. See Lasic 2006 for a discussion of the earlier translation and its revision by rNgog Lo.

<sup>75</sup> Translation: “Indeed, intelligent people looking for some result examine only that with regard to which they have a doubt. [...] Thus, those looking for some result do not have doubt with regard to it. Therefore, it does not have to be examined (by them).”

Dharmāloka's translation:

- (a) *rtog pa dang ldan pa rnams / gang 'dod pa de yid gnyis su gyurd na / de brtag par bya ba yin no /*  
 (b) *des na don 'dod pa'i rnams de la yid gnyis myed do / de'i phyir de brtag par bya ba ma yin no //*

Citation in rNgog Lo's *Rigs thigs 'grel ti ka*:

- (b) *don du gnyer ba rnams yid gnyis myed pa de'i phyir de brtag par bya ba ma yin no //*

Canonical translation (D39a1–2 = P46b3–4):

- (a) *rtog pa dang ldan pa rnams gang la don du gnyer ba rtog pa dang ldan pa the tshom za ba de nyid ni brtag par bya ba yin no //*  
 (b) *des na de la don du gnyer ba rnams yid gnyis med de / de'i phyir de brtag par bya ba ma yin no //*

This could suggest that rNgog Lo ordered a modification of the translation of *sāśaṅkā*, which was carried out in (a), but not for the second occurrence in (b). This may have been due to the lack of diligence or intelligence of the copyist in charge of including rNgog Lo's revisions into the text, which, as cogently argued by Lasic (2006), stands out in a number of passages. Indeed, a number of other passages in which the same Sanskrit word for “doubt” occurs twice also have *the tshom* twice in the translation.

Against the hypothesis of a sloppy copyist regarding this passage, one may note that in rNgog Lo's citation of the second passage (b) in his *Rigs thigs 'grel ti ka*—which at best testifies to his own translation—the translation of the Sanskrit *arthinaḥ* has been changed from *don 'dod pa'i rnams* to *don du gnyer ba rnams*, but *yid gnyis* is preserved for *sāśaṅkāḥ*. Thus the copyist may have correctly understood rNgog Lo's indications for the revision as implying a modification of the first occurrence of *yid gnyis* only. Further counter-evidence would lie in the fact that rNgog Lo's paraphrase of Dharmottara's explanation on this point in the *dKa' gnas* also uses the term *yid gnyis*—this is the only occurrence of the term in the whole *dKa' gnas*.<sup>76</sup>

<sup>76</sup> *dKa' gnas* 18,2–10: *dang po ni slob dpon chos mchog na re / ... dang po ni dpyad bya ma yin te / ... rtog pa dang ldan pa blang bya nyid du nges pas yid gnyis myed pa'i phyir bstan chos su yang de dpyad par bya ba ma yin no //*

Unfortunately, the Tabo fragments do not contain any other occurrences of *the tshom* or *yid gnyis*. And the citations of the *Nyāyabinduṭīkā* by rNgog Lo in his *Rigs thigs 'grel ṭi ka* count only one other occurrence of *the tshom*, where the canonical translation reads the same (NBT<sub>Skt</sub> 198,2; Tib. D25b6). The preference for *the tshom* is clear in rNgog Lo's translation of the *Pramāṇaviniścaya* and the *Pramāṇaviniścayaṭīkā* (at least as it is attested in the canon), in which the term *yid gnyis* is never used in this sense.<sup>77</sup>

- The fifth occurrence of *yid gnyis* in the canonical translation of the *Nyāyabinduṭīkā* is attested for *saṃśaya* in the very passage that rNgog Lo identifies in his *Rigs thigs 'grel ṭi ka* as the place where Dharmottara discusses the category of doubt (see above NBT<sub>Skt</sub> 22,2–3; Skt. and Tib. in n. 70). rNgog Lo only cites the beginning of this passage (i.e., *kha cig ni*) as marker, but the fact that he uses the term *yid gnyis* to refer to doubt in this context strongly suggests that his translation of this passage also read *yid gnyis*.

Apart from this passage, rNgog Lo uses *the tshom* wherever else he is talking about doubt in the *Rigs thigs 'grel ṭi ka*. In particular, when he presents his own classification of awareness—which differs from the one he ascribes to Dharmottara—rNgog Lo uses the term *the tshom* for the category of doubt.

In view of the above remarks, one can tentatively suggest the following scenario: rNgog Lo relied on Dharmāloka's translation when studying the *Nyāyabinduṭīkā*. In this translation, in the passage which rNgog Lo identifies as the exclusion of doubt from being knowledge (NBT<sub>Skt</sub> 22,2), the term *yid gnyis* translates *saṃśaya*. rNgog Lo thus initially calls *yid gnyis* the category of awareness consisting in doubt. But he is already in the process of revising the translation of the *Nyāyabinduṭīkā*, changing *yid gnyis* to *the tshom*, and using the latter in his own explanations. He does not, however, change this translation in at least two cases (the reason for this remains obscure).

His translation of the *Pramāṇaviniścaya* and *ṭīkā* and the composition of the *dKa' gnas* occur subsequently. *Yid gnyis* is not used anymore to translate Sanskrit expressions connoting doubt, and *the tshom* is also used by rNgog Lo in his discussions. Even when paraphrasing Dharmottara's key discussion on doubt in NBT<sub>Skt</sub> 22,2–3, rNgog Lo now uses the term

<sup>77</sup> In PVinṭ 3 one finds the expression *yid gnyis su gyur* (D29b5) for *tulārīḍha* (27b4).

the *tshom* rather than *yid gnyis* (although the latter is included in the canonical translation of this passage of the *Nyāyabinduṭīkā*). But a vestige of the use of *yid gnyis* nevertheless remains in his paraphrase of another view of Dharmottara, the source of which is one passage of the *Nyāyabinduṭīkā* in which rNgog Lo retained Dharmāloka's translation *yid gnyis*.

## (b) Understanding of the category

In the *Mun sel*, the debates around the category of “doubt” pertain to its having, or not, the operation of exclusion (see *Mun sel* 123.5 [a] and [b]). The former position would follow from the idea that the operation of exclusion is correlated with the operation of directing one's mind (*zhen pa*), which doubt has. The latter view, on the other hand, ties the operation of exclusion with the criterion of being determinate (*nges pa*), which doubt is not. Those who deny that doubt has the operation of exclusion argue that doubt does not exclude the incorrect option *non-x* (in the way that episodes of determinate awareness that correctly determine do) and also does not exclude the correct option *x* (in the way episodes of determinate awareness that incorrectly determine do).

The latter view was held by rNgog Lo and, reportedly, by rGya dmar ba as well.<sup>78</sup> In his *dKa' gnas* and his concise guide, rNgog Lo asserts that doubt neither ascertains positively nor negatively.<sup>79</sup> More precisely, because it does not ascertain negatively—this implies that it does not exclude anything—it cannot ascertain positively. According to rNgog Lo, doubt thus fails to be an episode of knowledge because it lacks the “positive ascertainment” (which implies a conceptual determination) that rNgog Lo takes to be a criterion for knowledge.<sup>80</sup> Some students of Phya pa such as Dan bag pa reportedly also adopted the view that doubt does not have the function of exclusion.<sup>81</sup>

<sup>78</sup> *Tshad bsdu*s 60,7–9: *rgya na re the tshom la gzhan sel med de the tshom gyis gang yang yongs su ma bca*d par gang yang rnam par mi chod pas so //

<sup>79</sup> rNgog Lo criticizes what he understands to be Dharmottara's position, that doubt ascertains an object that is both *x* and *non-x*. Since no such object exists in reality, doubt amounts, according to Dharmottara, to a mistaken cognition.

<sup>80</sup> See Hugon 2014: 214 and 220.

<sup>81</sup> Cf. gTsang drug rdo rje's *gSal byed* 8b3: <dan> *kha l na re the tshom la gzhan sel med gzhan sel yod na nges par thal rtog pa 'ang nges par 'jog pa gzhan sel gyis 'jog pa 'i phyir zhes zer ba*. The insertion “dan” refers to Dan bag pa.

Phya pa defends the former view, that doubt has the operation of exclusion, but accepts that neither  $x$  nor  $non-x$  is excluded. What, then, is excluded? According to Phya pa, the operation of conceiving of the intentional object as possible excludes conceiving of it as impossible.<sup>82</sup> Phya pa accepts that the operation of exclusion, which amounts to a “negative ascertainment,” implies “positive ascertainment” (for *rnam par gcod pa* and *yongs su gcod pa* are coextensive), and thus that these both apply in the case of doubt. Simply, these two sides of ascertainment do not pertain to  $x$  (or to  $non-x$ ), they pertain to the possibility of  $x$  (respectively, the possibility of  $non-x$ ).<sup>83</sup>

Although doubt thus has the operation of exclusion, since this exclusion pertains to the “possibility” only, it does not correspond to the “elimination of opposite superimposition” that is a requirement for knowledge. Doubt is compatible with the opposite superimposition ( $non-x$ , provided that  $x$  is the correct option) precisely because the possibility of this option  $non-x$  is preserved, given the definition of doubt as “that which includes the consideration of another alternative being possible.”

Phya pa does not refute any alternative definitions of doubt. But according to the *Tshad bsdus* (59,20–60,1), Phya pa’s definition was also held by “Zhang tshes” (presumably, Zhang tshes spong Chos kyi bla ma, who had been Phya pa’s ordination abbot and one of his teachers) (cf. 6.5 [iii]) and was different from the definition by “rGya” (rGya dmar ba), “engaging via an awareness that has a double-pointed aspect” (6.5 [iv]). This latter definition will be adopted by Phya pa’s student gTsang nag pa (6.5 [v]) and reportedly by Dan bag pa, another of Phya pa’s foremost disciples (6.5 [vii]).

Since Phya pa does not engage in a refutation of this definition, it is possible that he did not consider it as essentially different from his own. Phya pa’s example of doubt in the form “Is this permanent or impermanent” spells out a “double-pointed awareness” in which two contradictory options  $x$  and  $non-x$  are both held to be possible. Still, Phya pa sometimes

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<sup>82</sup> *Mun sel* 121.12: “For episodes of doubt, directing one’s mind toward its (i.e., the intentional object’s) possibility excludes its impossibility.”

<sup>83</sup> This would be like saying that doubt is not a determinate awareness with regard to its intentional object but is a determinate awareness with regard to the possibility of its intentional object. In the parallel passage of the *'Od zer* (29a4–5), Phya pa more mildly expresses the requirement of “excluding conceiving as  $non-x$ ” for “conceiving as  $x$ ,” which applies in the same way to  $x$  = “blue” and to  $x$  = “possible.”

exemplifies an episode of doubt by mentioning only one possible option, e.g., “the demon could exist in reality.”<sup>84</sup> This could suggest that he considered that, in an episode of doubt, the directing of the mind is toward one of the two options, without however being partial to this option in such a way that the other option is no longer held possible. This interpretation would correspond to the definition of doubt held by Sa paṅ: “Although one takes it to be *x*, being *non-x* is possible.”<sup>85</sup>

### (c) Translation

“Doubt” is a standard translation for *the tshom*. An alternative translation found in modern literature is “doubting consciousness” (Rinbochay&Napper 1980).

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<sup>84</sup> See *Mun sel* 121.112: “Conceiving of the existence of a demon as possible excludes conceiving of the existence of a demon as impossible.” See also *Mun sel* 123.53: “Doubt excludes the impossibility of sound being permanent.”

<sup>85</sup> *Rigs gter* II 71,2: *der 'dzin na yang de min srid //*. In this definition, Sa paṅ’s intention is surely not to imply that, from an *ontological* perspective, the option ‘it is *non-x*’ is possibly true/correct. That is, his definition is not to be read as the conjunction of (a) it is possibly true that it is *non-x*, but (b) the cognizer takes it to be *x*. Such a reading of Sa paṅ’s definition would wrongly entail that any *contingently* correct, non-doubting cognition would be an instance of doubt.

Instead, what Sa paṅ likely has in mind is that (b\*) the cognizer takes something to be *x*, and yet also (a\*) the cognizer takes it to be possible that it is *non-x*. In this way, the person’s mind is directed toward one particular option (*x*), but the other option (*non-x*) is still held to be possible. In other words, the invocation “being *non-x* is possible” is to be treated as indicating an *epistemic* possibility as opposed to an *ontological* possibility. This reading is confirmed by Sa paṅ’s later remark that “...when one thinks ‘it is possibly a true state of affairs’ or ‘it is possibly a false state of affairs,’ the awareness is an instance of doubt” (*Rigs gter* II 71,11: *...blo ni don bden yang rung brdzun yang rung brtags na the tshom yin no //*).





## 6. Definitions

Provided below are the definitions of the five types of cognition that are not episodes of knowledge found in Phya pa's *Mun sel* and *'Od zer*, the definitions criticized by Phya pa, as well as definitions found in a selection of other epistemological works (definitions by the authors of these works, or definitions of other scholars that they discuss). Those testify to the evolution of these notions within the Tibetan tradition, and should be helpful for assessing the place of additional material.

The definitions in the tables below follow the chronological order of the works they appear in (that order is in part tentative). Definitions cited by the respective authors are listed before the author's own definition. When the author of the work referred to in the last column is not the proponent of the given definition, the identification of the proponent provided in the text appears in quotation marks (e.g., "kha cig," "Phya pa"). A question mark indicates that the definition is discussed without being introduced as someone's position. Identifications provided in marginal notes appear within pointed brackets.

Definitions are grouped into categories (A, B...) based on the definitional criteria they mention, regardless of the literal formulation of these criteria, unless the latter grounds the rejection of a definition in favor of another. Potentially relevant differences in formulation are noted in parentheses.

### 6.1 Non-ascertaining perception (*snang la ma nges pa*)

#### Groups of definitions

- A – i, ix, xi, xv, xviii: Appearing; not bringing about a determining cognition
- B – ii, xiv: Appearing (ii: appearing particular); coexisting with a superimposition
- C – vii, xii: Appearing; compatibility with superimpositions
- D – iii, iv, v, vi, viii, x, xiii, xvi, xvii, xix: Appearing particular; compatibility with superimpositions (x: non-elimination of superimpositions)

i	A	“kha cig”	nges shes mi ’dren zhing snang pa	<i>Mun sel</i> 123.1 (a)
ii	B	“kha cig”	don rang gi mtshan nyid snang zhing sgro ’dogs dang lhan cig pa	<i>Mun sel</i> 123.1 (a)
iii	D	Phya pa	don rang gi mtshan nyid snang pa dang bzlog pa’i sgro ’dogs dang mi ’gal ba	<i>Mun sel</i> 123.12
iv	D	Phya pa	don rang gi mtshan nyid snang yang bzlog pa’i sgro ’dogs dang myi ’gal ba	<i>’Od zer</i> 111.222.1.b. 11, 24b1
v	D	Phya pa	sgro ’dogs dang myi ’gal zhing don rang gi mtshan nyid snang pa	<i>’Od zer</i> 33b5–6
vi	D	Phya pa	sgro ’dogs dang myi ’gal ba’i rang gi mtshan nyid snang pa	<i>’Od zer</i> 33b8
vii	C	“rGya”	sgro ’dogs dang mi ’gal ba’i snang ba yin	<i>Tshad bsdus</i> 54,18–19
viii	D	(author unknown)	bzlog pa’i sgro ’dogs dang mi ’gal zhing don rang gi mtshan nyid snang ba	<i>Tshad bsdus</i> 54,15–16
ix	A	“kha cig”	snang yang nges pa ’dren mi nus pa	<i>bsDus pa</i> 22b7
x	D	gTsang nag pa	rang gi mtshan nyid snang yang sgro ’dogs mi sel pa	<i>bsDus pa</i> 22b8
xi	A	“kha cig” <(rtag pa)?>	snang pa’i don la nges shes ’dren mi nus pa yin	<i>sGron ma</i> 5b3–4
xii	C	“kha cig” <phyar gya>	sgro ’dogs dang mi ’gal ba’i snang pa yin	<i>sGron ma</i> 5b4
xiii	D	mTshur ston	rang gi mtshan nyid snang pa’i don la sgro ’dogs dang mi ’gal ba	<i>sGron ma</i> 5b5
xiv	B	“kha cig”	sgro ’dogs dang lhan cig (em. lhan cig : Ms lhan) pa’i snang ba	<i>gSal byed</i> 9b4
xv	A	“ti ka byed kha l” <chos>	nges shes ’dren mi nus pa’i snang ba l yin	<i>gSal byed</i> 9b6
xvi	D	gTsang drug	don rang gi mtshan nyid snang zhing sgro ’dogs dang mi ’gal bar ’jug pa yin	<i>gSal byed</i> 9b7
xvii	D	“kha cig”	don rang gi mtshan nyid snang zhing sgro ’dogs dang mi ’gal bar ’jug pa yin	<i>rNam rgyal</i> A8b9; B11a3–4

xviii	A	Chu mig pa	'dzin pa gang zhig snang yul la nges shes mi 'dren pa	<i>rNam rgyal</i> A9a3; B11a8
xix	D	rDo rje dbang grags/ Chos kyi bzhad pa	don rang mtshan snang zhing sgro 'dogs dang mi 'gal ba (zhes bzhed)	<i>Tshad nye</i> <i>bscus</i> 8b2

## 6.2 Post-knowledge cognition (*bcad pa'i yul can*)

### Terms used for the category

- *bcad pa'i yul can*: i–ix,
- *bcad shes*: x, xi, xii–xiii (ms. A), xiv–xv (ms. A)
- *spyad shes*: xii (ms. B)
- *dpyad shes*: xiii (ms. B), xv (ms. B)
- *bcad pa yul can*: xvi, xvii

### Groups of definitions

- A – i, ii, iii: Superimpositions already eliminated; incompatibility with engaging in the opposite way (iii: incompatibility with opposite superimpositions)
- B – iv: Superimpositions already eliminated; subsequent apprehension
- C – v, vii, x, xii: Object already understood
- D – viii, xvi: Object already understood by an episode of knowledge
- E – xiii: Previous understanding of the object; incompatibility with superimpositions
- F – vi, ix, xi, xiv: Unimpaired previous understanding (vi: unimpaired understanding; xi: unimpaired aggregates of previous elimination of superimposition); incompatibility with superimpositions
- G – xv, xvii: Unimpaired previous understanding by an (xvii: one's own) episode of knowledge; incompatibility with superimpositions

i	A	Phya pa	sgro 'dogs chod zin pa'i don la bzlog pa'i zhen pa dang 'gal ba'i blo 'jug pa	<i>Mun sel</i> 123.22
ii	A	Phya pa	sgro 'dogs chod zin pa'i don la bzlog pa'i zhen pa dang 'gal bas 'jug pa	' <i>Od zer</i> 111.222.1.b. 121, 24b2 and 111.222.32, 29a1
iii	A	“Phya pa”	tshad mas sngar sgro 'dogs chod pa'i don la bzlog pa'i sgro 'dogs dang 'gal bas 'jug pa	<i>Tshad bsdus</i> 56,2–3
iv	B	?	tshad mas sngar sgro 'dogs chod zin pa'i don la phyis yang bltab nas 'dzin pa yin	<i>Tshad bsdus</i> 55,21–56,1
v	C	?	sngar rtogs zin la 'jug pa tsam	<i>bsDus pa</i> 23a3–4
vi	F	gTsang nag pa	rtogs pa'i byed pa ma nyams pa'i don la sgro 'dogs dang 'gal bar 'jug pa	<i>bsDus pa</i> 23a4
vii	C	?	sngar rtogs zin la 'jug pa tsam	<i>sGron ma</i> 6a1
viii	D	“kha cig”	tshad mas sngar rtogs zin pa'i don la yang 'jug pa yin	<i>sGron ma</i> 5b9
ix	F	mTshur ston	sngar rtogs pa'i byed pa ma nyams pa'i don la sgro 'dogs dang 'gal bar 'jug pa	<i>sGron ma</i> 6a1
x	C	“kha cig”	sngar rtogs zin la 'jug pa	<i>gSal byed</i> 10a4
xi	F	gTsang drug	sngar sgro 'dogs chod zin gyi 'du byed ma nyams pa'i don la sgro 'dogs dang 'gal bar 'jug pa	<i>gSal byed</i> 10a4–5
xii	C	“kha cig”	sngar rtogs zin gyi don la 'jug pa	<i>rNam rgyal</i> A9a7; B11b4
xiii	E	“kha cig”	sngar rtogs zin gyi don la sgro 'dogs dang 'gal bar 'jug pa	<i>rNam rgyal</i> A9a8; B11b5

xiv	F	“kha cig”	sngar rtogs kyi byed pa ma nyams pa'i don la sgro 'dogs dang 'gal bar 'jug pa	<i>rNam rgyal</i> A9a9 (not found in B)
xv	G	Chu mig pa	rang gi tshad mas sngar rtogs kyi byed pa ma nyams pa'i don la sgro 'dogs dang 'gal bar 'jug pa	<i>rNam rgyal</i> A9a9–b1; B11b6
xvi	D	?	tshad mas sngar rtogs zin gyi don la 'jug pa	<i>Tshad nye</i> <i>bsdus</i> 8b4
xvii	G	rDo rje dbang grags/Chos kyi bzhad pa	rang gis tshad mas sngar rtogs kyi byed pa ma nyams pa'i don la sgro 'dogs dang 'gal bar 'jug pa	<i>Tshad nye</i> <i>bsdus</i> 8b4

### 6.3 Factive assessment (*gid dpyod*)

#### Terms used for the category

- *gid dpyod*: i–ix, xiii–xv
- *gid spyod*: xi, xii

#### Groups of definitions

- A – i, iv, vi, viii, xi: Not based on experience or evidence; determinate (i: engaging while being partial; xi: determining while being partial)
- B – ix, xiii: Not based on experience or evidence; determinate (xiii: determining while being partial); having a veridical object
- C – v, xii: Not based on experience or evidence; determinate; having a veridical object; novel
- D – vii: Not based on experience or evidence; determinate; novel
- E – ii: Not based on evidence; determinate; having a veridical object; novel
- F – iii, x, xv: Not based on evidence; determinate; having a veridical object (x, xv: corresponding to reality); novel; having a concealed object
- G – xiv: Compatible with superimpositions; determining while being partial; having a veridical object

i	A	“kha cig”	myong pa dang rtags la ma rten par don phyogs cig du zhen pa	<i>Mun sel</i> 123.322
ii	E	Phya pa	sngar ma rtogs pa’i don bden pa rtags tshad mas nges pa la ma brten par nges pa	<i>Mun sel</i> 123.321
iii	F	Phya pa	lkog gyur bden pa rtags kyī rjes su ma ’brangs par gsar du nges pa	<i>’Od zer</i> 111.222.34, 29a5
iv	A	“rGya”	myong ba dang rtags (em. rtags : rtag) la ma brten par don nges tsam yin	<i>Tshad bsdus</i> 57,7–8
v	C	(author unknown)	myong ba dang rtags la ma brten par don bden pa gsar du nges pa	<i>Tshad bsdus</i> 58,1–2
vi	A	?	myong pa dang rtags la ma rten par nges pa tsam	<i>bsDus pa</i> 23a6
vii	D	gTsang nag pa	rtags dang myong pa myed par sngar ma rtogs pa’i don nges pa	<i>bsDus pa</i> 23a6
viii	A	“kha cig”	myong pa dang rtags la ma brten par don nges tsam yin	<i>sGron ma</i> 6a3
ix	B	“kha cig”	myong ba <dang> rtags la ma brten par don bden pa {gsar du} <sup>86</sup> nges pa yin	<i>sGron ma</i> 6a4 (marginal note)
x	F	mTshur ston	rtags kyī rgyu mtshan la ma brten par sngar ma rtogs pa’i rkog gyur la don dang mthun par nges pa	<i>sGron ma</i> 6a4
xi	A	“gzhan dag” <rgya>	myong ba dang rtags la ma brten par don mtha’ l tu nges pa	<i>gSal byed</i> 10a6–7
xii	C	gTsang drug	myong ba dang rtags la ma rten par sngar ma rtogs pa’i don bden pa nges pa	<i>gSal byed</i> 10a7
xiii	B	“kha cig”	myong ba (A ba, B pa) dang rtags la ma rten (A rten, B brten) par don bden pa mtha’ l du nges pa (A pa, B <pa>) yin	<i>rNam rgyal</i> A9b5–6; B12a2

<sup>86</sup> This expression is circled with a dotted line on the manuscript, probably indicating that it must be deleted. Indeed, the argument against this definition is that it would apply to conceptual post-knowledge cognition (which the mention of “novelty” would prevent).

xiv	G	Chu mig pa	sgro 'dogs dang mi 'gal zhing don bden pa mtha' cig (B cig, A 1) du nges pa	<i>rNam rgyal</i> A9b6–7; B12a3–4
xv	F	rDo rje dbang grags/ Chos kyi bzhad pa	rtags kyi rgyu mtshan la ma brten par sngar ma rtogs pa'i lkog gyur don dang mthun par nges pa	<i>Tshad nye bsdus</i> 8b6

## 6.4 Mistaken cognition (*log shes*)

### Groups of definitions

- A – i, ii, v: Positively discerning incorrectly  
 B – iii, vi: Having a non-veridical object  
 C – iv, xiii, xv: No correspondence with the state of affairs  
 D – xi: No correspondence with the state of affairs; engaging while being partial  
 E – vii, viii, x, xvi: Having something superimposed as its object  
 F – xiv: Taking as something what is not that  
 G – ix, xii, xvii: There is no general definition for this category

i	A	Phya pa	don phyin ci log du yongs su gcod pa	<i>Mun sel</i> 123.42
ii	A	Phya pa	don phyin ci log du yongs su gcod pa	<i>'Od zer</i> 111.222.31, 28b7
iii	B	“Phya pa” <sup>87</sup>	don mi bden pa yul du byed pa yin	<i>Tshad bsdus</i> 61,11–12
iv	C	“Byang chub skyabs”	don dang mi mthun pa yul du byed pa yin	<i>Tshad bsdus</i> 61,12–13
v	A	“rGya” <sup>88</sup>	don la phyin ci log tu yongs su gcod pa	<i>Tshad bsdus</i> 61,13–14
vi	B	“kha cig”	mi bden pa'i yul can	<i>bsDus pa</i> 23b2

<sup>87</sup> This attribution to “Phya pa” should instead be attached to the definition (v), and “rGya” to the definition (iii).

<sup>88</sup> See n. 87.

vii	E	gTsang nag pa	rang gis sgro btags pa yul byed pa	<i>bsDus pa</i> 23b3
viii	E	mTshur ston	rang yul sgro 'dogs pa	<i>sGron ma</i> 6a8
ix	G	“kha cig” <dan>	spyi'i mtshan nyid med	<i>gSal byed</i> 10b4
x	E	“chos kyi spyan can dag”	'dzin stangs rang gis sgro btags pa yin	<i>gSal byed</i> 10b4–5
xi	D	gTsang drug	'dzin stangs don gyi gnas lugs dang mi mthun par mtha' 1 tu 'jug pa yin	<i>gSal byed</i> 10b5
xii	G	“kha cig”	log shes spyi'i mtshan nyid cig (B cig, A 1) med	<i>rNam rgyal</i> A9b9; B12a7
xiii	C	“kha cig”	don dang mi mthun par 'dzin pa	<i>rNam rgyal</i> A10a2; B12a9
xiv	F	Chu mig pa	de ma yin la der 'dzin pa	<i>rNam rgyal</i> A10a3; B12b1
xv	C	“Phya pa”	don dang mi mthun par 'dzin pa	<i>Tshad nye</i> <i>bsdus</i> 9a3
xvi	E	“Tsang nag pa”	rang yul sgro 'dogs pa	<i>Tshad nye</i> <i>bsdus</i> 9a5
xvii	G	rDo rje dbang grags/Chos kyi bzhad pa	spyi mtshan nyid (em. mtshan nyid : Ms mtshan) mi btub pa	<i>Tshad nye</i> <i>bsdus</i> 9a7



## 6.5 Doubt (*the tshom*)

### Groups of definitions

- A – i, ii, iii, vi, x: Including consideration of another alternative  
 B – iv, v, vi, vii: Awareness having a double-pointed aspect  
 C – viii, ix, xi: Engaging without being partial

i	A	Phya pa	mtha' gzhan du srid pa'i dogs pa dang bcas pa	<i>Mun sel</i> 123.52
ii	A	Phya pa	mtha' gzhan du srid pa'i dogs pa dang bcas pa	<i>'Od zer</i> 111.222.33, 29a4
iii	A	“Zhang tshes dang Phya pa”	mtha' gzhan du srid pa'i dogs pa dang bcas pa	<i>Tshad bsdus</i> 59,21–60,1
iv	B	“rGya”	blo rtse gnyis kyi rnam pas 'jug pa	<i>Tshad bsdus</i> 59,20
v	B	gTsang nag pa	yul la rtse gnyis su 'jug pa	<i>bsDus pa</i> 23b4
vi	A B	mTshur ston	yul la rtse gnyis su 'jug pa'am / mtha' gzhan du srid par dogs pa dang bcas pa	<i>sGron ma</i> 6a9
vii	B	“kha cig” <dan>	blo rtse 2 kyi rnam pas 'jug pa	<i>gSal byed</i> 10b7–8
viii	C	gTsang drug	mtha' 1 tu ma nges par zhen pa 1 yin	<i>gSal byed</i> 10b8
ix	C	Chu mig pa	don mtha' 1 du ma nges par zhen pa	<i>rNam rgyal</i> A10a4; B12b2–3
x	A	rDo rje dbang grags/Chos kyi bzhad pa <rtsang 'bre>	mtha' gzhan du 'dzin pa'i dogs pa dang bcas pa	<i>Tshad nye bsdus</i> 9a8
xi	C	?	mtha' gcig du ma nges par zhen pa	<i>Tshad nye bsdus</i> 9a8 (marginal note)

