

Chapter 6

Dual Citizenship Acceptance and Immigrant Naturalisation Propensity in the Netherlands: The Relevance of Origin- and Destination-Country Rules

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Abstract

There is ample evidence that the possibility of holding dual citizenship is a key predictor of immigrant naturalisation. Over past decades, both migrant origin and destination countries have liberalised rules with regards to dual citizenship. Nevertheless, the acceptance of dual citizenship remains contested and a few countries have gone against the global tide by (re-)introducing restrictions. In this chapter we investigate the role of dual citizenship acceptance in origin and destination countries for immigrants' propensity to naturalise in the Netherlands, in the period around the reintroduction of the renunciation requirement there in 1997. While a declining post-reform trend in the number of naturalisations has been widely observed, there is limited research on the heterogenous impact of dual citizenship acceptance. We use individual-level register data and apply a Cox proportional hazards regression to analyse the propensity to naturalise among immigrants who could naturalise with or without dual citizenship. We identify dual citizenship acceptance by combining the changing regulations in the Netherlands with information on origin-country citizenship rules around the world. We find that the propensity to naturalise is higher among those who can hold dual citizenship and remains so almost two decades after migration to the host country. We show that dual citizenship acceptance especially affects naturalisation rates among immigrants from EU and other highly developed countries.

1. Introduction

In a political agreement at the start of a new government period in 2017, the current governing coalition of the Netherlands stated its intention to “modernise Dutch citizenship law” by liberalising the opportunities for dual citizenship of future foreign-born immigrants and emigrants (Rijksoverheid 2017, 6). At present, Dutch citizenship law stipulates that a foreigner who acquires Dutch citizenship through naturalisation but does not automatically lose her or his original citizenship in the process is – barring exceptions – in principle required to renounce her or his other citizenship(s). This requirement is increasingly uncommon in the European Union (EU), where most countries have followed

the global trend of accepting dual citizenship (Vink et al. 2019, 370).¹ In this context, critics of the renunciation requirement in the Netherlands argue that naturalisation is an important step in the integration process of immigrants and that the possibility to retain the original citizenship upon naturalisation facilitates political integration by removing an important obstacle to citizenship acquisition.²

The literature on the propensity of immigrants to naturalise is relatively conclusive about the impact of dual citizenship toleration. Several studies show that citizenship acquisition is more likely if migrants are able to retain their original citizenship upon naturalisation (Jones-Correa 2001; Labussière and Vink 2020; Mazzolari 2009; Peters, Vink and Schmeets 2016; but see Helgertz and Bevelander 2017). This is generally explained through the notion of a cost–benefit calculation, the central paradigm in this field of literature since the 1990s (Yang 1994). From this perspective, renouncing the original citizenship – and the rights attached to it – constitutes a considerable cost to naturalisation. Yet what is less clear is to whom dual citizenship matters the most or how the opportunity to hold dual citizenship affects the speed at which the host-country citizenship is acquired. Drawing on life-course concepts and principles (Peters and Vink 2016), citizenship acquisition can be understood in a biographical sense, whereby the utility of citizenship is conditioned by migrants' individual, social and institutional circumstances. From that perspective, we argue that not being able to hold dual citizenship primarily constitutes an obstacle to naturalisation for those whose original passport is relatively valuable – such as migrants from the EU or from other highly developed countries (Bevelander et al. 2015; Vink et al. 2021). Moreover, we expect the relevance of the opportunity to hold dual citizenship to gradually diminish as migrants settle and build their lives in the host country.

In this chapter we focus on naturalisation propensity around a dual citizenship restriction that was reintroduced in the Netherlands in 1997. In November 1991, the Dutch government decided that it no longer required foreigners to renounce their other citizenships upon naturalisation. This unofficial toleration period came to an end in June 1997, when the requirement was reintroduced. Yet besides the destination-country context we also take into account the origin context and identify dual citizenship acceptance by combining the changing regulation in the Netherlands in 1997 with information on origin-country citizenship rules around the world. We do so because being able to naturalise while retaining the origin-country citizenship depends both on the legislation of the origin country – in terms of whether or not the citizenship is automatically lost

¹ The following 11 countries still have a renunciation requirement in the EU: Austria, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Germany, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Slovenia and Spain.

² See, for instance, Kamerstuk 16 947 (R1181), no. 27 and Kamerstuk 21 427, no. 3 (reprint), pp. 30–31.

upon voluntary renunciation and, if it is not, whether an individual is able to renounce this voluntarily – as well as on the changing citizenship policy in the Netherlands, which did not require migrants to renounce their citizenship of origin during the early 1990s – if they could – but did so from 1997 onwards. Hence, we identify dual citizenship acceptance dynamically – based on a combination of destination and origin regulations – and analyse the impact on the naturalisation propensity among immigrants. We use individual-level register data and apply a Cox proportional hazards regression to analyse the propensity to naturalise among immigrants who could do so with or without dual citizenship. Subsequently we explore impact heterogeneity for different groups based on the established cost–benefit framework in the literature and analyse the extent to which the opportunity to hold dual citizenship continues to matter as time in the host country passes.

The chapter starts with a brief outline of the history of the renunciation requirement in the Netherlands surrounding the Dutch toleration period. This is followed by a discussion of the data and research design and the results of the analysis. The paper concludes with a summary of the main findings and a reflection on their implications for the literature, as well as for policy-makers.

2. Institutional context

Dual citizenship has been controversial in the Netherlands over the past three decades and continues to be contested today. The traditional approach to dual citizenship in the Netherlands is a restrictive one, as reflected in the signature and ratification of the 1963 Strasbourg Convention on the Reduction of Cases of Multiple Nationality and in the Dutch Nationality Act (DNA) that has been in place since 1 January 1985 – see Van Oers, de Hart and Groenendijk (2013) for an overview of historical developments and current citizenship law in the Netherlands. In the Netherlands, on the one hand, a foreign national who acquires Dutch citizenship by option declaration (DNA, art. 6a(1))³ or naturalisation (DNA, art. 9(1)(b)) in principle is expected to renounce her or his other citizenship(s), unless she or he already automatically loses that citizenship or cannot reasonably be expected to do so; similarly, a Dutch citizen who voluntarily acquires another citizenship automatically loses Dutch citizenship, unless one of the exceptions indicated by the law applies (DNA, art. 15(1)(a)).

This restrictive approach in Dutch citizenship law is in line with an overall sceptical attitude towards dual citizenship among the electorate, although voters in the Netherlands appear more reluctant to accept dual citizenship among naturalising immigrants

³ The option declaration is a faster and less costly procedure, with fewer conditions, through which an individual can acquire Dutch citizenship by making a statement expressing that he or she “opts” for Dutch citizenship.

than among Dutch citizens naturalising abroad (Vink, Schmeets and Mennes 2019; cf. de Hart 2007, 92). At the same time, since the 1980s, immigrant groups and parties on the (centre-)left of the political spectrum in the Netherlands have pressured subsequent governments to liberalise their legal attitude towards dual citizenship. Two arguments were of crucial importance: equality and representation.

First, the single most important feature of the 1985 amendment of the DNA was the equal treatment of men and women. Whereas previously there were important gender-based restrictions, since 1985 Dutch women can independently transmit Dutch citizenship to their child, even if the husband of the women is a foreigner and the child will also acquire a foreign citizenship through him. As a result, dual citizenship became increasingly prevalent in the Netherlands; if this is allowed for children of mixed-citizenship parentage, then why still restrict this for naturalising immigrants?

Second, immigrant groups and their advocates have argued that dual citizenship restriction presents an obstacle to immigrant integration, given that the renunciation requirement constitutes an important deterrent to immigrant naturalisation (van den Bedem 1993, 31–35). While political rights were, to some extent, decoupled from citizenship in 1986 by granting resident non-citizens local voting rights, at the national level voting rights remained (and remain) tied to citizenship. Low naturalisation rates thus resulted in a significant representation gap in the Netherlands. When, at the end of the 1980s, the centre-right government at the time asked the Scientific Council for Government Policy to advise on immigrant integration policy, the Council advised liberalising dual-citizenship policy and allowing migrants to retain their original citizenship upon naturalisation in order to strengthen the legal standing of immigrants and improve opportunities for participation and integration (WRR 1989, 93–96; cf. Heijs 1995, 198–203).

The new centre-left coalition that took office in 1989 subsequently emphasised in its governing programme that immigrants in the Netherlands should be able to acquire Dutch citizenship “without much ado”⁴ and, in November 1991, after considerable parliamentary debate, the government decided to no longer require naturalising foreigners to renounce their other citizenship. The new policy, reflected in a ministerial recommendation (*circulaire*),⁵ only applied to immigrants; Dutch citizens continued to automatically lose their citizenship upon naturalisation abroad (Van Oers, de Hart and Groenendijk 2013, 16).

A proposal to formally amend the DNA and abolish the renunciation requirement was subsequently introduced in February 1993.⁶ However, the bill encountered increasing political resistance due to the fragile political basis of the original compromise and changing political coalitions. The main opposition, from the right and centre-right,

⁴ Kamerstuk 21 132, nr. 8, vergaderjaar 1989–1990, p. 43.

⁵ Staatscourant 1992, no. 25.

⁶ Wetsvoorstel 23 029 (R1461).

focused on the idea that the possession of multiple citizenships would result in ambiguous loyalties and undermine the socio-cultural integration of groups already at risk of segregation within society.⁷ The bill's progress through parliament was stalled by these disagreements and, crucially, failed to be approved by the Senate in November 1996, resulting in its withdrawal. Subsequently the renunciation requirement was reinstated in June 1997, again by means of a ministerial recommendation, including a new provision that foreigners who were married to a Dutch citizen were not required to renounce their other citizenship.⁸ As before, persons benefiting from international protection, those who automatically lose their citizenship due to the nationality legislation of the country of the other citizenship, as well as those who are not able or cannot reasonably be expected to renounce their other citizenship were also exempt. These exemptions remained in place when a major revision of the DNA was introduced in 2003 and continue to be applicable today.⁹ Based on statistics covering the period 2007–2011, around two-thirds of persons (66 per cent) who acquire Dutch citizenship via naturalisation or option declaration are estimated to be able to hold dual citizenship (Ministerie van Veiligheid en Justitie 2012).¹⁰

Figure 6.1 displays the aggregate citizenship acquisition rate in the Netherlands through naturalisation or option over the past three decades. This suggests a substantial impact of the temporary liberalisation and subsequent restriction of dual citizenship, as has been frequently observed by others (de Hart 2007, 15–16; Entzinger 2006, 126–127; van Oers, de Hart and Groenendijk 2013, 17–18). The number of naturalisations increased sharply during the 1990s to over 80,000 in 1996, subsequently decreasing again in several waves, only to stabilise at around 30,000 per year by about 2003. However, since the Netherlands in the 1990s also observed a strong increase in the number of asylum-seekers, who are generally associated with high naturalisation rates (van Oers, de Hart and Groenendijk 2013, 18), micro-level analysis is required to estimate the magnitude and heterogeneity of the effect of dual-citizenship policy.


⁷ Kamerstuk 23 029 (R1461), no. 26a, pp. 1–2.

⁸ Staatscourant 1997, no. 128. This exception reflected the Second Protocol to the 1963 Strasbourg Convention, which was adopted in 1993 and had been signed by the Netherlands and ratified in 1996.

⁹ See here for a complete outline of applicable rules with regards to the renunciation requirement, including a list of applicable rules by country: <https://ind.nl/en/Pages/Renouncing-your-current-nationality.aspx>.

¹⁰ This estimate is based on the observation that around 34 per cent of persons acquiring Dutch citizenship cannot hold dual citizenship, either because they automatically lose their citizenship due to home-country regulations upon acquiring Dutch citizenship (18 per cent) or because a renunciation procedure was started in the Netherlands (16 per cent). Note that some persons may have been exempt from the renunciation requirement at a later stage if renunciation turned out to be impossible or to have detrimental economic consequences in the origin country).

Figure 6.1. Number of persons acquiring Dutch citizenship by naturalisation or through option declaration, 1990–2018




3. Research design

3.1 Data and sample

To study the impact of dual citizenship on immigrant naturalisation, this paper draws on administrative data from the System of Social Statistical Datasets. Developed by Statistics Netherlands, this database provides linked micro-level information from a variety of sources, including municipalities, the tax authorities and the Immigration and Naturalisation Service. The data include all legally registered individuals in the Netherlands – for more information, see Bakker, van Rooijen and van Toor (2014). These individual-level register data are linked to country-level information on expatriate dual citizenship policy from the MACIMIDE Global Expatriate Dual Citizenship Dataset (Vink, de Groot and Luk 2015). This dataset charts the rules of nearly all countries in the world since 1960 with regards to the loss or renunciation of citizenship after a citizen voluntarily acquires that of another state. Figure 6.2 provides an overview of the various origin-country policies that the migrants in our Dutch sample (see below) are subject to.

The research population consists of all foreign-born individuals who migrated to the Netherlands between 1985 and 1997. We track these individuals from 1995 to 2003, with yearly observations on the first of January of each year (observations = 865,224; N = 294,685). Migrants in the sample thus fell under the DNA of 1985 before its revi-

Figure 6.2. Stepwise overview of the criteria by which the moment of eligibility for naturalisation is determined



†Include years of cohabitation prior to the registered partnership.

sion in 2003 and the observation period includes the years both before and after the reintroduction of the renunciation requirement. We restrict the sample to foreign-born individuals both of whose parents were born abroad and select only migrants who are 18 years or older at the moment of migration. We only observe migrants once they are eligible for naturalisation. The most important requirements for naturalisation are as follows: an applicant needs to


- be at least 18 years of age;
- be in possession of a non-temporary residence permit;
- have primary residence on the territory of the Netherlands for a period of five years prior to the request for naturalisation (note that there is an exception to the residence requirement – but not primary residence – for applicants who have lived in a stable relationship with a Dutch citizen – see Figure 6.3 for details);

- pose no danger to public order, good morals or security in the Netherlands; and
- be considered sufficiently integrated into Dutch society based on his or her mastery of the Dutch language or – if residing in the Dutch Antilles or Aruba – the language commonly spoken on the island besides Dutch.

While migrants normally become eligible for naturalisation after five years of residence, they are exempt from this requirement when either:

- s/he has been the registered partner of a Dutch citizen and has cohabited with this partner for three years and the partner is a Dutch citizen at the moment of application;
- s/he has resided for three years in the Netherlands and has cohabited with a partner for three years and the partner is a Dutch citizen at the moment of application;¹¹ or
- s/he is stateless and has resided in the Netherlands for three years.

Figure 6.3. Immigrant cohorts 1985–1997, by dual citizenship regulation of country of origin (in percentages)



¹¹ While migrants who are in a registered partnership with a Dutch citizen prior to migration to the Netherlands can be eligible in less than three years after migration, Dutch register data do not include information to identify such instances.

In line with these criteria, the moment of eligibility is dynamically determined as either three, four or five years after migration (based on a residence requirement of five years or three in the case of an exception). The stepwise criteria by which the moment of eligibility is determined are outlined in Figure 6.3. See Table 6.1 in Annex 2 for descriptive statistics on the sample.

3.2 Empirical strategy

Our identification strategy is based on a Cox proportional hazards regression model. These models allow the estimation of duration until an event of interest, in this case naturalisation. The main econometric equation is as follows:

$$h(t) = h_0(t) \exp (bx + Bz(t))$$

where $h(t)$ is the hazard function at time t , determined by the baseline hazard at time t when all predictors are equal to zero ($h_0(t)$) and the exponential function of the time-constant (x_1, x_2, x_p) and time-varying ($z_1(t), z_2(t), z_p(t)$) predictors. Note that the latter predictors have an effect that depends on their values at time t . Due to our annual observations, the model constitutes a discrete-time survival analysis, where all characteristics are recorded within yearly intervals.

The dependent variable is naturalisation, measured dichotomously as possession of Dutch citizenship. The most important (time-varying) predictor is whether or not an individual loses or has to renounce her/his original citizenship when naturalising in the Netherlands. This is measured with a dummy that is set to unity when, based on citizenship policies in both the origin and host country at time t , a migrant does not automatically lose her/his citizenship upon naturalisation and is not required to renounce or cannot voluntarily renounce it (and hence is not required to do so). Conversely, it has value zero if a migrant automatically loses her/his citizenship or is required to renounce it upon naturalisation and can do so. Control variables include gender, age at migration, partner status and the citizenship of the partner, having minor children, the highest level of education, originating from an EU member state, geographic origin regions and migrant cohorts.

4. Results

4.1 Main effect

The drop in naturalisations in the Netherlands after 1997 has often been associated with the change in dual-citizenship policy (de Hart 2007, 15–16; Entzinger 2006, 126–127; van Oers, de Hart and Groenendijk 2013, 17–18). Yet not all migrants would have to renounce their original citizenship as a result of this policy change, either because they fell under an exception to the requirement or because they could not lose their original

citizenship due to the origin-country citizenship policy. This is captured in the dynamic dual-citizenship variable, which takes into account policies in both the origin and the host country over time.

Figure 6.4 reveals that migrants who do not lose or cannot renounce their original citizenship upon naturalisation are 12 percentage points more likely to naturalise than their counterparts who lose or have to renounce it, all else being constant. This has been frequently confirmed in the literature and can be explained through the notion of a cost–benefit framework (Labussière and Vink 2020; Mazzolari 2009; Peters, Vink and Schmeets 2016). What is less-well known is the extent to which the opportunity to hold dual citizenship remains important over time, as migrants settle and build their lives in the host country.

Figure 6.5 shows the hazard ratio of migrants who do not lose their original citizenship upon naturalisation compared to those who do by years since migration. While the difference becomes smaller over time, it remains statistically significant even 18 years after migration. This suggests – in line with recent research on second-generation immigrants in the Netherlands (Labussière and Vink 2020) – that restrictions on dual citizenship do not so much delay but, rather, disincentivise migrants from naturalisation altogether, at least during the initial decades after migration.

Figure 6.4. Heterogenous effects of the impact of losing or having to renounce the original citizenship on naturalisation rates among immigrants across different subsamples. Dots denote point estimates, and horizontal lines correspond to 95% confidence intervals.





Figure 6.5. Hazard ratio dual citizenship acceptance on immigrant naturalisation propensity (reference category = immigrant loses or has to renounce origin citizenship) by years since migration




4.2 Effect heterogeneity

Previous analyses demonstrate that dual citizenship acceptance has a significant and substantive impact on the propensity to naturalise. To whom, however, does dual citizenship matter the most? Building on the cost–benefit framework informing much of the citizenship acquisition literature (Yang 1994), research shows that a renunciation requirement constitutes an obstacle to naturalisation (Helgertz and Bevelander 2017; Labussière and Vink 2020; Mazzolari 2009; Peters, Vink and Schmeets 2016). Yet from the same theoretical perspective, one could argue that this will be particularly true for migrants whose original citizenship is relatively valuable¹² such as migrants from the EU or other highly developed countries (Bevelander et al. 2015). We thus perform subgroup analyses for migrants from the EU and associated states with free movement of persons,¹³ as well as for migrants from countries above or below the median Human Development Index (World Bank 2018) score in the sample (Figure 6.4 – see also Table 6.2 in Annex 2).

¹² See the Quality of Nationality Index (Kochenov and Lindenboom 2020) for an overview.

¹³ See Annex 1 for details on the operationalisation.

Figure 6.6. Hazard ratio dual citizenship acceptance on immigrant naturalisation propensity (reference category = immigrant loses or has to renounce origin citizenship), by years since migration, for immigrants from EU/non-EU (left graph) and high-/low-HDI (right graph) countries of origin



In line with the cost–benefit framework, both migrants from the EU and other countries with a high HDI score are particularly affected by the policy change. More specifically, the difference in naturalisation propensity between migrants from the EU who do not lose or cannot renounce their original citizenship compared to those who would lose or are expected to renounce it is 24 percentage points – but only 9 among those from non-EU countries. A similar discrepancy is observed among those from highly and less-developed countries of origin, with a difference of 26 and 7 percentage points respectively. When analysing the extent to which the opportunity to hold dual citizenship continues to matter as migrants reside in the host country, we observe statistically significant differences in the propensity to naturalise during the first 15 years after migration. Subsequently, the confidence intervals of migrants from EU and non-EU countries of origin start to overlap, whereas migrants from highly developed countries continue to have a higher propensity to naturalise than their counterparts. More generally, the importance of retaining the original citizenship upon naturalisation decreases over time, especially among migrants for whom dual citizenship matters the most. Yet the gap in naturalisation propensity only closes slowly. Using a quasi-experimental design, Peters and Vink (2021) show that the heterogenous effect of dual citizenship policy change in the Netherlands and Sweden can be causally interpreted.

5. Conclusions

In this chapter, we build on a well-established literature on dual citizenship acceptance for immigrants' propensity to naturalise. Our findings demonstrate that immigrants in the Netherlands who cannot or are not expected to renounce their original citizenship upon naturalisation are 12 percentage points more likely to naturalise than their counterparts who lose or have to renounce it, all else being constant. Yet there is substantial heterogeneity in the extent to which dual citizenship matters between migrant groups. Drawing on a cost-benefit framework, we expect that dual citizenship acceptance matters particularly for migrants whose original citizenship is valuable and who thus stand to lose the most from its loss or renunciation. Consistent with that notion, we find that the relevance of dual citizenship is much more pronounced among migrants from the EU and associated countries with which the EU shares a freedom of movement regime, as well as among migrants from highly developed countries of origin. Finally, the difference in naturalisation propensity between those who can and those who cannot naturalise while keeping their original citizenship persists even after a substantial period in the host country has passed, suggesting that restrictive dual-citizenship policies disincentivise rather than delay naturalisation.¹⁴ While the naturalisation gap closes over time, particularly among those for whom dual citizenship matters the most, this process is slow.

These findings have implications for debates about the integration of migrants from both a political and a socio-economic perspective. Dual citizenship was unofficially tolerated in the Netherlands with a view to improving the political participation and legal standing of immigrants. From that viewpoint, the measure was a success, since it led to a dramatic increase in naturalisations, particularly among Turks and refugees (van Oers, de Hart and Groenendijk 2013, 15). The findings in this chapter show that the reintroduction of the renunciation requirement reversed that process, with long-term consequences to the detriment of the political representation of migrants at the national level. The potential ramifications extend beyond the political sphere, however. The extensive field of research on the so-called "citizenship premium" – the positive outcomes associated with naturalisation – suggests that citizenship acquisition has the potential to facilitate the integration of immigrants. Research in the Dutch context shows that naturalisation increases the probability of paid employment (Peters, Vink and Schmeets 2018) and income from labour (Peters, Schmeets and Vink 2019), particularly among migrants from economically less-developed countries of origin, who face structural obstacles in the labour market and for whom the host-country citizenship is a valuable asset to mitigate their disadvantaged position (Hainmueller, Hangartner and Ward 2019). Positive out-

¹⁴ A recent comparative study shows that this pattern also holds true in the context of liberalising dual-citizenship policy in Sweden (Vink et al. 2021).

comes are not just limited to the labour market; naturalisation increases the probability of homeownership by signalling creditworthiness and attenuating ethnic discrimination in the housing market (Peters 2019). The potential boost that the host-country citizenship might offer to facilitate full participation and integration is lost for those who are disincentivised to naturalise due to the renunciation requirement.

Debates around dual citizenship in the Netherlands remain very much alive today, especially – but by no means exclusively – in the context of Brexit. Pushed by expat communities in the UK and elsewhere around the world, the current government coalition indicated in its governing programme of October 2017 that it planned to introduce a liberalisation of dual citizenship (Rijksoverheid 2017, 6; see also Boffey 2017). However, as of yet, no progress has been made on this proposal and it remains to be seen when, if at all, the Netherlands will finally align itself with the global trend of dual citizenship acceptance. The results of the analysis presented in this chapter suggest that this restrictive policy significantly and substantially affects naturalisation rates and thus political representation among immigrants in the Netherlands.

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Annex 1. Operationalisation of variables

Notes on the operationalisation of some of the covariates:

- *Years since migration*: due to the annual observations on 01 January of each year, the first observation of each individual is, in most cases, labelled as zero, unless a migrant came to the Netherlands on 01 January.
- *Partner*: we distinguish between migrants with no registered partner on the one hand and those with, respectively, either a native partner, a foreign-born naturalised partner or a foreign-born non-naturalised partner. We distinguish the partner by citizenship status in order to capture household dynamics of naturalisation, as migrants often naturalise together (Helgertz and Bevelander 2017; Peters, Vink and Schmeets 2016).
- *Highest achieved level of education*: operationalised as follows: individuals with a low education level received only primary or lower-secondary education. Individuals with a medium education level include those with upper-secondary, post-secondary and high vocational education; those with a high educational level finished a postgraduate education or higher. While the level of education technically varies over time within individuals, variation in the host country among foreign-born individuals who migrated after the age of 18 is minimal. We thus focus on the highest achieved education. Information on education is missing for a substantial group of individuals in the Netherlands (51 per cent), for whom we include a separate category labelled “education unknown”.
- *EU*: binary variable capturing whether (1) or not (0) in a particular year, a country is a member state of the European Union or one of the associated states with which the EU shared a free movement regime: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom (EU) + Iceland, Norway (1994: EFTA/EEA) and Liechtenstein (1995: EFTA/EEA).
- *HDI*: based on the Human Development Index, HDI is a three-dimensional measurement of the socio-economic conditions in a country, based on indicators for health, knowledge and standard of living. The composite index provides a score from 0 to 1, where a higher score equals greater development (World Bank 2018). This is dichotomised around the median of the sample into low and high HDI.
- *Dual citizenship*: information is derived from the MACIMIDE Global Expatriate Dual Citizenship Database (Vink, de Groot and Luk 2015), which provides detailed information on nearly all countries in the world over time regarding the loss or renunciation of citizenship after a citizen of a state voluntarily acquires the citizenship of another state.

Annex 2. Descriptive statistics and regression models**Table 6.1. Descriptive statistics, cohorts 1985–1997**

Naturalised	Yes	63.73
	No	36.27
Gender	Male	42.28
	Female	57.72
Age at migration	18–30	64.72
	31–40	23.95
	41–50	8.35
	50+	2.98
Partner	No partner	22.57
	Foreign-born foreign partner	27.60
	Foreign-born Dutch partner	22.26
	Native partner	27.57
Minor children	Yes	62.39
	No	37.61
Highest level of education	Low	32.77
	Middle	15.34
	High	9.91
	Unknown	41.97
Origin dual citizenship policy	Automatic loss	31.60
	Cannot renounce	18.98
	No automatic loss and can renounce	49.42
EU country of origin	Yes	25.63
	No	74.37
Origin regions	Europe	33.44
	North America and Oceania	2.74
	South America and Caribbean	6.48
	Africa	23.28
	Asia	8.19
	Middle East	25.87
Human Development Index	High	52.14
	Low	47.86
Immigration year	1985	4.83
	1986	6.34
	1987	7.07
	1988	8.07
	1989	9.06
	1990	9.56
	1991	8.56

1992	7.85
1993	8.05
1994	5.65
1995	8.79
1996	9.03
1997	7.14

N=294,685 Obs=685,224

Source: Statistics Netherlands

Table 6.2. Cox proportional hazard regression on the risk of naturalisation, cohorts 1985–1997.

	Main model			EU			Non-EU			High HDI			Low HDI		
	Hazard ratio	Clustered standard errors													
Dual citizenship															
Does not lose or cannot renounce	1.120 ***	0.012	1.235 ***	0.015	1.086 ***	0.012	1.256 ***	0.013	1.069 ***	0.010	1.069 ***	0.010	1.069 ***	0.010	0.010
Loses or has to renounce	ref.	ref.	ref.												
Gender															
Male	0.933 ***	0.004	1.223 ***	0.034	0.912 ***	0.004	1.158 ***	0.006	0.899 ***	0.004	0.899 ***	0.004	0.899 ***	0.004	0.004
Female	ref.	ref.	ref.												
Age at migration															
18-30	1.055 ***	0.005	1.170 ***	0.034	1.087 ***	0.006	1.096 ***	0.007	1.045 ***	0.007	1.045 ***	0.007	1.045 ***	0.007	0.007
31-40	1.031 ***	0.008	1.825 ***	0.071	1.049 ***	0.009	1.152 ***	0.012	0.925 ***	0.012	0.925 ***	0.012	0.925 ***	0.012	0.012
41-50	1.071 ***	0.013	3.151 ***	0.148	1.081 ***	0.014	1.276 ***	0.019	0.986	0.019	0.986	0.021	0.986	0.021	0.021
51+	ref.	ref.	ref.												
Partner															
No partner	0.380 ***	0.003	0.192 ***	0.011	0.361 ***	0.003	0.329 ***	0.004	0.357 ***	0.004	0.357 ***	0.004	0.357 ***	0.004	0.004
Foreign-born foreign partner	1.562 ***	0.008	2.321 ***	0.103	1.671 ***	0.009	1.763 ***	0.013	1.718 ***	0.013	1.718 ***	0.014	1.718 ***	0.014	0.014
Foreign-born Dutch partner	1.126 ***	0.008	0.838 ***	0.025	1.181 ***	0.008	0.586 ***	0.006	1.383 ***	0.006	1.383 ***	0.006	1.383 ***	0.006	0.006
Native partner	ref.	ref.	ref.												
Minor children															
Yes	1.034 ***	0.005	1.013 ***	0.027	1.039 ***	0.005	1.120 ***	0.008	1.033 ***	0.008	1.033 ***	0.008	1.033 ***	0.008	0.008
No	ref.	ref.	ref.												
Highest level of education															
Low	1.227 ***	0.007	0.915 *	0.036	1.303 ***	0.008	1.110 ***	0.009	1.258 ***	0.011	1.258 ***	0.011	1.258 ***	0.011	0.011
Middle	1.210 ***	0.009	0.828 ***	0.035	1.324 ***	0.010	1.005	0.010	1.369 ***	0.010	1.369 ***	0.010	1.369 ***	0.010	0.010
High	1.011 *	0.005	0.606 ***	0.021	1.031 ***	0.006	0.784 ***	0.006	1.028 ***	0.006	1.028 ***	0.006	1.028 ***	0.006	0.007
Unknown	ref.	ref.	ref.												

t: Includes a control for EU country of origin, origin regions and immigration year.
 *: p < 0.05
 ***: p < 0.001
 Source: Statistics Netherlands.