

## Chapter 1

### Introduction

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Citizenship is a multi-faceted concept. It is often understood to refer to a legal status – which, in international law, is called nationality – and a bundle of legal rights and duties associated with the status. This legal-institutional conception of citizenship can be juxtaposed with a sociological one that regards citizenship as connected to living conditions, a collective identity and a set of social practices. This book focuses mostly on the former interpretation of citizenship although it also takes into account individuals' attitudes towards the institution of citizenship and their motivations for changing their citizenship status and exercising their rights.

As a legal institution, citizenship serves two different functions – an external and an internal one. Externally, citizenship allocates individuals to states in the international state system (Brubaker 1992) and creates a basic responsibility of states for the protection of individuals' rights. These include the right to return to one's own country and the right of states to exercise diplomatic protection when their citizens' rights are violated by another state. The allocation of citizens to states is, however, not a perfect one. An estimated 4.2 million persons are stateless and thus without any recognised citizenship status (UNHCR 2020). There is also an unknown but rapidly increasing – and certainly much larger – number of individuals who hold more than one citizenship. This volume thus puts specific emphasis on the proliferating phenomenon of dual citizenship.

Connected with globalisation and changes in the relations between states, a new worldwide trend can be observed towards access to citizenship status and rights for both immigrants and emigrants and an increasing toleration of dual citizenship. These trends have been interpreted as manifestations of post- or transnational citizenship (Bauböck 1994; Blatter, Sochin D'Elia and Buess 2018; Faist 2008; Joppke 2010a; Sassen 2002; Soysal 1994; Spiro 2016). These two frames are not identical: a postnational one regards citizenship as increasingly disconnected from membership in nation states, whereas a transnational one focuses on interactions and overlap between statuses and rights generated by states interlinked in citizenship constellations (Bauböck 2010). Important questions investigated include the problem of dual loyalty (Baron 2009), the connection between naturalisations and socioeconomic integration (DeVoretz and Bevelander 2009; Hainmueller and Hangartner 2017; OECD 2011); and the social meaning of citizenship rights

and obligations from the perspective of both nation states and individuals (Janowitz 1980; Turner 1990; Vink 2015). Some authors have pointed out that global transformations involve a change in the meaning and value of citizenship, which tends to be regarded ever more instrumentally by both states and individuals (Bauböck 2019; Harpaz 2019; Harpaz and Mateos 2018; Joppke 2010b).

The external and internal functions of citizenship can be disconnected to a significant extent. All contemporary states have laws that determine who their nationals are and expect all other states to recognise such an attribution of membership. In a minimalistic interpretation, nearly all contemporary states also derive their internal legitimacy from “the people” subjected to their rule – i.e., the collective of their citizens – rather than from divine authority or the powers derived from territorial conquest. However, the internal function of citizenship as membership in a self-governing political community is fully developed only in democratic states whose legislatures represent citizens and whose governments are accountable to them. At the latest since the French Revolution, the state no longer belongs to the monarch and the feudal elites but must include and represent its citizens. The main conceptual instrument for achieving this breakthrough was citizenship. It implied the status of membership in a state associated with full social and political rights, based on the revolutionary ideas of freedom, equality and fraternity (Kadelbach 2007). The precise content of citizenship has evolved over time and varied across democratic states. T. H. Marshall’s (1950) evolutionary narrative of eighteenth-century civil rights in England generating political rights in the nineteenth century and these, in turn, leading to social citizenship in the twentieth, cannot be generalised to other contexts. For example, in late-nineteenth-century Germany, social rights preceded political ones and were introduced top-down to buy off working-class discontent (Mann 1987). It is also often argued that, today, only social citizenship rights are still incomplete in liberal democracies, while civil and political rights have universal coverage and are fully implemented. This is quite obviously a misperception. New developments, such as the digital revolution, have called for the reassessment of the content of civil rights such as that to privacy and global challenges – such as the Covid-19 pandemic and the climate crisis – raise new questions about citizenship rights. Most importantly for the topic of our book, Marshall’s (1950) account of citizenship is an exclusively internal one that ignores its role in the international state system and specifically how international migration can undermine his implicit assumption of national homogeneity and universal inclusion of the resident population as citizens (Joppke 2010b). What we find instead are increasing numbers of non-citizen residents, most of whom enjoy some types of right (civil and social but not full political rights) while the rights of non-resident citizens are being strengthened by granting them opportunities to vote from abroad in national elections (Arrighi and Bauböck 2017).

There is also a significant tension between the internal and external functions of citizenship. The latter has been described as an instrument for preserving global inequality (Carens 1987; Milanović 2016). Seen from a global perspective, the “birthright lottery”

(Shachar 2009) seems deeply unjust, as the citizenship which individuals receive automatically at birth determines not only what opportunities they will enjoy in their home country but also which other states will be ready to admit them if they seek to improve their lives through migration. From a democratic perspective, however, citizenship is always linked to norms of individual equality and the promotion of the common good within a particular political community. The set of universal human rights in international law and their enforcement mechanisms are not strong enough to bridge this gap between aspirations of domestic and of global equality that is inherent to citizenship as a normative concept. Narrowing this gap will require not just individual rights but policies of resource transfers and the promotion of endogenous democratic transformation and economic development in the “Global South”.

The recent evolution of citizenship as a status and bundle of rights has been characterised by two major changes. First, the technological revolutions in transport and travel and in electronic communication have, in some regards, produced a “world society” (Luhmann 1975). They have induced mass mobility across international borders on a scale never seen before in human history. While international migration – measured as the longer-term settlement of persons in states other than their country of birth – still remains at the rather modest level of 272 million people or 3.5 per cent of the global population (IOM 2020), international border crossings have grown steeply from just 25 million tourist arrivals in 1950 to 1.4 billion by 2018 (UNWTO 2019). Enhanced global mobility has also changed the character of migration in general: many people moving to another country today do so only for a limited time, returning back to their home country or proceeding on to another one (de Haas, Castles and Miller 2020; Haller 2019; Manning 2005).

Second, citizenship has not only become partly deterritorialised but has also moved up to supranational levels. Regional unions of states have introduced distinct forms of citizenship associated with free movement and political representation in Europe, Latin America and Western Africa. The most advanced example is the European Union, which can be characterised as a new type of polity composed of independent as well as interdependent states. Already the 1957 Treaty of Rome, which created the European Economic Community, included the free movement of workers as one of its four fundamental freedoms. The 1992 Treaty of Maastricht, which established the European Union, introduced a formal citizenship of the Union that comes with generalised rights to free movement, non-discrimination on the grounds of nationality in other member states and political participation rights at local and European levels. Since the 1985 Treaty of Schengen, most member states of the European Union and some non-EU countries decided to abolish border controls within their joint territory. This development can be considered as a change towards more freedom and openness in Europe, although it also has its drawbacks. First, growing numbers of internal migrants within the European Union have few incentives to acquire the citizenship of their new country of residence and remain excluded from national voting rights there. Second, opening internal borders

for free movement has made it necessary to coordinate and strengthen controls at the EU's external borders, making it more difficult for people from outside Europe to get in (Carr 2015; Haller 2016).

### **Structure of the book and overview of the chapters**

The volume combines three perspectives on (dual) citizenship. It takes a bird's eye view of global trends and patterns, it examines more closely a range of cases in order to sharpen a comparative view and it goes into even more detail with regard to the peculiar case of Austria, whose citizenship laws and policies raise important conundrums. This process of "zooming in" will hopefully help readers to put the Austrian case into a broader perspective that has not been present in public debates about citizenship there. What emerges from a comparative perspective is that Austria represents a case of high immigration with high barriers to citizenship. The strong resistance against the global trend towards the toleration of dual citizenship (see [Chapter 3](#)) presents a particular puzzle that will be addressed in [Chapter 10](#).

A second feature of the book is its interdisciplinary approach. As citizenship is a legal status determined under national law that is constrained by international legal norms, legal analysis is an indispensable starting point. Political science is needed to understand the drivers and actors of citizenship policies, the impact of inclusive or exclusionary citizenship on democratic politics and the importance of domestic political systems and international processes of norm diffusion for explaining divergent trajectories and regional trends. Equally important is the sociological perspective, which investigates the actual relevance of citizenship for the life situations of migrants or ethnic-kin minorities, as well as the attitudes of these immediately affected groups and of the general population towards the granting of new citizenships.

### ***Section 1: Citizenship identity and utility in global perspective***

The relation of citizenship to social and national identity is discussed in [Chapter 2 by Max Haller](#). In modern societies, many people belong to several different social circles. This contributes to their particular identity although it may also require considerable effort to develop a coherent personality. A complex, multiple identity – including particular gender, familial, occupational, religious, ethnic and other identities – is a characteristic of many people today. National identity is one among these. In particular, those people may become aware of it who are moving from one country to another or who are born to immigrant parents. Migrants will feel close to their countries of both origin and destination and therefore will have an interest in dual citizenship. However, interest in citizenship also has an instrumental value: it provides the rights of a full citizen and the new passport might open access to many more states around the world than that of the country of origin. In order to test these hypotheses, the chapter presents data from

several surveys. Findings from the *International Social Survey Programme* (ISSP) show that people consider citizenship to be one of the most important characteristics of national identity. A study on immigrants in Austria from the former Yugoslavia and from Turkey confirms, as mentioned above, that most of them feel connected to their countries of both origin and destination. The chapter also discusses citizenship as a set of obligations, particularly concerning political participation. Here, the ISSP data clearly show that the general population also thinks in this way. A large majority considers participation in elections and paying taxes as basic duties of citizens. Even conscription is considered as important by half of the population in many countries.

In **Chapter 3, Rainer Bauböck** summarises the causes of the strong global trend towards the toleration of dual citizenship. He then focuses on the possible limits of dual citizenship and the reasons for resistance to it by some states. Bauböck specifically considers why the two largest states in terms of population – China and India – adhere to a policy of strict non-toleration of multiple citizenship out of security concerns and adversarial ideologies of national sovereignty. He also examines the Eastern European context, where policies of regional hegemony (by Russia) and the mobilisation of ethnic-kin minorities in the near-abroad for buttressing the domestic hegemony of political incumbents (in Hungary) have triggered counter-reactions against dual citizenship in neighbouring states. In so-called Western democracies, security concerns about terrorism have not led to a retreat from dual citizenship but have turned a second citizenship into a potential liability, as possessing it allows states to denationalise citizens whom they consider to be a threat. Finally, Bauböck considers whether the demand for and supply of dual citizenship might shrink if the hyperglobalisation dynamics since the 1990s were partly reversed in response to pandemics and the climate crisis.

In **Chapter 4, Peter Spiro** takes up the latter question from a long-term historical perspective. After analysing the period of global resistance against multiple nationality from the mid-nineteenth to the mid-twentieth century, he shows why the underlying concerns have gradually faded away in an increasingly interconnected state system. Spiro's other focus is on the changing meaning and value of citizenship for individuals in the context of globalisation. Picking up the topic of Haller's **Chapter 2**, Spiro argues that the rise of dual citizenship is ultimately due to a slow tectonic change in the nature of national identities, as constructed by states and experienced by individuals. The novel contribution of the chapter lies in Spiro's reflections on the future of dual citizenship in a post-Covid-19 world. He argues that states will not be inclined to reverse citizenship offers to extraterritorial groups – such as foreign investors and populations linked to the country through more distant lines of ancestry – as long as they receive benefits from them that might help them to cope better with the shocks of the economic crisis. At the same time, individual demand for additional passports of certain countries is likely to increase if these do not only serve to enhance geographic mobility or social prestige but also provide a kind of global health insurance in case of pandemics.

**Yossi Harpaz' Chapter 5** builds on his recent book *Citizenship 2.0* (Harpaz 2019). It provides an empirical analysis of the global toleration of dual citizenship and examines its strategic uses by governments and individuals in a context of global inequality. Harpaz finds a steep rise – from 28 per cent in 1990 to 75 per cent in 2016 – in the number of states that accept dual citizenship in cases of the voluntary acquisition of a foreign nationality or of the acquisition of the country's own citizenship by naturalisation. Through offering a second citizenship, states aim to include international migrants, extraterritorial populations linked to a country of origin through ancestry or ethnicity and global investors. The benefits that states hope to accrue through these policies include symbolic, demographic, electoral or economic values. On the demand side, the chapter argues that global inequality explains patterns in the acquisition and use of dual citizenship. Harpaz categorises states into first, second and third tiers according to the value of their citizenship for individuals. He demonstrates that demand for an additional first-tier citizenship is highest in second-tier countries, which include most of Latin America and Eastern Europe as well as Israel. Case studies in Mexico, Serbia and Israel reveal three main motivations for obtaining a second passport: enhanced mobility, the signaling of social status and the mitigation of risks associated with a current residence and citizenship.

### ***Section 2: Dual citizenship in comparative perspective***

The second section of the book discusses European cases that illustrate different motivations for states to accept or promote dual citizenship as well as the impact that this option has on immigrants' motivations to acquire the citizenship of their host country.

In **Chapter 6, Floris Peters and Maarten Vink** address the latter question based on the quantitative analysis of Dutch data on naturalisation. The Netherlands presents a somewhat unique case where dual citizenship for immigrants was tolerated for several years in the 1990s before again becoming restricted. Peters and Vink use individual-level register data and apply a Cox proportional hazards regression to analyse naturalisation propensity among immigrants who could naturalise with or without dual citizenship. The opportunity to retain a previous citizenship in naturalisation procedures depends on both the country of origin and the host country accepting such an outcome. Peters and Vink therefore combine information about the changing regulation in the Netherlands with information on the origin-country toleration of expatriate dual citizenship rules around the world. They find that the opportunity to hold dual citizenship significantly raises the propensity of immigrants to naturalise – a higher incentive which remains strong for almost two decades after migration to the host country. A second important finding of this study is that the opportunity to retain a previous citizenship especially affects naturalisation rates among immigrants from the EU and highly developed third countries. This shows that migrants are particularly reluctant to renounce high-value citizenships.

In highly developed countries of immigration, dual citizenship has been discussed mostly as a tool for immigrant integration; in migrant sending countries all over the world it is seen as a way to retain legal ties with emigrants. By contrast, **Szabolcs Pogonyi's Chapter 7** shows how Eastern European states have used external dual-citizenship policies as instruments in the toolbox of postcommunist nation-building projects. In Eastern Europe, newly restored states as well as countries whose international borders have not been involved in recent territorial changes, offered citizenship for their ethnic kin living beyond the borders in order to strengthen the claims of the titular majorities over the state, creating or strengthening thereby ethnocentric regimes. Pogonyi provides an overview of kin-citizenship policies in Eastern Europe and argues that the inclusion of non-resident populations in the demos as part of fast-track nation-building generates internal democratic deficits and diplomatic skirmishes but rarely results in outright interstate conflict. The chapter also points out that individuals are mostly interested in kin-citizenship for reasons that have little to do with governments' transborder nationalist projects.

**Chapter 8 by Eva Ersbøll** provides a case study that focuses on the citizenship policy process. Denmark is a country that has only recently reformed its citizenship law to allow for dual citizenship. Eva Ersbøll analyses this change from a legal and political perspective. The chapter starts with a historical analysis of Denmark's stance on dual citizenship that shows how, in particular, other Nordic countries' reforms towards the toleration of dual citizenship at the beginning of the new millennium had a lasting impact on debates in Denmark. Ersbøll refutes claims in some of the comparative literature that a key argument for the adoption of the Danish reform was the securitisation of migration and citizenship and the fact that tolerating dual citizenship allows the revocation of the citizenship of terrorists without rendering them stateless. Denmark's policy reversal came at the end of a much longer process that involved prior changes in other Nordic countries and changes in the composition of the Danish government. A detailed account of policy initiatives and stances by different parties shows how resistance to the reform came from a national-conservative and anti-immigration party that provided parliamentary support for minority Liberal-Conservative governments. When an alternative government coalition, led by the Social Democrats, emerged in the 2011 elections, parliament embarked on a path to reform that was finally adopted in December 2014 and that came into force under a new Liberal government in 2015.

In a similar vein as the chapter on Denmark, in **Chapter 9, Günther Pallaver and Guido Denicolò** examine the case of Italy, with a focus on the evolution of its citizenship law. They show that initial hostility towards dual citizenship after the *Risorgimento* gave way to a desire to maintain links with the large diaspora of Italian emigrants already in the first basic citizenship law of 1912. Including Italians abroad as citizens across several generations was fully compatible with an ethno-cultural conception of national identity and has been a dominant concern ever since. Italy also permits the so-called *italiani*

*oriundi* – i.e., persons of Italian ancestry living permanently abroad – to regain Italian citizenship if they can prove that none of their direct ancestors has explicitly renounced it. The second group of residents abroad for whom Italy promotes the restoration of citizenship are ethnic Italians in the neighbouring territories of Slovenia and Croatia, which belonged to Italy before the peace treaties after World War II. Unlike for the *italiani oriundi*, these latter groups must establish a certain familiarity with the Italian culture and language. The active promotion of dual citizenship for them puts Italy in an awkward position when protesting against plans to award Austrian citizenship to German-speakers in South Tyrol (see [Chapter 14](#)). The final category discussed in the chapter is non-Italian immigrants whose numbers have been growing substantially since the 1990s. Although dual citizenship is tolerated in residence-based naturalisations, these are comparatively rare. Initiatives by the centre-left to introduce moderate forms of *ius soli* or *ius culturae* (naturalisation based on years of schooling) for the second generation have not been successful thus far.

### **Section 3: Austrian citizenship at home and abroad**

The third section discusses (dual) citizenship in Austria. This country is a particularly interesting case and, in some ways, also a paradigmatic one. First, it has one of the highest levels of immigration in Europe. In 2018, 1,385 million foreign citizens were living in Austria, which amounts to 15.7 per cent of the resident population.<sup>1</sup> This is – with the exception of small countries whose large shares of foreign population can be explained by particular contextual reasons<sup>2</sup> – the highest proportion within the European Union. Germany (11.7 per cent), the United Kingdom (9.7) and France (7.0) have considerably lower shares than Austria in this regard. Second, among comparable states, Austria is also quite unique in its particularly low naturalisation rates. They have been frozen at 7 out of 1,000 foreign residents acquiring Austrian citizenship per year since 2010.<sup>3</sup> This low naturalisation rate and Austria's persistently hostile attitude towards dual citizenship, which creates a major disincentive for naturalisation, are surprising given that its trans-

<sup>1</sup> Eurostat figures. Available at: [https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/images/f/fd/Ausl%C3%A4ndische\\_Bev%C3%B6lkerung\\_nach\\_Staatsangeh%C3%B6rigkeitsgruppe%2C\\_1\\_Januar\\_2018\\_FP2019-de.png](https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/images/f/fd/Ausl%C3%A4ndische_Bev%C3%B6lkerung_nach_Staatsangeh%C3%B6rigkeitsgruppe%2C_1_Januar_2018_FP2019-de.png) (accessed 08 December 2020).

<sup>2</sup> Luxembourg has an exceptionally high rate of 47.8 per cent foreigners because the Grand Duchy, with its large EU offices and branches of international corporations, offers tens of thousands of jobs for highly skilled people from nearby countries and because its main source of low-skilled labour migration since the 1960s is Portugal, which is an EU member state; Estonia has a high proportion (14.9 per cent) because of its ethnic Russian population; Malta (14.1) and Cyprus (17.3 per cent) are small island states with large diasporas that attract wealthy investors and retirement migrants.

<sup>3</sup> See [https://www.statistik.at/web\\_de/statistiken/menschen\\_und\\_gesellschaft/bevoelkerung/einbuengerungen/index.html](https://www.statistik.at/web_de/statistiken/menschen_und_gesellschaft/bevoelkerung/einbuengerungen/index.html) (accessed 08 December 2020).

formation into an immigration country was already noted in the early 1990s (Fassmann and Münz 1995). To investigate the reasons for this discrepancy between demographic fact and collective identities, reflected both in Austrian politics and in the attitudes of the populations, is therefore of more general interest.

In **Chapter 10, Rainer Bauböck and Gerd Valchars** focus on Austria's rejection of dual citizenship. The chapter takes into account the history of citizenship and the international conventions that Austria has joined and presents a detailed analysis of those provisions in Austrian law that are relevant for dual citizenship. The authors find that Austria has accepted dual citizenship in the case of acquisition by birth but still clings to a general prohibition of dual citizenship in both the naturalisation of immigrants and when Austrians voluntarily acquire another citizenship. The chapter addresses the conundrum as to why Austria has resisted the global trend towards toleration, although none of the explanations for such resistance discussed by Bauböck in **Chapter 3** apply to the Austrian case. It concludes that politicised hostility towards dual citizenship for one particular group of immigrants – those from Turkey – seems to have blocked debates about reform. The chapter ends with sketching pathways to policy change and a menu of legislative reforms that build on principles already recognised in Austrian citizenship legislation and that could lead to the toleration of dual citizenship.

**Chapter 11, by Stephan Marik-Lebeck**, examines – from a statistical perspective – the gap between Austria's demography as an immigration society and its low rates of citizenship acquisition. Marik-Lebeck asks how large the stock is of people among the country's resident foreign citizens who, in principle, would be entitled to apply for Austrian citizenship under the present legal conditions for its acquisition. The chapter first shows that Austria's naturalisation rates are, in fact, among the lowest in the EU (together with Denmark and the Czech Republic). Apart from the requirement to renounce a previous citizenship, the most important legal preconditions for naturalisation in Austria are a 10-year period of residence, sufficient income and proof of a sufficient knowledge of the German language. The chapter uses Central Residence Registration data to estimate the numbers of foreign residents potentially eligible for naturalisation. It takes into account information about duration of residence, age, citizenship of origin and region of residence in Austria and calculates how much the share of foreign residents in Austria could be reduced if EU/EFTA citizens and migrants from other countries who meet the age and residence requirements became Austrian citizens. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the reasons for the low uptake of citizenship. Among these are the weak incentives for EU citizens to apply for Austrian citizenship because this would not add significantly to their rights (except that of voting in national elections), the strict requirements that naturalisation applicants must have had a sufficient and steady income for several years and the restrictive Austrian law concerning dual citizenship.

A core assumption about naturalisation in the literature is that it supports the social, cultural and political integration of immigrants. There are several studies on this issue

for other countries and, in **Chapter 12, Raimund Haindorfer and Max Haller** investigate this hypothesis for the case of Austria. They compare the integration outcomes of immigrants with and without Austrian citizenship, controlling for other relevant factors (such as the length of stay in Austria). Their analysis is not based on panel data but they investigate more aspects of integration than other studies have done thus far. They look at four aspects of (social) integration in particular: structural integration (employment), social integration (social contacts with Austrians and agreement to interethnic marriages), cultural integration (knowledge of German and overcoming traditional gender roles) and identificative integration (a sense of national belonging and an interest in Austrian events). Their multivariate statistical analysis of the data from a survey of immigrants from the former Yugoslavia and Turkey shows that naturalisation is correlated positively with integration on five out of seven indicators. No effect of naturalisation was found only for attitudes towards gender roles and an interest in Austrian affairs. Thus, their central hypothesis – that naturalisation will have a positive effect on integration outcomes in the host society – has been confirmed by their empirical findings. It is noteworthy that the literature on this phenomenon has examined whether there might be a reciprocal relation between naturalisation and integration – with well-integrated immigrants applying more frequently for naturalisation; however, in a recent study, an experimental research design has demonstrated that naturalisation itself has a causal effect as it is a catalyst for further integration (Hainmueller and Hangartner 2017).

Another group of people connected to Austria who might be interested in dual citizenship are Austrians living abroad. This is a considerable population, estimated at 580,000 persons – more than the inhabitants of some Austrian provinces. They are represented by Austrian Associations all over the world, which are coordinated by the World Association of Austrians Living Abroad (AÖWB). This latter association has carried out a mail survey among its 10,000 members in the design of which the editors of the present volume were involved. About 2,400 persons participated in the survey. They were asked about their attitudes towards the relevance of citizenship in general, towards attaining the citizenship of the country where they are living and towards dual citizenship. The results, which are presented in **Chapter 13 by Florian Gundl**, are unambiguous. Nearly all respondents consider citizenship in general and Austrian citizenship in particular to be very important. A large majority supports dual citizenship and many would be interested to acquire the citizenship of their country of residence. This is much more frequently the case for Austrian expatriates living in advanced Western nations in Europe and North America and much less so for those living in Asia, Africa and South America. This finding confirms the analysis by Harpaz in **Chapter 5** and by Peters and Vink in **Chapter 6** that interest in dual citizenship strongly depends on the perceived value of particular nationalities. Interest in dual citizenship is also more pronounced among those with a longer term of residence in their host country and for persons with

higher levels of education. Since the sample was somewhat biased toward this group, the survey results might overestimate, to some degree, the interest in dual citizenship among Austrian expatriates.

Dual citizenship policies sometimes aim to include not only migrants but also co-ethnic groups in neighbouring countries. As analysed by [Szabolcs Pogonyi in Chapter 7](#), this has been the case for several countries of Central Eastern Europe. In recent years, some political actors in South Tyrol and Austrian governments have proposed the idea of offering Austrian citizenship to German-speaking South Tyroleans in addition to their Italian one. The historical background for this offer was that some right-wing groups and political parties in Austria and in South Tyrol are uneasy with the political autonomy granted to the region by Italy, in spite of the fact that it assures cultural autonomy, a high level of self-government to the province and a quite peaceful coexistence between the German- and the Italian-language groups. In order to grasp the attitudes of South Tyroleans of both groups, a representative survey was carried out, asking about their interest in Austrian citizenship. The results were surprising even to the initiators of the survey and the authors of this volume's [Chapter 14, Max Haller and Hermann Atz](#). A large majority of the respondents were quite critical about this proposal, not only among the Italian-speakers but also among the intended beneficiaries – i.e., German-speaking South Tyroleans. Their rationale was that the exclusive conferral of Austrian citizenship to the German-speaking group would drive a wedge between the German- and Italian-speaking population. Most South Tyroleans identify both with their province and with Italy and they also maintain diversified contacts with Austria. However, only a minority thinks that the conferral of Austrian citizenship would contribute to an improvement in their relations with Austria. Thus, the conclusion from this study is clear: dual citizenship can be a very important asset for people affiliated, in social, economic and cultural terms, to two countries but, when bestowed upon ethnic-kin minorities, it could also become more of a disruptive than an integrative force.

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