

VII

Appendices

Appendix 1: Excursuses in the first chapter of the *Mun sel*

Five passages in the first chapter of the *Mun sel* that were not directly relevant to the topic of Phya pa's philosophy of mind have been left out of the present edition and translation. The content of these digressions is summarized below and references are provided to existing editions and/or translations or related studies.

EX1 (1b1–4): Invocation and introductory verses

After giving the title of the work in Sanskrit and Tibetan, Phya pa pays his respects to the Bodhisattva Mañjuḥṣa ('*Jam pa 'i dbyangs*) and to his religious teachers (*bla ma rnams*) with the traditional formula "I bow down to..." (*...la phyag 'tshal lo*). This is followed by four verses, each consisting of four lines of fifteen syllables (two syllables are missing in the first line of the fourth verse). The first two are verses of invocation. The second two present the purpose of the treatise: extending Dignāga and Dharmakīrti's endeavor in the field of epistemology, and providing tools to progress on the path to omniscience.

This part of the text is critically edited and translated in the "info-sheet" prepared for the *Mun sel* by Pascale Hugon and Kazuo Kano in the framework of the project "A gateway to early Tibetan scholasticism – The *bKa' gdams gsung 'bum* collection," currently hosted at www.ikga.oeaw.ac.at/KDSB.

EX2 (1b9–3b3): Refutation of other philosophical systems (regarding the status of objects)

This passage discusses the status ascribed to the apprehended objects that Phya pa distinguishes from the point of view of three philosophical standpoints: representational idealism, non-representational idealism and representational external realism. Phya pa refutes these three systems. The position he adopts (stated in *Mun sel* 111(a)D) is characterized by Phya pa himself in terms of "non-representational external realism."

Phya pa's position and his arguments against the other systems are investigated in detail in Hugon 2016c. This publication also includes a critical edition and a translation of this passage of the *Mun sel* and of the parallel passages contained in the 'Od zer, in Phya pa's doxography, and in his summary of Madhyamaka (*sNying po*).

EX3 (4a8–6a3): On the epistemic object of inferential cognition

In this passage, Phya pa presents and criticizes the views of Dharmottara, Śāṅkaranandana, and a third scholar (who can be identified as rGya dmar ba) and presents his own view on the topic of the object of inferential cognition. The question is whether the epistemic object of the three types of inferential cognition—based on a logical reason qua essential property, qua effect, or qua non-apprehension (see, in this chapter, Appendix 2.5)—is a “simple negation” (*med dgag*) or a “negation with a positive retainer” (*ma yin dgag*).¹ An important issue that lies in the background of Phya pa's discussion is the status of the Madhyamaka proof of emptiness based on the logical reason ‘neither one nor many,’ the constitutive elements of which can be interpreted as being either simple negations or negations with a positive retainer.

The positions of the scholars considered are summarized in the table below. Phya pa's view is that the epistemic object that is *directly known* in an inferential cognition is the aggregate of the subject and the property to be proven, i.e., the thesis. For instance, in the classical examples illustrating the three types of inferential reasons, they are the aggregate of ‘sound’ and ‘impermanence’ (for an inferential cognition based on a logical reason qua essential property), the aggregate of ‘mountain pass’ and ‘fire’ (for a logical reason qua effect), and the aggregate of ‘entity’ and ‘emptiness’ (for a logical reason qua non-apprehension).² Such an aggregate is always a negation with a positive retainer unless both members of the aggregate, the subject and the property, are simple negations. The epistemic object that is *indirectly known* is the negation of the aggregate of the subject and the negandum. For instance, the negation

¹ On these notions in Phya pa's system and the choice of the English rendering, see Hugon 2015a: 62–64.

² Cf. Appendix 2.7, [b], [a], and [e], respectively.

of the aggregate of ‘sound’ and ‘permanence,’ the negation of the aggregate of ‘mountain pass’ and ‘non-fiery entity,’ and the negation of the aggregate of ‘entity’ and ‘ultimate entity.’ The negation of an aggregate is always a simple negation. For more details, see the analysis of this section in Hugon 2015a.

Table 4: The identification of the epistemic object

	Logical reason qua essential property	Logical reason qua effect	Logical reason qua non-apprehension
Dharmottara	Simple negation	Simple negation	Simple negation
Śāṅkaranandana	Negation with positive retainer	Negation with positive retainer	Negation with positive retainer
Anonymous (rGya dmar ba)	Negation with positive retainer	Negation with positive retainer	Simple negation
Phya pa	<u>Directly</u> Negation with positive retainer <u>Indirectly</u> Simple negation	<u>Directly</u> Negation with positive retainer <u>Indirectly</u> Simple negation	<u>Directly</u> Negation with positive retainer (Simple negation when the subject and the property are both simple negations) <u>Indirectly</u> Simple negation

EX4 (6a9–8a2): Proof that there is no duality of appearing and non-appearing for what is essentially identical

In this excursus, Phya pa presents the details of the reasoning proving that there is no duality of appearing for features such as ‘blue’ and ‘impermanent’ (or ‘momentary’). This proof, in turn, establishes that ‘blue’ and ‘momentariness,’ which are essentially identical and are devoid of distinction, appear as devoid of distinction. This is part of the establishment that in non-conceptual non-erroneous cognitions, the appearance corresponds to the way things are.

The inferential proof establishing the lack of duality is based on the logical reason ‘being substantially identical’ or ‘being a unique substance’ (*rdzas cig pa*). To be valid, this logical reason must satisfy the characteristics of (a) applying to the subject and (b) entailing the property to be proven (see Appendix 2.4).

The former, (a), can be established by resorting to the arguments that establish relations of substantial identity, which are extensively discussed in another context, that of the Buddhist proof of momentariness, and are not repeated there.

With regard to the latter, (b)—that ‘being substantially identical’ (*rdzas cig*) or ‘being essentially identical’ (*ngo bo cig*) entails the absence of the duality of appearing and non-appearing—Phya pa examines in detail the notion of “unity” or “identity” (*cig*) involved in the logical reason ‘being a unique substance’ (*Mun sel* 112.222.3). He spells out the various notions of conventional and ultimate ‘unity’ and ‘multiplicity’ in a gradual scale, starting with the non-Buddhists, then introducing the views of the Śrāvaka Buddhists of the Lesser Vehicle, then of the Buddhists following the Higher Vehicle, first Buddhist idealists, then proponents of the system of the Middle Way (Madhyamaka), in Phya pa’s words “those who analyze reality” (*de kho na dpyod pa rnams*). The logical reason ‘being a unique substance’ is qualified, from the point of view of the last system, in terms of a ‘conventional unity’ that involves parts. These parts are not, as argued, those constituted by ‘appearing features’ and ‘non-appearing features,’ but instead as temporal parts pertaining to the entity; even a single moment of an entity has a beginning, a middle and an end.

Phya pa also rejects a number of pseudo-parallels with the case of ‘blue’ and ‘impermanence’ appearing to perception:

- In *Mun sel* 112.222.1, he shows that ‘appearing features’ and ‘non-appearing features’ are incompatible for a single entity, but ‘apprehending a concept’ and ‘not apprehending a concept’ are not incompatible for a single cognition.
- In *Mun sel* 112.222.2, he shows that ‘determining blue’ and ‘not determining impermanence’ are not incompatible for a single cognition.
- In *Mun sel* 112.222.4, he shows that the case of the property ‘appearing’ for ‘blue’ and ‘impermanent’ is not similar to the case of the property ‘being empty’ for ‘entities’ and ‘what is impermanent’ when considering the inference establishing pervasive emptiness in the Madhyamaka system.

- In *Mun sel* 112.222.5, he shows that the case of ‘blue’ and ‘impermanent’ that both appear in a perceptual cognition is not similar to the case of ‘audible’ and ‘sound’ when concluding ‘impermanence’ in an inferential cognition.

This portion of the *Mun sel* is transcribed almost entirely in Hugon 2008b: 718–722. A parallel discussion in gTsang nag pa’s *bsDus pa* (117b2–118b4) can be found in Hugon 2008b: 725–726, and that in mTshur ston’s *sGron ma* (4a7–5a3) on pp. 731–733. The similar (but shorter) discussion of this point in the *Tshad ma rigs gter* by Sa skya Paṇḍita is edited and translated in French on pp. 400–407.

EX5 (8a7–8b3): On the definition of the apprehended object in the various philosophical systems

Phya pa defines the apprehended object as “something such that its own nature itself appears to awareness” (*Mun sel* 121.11). In this excursus, he argues that his own definition of the apprehended object also applies in the philosophical system of the idealists (both representationalists and non-representationalists) but not in the philosophical system of the proponents of representational external realism instantiated in the Sautrāntika model. In this model, one must distinguish the apprehended object of reflexive awareness from the apprehended object of transitive awareness. The first is the object of experience and has the nature of consciousness. It is defined as “revealing itself.” The second is defined as “the cause that directly projects an aspect similar to itself to consciousness.” Sautrāntikas do not accept that erroneous cognitions have an apprehended object.

This excursus is critically edited and translated in Hugon 2016c (Part II, Appendix V).

Appendix 2: On inference

The portions of the *Mun sel* translated in this volume include many references to inference. References are made not only to inferential cognition as a type of knowledge and as a member of the various typologies of awareness being discussed, but also to various examples of inferential reasoning, as well as to the characterization of the logical reason as valid or fallacious in arguments. All these references presuppose that the reader is already acquainted with Phya pa's theory of inference. The latter, however, is only taken up in the fourth chapter of the *Mun sel*, of which we have only translated a single section presenting the definition of inferential cognition (cf. *Mun sel* 241).

To allow non-specialists to get oriented within this topic and to follow the relevant arguments in the translation without burdening the latter with lengthy footnotes, this appendix provides a general introduction to the main features of the theory of inference in Buddhist epistemology, and points out some elements that are specific to Phya pa's version of this theory. The explanations provided below are limited to explaining the notions and examples that appear in the passages of the first chapter of the *Mun sel* that we have translated. Readers are referred to the publications indicated in footnotes for further reading and more extended biographical references.

Because the focus of this appendix is on Phya pa's theory, the Tibetan expression for technical terms is given first in parenthesis, followed by the Sanskrit term.

1. Inferential cognition as an episode of knowledge

Phya pa's theory of inference largely draws from that of the Indian Buddhist thinker Dharmakīrti.³

Inference (Tib. *rjes dpag*, Skt. *anumāna*) is one of the two types of episodes of knowledge accepted by the Buddhists. While the other type of knowledge, perception (Tib. *mngon sum*, Skt. *pratyakṣa*)—more specifically for Phya pa, perceptual knowledge (Tib. *mngon sum tshad ma*)—

³ For an introduction to Dharmakīrti's theory, see, for instance, Hayes&Gillon 1991. Hugon 2011c, which deals with Phya pa's theory of argumentation (in particular, proofs), includes a number of observations on his theory of inference.

only knows objects that are directly present to the cognizer, inference allows knowing objects that are “concealed” (Tib. *lkog gyur*, Skt. *parokṣa*). This includes objects that are not directly perceived, such as a fire on a mountain pass in the typical example of inferential reasoning (see below, 7[a]). Inference also allows the determination of some features of perceptible objects that cannot be determined through perception alone, such as an object’s impermanence (which are the features that Phya pa terms “non-manifest”).

Although Phya pa provides distinct definitions for inferential cognition (*rjes dpag*) and for inferential knowledge (*rjes dpag tshad ma*), he contends that all episodes of inferential cognition are episodes of knowledge (see *Mun sel* 241).

2. Inferential cognition vs. proof statement

In works of Buddhist logic, inference refers, strictly speaking, to a cognition—hence our translation “inferential cognition” for *rjes dpag*. It is a conceptual mental state that arises from an inferential process, in which a conclusion is derived from evidence termed a “logical reason” (Tib. *rtags* or *gtan tshigs*, Skt. *līnga* or *hetu*). Inferences are also often referred to as “proofs,” but Buddhist logicians distinguish what they term “inference-for-oneself”—the inferential cognition arrived at by a cognizer on the basis of evidence—from “inference-for-others”—which consists in a statement meant to allow an interlocutor to generate such an episode of knowledge. A particularity of the latter that fundamentally differentiates it from an Aristotelian syllogism is that the conclusion must not be stated.⁴

3. The elements of inferential reasoning

The inferential process rests on the articulation of three elements: the subject or locus, the logical reason, and the property to be proven. Strictly speaking, an inferential cognition consists in the knowledge of the thesis, which consists in the aggregate (Tib. *tshogs pa*, Skt. *samudāya*) of the subject and the property to be proven. Authors often, however, loosely

⁴ On this question and more generally on “inference-for-others” in Buddhist logic see Tillemans 1999, chapter 4 “On *Parārthānumāna*, Theses and Syllogisms.” On Phya pa’s prescriptions for proof-statements, see Hugon 2011c.

speak of an inferential cognition knowing the property to be proven (for instance, the inferential cognition of ‘fire’ rather than the inferential cognition of ‘fire on the mountain pass’). Phya pa himself uses the term *bsgrub bya* (literally “what is to be proven”) to refer either to the property to be proven (elsewhere more precisely termed Tib. *bsgrub bya’i chos*, Skt. *sādhyadharmā*) or to the thesis.⁵

4. The criteria of a valid logical reason: the three characteristics

Buddhist logicians hold that the cognition derived from evidence qualifies as an episode of knowledge if it relies on a valid logical reason. A valid logical reason is defined as a logical reason that fulfills three characteristics (Tib. *tshul gsum*, Skt. *trairūpya*):⁶

1. **“Being a property of the subject” (Tib. *phyogs chos*, Skt. *pakṣadharmatā*)**
The logical reason must be ascertained to be present in the locus. (A further implicit requirement is involved in this first characteristic: there must be a “desire to know” pertaining to the locus. Namely, whether the locus is or is not qualified by the property to be proven must not be already ascertained.)
2. **“Positive entailment” (Tib. *rjes su ’gro ba*, Skt. *anvaya*)**
The logical reason must be ascertained to be present only in “similar instances” (Tib. *mtshun phyogs*, Skt. *sapakṣa*).
3. **“Negative entailment” (Tib. *ldog pa*, Skt. *vyatireka*)**
The logical reason must be ascertained to be completely absent in “dissimilar instances” (Tib. *mi mtshun phyogs*, Skt. *vipakṣa, asapakṣa*).

Each of these characteristics involves a factual criterion and an epistemic criterion. The latter consists in the requirement that the factual criterion

⁵ See Hugon 2015a: 66–67 on the relevance of distinguishing the two. The term *bsgrub bya* in the sense of the aggregate of the subject and the property to be proven, which corresponds to the Sanskrit *sādhyā*, is often left untranslated by modern scholars, or rendered with the Latin term *probandum*. To avoid resorting to a term foreign to English-speaking philosophical scholarship (see Matilal 1990: 128–129), we have adopted the rendering “thesis.” It should be clear, however, that for Buddhist logicians, the “thesis” is not a proposition or a statement, but the contents of this statement.

⁶ Kajiyama 1958: 364–360, Kajiyama 1966: 58–56, Chi 1969, Gillon 1986, Hayes 1988: 142–154, Hayes&Gillon 1991, Hugon 2004.

be “ascertained.” This means that it must be determined by the cognizer via an episode of knowledge. For instance in the inference that there is fire on the mountain pass via the logical reason ‘smoke,’ for the first characteristic to be established, there must be smoke on the mountain pass (factual criterion) and the cognizer must have determined the presence of smoke on the mountain pass through a visual perception (epistemic criterion).

The interpretation of the three characteristics gave rise to a large debate in the Tibetan tradition.⁷ Dharmakīrti defined similar and dissimilar instances in terms of being “similar to the subject” and “dissimilar from the subject,” respectively, with regard to the qualification by the property to be proven. Some scholars viewed this phrasing as a ground to exclude the subject from the domain of similar instances (arguing that something cannot be “similar” to itself) and dissimilar instances.

Authors such as Sa skya Paṇḍita who adopted a “tripartitionist view,” according to which the subject constitutes a third domain outside the disjoint domains of similar and dissimilar instances, claimed to be more faithful to the letter of Dharmakīrti’s works. But they had difficulties accounting for the three characteristics as a sufficient condition for the validity for the logical reason. They were thus caught between exegetical and logical concerns and failed to satisfactorily bridge the gap between the two.

Phya pa (and, following his lead, scholars of the dGe lugs pa school in general), favored instead the logical angle from the outset, adopting a “bipartitionist” view according to which similar instances and dissimilar instances are disjoint and exhaustive, i.e., they include the subject. This required redefining “similar instances” as “instances qualified by the property to be proven” and “dissimilar instances” as “instances not qualified by the property to be proven.”

5. Entailment

The second and third characteristics of the logical reason stated above are held to be logically equivalent. They are often regrouped under a single condition that we translate with the term “entailment” (Tib. *khyab pa*,

⁷ On this debate, and Phya pa’s position, see Hugon 2004 and Hugon 2008b: 270–311 (in French).

Skt. *vyāpti*).⁸ The “entailment” is also spelled out in terms of everything that is qualified by the logical reason being qualified by the property to be proven.

In Buddhist logic, the notion of “entailment” goes hand in hand with the idea that there must be an “essential connection” (Tib. *rang bzhin gi ’brel*, Skt. *svabhāvapratibandha*) between the logical reason and the property to be proven. This essential connection can be of two types: identity or causality. Based on this point, Buddhist logicians distinguish three main kinds of logical reasons, which are then further subdivided (especially the third):

1. Essential property (Tib. *rang bzhin*, Skt. *svabhāva*): proving the qualification by another essential property
2. Effect (Tib. *’bras bu*, Skt. *kārya*): proving the presence of the cause
3. Non-apprehension (Tib. *mi/ma dmigs pa*, Skt. *anupalabdhi*) of an entailed item: proving the absence of an entailing item or non-qualification by an entailing item

6. Pseudo-logical reasons

A logical reason is fallacious if it fails to fulfill one or more of the three characteristics listed in §4 above. This may be due to either the factual criterion and/or the epistemic criterion failing to obtain. In such a case the evidence is termed a “pseudo-logical reason” (Tib. *gtan tshigs ltar snang*, Skt. *hetvābhāsa*) and the resulting cognition does not qualify as an episode of knowledge.

The main categories of pseudo-logical reasons are:

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|--|--|
| (i) Unestablished
(Tib. <i>ma grub pa</i> , Skt. <i>asiddha</i>) | – Failing to satisfy characteristic 1 |
| (ii) Inconclusive
(Tib. <i>ma nges pa</i> , Skt. <i>anai-
kāntika</i>) | – Failing to satisfy characteristic 2 or 3 |

⁸ Though in many scholarly works these two terms, *khyab pa* and *vyāpti*, are translated with the English noun “pervasion,” we have used the translation of “entailment,” which is much more common in contemporary logic. When expressed as verbs in logical contexts, the terms “entails” and “pervades” actually carry converse meanings. In particular, to say that “item A entails item B,” means the same thing as “item B pervades item A.”

- (iii) Contradictory
(Tib. *'gal ba*, Skt. *virodha*) – Failing to satisfy characteristics 2 and 3, but would satisfy characteristics 2 and 3 for the contradictory of the property to be proven

An example of (i) is the property ‘visible’ posited to prove that sound is impermanent (indeed, sound is not visible). A special case of (i) is when there is no ‘desire to know’ pertaining to the subject. For instance, when proving that there is fire in a locus where fire can be observed.

An example of (ii) is the property ‘being an epistemic object’ or ‘being an object of cognition’ posited to prove that sound is impermanent (for this property is also found among dissimilar instances, and thus fails to satisfy 2).

An example of (iii) is the property ‘produced’ posited to prove that sound is permanent (this property satisfies characteristics 2 and 3 with regard to impermanence).

In Phya pa’s system, the conclusion derived from a pseudo-logical reason can be either a mistaken cognition—if the determined thesis is non-veridical—or a factive assessment—if the determined thesis is veridical (see *Mun sel* 123.31). In these cases, Phya pa speaks of the putative evidence being a “mistaken reason” (*log pa’i rgyu mtshan*) when one of the characteristics does not obtain factually and of it being an “uncertified reason” (*rgyu mtshan gtan la ma phebs pa*) when characteristics 1, 2 and 3 obtain factually but not all of them are ascertained by the cognizer.⁹ (In this last case, the episode of awareness cannot be a mistaken cognition.)

7. Examples of inference mentioned by Phya pa

Phya pa typically discusses the various types of inferential cognitions by using stock examples, notably for the kinds distinguished above in §5. Other instances are inferences with specific features. For those, Phya pa draws his examples from discussions in Dharmakīrti’s works and from the Madhyamaka background.

The letters [a]...[f] refer to the marking of the various examples in the translation and the edition. They are, in particular, found in *Mun sel* 112.111.111.2.

⁹ Note that if the mistaken reason corresponds to type (iii), the determination cannot be an episode of factive assessment.

[a] “There is fire on the mountain pass because there is smoke.”

Subject: Mountain pass

Logical reason: Smoke

Property to be proven: Fire

Thesis: Aggregate of ‘mountain pass’ and ‘fire’

This is the stock-example for inferential cognition based on a logical reason qua effect—type (2) in §5 above.

[b] “Sound is impermanent because it is produced.”

Subject: Sound

Logical reason: Produced

Property to be proven: Impermanent

Thesis: Aggregate of ‘sound’ and ‘impermanent’

This is the stock-example for inferential cognition based on a logical reason qua essential property—type (1) in §5 above.

The momentariness, or impermanence, of all things is a central tenet for Buddhists. Things only exist for one instant, after which they cease. Continua existing over several moments are not held to be real. Only the instantaneous thing is real. Proving the momentariness of things and refuting their permanence becomes a concern for Buddhist logicians starting with Vasubandhu, and developing in the works of Dharmakīrti and his successors.¹⁰ In particular, there is a move already between Dharmakīrti’s earlier works and his later works from proving impermanence via the logical reason “produced”—which is associated with the proof of impermanence relying on destruction being causeless (*vināśitvānumāna*)—to proving it via the logical reason “existence” (*sattvānumāna*).¹¹ The two concepts ‘produced’ and ‘existent’ are coextensive.

[c] “A double moon can be given the designation ‘conventionally true,’ because it does not withstand analysis.”

Subject: Double moon

Logical reason (essential property): Not withstanding analysis

Property to be proven: Fit to have the designation ‘conventionally true’

¹⁰ On this topic, see Mimaki 1976.

¹¹ On this point, see Steinkellner 1968.

Thesis: Aggregate of ‘double moon’ and ‘the designation “conventionally true”’

This example relies on the Madhyamaka framework of the Two Truths, which distinguishes what is “ultimately true” and what is “conventionally true.” “Not withstanding analysis” is the definiens given by Phya pa for conventional truth.¹²

In Phya pa’s system, a definition involves a three-member framework composed of a definitional instance, a definiens, and a definiendum, which is parallel to the three-member framework of inferential reasoning.¹³ With respect to the definiens “not withstanding analysis,” the designation “conventionally true” is the definiendum which is fit to be applied to a definitional instance that has the definiens. These elements of a definition can be used in a definitional inference: the definiens can play the role of a logical reason to prove that a subject is fit to have the designation of the corresponding definiendum.

[d] “The verbal object ‘Luna’ is the direct referent of the word “moon,” because it is the apprehended object of a conceptual cognition.”

Subject: Verbal object ‘Luna’

Logical reason (essential property): Being the apprehended object of a conceptual cognition

Property to be proven: Being the direct referent of the word “moon”

Thesis: Aggregate of ‘verbal object “Luna”’ and ‘being the referent of the word “moon”’

The background for this discussion goes back to Dignāga’s discussion of fallacious theses.¹⁴ Dignāga holds that one can appeal to linguistic conventions (literally “a proposition commonly recognized through verbal knowledge,” Skt. *śābdaprasiddha*) to refute fallacious theses such as “that which has a rabbit is not the moon.” This thesis indeed contradicts

¹² See *sNying po* 16,5–6 (1.2.1.1.1): *mthar thug 'jal ba'i yul du mi bden la ma dpyad pa'i bsam ngor bden pa kun rdzob kyi bden pa'i mtshan nyid do //*

¹³ On Phya pa’s theory of definition, see Hugon 2009b.

¹⁴ See Tillemans 2000 on PV 4.109ff. and pp. 219–228 (“Dharmakīrti on *prasiddha* and *yogyatā*”) for a detailed discussion of this issue. The main points are summarized here.

the Sanskrit linguistic convention according to which the word *śaśin* (literally “that which has a rabbit”) refers to the moon (and vice versa).

Dharmakīrti reinterpreted this thesis to mean “*śaśin* is not the referent of the word *candra*” (*candra* being the usual Sanskrit expression to refer to the moon). According to Dharmakīrti, this is a fallacious thesis not only because there is a linguistic convention according to which the word *candra* does designate “that which has a rabbit,” i.e., the moon, but because *anything* can be the referent of the word *candra*. Indeed, a word is not predetermined to designate certain things and not others.

The inference [d] reflects the argument one finds in this regard in Durvekamiśra’s sub-commentary on NB 3.51 (as translated in Tillemans 2000: 223):

Whatever entity is the object of a conceptual cognition can be designated by an agreed upon word, just like the entity having branches and so forth [can be designated] by the word ‘tree.’ Now, *śaśin* is the object of a conceptual cognition.

According to Tillemans’s discussion, this argument hinges on the idea of “universal fitness”: ‘being the object of a conceptual cognition’ is a sufficient condition to have the fitness to be named by any word one wishes. But more precisely, in view of the expression “agreed upon word,” and in particular of the example, this argument should be viewed as expressing the idea of a “universal fitness restricted by linguistic conventions.” It establishes that *śaśin* can be designated by the agreed upon word “moon,” just like an entity having branches and so forth can be designated by the agreed upon word “tree.”

When Phya pa mentions this inference, the notion of “fitness” is not included in the formulation of the property to be proven, but there is little doubt that this example refers to the background discussion by Dharmakīrti, which is taken up later in the *Mun sel* when Phya pa explains the “elimination of the thesis via what is commonly recognized” (*Mun sel* 79b8ff.). Phya pa explains that this type of elimination amounts to an “elimination of the thesis by an inferential cognition in which a property depending on language is derived.”¹⁵ Such inferential cognitions are of two types:

¹⁵ *Mun sel* 80a1: *sgra la ltos pa'i chos dpog pa'i rjes dpag gis dam bcas pa la bsal pa grags pas bsal pa te.*

- deriving ‘being the direct referent of words’ from the logical reason ‘being the apprehended object of a conceptual cognition’ (as in the present example [d])
- deriving ‘being the intentional referent of words’ from any logical reason

The “direct referent of words” (*sgra’i dngos kyi brjod bya*) is, according to Phya pa, the concept that appears in conceptual cognition (for instance, the concept of ‘pot’ for the word “pot”). The “intentional referent” (*zhen pa’i brjod bya*) is what the cognizer conceives the word to be referring to (for instance, a real pot can be conceived as the referent of the word “pot”).

These two types of inferential cognition deal with the basic principle of what a word refers to, relying on the idea that any word can *a priori* refer in such a way. They are distinguished from inferential cognitions that rely on posited linguistic conventions linking a definiens and a definiendum (*Mun sel* 80a3–4). For instance, deriving the definiendum “cow” from the definiens “the collection of hump, dewlap, etc.”

The former inferential cognitions are associated with the common establishment of “agreement regarding communication” (*brda’i grags pa*), the latter with the common establishment of “agreement regarding transactional usage” (*tha snyad kyi grags pa*).¹⁶

[e] “Entities/All things are empty of an own nature, because they are neither one nor many.”

Subject: Entities/All things

Logical reason: Neither one nor many

Property to be proven: Empty

Thesis: Aggregate of ‘entity’ and ‘empty’

¹⁶ This second type is also presented in reference to a “non-deviant exclusion of what is other,” a notion introduced by Phya pa when dealing with the definiendum in the section on definition (see *Mun sel* 25b7–8). What is derived in the second type of inferential cognition is said to be the “fitness to be conceived of by a word that is a non-deviant exclusion of what is other” (*Mun sel* 80a4: *gzhan sel phyin ci ma log pa’i sgras zhen rung dpog pa*) or the “fitness to be expressed through directing via a non-deviant exclusion of what is other that distinguishes between two directly incompatible things” (*Mun sel* 80a3: *dngos ’gal las tha dad du byed pa’i gzhan sel phyin ci ma log pas zhen nas brjod du rung pa dpog pa*).

The inferential reasoning establishing emptiness is a key argument for Madhyamaka philosophers.¹⁷ The argument revolves around the idea that in order not to be empty, an entity must have a nature that is either one or many. But a singular nature is refuted by showing that entities can be divided into parts (spatial parts for external entities, temporal parts for external entities and mental events). The refutation of a multiple nature follows from the refutation of a singular nature.

This argument also figures prominently in Phya pa's discussions on inference in his epistemological works and in his Madhyamaka works.¹⁸ According to Phya pa, there are several possible interpretations of the elements of this inference (in particular the logical reason and the property to be proven). The logical reason can accordingly be variously classified as an instance of "essential property" (type (1) in §5) or "non-apprehension" (type (3) in §5).

Within the *'Od zer*, in a passage parallel to of the example mentioned in the *Mun sel*, Phya pa distinguishes a version of this inference in which the subject is "real entities" [e1] and a version in which the subject is "the objects to be cognized in general" (*shes bya tsam*) [e2], which includes both real entities and superimpositions.

[f] "A concept can be given the designation 'conventionally true,' because it does not withstand analysis."

Subject: Concept

Logical reason (essential property): Not withstanding analysis

Property to be proven: Fit to have the designation 'conventionally true'

Thesis: Aggregate of 'concept' and 'the designation "conventionally true"'

This inference has the same logical reason and property to be proven as in [c], but the subject is here "a concept." It is mentioned in *Mun sel* 121.2 to exemplify the case of an apprehended object that is also the engaged object of a cognition. This is the case here because the appearing concept is conceived of as a concept, and opposite superimpositions are eliminated with regard to the concept. Inference [d] could have been mentioned instead, as it has the same features in this regard.

¹⁷ A classic presentation for this argument is found for instance in the *Madhyamakālaṅkāra* of Śāntarakṣita and the *Madhyamakāloka* of his pupil Kamalaśīla. See Tillemans 1982 and 1983 and Keira 2004 for more details.

¹⁸ See Hugon 2015a.

Appendix 3: Definitions of knowledge

Listed below are the various versions of Phya pa's definition of knowledge and a selection of definitions by his predecessors and successors.

1. Phya pa's definitions

i – *Mun sel* 212.14

yongs su bcad pa'i don la mi 'khrul pa'i blo'i rnam pas gnas lugs dang 'gal ba'i sgro 'dogs skyed pa'i nus pa bzlog pa

ii – *Mun sel* 35b2

don la mi 'khrul pa'i rnam pas gshis dang mi mthun pa'i sgro 'dogs skyed nus sel pa

iii – *'Od zer* 111.221.2, 21b7

sngar ma rtogs pa'i don bden pa la bzlog pa'i sgro 'dogs dang 'gal ba

iv – *'Od zer* 111.221.2, 23b1

sngar ma rtogs pa'i don bden pa la don la myi 'khrul ba'i 'dzin stangs kyis bzlog pa'i sgro 'dogs dang 'gal ba

v – *'Od zer* 67b2

sgro 'dogs gcod byed yin

vi – *'Od zer* 172b7–8

mngon suM la yod pa'i tshad ma tsam du 'jog pa'i rgyu mtshan ni 'dzin stangs kyi rnam pa [172b8] don myed na mi 'byung bas sngar ma rtogs pa'i don gnod myed du bden pa la sgro 'dogs gcod pa yin la /

vii – *sNying po* 68,18–20

mngon sum dang rjes dpag la'ang tshad ma tsam gyi spyi'i mtshan nyid don la mi 'khrul ba'i blos sngar ma rtogs pa'i don la sgro 'dogs dang 'gal ba yod pas tshad ma ma yin par mi 'thad do //

2. Definitions by Tibetan authors who precede or are contemporaneous with Phya pa

i – “Byang chub skyabs,” cited in *Tshad bsdus* 115,14

don thob byed kyi nus pa mi slu ba yin

3. Definitions by Phya pa's successors

i – *Tshad bsdus* 114,18

bden pa'i don rtogs

ii – *Tshad bsdus* 116,16–18

sngar ma rtogs pa'i shes bya la 'dzin stangs kyi rnam pa don med
na mi 'byung ba'i stobs kyi sgro 'dogs gcod byed ces bya ba'o //

iii – gTsang nag pa, *bsDus pa* 16b8

sngar ma rtogs pa'i don rtogs pa

iv – mTshur ston, *sGron ma* 15b6–9

bden pa'i don rtogs ... [15b8] ... rtogs pa'i mtshan nyid ni sngar ma
rtogs pa'i don la 'dzin stangs mi 'khrul pas sgro 'dogs sel pa zhes
bya ba'i ngo bo dang / yul dang / [15b9] 'dzin stangs kyi khyad par
gsuM dang ldan pa

v – gTsang drug rdo rje, *gSal byed* 23a7

bden pa'i don rtogs yin de yang ci lta bu zhe na rtogs pa chos 3
tshang ba 1 yin te / rtogs pa rang gi ngo bo sgro 'dogs gcod byed
dang | yul gyi khyad par sngar ma rtogs pa la 'jug pa dang | 'dzin
stangs kyi khyad par don la mi 'khrul ba

vi – Chu mig pa, *rNam rgyal* A22b1–3; B26b4–6

bden pa'i don rtogs chos 3 tshang pa'am (B pa'am, A ba 'aM) /
gzhal bya'i don la mi slu ba ste de 2 rnam grangs pa yin no // gsum
(A gsum, B 3) gang zhe na / ngo bo'i khyad [A22b2] par sgro (B sgro
: A sgra) 'dogs gcod byed (A gcod byed : B gcod par byed pa ste /
rnam 'grel las / ... [B26b5] ... ces_so //) | 'dzin stangs kyi khyad par
(A par : B par ni) don la mi 'khrul ba (A ba : B ba te / 'di las ...
zhes so //) / yul gyi khyad par sngar ma rtogs pa la 'jug pa'o // (A
pa'o // dang po mtshan nyid yin par / rnam 'grel las / ... ces so //
gnyis pa mtshan nyid yin par [A22b3] 'di las ... ces so // 3 pa mtshan
nyid yin par / 'di las ... zhes so // : B pa te / [B26b6] 'di las ... zhes
so //)

vii – rDo rje dbang grags/Chos kyi bzhad pa, *Tshad nye bsdus* 11a3–4

rtogs pa chos 3 ldan tshad ma'i mtshan nyid du gsal te / rtogs pa
rang gi ngo bo sgro 'dogs sel pa yin te / ... yul gyi khyad par sngar
ma rtogs pa la 'jug pa ste / ... [11a4] ... 'dzin stangs kyi khyad par
don la mi 'khrul pa yin te /

Appendix 4: Lexicon

1. Tibetan-English equivalents

TIBETAN	ENGLISH
kun brtags	Imagined
kun rdzob	Conventional
kun rdzob kyi bden pa	Conventionally true
lkog gyur	Concealed
kha phyir ltas kyi yid	Mental cognition that is oriented outwards
khyab pa	Entailment (of the property to be proven)
khyab bya	Entailing item
khyab byed	Entailed item
'khrul pa	Erroneous
grub pa	To be established
'gal ba	Incompatible
'gal ba	Contradictory (logical reason)
sgra don	Verbal object
sgro btags	Superimposed
sgro 'dogs	Superimposition
bsgrub bya	Thesis, property to be proven
nges pa	Determinate awareness
nges pa	To determine, to ascertain
nges shes	Determining cognition
dngos po	Real entity, real
dngos med	Unreal
mngon sum	Perception
mngon sum tshad ma	Perceptual knowledge
gcad pa'i yul can/bcad pa'i yul can	Post-knowledge cognition
gcod pa, bcad pa	To eliminate
gcod pa	To discern
bcad pa'i yul can/gcad pa'i yul can	Post-knowledge cognition
bcad pa'i yul can gyi mngon sum	Perceptual post-knowledge cognition

chod pa	To be eliminated
'char ba	To arise
'jal ba	To evaluate
'jug pa	To engage
'jug (pa'i) yul	Engaged object
rjes dpag	Inferential cognition
rjes dpag tshad ma	Inferential knowledge
rjes su skyes pa'i nges shes	Subsequently arising determining cognition
rjes su 'gro bas stong	Devoid of commonality
pa/rjes 'gros stong pa	
nye bar btags pa	Totally made up
gtan tshigs	Logical reason, evidence
rtags	Logical reason, evidence, valid logical reason
rtags can	That for which a property is a logical reason
rtags ltar snang	Pseudo-logical reason
rtog bcas	Conceptual cognition
rtog bcas (kyi) log shes	Conceptual mistaken cognition
rtog pa	Conceptual cognition
rtog pa bcad pa'i yul can/rtog	Conceptual post-knowledge
pa gcad pa'i yul can	cognition
rtog med 'khrul pa	Non-conceptual erroneous cognition
rtog med 'khrul pa'i dmigs pa	Referent of non-conceptual erroneous cognition
rtog med ma 'khrul pa	Non-conceptual non-erroneous cognition
rtogs pa	To understand
tha dad pas stong pa/tha dad	Devoid of distinction
kyis stong pa	
the tshom/the tsom	Doubt
mthun phyogs	Similar instance
mthong pa	To observe
de las byung pa	Causality
dogs pa	To consider
don	State of affairs
don dam	Ultimate

don spyi	Concept
don byed nus pa	Capable of being causally active
don byed pa	Causally active
don byed mi nus pa	Incapable of being causally active
don rang gi mtshan nyid	Real particular
bdag cig pa	Essential identity, having a shared identity
bden pa	Veridical
'dren pa, drangs pa	To bring about
ldog pa	Exclusion property
gnas lugs	The actual way things are
gnod pa	To oppose
rnam (pa dang) ldan pa	Manifest feature
rnam (pa) med (pa)	Non-manifest feature
rnal 'byor gyi mngon sum	Yogic perception
rnal 'byor pa'i shes pa	Yogic cognition
snang pa	To appear, appearing
snang la ma nges pa	Non-ascertaining perception
dpog pa, dpags pa	To conclude, to deduce, to infer
dpyod mi bzod pa	Not withstanding analysis
phyi rol	External
phyogs chos	Being a property of the subject
blo	Awareness
dbang po'i shes pa	Sense cognition
'brel pa	Dependence
ma 'khrul pa	Non-erroneous
ma grub pa	Unestablished (logical reason)
ma nges pa	Inconclusive (logical reason)
ma gsal	Not clearly appearing
mi 'gal ba	Compatible, not incompatible
mi gsal	Not clearly appearing
mig gi rnam shes	Visual cognition
mig (gi) shes (pa)	Visual cognition
med na mi 'byung pa	Invariably related
myong pa	To experience
rtsod gzhi	Locus
tshad ma	Knowledge, episode of knowledge

tshad ma'i yul	Object of knowledge
tshad ma ma yin	Not an instance of knowledge
tshul gsum	Triple characteristic (of a logical reason), triply-characterized (logical reason)
tshogs pa	Aggregate
brdzun pa	Falsidical
zhen pa	To be directed, to conceive
zhen yul	Intentional object
gzhan dbang	Dependent
gzhan rig (pa)	Transitive awareness
gzhan rig gi mngon sum	Transitive perception
gzhan rig rtog pa	Conceptual transitive episode of awareness
gzhan rig (gi) rtog med	Non-conceptual transitive episode of awareness
gzhan sel pa	Excluding others
gzhal bya	Epistemic object
gzhi	Locus
gzung (pa'i) don/bzung (pa'i) don	State of affairs to be apprehended
gzung yul/bzung yul	Apprehended object
bzlog pa	To counter
yid	Mind
yid kyi shes pa	Mental cognition
yid gtad pa	To focus one's mind
yid dpyod	Factive assessment
yul	Object, objective element
yul can	Subjective element
yongs su grub pa	Perfected
yongs su gcad pa'i gzhal bya	Positively discerned epistemic object
yongs su gcod pa	To discern positively, to ascertain positively
yongs su bcad pa'i don	Positively discerned state of affairs
rang rig (pa)	Reflexive awareness
log pa	Excluded
log pa'i kun rdzob	Mistaken conventionality

log par nges pa	Mistaken determinate awareness
log shes	Mistaken cognition
log sa	Counterpart
shes 'dod	Desire to know
shes pa	Cognition
shes bya	Object to be cognized
shes bya la mi srid pa	Impossible, that is not the case
shes bya la srid pa	Possible, that is the case
sems	Mind
sems (las) byung (pa)	Mental factors
sel pa, bsal pa	To eliminate, to exclude
gsal	Clearly appearing

2. English-Tibetan equivalents

ENGLISH	TIBETAN
Aggregate	tshogs pa
(to) Appear	snang pa
Appearing	snang pa
Apprehended object	gzung yul/bzung yul
(to) Arise	'char ba
(to) Ascertain positively, to discern positively	yongs su gcod pa
(to) Ascertain, to determine	nges pa
Awareness	blo
Being a property of the subject	phyogs chos
(to) Bring about	'dren pa, drangs pa
Capable of being causally active	don byed nus pa
Causality	de las byung pa
Causally active	don byed pa
Clearly appearing	gsal
Cognition	shes pa
Compatible, not incompatible	mi 'gal ba
Concealed	lkog gyur
Concept	don spyi
Conceptual cognition	rtog bcas, rtog pa

Conceptual mistaken cognition	rtog bcas (kyi) log shes
Conceptual post-knowledge cognition	rtog pa bcaad pa'i yul can/rtog pa gcaad pa'i yul can
Conceptual transitive episode of awareness	gzhan rig rtog pa
(to) Conclude, to deduce, to infer	dpog pa, dpags pa
(to) Consider	dogs pa
Contradictory (logical reason)	'gal ba
Conventional	kun rdzob
Conventionally true	kun rdzob kyi bden pa
(to) Counter	bzlog pa
Counterpart	log sa
Dependence	'brel pa
Dependent	gzhan dbang
Desire to know	shes 'dod
Determinate awareness	nges pa
(to) Determine, to ascertain	nges pa
Determining cognition	nges shes
Devoid of commonality	rjes su 'gro bas stong pa/rjes 'gros stong pa
Devoid of distinction	tha dad pas stong pa/tha dad kyis stong pa
(to be) Directed, to conceive	zhen pa
(to) Discern	gcod pa
(to) Discern positively, to ascertain positively	yongs su gcod pa
Doubt	the tshom/the tsom
(to) Eliminate	gcod pa, bcaad pa
(to) Eliminate	sel pa, bsal pa
(to be) Eliminated	chod pa
(to) Engage	'jug pa
Engaged object	'jug (pa'i) yul
Entailed item	khyab byed
Entailing item	khyab bya
Entailment (of the property to be proven)	khyab pa
Epistemic object	gzhal bya

Erroneous	'khrul pa
Essential identity, having a shared identity	bdag cig pa
(to be) Established	grub pa
(to) Evaluate	'jal ba
Excluded	log pa
Excluding others	gzhan sel pa
Exclusion property	ldog pa
(to) Experience	myong pa
External	phyi rol
Factive assessment	yid dpyod
Falsidical	brdzun pa
(to) Focus one's mind	yid gtad pa
Imagined	kun brtags
Impossible, that is not the case	shes bya la mi srid pa
Incapable of being causally active	don byed mi nus pa
Incompatible	'gal ba
Inconclusive (logical reason)	ma nges pa
Inferential cognition	rjes dpag
Inferential knowledge	rjes dpag tshad ma
Intentional object	zhen yul
Invariably related	med na mi 'byung pa
Knowledge, episode of knowledge	tshad ma
Locus	rtsod gzhi, gzhi
Logical reason, evidence, valid logical reason	rtags
Manifest feature	rnam (pa dang) ldan pa
Mental cognition	yid kyi shes pa
Mental cognition that is oriented outwards	kha phyir ltas kyi yid
Mental factors	sems (las) byung (pa)
Mind	yid, sems
Mistaken cognition	log shes
Mistaken conventionality	log pa'i kun rdzob
Mistaken determinate awareness	log par nges pa
Non-ascertaining perception	snang la ma nges pa

Non-conceptual erroneous cognition	rtog med 'khrul pa
Non-conceptual non-erroneous cognition	rtog med ma 'khrul pa
Non-conceptual transitive episode of awareness	gzhan rig (gi) rtog med
Non-erroneous	ma 'khrul pa
Non-manifest feature	mam (pa) med (pa)
Not an instance of knowledge	tshad ma ma yin
Not clearly appearing	mi gsal/ma gsal
Not withstanding analysis	dpyod mi bzod pa
Object of knowledge	tshad ma'i yul
Object to be cognized	shes bya
Object, objective element	yul
(to) Observe	mthong pa
(to) Oppose	gnod pa
Perception	mngon sum
Perceptual knowledge	mngon sum tshad ma
Perceptual post-knowledge cognition	bcad pa'i yul can gyi mngon sum
Perfected	yongs su grub pa
Positively discerned epistemic object	yongs su gcad pa'i gzhal bya
Positively discerned state of affairs	yongs su bcad pa'i don
Possible, that is the case	shes bya la srid pa
Post-knowledge cognition	gcad pa'i yul can/bcad pa'i yul can
Property to be proven	bsgrub bya (used in the sense of bsgrub bya'i chos)
Pseudo-logical reason	rtags ltar snang, gtan tshigs ltar snang
Real	dngos po
Real entity	dngos po
Real particular	don rang gi mtshan nyid
Referent of non-conceptual erroneous cognition	rtog med 'khrul pa'i dmigs pa
Reflexive awareness	rang rig (pa)
Sense cognition	dbang po'i shes pa

Similar instance	mthun phyogs
State of affairs	don
State of affairs to be apprehended	gzung (pa'i) don/bzung (pa'i) don
Subjective element	yul can
Subsequently arising determining cognition	rjes su skyes pa'i nges shes
Superimposed	sgro btags
Superimposition	sgro 'dogs
That for which a property is a logical reason	rtags can
Thesis	bsgrub bya
Totally made up	nye bar btags pa
Transitive awareness	gzhan rig (pa)
Transitive perception	gzhan rig gi mngon sum
Triple characteristic (of a logical reason), triply-characterized (logical reason)	tshul gsum
Ultimate	don dam
(to) Understand	rtogs pa
Unestablished (logical reason)	ma grub pa
Unreal	dngos med
Verbal object	sgra don
Veridical	bden pa
Visual cognition	mig gi nam shes, mig (gi) shes (pa)
Yogic cognition	rnal 'byor pa'i shes pa
Yogic perception	rnal 'byor gyi mngon sum

